1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
12 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
13 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance};
14 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
15 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight};
16 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
17 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
18 use crate::ln::channel;
19 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
20 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
21 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
22 use crate::util::crypto::sign;
23 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
24 use crate::util::scid_utils::block_from_scid;
25 use crate::util::test_utils;
27 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
28 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
29 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
31 use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, Script, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime, Witness};
32 use bitcoin::util::sighash::SighashCache;
34 use crate::prelude::*;
36 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
39 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
40 // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
41 // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
42 // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
43 // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
44 // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
47 // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
49 // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
50 // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
52 // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
53 // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
54 // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
55 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
56 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
57 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
58 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
60 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
61 let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
63 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
64 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
65 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
66 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
68 let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
70 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
71 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
72 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
74 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
75 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
76 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
78 // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
79 // transaction for nodes[1].
80 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
81 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
82 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
83 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
84 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
86 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
87 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
88 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
89 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
91 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
92 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
93 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
96 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction, has_anchors_htlc_event: bool) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
97 let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
98 assert_eq!(spendable.len(), if has_anchors_htlc_event { 2 } else { 1 });
99 if has_anchors_htlc_event {
100 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { .. }) = spendable.pop().unwrap() {}
103 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
104 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
105 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
106 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
107 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
113 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
114 // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
115 // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
116 // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
118 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
119 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
120 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
121 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
123 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
125 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
127 // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
128 // before forwarding.
129 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
130 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
132 // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
133 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
135 // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
136 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
138 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
139 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
141 let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
142 assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
143 check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
145 // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
146 // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
147 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
148 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
149 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
151 // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
152 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
153 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
154 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
156 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
157 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
160 fn do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(anchors: bool) {
161 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
162 // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
163 // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
164 // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
165 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
166 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
167 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
169 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
170 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
172 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
173 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
175 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
176 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
177 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
178 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
180 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
181 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
183 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000;
184 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
185 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
186 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value
188 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
189 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
190 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
192 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
193 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
194 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
195 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
196 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
198 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
199 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
200 let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
201 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
202 let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
203 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
204 let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
205 assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
207 let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
208 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
209 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
211 let shutdown_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]));
212 let shutdown_tx_conf_height_b = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]));
214 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
215 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
217 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
218 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
220 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
221 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
222 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
224 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
225 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
226 amount_satoshis: 1000,
227 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
229 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
231 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
232 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
234 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
235 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
236 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id)
237 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b).is_empty());
239 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
240 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
242 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
243 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
244 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
245 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
247 let spendable_outputs_a = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
249 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a),
253 let spendable_outputs_b = test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
255 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b),
259 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
260 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
264 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
265 do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(false);
266 do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(true);
269 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
274 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
275 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
276 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
277 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
278 let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
279 let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
280 eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
281 assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
282 assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
285 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(anchors: bool, prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
286 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
287 // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
288 // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
289 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
290 if prev_commitment_tx {
291 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
292 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
293 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
294 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
295 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
297 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
298 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
300 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
301 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
303 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
304 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
306 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
308 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
309 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
312 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
313 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
316 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
317 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
322 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
323 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
326 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
327 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
328 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
329 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
331 // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
332 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
333 // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
334 // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
335 let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
336 // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
337 let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
339 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
341 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
342 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
344 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
345 let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
346 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
347 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
350 let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
351 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
352 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
353 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
355 let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
356 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
357 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
360 let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
361 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
362 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
363 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
365 let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
366 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
367 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
371 let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
372 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
373 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
374 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
375 payment_preimage: timeout_payment_preimage,
378 // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
379 // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
380 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
381 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
382 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
383 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
384 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
385 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
386 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
387 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
388 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
389 }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
390 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
392 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
394 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
396 let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
397 // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
398 // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
399 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
401 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
403 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
405 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
407 if prev_commitment_tx {
408 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
409 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
410 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
411 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
412 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
413 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
414 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
415 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
416 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
417 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
418 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
419 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
422 // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
423 // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
424 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
425 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) +
426 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
427 let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
428 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
429 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
430 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
431 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
432 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
433 commitment_tx_fee - // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs
434 anchor_outputs_value, // The anchor outputs value in satoshis
435 }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
436 if !prev_commitment_tx {
437 a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
439 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
440 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
441 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
442 amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
444 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
446 // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
447 // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
448 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
449 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
450 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
453 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
454 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
455 match events.pop().unwrap() {
456 Event::BumpTransaction(bump_event) => {
457 let mut first_htlc_event = bump_event.clone();
458 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut first_htlc_event {
459 htlc_descriptors.remove(1);
461 panic!("Unexpected event");
463 let mut second_htlc_event = bump_event;
464 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut second_htlc_event {
465 htlc_descriptors.remove(0);
467 panic!("Unexpected event");
469 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&first_htlc_event);
470 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&second_htlc_event);
472 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
476 let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
477 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
478 // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
479 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
480 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
481 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
482 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
483 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
484 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
486 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
487 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
489 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
490 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
491 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
492 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
493 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
494 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
495 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
497 // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
498 // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
499 // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
500 // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
501 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
502 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
503 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
504 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
505 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
506 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
507 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
508 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
509 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
510 // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
511 // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
512 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
513 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
514 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
516 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
518 received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
519 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
521 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
522 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
523 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
525 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
526 // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
527 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
528 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
529 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
530 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
531 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
532 }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
533 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
535 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0], false);
536 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
538 // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
539 // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
540 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
541 if prev_commitment_tx {
542 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
544 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, false);
546 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
547 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
548 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
549 assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()],
550 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
552 // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
553 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
554 let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
555 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
556 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
557 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
558 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
559 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
560 assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
561 a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
562 // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
563 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
564 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
566 // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
567 // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
568 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
569 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
570 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
571 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
572 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
574 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
575 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
577 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
578 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
579 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
580 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
582 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1], false);
584 // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
585 // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
586 // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
587 let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
588 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
590 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
591 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
592 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
593 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
594 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
595 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
596 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
597 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
599 // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
600 // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
601 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
602 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0], anchors);
604 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
605 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
606 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
607 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
608 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
610 // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
611 // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
612 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
613 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0], anchors);
615 assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
616 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
618 // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
619 // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
620 // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
621 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
622 assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
623 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
624 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
625 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
626 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
628 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
629 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
630 // monitor events or claimable balances.
631 for node in nodes.iter() {
632 connect_blocks(node, 6);
633 connect_blocks(node, 6);
634 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
635 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
640 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
641 do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, true);
642 do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, false);
643 do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, true);
644 do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, false);
647 fn do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(anchors: bool) {
648 // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
649 // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
650 // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
651 // delay prior to spendability.
653 // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
654 // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
655 // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
656 // claim by our counterparty).
657 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
658 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
659 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
661 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
662 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
664 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
665 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
667 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
669 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
670 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
673 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
674 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
677 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
678 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
683 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
684 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
687 // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
688 // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
689 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
690 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
692 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
693 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
694 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
695 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
696 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
698 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
699 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
700 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
702 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
703 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
705 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
706 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
707 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
708 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
710 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
711 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
712 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
714 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
715 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
716 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
717 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
718 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
719 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
721 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
722 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
724 // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
725 // claimable balances.
726 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
727 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
728 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
729 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
730 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
731 let commitment_tx = {
732 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
733 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
734 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
735 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
738 let commitment_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx));
739 if anchors && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
740 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
741 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
742 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid());
745 let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
746 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
747 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
750 let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
751 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
752 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
753 payment_hash: payment_hash_2,
756 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
757 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
758 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
759 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
760 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
761 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
762 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
763 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
765 // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
766 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
767 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
768 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
769 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
770 let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
771 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
772 check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], commitment_tx);
774 // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
776 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
777 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
778 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
779 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
780 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
781 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
783 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 2);
785 let timeout_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
786 assert_eq!(timeout_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
787 check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[0], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
788 check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[1], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
790 // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
791 // "awaiting confirmations" one.
792 let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
793 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0]);
794 // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
795 // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
796 // call, as described, two hunks down.
797 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
798 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
799 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
800 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
801 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
802 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
803 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
804 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
806 // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
807 // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
808 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
809 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, true, false);
810 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
811 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
812 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
813 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
814 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
815 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
816 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
817 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
819 // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
820 // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
821 // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
822 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
823 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
825 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
826 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
827 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
828 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
829 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
830 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
832 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
834 // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
835 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
836 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
837 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
838 .get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
839 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
840 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
841 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
842 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
844 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
845 let to_self_spendable_output = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
847 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a),
848 to_self_spendable_output
851 // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
852 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
853 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
854 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
855 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0], false);
857 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
858 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
859 // monitor events or claimable balances.
860 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
861 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
862 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
863 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
867 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
868 do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(false);
869 do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(true);
873 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
874 // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
876 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
877 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
878 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
879 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
881 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
882 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
884 // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
885 let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
886 let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
887 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
889 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
890 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
892 let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
893 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
894 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
895 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
897 let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
898 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
899 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
900 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
902 let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
903 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
904 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
905 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
907 let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
908 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
909 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
910 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
913 // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
914 // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
915 // HTLC output is spent.
917 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
918 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
919 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
920 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
921 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
923 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
924 amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
925 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
926 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
928 // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
929 let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
930 assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
931 check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
932 check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
934 // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
935 // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
936 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
937 let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
938 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
939 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
940 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
941 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
943 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
944 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
946 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
947 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
949 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
950 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
952 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
954 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
955 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
957 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
958 let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
959 amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
960 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
961 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
962 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
963 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
965 // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
966 // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
967 // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
968 // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
970 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
971 let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
972 assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
973 check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
974 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
975 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
977 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
978 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
980 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
981 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
982 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
984 // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
985 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
986 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0], false);
987 bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
989 // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
990 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
991 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1));
992 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
993 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
994 let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
995 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
996 check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
998 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
999 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1001 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1002 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1003 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1005 // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
1006 // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
1007 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1008 let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
1009 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1010 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1011 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1012 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1013 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1014 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1015 confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
1017 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1019 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1020 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1021 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1022 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1023 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1024 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1025 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1026 confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
1028 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1030 // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
1031 // payment failure event.
1032 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1033 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
1035 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1036 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1037 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1038 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1039 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1040 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1041 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1042 confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1044 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1046 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1047 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1048 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1049 confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1051 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1052 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0], false);
1054 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1055 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1056 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1058 // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
1059 // was already claimed.
1060 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1061 let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1062 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1063 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1064 confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1066 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1068 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1069 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1070 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1071 confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1073 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1075 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1076 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
1078 assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
1079 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1080 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1082 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1083 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1085 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1086 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1087 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1088 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1089 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1090 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1091 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1094 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
1095 let mut v = v_orig.clone();
1097 v.push((*t).clone());
1103 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(anchors: bool, confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
1104 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
1105 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1106 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1107 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1108 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1109 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1110 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1111 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1112 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1114 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1115 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1117 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1118 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1120 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1121 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1122 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1123 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1125 // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
1127 // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
1128 // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
1129 // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
1130 // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
1131 // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
1132 // later commitment transaction updates
1134 // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
1135 // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
1136 // HTLCs individually.
1138 let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
1139 let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1140 let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1142 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1144 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1145 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1147 let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1148 let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1150 // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1151 let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1152 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1154 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1156 let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1157 let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1159 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1160 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1162 let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1164 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1165 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1168 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1169 assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1170 let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1171 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1172 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1173 events.retain(|ev| {
1175 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1176 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1177 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1180 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1181 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1187 assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1188 if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1190 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, .. } => {},
1194 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1195 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1197 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1199 // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1200 // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1201 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1202 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1203 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1204 amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1205 claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1206 payment_hash: missing_htlc_payment_hash,
1207 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1208 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1209 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1210 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
1211 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1212 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1213 claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1214 payment_hash: live_payment_hash,
1216 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1218 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1219 let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1220 // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1222 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1223 claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
1225 // The following constants were determined experimentally
1226 const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 483;
1227 let outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: usize = if anchors { 574 } else { 571 };
1228 let inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: usize = if anchors { 582 } else { 578 };
1230 // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1231 // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1232 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1233 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1234 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1235 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1237 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1238 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1239 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1240 let inbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight as u64 / 1000;
1241 let outbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight as u64 / 1000;
1242 let to_self_claim_fee = chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000;
1244 // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1245 // claim balances separated out.
1246 let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1247 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1248 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1249 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1250 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1251 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1252 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1253 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1256 let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1257 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1259 let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1260 let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1261 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1263 let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1265 // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1266 // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1267 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1268 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1270 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1271 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1272 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1273 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1275 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1276 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1277 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1278 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1281 let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1282 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1283 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1285 let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1286 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
1287 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1290 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1291 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1292 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1294 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1295 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1298 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1299 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1301 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1303 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1304 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1306 // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1307 // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1308 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1309 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1311 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1312 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1313 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1314 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1315 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1316 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
1317 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1318 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1319 amount_satoshis: 3_000 - outbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1320 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1321 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1322 amount_satoshis: 4_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1323 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1324 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1325 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1326 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1328 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1330 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1331 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1333 let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1334 expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
1335 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1336 expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
1337 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1339 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1340 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }], false);
1341 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1342 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }], false);
1343 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1344 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1345 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0], false);
1346 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1347 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1], false);
1348 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1349 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1351 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1352 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1353 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1354 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1355 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1356 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1357 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1361 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1362 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, true);
1363 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, false);
1364 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, true);
1365 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, false);
1368 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(anchors: bool) {
1369 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1370 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1371 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1372 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1373 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1375 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1376 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1378 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1379 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1381 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1383 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1384 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1387 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1388 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1391 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1392 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1397 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1398 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
1401 // Create some initial channels
1402 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1403 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 12_000_000);
1404 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1405 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1407 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1408 let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1409 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1410 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1411 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1413 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[4].value, 11000); // to_self output
1415 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[2].value, 11000); // to_self output
1418 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs, an output for each side, and an
1419 // anchor output for each side if enabled.
1420 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if anchors { 6 } else { 4 });
1422 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1424 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1425 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1427 // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1428 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1429 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1430 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1431 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1433 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 1);
1435 let revoked_htlc_success = {
1436 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1437 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1438 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1439 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, if anchors { 3 } else { 1 });
1440 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(),
1441 if anchors { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS } else { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT });
1442 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1445 let revoked_htlc_success_fee = chan_feerate * revoked_htlc_success.weight() as u64 / 1000;
1447 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1449 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 2);
1451 let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
1452 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1453 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1454 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
1460 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1461 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
1462 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time.0, 0);
1463 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0, 0);
1465 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1466 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1467 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1469 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1470 let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1472 let revoked_to_self_claim = {
1473 let mut as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1474 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1476 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1477 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 4); // Separate to_remote claim
1478 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1479 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
1480 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1481 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
1482 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1483 Some(as_commitment_claim_txn.remove(0))
1485 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1486 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1487 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1488 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
1489 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1494 // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1495 // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1496 // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1497 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1498 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1499 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1500 let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1501 // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1502 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1503 confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1504 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1505 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1506 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1507 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1508 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1509 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1510 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1512 assert_eq!(as_balances,
1513 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1515 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
1516 let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1517 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1518 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1519 check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
1520 // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked outputs (which no longer includes the
1521 // spent HTLC output)
1522 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1523 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1525 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1527 check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1529 assert_eq!(as_balances,
1530 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1532 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1533 let as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee = chan_feerate * as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight() as u64 / 1000;
1535 // With anchors, B can pay for revoked_htlc_success's fee with additional inputs, rather
1536 // than with the HTLC itself.
1537 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1538 3_000 - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
1540 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1541 3_000 - revoked_htlc_success_fee - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
1544 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1545 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1546 // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1547 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1548 confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1549 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1550 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1551 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1552 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1553 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1554 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1555 amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1556 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1558 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1560 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1561 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], false);
1562 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1563 // to_self output to B
1564 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1565 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1566 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1567 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1568 amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1569 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1571 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1573 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1574 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0], false);
1575 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1576 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1577 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1578 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1579 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1581 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1583 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1584 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1585 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1586 // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1587 let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1588 for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1589 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1592 // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1594 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1595 let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1596 for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1597 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1600 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
1601 let (revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, revoked_to_self_claim) = {
1602 let mut as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1603 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1605 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1606 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1607 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1608 (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), revoked_to_self_claim.unwrap())
1610 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1611 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1612 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1613 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), 1);
1614 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1615 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1616 (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0))
1620 // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1621 // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1622 // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1623 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1624 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1625 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1626 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1627 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1628 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1630 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1632 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim);
1633 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1634 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1635 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1636 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1637 amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value,
1638 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1640 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1642 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim);
1643 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1644 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1645 amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.output[0].value,
1646 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1647 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1648 amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value,
1649 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1651 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1653 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1654 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, false);
1655 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1656 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim, false);
1658 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1660 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1661 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1662 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1663 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1664 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1665 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1666 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1670 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1671 do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(false);
1672 do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(true);
1675 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(anchors: bool) {
1676 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1677 // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1678 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1679 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1680 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1681 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1682 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1683 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1684 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1685 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1687 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1688 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1690 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1691 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1693 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1695 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1696 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1697 output: vec![TxOut {
1698 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1699 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1702 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1704 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1705 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1706 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1707 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1709 // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1710 // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1711 // revocation-claim transaction.
1713 let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1714 let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1716 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1718 // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1719 // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1720 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1721 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1723 // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1724 let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1726 assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1727 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1729 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1732 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1733 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1736 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1739 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1740 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1742 let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1743 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1744 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1746 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1747 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1749 let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1751 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1752 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1753 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1754 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1755 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1756 payment_hash: revoked_payment_hash,
1757 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1758 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1759 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1760 payment_hash: claimed_payment_hash,
1762 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1764 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1765 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1766 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1767 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1769 let mut claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1770 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1771 let revoked_to_self_claim = if anchors {
1772 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1773 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 5); // Separate to_remote claim
1774 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1775 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
1776 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1777 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
1778 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1779 Some(claim_txn.remove(0))
1781 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1782 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1783 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1784 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
1785 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1789 let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1791 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1792 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1793 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1794 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1795 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1796 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1797 confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1798 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1799 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1800 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1801 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1802 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1803 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1804 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1806 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1808 // Confirm A's HTLC-Success transaction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1811 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1812 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1813 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1814 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
1815 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
1817 let htlc_success_claim = if anchors {
1818 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1819 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1820 check_spends!(txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1823 as_revoked_txn[1].clone()
1825 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_claim);
1826 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage, None, true, false);
1828 let mut claim_txn_2 = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1829 // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1830 // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1831 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1833 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1);
1834 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1835 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], &htlc_success_claim);
1836 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1837 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1838 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1840 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1);
1841 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1842 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1843 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 2);
1844 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1845 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 1);
1846 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1849 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1850 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1851 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1852 confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1853 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1854 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1855 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1856 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1857 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1858 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1859 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1860 // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1861 // anyway, so its not a big change.
1862 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1864 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1866 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1867 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1869 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1870 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1871 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1872 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1873 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1874 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1875 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1876 // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1877 // anyway, so its not a big change.
1878 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1880 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1882 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1883 let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1885 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1886 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1887 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1888 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1889 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1890 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1891 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
1892 confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1894 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1896 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1897 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0], false);
1899 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1900 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1901 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1902 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1903 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1905 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1908 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&claim_txn_2[1], revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap()]);
1910 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1912 let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1915 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1916 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1917 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1918 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1919 amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap().output[0].value,
1920 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1922 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1924 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1925 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1926 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1928 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1931 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1933 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1934 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1936 let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1937 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1938 for (i, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
1939 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = event {
1940 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
1941 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
1942 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
1943 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()
1945 check_spends!(spend_tx, if i == 0 { &claim_txn_2[1] } else { revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap() });
1946 } else { panic!(); }
1949 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1], false);
1951 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1953 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1954 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1955 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1956 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1957 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1958 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1959 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1963 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
1964 do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(false);
1965 do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(true);
1968 fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
1969 // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
1970 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1971 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1973 let new_chain_monitor;
1975 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1976 let node_deserialized;
1978 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1980 // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
1981 // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
1982 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
1983 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
1985 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
1986 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1987 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1988 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
1989 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1991 let commitment_tx = {
1992 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1993 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1994 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
1995 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
1999 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2001 // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
2002 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
2003 let htlc_timeout_tx = {
2004 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2005 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2006 check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
2010 // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
2011 // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
2012 if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
2013 let serialized_monitor = hex::decode(
2014 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2016 reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2019 // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
2020 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
2021 if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
2022 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2025 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2026 if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
2027 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
2029 assert!(txn.len() < 6);
2032 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
2033 assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
2034 assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
2035 assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
2041 fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
2042 do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
2043 do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
2046 fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) {
2047 // Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every
2048 // `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call.
2049 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2050 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2051 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
2053 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2054 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2056 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
2057 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2059 let (_, _, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
2060 &nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 500_000_000
2062 const HTLC_AMT_MSAT: u64 = 1_000_000;
2063 const HTLC_AMT_SAT: u64 = HTLC_AMT_MSAT / 1000;
2064 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_AMT_MSAT);
2066 let htlc_expiry = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1;
2068 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(&nodes[0], &chan_id);
2069 assert_eq!(commitment_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 /* commitment tx only */} else { 2 /* commitment and htlc timeout tx */ });
2070 check_spends!(&commitment_txn[0], &funding_tx);
2071 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_txn[0]);
2072 check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
2073 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed,
2074 false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
2075 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2077 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2079 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2080 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2081 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` on anchors
2082 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2083 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2086 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2088 // Set up a helper closure we'll use throughout our test. We should only expect retries without
2089 // bumps if fees have not increased after a block has been connected (assuming the height timer
2090 // re-evaluates at every block) or after `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` is called.
2091 let mut prev_htlc_tx_feerate = None;
2092 let mut check_htlc_retry = |should_retry: bool, should_bump: bool| -> Option<Transaction> {
2093 let (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) = if anchors {
2094 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
2095 let events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2096 assert_eq!(events.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
2101 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2102 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2103 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2104 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2105 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2106 check_spends!(&htlc_tx, &commitment_txn[0], &coinbase_tx);
2107 let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value -
2108 htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>();
2109 let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
2110 (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
2112 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2115 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2116 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2117 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
2121 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2122 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]);
2123 let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value;
2124 let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
2125 (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
2128 assert!(htlc_tx_feerate > prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take().unwrap());
2129 } else if let Some(prev_feerate) = prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take() {
2130 assert_eq!(htlc_tx_feerate, prev_feerate);
2132 prev_htlc_tx_feerate = Some(htlc_tx_feerate);
2136 // Connect blocks up to one before the HTLC expires. This should not result in a claim/retry.
2137 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_expiry - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
2138 check_htlc_retry(false, false);
2140 // Connect one more block, producing our first claim.
2141 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2142 check_htlc_retry(true, false);
2144 // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
2145 // transactions pre-anchors.
2146 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2147 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2149 // Trigger a call and we should have another retry, but without a bump.
2150 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2151 check_htlc_retry(true, false);
2153 // Double the feerate and trigger a call, expecting a fee-bumped retry.
2154 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2155 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2156 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2158 // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
2159 // transactions pre-anchors.
2160 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2161 let htlc_tx = check_htlc_retry(true, anchors).unwrap();
2163 // Mine the HTLC transaction to ensure we don't retry claims while they're confirmed.
2164 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_tx);
2165 // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transactions,
2166 // we'll receive an extra bumped claim.
2167 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2168 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2169 nodes[0].wallet_source.remove_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 1 });
2170 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2172 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2173 check_htlc_retry(false, false);
2177 fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() {
2178 do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false);
2179 do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true);
2183 fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
2184 // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
2185 // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
2186 // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
2187 // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
2188 // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
2189 // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
2190 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2191 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2192 let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
2193 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2194 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2195 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2196 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2197 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2199 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
2200 &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
2202 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
2203 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000);
2205 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2206 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2208 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2210 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2211 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
2213 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2215 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2216 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2217 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2220 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
2221 &payment_hash_2, &payment_preimage_2, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
2222 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
2224 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
2225 &payment_hash_1, &payment_preimage_1, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2226 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2229 let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2230 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
2231 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
2232 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2233 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2235 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2236 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2237 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2238 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2239 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2242 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2243 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2244 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2245 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2246 let anchor_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2247 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2248 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2249 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2250 (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
2252 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2255 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[2].value, 1_000); // HTLC A -> B
2256 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[3].value, 2_000); // HTLC B -> A
2258 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2260 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2261 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2264 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2265 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
2267 let htlc_preimage_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2268 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
2269 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
2270 check_spends!(htlc_preimage_tx, commitment_tx);
2272 let htlc_timeout_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2273 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
2274 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
2275 check_spends!(htlc_timeout_tx, commitment_tx);
2277 if let Some(commitment_tx) = txn.pop() {
2278 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2282 let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2283 // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2284 // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2285 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2286 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2287 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
2288 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2290 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2);
2292 let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2293 for event in holder_events {
2295 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2296 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2297 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2298 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2299 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2300 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx, anchor_tx);
2301 htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
2303 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2307 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
2308 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2310 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2312 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
2314 let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2315 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2316 for event in holder_events {
2318 Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
2319 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2323 // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
2324 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2325 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2326 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2327 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2331 fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
2332 // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
2333 // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
2334 // revoked commitment.
2335 let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2336 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2337 // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
2338 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2339 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2341 let bob_chain_monitor;
2343 let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
2344 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2345 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2346 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2347 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2348 let bob_deserialized;
2350 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2352 let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2353 let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2355 // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
2356 let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
2358 // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
2359 let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2360 let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2361 let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2362 let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2364 // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
2365 // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
2367 let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
2368 let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
2370 // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
2371 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
2372 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
2373 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
2374 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
2376 // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
2378 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2379 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2381 // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
2383 nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
2384 bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
2386 for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
2387 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
2388 for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
2389 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
2390 &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2391 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2396 // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
2397 // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
2398 // the HTLCs still pending.
2399 *nodes[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2400 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
2401 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
2402 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2403 let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = {
2404 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2405 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2406 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2407 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2408 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
2409 check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
2410 check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3);
2411 (txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone())
2413 check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3);
2414 check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
2415 (txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone())
2419 // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
2420 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2421 let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2422 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2423 let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2424 for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
2425 let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat() * (idx + 1) as u64;
2426 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2428 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2429 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2430 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2432 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2435 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, utxo_value);
2437 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event),
2438 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2440 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2441 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2442 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]);
2443 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2444 anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone());
2447 for node in &nodes {
2448 mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_txs[1]]);
2450 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
2451 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
2452 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2454 // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
2457 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2458 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
2460 let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() {
2461 (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] })
2463 (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] })
2466 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2467 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
2468 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
2469 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2470 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
2471 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
2474 // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
2475 // through the success path.
2476 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2477 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2478 // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2479 // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2480 match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
2481 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
2482 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
2483 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
2484 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2485 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
2486 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2489 _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
2492 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
2493 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
2494 let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2495 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2497 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2498 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2499 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
2500 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2501 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
2504 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
2506 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2507 input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
2508 previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2509 ..Default::default()
2511 output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
2512 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
2513 script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
2516 let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
2517 for event in events {
2518 // We don't use the `BumpTransactionEventHandler` here because it does not support
2519 // creating one transaction from multiple `HTLCResolution` events.
2520 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
2521 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
2522 for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
2523 assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
2524 htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
2525 htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&secp));
2527 descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
2528 htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
2530 panic!("Unexpected event");
2533 for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
2534 let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
2535 let signer = htlc_descriptor.derive_channel_signer(&nodes[1].keys_manager);
2536 let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
2537 let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&secp);
2538 htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
2540 let fee_utxo_sig = {
2541 let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
2542 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
2543 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2545 let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2546 let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2547 sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2550 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2551 check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
2555 for node in &nodes {
2556 mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
2559 // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
2560 // the second level instead.
2561 let revoked_claim_transactions = {
2562 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2563 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2565 let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
2566 tx.input.len() == 2 &&
2567 tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2568 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
2569 ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2570 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
2571 for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
2572 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
2575 let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = HashMap::new();
2576 for current_tx in txn.into_iter() {
2577 revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx);
2579 revoked_claim_transaction_map
2581 for node in &nodes {
2582 mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claim_transactions.values().collect::<Vec<_>>());
2586 // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
2588 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2589 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
2591 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2592 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2594 // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2595 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2596 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2598 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2599 let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2600 assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4);
2601 for event in spendable_output_events {
2602 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event {
2603 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2604 assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap()));
2605 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2606 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
2609 if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(_) = &outputs[0] {
2610 check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_a, &revoked_commitment_b);
2612 check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
2615 panic!("unexpected event");
2619 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2620 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2621 // On the Alice side, the individual to_self_claim are still pending confirmation.
2622 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 2);
2623 // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
2624 // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
2625 // balances to claim.
2627 // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
2628 // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
2629 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);
2632 fn do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(confirm_commitment_before_reload: bool) {
2633 // Tests that we'll fix a ChannelMonitor's `counterparty_payment_script` for an anchor outputs
2634 // channel upon deserialization.
2635 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2636 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2639 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2640 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2641 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2642 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2643 let node_deserialized;
2644 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2646 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
2648 // Set the monitor's `counterparty_payment_script` to a dummy P2WPKH script.
2649 let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2650 let privkey = bitcoin::PrivateKey::from_slice(&[1; 32], bitcoin::Network::Testnet).unwrap();
2651 let pubkey = bitcoin::PublicKey::from_private_key(&secp, &privkey);
2652 let p2wpkh_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&pubkey.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2653 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).set_counterparty_payment_script(p2wpkh_script.clone());
2654 assert_eq!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script(), p2wpkh_script);
2656 // Confirm the counterparty's commitment and reload the monitor (either before or after) such
2657 // that we arrive at the correct `counterparty_payment_script` after the reload.
2658 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2659 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2660 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2661 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
2662 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2664 let commitment_tx = {
2665 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2666 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2667 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 4);
2668 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2672 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2673 let commitment_tx_conf_height = if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2674 // We should expect our round trip serialization check to fail as we're writing the monitor
2675 // with the incorrect P2WPKH script but reading it with the correct P2WSH script.
2676 *nodes[1].chain_monitor.expect_monitor_round_trip_fail.lock().unwrap() = Some(chan_id);
2677 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2678 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2679 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2680 commitment_tx_conf_height
2682 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2683 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2684 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2685 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2686 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
2687 commitment_tx_conf_height
2689 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2690 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2691 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script().is_v0_p2wsh());
2693 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2694 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2696 if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2697 // If we saw the commitment before our `counterparty_payment_script` was fixed, we'll never
2698 // get the spendable output event for the `to_remote` output, so we'll need to get it
2699 // manually via `get_spendable_outputs`.
2700 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2701 let outputs = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height);
2702 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2703 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2704 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
2707 check_spends!(spend_tx, &commitment_tx);
2709 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx, false);
2714 fn test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload() {
2715 do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(false);
2716 do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(true);
2719 #[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
2720 fn do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(anchors: bool, confirm_counterparty_commitment: bool) {
2721 // Tests that our monitor claims will always use fresh random signatures (ensuring a unique
2722 // wtxid) to prevent certain classes of transaction replacement at the bitcoin P2P layer.
2723 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2724 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2725 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2727 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2728 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2730 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2731 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2733 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2735 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2736 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2739 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2740 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2745 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2748 // Open a channel and route a payment. We'll let it timeout to claim it.
2749 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
2750 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
2752 let (closing_node, other_node) = if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2753 (&nodes[1], &nodes[0])
2755 (&nodes[0], &nodes[1])
2758 closing_node.node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &other_node.node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2760 // The commitment transaction comes first.
2761 let commitment_tx = {
2762 let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2763 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2764 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2768 mine_transaction(closing_node, &commitment_tx);
2769 check_added_monitors!(closing_node, 1);
2770 check_closed_broadcast!(closing_node, true);
2771 check_closed_event!(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
2773 mine_transaction(other_node, &commitment_tx);
2774 check_added_monitors!(other_node, 1);
2775 check_closed_broadcast!(other_node, true);
2776 check_closed_event!(other_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [closing_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
2778 // If we update the best block to the new height before providing the confirmed transactions,
2779 // we'll see another broadcast of the commitment transaction.
2780 if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2781 let _ = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2784 // Then comes the HTLC timeout transaction.
2785 if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2786 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 5);
2787 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
2788 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
2790 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
2792 if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2793 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
2795 let htlc_timeout_tx = {
2796 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2797 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2798 let tx = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == commitment_tx.txid() {
2803 check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
2807 // Check we rebroadcast it with a different wtxid.
2808 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2809 if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2810 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
2813 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2814 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2815 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), htlc_timeout_tx.txid());
2816 assert_ne!(txn[0].wtxid(), htlc_timeout_tx.wtxid());
2820 #[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
2822 fn test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures() {
2823 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, false);
2824 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, true);
2825 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, false);
2826 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, true);