1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
12 use crate::sign::{ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner, OutputSpender, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
13 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance};
14 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
15 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight};
16 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
17 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
18 use crate::ln::channel;
19 use crate::ln::types::ChannelId;
20 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
21 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
22 use crate::crypto::utils::sign;
23 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
24 use crate::util::scid_utils::block_from_scid;
25 use crate::util::test_utils;
27 use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, ScriptBuf, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
28 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
29 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
30 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
31 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
33 use bitcoin::sighash::{SighashCache, EcdsaSighashType};
34 use bitcoin::transaction::Version;
36 use crate::prelude::*;
38 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
41 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
42 // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
43 // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
44 // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
45 // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
46 // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
49 // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
51 // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
52 // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
54 // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
55 // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
56 // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
57 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
58 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
59 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
60 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
62 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
63 let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
65 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
66 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
67 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
68 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
70 let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
72 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
73 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
74 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
76 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
77 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
78 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
80 // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
81 // transaction for nodes[1].
82 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
83 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
84 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
85 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
86 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
88 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
89 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
90 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
91 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
93 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
94 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
95 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
98 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction, has_anchors_htlc_event: bool) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
99 let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
100 assert_eq!(spendable.len(), if has_anchors_htlc_event { 2 } else { 1 });
101 if has_anchors_htlc_event {
102 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { .. }) = spendable.pop().unwrap() {}
105 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
106 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
107 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
108 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
109 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
115 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
116 // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
117 // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
118 // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
120 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
121 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
122 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
123 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
125 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
127 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
129 // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
130 // before forwarding.
131 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
132 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
134 // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
135 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
137 // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
138 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
140 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
141 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
143 let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
144 assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
145 check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
147 // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
148 // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
149 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
150 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
151 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
153 // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
154 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
155 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
156 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
158 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
159 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
163 fn archive_fully_resolved_monitors() {
164 // Test we can archive fully resolved channel monitor.
165 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
166 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
167 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
168 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
169 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
171 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
172 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
174 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
175 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
176 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
177 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
178 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
180 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
181 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
182 let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
183 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
184 let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
185 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
186 let (_, _) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
188 let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
190 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
191 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
193 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
194 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
196 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
197 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
199 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors().len(), 1);
200 // First archive should set balances_empty_height to current block height
201 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.archive_fully_resolved_channel_monitors();
202 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors().len(), 1);
203 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4032);
204 // Second call after 4032 blocks, should archive the monitor
205 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.archive_fully_resolved_channel_monitors();
206 // Should have no monitors left
207 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors().len(), 0);
208 // Remove the corresponding outputs and transactions the chain source is
209 // watching. This is to make sure the `Drop` function assertions pass.
210 nodes.get_mut(0).unwrap().chain_source.remove_watched_txn_and_outputs(
211 OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 },
212 funding_tx.output[0].script_pubkey.clone()
216 fn do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(anchors: bool) {
217 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
218 // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
219 // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
220 // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
221 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
222 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
223 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
225 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
226 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
228 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
229 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
231 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
232 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
233 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
234 assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
236 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
237 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
239 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000;
240 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
241 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
242 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value
244 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
245 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
246 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
248 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
249 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
250 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
251 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
252 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
254 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
255 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
256 let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
257 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
258 let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
259 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
260 let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
261 assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
263 let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
264 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
265 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
267 let shutdown_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]));
268 let shutdown_tx_conf_height_b = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]));
270 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
271 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
273 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
274 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
276 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
277 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
278 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
280 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
281 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
282 amount_satoshis: 1000,
283 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
285 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
287 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
288 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
290 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
291 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
292 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id)
293 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b).is_empty());
295 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
296 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
298 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
299 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
300 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
301 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
303 let spendable_outputs_a = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
305 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a),
309 let spendable_outputs_b = test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
311 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b),
315 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
316 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
320 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
321 do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(false);
322 do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(true);
325 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
330 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
331 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
332 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
333 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
334 let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
335 let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
336 eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
337 assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
338 assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
341 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(anchors: bool, prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
342 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
343 // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
344 // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
345 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
346 if prev_commitment_tx {
347 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
348 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
349 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
350 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
351 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
353 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
354 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
356 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
357 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
359 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
360 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
362 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
363 version: Version::TWO,
364 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
365 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
368 value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
369 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
372 value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
373 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
378 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
379 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
382 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
383 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
384 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
385 assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
387 // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
388 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
389 // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
390 // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
391 let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
392 // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
393 let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
395 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
397 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
398 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
400 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
401 let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
402 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
403 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
406 let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
407 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
408 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
409 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
411 let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
412 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
413 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
416 let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
417 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
418 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
419 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
421 let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
422 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
423 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
427 let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
428 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
429 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
430 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
431 payment_preimage: timeout_payment_preimage,
434 // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
435 // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
436 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
437 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
438 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
439 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
440 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
441 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
442 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
443 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
444 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
445 }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
446 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
448 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
450 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
452 let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
453 // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
454 // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
455 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
457 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
459 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
461 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
463 if prev_commitment_tx {
464 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
465 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
466 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
467 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
469 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
470 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
471 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
472 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
473 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
474 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
475 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
478 // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
479 // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
480 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
481 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) +
482 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
483 let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
484 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
485 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
486 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
487 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
488 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
489 commitment_tx_fee - // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs
490 anchor_outputs_value, // The anchor outputs value in satoshis
491 }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
492 if !prev_commitment_tx {
493 a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
495 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
496 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
497 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
498 amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
500 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
502 // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
503 // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
504 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
505 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
506 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
509 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
510 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
511 match events.pop().unwrap() {
512 Event::BumpTransaction(bump_event) => {
513 let mut first_htlc_event = bump_event.clone();
514 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut first_htlc_event {
515 htlc_descriptors.remove(1);
517 panic!("Unexpected event");
519 let mut second_htlc_event = bump_event;
520 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut second_htlc_event {
521 htlc_descriptors.remove(0);
523 panic!("Unexpected event");
525 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&first_htlc_event);
526 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&second_htlc_event);
528 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
532 let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
533 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
534 // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
535 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
536 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
537 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
538 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
539 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value.to_sat(), 3_000);
540 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value.to_sat(), 4_000);
542 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
543 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
545 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
546 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
547 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
548 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
549 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
550 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
551 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
553 // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
554 // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
555 // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
556 // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
557 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
558 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
559 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
560 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
561 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
562 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
563 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
564 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
565 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
566 // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
567 // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
568 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
569 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
570 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
572 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
574 received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
575 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
577 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
578 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
579 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
581 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
582 // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
583 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
584 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
585 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
586 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
587 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
588 }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
589 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
591 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0], false);
592 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
594 // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
595 // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
596 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
597 if prev_commitment_tx {
598 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
600 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, false);
602 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
603 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
604 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
605 assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()],
606 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
608 // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
609 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
610 let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
611 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
612 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
613 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
614 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
615 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
616 assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
617 a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
618 // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
619 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value.to_sat(), 3_000);
620 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value.to_sat(), 4_000);
622 // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
623 // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
624 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
625 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
626 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
627 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
628 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
630 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
631 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
633 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
634 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
635 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
636 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
638 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1], false);
640 // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
641 // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
642 // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
643 let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
644 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
646 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
647 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
648 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
649 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
650 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
651 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
652 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
653 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
655 // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
656 // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
657 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
658 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0], anchors);
660 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
661 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
662 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
663 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
664 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
666 // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
667 // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
668 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
669 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0], anchors);
671 assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
672 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
674 // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
675 // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
676 // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
677 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
678 assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
679 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
680 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
681 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
682 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
684 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
685 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
686 // monitor events or claimable balances.
687 for node in nodes.iter() {
688 connect_blocks(node, 6);
689 connect_blocks(node, 6);
690 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
691 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
696 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
697 do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, true);
698 do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, false);
699 do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, true);
700 do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, false);
703 fn do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(anchors: bool) {
704 // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
705 // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
706 // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
707 // delay prior to spendability.
709 // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
710 // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
711 // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
712 // claim by our counterparty).
713 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
714 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
715 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
717 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
718 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
720 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
721 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
723 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
724 version: Version::TWO,
725 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
726 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
729 value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
730 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
733 value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
734 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
739 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
740 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
743 // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
744 // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
745 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
746 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
748 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
749 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
750 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
751 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
752 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
754 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
755 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
756 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
758 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
759 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
761 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
762 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
763 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
764 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
766 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
767 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
768 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
770 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
771 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
772 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
773 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
774 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
775 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
777 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
778 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
780 // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
781 // claimable balances.
782 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
783 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
784 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
785 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
786 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
787 let commitment_tx = {
788 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
789 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
790 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
791 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
794 let commitment_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx));
795 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
796 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
797 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
798 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid());
801 let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
802 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
803 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
806 let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
807 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
808 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
809 payment_hash: payment_hash_2,
812 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
813 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
814 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
815 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
816 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
817 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
818 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
819 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
821 // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
822 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
824 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
825 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
826 let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
827 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
828 check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], commitment_tx);
830 // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
832 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
833 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
834 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
835 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
836 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
837 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
839 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 2);
841 let timeout_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
842 assert_eq!(timeout_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
843 check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[0], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
844 check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[1], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
846 // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
847 // "awaiting confirmations" one.
848 let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
849 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0]);
850 // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
851 // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
852 // call, as described, two hunks down.
853 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
854 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
855 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
856 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
857 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
858 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
859 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
860 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
862 // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
863 // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
864 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
865 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, true, false);
866 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
867 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
868 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
869 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
870 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
871 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
872 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
873 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
875 // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
876 // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
877 // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
878 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
879 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
881 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
882 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
883 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
884 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
885 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
886 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
888 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
890 // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
891 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
892 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
893 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
894 .get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
895 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
896 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
897 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
898 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
900 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
901 let to_self_spendable_output = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
903 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a),
904 to_self_spendable_output
907 // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
908 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
909 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
910 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
911 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0], false);
913 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
914 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
915 // monitor events or claimable balances.
916 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
917 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
918 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
919 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
923 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
924 do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(false);
925 do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(true);
929 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
930 // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
932 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
933 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
934 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
935 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
937 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
938 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
940 // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
941 let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
942 let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
943 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
945 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
946 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
948 let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
949 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
950 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
951 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
953 let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
954 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
955 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
956 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
958 let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
959 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
960 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
961 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
963 let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
964 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
965 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
966 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
969 // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
970 // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
971 // HTLC output is spent.
973 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
974 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
975 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
976 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
977 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
979 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
980 amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
981 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
982 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
984 // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
985 let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
986 assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
987 check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
988 check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
990 // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
991 // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
992 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
993 let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
994 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
995 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
996 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
997 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
999 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
1000 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
1001 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1002 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1003 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1005 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
1006 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1008 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
1009 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1010 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1011 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1013 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1014 let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1015 amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
1016 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
1017 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
1018 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1019 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1021 // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
1022 // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
1023 // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
1024 // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
1026 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1027 let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1028 assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
1029 check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
1030 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
1031 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
1033 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
1034 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1036 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1037 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
1038 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1040 // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
1041 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1042 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0], false);
1043 bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
1045 // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
1046 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
1047 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1));
1048 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
1049 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
1050 let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1051 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
1052 check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
1054 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1055 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1057 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1058 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1059 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1061 // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
1062 // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
1063 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1064 let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
1065 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1066 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1067 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1068 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1069 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1070 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1071 confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
1073 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1075 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1076 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1077 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1078 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1079 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1080 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1081 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1082 confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
1084 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1086 // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
1087 // payment failure event.
1088 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1089 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
1091 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1092 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1093 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1094 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1095 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1096 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1097 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1098 confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1100 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1102 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1103 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1104 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1105 confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1107 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1108 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0], false);
1110 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1111 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1112 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1114 // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
1115 // was already claimed.
1116 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1117 let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1118 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1119 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1120 confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1122 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1124 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1125 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1126 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1127 confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1129 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1131 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1132 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
1134 assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
1135 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1136 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1138 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1139 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1141 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1142 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1143 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1144 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1145 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1146 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1147 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1150 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
1151 let mut v = v_orig.clone();
1153 v.push((*t).clone());
1159 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(anchors: bool, confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
1160 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
1161 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1162 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1163 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1164 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1165 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1166 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1167 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1168 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1170 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1171 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1173 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1174 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1176 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1177 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1178 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1179 assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
1181 // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
1183 // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
1184 // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
1185 // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
1186 // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
1187 // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
1188 // later commitment transaction updates
1190 // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
1191 // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
1192 // HTLCs individually.
1194 let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
1195 let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1196 let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1198 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1200 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1201 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1203 let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1204 let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1206 // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1207 let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1208 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1210 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1212 let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1213 let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1215 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1216 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1218 let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1220 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1221 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1222 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1224 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1225 assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1226 let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1227 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1228 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1229 events.retain(|ev| {
1231 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1232 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1233 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1236 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1237 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1243 assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1244 if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1246 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, .. } => {},
1250 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1251 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1253 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1255 // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1256 // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1257 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1258 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1259 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1260 amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1261 claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1262 payment_hash: missing_htlc_payment_hash,
1263 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1264 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1265 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1266 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
1267 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1268 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1269 claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1270 payment_hash: live_payment_hash,
1272 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1274 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1275 let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1276 // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1278 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1279 claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value.to_sat()).sum::<u64>());
1281 // The following constants were determined experimentally
1282 const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: u64 = 483;
1283 let outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: u64 = if anchors { 574 } else { 571 };
1284 let inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: u64 = if anchors { 582 } else { 578 };
1286 // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1287 // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1288 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight().to_wu(), outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1289 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight().to_wu(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1290 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight().to_wu(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1291 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight().to_wu(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1293 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1294 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1295 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1296 let inbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight / 1000;
1297 let outbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight / 1000;
1298 let to_self_claim_fee = chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight().to_wu() / 1000;
1300 // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1301 // claim balances separated out.
1302 let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1303 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1304 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1305 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1306 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1307 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1308 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1309 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1312 let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1313 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1315 let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1316 let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1317 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1319 let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1321 // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1322 // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1323 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1324 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1326 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1327 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1328 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1329 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1331 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1332 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1333 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1334 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1337 let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1338 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1339 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1341 let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1342 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
1343 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1346 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1347 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1348 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1350 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1351 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1354 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1355 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1357 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1359 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1360 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1362 // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1363 // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1364 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1365 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1367 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1368 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1369 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1370 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1371 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1372 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
1373 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1374 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1375 amount_satoshis: 3_000 - outbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1376 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1377 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1378 amount_satoshis: 4_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1379 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1380 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1381 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1382 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1384 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1386 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1387 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1389 let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1390 expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
1391 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1392 expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
1393 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1395 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1396 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }], false);
1397 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1398 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }], false);
1399 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1400 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1401 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0], false);
1402 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1403 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1], false);
1404 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1405 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1407 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1408 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1409 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1410 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1411 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1412 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1413 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1417 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1418 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, true);
1419 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, false);
1420 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, true);
1421 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, false);
1424 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(anchors: bool) {
1425 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1426 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1427 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1428 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1429 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1431 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1432 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1434 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1435 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1437 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1438 version: Version::TWO,
1439 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
1440 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1443 value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
1444 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1447 value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
1448 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1453 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1454 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
1457 // Create some initial channels
1458 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1459 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 12_000_000);
1460 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1461 assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
1463 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1464 let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1465 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1466 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1467 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1469 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[4].value.to_sat(), 11000); // to_self output
1471 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[2].value.to_sat(), 11000); // to_self output
1474 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs, an output for each side, and an
1475 // anchor output for each side if enabled.
1476 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if anchors { 6 } else { 4 });
1478 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1480 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1481 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1483 // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1484 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1485 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1487 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1489 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 1);
1491 let revoked_htlc_success = {
1492 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1493 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1494 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1495 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, if anchors { 3 } else { 1 });
1496 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(),
1497 if anchors { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS } else { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT });
1498 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1501 let revoked_htlc_success_fee = chan_feerate * revoked_htlc_success.weight().to_wu() / 1000;
1503 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1505 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 2);
1507 let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
1508 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1509 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1510 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
1516 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1517 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
1518 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
1519 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
1521 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1522 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1523 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1524 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1525 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1526 let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1528 let revoked_to_self_claim = {
1529 let mut as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1530 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1532 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1533 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 4); // Separate to_remote claim
1534 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1535 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
1536 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1537 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
1538 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1539 Some(as_commitment_claim_txn.remove(0))
1541 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1542 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1543 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1544 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
1545 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1550 // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1551 // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1552 // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1553 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1554 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1555 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1556 let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1557 // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1558 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1559 confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1560 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1561 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1562 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1563 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1564 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1565 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1566 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1568 assert_eq!(as_balances,
1569 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1571 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
1572 let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1573 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1574 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1575 check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
1576 // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked outputs (which no longer includes the
1577 // spent HTLC output)
1578 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1579 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1581 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1583 check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1585 assert_eq!(as_balances,
1586 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1588 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1589 let as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee = chan_feerate * as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight().to_wu() / 1000;
1591 // With anchors, B can pay for revoked_htlc_success's fee with additional inputs, rather
1592 // than with the HTLC itself.
1593 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value.to_sat(),
1594 3_000 - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
1596 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value.to_sat(),
1597 3_000 - revoked_htlc_success_fee - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
1600 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1601 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1602 // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1603 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1604 confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1605 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1606 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1607 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1608 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1609 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1610 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1611 amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value.to_sat(),
1612 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1614 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1616 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1617 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], false);
1618 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1619 // to_self output to B
1620 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1621 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1622 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1623 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1624 amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value.to_sat(),
1625 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1627 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1629 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1630 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0], false);
1631 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1632 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1633 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1634 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1635 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1637 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1639 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1640 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1641 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1642 // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1643 let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1644 for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1645 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1648 // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1650 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1651 let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1652 for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1653 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1656 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
1657 let (revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, revoked_to_self_claim) = {
1658 let mut as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1659 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1661 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1662 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1663 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1664 (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), revoked_to_self_claim.unwrap())
1666 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1667 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1668 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1669 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), 1);
1670 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1671 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1672 (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0))
1676 // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1677 // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1678 // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1679 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1680 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1681 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1682 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1683 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1684 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1686 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1688 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim);
1689 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1690 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1691 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1692 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1693 amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value.to_sat(),
1694 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1696 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1698 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim);
1699 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1700 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1701 amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.output[0].value.to_sat(),
1702 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1703 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1704 amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value.to_sat(),
1705 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1707 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1709 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1710 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, false);
1711 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1712 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim, false);
1714 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1716 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1717 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1718 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1719 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1720 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1721 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1722 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1726 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1727 do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(false);
1728 do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(true);
1731 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(anchors: bool) {
1732 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1733 // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1734 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1735 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1736 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1737 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1738 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1739 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1740 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1741 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1743 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1744 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1746 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1747 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1749 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1750 version: Version::TWO,
1751 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
1752 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1753 output: vec![TxOut {
1754 value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
1755 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1758 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1760 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1761 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1762 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1763 assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
1765 // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1766 // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1767 // revocation-claim transaction.
1769 let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1770 let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1772 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1774 // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1775 // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1776 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1777 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1779 // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1780 let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1782 assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1783 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1785 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1788 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1789 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1792 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1795 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1796 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1798 let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1799 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1800 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1802 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1803 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1805 let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1807 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1808 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1809 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1810 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1811 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1812 payment_hash: revoked_payment_hash,
1813 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1814 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1815 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1816 payment_hash: claimed_payment_hash,
1818 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1820 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1821 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1822 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1825 let mut claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1826 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1827 let revoked_to_self_claim = if anchors {
1828 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1829 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 5); // Separate to_remote claim
1830 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1831 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
1832 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1833 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
1834 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1835 Some(claim_txn.remove(0))
1837 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1838 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1839 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1840 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
1841 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1845 let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1847 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1848 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1849 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1850 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1851 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1852 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1853 confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1854 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1855 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1856 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1857 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1858 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1859 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1860 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1862 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1864 // Confirm A's HTLC-Success transaction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1867 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1868 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1869 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1870 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
1871 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
1873 let htlc_success_claim = if anchors {
1874 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1875 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1876 check_spends!(txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1879 as_revoked_txn[1].clone()
1881 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_claim);
1882 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage, None, true, false);
1884 let mut claim_txn_2 = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1885 // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1886 // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1887 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1889 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1);
1890 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1891 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], &htlc_success_claim);
1892 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1893 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1894 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1896 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1);
1897 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1898 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1899 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 2);
1900 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1901 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 1);
1902 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1905 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1906 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1907 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1908 confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1909 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1910 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1911 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1912 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1913 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1914 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1915 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1916 // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1917 // anyway, so its not a big change.
1918 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1920 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1922 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1923 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1925 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1926 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1927 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1928 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1929 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1930 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1931 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1932 // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1933 // anyway, so its not a big change.
1934 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1936 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1938 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1939 let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1941 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1942 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1943 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1944 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1945 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1946 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1947 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value.to_sat(),
1948 confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1950 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1952 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1953 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0], false);
1955 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1956 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1957 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1958 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1959 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1961 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1964 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&claim_txn_2[1], revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap()]);
1966 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1968 let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1971 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1972 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value.to_sat(),
1973 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1974 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1975 amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap().output[0].value.to_sat(),
1976 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1978 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1980 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1981 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value.to_sat(),
1982 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1984 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1987 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1989 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1990 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1992 let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1993 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1994 for (i, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
1995 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = event {
1996 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
1997 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
1998 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
1999 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()
2001 check_spends!(spend_tx, if i == 0 { &claim_txn_2[1] } else { revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap() });
2002 } else { panic!(); }
2005 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1], false);
2007 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
2009 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
2010 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
2011 // monitor events or claimable balances.
2012 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
2013 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
2014 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2015 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
2019 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
2020 do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(false);
2021 do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(true);
2024 fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
2025 // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
2026 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2027 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2029 let new_chain_monitor;
2031 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2032 let node_deserialized;
2034 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2036 // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
2037 // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
2038 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
2039 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
2041 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2042 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2043 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2044 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
2045 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2047 let commitment_tx = {
2048 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2049 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2050 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
2051 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2055 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2056 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2057 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2058 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2059 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid());
2062 // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
2063 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
2064 let htlc_timeout_tx = {
2065 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2066 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2067 check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
2071 // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
2072 // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
2073 if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
2074 let serialized_monitor = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(
2075 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0",
2077 reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2080 // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
2081 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
2082 if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
2083 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2086 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2087 if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
2088 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
2090 assert!(txn.len() < 6);
2093 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
2094 assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
2095 assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
2096 assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
2102 fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
2103 do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
2104 do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
2107 fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) {
2108 // Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every
2109 // `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call.
2110 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2111 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2112 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
2114 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2115 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2117 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
2118 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2120 let (_, _, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
2121 &nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 500_000_000
2123 const HTLC_AMT_MSAT: u64 = 1_000_000;
2124 const HTLC_AMT_SAT: u64 = HTLC_AMT_MSAT / 1000;
2125 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_AMT_MSAT);
2127 let htlc_expiry = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1;
2129 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(&nodes[0], &chan_id);
2130 assert_eq!(commitment_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 /* commitment tx only */} else { 2 /* commitment and htlc timeout tx */ });
2131 check_spends!(&commitment_txn[0], &funding_tx);
2132 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_txn[0]);
2133 check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
2134 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed,
2135 false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
2136 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2138 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2139 version: Version::TWO,
2140 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2141 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2142 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` on anchors
2143 value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
2144 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2147 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2149 // Set up a helper closure we'll use throughout our test. We should only expect retries without
2150 // bumps if fees have not increased after a block has been connected (assuming the height timer
2151 // re-evaluates at every block) or after `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` is called.
2152 let mut prev_htlc_tx_feerate = None;
2153 let mut check_htlc_retry = |should_retry: bool, should_bump: bool| -> Option<Transaction> {
2154 let (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) = if anchors {
2155 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
2156 let events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2157 assert_eq!(events.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
2162 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2163 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2164 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2165 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2166 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2167 check_spends!(&htlc_tx, &commitment_txn[0], &coinbase_tx);
2168 let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value.to_sat() -
2169 htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value.to_sat()).sum::<u64>();
2170 let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight().to_wu();
2171 (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
2173 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2176 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2177 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2178 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
2182 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2183 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]);
2184 let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value.to_sat();
2185 let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight().to_wu();
2186 (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
2189 assert!(htlc_tx_feerate > prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take().unwrap());
2190 } else if let Some(prev_feerate) = prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take() {
2191 assert_eq!(htlc_tx_feerate, prev_feerate);
2193 prev_htlc_tx_feerate = Some(htlc_tx_feerate);
2197 // Connect blocks up to one before the HTLC expires. This should not result in a claim/retry.
2198 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_expiry - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
2199 check_htlc_retry(false, false);
2201 // Connect one more block, producing our first claim.
2202 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2203 check_htlc_retry(true, false);
2205 // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
2206 // transactions pre-anchors.
2207 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2208 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2210 // Trigger a call and we should have another retry, but without a bump.
2211 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2212 check_htlc_retry(true, false);
2214 // Double the feerate and trigger a call, expecting a fee-bumped retry.
2215 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2216 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2217 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2219 // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
2220 // transactions pre-anchors.
2221 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2222 let htlc_tx = check_htlc_retry(true, anchors).unwrap();
2224 // Mine the HTLC transaction to ensure we don't retry claims while they're confirmed.
2225 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_tx);
2226 // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transactions,
2227 // we'll receive an extra bumped claim.
2228 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2229 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2230 nodes[0].wallet_source.remove_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 1 });
2231 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2233 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2234 check_htlc_retry(false, false);
2238 fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() {
2239 do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false);
2240 do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true);
2244 fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
2245 // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
2246 // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
2247 // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
2248 // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
2249 // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
2250 // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
2251 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2252 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2253 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
2254 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2255 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2256 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2257 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2258 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2260 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
2261 &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
2263 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
2264 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000);
2266 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2267 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2269 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2271 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2272 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
2274 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2276 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2277 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2278 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2281 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
2282 &payment_hash_2, &payment_preimage_2, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
2283 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
2285 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
2286 &payment_hash_1, &payment_preimage_1, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2287 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2290 let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2291 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
2292 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
2293 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2294 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2295 version: Version::TWO,
2296 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2297 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2298 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2299 value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
2300 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2303 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2304 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2305 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2306 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2307 let anchor_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2308 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2309 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2310 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2311 (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
2313 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2316 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[2].value.to_sat(), 1_000); // HTLC A -> B
2317 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[3].value.to_sat(), 2_000); // HTLC B -> A
2319 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2321 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2325 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2326 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
2328 let htlc_preimage_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2329 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
2330 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
2331 check_spends!(htlc_preimage_tx, commitment_tx);
2333 let htlc_timeout_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2334 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
2335 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
2336 check_spends!(htlc_timeout_tx, commitment_tx);
2338 if let Some(commitment_tx) = txn.pop() {
2339 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2343 let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2344 // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2345 // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2346 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2347 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2348 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
2349 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2351 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2);
2353 let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2354 for event in holder_events {
2356 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2357 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2358 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2359 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2360 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2361 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx, anchor_tx);
2362 htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
2364 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2368 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
2369 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2371 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2373 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
2375 let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2376 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2377 for event in holder_events {
2379 Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
2380 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2384 // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
2385 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2386 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2387 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2388 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2392 fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
2393 // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
2394 // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
2395 // revoked commitment.
2396 let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2397 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2398 // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
2399 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2400 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2402 let bob_chain_monitor;
2404 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
2405 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2406 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2407 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2408 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2409 let bob_deserialized;
2411 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2413 let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2414 let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2416 // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
2417 let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
2419 // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
2420 let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2421 let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2422 let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2423 let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2425 // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
2426 // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
2428 let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
2429 let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
2431 // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
2432 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
2433 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
2434 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
2435 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
2437 // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
2439 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2440 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2442 // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
2444 nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
2445 bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
2447 for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
2448 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
2449 for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
2450 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
2451 &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2452 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2457 // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
2458 // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
2459 // the HTLCs still pending.
2460 *nodes[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2461 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
2462 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
2463 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2465 // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
2466 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2467 let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2468 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2469 let mut revoked_commitment_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2470 let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2471 for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
2472 let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC * (idx + 1) as u64;
2473 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2474 version: Version::TWO,
2475 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2476 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2477 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2479 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2482 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, utxo_value);
2484 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event),
2485 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2487 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2488 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2489 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2490 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
2491 check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
2493 check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
2495 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]);
2496 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2498 revoked_commitment_txs.push(commitment_tx.clone());
2499 anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone());
2502 for node in &nodes {
2503 mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_txs[0], &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_txs[1], &anchor_txs[1]]);
2505 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
2506 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
2507 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2509 // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
2512 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2513 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
2515 let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_txs[0].txid() {
2516 (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] })
2518 (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] })
2521 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2522 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
2523 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_txs[0]);
2524 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2525 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
2526 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_txs[1]);
2529 // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
2530 // through the success path.
2531 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2532 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2533 // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2534 // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2535 match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
2536 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
2537 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
2538 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
2539 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2540 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
2541 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2544 _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
2547 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
2548 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
2549 let fee_utxo_script = ScriptBuf::new_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2550 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2551 version: Version::TWO,
2552 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2553 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2554 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
2555 value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
2556 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
2559 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
2560 version: Version::TWO,
2561 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2562 input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
2563 previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2564 ..Default::default()
2566 output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
2567 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
2568 script_pubkey: ScriptBuf::new_op_return(&[]),
2571 let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
2572 for event in events {
2573 // We don't use the `BumpTransactionEventHandler` here because it does not support
2574 // creating one transaction from multiple `HTLCResolution` events.
2575 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
2576 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
2577 for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
2578 assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
2579 htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
2580 htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&secp));
2582 descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
2583 htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
2585 panic!("Unexpected event");
2588 for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
2589 let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
2590 let signer = htlc_descriptor.derive_channel_signer(&nodes[1].keys_manager);
2591 let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
2592 let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&secp);
2593 htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
2595 let fee_utxo_sig = {
2596 let witness_script = ScriptBuf::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
2597 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).p2wsh_signature_hash(
2598 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2600 let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2601 let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2602 sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2605 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_slice(&[fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2606 check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_txs[0], revoked_commitment_txs[1]);
2610 for node in &nodes {
2611 mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
2614 // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
2615 // the second level instead.
2616 let revoked_claim_transactions = {
2617 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2618 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2620 let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
2621 tx.input.len() == 2 &&
2622 tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2623 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
2624 ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2625 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
2626 for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
2627 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
2630 let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = new_hash_map();
2631 for current_tx in txn.into_iter() {
2632 revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx);
2634 revoked_claim_transaction_map
2636 for node in &nodes {
2637 mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claim_transactions.values().collect::<Vec<_>>());
2641 // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
2643 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2644 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
2646 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2647 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2649 // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2650 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2651 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2653 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2654 let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2655 assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4);
2656 for event in spendable_output_events {
2657 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event {
2658 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2659 assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap()));
2660 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2661 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), ScriptBuf::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
2664 if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(_) = &outputs[0] {
2665 check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_txs[1]);
2667 check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
2670 panic!("unexpected event");
2674 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2675 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2676 // On the Alice side, the individual to_self_claim are still pending confirmation.
2677 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 2);
2678 // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
2679 // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
2680 // balances to claim.
2682 // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
2683 // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
2684 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);
2687 fn do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(confirm_commitment_before_reload: bool) {
2688 // Tests that we'll fix a ChannelMonitor's `counterparty_payment_script` for an anchor outputs
2689 // channel upon deserialization.
2690 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2691 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2694 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2695 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2696 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2697 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2698 let node_deserialized;
2699 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2701 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
2703 // Set the monitor's `counterparty_payment_script` to a dummy P2WPKH script.
2704 let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2705 let privkey = bitcoin::PrivateKey::from_slice(&[1; 32], bitcoin::Network::Testnet).unwrap();
2706 let pubkey = bitcoin::PublicKey::from_private_key(&secp, &privkey);
2707 let p2wpkh_script = ScriptBuf::new_p2wpkh(&pubkey.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2708 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).set_counterparty_payment_script(p2wpkh_script.clone());
2709 assert_eq!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script(), p2wpkh_script);
2711 // Confirm the counterparty's commitment and reload the monitor (either before or after) such
2712 // that we arrive at the correct `counterparty_payment_script` after the reload.
2713 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2714 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2715 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2716 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
2717 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2719 let commitment_tx = {
2720 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2721 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2722 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 4);
2723 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2727 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2728 let commitment_tx_conf_height = if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2729 // We should expect our round trip serialization check to fail as we're writing the monitor
2730 // with the incorrect P2WPKH script but reading it with the correct P2WSH script.
2731 *nodes[1].chain_monitor.expect_monitor_round_trip_fail.lock().unwrap() = Some(chan_id);
2732 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2733 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2734 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2735 commitment_tx_conf_height
2737 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2738 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2739 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2740 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2741 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
2742 commitment_tx_conf_height
2744 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2745 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2746 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script().is_p2wsh());
2748 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2749 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2751 if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2752 // If we saw the commitment before our `counterparty_payment_script` was fixed, we'll never
2753 // get the spendable output event for the `to_remote` output, so we'll need to get it
2754 // manually via `get_spendable_outputs`.
2755 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2756 let outputs = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height);
2757 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2758 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2759 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
2762 check_spends!(spend_tx, &commitment_tx);
2764 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx, false);
2769 fn test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload() {
2770 do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(false);
2771 do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(true);
2774 #[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
2775 fn do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(anchors: bool, confirm_counterparty_commitment: bool) {
2776 // Tests that our monitor claims will always use fresh random signatures (ensuring a unique
2777 // wtxid) to prevent certain classes of transaction replacement at the bitcoin P2P layer.
2778 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2779 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2780 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2782 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2783 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2785 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2786 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2788 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2789 version: Version::TWO,
2790 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2791 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2794 value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
2795 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2800 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2803 // Open a channel and route a payment. We'll let it timeout to claim it.
2804 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
2805 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
2807 let (closing_node, other_node) = if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2808 (&nodes[1], &nodes[0])
2810 (&nodes[0], &nodes[1])
2813 get_monitor!(closing_node, chan_id).broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(
2814 &closing_node.tx_broadcaster, &closing_node.fee_estimator, &closing_node.logger
2817 // The commitment transaction comes first.
2818 let commitment_tx = {
2819 let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2820 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2821 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2825 mine_transaction(closing_node, &commitment_tx);
2826 check_added_monitors!(closing_node, 1);
2827 check_closed_broadcast!(closing_node, true);
2828 check_closed_event!(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
2830 mine_transaction(other_node, &commitment_tx);
2831 check_added_monitors!(other_node, 1);
2832 check_closed_broadcast!(other_node, true);
2833 check_closed_event!(other_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [closing_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
2835 // If we update the best block to the new height before providing the confirmed transactions,
2836 // we'll see another broadcast of the commitment transaction.
2837 if !confirm_counterparty_commitment && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2838 let _ = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2841 // Then comes the HTLC timeout transaction.
2842 if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2843 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 5);
2844 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
2845 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
2847 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
2849 if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2850 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
2852 let htlc_timeout_tx = {
2853 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2854 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2855 let tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2856 check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
2860 // Check we rebroadcast it with a different wtxid.
2861 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2862 if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2863 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
2866 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2867 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2868 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), htlc_timeout_tx.txid());
2869 assert_ne!(txn[0].wtxid(), htlc_timeout_tx.wtxid());
2873 #[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
2875 fn test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures() {
2876 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, false);
2877 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, true);
2878 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, false);
2879 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, true);
2883 fn test_event_replay_causing_monitor_replay() {
2884 // In LDK 0.0.121 there was a bug where if a `PaymentSent` event caused an RAA
2885 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` hold and then the node was restarted after the `PaymentSent` event
2886 // and `ChannelMonitorUpdate` both completed but without persisting the `ChannelManager` we'd
2887 // replay the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` on restart (which is fine, but triggered a safety panic).
2888 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2889 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2891 let new_chain_monitor;
2892 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2893 let node_deserialized;
2894 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2896 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
2898 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000).0;
2900 do_claim_payment_along_route(
2901 ClaimAlongRouteArgs::new(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1]]], payment_preimage)
2904 // At this point the `PaymentSent` event has not been processed but the full commitment signed
2905 // dance has completed.
2906 let serialized_channel_manager = nodes[0].node.encode();
2908 // Now process the `PaymentSent` to get the final RAA `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, checking that it
2909 // resulted in a `ChannelManager` persistence request.
2910 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_needs_persistence();
2911 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, true /* expected post-event monitor update*/);
2912 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_needs_persistence());
2914 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).encode();
2915 reload_node!(nodes[0], &serialized_channel_manager, &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2917 // Expect the `PaymentSent` to get replayed, this time without the duplicate monitor update
2918 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false /* expected post-event monitor update*/);