1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
12 use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
13 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
15 use ln::channelmanager::BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
16 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
17 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
18 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
26 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
29 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
30 // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
31 // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
32 // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
33 // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
34 // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
37 // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
39 // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
40 // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
42 // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
43 // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
44 // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
45 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
46 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
47 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
48 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
50 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
51 let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
53 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
54 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
55 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
57 let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
59 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
60 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
61 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
63 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
64 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
65 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
67 // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
68 // transaction for nodes[1].
69 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
70 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
71 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
72 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
73 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
75 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
76 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
77 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
78 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
80 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
81 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
82 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
86 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
87 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
88 // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
89 // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
90 // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
91 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
92 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
93 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
94 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
96 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
97 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
98 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
99 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
101 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
102 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
104 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
105 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000
107 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
108 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
109 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
111 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id).unwrap();
112 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
113 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown);
114 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
115 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_1_shutdown);
117 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
118 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
119 let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
120 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
121 let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
122 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
123 let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
124 assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
126 let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
127 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
128 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
130 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
131 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
133 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
134 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
136 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
137 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
139 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
140 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000,
141 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
143 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
144 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
145 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1000,
146 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
148 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
150 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
151 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
153 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
154 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
155 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
156 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
158 let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
159 assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
160 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
161 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
162 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
163 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
164 check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
167 let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
168 assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
169 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
170 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
171 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
172 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
173 check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
175 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
176 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
179 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
184 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
185 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
186 // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
187 // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
188 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
189 if prev_commitment_tx {
190 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
191 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
192 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
193 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
194 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
196 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
197 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
198 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
200 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
201 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
202 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
203 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
205 // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
206 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
207 // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
208 // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
209 let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
210 // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
211 let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
213 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
215 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
216 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
218 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
219 // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
220 // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
221 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
222 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
223 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
224 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
225 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
226 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
227 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
228 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
229 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
231 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
232 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
233 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
235 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
237 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
238 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
239 let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
240 // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
241 // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
242 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
244 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
245 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
247 if prev_commitment_tx {
248 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
249 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
250 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
251 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
253 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
254 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
255 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
256 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
257 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
258 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
262 // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
263 // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
264 let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
265 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
266 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
267 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
268 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
269 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
270 // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
271 chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) +
272 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
273 channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
274 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
275 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
276 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
278 if !prev_commitment_tx {
279 a_expected_balances.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
280 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
281 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
284 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
285 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
286 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
287 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
289 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
291 // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
292 // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
293 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
294 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
295 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
297 let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
298 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), if prev_commitment_tx { 4 } else { 5 });
299 if prev_commitment_tx {
300 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[3], b_broadcast_txn[2]);
302 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0], b_broadcast_txn[3]);
303 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1], b_broadcast_txn[4]);
305 // b_broadcast_txn[0] should spend the HTLC output of the commitment tx for 3_000 sats
306 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
307 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
308 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
309 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
310 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
311 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
312 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[2], funding_tx);
314 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
315 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
316 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
317 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
318 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
319 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
321 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
322 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
323 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
325 // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
326 // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
327 // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
328 // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
329 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
330 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
332 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
333 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
334 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
335 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
336 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
337 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
338 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
339 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
340 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
341 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
343 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
344 // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
345 // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
346 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
347 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
348 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
350 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
352 Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
353 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
354 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
355 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
356 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
357 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
359 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
361 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
362 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, true);
363 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
365 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
366 // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
367 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
368 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
369 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
370 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
371 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
372 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
374 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
375 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
376 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
377 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
378 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
379 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
380 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
381 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
382 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
383 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
385 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
387 let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
388 assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
389 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
390 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
391 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
392 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
393 check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
396 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
398 // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
399 // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
400 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
401 if prev_commitment_tx {
402 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
404 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
406 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
407 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
408 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
409 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
410 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
411 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
413 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
414 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
415 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
416 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
417 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
419 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
421 // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
422 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
423 let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
424 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 3);
425 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], funding_tx);
426 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
427 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
428 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
429 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
430 assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout,
431 a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
432 // a_broadcast_txn [1] and [2] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
433 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
434 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
436 // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
437 // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
438 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
439 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
440 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
441 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
442 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
444 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
445 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
447 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
448 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
449 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
450 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, true);
452 let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
453 assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
454 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
455 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
456 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
457 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
458 check_spends!(spend_tx, a_broadcast_txn[2]);
461 // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
462 // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
463 // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
464 let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
465 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
467 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
468 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
469 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
470 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
471 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
472 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
473 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
474 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
475 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
477 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
479 // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
480 // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
481 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
483 let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
484 assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
485 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
486 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
487 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
488 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
489 check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
492 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
493 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
494 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
495 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
496 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
497 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
499 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
501 // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
502 // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
503 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
505 let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
506 assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
507 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
508 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
509 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
510 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
511 check_spends!(spend_tx, b_broadcast_txn[0]);
514 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
515 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
516 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
518 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
520 // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
521 // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
522 // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
523 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
524 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
525 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
526 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
528 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
529 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
530 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
531 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
535 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
536 do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
537 do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);