_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
  11
  12 use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
  13 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  14 use ln::channel;
  15 use ln::channelmanager::BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
  16 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
  17 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
  18 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
  19
  20 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  21 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  23
  24 use prelude::*;
  25
  26 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  27
  28 #[test]
  29 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
  30         // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
  31         // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
  32         // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
  33         // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
  34         // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
  35         // HTLC.
  36         //
  37         // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
  38         //
  39         // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
  40         // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
  41         //
  42         // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
  43         // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
  44         // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
  45         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
  46         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
  47         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
  48         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  49
  50         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
  51         let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
  52
  53         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
  54         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
  55         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
  56
  57         let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
  58
  59         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  60         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
  61         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
  62
  63         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  64         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
  65         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  66
  67         // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
  68         // transaction for nodes[1].
  69         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
  70         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  71         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
  72         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
  73         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
  74
  75         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
  76         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  77         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  78         let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
  79
  80         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
  81         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
  82         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
  83 }
  84
  85 #[test]
  86 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
  87         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
  88         // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
  89         // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
  90         // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
  91         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  92         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  93         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
  94         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  95
  96         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
  97                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
  98         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
  99         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 100
 101         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
 102         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 103
 104         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 105                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000
 106                 }],
 107                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 108         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
 109                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 110
 111         nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 112         let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 113         nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown);
 114         let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 115         nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_1_shutdown);
 116
 117         let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 118         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
 119         let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 120         nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
 121         let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 122         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
 123         let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 124         assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
 125
 126         let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 127         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
 128         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
 129
 130         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 131         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 132
 133         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 134         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 135
 136         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 137         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 138
 139         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 140                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000,
 141                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 142                 }],
 143                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 144         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 145                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1000,
 146                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 147                 }],
 148                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 149
 150         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 151         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 152
 153         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 154                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 155         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 156                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 157
 158         let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 159         assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
 160         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 161                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 162                 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 163                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 164                 check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
 165         }
 166
 167         let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 168         assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
 169         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 170                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 171                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 172                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 173                 check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
 174         }
 175         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 176         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 177 }
 178
 179 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
 180         v.sort_unstable();
 181         v
 182 }
 183
 184 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
 185         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
 186         // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
 187         // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
 188         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 189         if prev_commitment_tx {
 190                 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 191                 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 192                 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 193                 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
 194                 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
 195         }
 196         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 197         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 198         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 199
 200         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 201                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 202         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 203         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 204
 205         // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
 206         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
 207         // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
 208         // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
 209         let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
 210         // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
 211         let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
 212
 213         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 214
 215         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
 216         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 217
 218         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
 219         // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
 220         // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
 221         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 222                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 223                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 224                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 225                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 226                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 227                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 228                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 229                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 230                 }]),
 231                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 232         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 233                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 234                 }],
 235                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 236
 237         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
 238         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 239         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
 240
 241         let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 242         // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
 243         // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
 244         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
 245         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 246         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
 247
 248         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
 249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 250         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
 251
 252         if prev_commitment_tx {
 253                 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
 254                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
 255                 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
 256                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
 257                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 258                 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 259                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
 260                 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 261                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 262                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
 263                 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 264                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 265         }
 266
 267         // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
 268         // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
 269         let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 270                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
 271                                 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
 272                                 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
 273                                 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
 274                                 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
 275                                 // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
 276                                 chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) +
 277                                                                 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
 278                                                                 channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 279                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 280                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 281                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 282                 }];
 283         if !prev_commitment_tx {
 284                 a_expected_balances.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 285                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 286                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 287                 });
 288         }
 289         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
 290                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 291         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 292                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
 293                 }],
 294                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 295
 296         // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
 297         // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
 298         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 299         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 300         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 301
 302         let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 303         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), if prev_commitment_tx { 4 } else { 5 });
 304         if prev_commitment_tx {
 305                 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[3], b_broadcast_txn[2]);
 306         } else {
 307                 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0], b_broadcast_txn[3]);
 308                 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1], b_broadcast_txn[4]);
 309         }
 310         // b_broadcast_txn[0] should spend the HTLC output of the commitment tx for 3_000 sats
 311         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 312         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 313         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 314         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 315         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 316         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 317         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[2], funding_tx);
 318
 319         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 320         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 321         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 322         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 323         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 324         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 325         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 326         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 327         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 328         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 329
 330         // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
 331         // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
 332         // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
 333         // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
 334         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 335         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 336
 337         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 338                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 339                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 340                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 341                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 342                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 343                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 344                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 345                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 346                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 347                 }]),
 348                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 349         // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
 350         // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
 351         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 352                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 353                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 354                 },
 355                 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
 356                 // long.
 357                 Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 358                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 359                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 360                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 361                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 362                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 363                 }]),
 364                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 365
 366         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 367         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, true);
 368         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 369
 370         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
 371         // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
 372         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 373                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 374                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 375                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 376                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 377                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 378                 }]),
 379                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 380         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 381                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 382                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 383                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 384                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 385                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 386                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 387                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 388                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 389                 }]),
 390                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 391
 392         let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 393         assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
 394         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 395                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 396                 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 397                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 398                 check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
 399         }
 400
 401         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 402
 403         // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
 404         // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
 405         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 406         if prev_commitment_tx {
 407                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
 408         } else {
 409                 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
 410         }
 411         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 412                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 413                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 414                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 415                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 416                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 417                 }]),
 418                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 419         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 420         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 421                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 422                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 423                 }],
 424                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 425
 426         // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
 427         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
 428         let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 429         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 3);
 430         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], funding_tx);
 431         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 432         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 433         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
 434         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
 435         assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout,
 436                    a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
 437         // a_broadcast_txn [1] and [2] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
 438         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 439         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 440
 441         // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
 442         // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
 443         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
 444         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 445         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 446                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 447                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 448                 }],
 449                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 450         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
 451         // balance entry.
 452         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 453         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 454                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 455         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, true);
 456
 457         let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 458         assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
 459         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 460                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 461                 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 462                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 463                 check_spends!(spend_tx, a_broadcast_txn[2]);
 464         } else { panic!(); }
 465
 466         // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
 467         // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
 468         // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
 469         let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 470         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 471
 472         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 473                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 474                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 475                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 476                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 477                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 478                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 479                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 480                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 481                 }]),
 482                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 483
 484         // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
 485         // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
 486         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 487
 488         let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 489         assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
 490         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 491                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 492                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 493                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 494                 check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
 495         }
 496
 497         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 498                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 499                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 500                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 501                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 502                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 503                 }]),
 504                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 505
 506         // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
 507         // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
 508         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 509
 510         let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 511         assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
 512         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 513                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 514                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 515                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 516                 check_spends!(spend_tx, b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 517         } else { panic!(); }
 518
 519         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 520                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 521                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 522                 }],
 523                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 524
 525         // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
 526         // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
 527         // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
 528         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
 529         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 530                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 531                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 532                 }],
 533                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 534         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 535         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 536                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 537 }
 538
 539 #[test]
 540 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
 541         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
 542         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
 543 }
 544
 545 #[test]
 546 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
 547         // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
 548         // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
 549         // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
 550         // delay prior to spendability.
 551         //
 552         // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
 553         // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
 554         // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
 555         // claim by our counterparty).
 556         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 557         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 558         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 559         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 560
 561         // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
 562         // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
 563         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 564         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 565
 566         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
 567         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 568         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
 569         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 570
 571         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 572         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 573         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 574
 575         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 576         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
 577
 578         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
 579         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
 580         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 581
 582         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 583         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 584         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 585
 586         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 587         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
 588         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
 589         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 590         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 591         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
 592
 593         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
 594         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 595
 596         // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions
 597         let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 598         assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 3);
 599         check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
 600         check_spends!(as_txn[2], as_txn[0]);
 601         check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
 602
 603         // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
 604         // claimable balances.
 605         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 606         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 607         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 608         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 609         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 610
 611         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 612                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 613                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 614                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 615                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 616                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 617                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 618                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 619                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 620                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 621                 }]),
 622                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 623
 624         // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
 625         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 626         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 627         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 628         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 629         let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 630         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 3);
 631         check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]);
 632         check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[1], funding_tx);
 633         check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[2], bs_htlc_claim_txn[1]);
 634
 635         // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
 636         // transaction.
 637         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
 638         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 639                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 640                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 641                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 642                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 643                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 644                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 645                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 646                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 647                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 648                 }]),
 649                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 650         assert_eq!(as_txn[1].lock_time, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1); // as_txn[1] can be included in the next block
 651
 652         // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
 653         // "awaiting confirmations" one.
 654         let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 655         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
 656         // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
 657         // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
 658         // call, as described, two hunks down.
 659         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 660                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 661                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 662                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 663                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 664                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 665                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 666                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 667                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 668                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 669                 }]),
 670                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 671
 672         // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
 673         // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
 674         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
 675         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
 676         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 677                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 678                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 679                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 680                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 681                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 682                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 683                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 684                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 685                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 686                 }]),
 687                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 688
 689         // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
 690         // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
 691         // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
 692         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 693         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
 694
 695         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 696                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 697                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 698                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 699                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 700                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 701                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 702                 }]),
 703                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 704
 705         // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 706         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 707         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 708         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 709                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 710                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 711                 }],
 712                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 713         let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 714         assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
 715         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 716                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 717                 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 718                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 719                 check_spends!(spend_tx, as_txn[0]);
 720         }
 721
 722         // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 723         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 724         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 725         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 726         let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 727         assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
 728         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 729                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 730                 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 731                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 732                 check_spends!(spend_tx, as_txn[1]);
 733         }
 734 }