1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
13 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner};
15 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
16 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
17 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
18 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
20 use crate::events::bump_transaction::BumpTransactionEvent;
21 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
22 use crate::ln::channel;
24 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
26 use crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager;
27 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
30 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
32 use crate::util::crypto::sign;
34 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
36 use crate::util::test_utils;
39 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
42 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
44 use bitcoin::secp256k1::SecretKey;
46 use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, Script, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime, Witness};
47 use bitcoin::Transaction;
49 use bitcoin::util::sighash::SighashCache;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
53 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
56 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
57 // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
58 // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
59 // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
60 // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
61 // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
64 // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
66 // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
67 // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
69 // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
70 // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
71 // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
72 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
73 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
74 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
75 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
77 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
78 let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
80 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
81 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
82 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
84 let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
86 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
87 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
88 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
90 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
91 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
92 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
94 // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
95 // transaction for nodes[1].
96 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
97 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
98 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
99 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
100 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
102 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
103 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
104 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
105 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
107 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
108 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
109 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
112 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction) {
113 let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
114 assert_eq!(spendable.len(), 1);
115 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
116 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
117 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
118 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
119 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
124 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
125 // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
126 // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
127 // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
129 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
130 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
131 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
132 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
134 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
136 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
138 // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
139 // before forwarding.
140 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
141 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
143 // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
144 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
146 // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
147 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
149 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
150 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
152 let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
153 assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
154 check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
156 // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
157 // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
158 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
159 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
160 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
162 // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
163 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
164 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
165 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
167 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
168 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
172 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
173 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
174 // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
175 // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
176 // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
177 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
178 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
179 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
180 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
182 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
183 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
184 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
185 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
187 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
188 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
190 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
191 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000
193 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
194 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
195 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
197 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
198 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
199 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
200 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
201 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
203 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
204 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
205 let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
206 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
207 let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
208 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
209 let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
210 assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
212 let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
213 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
214 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
216 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
217 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
219 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
220 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
222 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
223 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
225 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
226 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000,
227 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
229 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
230 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
231 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1000,
232 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
234 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
236 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
237 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
239 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
240 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
241 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
242 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
244 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
245 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
247 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
248 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
251 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
256 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
257 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
258 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
259 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
260 let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
261 let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
262 eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
263 assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
264 assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
267 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
268 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
269 // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
270 // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
271 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
272 if prev_commitment_tx {
273 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
274 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
275 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
276 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
277 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
279 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
280 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
281 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
283 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
284 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
285 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
286 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
288 // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
289 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
290 // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
291 // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
292 let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
293 // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
294 let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
296 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
298 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
299 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
301 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
302 // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
303 // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
304 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
305 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
306 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
307 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
308 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
309 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
310 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
311 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
312 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
314 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
315 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
316 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
317 }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
318 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
319 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
320 }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
321 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
322 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
324 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
326 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
328 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
330 let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
331 // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
332 // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
333 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
334 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
335 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
337 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
338 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
339 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
341 if prev_commitment_tx {
342 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
343 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
344 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
345 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
346 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
347 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
348 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
349 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
350 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
351 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
352 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
353 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
356 // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
357 // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
358 let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
359 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
360 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
361 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
362 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
363 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
364 // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
365 chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) +
366 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
367 channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
368 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
369 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
370 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
372 if !prev_commitment_tx {
373 a_expected_balances.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
374 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
375 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
378 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
379 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
380 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
381 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
383 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
385 // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
386 // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
387 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
388 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
389 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
391 let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
392 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
393 // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
394 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
395 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
396 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
397 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
398 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
399 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
401 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
402 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
403 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
404 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
405 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
406 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
408 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
409 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
410 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
412 // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
413 // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
414 // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
415 // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
416 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
417 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
419 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
420 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
421 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
422 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
423 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
424 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
425 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
426 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
427 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
428 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
430 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
431 // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
432 // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
433 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
434 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
435 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
437 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
439 Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
440 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
441 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
442 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
443 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
444 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
446 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
448 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
449 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
450 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
452 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
453 // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
454 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
455 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
456 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
457 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
458 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
459 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
461 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
462 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
463 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
464 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
465 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
466 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
467 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
468 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
469 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
470 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
472 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
474 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
475 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
477 // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
478 // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
479 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
480 if prev_commitment_tx {
481 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
483 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
485 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
486 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
487 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
488 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
489 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
490 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
492 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
493 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
494 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
495 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
496 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
498 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
500 // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
501 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
502 let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
503 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
504 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
505 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
506 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
507 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
508 assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
509 a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
510 // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
511 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
512 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
514 // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
515 // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
516 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
517 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
518 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
519 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
520 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
522 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
523 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
525 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
526 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
527 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
528 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
530 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
532 // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
533 // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
534 // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
535 let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
536 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
538 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
539 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
540 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
541 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
542 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
543 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
544 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
545 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
546 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
548 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
550 // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
551 // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
552 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
553 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
555 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
556 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
557 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
558 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
559 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
560 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
562 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
564 // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
565 // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
566 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
567 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
569 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
570 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
571 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
573 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
575 // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
576 // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
577 // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
578 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
579 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
580 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
581 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
583 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
584 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
585 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
586 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
588 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
589 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
590 // monitor events or claimable balances.
591 for node in nodes.iter() {
592 connect_blocks(node, 6);
593 connect_blocks(node, 6);
594 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
595 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
600 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
601 do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
602 do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
606 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
607 // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
608 // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
609 // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
610 // delay prior to spendability.
612 // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
613 // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
614 // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
615 // claim by our counterparty).
616 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
617 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
618 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
619 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
621 // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
622 // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
623 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
624 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
626 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
627 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
628 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
631 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
632 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
633 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
635 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
636 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
638 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
639 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
640 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
642 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
643 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
644 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
646 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
647 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
648 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
649 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
650 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
651 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
653 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
654 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
656 // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions
657 let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
658 assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 3);
659 check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
660 check_spends!(as_txn[2], as_txn[0]);
661 check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
663 // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
664 // claimable balances.
665 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
666 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
667 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
668 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
669 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
671 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
672 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
673 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
674 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
675 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
676 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
677 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
678 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
679 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
680 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
682 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
684 // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
685 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
687 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
688 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
689 let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
690 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
691 check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]);
693 // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
695 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
696 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
697 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
698 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
699 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
700 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
701 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
702 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
703 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
704 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
705 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
707 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
708 assert_eq!(as_txn[1].lock_time.0, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1); // as_txn[1] can be included in the next block
710 // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
711 // "awaiting confirmations" one.
712 let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
713 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
714 // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
715 // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
716 // call, as described, two hunks down.
717 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
718 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
719 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
720 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
721 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
722 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
723 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
724 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
725 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
726 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
728 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
730 // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
731 // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
732 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
733 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
734 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
735 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
736 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
737 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
738 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
739 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
740 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
741 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
742 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
743 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
745 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
747 // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
748 // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
749 // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
750 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
751 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
753 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
754 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
755 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
756 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
757 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
758 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
759 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
761 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
763 // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
764 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
765 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
766 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
767 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
768 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
770 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
771 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
773 // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
774 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
775 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
776 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
777 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
779 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
780 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
781 // monitor events or claimable balances.
782 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
783 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
784 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
785 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
789 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
790 // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
792 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
793 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
794 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
795 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
797 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
798 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
800 // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
801 let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
802 let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
803 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
805 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
806 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
808 // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
809 // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
810 // HTLC output is spent.
812 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
813 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
814 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
815 }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
816 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
817 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
818 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
819 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
820 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
822 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
824 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
825 claimable_amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
826 }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
827 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
828 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
829 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
830 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
831 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
833 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
835 // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
836 let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
837 assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
838 check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
839 check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
841 // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
842 // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
843 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
844 let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
845 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
846 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
847 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
848 }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
849 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
850 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
851 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
852 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
853 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
856 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
857 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
858 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
859 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
860 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
862 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
863 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
865 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
866 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
867 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
868 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
870 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
871 let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
872 claimable_amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
873 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
874 }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
875 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
876 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
877 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
878 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
879 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
881 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
882 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
884 // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
885 // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
886 // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
887 // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
889 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
890 let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
891 assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
892 check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
893 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
894 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
896 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
897 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
899 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
900 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
901 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
903 // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
904 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
905 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
906 bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
908 // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
909 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
910 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) - 1);
911 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
912 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
913 let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
914 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
915 check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
917 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
918 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
920 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
921 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
922 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
924 // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
925 // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
926 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
927 let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
928 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
929 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
930 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
931 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
932 }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
933 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
934 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
935 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
936 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
937 confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
939 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
941 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
942 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
943 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
944 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
945 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
946 }, Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
947 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
948 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
949 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
950 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
951 confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
953 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
955 // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
956 // payment failure event.
957 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
958 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
960 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
961 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
962 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
963 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
964 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
965 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
966 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
967 confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
969 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
971 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
972 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
973 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
974 confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
976 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
977 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
979 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
980 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
981 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
983 // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
984 // was already claimed.
985 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
986 let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
987 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
988 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
989 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
990 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
991 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
992 confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
994 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
996 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
997 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
998 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
999 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1000 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1001 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1002 confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1004 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1006 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1007 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
1009 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
1010 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1011 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1013 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1014 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1016 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1017 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1019 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1020 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1021 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1022 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1023 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1024 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1025 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1028 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
1029 let mut v = v_orig.clone();
1031 v.push((*t).clone());
1037 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
1038 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
1039 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1040 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1041 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1042 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1043 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1044 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1045 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1046 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1047 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1049 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1050 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1051 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1052 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1054 // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
1056 // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
1057 // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
1058 // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
1059 // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
1060 // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
1061 // later commitment transaction updates
1063 // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
1064 // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
1065 // HTLCs individually.
1067 let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
1068 let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1069 let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1071 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1073 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1074 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1076 let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1077 let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1079 // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1080 let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1081 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1083 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1085 let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1086 let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1088 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1089 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1091 let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1093 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1094 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1095 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1097 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1098 assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1099 let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1100 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1101 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1102 events.retain(|ev| {
1104 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1105 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1106 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1109 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1110 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1116 assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1117 if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1119 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
1123 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1124 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1125 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1126 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1128 // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1129 // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1130 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1131 claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1132 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1133 claimable_amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1134 claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1135 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1136 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1137 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1138 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1139 claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1140 claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1142 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1144 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1145 let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1146 // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1148 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1149 claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
1151 // The following constants were determined experimentally
1152 const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 483;
1153 const OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 571;
1154 const INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 578;
1156 // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1157 // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1158 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1159 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1160 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1161 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1163 // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1164 // claim balances separated out.
1165 let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1166 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1167 claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1168 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1169 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1170 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1171 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1172 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1175 let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1176 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1177 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1179 let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1180 let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1181 claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1183 let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1185 // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1186 // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1187 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1188 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1190 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1191 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1192 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1193 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1195 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1196 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1197 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1198 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1201 let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1202 claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1203 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1205 let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1206 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1207 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1208 - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1209 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1212 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1213 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1214 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1216 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1217 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1220 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1221 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1223 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1225 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1226 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1228 // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1229 // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1230 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1231 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1233 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1234 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1235 claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1236 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1237 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1238 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1239 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1240 - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1241 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1242 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1243 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000 - chan_feerate * OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1244 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1245 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1246 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1247 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1248 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1249 claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1250 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1252 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1254 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1255 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1257 let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1258 expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
1259 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1260 expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
1261 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1263 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1264 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }]);
1265 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1266 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }]);
1267 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1268 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1269 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1270 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1271 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1272 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1273 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1275 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1276 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1277 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1278 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1279 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1280 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1281 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1285 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1286 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true);
1287 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false);
1291 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1292 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1293 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1294 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1295 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1296 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1297 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1299 // Create some initial channels
1300 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1301 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 11_000_000);
1302 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1303 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1305 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1306 let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1307 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1308 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1309 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1311 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs and an output for both sides
1312 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
1314 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1316 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1317 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1319 // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1320 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1321 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1323 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1324 let revoked_htlc_success_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1326 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn.len(), 1);
1327 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1328 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
1329 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1331 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1332 let revoked_htlc_timeout_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1333 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_timeout_txn.len(), 1);
1334 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1335 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
1336 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
1337 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
1339 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1340 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1341 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1343 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1344 let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1346 let as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1347 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), 1);
1348 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1350 // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1351 // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1352 // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1353 let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1354 // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1355 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1356 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1357 confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1358 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1359 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1360 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1361 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1362 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1363 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1364 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1366 assert_eq!(as_balances,
1367 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1369 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success_txn[0]);
1370 let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1371 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1372 check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success_txn[0]);
1373 check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]); // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked
1374 // outputs (which no longer includes the spent HTLC output)
1376 assert_eq!(as_balances,
1377 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1379 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1380 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1381 3_000 - chan_feerate * (revoked_htlc_success_txn[0].weight() + as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight()) as u64 / 1000);
1383 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1384 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1385 // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1386 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1387 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1388 confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1389 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1390 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1391 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1392 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1393 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1394 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1395 claimable_amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1396 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1398 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1400 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1401 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1402 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1403 // to_self output to B
1404 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1405 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1406 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1407 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1408 claimable_amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1409 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1411 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1413 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1414 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1415 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1416 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1417 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1418 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1419 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1421 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1423 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0].lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1424 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1425 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1426 // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1427 let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1428 for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1429 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1432 // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1434 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1435 let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1436 for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1437 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1440 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0]);
1441 let as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1442 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1444 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout_txn[0]);
1445 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1447 // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1448 // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1449 // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1450 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1451 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1452 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1453 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1454 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1455 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1457 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1459 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1460 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1461 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1462 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1463 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1464 claimable_amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1465 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1467 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1469 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
1470 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1471 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1472 claimable_amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].output[0].value,
1473 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1474 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1475 claimable_amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1476 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1478 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1480 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1481 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1482 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1483 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
1485 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1487 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1488 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1489 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1490 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1491 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1492 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1493 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1497 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
1498 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1499 // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1500 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1501 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1502 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1503 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1504 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1505 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1506 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1507 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1508 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1510 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1511 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1512 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1513 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1515 // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1516 // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1517 // revocation-claim transaction.
1519 let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1520 let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1522 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1524 // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1525 // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1526 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1527 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1529 // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1530 let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1532 assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), 2);
1533 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1534 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1536 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1537 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1540 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1543 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1546 let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1547 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1548 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1550 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1551 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1552 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1553 let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1555 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1556 claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1557 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1558 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1559 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1560 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1561 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1562 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1564 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1566 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1567 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1568 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1571 let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1572 // Currently the revoked commitment outputs are all claimed in one aggregated transaction
1573 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 1);
1574 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1575 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1577 let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1579 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1580 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1581 claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1582 confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1583 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1584 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1585 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1586 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1587 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1588 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1589 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1590 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1592 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1594 // Confirm A's HTLC-Success tranasction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1596 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[1]);
1597 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage);
1598 let mut claim_txn_2: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1599 claim_txn_2.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| if tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid()) { 0 } else { 1 });
1600 // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1601 // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1602 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1603 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 2);
1604 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1605 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1606 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1608 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1609 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1610 claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1611 confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1612 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1613 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1614 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1615 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1616 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1617 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1618 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1619 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1620 // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1621 // anyway, so its not a big change.
1622 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1624 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1626 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1627 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1629 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1630 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1631 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1632 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1633 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1634 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1635 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1636 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1637 // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1638 // anyway, so its not a big change.
1639 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1641 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1643 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1644 let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1646 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1647 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1648 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1649 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1650 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1651 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1652 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1653 claimable_amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1654 confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1656 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1658 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1659 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1661 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1662 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1663 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1664 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1665 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1666 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1668 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1670 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1671 let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1673 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1674 claimable_amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
1675 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1677 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1679 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1681 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1682 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1683 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1684 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1686 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1687 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1688 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1689 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1690 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1691 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1692 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1697 fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
1698 // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
1699 // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
1700 // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
1701 // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
1702 // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
1703 // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
1704 let secp = Secp256k1::new();
1705 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1706 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1707 let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
1708 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
1709 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1710 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
1711 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1713 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
1714 &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
1716 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
1717 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1719 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1721 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
1722 check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
1723 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
1725 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
1726 &payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
1727 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
1730 let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1731 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
1732 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
1733 Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { commitment_tx, anchor_descriptor, .. }) => {
1734 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.input.len(), 1);
1735 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 6);
1736 let mut anchor_tx = Transaction {
1738 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1740 TxIn { previous_output: anchor_descriptor.outpoint, ..Default::default() },
1741 TxIn { ..Default::default() },
1743 output: vec![TxOut {
1744 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1745 script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
1748 let signer = nodes[0].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
1749 anchor_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &anchor_descriptor.channel_keys_id,
1751 let funding_sig = signer.sign_holder_anchor_input(&mut anchor_tx, 0, &secp).unwrap();
1752 anchor_tx.input[0].witness = chan_utils::build_anchor_input_witness(
1753 &signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, &funding_sig
1755 (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
1757 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1760 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
1761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1763 let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1764 // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
1765 // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
1766 match *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow() {
1767 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
1768 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
1769 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
1770 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
1773 _ => assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2),
1775 let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1776 for event in holder_events {
1778 Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) => {
1779 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 1);
1780 let htlc_descriptor = &htlc_descriptors[0];
1781 let signer = nodes[0].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
1782 htlc_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id
1784 let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp);
1785 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
1787 lock_time: tx_lock_time,
1789 htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input(), // HTLC input
1790 TxIn { ..Default::default() } // Fee input
1793 htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&per_commitment_point, &secp), // HTLC output
1794 TxOut { // Fee input change
1795 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1796 script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
1800 let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, 0, htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
1801 let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&per_commitment_point, &secp);
1802 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
1803 htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
1805 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1809 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
1810 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1812 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1814 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
1816 let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1817 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
1818 for event in holder_events {
1820 Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
1821 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1825 // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
1826 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1831 fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
1832 // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
1833 // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
1834 // revoked commitment.
1835 let secp = Secp256k1::new();
1836 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1837 // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
1838 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1839 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1840 let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
1841 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
1842 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1843 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
1845 let bob_persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
1846 let bob_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
1847 let bob_deserialized: ChannelManager<
1848 &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface,
1849 &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
1850 &test_utils::TestRouter, &test_utils::TestLogger,
1853 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1855 let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
1856 let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
1858 // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
1859 let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
1861 // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
1862 let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
1863 let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
1864 let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
1865 let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
1867 // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
1868 // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
1870 let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
1871 let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
1873 // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
1874 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
1875 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
1876 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
1877 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
1879 // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
1881 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
1882 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
1884 // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
1886 nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
1887 bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
1889 for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
1890 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1891 for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
1892 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
1893 &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
1894 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
1899 // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
1900 // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
1901 // the HTLCs still pending.
1902 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1903 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
1904 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
1905 let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = {
1906 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1907 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1908 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
1909 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
1910 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
1911 check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
1912 check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3);
1913 (txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone())
1915 check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3);
1916 check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
1917 (txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone())
1921 // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
1922 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1923 let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1924 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1926 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
1927 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
1928 let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
1929 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1931 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1932 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1933 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
1934 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1935 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
1938 let mut anchor_tx = Transaction {
1940 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1943 previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1944 ..Default::default()
1947 output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
1948 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
1949 script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
1952 let mut signers = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1953 for event in events {
1955 Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { anchor_descriptor, .. }) => {
1956 anchor_tx.input.push(TxIn {
1957 previous_output: anchor_descriptor.outpoint,
1958 ..Default::default()
1960 let signer = nodes[1].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
1961 anchor_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &anchor_descriptor.channel_keys_id,
1963 signers.push(signer);
1965 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1968 for (i, signer) in signers.into_iter().enumerate() {
1969 let anchor_idx = i + 1;
1970 let funding_sig = signer.sign_holder_anchor_input(&mut anchor_tx, anchor_idx, &secp).unwrap();
1971 anchor_tx.input[anchor_idx].witness = chan_utils::build_anchor_input_witness(
1972 &signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, &funding_sig
1975 let fee_utxo_sig = {
1976 let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
1977 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&anchor_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
1978 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
1980 let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
1981 let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
1982 sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
1985 anchor_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
1986 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
1990 for node in &nodes {
1991 mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_tx]);
1993 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
1994 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
1995 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1997 // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
2000 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2001 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2003 let (revoked_claim_a, revoked_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() {
2009 // TODO: to_self claim must be separate from HTLC claims
2010 assert_eq!(revoked_claim_a.input.len(), 3); // Spends both HTLC outputs and to_self output
2011 assert_eq!(revoked_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
2012 check_spends!(revoked_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
2013 assert_eq!(revoked_claim_b.input.len(), 3); // Spends both HTLC outputs and to_self output
2014 assert_eq!(revoked_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
2015 check_spends!(revoked_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
2018 // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
2019 // through the success path.
2020 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2021 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2022 // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2023 // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2024 match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
2025 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
2026 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
2027 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
2028 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2029 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
2030 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2033 _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
2036 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
2037 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
2038 let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2039 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2041 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2042 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2043 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
2044 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2045 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
2048 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
2050 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2051 input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
2052 previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2053 ..Default::default()
2055 output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
2056 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
2057 script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
2060 let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
2061 for event in events {
2062 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
2063 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
2064 for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
2065 assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
2066 let signer = nodes[1].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
2067 htlc_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id
2069 let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp);
2070 htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
2071 htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&per_commitment_point, &secp));
2073 descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
2074 htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
2076 panic!("Unexpected event");
2079 for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
2080 let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
2081 let signer = nodes[1].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
2082 htlc_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id
2084 let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
2085 let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp);
2086 let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&per_commitment_point, &secp);
2087 htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
2089 let fee_utxo_sig = {
2090 let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
2091 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
2092 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2094 let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2095 let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2096 sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2099 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2100 check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
2104 for node in &nodes {
2105 mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
2108 // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
2109 // the second level instead.
2110 let revoked_claims = {
2111 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2112 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
2114 let revoked_to_self_claim_a = txn.iter().find(|tx|
2115 tx.input.len() == 1 &&
2116 tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2117 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid()
2119 check_spends!(revoked_to_self_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
2121 let revoked_to_self_claim_b = txn.iter().find(|tx|
2122 tx.input.len() == 1 &&
2123 tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2124 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_b.txid()
2126 check_spends!(revoked_to_self_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
2128 let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
2129 tx.input.len() == 2 &&
2130 tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2131 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
2132 ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2133 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
2134 for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
2135 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
2140 for node in &nodes {
2141 mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claims.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>());
2145 // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
2147 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2148 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
2150 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2151 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2153 // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2154 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2155 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2157 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2158 let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2159 assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4);
2160 for (idx, event) in spendable_output_events.iter().enumerate() {
2161 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = event {
2162 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2163 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2164 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, &Secp256k1::new(),
2166 check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claims[idx]);
2168 panic!("unexpected event");
2172 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2173 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2174 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).is_empty());
2175 // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
2176 // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
2177 // balances to claim.
2179 // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
2180 // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
2181 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);