1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
12 use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
13 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
15 use ln::channelmanager::BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
16 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
17 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
18 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
26 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
29 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
30 // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
31 // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
32 // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
33 // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
34 // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
37 // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
39 // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
40 // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
42 // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
43 // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
44 // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
45 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
46 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
47 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
48 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
50 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
51 let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
53 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
54 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
55 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
57 let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
59 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
60 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
61 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
63 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
64 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
65 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
67 // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
68 // transaction for nodes[1].
69 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
70 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
71 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
72 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
73 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
75 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
76 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
77 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
78 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
80 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
81 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
82 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
86 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
87 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
88 // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
89 // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
90 // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
91 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
92 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
93 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
94 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
96 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
97 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
98 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
99 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
101 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
102 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
104 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
105 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000
107 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
108 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
109 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
111 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
112 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
113 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown);
114 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
115 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_1_shutdown);
117 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
118 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
119 let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
120 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
121 let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
122 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
123 let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
124 assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
126 let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
127 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
128 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
130 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
131 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
133 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
134 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
136 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
137 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
139 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
140 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000,
141 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
143 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
144 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
145 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1000,
146 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
148 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
150 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
151 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
153 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
154 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
155 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
156 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
158 let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
159 assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
160 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
161 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
162 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
163 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
164 check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
167 let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
168 assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
169 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
170 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
171 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
172 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
173 check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
175 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
176 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
179 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
184 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
185 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
186 // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
187 // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
188 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
189 if prev_commitment_tx {
190 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
191 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
192 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
193 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
194 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
196 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
197 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
198 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
200 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
201 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
202 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
203 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
205 // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
206 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
207 // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
208 // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
209 let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
210 // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
211 let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
213 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
215 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
216 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
218 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
219 // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
220 // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
221 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
222 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
223 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
224 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
225 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
226 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
227 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
228 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
229 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
231 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
232 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
233 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
235 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
237 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
238 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
239 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
241 let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
242 // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
243 // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
244 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
245 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
246 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
248 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
250 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
252 if prev_commitment_tx {
253 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
254 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
255 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
256 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
258 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
259 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
260 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
261 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
262 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
263 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
264 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
267 // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
268 // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
269 let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
270 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
271 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
272 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
273 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
274 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
275 // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
276 chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) +
277 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
278 channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
279 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
280 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
281 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
283 if !prev_commitment_tx {
284 a_expected_balances.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
285 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
286 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
289 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
290 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
291 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
292 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
294 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
296 // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
297 // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
298 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
299 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
300 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
302 let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
303 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), if prev_commitment_tx { 4 } else { 5 });
304 if prev_commitment_tx {
305 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[3], b_broadcast_txn[2]);
307 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0], b_broadcast_txn[3]);
308 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1], b_broadcast_txn[4]);
310 // b_broadcast_txn[0] should spend the HTLC output of the commitment tx for 3_000 sats
311 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
312 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
313 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
314 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
315 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
316 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
317 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[2], funding_tx);
319 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
320 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
322 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
323 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
324 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
325 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
326 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
327 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
328 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
330 // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
331 // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
332 // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
333 // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
334 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
335 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
337 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
338 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
339 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
340 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
341 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
342 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
343 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
344 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
345 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
346 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
348 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
349 // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
350 // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
351 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
352 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
353 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
355 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
357 Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
358 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
359 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
360 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
361 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
362 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
364 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
366 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
367 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, true);
368 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
370 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
371 // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
372 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
373 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
374 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
375 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
376 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
377 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
379 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
380 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
381 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
382 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
383 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
384 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
385 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
386 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
387 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
388 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
390 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
392 let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
393 assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
394 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
395 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
396 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
397 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
398 check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
401 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
403 // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
404 // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
405 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
406 if prev_commitment_tx {
407 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
409 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
411 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
412 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
413 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
414 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
415 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
416 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
418 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
419 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
420 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
421 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
422 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
424 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
426 // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
427 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
428 let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
429 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 3);
430 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], funding_tx);
431 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
432 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
433 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
434 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
435 assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout,
436 a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
437 // a_broadcast_txn [1] and [2] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
438 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
439 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
441 // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
442 // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
443 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
444 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
445 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
446 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
447 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
449 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
450 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
452 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
453 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
454 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
455 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, true);
457 let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
458 assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
459 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
460 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
461 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
462 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
463 check_spends!(spend_tx, a_broadcast_txn[2]);
466 // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
467 // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
468 // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
469 let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
470 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
472 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
473 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
474 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
475 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
476 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
477 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
478 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
479 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
480 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
482 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
484 // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
485 // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
486 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
488 let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
489 assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
490 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
491 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
492 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
493 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
494 check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
497 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
498 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
499 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
500 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
501 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
502 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
504 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
506 // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
507 // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
508 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
510 let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
511 assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
512 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
513 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
514 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
515 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
516 check_spends!(spend_tx, b_broadcast_txn[0]);
519 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
520 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
521 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
523 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
525 // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
526 // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
527 // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
528 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
529 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
530 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
531 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
533 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
534 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
535 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
536 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
540 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
541 do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
542 do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
546 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
547 // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
548 // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
549 // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
550 // delay prior to spendability.
552 // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
553 // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
554 // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
555 // claim by our counterparty).
556 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
557 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
558 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
559 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
561 // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
562 // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
563 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
564 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
566 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
567 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
568 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
571 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
572 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
573 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
575 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
576 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
578 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
579 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
582 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
583 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
584 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
586 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
587 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
588 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
589 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
591 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
593 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
594 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
596 // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions
597 let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
598 assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 3);
599 check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
600 check_spends!(as_txn[2], as_txn[0]);
601 check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
603 // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
604 // claimable balances.
605 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
606 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
607 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
608 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
609 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
611 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
612 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
613 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
614 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
615 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
616 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
617 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
618 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
619 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
620 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
622 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
624 // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
625 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
626 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
627 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
628 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
629 let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
630 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 3);
631 check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]);
632 check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[1], funding_tx);
633 check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[2], bs_htlc_claim_txn[1]);
635 // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
637 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
638 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
639 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
640 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
641 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
642 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
643 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
644 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
645 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
646 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
647 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
649 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
650 assert_eq!(as_txn[1].lock_time, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1); // as_txn[1] can be included in the next block
652 // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
653 // "awaiting confirmations" one.
654 let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
655 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
656 // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
657 // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
658 // call, as described, two hunks down.
659 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
660 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
661 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
662 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
663 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
664 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
665 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
666 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
667 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
668 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
670 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
672 // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
673 // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
674 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
675 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
676 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
677 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
678 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
679 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
680 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
681 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
682 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
683 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
684 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
685 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
687 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
689 // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
690 // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
691 // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
692 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
693 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
695 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
696 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
697 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
698 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
699 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
700 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
701 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
703 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
705 // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
706 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
707 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
708 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
709 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
710 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
712 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
713 let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
714 assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
715 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
716 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
717 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
718 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
719 check_spends!(spend_tx, as_txn[0]);
722 // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
723 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
724 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
725 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
726 let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
727 assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
728 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
729 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
730 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
731 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
732 check_spends!(spend_tx, as_txn[1]);