_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
  11
  12 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
  13 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance};
  14 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  15 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight};
  16 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
  17 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
  18 use crate::ln::channel;
  19 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
  20 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
  21 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
  22 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
  23 use crate::util::crypto::sign;
  24 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
  25 use crate::util::scid_utils::block_from_scid;
  26 use crate::util::test_utils;
  27
  28 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
  29 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  30 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
  32 use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, Script, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime, Witness};
  33 use bitcoin::util::sighash::SighashCache;
  34
  35 use crate::prelude::*;
  36
  37 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  38
  39 #[test]
  40 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
  41         // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
  42         // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
  43         // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
  44         // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
  45         // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
  46         // HTLC.
  47         //
  48         // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
  49         //
  50         // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
  51         // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
  52         //
  53         // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
  54         // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
  55         // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
  56         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
  57         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
  58         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
  59         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  60
  61         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
  62         let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
  63
  64         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
  65         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
  66                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
  67         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
  68
  69         let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
  70
  71         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  72         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
  73         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
  74
  75         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  76         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
  77         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  78
  79         // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
  80         // transaction for nodes[1].
  81         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
  82         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  83         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
  84         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
  85         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
  86
  87         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
  88         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
  89         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  90         let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
  91
  92         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
  93         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
  94         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
  95 }
  96
  97 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction, has_anchors_htlc_event: bool) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
  98         let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
  99         assert_eq!(spendable.len(), if has_anchors_htlc_event { 2 } else { 1 });
 100         if has_anchors_htlc_event {
 101                 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { .. }) = spendable.pop().unwrap() {}
 102                 else { panic!(); }
 103         }
 104         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 105                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 106                 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 107                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 108                 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
 109                 outputs
 110         } else { panic!(); }
 111 }
 112
 113 #[test]
 114 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
 115         // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
 116         // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
 117         // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
 118         // confirmations.
 119         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 120         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 121         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 122         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 123
 124         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
 125
 126         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
 127
 128         // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
 129         // before forwarding.
 130         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
 131         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
 132
 133         // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
 134         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
 135
 136         // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
 137         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
 138         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 139         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 140         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 141
 142         let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 143         assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
 144         check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
 145
 146         // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
 147         // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
 148         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 149         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 150         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 151
 152         // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
 153         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
 154         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 155         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 156
 157         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 158         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
 159 }
 160
 161 fn do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(anchors: bool) {
 162         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
 163         // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
 164         // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
 165         // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
 166         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 167         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 168         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
 169         if anchors {
 170                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
 171                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
 172         }
 173         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
 174         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 175
 176         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 177                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 178         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 179         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 180
 181         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 182         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 183
 184         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate * chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000;
 185         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
 186         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 187                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 188                         transaction_fee_satoshis: commitment_tx_fee,
 189                         outbound_payment_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
 190                         outbound_forwarded_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
 191                         inbound_claiming_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
 192                         inbound_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
 193                 }],
 194                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 195         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 196                         amount_satoshis: 1_000, transaction_fee_satoshis: 0,
 197                         outbound_payment_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
 198                         outbound_forwarded_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
 199                         inbound_claiming_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
 200                         inbound_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
 201                 }],
 202                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 203
 204         nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 205         let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 206         nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
 207         let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 208         nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
 209
 210         let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 211         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
 212         let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 213         nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
 214         let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 215         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
 216         let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 217         assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
 218
 219         let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 220         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
 221         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
 222
 223         let shutdown_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]));
 224         let shutdown_tx_conf_height_b = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]));
 225
 226         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 227         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 228
 229         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 230         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 231
 232         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 233                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 234                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 235                 }],
 236                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 237         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 238                         amount_satoshis: 1000,
 239                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 240                 }],
 241                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 242
 243         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 244         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 245
 246         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
 247                 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
 248         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id)
 249                 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b).is_empty());
 250
 251         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 252         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
 253
 254         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 255                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 256         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 257                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 258
 259         let spendable_outputs_a = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
 260         assert_eq!(
 261                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a),
 262                 spendable_outputs_a
 263         );
 264
 265         let spendable_outputs_b = test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
 266         assert_eq!(
 267                 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b),
 268                 spendable_outputs_b
 269         );
 270
 271         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 272         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 273 }
 274
 275 #[test]
 276 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
 277         do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(false);
 278         do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(true);
 279 }
 280
 281 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
 282         v.sort_unstable();
 283         v
 284 }
 285
 286 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
 287 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
 288 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
 289 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
 290         let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 291         let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 292         eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
 293         assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
 294         assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
 295 }
 296
 297 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(anchors: bool, prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
 298         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
 299         // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
 300         // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
 301         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 302         if prev_commitment_tx {
 303                 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 304                 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 305                 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 306                 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
 307                 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
 308         }
 309         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 310         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
 311         if anchors {
 312                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
 313                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
 314         }
 315         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
 316         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 317
 318         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
 319                 version: 2,
 320                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
 321                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
 322                 output: vec![
 323                         TxOut {
 324                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
 325                                 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
 326                         },
 327                         TxOut {
 328                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
 329                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
 330                         },
 331                 ],
 332         };
 333         if anchors {
 334                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
 335                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
 336         }
 337
 338         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 339                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 340         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 341         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 342
 343         // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
 344         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
 345         // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
 346         // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
 347         let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
 348         // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
 349         let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
 350
 351         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 352
 353         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 354         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 355
 356         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
 357         let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 358                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 359                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 360                 payment_hash,
 361                 outbound_payment: true,
 362         };
 363         let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 364                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 365                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 366                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 367                 outbound_payment: true,
 368         };
 369         let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 370                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 371                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 372                 payment_hash,
 373         };
 374         let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 375                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 376                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 377                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 378         };
 379         let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 380                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 381                 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 382                 payment_hash,
 383                 payment_preimage,
 384         };
 385         let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 386                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 387                 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 388                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 389                 payment_preimage: timeout_payment_preimage,
 390         };
 391
 392         // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
 393         // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
 394         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
 395                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 396         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
 397         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 398                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 399                         transaction_fee_satoshis: commitment_tx_fee,
 400                         outbound_payment_htlc_rounded_msat: 3000,
 401                         outbound_forwarded_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
 402                         inbound_claiming_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
 403                         inbound_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
 404                 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 405                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 406         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 407                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 408                         transaction_fee_satoshis: 0,
 409                         outbound_payment_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
 410                         outbound_forwarded_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
 411                         inbound_claiming_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
 412                         inbound_htlc_rounded_msat: 3000,
 413                 }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 414                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 415
 416         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
 417         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 418         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
 419
 420         let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 421         // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
 422         // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
 423         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
 424         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 425         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
 426
 427         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
 428         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 429         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
 430
 431         if prev_commitment_tx {
 432                 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
 433                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
 434                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
 435                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
 436                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 437                 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 438                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
 439                 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 440                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 441                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
 442                 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 443                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 444         }
 445
 446         // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
 447         // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
 448         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
 449                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) +
 450                 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 451         let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 452                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
 453                                 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
 454                                 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
 455                                 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
 456                                 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
 457                                 commitment_tx_fee - // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs
 458                                 anchor_outputs_value, // The anchor outputs value in satoshis
 459                         transaction_fee_satoshis: commitment_tx_fee,
 460                         outbound_payment_htlc_rounded_msat: 3000,
 461                         outbound_forwarded_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
 462                         inbound_claiming_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
 463                         inbound_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
 464                 }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
 465         if !prev_commitment_tx {
 466                 a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
 467         }
 468         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
 469                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 470         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 471                         amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
 472                         transaction_fee_satoshis: 0,
 473                         outbound_payment_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
 474                         outbound_forwarded_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
 475                         inbound_claiming_htlc_rounded_msat: 3000,
 476                         inbound_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
 477                 }],
 478                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 479
 480         // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
 481         // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
 482         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 483         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 484         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 485
 486         if anchors {
 487                 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 488                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 489                 match events.pop().unwrap() {
 490                         Event::BumpTransaction(bump_event) => {
 491                                 let mut first_htlc_event = bump_event.clone();
 492                                 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut first_htlc_event {
 493                                         htlc_descriptors.remove(1);
 494                                 } else {
 495                                         panic!("Unexpected event");
 496                                 }
 497                                 let mut second_htlc_event = bump_event;
 498                                 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut second_htlc_event {
 499                                         htlc_descriptors.remove(0);
 500                                 } else {
 501                                         panic!("Unexpected event");
 502                                 }
 503                                 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&first_htlc_event);
 504                                 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&second_htlc_event);
 505                         },
 506                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 507                 }
 508         }
 509
 510         let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
 511         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 512         // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
 513         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
 514         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
 515         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
 516         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
 517         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 518         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 519
 520         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 521         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 522         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 523         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 524         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 525         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 526         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 527         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 528         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 529         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 530
 531         // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
 532         // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
 533         // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
 534         // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
 535         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 536         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 537         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
 538                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 539         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 540                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 541                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 542                 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 543                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 544         // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
 545         // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
 546         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 547                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 548                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 549                 },
 550                 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
 551                 // long.
 552                 received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 553                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 554
 555         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 556         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
 557         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 558
 559         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
 560         // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
 561         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 562                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 563         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 564                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 565                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 566                 }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 567                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 568
 569         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0], false);
 570         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 571
 572         // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
 573         // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
 574         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 575         if prev_commitment_tx {
 576                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
 577         } else {
 578                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, false);
 579         }
 580         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 581                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 582         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 583         assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()],
 584                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 585
 586         // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
 587         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 588         let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 589         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 590         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 591         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 592         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 593         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 594         assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
 595                    a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
 596         // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
 597         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 598         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 599
 600         // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
 601         // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
 602         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 603         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 604         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 605                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 606                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 607                 }],
 608                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 609         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
 610         // balance entry.
 611         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 612         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 613                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 614         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
 615
 616         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1], false);
 617
 618         // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
 619         // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
 620         // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
 621         let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 622         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 623
 624         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 625                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 626                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 627                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 628                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 629                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 630                 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 631                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 632
 633         // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
 634         // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
 635         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 636         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0], anchors);
 637
 638         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 639                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 640                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 641                 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 642                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 643
 644         // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
 645         // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
 646         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 647         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0], anchors);
 648
 649         assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
 650                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 651
 652         // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
 653         // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
 654         // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
 655         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 656         assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
 657                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 658         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 659         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 660                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 661
 662         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 663         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 664         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 665         for node in nodes.iter() {
 666                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 667                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 668                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 669                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 670         }
 671 }
 672
 673 #[test]
 674 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
 675         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, true);
 676         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, false);
 677         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, true);
 678         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, false);
 679 }
 680
 681 fn do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(anchors: bool) {
 682         // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
 683         // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
 684         // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
 685         // delay prior to spendability.
 686         //
 687         // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
 688         // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
 689         // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
 690         // claim by our counterparty).
 691         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 692         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 693         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
 694         if anchors {
 695                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
 696                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
 697         }
 698         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
 699         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 700
 701         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
 702                 version: 2,
 703                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
 704                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
 705                 output: vec![
 706                         TxOut {
 707                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
 708                                 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
 709                         },
 710                         TxOut {
 711                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
 712                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
 713                         },
 714                 ],
 715         };
 716         if anchors {
 717                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
 718                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
 719         }
 720
 721         // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
 722         // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
 723         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
 724         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 725
 726         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
 727         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 728         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
 729                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 730         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 731
 732         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 733         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 734         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 735
 736         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 737         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
 738
 739         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
 740         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
 741                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
 742         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 743
 744         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 745         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 746         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 747
 748         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 749         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
 750         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
 751         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 752         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 753         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
 754
 755         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 756         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 757
 758         // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
 759         // claimable balances.
 760         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 761         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 762         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 763         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 764         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 765         let commitment_tx = {
 766                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
 767                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
 768                 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
 769                 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
 770                 commitment_tx
 771         };
 772         let commitment_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx));
 773         if anchors && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
 774                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
 775                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
 776                 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid());
 777         }
 778
 779         let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 780                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 781                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 782                 payment_hash,
 783                 outbound_payment: true,
 784         };
 785         let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 786                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 787                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 788                 payment_hash: payment_hash_2,
 789                 outbound_payment: true,
 790         };
 791
 792         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
 793                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 794         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
 795         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 796                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 797                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 798                 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 799                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 800
 801         // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
 802         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
 803         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 804         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 805         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 806         let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 807         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
 808         check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], commitment_tx);
 809
 810         // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
 811         // transaction.
 812         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
 813         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 814                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 815                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 816                 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 817                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 818         if anchors {
 819                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 2);
 820         }
 821         let timeout_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
 822         assert_eq!(timeout_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
 823         check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[0], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
 824         check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[1], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
 825
 826         // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
 827         // "awaiting confirmations" one.
 828         let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 829         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0]);
 830         // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
 831         // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
 832         // call, as described, two hunks down.
 833         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 834                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 835                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 836                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 837                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 838                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 839                 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 840                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 841
 842         // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
 843         // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
 844         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
 845         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, true, false);
 846         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 847                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 848                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 849                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 850                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 851                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 852                 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 853                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 854
 855         // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
 856         // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
 857         // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
 858         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 859         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
 860
 861         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 862                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 863                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 864                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 865                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 866                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 867                 }]),
 868                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 869
 870         // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 871         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 872         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
 873         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
 874                 .get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
 875         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 876         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 877                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 878                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 879                 }],
 880                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 881         let to_self_spendable_output = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
 882         assert_eq!(
 883                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a),
 884                 to_self_spendable_output
 885         );
 886
 887         // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 888         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 889         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 890         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 891         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0], false);
 892
 893         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 894         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 895         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 896         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 897         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 898         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 899         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 900 }
 901
 902 #[test]
 903 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
 904         do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(false);
 905         do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(true);
 906 }
 907
 908 #[test]
 909 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
 910         // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
 911         // have a preimage.
 912         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 913         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 914         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 915         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 916
 917         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
 918         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 919
 920         // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
 921         let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
 922         let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
 923         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 924
 925         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 926         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 927
 928         let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 929                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 930                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 931                 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
 932                 outbound_payment: true,
 933         };
 934         let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 935                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 936                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 937                 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
 938         };
 939         let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 940                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 941                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 942                 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
 943         };
 944         let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 945                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 946                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 947                 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
 948                 outbound_payment: true,
 949         };
 950
 951         // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
 952         // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
 953         // HTLC output is spent.
 954         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
 955                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 956         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 957                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - commitment_tx_fee,
 958                         transaction_fee_satoshis: commitment_tx_fee,
 959                         outbound_payment_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
 960                         outbound_forwarded_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
 961                         inbound_claiming_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
 962                         inbound_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
 963                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
 964                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 965
 966         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 967                         amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
 968                         transaction_fee_satoshis: 0,
 969                         outbound_payment_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
 970                         outbound_forwarded_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
 971                         inbound_claiming_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
 972                         inbound_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
 973                 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
 974                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 975
 976         // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
 977         let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 978         assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
 979         check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
 980         check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
 981
 982         // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
 983         // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
 984         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 985         let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 986                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 987                                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 988                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 989                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
 990
 991         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 992         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
 993         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 994         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 995         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 996
 997         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 998                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 999
1000         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
1001         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1002         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1003         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1004
1005         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1006         let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1007                         amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
1008                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
1009                 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
1010         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1011                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1012
1013         // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
1014         // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
1015         // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
1016         // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
1017
1018         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1019         let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1020         assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
1021         check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
1022         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
1023                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
1024
1025         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
1026                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1027
1028         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1029         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
1030                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1031
1032         // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
1033         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1034         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0], false);
1035         bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
1036
1037         // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
1038         nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
1039         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1));
1040         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
1041                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
1042         let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1043         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
1044         check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
1045
1046         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1047                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1048
1049         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1050         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1051                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1052
1053         // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
1054         // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
1055         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1056         let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
1057         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1058                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1059                                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1060                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1061                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1062                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1063                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
1064                 }]),
1065                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1066
1067         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1068         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1069                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1070                                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1071                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1072                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1073                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1074                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
1075                 }]),
1076                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1077
1078         // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
1079         // payment failure event.
1080         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1081         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
1082
1083         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1084         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1085                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1086                                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1087                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1088                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1089                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1090                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1091                 }]),
1092                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1093
1094         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1095         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1096                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1097                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1098                 }],
1099                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1100         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0], false);
1101
1102         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1103         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1104         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1105
1106         // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
1107         // was already claimed.
1108         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1109         let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1110         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1111                         amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1112                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1113                 }]),
1114                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1115
1116         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1117         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1118                         amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1119                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1120                 }]),
1121                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1122
1123         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1124         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
1125
1126         assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
1127                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1128         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1129
1130         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1131         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1132
1133         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1134         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1135         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1136         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1137         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1138         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1139         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1140 }
1141
1142 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
1143         let mut v = v_orig.clone();
1144         for t in extra_ts {
1145                 v.push((*t).clone());
1146         }
1147         v.sort_unstable();
1148         v
1149 }
1150
1151 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(anchors: bool, confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
1152         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
1153         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1154         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1155         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1156         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1157         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1158         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1159         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1160         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1161         if anchors {
1162                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1163                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1164         }
1165         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1166         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1167
1168         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1169                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1170         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1171         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1172
1173         // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
1174         //
1175         // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
1176         // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
1177         // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
1178         // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
1179         // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
1180         //     later commitment transaction updates
1181         //
1182         // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
1183         // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
1184         // HTLCs individually.
1185
1186         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
1187         let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1188         let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1189
1190         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1191
1192         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1193         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1194
1195         let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1196         let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1197
1198         // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1199         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1200         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1201
1202         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1203
1204         let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1205         let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1206
1207         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1208         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1209         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1210         let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1211
1212         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1213         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1214         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1215
1216         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1217         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1218         let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1219                 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1220                 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1221         events.retain(|ev| {
1222                 match ev {
1223                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1224                                 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1225                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1226                                 false
1227                         },
1228                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1229                                 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1230                                 false
1231                         },
1232                         _ => true,
1233                 }
1234         });
1235         assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1236         if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1237         match &events[1] {
1238                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, .. } => {},
1239                 _ => panic!(),
1240         }
1241
1242         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1243         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1244         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1245         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1246
1247         // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1248         // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1249         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1250                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1251                         transaction_fee_satoshis: 0,
1252                         outbound_payment_htlc_rounded_msat: 3000,
1253                         outbound_forwarded_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
1254                         inbound_claiming_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
1255                         inbound_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
1256                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1257                         amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1258                         claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1259                         payment_hash: missing_htlc_payment_hash,
1260                         outbound_payment: true,
1261                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1262                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1263                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1264                         payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
1265                         outbound_payment: true,
1266                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1267                         amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1268                         claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1269                         payment_hash: live_payment_hash,
1270                         outbound_payment: true,
1271                 }]),
1272                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1273
1274         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1275         let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1276         // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1277         // quite soon.
1278         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1279         claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
1280
1281         // The following constants were determined experimentally
1282         const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 483;
1283         let outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: usize = if anchors { 574 } else { 571 };
1284         let inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: usize = if anchors { 582 } else { 578 };
1285
1286         // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1287         // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1288         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1289         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1290         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1291         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1292
1293         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1294                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1295         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1296         let inbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight as u64 / 1000;
1297         let outbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight as u64 / 1000;
1298         let to_self_claim_fee = chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000;
1299
1300         // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1301         // claim balances separated out.
1302         let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1303                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1304                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1305                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1306                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1307                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1308                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1309                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1310                 }];
1311
1312         let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1313                 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1314         };
1315         let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1316         let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1317                 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1318         };
1319         let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1320
1321         // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1322         // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1323         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1324                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1325
1326         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1327                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1328                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1329                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1330         } else {
1331                 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1332                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1333                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1334                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1335         }
1336
1337         let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1338                 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1339                 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1340         };
1341         let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1342                 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
1343                 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1344         };
1345
1346         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1347                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1348                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1349         } else {
1350                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1351                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1352         }
1353
1354         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1355                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1356         } else {
1357                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1358         }
1359         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1360                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1361
1362         // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1363         // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1364         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1365         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1366
1367         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1368                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1369                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1370                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1371                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1372                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
1373                         confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1374                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1375                         amount_satoshis: 3_000 - outbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1376                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1377                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1378                         amount_satoshis: 4_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1379                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1380                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1381                         amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1382                         confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1383                 }]),
1384                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1385
1386         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1387         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1388
1389         let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1390         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
1391                 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1392         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
1393                 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1394
1395         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1396         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }], false);
1397         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1398         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }], false);
1399         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1400         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1401         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0], false);
1402         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1403         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1], false);
1404         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1405         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1406
1407         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1408         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1409         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1410         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1411         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1412         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1413         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1414 }
1415
1416 #[test]
1417 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1418         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, true);
1419         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, false);
1420         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, true);
1421         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, false);
1422 }
1423
1424 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(anchors: bool) {
1425         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1426         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1427         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1428         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1429         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1430         if anchors {
1431                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1432                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1433         }
1434         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1435         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1436
1437         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1438                 version: 2,
1439                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1440                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1441                 output: vec![
1442                         TxOut {
1443                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1444                                 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1445                         },
1446                         TxOut {
1447                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1448                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1449                         },
1450                 ],
1451         };
1452         if anchors {
1453                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1454                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
1455         }
1456
1457         // Create some initial channels
1458         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1459                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 12_000_000);
1460         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1461         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1462
1463         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1464         let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1465         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1466         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1467         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1468         if anchors {
1469                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[4].value, 11000); // to_self output
1470         } else {
1471                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[2].value, 11000); // to_self output
1472         }
1473
1474         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs, an output for each side, and an
1475         // anchor output for each side if enabled.
1476         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if anchors { 6 } else { 4 });
1477
1478         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1479
1480         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1481         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1482
1483         // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1484         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1485         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1486         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1487         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1488         if anchors {
1489                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 1);
1490         }
1491         let revoked_htlc_success = {
1492                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1493                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1494                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1495                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, if anchors { 3 } else { 1 });
1496                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(),
1497                         if anchors { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS } else { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT });
1498                 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1499                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1500         };
1501         let revoked_htlc_success_fee = chan_feerate * revoked_htlc_success.weight() as u64 / 1000;
1502
1503         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1504         if anchors {
1505                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 2);
1506         }
1507         let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
1508                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1509                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1510                 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
1511                         txn.remove(1)
1512                 } else {
1513                         txn.remove(0)
1514                 }
1515         };
1516         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1517         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
1518         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time.0, 0);
1519         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0, 0);
1520
1521         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1522         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1523         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1524         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1525         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1526         let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1527
1528         let revoked_to_self_claim = {
1529                 let mut as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1530                 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1531                 if anchors {
1532                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1533                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 4); // Separate to_remote claim
1534                         check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1535                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
1536                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1537                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
1538                         check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1539                         Some(as_commitment_claim_txn.remove(0))
1540                 } else {
1541                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1542                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1543                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1544                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
1545                         check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1546                         None
1547                 }
1548         };
1549
1550         // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1551         // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1552         // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1553         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1554                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1555         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1556         let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1557                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1558                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1559                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1560                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1561                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1562                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1563                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1564                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1565                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1566                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1567                 }]);
1568         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1569                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1570
1571         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
1572         let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1573         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1574         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1575         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
1576         // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked outputs (which no longer includes the
1577         // spent HTLC output)
1578         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1579         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1580         if !anchors {
1581                 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1582         }
1583         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1584
1585         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1586                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1587
1588         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1589         let as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee = chan_feerate * as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight() as u64 / 1000;
1590         if anchors {
1591                 // With anchors, B can pay for revoked_htlc_success's fee with additional inputs, rather
1592                 // than with the HTLC itself.
1593                 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1594                         3_000 - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
1595         } else {
1596                 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1597                         3_000 - revoked_htlc_success_fee - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
1598         }
1599
1600         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1601         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1602                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1603                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1604                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1605                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1606                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1607                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1608                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1609                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1610                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1611                         amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1612                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1613                 }]),
1614                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1615
1616         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1617         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], false);
1618         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1619                         // to_self output to B
1620                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1621                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1622                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1623                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1624                         amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1625                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1626                 }]),
1627                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1628
1629         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1630         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0], false);
1631         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1632                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1633                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1634                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1635                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1636                 }]),
1637                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1638
1639         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1640         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1641                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1642         // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1643         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1644         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1645                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1646         }
1647
1648         // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1649         // claiming.
1650         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1651         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1652         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1653                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1654         }
1655
1656         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
1657         let (revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, revoked_to_self_claim) = {
1658                 let mut as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1659                 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1660                 if anchors {
1661                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1662                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1663                         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1664                         (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), revoked_to_self_claim.unwrap())
1665                 } else {
1666                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1667                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1668                         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1669                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), 1);
1670                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1671                         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1672                         (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0))
1673                 }
1674         };
1675
1676         // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1677         // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1678         // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1679         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1680         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1681                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1682                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1683                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1684                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1685                 }]),
1686                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1687
1688         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim);
1689         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1690                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1691                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1692                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1693                         amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value,
1694                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1695                 }]),
1696                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1697
1698         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim);
1699         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1700                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1701                         amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.output[0].value,
1702                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1703                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1704                         amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value,
1705                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1706                 }]),
1707                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1708
1709         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1710         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, false);
1711         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1712         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim, false);
1713
1714         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1715
1716         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1717         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1718         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1719         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1720         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1721         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1722         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1723 }
1724
1725 #[test]
1726 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1727         do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(false);
1728         do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(true);
1729 }
1730
1731 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(anchors: bool) {
1732         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1733         // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1734         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1735         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1736         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1737         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1738         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1739         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1740         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1741         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1742         if anchors {
1743                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1744                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1745         }
1746         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1747         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1748
1749         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1750                 version: 2,
1751                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1752                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1753                 output: vec![TxOut {
1754                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1755                         script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1756                 }],
1757         };
1758         nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1759
1760         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1761                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1762         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1763         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1764
1765         // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1766         // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1767         // revocation-claim transaction.
1768
1769         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1770         let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1771
1772         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1773
1774         // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1775         // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1776         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1777                 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1778
1779         // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1780         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1781
1782         assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1783         check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1784         if !anchors {
1785                 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1786         }
1787
1788         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1789         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1790
1791         {
1792                 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1793                 *feerate += 1;
1794         }
1795         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1796         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1797
1798         let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1799         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1800         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1801
1802         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1803         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1804         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1805         let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1806
1807         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1808                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1809                         transaction_fee_satoshis: 0,
1810                         outbound_payment_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
1811                         outbound_forwarded_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
1812                         inbound_claiming_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
1813                         inbound_htlc_rounded_msat: 0,
1814                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1815                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1816                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1817                         payment_hash: revoked_payment_hash,
1818                         outbound_payment: true,
1819                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1820                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1821                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1822                         payment_hash: claimed_payment_hash,
1823                         outbound_payment: true,
1824                 }]),
1825                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1826
1827         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1828         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1829         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1830         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1831
1832         let mut claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1833         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1834         let revoked_to_self_claim = if anchors {
1835                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1836                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 5); // Separate to_remote claim
1837                 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1838                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
1839                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1840                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
1841                 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1842                 Some(claim_txn.remove(0))
1843         } else {
1844                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1845                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1846                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1847                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
1848                 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1849                 None
1850         };
1851
1852         let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1853
1854         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1855                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1856         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1857         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1858                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1859                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1860                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1861                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1862                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1863                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1864                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1865                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1866                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1867                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1868                 }]),
1869                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1870
1871         // Confirm A's HTLC-Success transaction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1872         // new claim.
1873         if anchors {
1874                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1875                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1876                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1877                 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
1878                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
1879         }
1880         let htlc_success_claim = if anchors {
1881                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1882                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1883                 check_spends!(txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1884                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1885         } else {
1886                 as_revoked_txn[1].clone()
1887         };
1888         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_claim);
1889         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage, None, true, false);
1890
1891         let mut claim_txn_2 = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1892         // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1893         // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1894         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1895         if anchors {
1896                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1);
1897                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1898                 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], &htlc_success_claim);
1899                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1900                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1901                 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1902         } else {
1903                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1);
1904                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1905                 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1906                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 2);
1907                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1908                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 1);
1909                 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1910         }
1911
1912         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1913                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1914                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1915                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1916                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1917                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1918                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1919                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1920                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1921                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1922                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1923                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1924                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1925                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1926                 }]),
1927                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1928
1929         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1930         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1931
1932         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1933                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1934                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1935                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1936                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1937                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1938                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1939                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1940                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1941                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1942                 }]),
1943                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1944
1945         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1946         let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1947
1948         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1949                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1950                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1951                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1952                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1953                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1954                         amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
1955                         confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1956                 }]),
1957                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1958
1959         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1960         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0], false);
1961
1962         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1963                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1964                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1965                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1966                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1967                 }]),
1968                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1969
1970         if anchors {
1971                 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&claim_txn_2[1], revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap()]);
1972         } else {
1973                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1974         }
1975         let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1976
1977         if anchors {
1978                 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1979                                 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1980                                 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1981                         }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1982                                 amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap().output[0].value,
1983                                 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1984                         }],
1985                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1986         } else {
1987                 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1988                                 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1989                                 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1990                         }],
1991                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1992         }
1993
1994         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1995
1996         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1997         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1998         if anchors {
1999                 let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2000                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2001                 for (i, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
2002                         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = event {
2003                                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2004                                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2005                                         &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
2006                                         253, None, &Secp256k1::new()
2007                                 ).unwrap();
2008                                 check_spends!(spend_tx, if i == 0 { &claim_txn_2[1] } else { revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap() });
2009                         } else { panic!(); }
2010                 }
2011         } else {
2012                 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1], false);
2013         }
2014         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
2015
2016         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
2017         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
2018         // monitor events or claimable balances.
2019         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
2020         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
2021         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2022         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
2023 }
2024
2025 #[test]
2026 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
2027         do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(false);
2028         do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(true);
2029 }
2030
2031 fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
2032         // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
2033         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2034         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2035         let persister;
2036         let new_chain_monitor;
2037
2038         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2039         let node_deserialized;
2040
2041         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2042
2043         // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
2044         // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
2045         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
2046         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
2047
2048         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2049         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2050         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2051         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
2052                  [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2053
2054         let commitment_tx = {
2055                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2056                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2057                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
2058                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2059                 txn.pop().unwrap()
2060         };
2061
2062         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2063
2064         // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
2065         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
2066         let htlc_timeout_tx = {
2067                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2068                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2069                 check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
2070                 txn.pop().unwrap()
2071         };
2072
2073         // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
2074         // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
2075         if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
2076                 let serialized_monitor = hex::decode(
2077                         "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2078                 ).unwrap();
2079                 reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2080         }
2081
2082         // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
2083         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
2084         if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
2085                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2086         }
2087         {
2088                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2089                 if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
2090                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
2091                 } else {
2092                         assert!(txn.len() < 6);
2093                 }
2094                 for tx in txn {
2095                         assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
2096                         assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
2097                         assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
2098                         assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
2099                 }
2100         }
2101 }
2102
2103 #[test]
2104 fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
2105         do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
2106         do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
2107 }
2108
2109 fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) {
2110         // Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every
2111         // `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call.
2112         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2113         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2114         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
2115         if anchors {
2116                 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2117                 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2118         }
2119         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
2120         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2121
2122         let (_, _, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
2123                 &nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 500_000_000
2124         );
2125         const HTLC_AMT_MSAT: u64 = 1_000_000;
2126         const HTLC_AMT_SAT: u64 = HTLC_AMT_MSAT / 1000;
2127         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_AMT_MSAT);
2128
2129         let htlc_expiry = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1;
2130
2131         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(&nodes[0], &chan_id);
2132         assert_eq!(commitment_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 /* commitment tx only */} else { 2 /* commitment and htlc timeout tx */ });
2133         check_spends!(&commitment_txn[0], &funding_tx);
2134         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_txn[0]);
2135         check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
2136         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed,
2137                  false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
2138         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2139
2140         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2141                 version: 2,
2142                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2143                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2144                 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` on anchors
2145                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2146                         script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2147                 }],
2148         };
2149         nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2150
2151         // Set up a helper closure we'll use throughout our test. We should only expect retries without
2152         // bumps if fees have not increased after a block has been connected (assuming the height timer
2153         // re-evaluates at every block) or after `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` is called.
2154         let mut prev_htlc_tx_feerate = None;
2155         let mut check_htlc_retry = |should_retry: bool, should_bump: bool| -> Option<Transaction> {
2156                 let (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) = if anchors {
2157                         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
2158                         let events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2159                         assert_eq!(events.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
2160                         if !should_retry {
2161                                 return None;
2162                         }
2163                         match &events[0] {
2164                                 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2165                                         nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2166                                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2167                                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2168                                         let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2169                                         check_spends!(&htlc_tx, &commitment_txn[0], &coinbase_tx);
2170                                         let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value -
2171                                                 htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>();
2172                                         let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
2173                                         (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
2174                                 }
2175                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2176                         }
2177                 } else {
2178                         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2179                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2180                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
2181                         if !should_retry {
2182                                 return None;
2183                         }
2184                         let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2185                         check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]);
2186                         let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value;
2187                         let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
2188                         (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
2189                 };
2190                 if should_bump {
2191                         assert!(htlc_tx_feerate > prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take().unwrap());
2192                 } else if let Some(prev_feerate) = prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take() {
2193                         assert_eq!(htlc_tx_feerate, prev_feerate);
2194                 }
2195                 prev_htlc_tx_feerate = Some(htlc_tx_feerate);
2196                 Some(htlc_tx)
2197         };
2198
2199         // Connect blocks up to one before the HTLC expires. This should not result in a claim/retry.
2200         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_expiry - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
2201         check_htlc_retry(false, false);
2202
2203         // Connect one more block, producing our first claim.
2204         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2205         check_htlc_retry(true, false);
2206
2207         // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
2208         // transactions pre-anchors.
2209         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2210         check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2211
2212         // Trigger a call and we should have another retry, but without a bump.
2213         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2214         check_htlc_retry(true, false);
2215
2216         // Double the feerate and trigger a call, expecting a fee-bumped retry.
2217         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2218         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2219         check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2220
2221         // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
2222         // transactions pre-anchors.
2223         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2224         let htlc_tx = check_htlc_retry(true, anchors).unwrap();
2225
2226         // Mine the HTLC transaction to ensure we don't retry claims while they're confirmed.
2227         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_tx);
2228         // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transactions,
2229         // we'll receive an extra bumped claim.
2230         if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2231                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2232                 nodes[0].wallet_source.remove_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 1 });
2233                 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2234         }
2235         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2236         check_htlc_retry(false, false);
2237 }
2238
2239 #[test]
2240 fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() {
2241         do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false);
2242         do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true);
2243 }
2244
2245 #[test]
2246 fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
2247         // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
2248         // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
2249         // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
2250         // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
2251         // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
2252         // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
2253         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2254         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2255         let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
2256         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2257         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2258         anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2259         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2260         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2261
2262         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
2263                 &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
2264         );
2265         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
2266         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000);
2267
2268         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2269         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2270
2271         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2272
2273         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2274         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
2275
2276         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2277         {
2278                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2279                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2280                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2281         }
2282
2283         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
2284                 &payment_hash_2, &payment_preimage_2, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
2285                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
2286         );
2287         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
2288                 &payment_hash_1, &payment_preimage_1, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2289                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2290         );
2291
2292         let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2293         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
2294         let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
2295                 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2296                         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2297                                 version: 2,
2298                                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2299                                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2300                                 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2301                                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2302                                         script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2303                                 }],
2304                         };
2305                         nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2306                         nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2307                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2308                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2309                         let anchor_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2310                         let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2311                         check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2312                         check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2313                         (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
2314                 },
2315                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2316         };
2317
2318         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[2].value, 1_000); // HTLC A -> B
2319         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[3].value, 2_000); // HTLC B -> A
2320
2321         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2322         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2323         mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2324         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2325
2326         {
2327                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2328                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
2329
2330                 let htlc_preimage_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2331                 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
2332                 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
2333                 check_spends!(htlc_preimage_tx, commitment_tx);
2334
2335                 let htlc_timeout_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2336                 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
2337                 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
2338                 check_spends!(htlc_timeout_tx, commitment_tx);
2339
2340                 if let Some(commitment_tx) = txn.pop() {
2341                         check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2342                 }
2343         }
2344
2345         let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2346         // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2347         // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2348         if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2349                 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2350                 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
2351                 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2352         } else {
2353                 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2);
2354         }
2355         let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2356         for event in holder_events {
2357                 match event {
2358                         Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2359                                 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2360                                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2361                                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2362                                 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2363                                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx, anchor_tx);
2364                                 htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
2365                         },
2366                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2367                 }
2368         }
2369
2370         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
2371         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2372
2373         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2374
2375         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
2376
2377         let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2378         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2379         for event in holder_events {
2380                 match event {
2381                         Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
2382                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2383                 }
2384         }
2385
2386         // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
2387         nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2388         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2389         nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2390         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2391 }
2392
2393 #[test]
2394 fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
2395         // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
2396         // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
2397         // revoked commitment.
2398         let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2399         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2400         // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
2401         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2402         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2403         let bob_persister;
2404         let bob_chain_monitor;
2405
2406         let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
2407         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2408         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2409         anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2410         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2411         let bob_deserialized;
2412
2413         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2414
2415         let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2416         let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2417
2418         // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
2419         let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
2420
2421         // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
2422         let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2423         let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2424         let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2425         let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2426
2427         // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
2428         // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
2429         // present.
2430         let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
2431         let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
2432
2433         // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
2434         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
2435         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
2436         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
2437         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
2438
2439         // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
2440         // revoked state.
2441         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2442         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2443
2444         // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
2445         reload_node!(
2446                 nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
2447                 bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
2448         );
2449         for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
2450                 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
2451                 for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
2452                         monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
2453                                 &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2454                                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2455                         );
2456                 }
2457         }
2458
2459         // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
2460         // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
2461         // the HTLCs still pending.
2462         *nodes[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2463         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
2464         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
2465         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2466         let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = {
2467                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2468                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2469                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2470                 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2471                 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
2472                         check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
2473                         check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3);
2474                         (txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone())
2475                 } else {
2476                         check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3);
2477                         check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
2478                         (txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone())
2479                 }
2480         };
2481
2482         // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
2483         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2484         let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2485         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2486         let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2487         for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
2488                 let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat() * (idx + 1) as u64;
2489                 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2490                         version: 2,
2491                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2492                         input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2493                         output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2494                                 value: utxo_value,
2495                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2496                         }],
2497                 };
2498                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, utxo_value);
2499                 match event {
2500                         Event::BumpTransaction(event) => nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event),
2501                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2502                 };
2503                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2504                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2505                 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]);
2506                 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2507                 anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone());
2508         };
2509
2510         for node in &nodes {
2511                 mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_txs[1]]);
2512         }
2513         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
2514         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
2515         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2516
2517         // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
2518         // revoked outputs.
2519         {
2520                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2521                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
2522
2523                 let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() {
2524                         (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] })
2525                 } else {
2526                         (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] })
2527                 };
2528
2529                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2530                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
2531                 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
2532                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2533                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
2534                 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
2535         }
2536
2537         // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
2538         // through the success path.
2539         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2540         let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2541         // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2542         // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2543         match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
2544                 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
2545                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
2546                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
2547                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2548                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
2549                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2550
2551                 },
2552                 _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
2553         };
2554         let htlc_tx = {
2555                 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
2556                 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
2557                 let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2558                 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2559                         version: 2,
2560                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2561                         input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2562                         output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
2563                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2564                                 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
2565                         }],
2566                 };
2567                 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
2568                         version: 2,
2569                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2570                         input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
2571                                 previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2572                                 ..Default::default()
2573                         }],
2574                         output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
2575                                 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
2576                                 script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
2577                         }],
2578                 };
2579                 let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
2580                 for event in events {
2581                         // We don't use the `BumpTransactionEventHandler` here because it does not support
2582                         // creating one transaction from multiple `HTLCResolution` events.
2583                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
2584                                 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
2585                                 for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
2586                                         assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
2587                                         htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
2588                                         htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&secp));
2589                                 }
2590                                 descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
2591                                 htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
2592                         } else {
2593                                 panic!("Unexpected event");
2594                         }
2595                 }
2596                 for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
2597                         let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
2598                         let signer = htlc_descriptor.derive_channel_signer(&nodes[1].keys_manager);
2599                         let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
2600                         let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&secp);
2601                         htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
2602                 }
2603                 let fee_utxo_sig = {
2604                         let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
2605                         let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
2606                                 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2607                         ).unwrap()[..]);
2608                         let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2609                         let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2610                         sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2611                         sig
2612                 };
2613                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2614                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
2615                 htlc_tx
2616         };
2617
2618         for node in &nodes {
2619                 mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
2620         }
2621
2622         // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
2623         // the second level instead.
2624         let revoked_claim_transactions = {
2625                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2626                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2627
2628                 let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
2629                         tx.input.len() == 2 &&
2630                         tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2631                         tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
2632                 ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2633                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
2634                 for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
2635                         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
2636                 }
2637
2638                 let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = HashMap::new();
2639                 for current_tx in txn.into_iter() {
2640                         revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx);
2641                 }
2642                 revoked_claim_transaction_map
2643         };
2644         for node in &nodes {
2645                 mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claim_transactions.values().collect::<Vec<_>>());
2646         }
2647
2648
2649         // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
2650         // been reached.
2651         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2652         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
2653
2654         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2655         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2656
2657         // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2658         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2659         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2660
2661         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2662         let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2663         assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4);
2664         for event in spendable_output_events {
2665                 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event {
2666                         assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2667                         assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap()));
2668                         let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2669                                 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
2670                         ).unwrap();
2671
2672                         if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(_) = &outputs[0] {
2673                                 check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_a, &revoked_commitment_b);
2674                         } else {
2675                                 check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
2676                         }
2677                 } else {
2678                         panic!("unexpected event");
2679                 }
2680         }
2681
2682         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2683         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2684         // On the Alice side, the individual to_self_claim are still pending confirmation.
2685         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 2);
2686         // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
2687         // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
2688         // balances to claim.
2689         //
2690         // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
2691         // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
2692         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);
2693 }
2694
2695 fn do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(confirm_commitment_before_reload: bool) {
2696         // Tests that we'll fix a ChannelMonitor's `counterparty_payment_script` for an anchor outputs
2697         // channel upon deserialization.
2698         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2699         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2700         let persister;
2701         let chain_monitor;
2702         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2703         user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2704         user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2705         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2706         let node_deserialized;
2707         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2708
2709         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
2710
2711         // Set the monitor's `counterparty_payment_script` to a dummy P2WPKH script.
2712         let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2713         let privkey = bitcoin::PrivateKey::from_slice(&[1; 32], bitcoin::Network::Testnet).unwrap();
2714         let pubkey = bitcoin::PublicKey::from_private_key(&secp, &privkey);
2715         let p2wpkh_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&pubkey.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2716         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).set_counterparty_payment_script(p2wpkh_script.clone());
2717         assert_eq!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script(), p2wpkh_script);
2718
2719         // Confirm the counterparty's commitment and reload the monitor (either before or after) such
2720         // that we arrive at the correct `counterparty_payment_script` after the reload.
2721         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2722         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2723         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2724         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
2725                  [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2726
2727         let commitment_tx = {
2728                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2729                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2730                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 4);
2731                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2732                 txn.pop().unwrap()
2733         };
2734
2735         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2736         let commitment_tx_conf_height = if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2737                 // We should expect our round trip serialization check to fail as we're writing the monitor
2738                 // with the incorrect P2WPKH script but reading it with the correct P2WSH script.
2739                 *nodes[1].chain_monitor.expect_monitor_round_trip_fail.lock().unwrap() = Some(chan_id);
2740                 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2741                 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2742                 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2743                 commitment_tx_conf_height
2744         } else {
2745                 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2746                 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2747                 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2748                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2749                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
2750                 commitment_tx_conf_height
2751         };
2752         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2753                  [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2754         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script().is_v0_p2wsh());
2755
2756         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2757         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2758
2759         if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2760                 // If we saw the commitment before our `counterparty_payment_script` was fixed, we'll never
2761                 // get the spendable output event for the `to_remote` output, so we'll need to get it
2762                 // manually via `get_spendable_outputs`.
2763                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2764                 let outputs = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height);
2765                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2766                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2767                         &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
2768                         253, None, &secp
2769                 ).unwrap();
2770                 check_spends!(spend_tx, &commitment_tx);
2771         } else {
2772                 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx, false);
2773         }
2774 }
2775
2776 #[test]
2777 fn test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload() {
2778         do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(false);
2779         do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(true);
2780 }
2781
2782 #[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
2783 fn do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(anchors: bool, confirm_counterparty_commitment: bool) {
2784         // Tests that our monitor claims will always use fresh random signatures (ensuring a unique
2785         // wtxid) to prevent certain classes of transaction replacement at the bitcoin P2P layer.
2786         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2787         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2788         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2789         if anchors {
2790                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2791                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2792         }
2793         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2794         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2795
2796         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2797                 version: 2,
2798                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2799                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2800                 output: vec![
2801                         TxOut {
2802                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2803                                 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2804                         },
2805                 ],
2806         };
2807         if anchors {
2808                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2809         }
2810
2811         // Open a channel and route a payment. We'll let it timeout to claim it.
2812         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
2813         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
2814
2815         let (closing_node, other_node) = if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2816                 (&nodes[1], &nodes[0])
2817         } else {
2818                 (&nodes[0], &nodes[1])
2819         };
2820
2821         closing_node.node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &other_node.node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2822
2823         // The commitment transaction comes first.
2824         let commitment_tx = {
2825                 let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2826                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2827                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2828                 txn.pop().unwrap()
2829         };
2830
2831         mine_transaction(closing_node, &commitment_tx);
2832         check_added_monitors!(closing_node, 1);
2833         check_closed_broadcast!(closing_node, true);
2834         check_closed_event!(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
2835
2836         mine_transaction(other_node, &commitment_tx);
2837         check_added_monitors!(other_node, 1);
2838         check_closed_broadcast!(other_node, true);
2839         check_closed_event!(other_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [closing_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
2840
2841         // If we update the best block to the new height before providing the confirmed transactions,
2842         // we'll see another broadcast of the commitment transaction.
2843         if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2844                 let _ = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2845         }
2846
2847         // Then comes the HTLC timeout transaction.
2848         if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2849                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 5);
2850                 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
2851                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
2852         } else {
2853                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
2854         }
2855         if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2856                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
2857         }
2858         let htlc_timeout_tx = {
2859                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2860                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2861                 let tx = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == commitment_tx.txid() {
2862                         txn[0].clone()
2863                 } else {
2864                         txn[1].clone()
2865                 };
2866                 check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
2867                 tx
2868         };
2869
2870         // Check we rebroadcast it with a different wtxid.
2871         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2872         if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2873                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
2874         }
2875         {
2876                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2877                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2878                 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), htlc_timeout_tx.txid());
2879                 assert_ne!(txn[0].wtxid(), htlc_timeout_tx.wtxid());
2880         }
2881 }
2882
2883 #[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
2884 #[test]
2885 fn test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures() {
2886         do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, false);
2887         do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, true);
2888         do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, false);
2889         do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, true);
2890 }