_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
  11
  12 use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
  13 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  14 use ln::channel;
  15 use ln::channelmanager::BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
  16 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
  17 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
  18 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
  19
  20 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  21 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  23 use bitcoin::Transaction;
  24
  25 use prelude::*;
  26
  27 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  28
  29 #[test]
  30 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
  31         // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
  32         // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
  33         // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
  34         // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
  35         // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
  36         // HTLC.
  37         //
  38         // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
  39         //
  40         // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
  41         // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
  42         //
  43         // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
  44         // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
  45         // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
  46         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
  47         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
  48         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
  49         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  50
  51         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
  52         let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
  53
  54         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
  55         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
  56         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
  57
  58         let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
  59
  60         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  61         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
  62         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
  63
  64         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  65         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
  66         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  67
  68         // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
  69         // transaction for nodes[1].
  70         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
  71         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  72         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
  73         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
  74         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
  75
  76         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
  77         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
  78         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  79         let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
  80
  81         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
  82         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
  83         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
  84 }
  85
  86 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction) {
  87         let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
  88         assert_eq!(spendable.len(), 1);
  89         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
  90                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
  91                 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
  92                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
  93                 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
  94         } else { panic!(); }
  95 }
  96
  97 #[test]
  98 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
  99         // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
 100         // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
 101         // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
 102         // confirmations.
 103         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 104         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 105         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 106         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 107
 108         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 109
 110         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
 111
 112         // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
 113         // before forwarding.
 114         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
 115         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
 116
 117         // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
 118         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
 119
 120         // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
 121         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
 122         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 123         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 124         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 125
 126         let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 127         assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 2);
 128         check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
 129         check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[1], chan.3);
 130
 131         // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
 132         // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
 133         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 134         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 135         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 136
 137         // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
 138         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
 139         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 140         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 141
 142         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 143         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, true);
 144 }
 145
 146 #[test]
 147 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
 148         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
 149         // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
 150         // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
 151         // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
 152         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 153         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 154         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 155         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 156
 157         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 158                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 159         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 160         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 161
 162         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
 163         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 164
 165         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 166                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000
 167                 }],
 168                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 169         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
 170                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 171
 172         nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 173         let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 174         nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown);
 175         let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 176         nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_1_shutdown);
 177
 178         let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 179         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
 180         let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 181         nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
 182         let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 183         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
 184         let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 185         assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
 186
 187         let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 188         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
 189         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
 190
 191         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 192         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 193
 194         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 195         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 196
 197         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 198         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 199
 200         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 201                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000,
 202                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 203                 }],
 204                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 205         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 206                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1000,
 207                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 208                 }],
 209                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 210
 211         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 212         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 213
 214         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 215                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 216         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 217                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 218
 219         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 220         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 221
 222         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 223         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 224 }
 225
 226 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
 227         v.sort_unstable();
 228         v
 229 }
 230
 231 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
 232         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
 233         // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
 234         // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
 235         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 236         if prev_commitment_tx {
 237                 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 238                 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 239                 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 240                 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
 241                 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
 242         }
 243         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 244         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 245         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 246
 247         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 248                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 249         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 250         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 251
 252         // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
 253         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
 254         // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
 255         // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
 256         let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
 257         // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
 258         let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
 259
 260         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 261
 262         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
 263         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 264
 265         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
 266         // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
 267         // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
 268         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 269                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 270                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 271                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 272                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 273                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 274                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 275                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 276                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 277                 }]),
 278                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 279         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 280                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 281                 }],
 282                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 283
 284         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
 285         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 286         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
 287
 288         let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 289         // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
 290         // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
 291         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
 292         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 293         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
 294
 295         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
 296         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 297         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
 298
 299         if prev_commitment_tx {
 300                 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
 301                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
 302                 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
 303                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
 304                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 305                 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 306                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
 307                 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 308                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 309                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
 310                 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 311                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 312         }
 313
 314         // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
 315         // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
 316         let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 317                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
 318                                 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
 319                                 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
 320                                 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
 321                                 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
 322                                 // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
 323                                 chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) +
 324                                                                 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
 325                                                                 channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 326                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 327                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 328                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 329                 }];
 330         if !prev_commitment_tx {
 331                 a_expected_balances.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 332                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 333                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 334                 });
 335         }
 336         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
 337                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 338         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 339                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
 340                 }],
 341                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 342
 343         // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
 344         // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
 345         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 346         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 347         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 348
 349         let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 350         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), if prev_commitment_tx { 4 } else { 5 });
 351         if prev_commitment_tx {
 352                 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[3], b_broadcast_txn[2]);
 353         } else {
 354                 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0], b_broadcast_txn[3]);
 355                 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1], b_broadcast_txn[4]);
 356         }
 357         // b_broadcast_txn[0] should spend the HTLC output of the commitment tx for 3_000 sats
 358         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 359         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 360         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 361         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 362         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 363         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 364         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[2], funding_tx);
 365
 366         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 367         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 368         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 369         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 370         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 371         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 372         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 373         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 374         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 375         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 376
 377         // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
 378         // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
 379         // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
 380         // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
 381         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 382         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 383
 384         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 385                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 386                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 387                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 388                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 389                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 390                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 391                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 392                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 393                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 394                 }]),
 395                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 396         // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
 397         // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
 398         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 399                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 400                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 401                 },
 402                 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
 403                 // long.
 404                 Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 405                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 406                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 407                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 408                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 409                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 410                 }]),
 411                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 412
 413         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 414         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, true);
 415         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 416
 417         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
 418         // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
 419         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 420                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 421                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 422                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 423                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 424                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 425                 }]),
 426                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 427         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 428                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 429                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 430                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 431                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 432                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 433                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 434                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 435                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 436                 }]),
 437                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 438
 439         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 440         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 441
 442         // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
 443         // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
 444         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 445         if prev_commitment_tx {
 446                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
 447         } else {
 448                 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
 449         }
 450         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 451                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 452                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 453                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 454                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 455                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 456                 }]),
 457                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 458         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 459         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 460                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 461                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 462                 }],
 463                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 464
 465         // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
 466         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
 467         let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 468         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 3);
 469         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], funding_tx);
 470         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 471         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 472         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
 473         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
 474         assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout,
 475                    a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
 476         // a_broadcast_txn [1] and [2] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
 477         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 478         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 479
 480         // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
 481         // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
 482         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
 483         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 484         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 485                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 486                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 487                 }],
 488                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 489         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
 490         // balance entry.
 491         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 492         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 493                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 494         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, true);
 495
 496         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
 497
 498         // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
 499         // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
 500         // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
 501         let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 502         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 503
 504         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 505                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 506                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 507                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 508                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 509                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 510                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 511                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 512                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 513                 }]),
 514                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 515
 516         // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
 517         // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
 518         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 519         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 520
 521         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 522                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 523                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 524                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 525                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 526                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 527                 }]),
 528                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 529
 530         // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
 531         // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
 532         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 533         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 534
 535         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 536                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 537                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 538                 }],
 539                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 540
 541         // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
 542         // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
 543         // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
 544         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
 545         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 546                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 547                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 548                 }],
 549                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 550         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 551         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 552                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 553 }
 554
 555 #[test]
 556 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
 557         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
 558         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
 559 }
 560
 561 #[test]
 562 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
 563         // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
 564         // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
 565         // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
 566         // delay prior to spendability.
 567         //
 568         // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
 569         // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
 570         // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
 571         // claim by our counterparty).
 572         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 573         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 574         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 575         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 576
 577         // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
 578         // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
 579         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 580         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 581
 582         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
 583         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 584         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
 585         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 586
 587         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 588         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 589         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 590
 591         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 592         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
 593
 594         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
 595         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
 596         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 597
 598         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 599         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 600         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 601
 602         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 603         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
 604         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
 605         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 606         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 607         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
 608
 609         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
 610         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 611
 612         // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions
 613         let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 614         assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 3);
 615         check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
 616         check_spends!(as_txn[2], as_txn[0]);
 617         check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
 618
 619         // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
 620         // claimable balances.
 621         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 622         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 623         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 624         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 625         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 626
 627         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 628                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 629                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 630                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 631                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 632                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 633                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 634                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 635                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 636                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 637                 }]),
 638                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 639
 640         // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
 641         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 642         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 643         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 644         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 645         let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 646         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 3);
 647         check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]);
 648         check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[1], funding_tx);
 649         check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[2], bs_htlc_claim_txn[1]);
 650
 651         // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
 652         // transaction.
 653         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
 654         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 655                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 656                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 657                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 658                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 659                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 660                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 661                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 662                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 663                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 664                 }]),
 665                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 666         assert_eq!(as_txn[1].lock_time, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1); // as_txn[1] can be included in the next block
 667
 668         // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
 669         // "awaiting confirmations" one.
 670         let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 671         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
 672         // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
 673         // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
 674         // call, as described, two hunks down.
 675         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 676                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 677                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 678                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 679                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 680                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 681                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 682                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 683                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 684                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 685                 }]),
 686                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 687
 688         // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
 689         // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
 690         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
 691         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
 692         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 693                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 694                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 695                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 696                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 697                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 698                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 699                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 700                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 701                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 702                 }]),
 703                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 704
 705         // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
 706         // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
 707         // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
 708         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 709         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
 710
 711         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 712                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 713                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 714                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 715                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 716                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 717                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 718                 }]),
 719                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 720
 721         // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 722         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 723         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 724         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 725                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 726                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 727                 }],
 728                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 729         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 730
 731         // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 732         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 733         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 734         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 735         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
 736 }