1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
12 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
13 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance};
14 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
15 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight};
16 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
17 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
18 use crate::ln::channel;
19 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
20 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
21 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
22 use crate::util::crypto::sign;
23 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
24 use crate::util::scid_utils::block_from_scid;
25 use crate::util::test_utils;
27 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
28 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
29 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
31 use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, Script, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime, Witness};
32 use bitcoin::util::sighash::SighashCache;
34 use crate::prelude::*;
36 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
39 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
40 // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
41 // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
42 // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
43 // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
44 // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
47 // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
49 // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
50 // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
52 // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
53 // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
54 // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
55 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
56 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
57 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
58 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
60 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
61 let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
63 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
64 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
65 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
66 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
68 let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
70 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
71 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
72 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
74 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
75 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
76 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
78 // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
79 // transaction for nodes[1].
80 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
81 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
82 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
83 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
84 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
86 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
87 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
88 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
89 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
91 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
92 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
93 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
96 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
97 let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
98 assert_eq!(spendable.len(), 1);
99 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
100 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
101 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
102 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
103 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
109 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
110 // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
111 // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
112 // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
114 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
115 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
116 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
117 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
119 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
121 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
123 // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
124 // before forwarding.
125 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
126 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
128 // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
129 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
131 // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
132 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
134 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
135 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
137 let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
138 assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
139 check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
141 // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
142 // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
143 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
144 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
145 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
147 // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
148 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
149 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
150 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
152 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
153 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
157 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
158 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
159 // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
160 // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
161 // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
162 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
163 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
164 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
165 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
167 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
168 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
169 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
170 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
172 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
173 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
175 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
176 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000
178 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
179 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
180 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
182 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
183 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
184 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
185 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
186 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
188 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
189 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
190 let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
191 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
192 let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
193 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
194 let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
195 assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
197 let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
198 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
199 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
201 let shutdown_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]));
202 let shutdown_tx_conf_height_b = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]));
204 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
205 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
207 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
208 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
210 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
211 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000,
212 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
214 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
215 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
216 amount_satoshis: 1000,
217 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
219 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
221 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
222 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
224 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
225 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
226 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id)
227 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b).is_empty());
229 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
230 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
232 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
233 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
234 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
235 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
237 let spendable_outputs_a = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
239 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a),
243 let spendable_outputs_b = test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
245 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b),
249 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
250 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
253 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
258 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
259 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
260 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
261 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
262 let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
263 let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
264 eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
265 assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
266 assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
269 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
270 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
271 // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
272 // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
273 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
274 if prev_commitment_tx {
275 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
276 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
277 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
278 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
279 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
281 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
282 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
283 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
285 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
286 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
287 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
288 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
290 // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
291 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
292 // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
293 // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
294 let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
295 // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
296 let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
298 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
300 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
301 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
303 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
304 let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
305 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
306 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
309 let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
310 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
311 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
312 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
314 let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
315 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
316 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
319 let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
320 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
321 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
322 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
324 let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
325 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
326 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
330 let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
331 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
332 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
333 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
334 payment_preimage: timeout_payment_preimage,
337 // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
338 // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
339 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
340 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
341 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
342 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
343 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
344 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
345 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
346 }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
347 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
349 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
350 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
351 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
353 let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
354 // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
355 // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
356 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
357 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
358 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
360 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
361 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
362 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
364 if prev_commitment_tx {
365 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
366 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
367 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
368 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
369 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
370 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
371 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
372 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
374 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
375 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
376 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
379 // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
380 // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
381 let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
382 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
383 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
384 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
385 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
386 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
387 // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
388 chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) +
389 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
390 channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
391 }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
392 if !prev_commitment_tx {
393 a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
395 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
396 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
397 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
398 amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
400 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
402 // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
403 // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
404 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
405 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
406 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
408 let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
409 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
410 // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
411 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
412 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
413 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
414 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
415 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
416 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
418 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
419 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
421 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
422 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
423 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
424 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
425 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
426 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
427 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
429 // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
430 // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
431 // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
432 // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
433 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
434 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
436 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
437 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
438 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
439 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
440 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
441 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
442 // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
443 // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
444 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
445 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
446 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
448 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
450 received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
451 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
453 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
454 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
455 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
457 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
458 // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
459 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
460 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
461 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
462 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
463 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
464 }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
465 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
467 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
468 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
470 // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
471 // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
472 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
473 if prev_commitment_tx {
474 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
476 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, false);
478 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
479 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
480 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
481 assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()],
482 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
484 // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
485 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
486 let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
487 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
488 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
489 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
490 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
491 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
492 assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
493 a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
494 // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
495 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
496 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
498 // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
499 // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
500 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
501 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
502 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
503 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
504 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
506 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
507 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
509 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
510 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
511 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
512 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
514 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
516 // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
517 // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
518 // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
519 let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
520 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
522 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
523 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
524 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
525 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
526 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
527 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
528 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
529 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
531 // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
532 // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
533 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
534 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
536 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
537 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
538 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
539 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
540 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
542 // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
543 // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
544 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
545 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
547 assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
548 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
550 // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
551 // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
552 // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
553 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
554 assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
555 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
556 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
557 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
558 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
560 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
561 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
562 // monitor events or claimable balances.
563 for node in nodes.iter() {
564 connect_blocks(node, 6);
565 connect_blocks(node, 6);
566 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
567 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
572 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
573 do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
574 do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
578 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
579 // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
580 // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
581 // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
582 // delay prior to spendability.
584 // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
585 // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
586 // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
587 // claim by our counterparty).
588 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
589 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
590 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
591 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
593 // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
594 // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
595 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
596 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
598 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
599 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
600 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
601 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
602 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
604 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
605 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
606 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
608 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
609 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
611 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
612 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
613 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
614 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
616 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
617 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
618 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
620 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
621 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
622 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
623 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
624 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
625 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
627 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
628 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
630 // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions
631 let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
632 assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 3);
633 check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
634 check_spends!(as_txn[2], as_txn[0]);
635 check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
637 // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
638 // claimable balances.
639 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
640 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
641 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
642 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
643 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
645 let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
646 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
647 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
650 let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
651 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
652 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
653 payment_hash: payment_hash_2,
656 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
657 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
658 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
659 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
660 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
661 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
663 // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
664 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
665 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
666 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
667 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
668 let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
669 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
670 check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]);
672 // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
674 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
675 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
676 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
677 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
678 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
679 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
680 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
681 assert_eq!(as_txn[1].lock_time.0, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1); // as_txn[1] can be included in the next block
683 // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
684 // "awaiting confirmations" one.
685 let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
686 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
687 // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
688 // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
689 // call, as described, two hunks down.
690 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
691 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
692 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
693 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
694 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
695 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
696 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
697 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
698 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
700 // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
701 // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
702 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
703 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, true, false);
704 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
705 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
706 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
707 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
708 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
709 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
710 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
711 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
712 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
714 // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
715 // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
716 // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
717 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
718 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
720 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
721 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
722 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
723 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
724 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
725 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
726 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
728 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
730 // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
731 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
732 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
733 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
734 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
735 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
737 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
738 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
740 // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
741 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
742 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
743 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
744 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
746 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
747 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
748 // monitor events or claimable balances.
749 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
750 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
751 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
752 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
756 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
757 // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
759 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
760 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
761 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
762 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
764 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
765 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
767 // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
768 let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
769 let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
770 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
772 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
773 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
775 let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
776 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
777 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
778 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
780 let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
781 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
782 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
783 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
785 let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
786 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
787 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
788 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
790 let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
791 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
792 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
793 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
796 // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
797 // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
798 // HTLC output is spent.
800 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
801 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
802 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
803 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
804 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
806 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
807 amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
808 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
809 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
811 // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
812 let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
813 assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
814 check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
815 check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
817 // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
818 // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
819 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
820 let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
821 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
822 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
823 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
824 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
826 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
827 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
829 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
830 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
832 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
833 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
835 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
837 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
838 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
840 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
841 let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
842 amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
843 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
844 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
845 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
846 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
848 // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
849 // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
850 // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
851 // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
853 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
854 let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
855 assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
856 check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
857 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
858 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
860 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
861 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
863 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
864 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
865 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
867 // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
868 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
869 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
870 bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
872 // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
873 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
874 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1));
875 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
876 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
877 let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
878 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
879 check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
881 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
882 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
884 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
885 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
886 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
888 // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
889 // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
890 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
891 let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
892 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
893 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
894 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
895 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
896 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
897 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
898 confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
900 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
902 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
903 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
904 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
905 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
906 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
907 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
908 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
909 confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
911 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
913 // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
914 // payment failure event.
915 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
916 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
918 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
919 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
920 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
921 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
922 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
923 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
924 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
925 confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
927 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
929 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
930 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
931 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
932 confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
934 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
935 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
937 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
938 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
939 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
941 // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
942 // was already claimed.
943 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
944 let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
945 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
946 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
947 confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
949 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
951 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
952 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
953 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
954 confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
956 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
958 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
959 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
961 assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
962 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
963 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
965 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
966 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
968 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
969 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
970 // monitor events or claimable balances.
971 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
972 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
973 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
974 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
977 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
978 let mut v = v_orig.clone();
980 v.push((*t).clone());
986 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
987 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
988 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
989 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
990 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
991 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
992 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
993 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
994 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
995 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
996 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
998 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
999 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1000 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1001 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1003 // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
1005 // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
1006 // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
1007 // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
1008 // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
1009 // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
1010 // later commitment transaction updates
1012 // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
1013 // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
1014 // HTLCs individually.
1016 let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
1017 let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1018 let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1020 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1022 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1023 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1025 let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1026 let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1028 // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1029 let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1030 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1032 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1034 let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1035 let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1037 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1038 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1039 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1040 let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1042 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1043 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1046 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1047 assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1048 let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1049 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1050 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1051 events.retain(|ev| {
1053 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1054 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1055 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1058 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1059 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1065 assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1066 if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1068 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, .. } => {},
1072 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1073 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1074 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1075 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1077 // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1078 // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1079 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1080 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1081 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1082 amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1083 claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1084 payment_hash: missing_htlc_payment_hash,
1085 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1086 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1087 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1088 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
1089 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1090 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1091 claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1092 payment_hash: live_payment_hash,
1094 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1096 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1097 let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1098 // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1100 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1101 claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
1103 // The following constants were determined experimentally
1104 const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 483;
1105 const OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 571;
1106 const INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 578;
1108 // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1109 // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1110 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1111 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1112 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1113 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1115 // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1116 // claim balances separated out.
1117 let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1118 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1119 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1120 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1121 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1122 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1123 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1124 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1127 let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1128 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1129 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1131 let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1132 let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1133 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1135 let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1137 // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1138 // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1139 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1140 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1142 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1143 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1144 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1145 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1147 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1148 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1149 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1150 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1153 let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1154 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1155 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1157 let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1158 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1159 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1160 - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1161 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1164 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1165 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1166 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1168 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1169 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1172 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1173 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1175 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1177 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1178 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1180 // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1181 // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1182 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1183 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1185 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1186 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1187 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1188 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1189 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1190 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1191 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1192 - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1193 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1194 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1195 amount_satoshis: 3_000 - chan_feerate * OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1196 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1197 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1198 amount_satoshis: 4_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1199 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1200 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1201 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1202 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1204 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1206 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1207 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1209 let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1210 expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
1211 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1212 expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
1213 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1215 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1216 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }]);
1217 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1218 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }]);
1219 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1220 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1221 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1222 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1223 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1224 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1225 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1227 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1228 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1229 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1230 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1231 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1232 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1233 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1237 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1238 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true);
1239 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false);
1243 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1244 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1245 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1246 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1247 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1248 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1249 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1251 // Create some initial channels
1252 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1253 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 11_000_000);
1254 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1255 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1257 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1258 let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1259 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1260 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1261 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1263 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs and an output for both sides
1264 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
1266 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1268 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1269 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1271 // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1272 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1273 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1275 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1276 let revoked_htlc_success = {
1277 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1278 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1279 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1280 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
1281 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1285 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1286 let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
1287 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1288 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1289 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
1295 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1296 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
1297 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time.0, 0);
1298 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0, 0);
1300 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1301 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1302 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1303 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1304 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1305 let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1307 let as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1308 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), 1);
1309 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1311 // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1312 // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1313 // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1314 let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1315 // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1316 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1317 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1318 confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1319 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1320 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1321 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1322 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1323 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1324 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1325 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1327 assert_eq!(as_balances,
1328 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1330 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
1331 let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1332 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1333 check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
1334 check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]); // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked
1335 // outputs (which no longer includes the spent HTLC output)
1337 assert_eq!(as_balances,
1338 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1340 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1341 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1342 3_000 - chan_feerate * (revoked_htlc_success.weight() + as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight()) as u64 / 1000);
1344 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1345 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1346 // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1347 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1348 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1349 confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1350 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1351 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1352 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1353 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1354 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1355 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1356 amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1357 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1359 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1361 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1362 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1363 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1364 // to_self output to B
1365 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1366 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1367 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1368 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1369 amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1370 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1372 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1374 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1375 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1376 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1377 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1378 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1379 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1380 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1382 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1384 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1385 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1386 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1387 // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1388 let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1389 for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1390 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1393 // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1395 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1396 let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1397 for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1398 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1401 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
1402 let as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1403 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1405 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1406 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1408 // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1409 // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1410 // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1411 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1412 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1413 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1414 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1415 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1416 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1418 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1420 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1421 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1422 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1423 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1424 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1425 amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1426 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1428 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1430 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
1431 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1432 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1433 amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].output[0].value,
1434 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1435 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1436 amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1437 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1439 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1441 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1442 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1443 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1444 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
1446 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1448 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1449 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1450 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1451 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1452 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1453 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1454 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1458 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
1459 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1460 // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1461 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1462 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1463 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1464 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1465 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1466 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1467 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1468 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1469 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1471 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1472 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1473 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1474 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1476 // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1477 // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1478 // revocation-claim transaction.
1480 let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1481 let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1483 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1485 // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1486 // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1487 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1488 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1490 // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1491 let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1493 assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), 2);
1494 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1495 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1497 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1498 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1501 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1504 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1505 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1507 let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1508 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1509 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1511 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1512 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1513 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1514 let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1516 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1517 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1518 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1519 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1520 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1521 payment_hash: revoked_payment_hash,
1522 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1523 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1524 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1525 payment_hash: claimed_payment_hash,
1527 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1529 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1530 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1531 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1534 let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1535 // Currently the revoked commitment outputs are all claimed in one aggregated transaction
1536 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 1);
1537 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1538 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1540 let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1542 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1543 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1544 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1545 confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1546 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1547 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1548 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1549 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1550 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1551 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1552 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1553 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1555 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1557 // Confirm A's HTLC-Success tranasction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1559 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[1]);
1560 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage, None, true, false);
1561 let mut claim_txn_2: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1562 claim_txn_2.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| if tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid()) { 0 } else { 1 });
1563 // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1564 // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1565 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1566 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 2);
1567 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1568 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1569 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1571 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1572 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1573 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1574 confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1575 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1576 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1577 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1578 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1579 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1580 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1581 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1582 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1583 // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1584 // anyway, so its not a big change.
1585 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1587 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1589 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1590 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1592 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1593 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1594 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1595 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1596 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1597 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1598 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1599 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1600 // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1601 // anyway, so its not a big change.
1602 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1604 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1606 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1607 let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1609 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1610 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1611 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1612 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1613 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1614 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1615 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1616 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1617 confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1619 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1621 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1622 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1624 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1625 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1626 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1627 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1628 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1629 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1631 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1633 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1634 let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1636 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1637 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
1638 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1640 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1642 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1644 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1645 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1646 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1647 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1649 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1650 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1651 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1652 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1653 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1654 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1655 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1658 fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
1659 // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
1660 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1661 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1663 let new_chain_monitor;
1665 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1666 let node_deserialized;
1668 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1670 // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
1671 // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
1672 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
1673 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
1675 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
1676 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1677 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1678 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
1679 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1681 let commitment_tx = {
1682 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1683 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1684 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
1685 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
1689 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
1691 // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
1692 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1693 let htlc_timeout_tx = {
1694 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1695 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1696 check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
1700 // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
1701 // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
1702 if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
1703 let serialized_monitor = hex::decode(
1704 "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",
1706 reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
1709 // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
1710 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1711 if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
1712 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1715 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1716 if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
1717 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
1719 assert!(txn.len() < 6);
1722 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
1723 assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
1724 assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
1725 assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
1731 fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
1732 do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
1733 do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
1736 fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) {
1737 // Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every
1738 // `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call.
1739 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1740 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1741 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1743 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1744 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1746 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
1747 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1749 let (_, _, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
1750 &nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 500_000_000
1752 const HTLC_AMT_MSAT: u64 = 1_000_000;
1753 const HTLC_AMT_SAT: u64 = HTLC_AMT_MSAT / 1000;
1754 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_AMT_MSAT);
1756 let htlc_expiry = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1;
1758 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(&nodes[0], &chan_id);
1759 assert_eq!(commitment_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 /* commitment tx only */} else { 2 /* commitment and htlc timeout tx */ });
1760 check_spends!(&commitment_txn[0], &funding_tx);
1761 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_txn[0]);
1762 check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
1763 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed,
1764 false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1765 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1767 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1769 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1770 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1771 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` on anchors
1772 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1773 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1776 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1778 // Set up a helper closure we'll use throughout our test. We should only expect retries without
1779 // bumps if fees have not increased after a block has been connected (assuming the height timer
1780 // re-evaluates at every block) or after `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` is called.
1781 let mut prev_htlc_tx_feerate = None;
1782 let mut check_htlc_retry = |should_retry: bool, should_bump: bool| -> Option<Transaction> {
1783 let (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) = if anchors {
1784 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
1785 let events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1786 assert_eq!(events.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
1791 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
1792 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
1793 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1794 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1795 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1796 check_spends!(&htlc_tx, &commitment_txn[0], &coinbase_tx);
1797 let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value -
1798 htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>();
1799 let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
1800 (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
1802 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1805 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1806 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1807 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
1811 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1812 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]);
1813 let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value;
1814 let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
1815 (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
1818 assert!(htlc_tx_feerate > prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take().unwrap());
1819 } else if let Some(prev_feerate) = prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take() {
1820 assert_eq!(htlc_tx_feerate, prev_feerate);
1822 prev_htlc_tx_feerate = Some(htlc_tx_feerate);
1826 // Connect blocks up to one before the HTLC expires. This should not result in a claim/retry.
1827 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_expiry - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
1828 check_htlc_retry(false, false);
1830 // Connect one more block, producing our first claim.
1831 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1832 check_htlc_retry(true, false);
1834 // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
1835 // transactions pre-anchors.
1836 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1837 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1839 // Trigger a call and we should have another retry, but without a bump.
1840 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1841 check_htlc_retry(true, false);
1843 // Double the feerate and trigger a call, expecting a fee-bumped retry.
1844 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
1845 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1846 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1848 // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
1849 // transactions pre-anchors.
1850 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1851 let htlc_tx = check_htlc_retry(true, anchors).unwrap();
1853 // Mine the HTLC transaction to ensure we don't retry claims while they're confirmed.
1854 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_tx);
1855 // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transactions,
1856 // we'll receive an extra bumped claim.
1857 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
1858 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1859 nodes[0].wallet_source.remove_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 1 });
1860 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1862 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1863 check_htlc_retry(false, false);
1867 fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() {
1868 do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false);
1869 do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true);
1873 fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
1874 // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
1875 // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
1876 // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
1877 // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
1878 // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
1879 // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
1880 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1881 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1882 let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
1883 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
1884 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1885 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1886 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
1887 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1889 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
1890 &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
1892 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
1893 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000);
1895 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1896 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1898 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
1900 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
1901 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
1903 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
1905 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1906 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1907 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
1910 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
1911 &payment_hash_2, &payment_preimage_2, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
1912 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
1914 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
1915 &payment_hash_1, &payment_preimage_1, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
1916 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
1919 let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1920 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
1921 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
1922 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
1923 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1925 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1926 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1927 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
1928 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1929 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1932 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1933 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
1934 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1935 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1936 let anchor_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1937 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1938 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
1939 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
1940 (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
1942 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1945 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[2].value, 1_000); // HTLC A -> B
1946 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[3].value, 2_000); // HTLC B -> A
1948 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
1949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1950 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
1951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1954 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1955 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
1957 let htlc_preimage_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1958 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1959 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1960 check_spends!(htlc_preimage_tx, commitment_tx);
1962 let htlc_timeout_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1963 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1964 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1965 check_spends!(htlc_timeout_tx, commitment_tx);
1967 if let Some(commitment_tx) = txn.pop() {
1968 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
1972 let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1973 // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
1974 // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
1975 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
1976 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
1977 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
1978 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
1980 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2);
1982 let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1983 for event in holder_events {
1985 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
1986 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
1987 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1988 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1989 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1990 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx, anchor_tx);
1991 htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
1993 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1997 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
1998 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2000 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2002 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
2004 let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2005 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2006 for event in holder_events {
2008 Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
2009 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2013 // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
2014 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2015 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2016 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2017 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2021 fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
2022 // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
2023 // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
2024 // revoked commitment.
2025 let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2026 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2027 // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
2028 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2029 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2031 let bob_chain_monitor;
2033 let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
2034 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2035 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2036 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2037 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2038 let bob_deserialized;
2040 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2042 let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2043 let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2045 // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
2046 let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
2048 // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
2049 let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2050 let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2051 let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2052 let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2054 // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
2055 // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
2057 let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
2058 let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
2060 // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
2061 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
2062 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
2063 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
2064 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
2066 // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
2068 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2069 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2071 // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
2073 nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
2074 bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
2076 for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
2077 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
2078 for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
2079 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
2080 &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2081 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2086 // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
2087 // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
2088 // the HTLCs still pending.
2089 *nodes[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2090 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
2091 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
2092 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2093 let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = {
2094 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2095 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2096 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2097 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2098 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
2099 check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
2100 check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3);
2101 (txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone())
2103 check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3);
2104 check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
2105 (txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone())
2109 // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
2110 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2111 let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2112 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2113 let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2114 for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
2115 let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat() * (idx + 1) as u64;
2116 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2118 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2119 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2120 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2122 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2125 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, utxo_value);
2127 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event),
2128 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2130 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2131 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2132 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]);
2133 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2134 anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone());
2137 for node in &nodes {
2138 mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_txs[1]]);
2140 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
2141 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
2142 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2144 // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
2147 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2148 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
2150 let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() {
2151 (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] })
2153 (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] })
2156 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2157 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
2158 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
2159 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2160 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
2161 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
2164 // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
2165 // through the success path.
2166 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2167 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2168 // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2169 // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2170 match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
2171 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
2172 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
2173 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
2174 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2175 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
2176 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2179 _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
2182 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
2183 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
2184 let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2185 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2187 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2188 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2189 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
2190 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2191 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
2194 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
2196 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2197 input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
2198 previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2199 ..Default::default()
2201 output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
2202 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
2203 script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
2206 let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
2207 for event in events {
2208 // We don't use the `BumpTransactionEventHandler` here because it does not support
2209 // creating one transaction from multiple `HTLCResolution` events.
2210 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
2211 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
2212 for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
2213 assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
2214 htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
2215 htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&secp));
2217 descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
2218 htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
2220 panic!("Unexpected event");
2223 for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
2224 let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
2225 let signer = htlc_descriptor.derive_channel_signer(&nodes[1].keys_manager);
2226 let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
2227 let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&secp);
2228 htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
2230 let fee_utxo_sig = {
2231 let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
2232 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
2233 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2235 let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2236 let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2237 sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2240 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2241 check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
2245 for node in &nodes {
2246 mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
2249 // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
2250 // the second level instead.
2251 let revoked_claim_transactions = {
2252 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2253 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2255 let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
2256 tx.input.len() == 2 &&
2257 tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2258 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
2259 ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2260 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
2261 for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
2262 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
2265 let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = HashMap::new();
2266 for current_tx in txn.into_iter() {
2267 revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx);
2269 revoked_claim_transaction_map
2271 for node in &nodes {
2272 mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claim_transactions.values().collect::<Vec<_>>());
2276 // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
2278 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2279 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
2281 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2282 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2284 // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2285 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2286 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2288 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2289 let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2290 assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4);
2291 for event in spendable_output_events {
2292 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event {
2293 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2294 assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap()));
2295 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2296 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
2299 if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(_) = &outputs[0] {
2300 check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_a, &revoked_commitment_b);
2302 check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
2305 panic!("unexpected event");
2309 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2310 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2311 // On the Alice side, the individual to_self_claim are still pending confirmation.
2312 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 2);
2313 // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
2314 // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
2315 // balances to claim.
2317 // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
2318 // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
2319 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);