_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
  11
  12 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
  13 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance};
  14 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  15 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight};
  16 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
  17 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
  18 use crate::ln::channel;
  19 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
  20 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
  21 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
  22 use crate::util::crypto::sign;
  23 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
  24 use crate::util::scid_utils::block_from_scid;
  25 use crate::util::test_utils;
  26
  27 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
  28 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  29 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
  31 use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, Script, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime, Witness};
  32 use bitcoin::util::sighash::SighashCache;
  33
  34 use crate::prelude::*;
  35
  36 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  37
  38 #[test]
  39 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
  40         // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
  41         // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
  42         // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
  43         // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
  44         // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
  45         // HTLC.
  46         //
  47         // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
  48         //
  49         // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
  50         // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
  51         //
  52         // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
  53         // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
  54         // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
  55         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
  56         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
  57         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
  58         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  59
  60         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
  61         let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
  62
  63         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
  64         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
  65                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
  66         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
  67
  68         let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
  69
  70         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  71         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
  72         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
  73
  74         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  75         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
  76         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  77
  78         // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
  79         // transaction for nodes[1].
  80         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
  81         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  82         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
  83         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
  84         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
  85
  86         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
  87         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
  88         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  89         let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
  90
  91         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
  92         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
  93         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
  94 }
  95
  96 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
  97         let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
  98         assert_eq!(spendable.len(), 1);
  99         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 100                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 101                 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 102                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 103                 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
 104                 outputs
 105         } else { panic!(); }
 106 }
 107
 108 #[test]
 109 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
 110         // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
 111         // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
 112         // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
 113         // confirmations.
 114         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 115         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 116         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 117         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 118
 119         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
 120
 121         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
 122
 123         // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
 124         // before forwarding.
 125         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
 126         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
 127
 128         // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
 129         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
 130
 131         // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
 132         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
 133         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 134         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 135         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 136
 137         let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 138         assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
 139         check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
 140
 141         // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
 142         // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
 143         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 144         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 145         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 146
 147         // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
 148         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
 149         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 150         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 151
 152         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 153         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
 154 }
 155
 156 fn do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(anchors: bool) {
 157         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
 158         // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
 159         // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
 160         // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
 161         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 162         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 163         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
 164         if anchors {
 165                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
 166                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
 167         }
 168         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
 169         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 170
 171         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 172                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 173         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 174         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 175
 176         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 177         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 178
 179         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000;
 180         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
 181         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 182                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value
 183                 }],
 184                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 185         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
 186                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 187
 188         nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 189         let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 190         nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
 191         let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 192         nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
 193
 194         let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 195         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
 196         let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 197         nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
 198         let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 199         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
 200         let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 201         assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
 202
 203         let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 204         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
 205         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
 206
 207         let shutdown_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]));
 208         let shutdown_tx_conf_height_b = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]));
 209
 210         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 211         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 212
 213         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 214         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 215
 216         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 217                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 218                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 219                 }],
 220                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 221         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 222                         amount_satoshis: 1000,
 223                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 224                 }],
 225                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 226
 227         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 228         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 229
 230         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
 231                 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
 232         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id)
 233                 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b).is_empty());
 234
 235         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 236         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
 237
 238         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 239                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 240         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 241                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 242
 243         let spendable_outputs_a = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 244         assert_eq!(
 245                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a),
 246                 spendable_outputs_a
 247         );
 248
 249         let spendable_outputs_b = test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 250         assert_eq!(
 251                 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b),
 252                 spendable_outputs_b
 253         );
 254
 255         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 256         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 257 }
 258
 259 #[test]
 260 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
 261         do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(false);
 262         do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(true);
 263 }
 264
 265 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
 266         v.sort_unstable();
 267         v
 268 }
 269
 270 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
 271 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
 272 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
 273 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
 274         let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 275         let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 276         eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
 277         assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
 278         assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
 279 }
 280
 281 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
 282         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
 283         // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
 284         // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
 285         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 286         if prev_commitment_tx {
 287                 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 288                 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 289                 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 290                 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
 291                 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
 292         }
 293         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 294         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 295         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 296
 297         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 298                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 299         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 300         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 301
 302         // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
 303         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
 304         // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
 305         // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
 306         let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
 307         // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
 308         let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
 309
 310         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 311
 312         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 313         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 314
 315         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
 316         let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 317                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 318                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 319                 payment_hash,
 320         };
 321         let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 322                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 323                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 324                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 325         };
 326         let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 327                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 328                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 329                 payment_hash,
 330         };
 331         let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 332                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 333                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 334                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 335         };
 336         let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 337                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 338                 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 339                 payment_hash,
 340                 payment_preimage,
 341         };
 342         let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 343                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 344                 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 345                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 346                 payment_preimage: timeout_payment_preimage,
 347         };
 348
 349         // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
 350         // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
 351         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 352                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 353                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 354                 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 355                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 356         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 357                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 358                 }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 359                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 360
 361         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
 362         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 363         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
 364
 365         let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 366         // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
 367         // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
 368         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
 369         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 370         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
 371
 372         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
 373         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 374         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
 375
 376         if prev_commitment_tx {
 377                 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
 378                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
 379                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
 380                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
 381                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 382                 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 383                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
 384                 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 385                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 386                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
 387                 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 388                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 389         }
 390
 391         // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
 392         // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
 393         let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 394                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
 395                                 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
 396                                 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
 397                                 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
 398                                 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
 399                                 // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
 400                                 chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) +
 401                                                                 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
 402                                                                 channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 403                 }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
 404         if !prev_commitment_tx {
 405                 a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
 406         }
 407         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
 408                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 409         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 410                         amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
 411                 }],
 412                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 413
 414         // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
 415         // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
 416         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 417         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 418         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 419
 420         let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 421         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 422         // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
 423         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 424         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 425         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 426         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 427         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 428         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 429
 430         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 431         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 432         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 433         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 434         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 435         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 436         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 437         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 438         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 439         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 440
 441         // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
 442         // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
 443         // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
 444         // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
 445         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 446         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 447
 448         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 449                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 450                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 451                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 452                 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 453                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 454         // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
 455         // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
 456         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 457                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 458                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 459                 },
 460                 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
 461                 // long.
 462                 received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 463                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 464
 465         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 466         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
 467         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 468
 469         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
 470         // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
 471         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 472                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 473         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 474                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 475                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 476                 }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 477                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 478
 479         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 480         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 481
 482         // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
 483         // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
 484         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 485         if prev_commitment_tx {
 486                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
 487         } else {
 488                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, false);
 489         }
 490         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 491                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 492         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 493         assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()],
 494                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 495
 496         // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
 497         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 498         let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 499         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 500         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 501         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 502         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 503         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 504         assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
 505                    a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
 506         // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
 507         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 508         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 509
 510         // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
 511         // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
 512         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 513         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 514         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 515                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 516                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 517                 }],
 518                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 519         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
 520         // balance entry.
 521         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 522         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 523                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 524         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
 525
 526         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 527
 528         // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
 529         // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
 530         // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
 531         let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 532         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 533
 534         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 535                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 536                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 537                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 538                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 539                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 540                 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 541                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 542
 543         // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
 544         // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
 545         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 546         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 547
 548         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 549                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 550                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 551                 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 552                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 553
 554         // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
 555         // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
 556         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 557         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 558
 559         assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
 560                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 561
 562         // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
 563         // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
 564         // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
 565         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 566         assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
 567                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 568         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 569         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 570                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 571
 572         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 573         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 574         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 575         for node in nodes.iter() {
 576                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 577                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 578                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 579                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 580         }
 581 }
 582
 583 #[test]
 584 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
 585         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
 586         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
 587 }
 588
 589 #[test]
 590 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
 591         // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
 592         // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
 593         // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
 594         // delay prior to spendability.
 595         //
 596         // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
 597         // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
 598         // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
 599         // claim by our counterparty).
 600         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 601         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 602         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 603         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 604
 605         // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
 606         // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
 607         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
 608         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 609
 610         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
 611         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 612         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
 613                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 614         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 615
 616         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 617         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 618         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 619
 620         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 621         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
 622
 623         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
 624         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
 625                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
 626         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 627
 628         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 629         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 630         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 631
 632         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 633         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
 634         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
 635         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 636         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 637         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
 638
 639         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 640         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 641
 642         // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions
 643         let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 644         assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 3);
 645         check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
 646         check_spends!(as_txn[2], as_txn[0]);
 647         check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
 648
 649         // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
 650         // claimable balances.
 651         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 652         let commitment_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]));
 653         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 654         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 655         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 656
 657         let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 658                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 659                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 660                 payment_hash,
 661         };
 662         let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 663                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 664                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 665                 payment_hash: payment_hash_2,
 666         };
 667
 668         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 669                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 670                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 671                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 672                 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 673                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 674
 675         // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
 676         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 677         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 678         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 679         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 680         let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 681         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
 682         check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]);
 683
 684         // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
 685         // transaction.
 686         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
 687         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 688                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 689                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 690                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 691                 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 692                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 693         assert_eq!(as_txn[1].lock_time.0, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1); // as_txn[1] can be included in the next block
 694
 695         // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
 696         // "awaiting confirmations" one.
 697         let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 698         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
 699         // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
 700         // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
 701         // call, as described, two hunks down.
 702         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 703                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 704                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 705                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 706                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 707                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 708                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 709                 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 710                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 711
 712         // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
 713         // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
 714         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
 715         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, true, false);
 716         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 717                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 718                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 719                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 720                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 721                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 722                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 723                 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 724                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 725
 726         // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
 727         // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
 728         // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
 729         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 730         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
 731
 732         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 733                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 734                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 735                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 736                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 737                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 738                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 739                 }]),
 740                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 741
 742         // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 743         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 744         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
 745         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
 746                 .get_spendable_outputs(&as_txn[0], commitment_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
 747         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 748         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 749                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 750                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 751                 }],
 752                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 753         let to_self_spendable_output = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 754         assert_eq!(
 755                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&as_txn[0], commitment_tx_conf_height_a),
 756                 to_self_spendable_output
 757         );
 758
 759         // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 760         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 761         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 762         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 763         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
 764
 765         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 766         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 767         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 768         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 769         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 770         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 771         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 772 }
 773
 774 #[test]
 775 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
 776         // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
 777         // have a preimage.
 778         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 779         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 780         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 781         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 782
 783         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
 784         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 785
 786         // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
 787         let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
 788         let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
 789         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 790
 791         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 792         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 793
 794         let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 795                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 796                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 797                 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
 798         };
 799         let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 800                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 801                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 802                 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
 803         };
 804         let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 805                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 806                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 807                 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
 808         };
 809         let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 810                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 811                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 812                 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
 813         };
 814
 815         // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
 816         // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
 817         // HTLC output is spent.
 818
 819         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 820                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 821                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 822                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
 823                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 824
 825         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 826                         amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
 827                 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
 828                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 829
 830         // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
 831         let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 832         assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
 833         check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
 834         check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
 835
 836         // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
 837         // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
 838         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 839         let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 840                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 841                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 842                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 843                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
 844
 845         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 846         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
 847         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 848         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 849         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 850
 851         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 852                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 853
 854         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 855         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 856         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 857         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 858
 859         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
 860         let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 861                         amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
 862                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 863                 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
 864         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 865                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 866
 867         // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
 868         // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
 869         // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
 870         // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
 871
 872         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
 873         let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 874         assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
 875         check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
 876         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
 877                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
 878
 879         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 880                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 881
 882         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 883         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 884                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 885
 886         // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
 887         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 888         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 889         bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
 890
 891         // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
 892         nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
 893         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1));
 894         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
 895                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
 896         let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 897         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
 898         check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
 899
 900         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 901                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 902
 903         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
 904         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 905                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 906
 907         // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
 908         // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
 909         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 910         let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
 911         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 912                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 913                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 914                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 915                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 916                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 917                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
 918                 }]),
 919                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 920
 921         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 922         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 923                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 924                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 925                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 926                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 927                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 928                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
 929                 }]),
 930                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 931
 932         // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
 933         // payment failure event.
 934         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 935         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
 936
 937         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 938         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 939                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 940                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 941                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 942                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 943                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 944                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
 945                 }]),
 946                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 947
 948         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 949         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 950                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 951                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
 952                 }],
 953                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 954         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 955
 956         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 957         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 958         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 959
 960         // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
 961         // was already claimed.
 962         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 963         let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
 964         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 965                         amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 966                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
 967                 }]),
 968                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 969
 970         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 971         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 972                         amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 973                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
 974                 }]),
 975                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 976
 977         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 978         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
 979
 980         assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
 981                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 982         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 983
 984         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
 985         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 986
 987         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 988         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 989         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 990         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
 991         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
 992         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 993         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 994 }
 995
 996 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
 997         let mut v = v_orig.clone();
 998         for t in extra_ts {
 999                 v.push((*t).clone());
1000         }
1001         v.sort_unstable();
1002         v
1003 }
1004
1005 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
1006         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
1007         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1008         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1009         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1010         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1011         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1012         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1013         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1014         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1015         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1016
1017         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1018                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1019         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1020         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1021
1022         // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
1023         //
1024         // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
1025         // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
1026         // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
1027         // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
1028         // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
1029         //     later commitment transaction updates
1030         //
1031         // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
1032         // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
1033         // HTLCs individually.
1034
1035         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
1036         let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1037         let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1038
1039         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1040
1041         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1042         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1043
1044         let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1045         let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1046
1047         // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1048         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1049         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1050
1051         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1052
1053         let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1054         let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1055
1056         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1057         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1058         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1059         let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1060
1061         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1062         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1063         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1064
1065         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1066         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1067         let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1068                 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1069                 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1070         events.retain(|ev| {
1071                 match ev {
1072                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1073                                 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1074                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1075                                 false
1076                         },
1077                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1078                                 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1079                                 false
1080                         },
1081                         _ => true,
1082                 }
1083         });
1084         assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1085         if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1086         match &events[1] {
1087                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, .. } => {},
1088                 _ => panic!(),
1089         }
1090
1091         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1092         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1093         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1094         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1095
1096         // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1097         // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1098         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1099                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1100                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1101                         amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1102                         claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1103                         payment_hash: missing_htlc_payment_hash,
1104                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1105                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1106                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1107                         payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
1108                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1109                         amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1110                         claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1111                         payment_hash: live_payment_hash,
1112                 }]),
1113                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1114
1115         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1116         let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1117         // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1118         // quite soon.
1119         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1120         claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
1121
1122         // The following constants were determined experimentally
1123         const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 483;
1124         const OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 571;
1125         const INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 578;
1126
1127         // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1128         // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1129         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1130         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1131         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1132         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1133
1134         // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1135         // claim balances separated out.
1136         let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1137                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1138                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1139                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1140                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1141                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1142                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1143                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1144                 }];
1145
1146         let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1147                 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1148                         (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1149         };
1150         let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1151         let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1152                 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1153         };
1154         let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1155
1156         // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1157         // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1158         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1159                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1160
1161         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1162                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1163                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1164                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1165         } else {
1166                 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1167                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1168                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1169                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1170         }
1171
1172         let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1173                 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1174                 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1175         };
1176         let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1177                 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1178                         (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1179                         - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1180                 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1181         };
1182
1183         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1184                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1185                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1186         } else {
1187                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1188                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1189         }
1190
1191         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1192                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1193         } else {
1194                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1195         }
1196         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1197                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1198
1199         // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1200         // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1201         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1202         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1203
1204         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1205                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1206                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1207                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1208                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1209                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1210                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1211                                 - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1212                         confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1213                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1214                         amount_satoshis: 3_000 - chan_feerate * OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1215                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1216                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1217                         amount_satoshis: 4_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1218                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1219                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1220                         amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1221                         confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1222                 }]),
1223                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1224
1225         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1226         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1227
1228         let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1229         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
1230                 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1231         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
1232                 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1233
1234         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1235         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }]);
1236         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1237         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }]);
1238         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1239         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1240         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1241         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1242         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1243         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1244         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1245
1246         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1247         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1248         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1249         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1250         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1251         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1252         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1253 }
1254
1255 #[test]
1256 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1257         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true);
1258         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false);
1259 }
1260
1261 #[test]
1262 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1263         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1264         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1265         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1266         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1267         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1268         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1269
1270         // Create some initial channels
1271         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1272                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 11_000_000);
1273         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1274         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1275
1276         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1277         let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1278         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1279         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1280         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1281
1282         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs and an output for both sides
1283         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
1284
1285         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1286
1287         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1288         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1289
1290         // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1291         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1292         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1293         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1294         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1295         let revoked_htlc_success = {
1296                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1297                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1298                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1299                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
1300                 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1301                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1302         };
1303
1304         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1305         let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
1306                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1307                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1308                 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
1309                         txn.remove(1)
1310                 } else {
1311                         txn.remove(0)
1312                 }
1313         };
1314         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1315         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
1316         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time.0, 0);
1317         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0, 0);
1318
1319         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1320         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1321         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1322         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1323         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1324         let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1325
1326         let as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1327         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), 1);
1328         check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1329
1330         // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1331         // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1332         // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1333         let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1334                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1335                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1336                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1337                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1338                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1339                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1340                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1341                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1342                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1343                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1344                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1345                 }]);
1346         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1347                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1348
1349         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
1350         let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1351         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1352         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
1353         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]); // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked
1354                                                                   // outputs (which no longer includes the spent HTLC output)
1355
1356         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1357                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1358
1359         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1360         fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1361                 3_000 - chan_feerate * (revoked_htlc_success.weight() + as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight()) as u64 / 1000);
1362
1363         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1364         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1365                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1366                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1367                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1368                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1369                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1370                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1371                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1372                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1373                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1374                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1375                         amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1376                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1377                 }]),
1378                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1379
1380         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1381         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1382         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1383                         // to_self output to B
1384                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1385                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1386                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1387                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1388                         amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1389                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1390                 }]),
1391                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1392
1393         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1394         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1395         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1396                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1397                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1398                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1399                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1400                 }]),
1401                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1402
1403         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1404         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1405                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1406         // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1407         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1408         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1409                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1410         }
1411
1412         // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1413         // claiming.
1414         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1415         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1416         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1417                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1418         }
1419
1420         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
1421         let as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1422         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1423
1424         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1425         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1426
1427         // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1428         // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1429         // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1430         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1431         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1432                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1433                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1434                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1435                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1436                 }]),
1437                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1438
1439         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1440         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1441                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1442                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1443                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1444                         amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1445                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1446                 }]),
1447                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1448
1449         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
1450         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1451                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1452                         amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].output[0].value,
1453                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1454                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1455                         amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1456                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1457                 }]),
1458                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1459
1460         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1461         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1462         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1463         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
1464
1465         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1466
1467         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1468         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1469         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1470         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1471         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1472         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1473         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1474 }
1475
1476 #[test]
1477 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
1478         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1479         // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1480         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1481         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1482         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1483         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1484         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1485         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1486         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1487         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1488         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1489
1490         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1491                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1492         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1493         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1494
1495         // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1496         // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1497         // revocation-claim transaction.
1498
1499         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1500         let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1501
1502         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1503
1504         // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1505         // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1506         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1507                 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1508
1509         // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1510         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1511
1512         assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), 2);
1513         check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1514         check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1515
1516         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1517         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1518
1519         {
1520                 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1521                 *feerate += 1;
1522         }
1523         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1524         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1525
1526         let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1527         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1528         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1529
1530         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1531         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1532         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1533         let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1534
1535         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1536                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1537                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1538                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1539                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1540                         payment_hash: revoked_payment_hash,
1541                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1542                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1543                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1544                         payment_hash: claimed_payment_hash,
1545                 }]),
1546                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1547
1548         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1549         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1550         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1551         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1552
1553         let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1554         // Currently the revoked commitment outputs are all claimed in one aggregated transaction
1555         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 1);
1556         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1557         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1558
1559         let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1560
1561         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1562                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1563                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1564                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1565                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1566                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1567                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1568                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1569                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1570                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1571                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1572                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1573                 }]),
1574                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1575
1576         // Confirm A's HTLC-Success tranasction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1577         // new claim.
1578         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[1]);
1579         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage, None, true, false);
1580         let mut claim_txn_2: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1581         claim_txn_2.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| if tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid()) { 0 } else { 1 });
1582         // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1583         // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1584         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1585         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 2);
1586         check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1587         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1588         check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1589
1590         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1591                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1592                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1593                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1594                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1595                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1596                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1597                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1598                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1599                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1600                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1601                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1602                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1603                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1604                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1605                 }]),
1606                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1607
1608         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1609         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1610
1611         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1612                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1613                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1614                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1615                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1616                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1617                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1618                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1619                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1620                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1621                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1622                 }]),
1623                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1624
1625         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1626         let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1627
1628         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1629                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1630                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1631                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1632                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1633                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1634                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1635                         amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1636                         confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1637                 }]),
1638                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1639
1640         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1641         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1642
1643         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1644                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1645                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1646                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1647                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1648                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1649                 }]),
1650                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1651
1652         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1653         let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1654
1655         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1656                         amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
1657                         confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1658                 }],
1659                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1660
1661         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1662
1663         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1664         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1665         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1666         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1667
1668         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1669         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1670         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1671         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1672         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1673         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1674         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1675 }
1676
1677 fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
1678         // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
1679         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1680         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1681         let persister;
1682         let new_chain_monitor;
1683
1684         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1685         let node_deserialized;
1686
1687         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1688
1689         // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
1690         // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
1691         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
1692         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
1693
1694         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
1695         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1696         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1697         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
1698                  [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1699
1700         let commitment_tx = {
1701                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1702                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1703                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
1704                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
1705                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1706         };
1707
1708         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
1709
1710         // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
1711         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1712         let htlc_timeout_tx = {
1713                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1714                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1715                 check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
1716                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1717         };
1718
1719         // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
1720         // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
1721         if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
1722                 let serialized_monitor = hex::decode(
1723                         "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1724                 ).unwrap();
1725                 reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
1726         }
1727
1728         // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
1729         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1730         if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
1731                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1732         }
1733         {
1734                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1735                 if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
1736                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
1737                 } else {
1738                         assert!(txn.len() < 6);
1739                 }
1740                 for tx in txn {
1741                         assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
1742                         assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
1743                         assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
1744                         assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
1745                 }
1746         }
1747 }
1748
1749 #[test]
1750 fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
1751         do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
1752         do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
1753 }
1754
1755 fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) {
1756         // Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every
1757         // `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call.
1758         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1759         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1760         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1761         if anchors {
1762                 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1763                 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1764         }
1765         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
1766         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1767
1768         let (_, _, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
1769                 &nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 500_000_000
1770         );
1771         const HTLC_AMT_MSAT: u64 = 1_000_000;
1772         const HTLC_AMT_SAT: u64 = HTLC_AMT_MSAT / 1000;
1773         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_AMT_MSAT);
1774
1775         let htlc_expiry = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1;
1776
1777         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(&nodes[0], &chan_id);
1778         assert_eq!(commitment_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 /* commitment tx only */} else { 2 /* commitment and htlc timeout tx */ });
1779         check_spends!(&commitment_txn[0], &funding_tx);
1780         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_txn[0]);
1781         check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
1782         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed,
1783                  false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1784         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1785
1786         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1787                 version: 2,
1788                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1789                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1790                 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` on anchors
1791                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1792                         script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1793                 }],
1794         };
1795         nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1796
1797         // Set up a helper closure we'll use throughout our test. We should only expect retries without
1798         // bumps if fees have not increased after a block has been connected (assuming the height timer
1799         // re-evaluates at every block) or after `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` is called.
1800         let mut prev_htlc_tx_feerate = None;
1801         let mut check_htlc_retry = |should_retry: bool, should_bump: bool| -> Option<Transaction> {
1802                 let (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) = if anchors {
1803                         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
1804                         let events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1805                         assert_eq!(events.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
1806                         if !should_retry {
1807                                 return None;
1808                         }
1809                         match &events[0] {
1810                                 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
1811                                         nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
1812                                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1813                                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1814                                         let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1815                                         check_spends!(&htlc_tx, &commitment_txn[0], &coinbase_tx);
1816                                         let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value -
1817                                                 htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>();
1818                                         let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
1819                                         (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
1820                                 }
1821                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1822                         }
1823                 } else {
1824                         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1825                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1826                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
1827                         if !should_retry {
1828                                 return None;
1829                         }
1830                         let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1831                         check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]);
1832                         let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value;
1833                         let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
1834                         (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
1835                 };
1836                 if should_bump {
1837                         assert!(htlc_tx_feerate > prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take().unwrap());
1838                 } else if let Some(prev_feerate) = prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take() {
1839                         assert_eq!(htlc_tx_feerate, prev_feerate);
1840                 }
1841                 prev_htlc_tx_feerate = Some(htlc_tx_feerate);
1842                 Some(htlc_tx)
1843         };
1844
1845         // Connect blocks up to one before the HTLC expires. This should not result in a claim/retry.
1846         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_expiry - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
1847         check_htlc_retry(false, false);
1848
1849         // Connect one more block, producing our first claim.
1850         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1851         check_htlc_retry(true, false);
1852
1853         // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
1854         // transactions pre-anchors.
1855         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1856         check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1857
1858         // Trigger a call and we should have another retry, but without a bump.
1859         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1860         check_htlc_retry(true, false);
1861
1862         // Double the feerate and trigger a call, expecting a fee-bumped retry.
1863         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
1864         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1865         check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1866
1867         // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
1868         // transactions pre-anchors.
1869         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1870         let htlc_tx = check_htlc_retry(true, anchors).unwrap();
1871
1872         // Mine the HTLC transaction to ensure we don't retry claims while they're confirmed.
1873         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_tx);
1874         // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transactions,
1875         // we'll receive an extra bumped claim.
1876         if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
1877                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1878                 nodes[0].wallet_source.remove_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 1 });
1879                 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1880         }
1881         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1882         check_htlc_retry(false, false);
1883 }
1884
1885 #[test]
1886 fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() {
1887         do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false);
1888         do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true);
1889 }
1890
1891 #[test]
1892 fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
1893         // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
1894         // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
1895         // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
1896         // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
1897         // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
1898         // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
1899         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1900         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1901         let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
1902         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
1903         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1904         anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1905         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
1906         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1907
1908         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
1909                 &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
1910         );
1911         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
1912         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000);
1913
1914         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1915         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1916
1917         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
1918
1919         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
1920         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
1921
1922         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
1923         {
1924                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1925                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1926                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
1927         }
1928
1929         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
1930                 &payment_hash_2, &payment_preimage_2, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
1931                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
1932         );
1933         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
1934                 &payment_hash_1, &payment_preimage_1, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
1935                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
1936         );
1937
1938         let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1939         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
1940         let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
1941                 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
1942                         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1943                                 version: 2,
1944                                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1945                                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1946                                 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
1947                                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1948                                         script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1949                                 }],
1950                         };
1951                         nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1952                         nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
1953                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1954                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1955                         let anchor_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1956                         let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1957                         check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
1958                         check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
1959                         (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
1960                 },
1961                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1962         };
1963
1964         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[2].value, 1_000); // HTLC A -> B
1965         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[3].value, 2_000); // HTLC B -> A
1966
1967         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
1968         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1969         mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
1970         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1971
1972         {
1973                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1974                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
1975
1976                 let htlc_preimage_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1977                 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1978                 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1979                 check_spends!(htlc_preimage_tx, commitment_tx);
1980
1981                 let htlc_timeout_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1982                 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1983                 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1984                 check_spends!(htlc_timeout_tx, commitment_tx);
1985
1986                 if let Some(commitment_tx) = txn.pop() {
1987                         check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
1988                 }
1989         }
1990
1991         let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1992         // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
1993         // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
1994         if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
1995                 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
1996                 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
1997                 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
1998         } else {
1999                 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2);
2000         }
2001         let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2002         for event in holder_events {
2003                 match event {
2004                         Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2005                                 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2006                                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2007                                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2008                                 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2009                                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx, anchor_tx);
2010                                 htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
2011                         },
2012                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2013                 }
2014         }
2015
2016         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
2017         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2018
2019         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2020
2021         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
2022
2023         let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2024         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2025         for event in holder_events {
2026                 match event {
2027                         Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
2028                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2029                 }
2030         }
2031
2032         // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
2033         nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2034         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2035         nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2036         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2037 }
2038
2039 #[test]
2040 fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
2041         // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
2042         // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
2043         // revoked commitment.
2044         let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2045         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2046         // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
2047         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2048         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2049         let bob_persister;
2050         let bob_chain_monitor;
2051
2052         let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
2053         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2054         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2055         anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2056         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2057         let bob_deserialized;
2058
2059         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2060
2061         let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2062         let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2063
2064         // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
2065         let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
2066
2067         // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
2068         let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2069         let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2070         let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2071         let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2072
2073         // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
2074         // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
2075         // present.
2076         let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
2077         let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
2078
2079         // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
2080         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
2081         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
2082         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
2083         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
2084
2085         // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
2086         // revoked state.
2087         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2088         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2089
2090         // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
2091         reload_node!(
2092                 nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
2093                 bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
2094         );
2095         for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
2096                 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
2097                 for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
2098                         monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
2099                                 &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2100                                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2101                         );
2102                 }
2103         }
2104
2105         // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
2106         // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
2107         // the HTLCs still pending.
2108         *nodes[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2109         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
2110         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
2111         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2112         let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = {
2113                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2114                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2115                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2116                 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2117                 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
2118                         check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
2119                         check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3);
2120                         (txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone())
2121                 } else {
2122                         check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3);
2123                         check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
2124                         (txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone())
2125                 }
2126         };
2127
2128         // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
2129         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2130         let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2131         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2132         let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2133         for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
2134                 let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat() * (idx + 1) as u64;
2135                 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2136                         version: 2,
2137                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2138                         input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2139                         output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2140                                 value: utxo_value,
2141                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2142                         }],
2143                 };
2144                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, utxo_value);
2145                 match event {
2146                         Event::BumpTransaction(event) => nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event),
2147                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2148                 };
2149                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2150                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2151                 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]);
2152                 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2153                 anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone());
2154         };
2155
2156         for node in &nodes {
2157                 mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_txs[1]]);
2158         }
2159         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
2160         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
2161         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2162
2163         // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
2164         // revoked outputs.
2165         {
2166                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2167                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
2168
2169                 let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() {
2170                         (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] })
2171                 } else {
2172                         (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] })
2173                 };
2174
2175                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2176                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
2177                 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
2178                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2179                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
2180                 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
2181         }
2182
2183         // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
2184         // through the success path.
2185         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2186         let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2187         // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2188         // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2189         match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
2190                 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
2191                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
2192                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
2193                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2194                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
2195                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2196
2197                 },
2198                 _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
2199         };
2200         let htlc_tx = {
2201                 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
2202                 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
2203                 let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2204                 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2205                         version: 2,
2206                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2207                         input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2208                         output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
2209                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2210                                 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
2211                         }],
2212                 };
2213                 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
2214                         version: 2,
2215                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2216                         input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
2217                                 previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2218                                 ..Default::default()
2219                         }],
2220                         output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
2221                                 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
2222                                 script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
2223                         }],
2224                 };
2225                 let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
2226                 for event in events {
2227                         // We don't use the `BumpTransactionEventHandler` here because it does not support
2228                         // creating one transaction from multiple `HTLCResolution` events.
2229                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
2230                                 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
2231                                 for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
2232                                         assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
2233                                         htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
2234                                         htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&secp));
2235                                 }
2236                                 descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
2237                                 htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
2238                         } else {
2239                                 panic!("Unexpected event");
2240                         }
2241                 }
2242                 for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
2243                         let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
2244                         let signer = htlc_descriptor.derive_channel_signer(&nodes[1].keys_manager);
2245                         let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
2246                         let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&secp);
2247                         htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
2248                 }
2249                 let fee_utxo_sig = {
2250                         let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
2251                         let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
2252                                 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2253                         ).unwrap()[..]);
2254                         let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2255                         let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2256                         sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2257                         sig
2258                 };
2259                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2260                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
2261                 htlc_tx
2262         };
2263
2264         for node in &nodes {
2265                 mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
2266         }
2267
2268         // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
2269         // the second level instead.
2270         let revoked_claim_transactions = {
2271                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2272                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2273
2274                 let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
2275                         tx.input.len() == 2 &&
2276                         tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2277                         tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
2278                 ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2279                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
2280                 for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
2281                         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
2282                 }
2283
2284                 let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = HashMap::new();
2285                 for current_tx in txn.into_iter() {
2286                         revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx);
2287                 }
2288                 revoked_claim_transaction_map
2289         };
2290         for node in &nodes {
2291                 mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claim_transactions.values().collect::<Vec<_>>());
2292         }
2293
2294
2295         // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
2296         // been reached.
2297         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2298         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
2299
2300         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2301         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2302
2303         // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2304         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2305         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2306
2307         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2308         let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2309         assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4);
2310         for event in spendable_output_events {
2311                 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event {
2312                         assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2313                         assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap()));
2314                         let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2315                                 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
2316                         ).unwrap();
2317
2318                         if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(_) = &outputs[0] {
2319                                 check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_a, &revoked_commitment_b);
2320                         } else {
2321                                 check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
2322                         }
2323                 } else {
2324                         panic!("unexpected event");
2325                 }
2326         }
2327
2328         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2329         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2330         // On the Alice side, the individual to_self_claim are still pending confirmation.
2331         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 2);
2332         // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
2333         // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
2334         // balances to claim.
2335         //
2336         // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
2337         // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
2338         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);
2339 }
2340
2341 fn do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(confirm_commitment_before_reload: bool) {
2342         // Tests that we'll fix a ChannelMonitor's `counterparty_payment_script` for an anchor outputs
2343         // channel upon deserialization.
2344         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2345         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2346         let persister;
2347         let chain_monitor;
2348         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2349         user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2350         user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2351         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2352         let node_deserialized;
2353         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2354
2355         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
2356
2357         // Set the monitor's `counterparty_payment_script` to a dummy P2WPKH script.
2358         let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2359         let privkey = bitcoin::PrivateKey::from_slice(&[1; 32], bitcoin::Network::Testnet).unwrap();
2360         let pubkey = bitcoin::PublicKey::from_private_key(&secp, &privkey);
2361         let p2wpkh_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&pubkey.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2362         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).set_counterparty_payment_script(p2wpkh_script.clone());
2363         assert_eq!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script(), p2wpkh_script);
2364
2365         // Confirm the counterparty's commitment and reload the monitor (either before or after) such
2366         // that we arrive at the correct `counterparty_payment_script` after the reload.
2367         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2368         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2369         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2370         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
2371                  [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2372
2373         let commitment_tx = {
2374                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2375                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2376                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 4);
2377                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2378                 txn.pop().unwrap()
2379         };
2380
2381         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2382         let commitment_tx_conf_height = if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2383                 // We should expect our round trip serialization check to fail as we're writing the monitor
2384                 // with the incorrect P2WPKH script but reading it with the correct P2WSH script.
2385                 *nodes[1].chain_monitor.expect_monitor_round_trip_fail.lock().unwrap() = Some(chan_id);
2386                 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2387                 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2388                 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2389                 commitment_tx_conf_height
2390         } else {
2391                 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2392                 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2393                 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2394                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2395                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
2396                 commitment_tx_conf_height
2397         };
2398         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2399                  [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2400         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script().is_v0_p2wsh());
2401
2402         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2403         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2404
2405         if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2406                 // If we saw the commitment before our `counterparty_payment_script` was fixed, we'll never
2407                 // get the spendable output event for the `to_remote` output, so we'll need to get it
2408                 // manually via `get_spendable_outputs`.
2409                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2410                 let outputs = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height);
2411                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2412                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2413                         &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
2414                         253, None, &secp
2415                 ).unwrap();
2416                 check_spends!(spend_tx, &commitment_tx);
2417         } else {
2418                 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
2419         }
2420 }
2421
2422 #[test]
2423 fn test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload() {
2424         do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(false);
2425         do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(true);
2426 }