[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / monitor_tests.rs

// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
// history.
//
// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
// licenses.

//! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.

use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance};
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight};
use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
use crate::ln::channel;
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelManager, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
use crate::util::crypto::sign;
use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
use crate::util::test_utils;

use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, Script, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime, Witness};
use bitcoin::util::sighash::SighashCache;

use crate::prelude::*;

use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;

#[test]
fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
        // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
        // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
        // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
        // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
        // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
        // HTLC.
        //
        // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
        //
        // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
        // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
        //
        // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
        // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
        // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
        let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);

        let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
        nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);

        let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);

        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
        get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
        // transaction for nodes[1].
        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());

        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
        expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
}

fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction) {
        let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(spendable.len(), 1);
        if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
                assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
                let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
                        Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
                check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
        } else { panic!(); }
}

#[test]
fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
        // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
        // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
        // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
        // confirmations.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);

        let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;

        // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
        // before forwarding.
        let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);

        // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
        route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);

        // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);

        let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
        assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);

        // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
        // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
        assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
        assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());

        // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
        assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
        assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());

        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
        expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
}

#[test]
fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
        // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
        // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
        // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
        // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
                create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
        let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
        assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);

        let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
        let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);

        assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000
                }],
                nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
        assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
                nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());

        nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
        let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
        let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);

        let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
        let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
        let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
        let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        assert!(node_1_none.is_none());

        let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
        assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
        assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);

        mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);

        assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
        assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());

        assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
        assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());

        assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000,
                        confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
                }],
                nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
        assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 1000,
                        confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
                }],
                nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());

        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);

        assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
                nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
        assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
                nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());

        test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
        test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);

        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
}

fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
        v.sort_unstable();
        v
}

/// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
/// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
/// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
        let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
        let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
        eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
        assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
        assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
}

fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
        // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
        // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
        // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
        let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        if prev_commitment_tx {
                // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
                // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
                // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
                // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
                chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
        }
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
                create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
        let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
        assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);

        // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
        let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
        // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
        // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
        let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
        // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
        let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);

        let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety

        let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
        let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);

        let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
        let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
                amount_satoshis: 3_000,
                claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
                payment_hash,
        };
        let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
                amount_satoshis: 4_000,
                claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
                payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
        };
        let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
                amount_satoshis: 3_000,
                expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
                payment_hash,
        };
        let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
                amount_satoshis: 4_000,
                expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
                payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
        };
        let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
                amount_satoshis: 3_000,
                timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
                payment_hash,
                payment_preimage,
        };
        let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
                amount_satoshis: 4_000,
                timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
                payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
                payment_preimage: timeout_payment_preimage,
        };

        // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
        // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
                                (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
                }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000,
                }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);

        let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
        // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
        nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);

        nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);

        if prev_commitment_tx {
                // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
                nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
                expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
                nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
                let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
                let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        }

        // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
        // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
        let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
                                4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
                                3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
                                1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
                                3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
                                // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
                                chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) +
                                                                if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
                                                                channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
                }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
        if !prev_commitment_tx {
                a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
        }
        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
                sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
        assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
                }],
                nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());

        // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
        // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
        let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
        mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);

        let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
        assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
        // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
        check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
        check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
        assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
        assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);

        assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
        assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
        assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());

        // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
        // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
        // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
        // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
        assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
        assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());

        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
                                (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
                        confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
                }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
        // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
        // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000,
                        confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
                },
                // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
                // long.
                received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
        expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);

        // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
        // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000,
                        confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
                }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
        assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());

        // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
        // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
        mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
        if prev_commitment_tx {
                expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
        } else {
                expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, false);
        }
        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
        assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()],
                nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());

        // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
        let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
        assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
        assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
        assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
        assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
                   a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
        // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
        assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
        assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);

        // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
        // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
        mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
        assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 4_000,
                        confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
                }],
                nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
        // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
        // balance entry.
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
        assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
                nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
        expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);

        test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);

        // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
        // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
        // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
        let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);

        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000,
                        confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
                }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 3_000,
                        confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
                }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
        // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
        test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);

        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 3_000,
                        confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
                }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
        // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
        test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);

        assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
                nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());

        // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
        // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
        // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
        assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
                nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
        assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
                nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());

        // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
        // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
        // monitor events or claimable balances.
        for node in nodes.iter() {
                connect_blocks(node, 6);
                connect_blocks(node, 6);
                assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
                assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
        }
}

#[test]
fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
        do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
        do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
}

#[test]
fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
        // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
        // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
        // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
        // delay prior to spendability.
        //
        // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
        // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
        // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
        // claim by our counterparty).
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
        // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
        let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
        let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };

        let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
        let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
        nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);

        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
        expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);

        let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
        nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);

        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
        expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
        nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
        get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);

        let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
        let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);

        // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions
        let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
        assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 3);
        check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
        check_spends!(as_txn[2], as_txn[0]);
        check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);

        // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
        // claimable balances.
        let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
        mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);

        let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
                amount_satoshis: 10_000,
                claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
                payment_hash,
        };
        let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
                amount_satoshis: 20_000,
                claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
                payment_hash: payment_hash_2,
        };

        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
                                (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
                        confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
                }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
        let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
        assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]);

        // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
        // transaction.
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
                                (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
                        confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
                }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
        assert_eq!(as_txn[1].lock_time.0, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1); // as_txn[1] can be included in the next block

        // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
        // "awaiting confirmations" one.
        let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
        mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
        // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
        // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
        // call, as described, two hunks down.
        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
                                (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
                        confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
                }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 10_000,
                        confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
                }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
        // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
        mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
        expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, true, false);
        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
                                (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
                        confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
                }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 10_000,
                        confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
                }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
        // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
        // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
        expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);

        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
                                (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
                        confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
                }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 10_000,
                        confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
                }]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
        // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
        assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 10_000,
                        confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
                }],
                nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
        test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);

        // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
        // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
        assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
        test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);

        // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
        // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
        // monitor events or claimable balances.
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
        assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
        assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
}

#[test]
fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
        // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
        // have a preimage.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
        let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };

        // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
        let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
        let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
        let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety

        let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
        let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);

        let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
                amount_satoshis: 10_000,
                claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
                payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
        };
        let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
                amount_satoshis: 20_000,
                expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
                payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
        };
        let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
                amount_satoshis: 10_000,
                expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
                payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
        };
        let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
                amount_satoshis: 20_000,
                claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
                payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
        };

        // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
        // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
        // HTLC output is spent.

        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
                                (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
                }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
                        amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
                }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
        let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
        assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
        check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
        check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);

        // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
        // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
        let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
        let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
                                (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
                        confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
                }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);

        mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
        nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);

        assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
                sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);

        let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
        let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
                        confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
                }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
        assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
                sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
        // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
        // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
        // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.

        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
        let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
        assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
                [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);

        assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
                sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
        assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
                sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
        test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
        bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });

        // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
        nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1));
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
                [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
        let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
        assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);

        assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
                sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
        assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
                sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
        // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
        mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
        let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
                                (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
                        confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
                }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 10_000,
                        confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
                }]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
                                (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
                        confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
                }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 10_000,
                        confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
                }]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
        // payment failure event.
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
        expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);

        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
                                (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
                        confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
                }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 10_000,
                        confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
                }]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
        assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 10_000,
                        confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
                }],
                nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
        test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);

        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
        assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
        test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);

        // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
        // was already claimed.
        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
        let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 20_000,
                        confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
                }]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 20_000,
                        confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
                }]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
        expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);

        assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
                nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
        test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);

        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
        assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());

        // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
        // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
        // monitor events or claimable balances.
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
        assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
        assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
}

fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
        let mut v = v_orig.clone();
        for t in extra_ts {
                v.push((*t).clone());
        }
        v.sort_unstable();
        v
}

fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
        // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
        let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
        // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
        // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
        // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
        chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
                create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
        let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
        assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);

        // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
        //
        // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
        // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
        // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
        // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
        // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
        //     later commitment transaction updates
        //
        // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
        // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
        // HTLCs individually.

        let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
        let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
        let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;

        let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety

        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);

        let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
        let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;

        // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
        let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
        let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);

        let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;

        let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
        let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;

        nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
        expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
        let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
                [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
                .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
        events.retain(|ev| {
                match ev {
                        Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
                                assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
                                assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
                                false
                        },
                        Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
                                assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
                                false
                        },
                        _ => true,
                }
        });
        assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
        if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
        match &events[1] {
                Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
                _ => panic!(),
        }

        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);

        // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
        // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
                        amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
                }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
                        amount_satoshis: 2_000,
                        claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
                        payment_hash: missing_htlc_payment_hash,
                }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
                        amount_satoshis: 4_000,
                        claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
                        payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
                }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
                        amount_satoshis: 5_000,
                        claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
                        payment_hash: live_payment_hash,
                }]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
        let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
        // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
        // quite soon.
        assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
        claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());

        // The following constants were determined experimentally
        const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 483;
        const OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 571;
        const INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 578;

        // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
        // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
        fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
        fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
        fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
        fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);

        // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
        // claim balances separated out.
        let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
                        amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
                        confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
                }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
                        amount_satoshis: 3_000,
                }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
                        amount_satoshis: 4_000,
                }];

        let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
                amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
                        (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
        };
        let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
        let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
                amount_satoshis: 5_000,
        };
        let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;

        // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
        // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
        assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
                mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
                largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
                to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
        } else {
                // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
                mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
                to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
                largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
        }

        let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
                confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
        };
        let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
                        (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
                        - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
                confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
        };

        if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
                assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
                        sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
        } else {
                assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
                        sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
        }

        if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
                mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
        } else {
                mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
        }
        assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
        // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);

        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
                        amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
                        confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
                }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
                                (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
                                - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
                        confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
                }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 3_000 - chan_feerate * OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
                        confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
                }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 4_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
                        confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
                }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
                        confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
                }]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
        test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);

        let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
                missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
        expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
                dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());

        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
        test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }]);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
        test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }]);
        expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
        test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
        test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
        expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
        assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());

        // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
        // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
        // monitor events or claimable balances.
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
        assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
        assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
}

#[test]
fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
        do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true);
        do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false);
}

#[test]
fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
        // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
        let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Create some initial channels
        let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
                create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 11_000_000);
        let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
        assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);

        let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
        let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
        let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());

        // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs and an output for both sides
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 4);

        claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);

        let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
        let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);

        // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
        let revoked_htlc_success = {
                let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
                assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
                check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
                txn.pop().unwrap()
        };

        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
        let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
                let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
                assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
                if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
                        txn.remove(1)
                } else {
                        txn.remove(0)
                }
        };
        check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0]);
        assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
        assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time.0, 0);
        assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0, 0);

        // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
        mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
        let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;

        let as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
        assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);

        // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
        // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
        // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
        let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
                                (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
                        confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
                }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
                        // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
                        amount_satoshis: 10_000,
                }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
                        amount_satoshis: 3_000,
                }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000,
                }]);
        assert_eq!(as_balances,
                sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
        let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
        assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
        check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
        check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]); // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked
                                                                  // outputs (which no longer includes the spent HTLC output)

        assert_eq!(as_balances,
                sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
        fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
                3_000 - chan_feerate * (revoked_htlc_success.weight() + as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight()) as u64 / 1000);

        mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
                                (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
                        confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
                }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
                        // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
                        amount_satoshis: 10_000,
                }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000,
                }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
                        confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
                }]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
        test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
                        // to_self output to B
                        amount_satoshis: 10_000,
                }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000,
                }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
                        confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
                }]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
        test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
                        // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
                        amount_satoshis: 10_000,
                }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000,
                }]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
                [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
        // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
        let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
        for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
                check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
        }

        // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
        // claiming.
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
        let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
        for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
                check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
        }

        mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
        let as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
        assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);

        check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
        check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);

        // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
        // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
        // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
                        // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
                        amount_satoshis: 10_000,
                }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000,
                }]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
                        // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
                        amount_satoshis: 10_000,
                }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
                        confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
                }]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
                        amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].output[0].value,
                        confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
                }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
                        confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
                }]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
        test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
        test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);

        assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());

        // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
        // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
        // monitor events or claimable balances.
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
        assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
        assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
}

#[test]
fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
        // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
        // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
        let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
        // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
        // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
        // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
        chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
                create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
        let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
        assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);

        // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
        // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
        // revocation-claim transaction.

        let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
        let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;

        let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety

        // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
        // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
        get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
                &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);

        // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
        let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);

        assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), 2);
        check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
        check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction

        let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
        let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;

        {
                let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
                *feerate += 1;
        }
        nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);

        nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
        expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
                        amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
                }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
                        amount_satoshis: 4_000,
                        claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
                        payment_hash: revoked_payment_hash,
                }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
                        amount_satoshis: 3_000,
                        claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
                        payment_hash: claimed_payment_hash,
                }]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
        // Currently the revoked commitment outputs are all claimed in one aggregated transaction
        assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
        check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);

        let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;

        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
                        amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
                        confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
                }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
                        // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
                                (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
                }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
                        amount_satoshis: 4_000,
                }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
                        amount_satoshis: 3_000,
                }]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        // Confirm A's HTLC-Success tranasction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
        // new claim.
        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[1]);
        expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage, None, true, false);
        let mut claim_txn_2: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
        claim_txn_2.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| if tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid()) { 0 } else { 1 });
        // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
        // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
        assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
        assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 2);
        check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
        assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[1]);

        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
                        amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
                        confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
                }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
                        // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
                                (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
                }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
                        amount_satoshis: 4_000,
                }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
                        // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
                        // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
                        // anyway, so its not a big change.
                        amount_satoshis: 3_000,
                }]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
        test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);

        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
                        // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
                                (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
                }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
                        amount_satoshis: 4_000,
                }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
                        // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
                        // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
                        // anyway, so its not a big change.
                        amount_satoshis: 3_000,
                }]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
        let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;

        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
                        // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
                                (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
                }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
                        amount_satoshis: 4_000,
                }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
                        amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
                        confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
                }]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
        test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);

        assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
                        // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
                        amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
                                (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
                }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
                        amount_satoshis: 4_000,
                }]),
                sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));

        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
        let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;

        assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                        amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
                        confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
                }],
                nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());

        assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output

        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
        expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
        test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
        assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());

        // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
        // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
        // monitor events or claimable balances.
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
        assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
        assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
}

fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
        // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let persister;
        let new_chain_monitor;

        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let node_deserialized;

        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
        // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
        let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
        route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);

        nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
        check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
        check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);

        let commitment_tx = {
                let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
                assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
                check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
                txn.pop().unwrap()
        };

        mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);

        // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
        let htlc_timeout_tx = {
                let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
                assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
                check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
                txn.pop().unwrap()
        };

        // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
        // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
        if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
                let serialized_monitor = hex::decode(
                        "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0",
                ).unwrap();
                reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
        }

        // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
        if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
                check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
        }
        {
                let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
                if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
                        assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
                } else {
                        assert!(txn.len() < 6);
                }
                for tx in txn {
                        assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
                        assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
                        assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
                        assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
                }
        }
}

#[test]
fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
        do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
        do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
}

fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) {
        // Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every
        // `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call.
        let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
        if anchors {
                config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
                config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
        }
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let (_, _, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
                &nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 500_000_000
        );
        const HTLC_AMT_MSAT: u64 = 1_000_000;
        const HTLC_AMT_SAT: u64 = HTLC_AMT_MSAT / 1000;
        route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_AMT_MSAT);

        let htlc_expiry = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1;

        let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(&nodes[0], &chan_id);
        assert_eq!(commitment_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 /* commitment tx only */} else { 2 /* commitment and htlc timeout tx */ });
        check_spends!(&commitment_txn[0], &funding_tx);
        mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_txn[0]);
        check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
        check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed,
                 false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
        check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);

        let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
                version: 2,
                lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
                input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
                output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` on anchors
                        value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
                        script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
                }],
        };
        nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);

        // Set up a helper closure we'll use throughout our test. We should only expect retries without
        // bumps if fees have not increased after a block has been connected (assuming the height timer
        // re-evaluates at every block) or after `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` is called.
        let mut prev_htlc_tx_feerate = None;
        let mut check_htlc_retry = |should_retry: bool, should_bump: bool| -> Option<Transaction> {
                let (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) = if anchors {
                        assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
                        let events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                        assert_eq!(events.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
                        if !should_retry {
                                return None;
                        }
                        match &events[0] {
                                Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
                                        nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
                                        let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
                                        assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
                                        let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
                                        check_spends!(&htlc_tx, &commitment_txn[0], &coinbase_tx);
                                        let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value -
                                                htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>();
                                        let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
                                        (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
                                }
                                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                        }
                } else {
                        assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
                        let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
                        assert_eq!(txn.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
                        if !should_retry {
                                return None;
                        }
                        let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
                        check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]);
                        let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value;
                        let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
                        (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
                };
                if should_bump {
                        assert!(htlc_tx_feerate > prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take().unwrap());
                } else if let Some(prev_feerate) = prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take() {
                        assert_eq!(htlc_tx_feerate, prev_feerate);
                }
                prev_htlc_tx_feerate = Some(htlc_tx_feerate);
                Some(htlc_tx)
        };

        // Connect blocks up to one before the HTLC expires. This should not result in a claim/retry.
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_expiry - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
        check_htlc_retry(false, false);

        // Connect one more block, producing our first claim.
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
        check_htlc_retry(true, false);

        // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
        // transactions pre-anchors.
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
        check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);

        // Trigger a call and we should have another retry, but without a bump.
        nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
        check_htlc_retry(true, false);

        // Double the feerate and trigger a call, expecting a fee-bumped retry.
        *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
        nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
        check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);

        // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
        // transactions pre-anchors.
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
        let htlc_tx = check_htlc_retry(true, anchors).unwrap();

        // Mine the HTLC transaction to ensure we don't retry claims while they're confirmed.
        mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_tx);
        // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transactions,
        // we'll receive an extra bumped claim.
        if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
                nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
                nodes[0].wallet_source.remove_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 1 });
                check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
        }
        nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
        check_htlc_retry(false, false);
}

#[test]
fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() {
        do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false);
        do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true);
}

#[test]
fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
        // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
        // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
        // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
        // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
        // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
        // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
        let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
        anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
        anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
        anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
                &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
        ).2;
        route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
        let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);

        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());

        *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
        check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
        assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());

        get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
                &payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
                &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
        );

        let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
        let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
                Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
                        let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
                                version: 2,
                                lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
                                input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
                                output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
                                        value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
                                        script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
                                }],
                        };
                        nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
                        nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
                        let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
                        assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
                        let anchor_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
                        let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
                        check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
                        (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };

        mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
        // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
        match *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow() {
                ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
                        assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
                        if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
                        else { panic!("unexpected event"); }

                },
                _ => assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2),
        };
        let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
        for event in holder_events {
                match event {
                        Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
                                nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
                                let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
                                assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
                                let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
                                check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx, anchor_tx);
                                htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }
        }

        mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);

        assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());

        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);

        let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
        for event in holder_events {
                match event {
                        Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }
        }

        // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
        nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
}

#[test]
fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
        // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
        // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
        // revoked commitment.
        let secp = Secp256k1::new();
        let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
        chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let bob_persister;
        let bob_chain_monitor;

        let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
        anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
        anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
        anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
        let bob_deserialized;

        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
        let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);

        // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
        let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();

        // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
        let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
        let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
        let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
        let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);

        // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
        // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
        // present.
        let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
        let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();

        // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
        claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
        claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
        claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
        claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);

        // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
        // revoked state.
        send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
        send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);

        // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
        reload_node!(
                nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
                bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
        );
        for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
                let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
                for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
                        monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
                                &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
                                &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
                        );
                }
        }

        // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
        // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
        // the HTLCs still pending.
        *nodes[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
        nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
        check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
        check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
        let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = {
                let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
                assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
                assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
                assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
                if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
                        check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
                        check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3);
                        (txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone())
                } else {
                        check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3);
                        check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
                        (txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone())
                }
        };

        // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
        assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
        let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
        let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
        for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
                let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat() * (idx + 1) as u64;
                let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
                        version: 2,
                        lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
                        input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
                        output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
                                value: utxo_value,
                                script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
                        }],
                };
                nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, utxo_value);
                match event {
                        Event::BumpTransaction(event) => nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event),
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                };
                let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
                assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
                let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]);
                check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
                anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone());
        };

        for node in &nodes {
                mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_txs[1]]);
        }
        check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
        check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
        check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);

        // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
        // revoked outputs.
        {
                let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
                assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);

                let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() {
                        (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] })
                } else {
                        (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] })
                };

                assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
                assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
                check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
                assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
                assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
                check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
        }

        // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
        // through the success path.
        assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
        let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
        // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
        match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
                ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
                        assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
                        if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
                        else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
                        if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
                        else { panic!("unexpected event"); }

                },
                _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
        };
        let htlc_tx = {
                let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
                let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
                let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
                let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
                        version: 2,
                        lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
                        input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
                        output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
                                value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
                                script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
                        }],
                };
                let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
                        version: 2,
                        lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
                        input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
                                previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
                                ..Default::default()
                        }],
                        output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
                                value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
                                script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
                        }],
                };
                let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
                for event in events {
                        // We don't use the `BumpTransactionEventHandler` here because it does not support
                        // creating one transaction from multiple `HTLCResolution` events.
                        if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
                                assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
                                for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
                                        assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
                                        htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
                                        htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&secp));
                                }
                                descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
                                htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
                        } else {
                                panic!("Unexpected event");
                        }
                }
                for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
                        let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
                        let signer = htlc_descriptor.derive_channel_signer(&nodes[1].keys_manager);
                        let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
                        let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&secp);
                        htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
                }
                let fee_utxo_sig = {
                        let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
                        let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
                                0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
                        ).unwrap()[..]);
                        let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
                        let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
                        sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
                        sig
                };
                htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
                check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
                htlc_tx
        };

        for node in &nodes {
                mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
        }

        // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
        // the second level instead.
        let revoked_claims = {
                let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
                assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);

                let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
                        tx.input.len() == 2 &&
                        tx.output.len() == 1 &&
                        tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
                ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
                assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
                for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
                        check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
                }

                txn
        };
        for node in &nodes {
                mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claims.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>());
        }


        // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
        // been reached.
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);

        assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
        assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());

        // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);

        assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
        let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 2);
        for (idx, event) in spendable_output_events.iter().enumerate() {
                if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = event {
                        assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
                        let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
                                &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
                        ).unwrap();
                        check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claims[idx]);
                } else {
                        panic!("unexpected event");
                }
        }

        assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
        assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
        // On the Alice side, the individual to_self_claim are still pending confirmation.
        assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 2);
        // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
        // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
        // balances to claim.
        //
        // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
        // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
        assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);
}