_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
  11
  12 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner};
  13 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance};
  14 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  15 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
  16 use crate::events::bump_transaction::BumpTransactionEvent;
  17 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
  18 use crate::ln::channel;
  19 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
  20 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelManager, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
  21 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
  22 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
  23 use crate::util::crypto::sign;
  24 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
  25 use crate::util::test_utils;
  26
  27 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
  28 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  29 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
  31 use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, Script, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime, Witness};
  32 use bitcoin::util::sighash::SighashCache;
  33
  34 use crate::prelude::*;
  35
  36 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  37
  38 #[test]
  39 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
  40         // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
  41         // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
  42         // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
  43         // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
  44         // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
  45         // HTLC.
  46         //
  47         // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
  48         //
  49         // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
  50         // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
  51         //
  52         // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
  53         // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
  54         // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
  55         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
  56         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
  57         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
  58         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  59
  60         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
  61         let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
  62
  63         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
  64         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
  65                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
  66         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
  67
  68         let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
  69
  70         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  71         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
  72         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
  73
  74         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  75         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
  76         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  77
  78         // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
  79         // transaction for nodes[1].
  80         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
  81         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  82         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
  83         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
  84         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
  85
  86         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
  87         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
  88         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  89         let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
  90
  91         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
  92         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
  93         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
  94 }
  95
  96 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction) {
  97         let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
  98         assert_eq!(spendable.len(), 1);
  99         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 100                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 101                 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 102                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 103                 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
 104         } else { panic!(); }
 105 }
 106
 107 #[test]
 108 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
 109         // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
 110         // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
 111         // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
 112         // confirmations.
 113         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 114         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 115         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 116         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 117
 118         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
 119
 120         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
 121
 122         // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
 123         // before forwarding.
 124         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
 125         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
 126
 127         // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
 128         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
 129
 130         // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
 131         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
 132         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 133         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 134         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 135
 136         let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 137         assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
 138         check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
 139
 140         // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
 141         // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
 142         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 143         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 144         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 145
 146         // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
 147         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
 148         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 149         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 150
 151         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 152         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
 153 }
 154
 155 #[test]
 156 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
 157         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
 158         // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
 159         // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
 160         // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
 161         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 162         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 163         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 164         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 165
 166         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 167                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 168         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 169         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 170
 171         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 172         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 173
 174         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 175                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000
 176                 }],
 177                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 178         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
 179                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 180
 181         nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 182         let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 183         nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
 184         let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 185         nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
 186
 187         let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 188         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
 189         let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 190         nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
 191         let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 192         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
 193         let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 194         assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
 195
 196         let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 197         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
 198         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
 199
 200         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 201         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 202
 203         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 204         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 205
 206         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 207         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 208
 209         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 210                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000,
 211                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 212                 }],
 213                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 214         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 215                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1000,
 216                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 217                 }],
 218                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 219
 220         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 221         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 222
 223         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 224                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 225         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 226                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 227
 228         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 229         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 230
 231         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 232         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 233 }
 234
 235 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
 236         v.sort_unstable();
 237         v
 238 }
 239
 240 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
 241 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
 242 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
 243 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
 244         let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 245         let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 246         eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
 247         assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
 248         assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
 249 }
 250
 251 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
 252         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
 253         // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
 254         // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
 255         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 256         if prev_commitment_tx {
 257                 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 258                 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 259                 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 260                 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
 261                 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
 262         }
 263         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 264         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 265         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 266
 267         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 268                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 269         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 270         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 271
 272         // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
 273         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
 274         // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
 275         // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
 276         let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
 277         // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
 278         let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
 279
 280         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 281
 282         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 283         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 284
 285         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
 286         let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 287                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 288                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 289                 payment_hash,
 290         };
 291         let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 292                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 293                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 294                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 295         };
 296         let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 297                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 298                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 299                 payment_hash,
 300         };
 301         let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 302                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 303                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 304                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 305         };
 306         let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 307                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 308                 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 309                 payment_hash,
 310                 payment_preimage,
 311         };
 312         let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 313                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 314                 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 315                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 316                 payment_preimage: timeout_payment_preimage,
 317         };
 318
 319         // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
 320         // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
 321         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 322                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 323                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 324                 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 325                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 326         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 327                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 328                 }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 329                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 330
 331         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
 332         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 333         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
 334
 335         let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 336         // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
 337         // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
 338         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
 339         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 340         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
 341
 342         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
 343         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 344         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
 345
 346         if prev_commitment_tx {
 347                 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
 348                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
 349                 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
 350                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
 351                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 352                 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 353                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
 354                 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 355                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 356                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
 357                 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 358                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 359         }
 360
 361         // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
 362         // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
 363         let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 364                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
 365                                 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
 366                                 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
 367                                 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
 368                                 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
 369                                 // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
 370                                 chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) +
 371                                                                 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
 372                                                                 channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 373                 }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
 374         if !prev_commitment_tx {
 375                 a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
 376         }
 377         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
 378                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 379         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 380                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
 381                 }],
 382                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 383
 384         // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
 385         // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
 386         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 387         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 388         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 389
 390         let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 391         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 392         // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
 393         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 394         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 395         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 396         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 397         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 398         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 399
 400         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 401         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 402         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 403         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 404         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 405         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 406         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 407         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 408         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 409         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 410
 411         // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
 412         // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
 413         // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
 414         // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
 415         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 416         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 417
 418         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 419                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 420                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 421                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 422                 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 423                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 424         // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
 425         // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
 426         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 427                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 428                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 429                 },
 430                 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
 431                 // long.
 432                 received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 433                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 434
 435         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 436         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
 437         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 438
 439         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
 440         // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
 441         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 442                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 443         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 444                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 445                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 446                 }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 447                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 448
 449         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 450         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 451
 452         // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
 453         // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
 454         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 455         if prev_commitment_tx {
 456                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
 457         } else {
 458                 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
 459         }
 460         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 461                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 462         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 463         assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()],
 464                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 465
 466         // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
 467         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 468         let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 469         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 470         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 471         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 472         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 473         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 474         assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
 475                    a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
 476         // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
 477         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 478         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 479
 480         // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
 481         // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
 482         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 483         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 484         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 485                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 486                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 487                 }],
 488                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 489         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
 490         // balance entry.
 491         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 492         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 493                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 494         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
 495
 496         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 497
 498         // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
 499         // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
 500         // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
 501         let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 502         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 503
 504         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 505                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 506                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 507                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 508                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 509                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 510                 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 511                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 512
 513         // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
 514         // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
 515         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 516         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 517
 518         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 519                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 520                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 521                 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 522                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 523
 524         // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
 525         // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
 526         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 527         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 528
 529         assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
 530                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 531
 532         // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
 533         // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
 534         // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
 535         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 536         assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
 537                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 538         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 539         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 540                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 541
 542         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 543         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 544         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 545         for node in nodes.iter() {
 546                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 547                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 548                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 549                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 550         }
 551 }
 552
 553 #[test]
 554 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
 555         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
 556         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
 557 }
 558
 559 #[test]
 560 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
 561         // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
 562         // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
 563         // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
 564         // delay prior to spendability.
 565         //
 566         // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
 567         // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
 568         // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
 569         // claim by our counterparty).
 570         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 571         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 572         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 573         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 574
 575         // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
 576         // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
 577         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
 578         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 579
 580         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
 581         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 582         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
 583                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 584         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 585
 586         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 587         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 588         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 589
 590         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 591         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
 592
 593         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
 594         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
 595                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
 596         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 597
 598         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 599         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 600         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 601
 602         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 603         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
 604         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
 605         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 606         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 607         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
 608
 609         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 610         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 611
 612         // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions
 613         let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 614         assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 3);
 615         check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
 616         check_spends!(as_txn[2], as_txn[0]);
 617         check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
 618
 619         // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
 620         // claimable balances.
 621         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 622         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 623         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 624         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 625         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 626
 627         let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 628                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 629                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 630                 payment_hash,
 631         };
 632         let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 633                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 634                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 635                 payment_hash: payment_hash_2,
 636         };
 637
 638         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 639                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 640                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 641                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 642                 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 643                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 644
 645         // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
 646         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 647         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 648         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 649         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 650         let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 651         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
 652         check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]);
 653
 654         // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
 655         // transaction.
 656         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
 657         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 658                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 659                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 660                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 661                 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 662                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 663         assert_eq!(as_txn[1].lock_time.0, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1); // as_txn[1] can be included in the next block
 664
 665         // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
 666         // "awaiting confirmations" one.
 667         let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 668         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
 669         // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
 670         // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
 671         // call, as described, two hunks down.
 672         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 673                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 674                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 675                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 676                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 677                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 678                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 679                 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 680                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 681
 682         // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
 683         // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
 684         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
 685         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
 686         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 687                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 688                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 689                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 690                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 691                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 692                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 693                 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 694                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 695
 696         // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
 697         // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
 698         // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
 699         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 700         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
 701
 702         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 703                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 704                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 705                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 706                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 707                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 708                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 709                 }]),
 710                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 711
 712         // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 713         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 714         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 715         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 716                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 717                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 718                 }],
 719                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 720         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 721
 722         // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 723         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 724         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 725         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 726         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
 727
 728         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 729         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 730         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 731         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 732         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 733         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 734         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 735 }
 736
 737 #[test]
 738 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
 739         // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
 740         // have a preimage.
 741         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 742         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 743         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 744         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 745
 746         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
 747         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 748
 749         // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
 750         let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
 751         let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
 752         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 753
 754         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 755         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 756
 757         let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 758                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 759                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 760                 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
 761         };
 762         let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 763                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 764                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 765                 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
 766         };
 767         let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 768                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 769                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 770                 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
 771         };
 772         let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 773                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 774                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 775                 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
 776         };
 777
 778         // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
 779         // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
 780         // HTLC output is spent.
 781
 782         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 783                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 784                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 785                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
 786                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 787
 788         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 789                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
 790                 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
 791                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 792
 793         // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
 794         let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 795         assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
 796         check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
 797         check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
 798
 799         // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
 800         // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
 801         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 802         let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 803                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 804                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 805                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 806                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
 807
 808         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 809         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
 810         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 811         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 812         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 813
 814         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 815                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 816
 817         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 818         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 819         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 820         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 821
 822         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
 823         let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 824                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
 825                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 826                 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
 827         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 828                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 829
 830         // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
 831         // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
 832         // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
 833         // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
 834
 835         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
 836         let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 837         assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
 838         check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
 839         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
 840                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
 841
 842         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 843                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 844
 845         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 846         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 847                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 848
 849         // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
 850         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 851         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 852         bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
 853
 854         // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
 855         nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
 856         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1));
 857         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
 858                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
 859         let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 860         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
 861         check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
 862
 863         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 864                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 865
 866         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
 867         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 868                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 869
 870         // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
 871         // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
 872         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 873         let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
 874         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 875                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 876                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 877                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 878                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 879                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 880                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
 881                 }]),
 882                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 883
 884         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 885         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 886                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 887                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 888                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 889                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 890                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 891                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
 892                 }]),
 893                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 894
 895         // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
 896         // payment failure event.
 897         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 898         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
 899
 900         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 901         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 902                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 903                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 904                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 905                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 906                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 907                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
 908                 }]),
 909                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 910
 911         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 912         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 913                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 914                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
 915                 }],
 916                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 917         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 918
 919         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 920         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 921         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 922
 923         // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
 924         // was already claimed.
 925         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 926         let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
 927         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 928                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 929                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
 930                 }]),
 931                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 932
 933         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 934         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 935                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 936                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
 937                 }]),
 938                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 939
 940         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 941         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
 942
 943         assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
 944                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 945         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 946
 947         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
 948         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 949
 950         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 951         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 952         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 953         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
 954         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
 955         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 956         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 957 }
 958
 959 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
 960         let mut v = v_orig.clone();
 961         for t in extra_ts {
 962                 v.push((*t).clone());
 963         }
 964         v.sort_unstable();
 965         v
 966 }
 967
 968 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
 969         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
 970         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 971         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 972         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 973         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 974         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
 975         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
 976         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 977         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 978         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 979
 980         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 981                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
 982         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 983         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 984
 985         // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
 986         //
 987         // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
 988         // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
 989         // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
 990         // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
 991         // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
 992         //     later commitment transaction updates
 993         //
 994         // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
 995         // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
 996         // HTLCs individually.
 997
 998         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
 999         let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1000         let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1001
1002         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1003
1004         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1005         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1006
1007         let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1008         let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1009
1010         // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1011         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1012         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1013
1014         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1015
1016         let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1017         let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1018
1019         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1020         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1021         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1022         let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1023
1024         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1025         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1026         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1027
1028         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1029         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1030         let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1031                 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1032                 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1033         events.retain(|ev| {
1034                 match ev {
1035                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1036                                 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1037                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1038                                 false
1039                         },
1040                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1041                                 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1042                                 false
1043                         },
1044                         _ => true,
1045                 }
1046         });
1047         assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1048         if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1049         match &events[1] {
1050                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
1051                 _ => panic!(),
1052         }
1053
1054         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1055         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1056         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1057         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1058
1059         // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1060         // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1061         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1062                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1063                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1064                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1065                         claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1066                         payment_hash: missing_htlc_payment_hash,
1067                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1068                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1069                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1070                         payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
1071                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1072                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1073                         claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1074                         payment_hash: live_payment_hash,
1075                 }]),
1076                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1077
1078         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1079         let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1080         // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1081         // quite soon.
1082         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1083         claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
1084
1085         // The following constants were determined experimentally
1086         const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 483;
1087         const OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 571;
1088         const INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 578;
1089
1090         // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1091         // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1092         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1093         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1094         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1095         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1096
1097         // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1098         // claim balances separated out.
1099         let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1100                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1101                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1102                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1103                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1104                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1105                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1106                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1107                 }];
1108
1109         let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1110                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1111                         (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1112         };
1113         let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1114         let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1115                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1116         };
1117         let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1118
1119         // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1120         // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1121         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1122                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1123
1124         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1125                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1126                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1127                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1128         } else {
1129                 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1130                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1131                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1132                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1133         }
1134
1135         let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1136                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1137                 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1138         };
1139         let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1140                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1141                         (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1142                         - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1143                 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1144         };
1145
1146         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1147                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1148                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1149         } else {
1150                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1151                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1152         }
1153
1154         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1155                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1156         } else {
1157                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1158         }
1159         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1160                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1161
1162         // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1163         // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1164         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1165         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1166
1167         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1168                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1169                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1170                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1171                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1172                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1173                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1174                                 - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1175                         confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1176                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1177                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000 - chan_feerate * OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1178                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1179                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1180                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1181                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1182                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1183                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1184                         confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1185                 }]),
1186                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1187
1188         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1189         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1190
1191         let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1192         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
1193                 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1194         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
1195                 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1196
1197         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1198         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }]);
1199         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1200         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }]);
1201         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1202         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1203         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1204         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1205         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1206         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1207         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1208
1209         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1210         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1211         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1212         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1213         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1214         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1215         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1216 }
1217
1218 #[test]
1219 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1220         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true);
1221         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false);
1222 }
1223
1224 #[test]
1225 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1226         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1227         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1228         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1229         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1230         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1231         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1232
1233         // Create some initial channels
1234         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1235                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 11_000_000);
1236         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1237         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1238
1239         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1240         let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1241         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1242         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1243         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1244
1245         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs and an output for both sides
1246         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
1247
1248         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1249
1250         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1251         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1252
1253         // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1254         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1255         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1256         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1257         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1258         let revoked_htlc_success = {
1259                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1260                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1261                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1262                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
1263                 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1264                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1265         };
1266
1267         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1268         let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
1269                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1270                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1271                 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
1272                         txn.remove(1)
1273                 } else {
1274                         txn.remove(0)
1275                 }
1276         };
1277         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1278         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
1279         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time.0, 0);
1280         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0, 0);
1281
1282         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1283         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1284         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1285         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1286         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1287         let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1288
1289         let as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1290         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), 1);
1291         check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1292
1293         // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1294         // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1295         // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1296         let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1297                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1298                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1299                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1300                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1301                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1302                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1303                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1304                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1305                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1306                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1307                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1308                 }]);
1309         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1310                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1311
1312         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
1313         let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1314         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1315         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
1316         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]); // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked
1317                                                                   // outputs (which no longer includes the spent HTLC output)
1318
1319         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1320                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1321
1322         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1323         fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1324                 3_000 - chan_feerate * (revoked_htlc_success.weight() + as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight()) as u64 / 1000);
1325
1326         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1327         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1328                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1329                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1330                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1331                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1332                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1333                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1334                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1335                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1336                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1337                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1338                         claimable_amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1339                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1340                 }]),
1341                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1342
1343         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1344         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1345         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1346                         // to_self output to B
1347                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1348                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1349                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1350                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1351                         claimable_amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1352                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1353                 }]),
1354                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1355
1356         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1357         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1358         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1359                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1360                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1361                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1362                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1363                 }]),
1364                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1365
1366         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1367         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1368                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1369         // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1370         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1371         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1372                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1373         }
1374
1375         // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1376         // claiming.
1377         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1378         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1379         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1380                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1381         }
1382
1383         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
1384         let as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1385         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1386
1387         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1388         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1389
1390         // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1391         // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1392         // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1393         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1394         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1395                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1396                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1397                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1398                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1399                 }]),
1400                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1401
1402         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1403         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1404                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1405                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1406                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1407                         claimable_amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1408                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1409                 }]),
1410                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1411
1412         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
1413         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1414                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1415                         claimable_amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].output[0].value,
1416                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1417                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1418                         claimable_amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1419                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1420                 }]),
1421                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1422
1423         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1424         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1425         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1426         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
1427
1428         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1429
1430         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1431         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1432         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1433         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1434         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1435         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1436         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1437 }
1438
1439 #[test]
1440 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
1441         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1442         // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1443         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1444         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1445         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1446         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1447         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1448         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1449         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1450         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1451         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1452
1453         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1454                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1455         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1456         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1457
1458         // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1459         // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1460         // revocation-claim transaction.
1461
1462         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1463         let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1464
1465         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1466
1467         // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1468         // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1469         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1470                 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1471
1472         // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1473         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1474
1475         assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), 2);
1476         check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1477         check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1478
1479         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1480         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1481
1482         {
1483                 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1484                 *feerate += 1;
1485         }
1486         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1487         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1488
1489         let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1490         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1491         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1492
1493         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1494         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1495         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1496         let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1497
1498         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1499                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1500                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1501                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1502                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1503                         payment_hash: revoked_payment_hash,
1504                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1505                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1506                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1507                         payment_hash: claimed_payment_hash,
1508                 }]),
1509                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1510
1511         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1512         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1513         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1514         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1515
1516         let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1517         // Currently the revoked commitment outputs are all claimed in one aggregated transaction
1518         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 1);
1519         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1520         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1521
1522         let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1523
1524         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1525                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1526                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1527                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1528                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1529                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1530                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1531                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1532                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1533                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1534                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1535                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1536                 }]),
1537                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1538
1539         // Confirm A's HTLC-Success tranasction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1540         // new claim.
1541         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[1]);
1542         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage);
1543         let mut claim_txn_2: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1544         claim_txn_2.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| if tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid()) { 0 } else { 1 });
1545         // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1546         // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1547         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1548         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 2);
1549         check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1550         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1551         check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1552
1553         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1554                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1555                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1556                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1557                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1558                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1559                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1560                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1561                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1562                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1563                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1564                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1565                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1566                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1567                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1568                 }]),
1569                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1570
1571         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1572         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1573
1574         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1575                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1576                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1577                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1578                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1579                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1580                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1581                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1582                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1583                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1584                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1585                 }]),
1586                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1587
1588         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1589         let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1590
1591         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1592                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1593                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1594                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1595                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1596                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1597                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1598                         claimable_amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1599                         confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1600                 }]),
1601                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1602
1603         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1604         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1605
1606         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1607                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1608                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1609                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1610                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1611                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1612                 }]),
1613                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1614
1615         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1616         let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1617
1618         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1619                         claimable_amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
1620                         confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1621                 }],
1622                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1623
1624         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1625
1626         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1627         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1628         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1629         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1630
1631         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1632         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1633         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1634         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1635         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1636         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1637         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1638 }
1639
1640 fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
1641         // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
1642         let persister;
1643         let new_chain_monitor;
1644         let node_deserialized;
1645
1646         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1647         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1648         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1649         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1650
1651         // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
1652         // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
1653         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
1654         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
1655
1656         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
1657         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1658         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1659         check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false);
1660
1661         let commitment_tx = {
1662                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1663                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1664                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
1665                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
1666                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1667         };
1668
1669         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
1670
1671         // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
1672         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1673         let htlc_timeout_tx = {
1674                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1675                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1676                 check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
1677                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1678         };
1679
1680         // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
1681         // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
1682         if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
1683                 let serialized_monitor = hex::decode(
1684 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1685                 ).unwrap();
1686                 reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
1687         }
1688
1689         // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
1690         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1691         if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
1692                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1693         }
1694         {
1695                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1696                 if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
1697                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
1698                 } else {
1699                         assert!(txn.len() < 6);
1700                 }
1701                 for tx in txn {
1702                         assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
1703                         assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
1704                         assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
1705                         assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
1706                 }
1707         }
1708 }
1709
1710 #[test]
1711 fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
1712         do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
1713         do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
1714 }
1715
1716 fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) {
1717         // Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every
1718         // `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call.
1719         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1720         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1721         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1722         if anchors {
1723                 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1724                 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1725         }
1726         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
1727         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1728
1729         let (_, _, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
1730                 &nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 500_000_000
1731         );
1732         const HTLC_AMT_MSAT: u64 = 1_000_000;
1733         const HTLC_AMT_SAT: u64 = HTLC_AMT_MSAT / 1000;
1734         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_AMT_MSAT);
1735
1736         let htlc_expiry = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1;
1737
1738         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(&nodes[0], &chan_id);
1739         assert_eq!(commitment_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 /* commitment tx only */} else { 2 /* commitment and htlc timeout tx */ });
1740         check_spends!(&commitment_txn[0], &funding_tx);
1741         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_txn[0]);
1742         check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
1743         check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false);
1744         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1745
1746         // Set up a helper closure we'll use throughout our test. We should only expect retries without
1747         // bumps if fees have not increased after a block has been connected (assuming the height timer
1748         // re-evaluates at every block) or after `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` is called.
1749         let mut prev_htlc_tx_feerate = None;
1750         let mut check_htlc_retry = |should_retry: bool, should_bump: bool| -> Option<Transaction> {
1751                 let (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) = if anchors {
1752                         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
1753                         let mut events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1754                         assert_eq!(events.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
1755                         if !should_retry {
1756                                 return None;
1757                         }
1758                         #[allow(unused_assignments)]
1759                         let mut tx = Transaction {
1760                                 version: 2,
1761                                 lock_time: bitcoin::PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1762                                 input: vec![],
1763                                 output: vec![],
1764                         };
1765                         #[allow(unused_assignments)]
1766                         let mut feerate = 0;
1767                         feerate = if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution {
1768                                 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, ..
1769                         }) = events.pop().unwrap() {
1770                                 let secp = Secp256k1::new();
1771                                 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 1);
1772                                 let descriptor = htlc_descriptors.pop().unwrap();
1773                                 assert_eq!(descriptor.commitment_txid, commitment_txn[0].txid());
1774                                 let htlc_output_idx = descriptor.htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as usize;
1775                                 assert!(htlc_output_idx < commitment_txn[0].output.len());
1776                                 tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
1777                                 // Note that we don't care about actually making the HTLC transaction meet the
1778                                 // feerate for the test, we just want to make sure the feerates we receive from
1779                                 // the events never decrease.
1780                                 tx.input.push(descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
1781                                 let signer = nodes[0].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
1782                                         descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &descriptor.channel_keys_id,
1783                                 );
1784                                 let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(
1785                                         descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp
1786                                 );
1787                                 tx.output.push(descriptor.tx_output(&per_commitment_point, &secp));
1788                                 let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&mut tx, 0, &descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
1789                                 let witness_script = descriptor.witness_script(&per_commitment_point, &secp);
1790                                 tx.input[0].witness = descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
1791                                 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight as u64
1792                         } else { panic!("unexpected event"); };
1793                         (tx, feerate)
1794                 } else {
1795                         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1796                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1797                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
1798                         if !should_retry {
1799                                 return None;
1800                         }
1801                         let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1802                         check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]);
1803                         let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value;
1804                         let htlc_tx_feerate = htlc_tx_fee * 1000 / htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
1805                         (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate)
1806                 };
1807                 if should_bump {
1808                         assert!(htlc_tx_feerate > prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take().unwrap());
1809                 } else if let Some(prev_feerate) = prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take() {
1810                         assert_eq!(htlc_tx_feerate, prev_feerate);
1811                 }
1812                 prev_htlc_tx_feerate = Some(htlc_tx_feerate);
1813                 Some(htlc_tx)
1814         };
1815
1816         // Connect blocks up to one before the HTLC expires. This should not result in a claim/retry.
1817         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_expiry - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
1818         check_htlc_retry(false, false);
1819
1820         // Connect one more block, producing our first claim.
1821         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1822         check_htlc_retry(true, false);
1823
1824         // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
1825         // transactions pre-anchors.
1826         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1827         check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1828
1829         // Trigger a call and we should have another retry, but without a bump.
1830         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1831         check_htlc_retry(true, false);
1832
1833         // Double the feerate and trigger a call, expecting a fee-bumped retry.
1834         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
1835         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1836         check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1837
1838         // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
1839         // transactions pre-anchors.
1840         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1841         let htlc_tx = check_htlc_retry(true, anchors).unwrap();
1842
1843         // Mine the HTLC transaction to ensure we don't retry claims while they're confirmed.
1844         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_tx);
1845         // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transasctions,
1846         // we'll receive an extra bumped claim.
1847         if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
1848                 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1849         }
1850         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1851         check_htlc_retry(false, false);
1852 }
1853
1854 #[test]
1855 fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() {
1856         do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false);
1857         do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true);
1858 }
1859
1860 #[test]
1861 fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
1862         // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
1863         // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
1864         // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
1865         // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
1866         // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
1867         // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
1868         let secp = Secp256k1::new();
1869         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1870         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1871         let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
1872         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
1873         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1874         anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1875         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
1876         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1877
1878         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
1879                 &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
1880         ).2;
1881         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
1882         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1883
1884         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1885
1886         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
1887         check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
1888         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
1889
1890         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
1891                 &payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
1892                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
1893         );
1894
1895         let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1896         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
1897         let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
1898                 Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { commitment_tx, anchor_descriptor, .. })  => {
1899                         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.input.len(), 1);
1900                         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 6);
1901                         let mut anchor_tx = Transaction {
1902                                 version: 2,
1903                                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1904                                 input: vec![
1905                                         TxIn { previous_output: anchor_descriptor.outpoint, ..Default::default() },
1906                                         TxIn { ..Default::default() },
1907                                 ],
1908                                 output: vec![TxOut {
1909                                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1910                                         script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
1911                                 }],
1912                         };
1913                         let signer = nodes[0].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
1914                                 anchor_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &anchor_descriptor.channel_keys_id,
1915                         );
1916                         let funding_sig = signer.sign_holder_anchor_input(&mut anchor_tx, 0, &secp).unwrap();
1917                         anchor_tx.input[0].witness = chan_utils::build_anchor_input_witness(
1918                                 &signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, &funding_sig
1919                         );
1920                         (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
1921                 },
1922                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1923         };
1924
1925         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
1926         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1927
1928         let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1929         // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
1930         // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
1931         match *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow() {
1932                 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
1933                         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
1934                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
1935                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
1936
1937                 },
1938                 _ => assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2),
1939         };
1940         let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1941         for event in holder_events {
1942                 match event {
1943                         Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) => {
1944                                 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 1);
1945                                 let htlc_descriptor = &htlc_descriptors[0];
1946                                 let signer = nodes[0].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
1947                                         htlc_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id
1948                                 );
1949                                 let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp);
1950                                 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
1951                                         version: 2,
1952                                         lock_time: tx_lock_time,
1953                                         input: vec![
1954                                                 htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input(), // HTLC input
1955                                                 TxIn { ..Default::default() } // Fee input
1956                                         ],
1957                                         output: vec![
1958                                                 htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&per_commitment_point, &secp), // HTLC output
1959                                                 TxOut { // Fee input change
1960                                                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1961                                                         script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
1962                                                 }
1963                                         ]
1964                                 };
1965                                 let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, 0, htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
1966                                 let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&per_commitment_point, &secp);
1967                                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
1968                                 htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
1969                         },
1970                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1971                 }
1972         }
1973
1974         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
1975         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1976
1977         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1978
1979         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
1980
1981         let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1982         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
1983         for event in holder_events {
1984                 match event {
1985                         Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
1986                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1987                 }
1988         }
1989
1990         // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
1991         nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1992 }
1993
1994 #[test]
1995 fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
1996         // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
1997         // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
1998         // revoked commitment.
1999         let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2000         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2001         // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
2002         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2003         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2004         let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
2005         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2006         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2007         anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2008         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2009
2010         let bob_persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
2011         let bob_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
2012         let bob_deserialized: ChannelManager<
2013                 &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface,
2014                 &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
2015                 &test_utils::TestRouter, &test_utils::TestLogger,
2016         >;
2017
2018         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2019
2020         let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2021         let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2022
2023         // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
2024         let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
2025
2026         // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
2027         let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2028         let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2029         let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2030         let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2031
2032         // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
2033         // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
2034         // present.
2035         let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
2036         let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
2037
2038         // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
2039         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
2040         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
2041         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
2042         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
2043
2044         // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
2045         // revoked state.
2046         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2047         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2048
2049         // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
2050         reload_node!(
2051                 nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
2052                 bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
2053         );
2054         for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
2055                 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
2056                 for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
2057                         monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
2058                                 &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2059                                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2060                         );
2061                 }
2062         }
2063
2064         // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
2065         // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
2066         // the HTLCs still pending.
2067         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
2068         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
2069         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
2070         let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = {
2071                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2072                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2073                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2074                 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2075                 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
2076                         check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
2077                         check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3);
2078                         (txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone())
2079                 } else {
2080                         check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3);
2081                         check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
2082                         (txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone())
2083                 }
2084         };
2085
2086         // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
2087         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2088         let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2089         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2090         let anchor_tx = {
2091                 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
2092                 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
2093                 let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2094                 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2095                         version: 2,
2096                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2097                         input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2098                         output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2099                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2100                                 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
2101                         }],
2102                 };
2103                 let mut anchor_tx = Transaction {
2104                         version: 2,
2105                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2106                         input: vec![
2107                                 TxIn { // Fee input
2108                                         previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2109                                         ..Default::default()
2110                                 },
2111                         ],
2112                         output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
2113                                 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
2114                                 script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
2115                         }],
2116                 };
2117                 let mut signers = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2118                 for event in events {
2119                         match event {
2120                                 Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { anchor_descriptor, .. })  => {
2121                                         anchor_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2122                                                 previous_output: anchor_descriptor.outpoint,
2123                                                 ..Default::default()
2124                                         });
2125                                         let signer = nodes[1].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
2126                                                 anchor_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &anchor_descriptor.channel_keys_id,
2127                                         );
2128                                         signers.push(signer);
2129                                 },
2130                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2131                         }
2132                 }
2133                 for (i, signer) in signers.into_iter().enumerate() {
2134                         let anchor_idx = i + 1;
2135                         let funding_sig = signer.sign_holder_anchor_input(&mut anchor_tx, anchor_idx, &secp).unwrap();
2136                         anchor_tx.input[anchor_idx].witness = chan_utils::build_anchor_input_witness(
2137                                 &signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, &funding_sig
2138                         );
2139                 }
2140                 let fee_utxo_sig = {
2141                         let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
2142                         let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&anchor_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
2143                                 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2144                         ).unwrap()[..]);
2145                         let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2146                         let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2147                         sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2148                         sig
2149                 };
2150                 anchor_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2151                 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
2152                 anchor_tx
2153         };
2154
2155         for node in &nodes {
2156                 mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_tx]);
2157         }
2158         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
2159         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
2160         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2161
2162         // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
2163         // revoked outputs.
2164         {
2165                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2166                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
2167
2168                 let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() {
2169                         (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] })
2170                 } else {
2171                         (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] })
2172                 };
2173
2174                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2175                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
2176                 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
2177                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2178                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
2179                 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
2180         }
2181
2182         // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
2183         // through the success path.
2184         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2185         let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2186         // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2187         // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2188         match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
2189                 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
2190                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
2191                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
2192                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2193                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
2194                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2195
2196                 },
2197                 _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
2198         };
2199         let htlc_tx = {
2200                 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
2201                 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
2202                 let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2203                 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2204                         version: 2,
2205                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2206                         input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2207                         output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
2208                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2209                                 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
2210                         }],
2211                 };
2212                 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
2213                         version: 2,
2214                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2215                         input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
2216                                 previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2217                                 ..Default::default()
2218                         }],
2219                         output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
2220                                 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
2221                                 script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
2222                         }],
2223                 };
2224                 let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
2225                 for event in events {
2226                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
2227                                 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
2228                                 for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
2229                                         assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
2230                                         let signer = nodes[1].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
2231                                                 htlc_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id
2232                                         );
2233                                         let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp);
2234                                         htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
2235                                         htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&per_commitment_point, &secp));
2236                                 }
2237                                 descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
2238                                 htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
2239                         } else {
2240                                 panic!("Unexpected event");
2241                         }
2242                 }
2243                 for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
2244                         let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
2245                         let signer = nodes[1].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
2246                                 htlc_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id
2247                         );
2248                         let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
2249                         let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp);
2250                         let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&per_commitment_point, &secp);
2251                         htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
2252                 }
2253                 let fee_utxo_sig = {
2254                         let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
2255                         let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
2256                                 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2257                         ).unwrap()[..]);
2258                         let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2259                         let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2260                         sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2261                         sig
2262                 };
2263                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2264                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
2265                 htlc_tx
2266         };
2267
2268         for node in &nodes {
2269                 mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
2270         }
2271
2272         // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
2273         // the second level instead.
2274         let revoked_claims = {
2275                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2276                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2277
2278                 let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
2279                         tx.input.len() == 2 &&
2280                         tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2281                         tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
2282                 ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2283                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
2284                 for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
2285                         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
2286                 }
2287
2288                 txn
2289         };
2290         for node in &nodes {
2291                 mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claims.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>());
2292         }
2293
2294
2295         // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
2296         // been reached.
2297         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2298         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
2299
2300         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2301         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2302
2303         // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2304         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2305         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2306
2307         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2308         let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2309         assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 2);
2310         for (idx, event) in spendable_output_events.iter().enumerate() {
2311                 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = event {
2312                         assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2313                         let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2314                                 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
2315                         ).unwrap();
2316                         check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claims[idx]);
2317                 } else {
2318                         panic!("unexpected event");
2319                 }
2320         }
2321
2322         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2323         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2324         // On the Alice side, the individual to_self_claim are still pending confirmation.
2325         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 2);
2326         // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
2327         // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
2328         // balances to claim.
2329         //
2330         // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
2331         // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
2332         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);
2333 }