git.bitcoin.ninja Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
  11
  12 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
  13 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance};
  14 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  15 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight};
  16 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
  17 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
  18 use crate::ln::channel;
  19 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
  20 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
  21 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
  22 use crate::util::crypto::sign;
  23 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
  24 use crate::util::test_utils;
  25
  26 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
  27 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  28 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
  30 use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, Script, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime, Witness};
  31 use bitcoin::util::sighash::SighashCache;
  32
  33 use crate::prelude::*;
  34
  35 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  36
  37 #[test]
  38 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
  39         // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
  40         // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
  41         // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
  42         // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
  43         // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
  44         // HTLC.
  45         //
  46         // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
  47         //
  48         // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
  49         // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
  50         //
  51         // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
  52         // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
  53         // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
  54         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
  55         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
  56         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
  57         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  58
  59         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
  60         let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
  61
  62         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
  63         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
  64                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
  65         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
  66
  67         let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
  68
  69         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  70         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
  71         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
  72
  73         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  74         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
  75         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  76
  77         // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
  78         // transaction for nodes[1].
  79         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
  80         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  81         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
  82         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
  83         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
  84
  85         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
  86         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
  87         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  88         let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
  89
  90         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
  91         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
  92         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
  93 }
  94
  95 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction) {
  96         let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
  97         assert_eq!(spendable.len(), 1);
  98         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
  99                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 100                 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 101                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 102                 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
 103         } else { panic!(); }
 104 }
 105
 106 #[test]
 107 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
 108         // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
 109         // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
 110         // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
 111         // confirmations.
 112         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 113         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 114         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 115         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 116
 117         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
 118
 119         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
 120
 121         // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
 122         // before forwarding.
 123         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
 124         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
 125
 126         // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
 127         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
 128
 129         // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
 130         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
 131         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 132         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 133         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 134
 135         let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 136         assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
 137         check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
 138
 139         // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
 140         // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
 141         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 142         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 143         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 144
 145         // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
 146         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
 147         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 148         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 149
 150         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 151         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
 152 }
 153
 154 #[test]
 155 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
 156         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
 157         // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
 158         // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
 159         // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
 160         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 161         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 162         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 163         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 164
 165         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 166                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 167         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 168         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 169
 170         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 171         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 172
 173         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 174                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000
 175                 }],
 176                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 177         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
 178                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 179
 180         nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 181         let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 182         nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
 183         let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 184         nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
 185
 186         let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 187         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
 188         let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 189         nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
 190         let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 191         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
 192         let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 193         assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
 194
 195         let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 196         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
 197         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
 198
 199         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 200         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 201
 202         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 203         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 204
 205         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 206         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 207
 208         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 209                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000,
 210                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 211                 }],
 212                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 213         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 214                         amount_satoshis: 1000,
 215                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 216                 }],
 217                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 218
 219         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 220         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 221
 222         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 223                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 224         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 225                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 226
 227         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 228         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 229
 230         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 231         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 232 }
 233
 234 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
 235         v.sort_unstable();
 236         v
 237 }
 238
 239 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
 240 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
 241 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
 242 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
 243         let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 244         let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 245         eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
 246         assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
 247         assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
 248 }
 249
 250 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
 251         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
 252         // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
 253         // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
 254         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 255         if prev_commitment_tx {
 256                 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 257                 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 258                 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 259                 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
 260                 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
 261         }
 262         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 263         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 264         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 265
 266         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 267                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 268         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 269         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 270
 271         // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
 272         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
 273         // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
 274         // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
 275         let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
 276         // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
 277         let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
 278
 279         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 280
 281         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 282         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 283
 284         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
 285         let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 286                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 287                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 288                 payment_hash,
 289         };
 290         let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 291                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 292                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 293                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 294         };
 295         let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 296                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 297                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 298                 payment_hash,
 299         };
 300         let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 301                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 302                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 303                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 304         };
 305         let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 306                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 307                 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 308                 payment_hash,
 309                 payment_preimage,
 310         };
 311         let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 312                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 313                 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 314                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 315                 payment_preimage: timeout_payment_preimage,
 316         };
 317
 318         // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
 319         // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
 320         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 321                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 322                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 323                 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 324                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 325         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 326                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 327                 }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 328                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 329
 330         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
 331         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 332         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
 333
 334         let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 335         // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
 336         // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
 337         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
 338         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 339         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
 340
 341         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
 342         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 343         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
 344
 345         if prev_commitment_tx {
 346                 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
 347                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
 348                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
 349                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
 350                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 351                 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 352                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
 353                 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 354                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 355                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
 356                 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 357                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 358         }
 359
 360         // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
 361         // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
 362         let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 363                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
 364                                 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
 365                                 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
 366                                 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
 367                                 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
 368                                 // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
 369                                 chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) +
 370                                                                 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
 371                                                                 channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 372                 }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
 373         if !prev_commitment_tx {
 374                 a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
 375         }
 376         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
 377                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 378         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 379                         amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
 380                 }],
 381                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 382
 383         // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
 384         // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
 385         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 386         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 387         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 388
 389         let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 390         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 391         // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
 392         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 393         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 394         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 395         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 396         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 397         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 398
 399         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 400         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 401         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 402         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 403         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 404         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 405         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 406         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 407         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 408         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 409
 410         // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
 411         // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
 412         // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
 413         // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
 414         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 415         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 416
 417         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 418                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 419                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 420                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 421                 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 422                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 423         // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
 424         // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
 425         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 426                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 427                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 428                 },
 429                 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
 430                 // long.
 431                 received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 432                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 433
 434         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 435         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
 436         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 437
 438         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
 439         // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
 440         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 441                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 442         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 443                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 444                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 445                 }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 446                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 447
 448         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 449         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 450
 451         // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
 452         // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
 453         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 454         if prev_commitment_tx {
 455                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
 456         } else {
 457                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, false);
 458         }
 459         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 460                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 461         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 462         assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()],
 463                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 464
 465         // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
 466         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 467         let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 468         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 469         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 470         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 471         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 472         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 473         assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
 474                    a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
 475         // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
 476         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 477         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 478
 479         // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
 480         // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
 481         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 482         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 483         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 484                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 485                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 486                 }],
 487                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 488         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
 489         // balance entry.
 490         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 491         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 492                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 493         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
 494
 495         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 496
 497         // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
 498         // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
 499         // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
 500         let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 501         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 502
 503         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 504                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 505                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 506                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 507                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 508                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 509                 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 510                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 511
 512         // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
 513         // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
 514         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 515         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 516
 517         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 518                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 519                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 520                 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 521                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 522
 523         // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
 524         // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
 525         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 526         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 527
 528         assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
 529                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 530
 531         // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
 532         // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
 533         // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
 534         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 535         assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
 536                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 537         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 538         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 539                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 540
 541         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 542         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 543         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 544         for node in nodes.iter() {
 545                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 546                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 547                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 548                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 549         }
 550 }
 551
 552 #[test]
 553 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
 554         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
 555         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
 556 }
 557
 558 #[test]
 559 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
 560         // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
 561         // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
 562         // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
 563         // delay prior to spendability.
 564         //
 565         // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
 566         // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
 567         // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
 568         // claim by our counterparty).
 569         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 570         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 571         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 572         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 573
 574         // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
 575         // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
 576         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
 577         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 578
 579         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
 580         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 581         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
 582                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 583         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 584
 585         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 586         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 587         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 588
 589         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 590         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
 591
 592         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
 593         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
 594                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
 595         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 596
 597         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 598         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 599         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 600
 601         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 602         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
 603         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
 604         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 605         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 606         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
 607
 608         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 609         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 610
 611         // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions
 612         let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 613         assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 3);
 614         check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
 615         check_spends!(as_txn[2], as_txn[0]);
 616         check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
 617
 618         // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
 619         // claimable balances.
 620         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 621         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 622         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 623         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 624         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 625
 626         let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 627                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 628                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 629                 payment_hash,
 630         };
 631         let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 632                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 633                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 634                 payment_hash: payment_hash_2,
 635         };
 636
 637         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 638                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 639                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 640                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 641                 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 642                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 643
 644         // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
 645         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 646         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 647         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 648         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 649         let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 650         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
 651         check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]);
 652
 653         // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
 654         // transaction.
 655         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
 656         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 657                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 658                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 659                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 660                 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 661                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 662         assert_eq!(as_txn[1].lock_time.0, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1); // as_txn[1] can be included in the next block
 663
 664         // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
 665         // "awaiting confirmations" one.
 666         let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 667         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
 668         // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
 669         // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
 670         // call, as described, two hunks down.
 671         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 672                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 673                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 674                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 675                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 676                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 677                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 678                 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 679                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 680
 681         // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
 682         // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
 683         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
 684         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, true, false);
 685         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 686                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 687                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 688                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 689                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 690                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 691                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 692                 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 693                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 694
 695         // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
 696         // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
 697         // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
 698         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 699         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
 700
 701         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 702                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 703                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 704                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 705                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 706                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 707                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 708                 }]),
 709                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 710
 711         // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 712         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 713         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 714         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 715                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 716                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 717                 }],
 718                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 719         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 720
 721         // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 722         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 723         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 724         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 725         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
 726
 727         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 728         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 729         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 730         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 731         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 732         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 733         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 734 }
 735
 736 #[test]
 737 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
 738         // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
 739         // have a preimage.
 740         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 741         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 742         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 743         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 744
 745         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
 746         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 747
 748         // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
 749         let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
 750         let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
 751         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 752
 753         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 754         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 755
 756         let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 757                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 758                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 759                 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
 760         };
 761         let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 762                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 763                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 764                 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
 765         };
 766         let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 767                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 768                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 769                 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
 770         };
 771         let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 772                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 773                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 774                 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
 775         };
 776
 777         // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
 778         // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
 779         // HTLC output is spent.
 780
 781         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 782                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 783                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 784                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
 785                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 786
 787         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 788                         amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
 789                 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
 790                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 791
 792         // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
 793         let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 794         assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
 795         check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
 796         check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
 797
 798         // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
 799         // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
 800         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 801         let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 802                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 803                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 804                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 805                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
 806
 807         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 808         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
 809         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 810         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 811         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 812
 813         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 814                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 815
 816         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 817         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 818         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 819         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 820
 821         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
 822         let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 823                         amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
 824                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 825                 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
 826         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 827                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 828
 829         // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
 830         // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
 831         // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
 832         // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
 833
 834         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
 835         let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 836         assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
 837         check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
 838         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
 839                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
 840
 841         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 842                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 843
 844         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 845         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 846                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 847
 848         // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
 849         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 850         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 851         bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
 852
 853         // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
 854         nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
 855         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1));
 856         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
 857                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
 858         let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 859         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
 860         check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
 861
 862         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 863                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 864
 865         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
 866         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 867                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 868
 869         // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
 870         // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
 871         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 872         let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
 873         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 874                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 875                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 876                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 877                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 878                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 879                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
 880                 }]),
 881                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 882
 883         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 884         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 885                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 886                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 887                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 888                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 889                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 890                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
 891                 }]),
 892                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 893
 894         // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
 895         // payment failure event.
 896         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 897         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
 898
 899         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 900         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 901                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 902                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 903                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 904                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 905                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 906                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
 907                 }]),
 908                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 909
 910         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 911         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 912                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 913                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
 914                 }],
 915                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 916         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 917
 918         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 919         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 920         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 921
 922         // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
 923         // was already claimed.
 924         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 925         let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
 926         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 927                         amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 928                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
 929                 }]),
 930                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 931
 932         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 933         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 934                         amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 935                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
 936                 }]),
 937                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 938
 939         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 940         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
 941
 942         assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
 943                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 944         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 945
 946         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
 947         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 948
 949         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 950         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 951         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 952         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
 953         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
 954         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 955         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 956 }
 957
 958 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
 959         let mut v = v_orig.clone();
 960         for t in extra_ts {
 961                 v.push((*t).clone());
 962         }
 963         v.sort_unstable();
 964         v
 965 }
 966
 967 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
 968         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
 969         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 970         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 971         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 972         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 973         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
 974         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
 975         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 976         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 977         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 978
 979         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 980                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
 981         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 982         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 983
 984         // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
 985         //
 986         // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
 987         // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
 988         // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
 989         // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
 990         // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
 991         //     later commitment transaction updates
 992         //
 993         // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
 994         // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
 995         // HTLCs individually.
 996
 997         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
 998         let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
 999         let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1000
1001         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1002
1003         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1004         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1005
1006         let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1007         let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1008
1009         // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1010         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1011         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1012
1013         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1014
1015         let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1016         let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1017
1018         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1019         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1020         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1021         let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1022
1023         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1024         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1025         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1026
1027         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1028         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1029         let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1030                 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1031                 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1032         events.retain(|ev| {
1033                 match ev {
1034                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1035                                 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1036                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1037                                 false
1038                         },
1039                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1040                                 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1041                                 false
1042                         },
1043                         _ => true,
1044                 }
1045         });
1046         assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1047         if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1048         match &events[1] {
1049                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
1050                 _ => panic!(),
1051         }
1052
1053         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1054         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1055         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1056         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1057
1058         // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1059         // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1060         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1061                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1062                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1063                         amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1064                         claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1065                         payment_hash: missing_htlc_payment_hash,
1066                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1067                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1068                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1069                         payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
1070                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1071                         amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1072                         claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1073                         payment_hash: live_payment_hash,
1074                 }]),
1075                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1076
1077         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1078         let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1079         // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1080         // quite soon.
1081         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1082         claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
1083
1084         // The following constants were determined experimentally
1085         const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 483;
1086         const OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 571;
1087         const INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 578;
1088
1089         // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1090         // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1091         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1092         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1093         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1094         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1095
1096         // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1097         // claim balances separated out.
1098         let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1099                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1100                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1101                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1102                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1103                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1104                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1105                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1106                 }];
1107
1108         let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1109                 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1110                         (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1111         };
1112         let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1113         let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1114                 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1115         };
1116         let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1117
1118         // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1119         // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1120         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1121                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1122
1123         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1124                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1125                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1126                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1127         } else {
1128                 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1129                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1130                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1131                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1132         }
1133
1134         let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1135                 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1136                 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1137         };
1138         let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1139                 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1140                         (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1141                         - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1142                 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1143         };
1144
1145         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1146                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1147                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1148         } else {
1149                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1150                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1151         }
1152
1153         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1154                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1155         } else {
1156                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1157         }
1158         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1159                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1160
1161         // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1162         // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1163         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1164         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1165
1166         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1167                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1168                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1169                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1170                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1171                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1172                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1173                                 - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1174                         confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1175                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1176                         amount_satoshis: 3_000 - chan_feerate * OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1177                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1178                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1179                         amount_satoshis: 4_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1180                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1181                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1182                         amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1183                         confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1184                 }]),
1185                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1186
1187         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1188         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1189
1190         let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1191         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
1192                 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1193         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
1194                 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1195
1196         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1197         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }]);
1198         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1199         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }]);
1200         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1201         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1202         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1203         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1204         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1205         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1206         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1207
1208         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1209         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1210         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1211         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1212         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1213         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1214         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1215 }
1216
1217 #[test]
1218 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1219         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true);
1220         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false);
1221 }
1222
1223 #[test]
1224 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1225         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1226         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1227         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1228         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1229         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1230         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1231
1232         // Create some initial channels
1233         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1234                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 11_000_000);
1235         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1236         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1237
1238         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1239         let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1240         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1241         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1242         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1243
1244         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs and an output for both sides
1245         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
1246
1247         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1248
1249         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1250         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1251
1252         // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1253         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1254         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1255         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1256         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1257         let revoked_htlc_success = {
1258                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1259                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1260                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1261                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
1262                 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1263                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1264         };
1265
1266         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1267         let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
1268                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1269                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1270                 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
1271                         txn.remove(1)
1272                 } else {
1273                         txn.remove(0)
1274                 }
1275         };
1276         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1277         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
1278         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time.0, 0);
1279         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0, 0);
1280
1281         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1282         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1283         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1284         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1285         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1286         let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1287
1288         let as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1289         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), 1);
1290         check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1291
1292         // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1293         // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1294         // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1295         let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1296                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1297                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1298                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1299                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1300                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1301                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1302                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1303                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1304                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1305                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1306                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1307                 }]);
1308         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1309                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1310
1311         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
1312         let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1313         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1314         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
1315         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]); // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked
1316                                                                   // outputs (which no longer includes the spent HTLC output)
1317
1318         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1319                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1320
1321         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1322         fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1323                 3_000 - chan_feerate * (revoked_htlc_success.weight() + as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight()) as u64 / 1000);
1324
1325         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1326         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1327                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1328                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1329                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1330                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1331                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1332                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1333                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1334                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1335                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1336                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1337                         amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1338                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1339                 }]),
1340                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1341
1342         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1343         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1344         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1345                         // to_self output to B
1346                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1347                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1348                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1349                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1350                         amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1351                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1352                 }]),
1353                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1354
1355         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1356         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1357         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1358                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1359                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1360                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1361                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1362                 }]),
1363                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1364
1365         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1366         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1367                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1368         // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1369         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1370         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1371                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1372         }
1373
1374         // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1375         // claiming.
1376         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1377         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1378         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1379                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1380         }
1381
1382         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
1383         let as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1384         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1385
1386         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1387         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1388
1389         // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1390         // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1391         // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1392         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1393         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1394                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1395                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1396                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1397                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1398                 }]),
1399                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1400
1401         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1402         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1403                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1404                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1405                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1406                         amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1407                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1408                 }]),
1409                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1410
1411         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
1412         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1413                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1414                         amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].output[0].value,
1415                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1416                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1417                         amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1418                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1419                 }]),
1420                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1421
1422         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1423         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1424         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1425         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
1426
1427         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1428
1429         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1430         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1431         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1432         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1433         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1434         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1435         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1436 }
1437
1438 #[test]
1439 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
1440         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1441         // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1442         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1443         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1444         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1445         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1446         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1447         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1448         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1449         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1450         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1451
1452         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1453                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1454         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1455         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1456
1457         // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1458         // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1459         // revocation-claim transaction.
1460
1461         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1462         let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1463
1464         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1465
1466         // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1467         // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1468         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1469                 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1470
1471         // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1472         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1473
1474         assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), 2);
1475         check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1476         check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1477
1478         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1479         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1480
1481         {
1482                 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1483                 *feerate += 1;
1484         }
1485         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1486         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1487
1488         let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1489         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1490         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1491
1492         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1493         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1494         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1495         let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1496
1497         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1498                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1499                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1500                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1501                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1502                         payment_hash: revoked_payment_hash,
1503                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1504                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1505                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1506                         payment_hash: claimed_payment_hash,
1507                 }]),
1508                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1509
1510         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1511         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1512         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1513         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1514
1515         let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1516         // Currently the revoked commitment outputs are all claimed in one aggregated transaction
1517         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 1);
1518         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1519         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1520
1521         let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1522
1523         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1524                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1525                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1526                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1527                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1528                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1529                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1530                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1531                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1532                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1533                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1534                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1535                 }]),
1536                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1537
1538         // Confirm A's HTLC-Success tranasction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1539         // new claim.
1540         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[1]);
1541         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage, None, true, false);
1542         let mut claim_txn_2: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1543         claim_txn_2.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| if tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid()) { 0 } else { 1 });
1544         // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1545         // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1546         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1547         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 2);
1548         check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1549         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1550         check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1551
1552         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1553                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1554                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1555                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1556                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1557                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1558                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1559                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1560                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1561                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1562                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1563                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1564                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1565                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1566                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1567                 }]),
1568                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1569
1570         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1571         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1572
1573         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1574                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1575                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1576                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1577                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1578                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1579                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1580                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1581                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1582                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1583                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1584                 }]),
1585                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1586
1587         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1588         let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1589
1590         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1591                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1592                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1593                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1594                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1595                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1596                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1597                         amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1598                         confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1599                 }]),
1600                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1601
1602         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1603         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1604
1605         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1606                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1607                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1608                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1609                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1610                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1611                 }]),
1612                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1613
1614         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1615         let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1616
1617         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1618                         amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
1619                         confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1620                 }],
1621                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1622
1623         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1624
1625         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1626         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1627         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1628         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1629
1630         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1631         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1632         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1633         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1634         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1635         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1636         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1637 }
1638
1639 fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
1640         // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
1641         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1642         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1643         let persister;
1644         let new_chain_monitor;
1645
1646         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1647         let node_deserialized;
1648
1649         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1650
1651         // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
1652         // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
1653         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
1654         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
1655
1656         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
1657         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1658         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1659         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
1660                  [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1661
1662         let commitment_tx = {
1663                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1664                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1665                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
1666                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
1667                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1668         };
1669
1670         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
1671
1672         // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
1673         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1674         let htlc_timeout_tx = {
1675                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1676                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1677                 check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
1678                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1679         };
1680
1681         // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
1682         // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
1683         if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
1684                 let serialized_monitor = hex::decode(
1685                         "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",
1686                 ).unwrap();
1687                 reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
1688         }
1689
1690         // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
1691         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1692         if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
1693                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1694         }
1695         {
1696                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1697                 if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
1698                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
1699                 } else {
1700                         assert!(txn.len() < 6);
1701                 }
1702                 for tx in txn {
1703                         assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
1704                         assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
1705                         assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
1706                         assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
1707                 }
1708         }
1709 }
1710
1711 #[test]
1712 fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
1713         do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
1714         do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
1715 }
1716
1717 fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) {
1718         // Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every
1719         // `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call.
1720         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1721         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1722         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1723         if anchors {
1724                 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1725                 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1726         }
1727         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
1728         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1729
1730         let (_, _, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
1731                 &nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 500_000_000
1732         );
1733         const HTLC_AMT_MSAT: u64 = 1_000_000;
1734         const HTLC_AMT_SAT: u64 = HTLC_AMT_MSAT / 1000;
1735         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_AMT_MSAT);
1736
1737         let htlc_expiry = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1;
1738
1739         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(&nodes[0], &chan_id);
1740         assert_eq!(commitment_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 /* commitment tx only */} else { 2 /* commitment and htlc timeout tx */ });
1741         check_spends!(&commitment_txn[0], &funding_tx);
1742         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_txn[0]);
1743         check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
1744         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed,
1745                  false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1746         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1747
1748         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1749                 version: 2,
1750                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1751                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1752                 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` on anchors
1753                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1754                         script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1755                 }],
1756         };
1757         nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1758
1759         // Set up a helper closure we'll use throughout our test. We should only expect retries without
1760         // bumps if fees have not increased after a block has been connected (assuming the height timer
1761         // re-evaluates at every block) or after `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` is called.
1762         let mut prev_htlc_tx_feerate = None;
1763         let mut check_htlc_retry = |should_retry: bool, should_bump: bool| -> Option<Transaction> {
1764                 let (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) = if anchors {
1765                         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
1766                         let events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1767                         assert_eq!(events.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
1768                         if !should_retry {
1769                                 return None;
1770                         }
1771                         match &events[0] {
1772                                 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
1773                                         nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
1774                                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1775                                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1776                                         let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1777                                         check_spends!(&htlc_tx, &commitment_txn[0], &coinbase_tx);
1778                                         let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value -
1779                                                 htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>();
1780                                         let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
1781                                         (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
1782                                 }
1783                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1784                         }
1785                 } else {
1786                         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1787                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1788                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
1789                         if !should_retry {
1790                                 return None;
1791                         }
1792                         let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1793                         check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]);
1794                         let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value;
1795                         let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
1796                         (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
1797                 };
1798                 if should_bump {
1799                         assert!(htlc_tx_feerate > prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take().unwrap());
1800                 } else if let Some(prev_feerate) = prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take() {
1801                         assert_eq!(htlc_tx_feerate, prev_feerate);
1802                 }
1803                 prev_htlc_tx_feerate = Some(htlc_tx_feerate);
1804                 Some(htlc_tx)
1805         };
1806
1807         // Connect blocks up to one before the HTLC expires. This should not result in a claim/retry.
1808         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_expiry - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
1809         check_htlc_retry(false, false);
1810
1811         // Connect one more block, producing our first claim.
1812         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1813         check_htlc_retry(true, false);
1814
1815         // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
1816         // transactions pre-anchors.
1817         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1818         check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1819
1820         // Trigger a call and we should have another retry, but without a bump.
1821         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1822         check_htlc_retry(true, false);
1823
1824         // Double the feerate and trigger a call, expecting a fee-bumped retry.
1825         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
1826         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1827         check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1828
1829         // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
1830         // transactions pre-anchors.
1831         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1832         let htlc_tx = check_htlc_retry(true, anchors).unwrap();
1833
1834         // Mine the HTLC transaction to ensure we don't retry claims while they're confirmed.
1835         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_tx);
1836         // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transactions,
1837         // we'll receive an extra bumped claim.
1838         if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
1839                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1840                 nodes[0].wallet_source.remove_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 1 });
1841                 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1842         }
1843         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1844         check_htlc_retry(false, false);
1845 }
1846
1847 #[test]
1848 fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() {
1849         do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false);
1850         do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true);
1851 }
1852
1853 #[test]
1854 fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
1855         // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
1856         // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
1857         // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
1858         // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
1859         // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
1860         // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
1861         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1862         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1863         let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
1864         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
1865         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1866         anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1867         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
1868         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1869
1870         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
1871                 &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
1872         ).2;
1873         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
1874         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1875
1876         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1877
1878         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
1879         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
1880         check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
1881         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
1882
1883         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
1884                 &payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
1885                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
1886         );
1887
1888         let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1889         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
1890         let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
1891                 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
1892                         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1893                                 version: 2,
1894                                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1895                                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1896                                 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
1897                                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1898                                         script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1899                                 }],
1900                         };
1901                         nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1902                         nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
1903                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1904                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1905                         let anchor_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1906                         let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1907                         check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
1908                         (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
1909                 },
1910                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1911         };
1912
1913         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
1914         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1915
1916         let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1917         // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
1918         // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
1919         match *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow() {
1920                 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
1921                         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
1922                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
1923                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
1924
1925                 },
1926                 _ => assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2),
1927         };
1928         let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1929         for event in holder_events {
1930                 match event {
1931                         Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
1932                                 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
1933                                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1934                                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1935                                 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1936                                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx, anchor_tx);
1937                                 htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
1938                         },
1939                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1940                 }
1941         }
1942
1943         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
1944         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1945
1946         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1947
1948         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
1949
1950         let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1951         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
1952         for event in holder_events {
1953                 match event {
1954                         Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
1955                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1956                 }
1957         }
1958
1959         // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
1960         nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1961 }
1962
1963 #[test]
1964 fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
1965         // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
1966         // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
1967         // revoked commitment.
1968         let secp = Secp256k1::new();
1969         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1970         // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
1971         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1972         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1973         let bob_persister;
1974         let bob_chain_monitor;
1975
1976         let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
1977         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
1978         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1979         anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1980         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
1981         let bob_deserialized;
1982
1983         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1984
1985         let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
1986         let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
1987
1988         // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
1989         let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
1990
1991         // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
1992         let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
1993         let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
1994         let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
1995         let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
1996
1997         // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
1998         // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
1999         // present.
2000         let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
2001         let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
2002
2003         // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
2004         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
2005         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
2006         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
2007         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
2008
2009         // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
2010         // revoked state.
2011         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2012         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2013
2014         // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
2015         reload_node!(
2016                 nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
2017                 bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
2018         );
2019         for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
2020                 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
2021                 for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
2022                         monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
2023                                 &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2024                                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2025                         );
2026                 }
2027         }
2028
2029         // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
2030         // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
2031         // the HTLCs still pending.
2032         *nodes[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2033         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
2034         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
2035         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2036         let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = {
2037                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2038                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2039                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2040                 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2041                 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
2042                         check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
2043                         check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3);
2044                         (txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone())
2045                 } else {
2046                         check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3);
2047                         check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
2048                         (txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone())
2049                 }
2050         };
2051
2052         // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
2053         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2054         let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2055         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2056         let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2057         for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
2058                 let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat() * (idx + 1) as u64;
2059                 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2060                         version: 2,
2061                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2062                         input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2063                         output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2064                                 value: utxo_value,
2065                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2066                         }],
2067                 };
2068                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, utxo_value);
2069                 match event {
2070                         Event::BumpTransaction(event) => nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event),
2071                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2072                 };
2073                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2074                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2075                 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]);
2076                 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2077                 anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone());
2078         };
2079
2080         for node in &nodes {
2081                 mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_txs[1]]);
2082         }
2083         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
2084         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
2085         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2086
2087         // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
2088         // revoked outputs.
2089         {
2090                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2091                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
2092
2093                 let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() {
2094                         (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] })
2095                 } else {
2096                         (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] })
2097                 };
2098
2099                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2100                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
2101                 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
2102                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2103                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
2104                 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
2105         }
2106
2107         // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
2108         // through the success path.
2109         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2110         let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2111         // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2112         // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2113         match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
2114                 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
2115                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
2116                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
2117                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2118                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
2119                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2120
2121                 },
2122                 _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
2123         };
2124         let htlc_tx = {
2125                 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
2126                 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
2127                 let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2128                 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2129                         version: 2,
2130                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2131                         input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2132                         output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
2133                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2134                                 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
2135                         }],
2136                 };
2137                 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
2138                         version: 2,
2139                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2140                         input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
2141                                 previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2142                                 ..Default::default()
2143                         }],
2144                         output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
2145                                 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
2146                                 script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
2147                         }],
2148                 };
2149                 let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
2150                 for event in events {
2151                         // We don't use the `BumpTransactionEventHandler` here because it does not support
2152                         // creating one transaction from multiple `HTLCResolution` events.
2153                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
2154                                 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
2155                                 for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
2156                                         assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
2157                                         htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
2158                                         htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&secp));
2159                                 }
2160                                 descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
2161                                 htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
2162                         } else {
2163                                 panic!("Unexpected event");
2164                         }
2165                 }
2166                 for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
2167                         let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
2168                         let signer = htlc_descriptor.derive_channel_signer(&nodes[1].keys_manager);
2169                         let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
2170                         let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&secp);
2171                         htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
2172                 }
2173                 let fee_utxo_sig = {
2174                         let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
2175                         let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
2176                                 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2177                         ).unwrap()[..]);
2178                         let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2179                         let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2180                         sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2181                         sig
2182                 };
2183                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2184                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
2185                 htlc_tx
2186         };
2187
2188         for node in &nodes {
2189                 mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
2190         }
2191
2192         // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
2193         // the second level instead.
2194         let revoked_claims = {
2195                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2196                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2197
2198                 let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
2199                         tx.input.len() == 2 &&
2200                         tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2201                         tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
2202                 ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2203                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
2204                 for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
2205                         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
2206                 }
2207
2208                 txn
2209         };
2210         for node in &nodes {
2211                 mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claims.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>());
2212         }
2213
2214
2215         // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
2216         // been reached.
2217         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2218         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
2219
2220         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2221         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2222
2223         // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2224         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2225         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2226
2227         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2228         let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2229         assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 2);
2230         for (idx, event) in spendable_output_events.iter().enumerate() {
2231                 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event {
2232                         assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2233                         assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap()));
2234                         let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2235                                 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
2236                         ).unwrap();
2237                         check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claims[idx]);
2238                 } else {
2239                         panic!("unexpected event");
2240                 }
2241         }
2242
2243         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2244         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2245         // On the Alice side, the individual to_self_claim are still pending confirmation.
2246         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 2);
2247         // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
2248         // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
2249         // balances to claim.
2250         //
2251         // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
2252         // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
2253         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);
2254 }