1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
12 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
13 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance};
14 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
15 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight};
16 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
17 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
18 use crate::ln::channel;
19 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
20 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
21 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
22 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
23 use crate::util::crypto::sign;
24 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
25 use crate::util::scid_utils::block_from_scid;
26 use crate::util::test_utils;
28 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
29 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
30 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
32 use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, Script, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime, Witness};
33 use bitcoin::util::sighash::SighashCache;
35 use crate::prelude::*;
37 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
40 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
41 // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
42 // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
43 // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
44 // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
45 // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
48 // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
50 // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
51 // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
53 // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
54 // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
55 // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
56 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
57 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
58 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
59 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
61 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
62 let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
64 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
65 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
66 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
67 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
69 let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
71 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
72 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
73 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
75 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
76 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
77 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
79 // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
80 // transaction for nodes[1].
81 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
82 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
83 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
84 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
85 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
87 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
88 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
89 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
90 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
92 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
93 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
94 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
97 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction, has_anchors_htlc_event: bool) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
98 let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
99 assert_eq!(spendable.len(), if has_anchors_htlc_event { 2 } else { 1 });
100 if has_anchors_htlc_event {
101 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { .. }) = spendable.pop().unwrap() {}
104 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
105 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
106 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
107 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
108 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
114 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
115 // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
116 // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
117 // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
119 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
120 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
121 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
122 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
124 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
126 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
128 // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
129 // before forwarding.
130 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
131 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
133 // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
134 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
136 // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
137 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
139 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
140 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
142 let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
143 assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
144 check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
146 // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
147 // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
148 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
149 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
150 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
152 // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
153 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
154 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
155 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
157 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
158 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
161 fn do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(anchors: bool) {
162 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
163 // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
164 // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
165 // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
166 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
167 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
168 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
170 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
171 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
173 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
174 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
176 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
177 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
178 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
179 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
181 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
182 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
184 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate * chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000;
185 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
186 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
187 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
188 transaction_fee_satoshis: commitment_fee,
190 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
191 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis: 1_000, transaction_fee_satoshis: 0 }],
192 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
194 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
195 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
196 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
197 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
198 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
200 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
201 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
202 let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
203 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
204 let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
205 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
206 let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
207 assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
209 let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
210 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
211 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
213 let shutdown_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]));
214 let shutdown_tx_conf_height_b = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]));
216 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
217 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
219 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
220 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
222 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
223 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
224 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
226 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
227 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
228 amount_satoshis: 1000,
229 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
231 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
233 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
234 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
236 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
237 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
238 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id)
239 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b).is_empty());
241 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
242 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
244 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
245 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
246 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
247 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
249 let spendable_outputs_a = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
251 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a),
255 let spendable_outputs_b = test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
257 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b),
261 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
262 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
266 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
267 do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(false);
268 do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(true);
271 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
276 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
277 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
278 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
279 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
280 let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
281 let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
282 eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
283 assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
284 assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
287 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(anchors: bool, prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
288 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
289 // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
290 // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
291 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
292 if prev_commitment_tx {
293 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
294 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
295 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
296 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
297 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
299 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
300 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
302 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
303 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
305 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
306 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
308 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
310 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
311 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
314 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
315 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
318 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
319 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
324 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
325 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
328 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
329 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
330 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
331 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
333 // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
334 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
335 // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
336 // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
337 let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
338 // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
339 let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
341 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
343 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
344 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
346 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
347 let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
348 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
349 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
351 outbound_payment: true,
353 let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
354 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
355 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
356 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
357 outbound_payment: true,
359 let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
360 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
361 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
364 let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
365 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
366 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
367 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
369 let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
370 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
371 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
375 let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
376 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
377 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
378 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
379 payment_preimage: timeout_payment_preimage,
382 // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
383 // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
384 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
385 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
386 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
387 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
388 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
389 transaction_fee_satoshis: commitment_tx_fee,
390 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
391 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
392 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
393 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
394 transaction_fee_satoshis: 0,
395 }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
396 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
398 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
399 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
400 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
402 let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
403 // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
404 // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
405 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
406 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
407 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
409 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
410 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
411 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
413 if prev_commitment_tx {
414 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
415 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
416 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
417 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
419 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
420 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
421 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
422 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
423 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
424 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
425 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
428 // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
429 // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
430 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
431 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) +
432 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
433 let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
434 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
435 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
436 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
437 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
438 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
439 commitment_tx_fee - // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs
440 anchor_outputs_value, // The anchor outputs value in satoshis
441 transaction_fee_satoshis: commitment_tx_fee,
442 }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
443 if !prev_commitment_tx {
444 a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
446 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
447 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
448 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
449 amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
450 transaction_fee_satoshis: 0,
452 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
454 // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
455 // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
456 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
457 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
458 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
461 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
462 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
463 match events.pop().unwrap() {
464 Event::BumpTransaction(bump_event) => {
465 let mut first_htlc_event = bump_event.clone();
466 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut first_htlc_event {
467 htlc_descriptors.remove(1);
469 panic!("Unexpected event");
471 let mut second_htlc_event = bump_event;
472 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut second_htlc_event {
473 htlc_descriptors.remove(0);
475 panic!("Unexpected event");
477 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&first_htlc_event);
478 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&second_htlc_event);
480 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
484 let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
485 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
486 // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
487 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
488 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
489 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
490 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
491 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
492 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
494 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
495 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
496 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
497 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
498 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
499 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
501 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
502 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
503 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
505 // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
506 // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
507 // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
508 // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
509 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
510 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
511 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
512 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
513 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
514 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
515 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
516 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
517 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
518 // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
519 // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
520 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
521 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
522 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
524 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
526 received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
527 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
529 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
530 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
531 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
533 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
534 // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
535 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
536 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
537 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
538 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
539 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
540 }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
541 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
543 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0], false);
544 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
546 // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
547 // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
548 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
549 if prev_commitment_tx {
550 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
552 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, false);
554 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
555 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
556 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
557 assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()],
558 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
560 // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
561 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
562 let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
563 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
564 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
565 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
566 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
567 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
568 assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
569 a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
570 // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
571 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
572 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
574 // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
575 // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
576 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
577 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
578 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
579 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
580 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
582 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
583 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
585 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
586 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
587 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
588 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
590 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1], false);
592 // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
593 // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
594 // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
595 let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
596 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
598 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
599 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
600 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
601 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
602 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
603 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
604 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
605 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
607 // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
608 // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
609 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
610 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0], anchors);
612 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
613 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
614 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
615 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
616 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
618 // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
619 // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
620 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
621 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0], anchors);
623 assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
624 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
626 // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
627 // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
628 // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
629 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
630 assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
631 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
632 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
633 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
634 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
636 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
637 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
638 // monitor events or claimable balances.
639 for node in nodes.iter() {
640 connect_blocks(node, 6);
641 connect_blocks(node, 6);
642 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
643 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
648 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
649 do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, true);
650 do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, false);
651 do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, true);
652 do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, false);
655 fn do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(anchors: bool) {
656 // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
657 // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
658 // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
659 // delay prior to spendability.
661 // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
662 // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
663 // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
664 // claim by our counterparty).
665 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
666 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
667 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
669 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
670 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
672 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
673 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
675 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
677 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
678 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
681 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
682 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
685 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
686 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
691 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
692 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
695 // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
696 // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
697 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
698 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
700 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
701 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
702 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
703 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
704 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
706 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
707 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
708 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
710 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
711 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
713 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
714 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
715 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
716 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
718 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
719 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
720 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
722 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
723 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
724 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
725 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
726 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
727 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
729 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
730 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
732 // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
733 // claimable balances.
734 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
735 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
736 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
737 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
738 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
739 let commitment_tx = {
740 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
741 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
742 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
743 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
746 let commitment_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx));
747 if anchors && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
748 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
749 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
750 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid());
753 let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
754 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
755 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
757 outbound_payment: true,
759 let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
760 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
761 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
762 payment_hash: payment_hash_2,
763 outbound_payment: true,
766 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
767 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
768 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
769 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
770 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
771 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
772 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
773 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
775 // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
776 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
777 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
778 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
779 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
780 let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
781 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
782 check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], commitment_tx);
784 // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
786 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
787 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
788 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
789 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
790 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
791 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
793 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 2);
795 let timeout_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
796 assert_eq!(timeout_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
797 check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[0], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
798 check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[1], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
800 // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
801 // "awaiting confirmations" one.
802 let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
803 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0]);
804 // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
805 // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
806 // call, as described, two hunks down.
807 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
808 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
809 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
810 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
811 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
812 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
813 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
814 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
816 // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
817 // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
818 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
819 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, true, false);
820 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
821 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
822 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
823 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
824 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
825 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
826 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
827 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
829 // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
830 // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
831 // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
832 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
833 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
835 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
836 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
837 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
838 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
839 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
840 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
842 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
844 // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
845 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
846 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
847 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
848 .get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
849 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
850 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
851 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
852 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
854 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
855 let to_self_spendable_output = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
857 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a),
858 to_self_spendable_output
861 // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
862 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
863 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
864 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
865 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0], false);
867 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
868 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
869 // monitor events or claimable balances.
870 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
871 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
872 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
873 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
877 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
878 do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(false);
879 do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(true);
883 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
884 // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
886 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
887 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
888 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
889 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
891 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
892 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
894 // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
895 let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
896 let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
897 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
899 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
900 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
902 let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
903 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
904 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
905 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
906 outbound_payment: true,
908 let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
909 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
910 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
911 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
913 let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
914 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
915 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
916 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
918 let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
919 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
920 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
921 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
922 outbound_payment: true,
925 // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
926 // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
927 // HTLC output is spent.
928 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
929 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
930 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
931 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - commitment_tx_fee,
932 transaction_fee_satoshis: commitment_tx_fee,
933 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
934 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
936 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
937 amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
938 transaction_fee_satoshis: 0,
939 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
940 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
942 // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
943 let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
944 assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
945 check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
946 check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
948 // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
949 // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
950 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
951 let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
952 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
953 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
954 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
955 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
957 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
958 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
959 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
960 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
961 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
963 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
964 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
966 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
968 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
969 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
971 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
972 let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
973 amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
974 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
975 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
976 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
977 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
979 // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
980 // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
981 // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
982 // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
984 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
985 let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
986 assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
987 check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
988 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
989 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
991 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
992 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
994 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
995 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
996 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
998 // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
999 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1000 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0], false);
1001 bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
1003 // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
1004 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
1005 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1));
1006 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
1007 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
1008 let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1009 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
1010 check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
1012 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1013 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1015 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1016 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1017 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1019 // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
1020 // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
1021 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1022 let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
1023 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1024 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1025 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1026 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1027 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1028 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1029 confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
1031 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1033 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1034 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1035 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1036 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1037 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1038 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1039 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1040 confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
1042 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1044 // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
1045 // payment failure event.
1046 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1047 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
1049 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1050 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1051 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1052 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1053 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1054 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1055 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1056 confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1058 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1060 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1061 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1062 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1063 confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1065 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1066 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0], false);
1068 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1069 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1070 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1072 // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
1073 // was already claimed.
1074 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1075 let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1076 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1077 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1078 confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1080 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1082 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1083 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1084 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1085 confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1087 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1089 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1090 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
1092 assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
1093 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1094 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1096 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1097 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1099 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1100 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1101 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1102 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1103 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1104 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1105 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1108 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
1109 let mut v = v_orig.clone();
1111 v.push((*t).clone());
1117 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(anchors: bool, confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
1118 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
1119 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1120 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1121 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1122 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1123 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1124 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1125 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1126 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1128 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1129 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1131 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1132 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1134 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1135 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1136 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1137 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1139 // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
1141 // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
1142 // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
1143 // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
1144 // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
1145 // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
1146 // later commitment transaction updates
1148 // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
1149 // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
1150 // HTLCs individually.
1152 let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
1153 let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1154 let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1156 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1158 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1159 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1161 let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1162 let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1164 // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1165 let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1166 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1168 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1170 let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1171 let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1173 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1174 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1176 let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1178 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1179 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1180 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1182 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1183 assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1184 let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1185 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1186 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1187 events.retain(|ev| {
1189 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1190 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1191 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1194 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1195 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1201 assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1202 if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1204 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, .. } => {},
1208 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1209 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1210 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1211 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1213 // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1214 // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1215 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1216 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1217 transaction_fee_satoshis: 0,
1218 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1219 amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1220 claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1221 payment_hash: missing_htlc_payment_hash,
1222 outbound_payment: true,
1223 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1224 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1225 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1226 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
1227 outbound_payment: true,
1228 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1229 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1230 claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1231 payment_hash: live_payment_hash,
1232 outbound_payment: true,
1234 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1236 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1237 let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1238 // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1240 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1241 claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
1243 // The following constants were determined experimentally
1244 const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 483;
1245 let outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: usize = if anchors { 574 } else { 571 };
1246 let inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: usize = if anchors { 582 } else { 578 };
1248 // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1249 // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1250 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1251 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1252 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1253 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1255 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1256 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1257 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1258 let inbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight as u64 / 1000;
1259 let outbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight as u64 / 1000;
1260 let to_self_claim_fee = chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000;
1262 // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1263 // claim balances separated out.
1264 let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1265 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1266 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1267 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1268 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1269 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1270 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1271 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1274 let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1275 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1277 let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1278 let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1279 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1281 let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1283 // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1284 // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1285 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1286 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1288 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1289 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1290 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1291 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1293 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1294 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1295 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1296 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1299 let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1300 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1301 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1303 let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1304 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
1305 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1308 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1309 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1310 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1312 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1313 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1316 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1317 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1319 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1321 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1322 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1324 // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1325 // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1326 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1327 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1329 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1330 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1331 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1332 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1333 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1334 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
1335 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1336 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1337 amount_satoshis: 3_000 - outbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1338 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1339 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1340 amount_satoshis: 4_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1341 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1342 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1343 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1344 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1346 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1348 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1349 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1351 let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1352 expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
1353 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1354 expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
1355 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1357 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1358 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }], false);
1359 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1360 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }], false);
1361 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1362 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1363 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0], false);
1364 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1365 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1], false);
1366 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1367 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1369 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1370 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1371 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1372 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1373 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1374 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1375 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1379 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1380 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, true);
1381 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, false);
1382 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, true);
1383 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, false);
1386 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(anchors: bool) {
1387 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1388 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1389 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1390 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1391 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1393 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1394 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1396 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1397 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1399 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1401 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1402 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1405 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1406 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1409 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1410 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1415 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1416 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
1419 // Create some initial channels
1420 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1421 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 12_000_000);
1422 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1423 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1425 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1426 let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1427 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1428 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1429 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1431 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[4].value, 11000); // to_self output
1433 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[2].value, 11000); // to_self output
1436 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs, an output for each side, and an
1437 // anchor output for each side if enabled.
1438 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if anchors { 6 } else { 4 });
1440 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1442 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1443 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1445 // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1446 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1447 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1448 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1449 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1451 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 1);
1453 let revoked_htlc_success = {
1454 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1455 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1456 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1457 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, if anchors { 3 } else { 1 });
1458 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(),
1459 if anchors { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS } else { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT });
1460 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1463 let revoked_htlc_success_fee = chan_feerate * revoked_htlc_success.weight() as u64 / 1000;
1465 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1467 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 2);
1469 let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
1470 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1471 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1472 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
1478 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1479 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
1480 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time.0, 0);
1481 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0, 0);
1483 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1484 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1485 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1487 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1488 let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1490 let revoked_to_self_claim = {
1491 let mut as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1492 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1494 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1495 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 4); // Separate to_remote claim
1496 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1497 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
1498 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1499 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
1500 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1501 Some(as_commitment_claim_txn.remove(0))
1503 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1504 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1505 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1506 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
1507 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1512 // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1513 // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1514 // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1515 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1516 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1517 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1518 let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1519 // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1520 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1521 confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1522 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1523 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1524 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1525 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1526 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1527 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1528 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1530 assert_eq!(as_balances,
1531 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1533 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
1534 let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1535 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1536 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1537 check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
1538 // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked outputs (which no longer includes the
1539 // spent HTLC output)
1540 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1541 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1543 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1545 check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1547 assert_eq!(as_balances,
1548 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1550 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1551 let as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee = chan_feerate * as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight() as u64 / 1000;
1553 // With anchors, B can pay for revoked_htlc_success's fee with additional inputs, rather
1554 // than with the HTLC itself.
1555 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1556 3_000 - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
1558 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1559 3_000 - revoked_htlc_success_fee - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
1562 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1563 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1564 // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1565 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1566 confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1567 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1568 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1569 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1570 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1571 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1572 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1573 amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1574 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1576 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1578 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1579 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], false);
1580 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1581 // to_self output to B
1582 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1583 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1584 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1585 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1586 amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1587 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1589 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1591 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1592 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0], false);
1593 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1594 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1595 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1596 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1597 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1599 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1601 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1602 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1603 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1604 // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1605 let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1606 for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1607 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1610 // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1612 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1613 let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1614 for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1615 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1618 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
1619 let (revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, revoked_to_self_claim) = {
1620 let mut as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1621 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1623 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1624 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1625 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1626 (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), revoked_to_self_claim.unwrap())
1628 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1629 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1630 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1631 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), 1);
1632 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1633 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1634 (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0))
1638 // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1639 // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1640 // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1641 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1642 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1643 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1644 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1645 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1646 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1648 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1650 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim);
1651 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1652 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1653 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1654 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1655 amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value,
1656 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1658 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1660 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim);
1661 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1662 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1663 amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.output[0].value,
1664 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1665 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1666 amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value,
1667 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1669 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1671 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1672 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, false);
1673 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1674 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim, false);
1676 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1678 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1679 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1680 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1681 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1682 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1683 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1684 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1688 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1689 do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(false);
1690 do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(true);
1693 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(anchors: bool) {
1694 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1695 // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1696 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1697 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1698 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1699 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1700 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1701 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1702 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1703 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1705 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1706 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1708 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1709 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1711 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1713 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1714 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1715 output: vec![TxOut {
1716 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1717 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1720 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1722 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1723 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1724 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1725 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1727 // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1728 // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1729 // revocation-claim transaction.
1731 let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1732 let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1734 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1736 // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1737 // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1738 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1739 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1741 // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1742 let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1744 assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1745 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1747 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1750 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1751 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1754 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1757 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1760 let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1761 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1762 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1764 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1765 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1766 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1767 let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1769 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1770 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1771 transaction_fee_satoshis: 0,
1772 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1773 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1774 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1775 payment_hash: revoked_payment_hash,
1776 outbound_payment: true,
1777 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1778 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1779 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1780 payment_hash: claimed_payment_hash,
1781 outbound_payment: true,
1783 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1785 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1786 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1787 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1788 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1790 let mut claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1791 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1792 let revoked_to_self_claim = if anchors {
1793 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1794 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 5); // Separate to_remote claim
1795 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1796 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
1797 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1798 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
1799 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1800 Some(claim_txn.remove(0))
1802 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1803 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1804 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1805 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
1806 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1810 let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1812 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1813 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1814 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1815 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1816 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1817 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1818 confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1819 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1820 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1821 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1822 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1823 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1824 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1825 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1827 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1829 // Confirm A's HTLC-Success transaction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1832 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1833 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1834 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1835 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
1836 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
1838 let htlc_success_claim = if anchors {
1839 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1840 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1841 check_spends!(txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1844 as_revoked_txn[1].clone()
1846 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_claim);
1847 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage, None, true, false);
1849 let mut claim_txn_2 = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1850 // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1851 // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1852 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1854 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1);
1855 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1856 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], &htlc_success_claim);
1857 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1858 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1859 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1861 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1);
1862 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1863 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1864 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 2);
1865 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1866 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 1);
1867 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1870 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1871 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1872 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1873 confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1874 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1875 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1876 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1877 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1878 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1879 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1880 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1881 // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1882 // anyway, so its not a big change.
1883 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1885 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1887 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1888 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1890 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1891 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1892 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1893 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1894 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1895 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1896 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1897 // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1898 // anyway, so its not a big change.
1899 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1901 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1903 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1904 let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1906 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1907 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1908 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1909 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1910 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1911 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1912 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
1913 confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1915 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1917 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1918 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0], false);
1920 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1921 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1922 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1923 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1924 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1926 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1929 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&claim_txn_2[1], revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap()]);
1931 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1933 let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1936 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1937 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1938 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1939 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1940 amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap().output[0].value,
1941 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1943 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1945 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1946 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1947 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1949 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1952 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1954 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1955 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1957 let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1958 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1959 for (i, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
1960 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = event {
1961 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
1962 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
1963 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
1964 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()
1966 check_spends!(spend_tx, if i == 0 { &claim_txn_2[1] } else { revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap() });
1967 } else { panic!(); }
1970 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1], false);
1972 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1974 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1975 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1976 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1977 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1978 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1979 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1980 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1984 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
1985 do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(false);
1986 do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(true);
1989 fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
1990 // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
1991 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1992 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1994 let new_chain_monitor;
1996 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1997 let node_deserialized;
1999 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2001 // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
2002 // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
2003 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
2004 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
2006 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2007 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2008 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2009 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
2010 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2012 let commitment_tx = {
2013 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2014 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2015 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
2016 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2020 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2022 // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
2023 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
2024 let htlc_timeout_tx = {
2025 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2026 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2027 check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
2031 // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
2032 // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
2033 if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
2034 let serialized_monitor = hex::decode(
2035 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0",
2037 reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2040 // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
2041 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
2042 if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
2043 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2046 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2047 if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
2048 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
2050 assert!(txn.len() < 6);
2053 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
2054 assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
2055 assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
2056 assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
2062 fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
2063 do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
2064 do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
2067 fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) {
2068 // Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every
2069 // `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call.
2070 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2071 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2072 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
2074 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2075 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2077 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
2078 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2080 let (_, _, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
2081 &nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 500_000_000
2083 const HTLC_AMT_MSAT: u64 = 1_000_000;
2084 const HTLC_AMT_SAT: u64 = HTLC_AMT_MSAT / 1000;
2085 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_AMT_MSAT);
2087 let htlc_expiry = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1;
2089 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(&nodes[0], &chan_id);
2090 assert_eq!(commitment_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 /* commitment tx only */} else { 2 /* commitment and htlc timeout tx */ });
2091 check_spends!(&commitment_txn[0], &funding_tx);
2092 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_txn[0]);
2093 check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
2094 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed,
2095 false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
2096 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2098 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2100 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2101 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2102 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` on anchors
2103 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2104 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2107 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2109 // Set up a helper closure we'll use throughout our test. We should only expect retries without
2110 // bumps if fees have not increased after a block has been connected (assuming the height timer
2111 // re-evaluates at every block) or after `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` is called.
2112 let mut prev_htlc_tx_feerate = None;
2113 let mut check_htlc_retry = |should_retry: bool, should_bump: bool| -> Option<Transaction> {
2114 let (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) = if anchors {
2115 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
2116 let events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2117 assert_eq!(events.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
2122 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2123 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2124 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2125 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2126 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2127 check_spends!(&htlc_tx, &commitment_txn[0], &coinbase_tx);
2128 let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value -
2129 htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>();
2130 let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
2131 (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
2133 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2136 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2137 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2138 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
2142 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2143 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]);
2144 let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value;
2145 let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
2146 (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
2149 assert!(htlc_tx_feerate > prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take().unwrap());
2150 } else if let Some(prev_feerate) = prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take() {
2151 assert_eq!(htlc_tx_feerate, prev_feerate);
2153 prev_htlc_tx_feerate = Some(htlc_tx_feerate);
2157 // Connect blocks up to one before the HTLC expires. This should not result in a claim/retry.
2158 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_expiry - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
2159 check_htlc_retry(false, false);
2161 // Connect one more block, producing our first claim.
2162 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2163 check_htlc_retry(true, false);
2165 // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
2166 // transactions pre-anchors.
2167 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2168 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2170 // Trigger a call and we should have another retry, but without a bump.
2171 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2172 check_htlc_retry(true, false);
2174 // Double the feerate and trigger a call, expecting a fee-bumped retry.
2175 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2176 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2177 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2179 // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
2180 // transactions pre-anchors.
2181 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2182 let htlc_tx = check_htlc_retry(true, anchors).unwrap();
2184 // Mine the HTLC transaction to ensure we don't retry claims while they're confirmed.
2185 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_tx);
2186 // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transactions,
2187 // we'll receive an extra bumped claim.
2188 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2189 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2190 nodes[0].wallet_source.remove_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 1 });
2191 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2193 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2194 check_htlc_retry(false, false);
2198 fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() {
2199 do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false);
2200 do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true);
2204 fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
2205 // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
2206 // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
2207 // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
2208 // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
2209 // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
2210 // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
2211 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2212 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2213 let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
2214 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2215 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2216 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2217 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2218 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2220 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
2221 &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
2223 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
2224 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000);
2226 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2227 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2229 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2231 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2232 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
2234 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2236 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2237 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2238 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2241 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
2242 &payment_hash_2, &payment_preimage_2, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
2243 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
2245 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
2246 &payment_hash_1, &payment_preimage_1, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2247 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2250 let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2251 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
2252 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
2253 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2254 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2256 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2257 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2258 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2259 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2260 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2263 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2264 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2265 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2266 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2267 let anchor_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2268 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2269 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2270 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2271 (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
2273 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2276 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[2].value, 1_000); // HTLC A -> B
2277 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[3].value, 2_000); // HTLC B -> A
2279 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2281 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2282 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2285 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2286 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
2288 let htlc_preimage_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2289 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
2290 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
2291 check_spends!(htlc_preimage_tx, commitment_tx);
2293 let htlc_timeout_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2294 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
2295 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
2296 check_spends!(htlc_timeout_tx, commitment_tx);
2298 if let Some(commitment_tx) = txn.pop() {
2299 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2303 let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2304 // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2305 // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2306 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2307 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2308 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
2309 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2311 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2);
2313 let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2314 for event in holder_events {
2316 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2317 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2318 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2319 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2320 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2321 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx, anchor_tx);
2322 htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
2324 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2328 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
2329 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2331 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2333 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
2335 let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2336 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2337 for event in holder_events {
2339 Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
2340 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2344 // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
2345 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2346 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2347 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2348 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2352 fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
2353 // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
2354 // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
2355 // revoked commitment.
2356 let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2357 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2358 // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
2359 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2360 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2362 let bob_chain_monitor;
2364 let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
2365 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2366 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2367 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2368 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2369 let bob_deserialized;
2371 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2373 let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2374 let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2376 // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
2377 let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
2379 // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
2380 let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2381 let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2382 let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2383 let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2385 // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
2386 // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
2388 let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
2389 let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
2391 // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
2392 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
2393 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
2394 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
2395 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
2397 // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
2399 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2400 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2402 // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
2404 nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
2405 bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
2407 for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
2408 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
2409 for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
2410 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
2411 &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2412 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2417 // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
2418 // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
2419 // the HTLCs still pending.
2420 *nodes[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2421 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
2422 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
2423 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2424 let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = {
2425 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2426 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2427 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2428 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2429 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
2430 check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
2431 check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3);
2432 (txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone())
2434 check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3);
2435 check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
2436 (txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone())
2440 // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
2441 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2442 let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2443 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2444 let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2445 for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
2446 let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat() * (idx + 1) as u64;
2447 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2449 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2450 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2451 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2453 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2456 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, utxo_value);
2458 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event),
2459 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2461 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2462 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2463 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]);
2464 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2465 anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone());
2468 for node in &nodes {
2469 mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_txs[1]]);
2471 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
2472 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
2473 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2475 // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
2478 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2479 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
2481 let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() {
2482 (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] })
2484 (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] })
2487 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2488 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
2489 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
2490 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2491 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
2492 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
2495 // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
2496 // through the success path.
2497 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2498 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2499 // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2500 // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2501 match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
2502 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
2503 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
2504 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
2505 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2506 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
2507 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2510 _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
2513 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
2514 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
2515 let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2516 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2518 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2519 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2520 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
2521 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2522 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
2525 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
2527 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2528 input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
2529 previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2530 ..Default::default()
2532 output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
2533 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
2534 script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
2537 let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
2538 for event in events {
2539 // We don't use the `BumpTransactionEventHandler` here because it does not support
2540 // creating one transaction from multiple `HTLCResolution` events.
2541 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
2542 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
2543 for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
2544 assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
2545 htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
2546 htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&secp));
2548 descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
2549 htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
2551 panic!("Unexpected event");
2554 for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
2555 let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
2556 let signer = htlc_descriptor.derive_channel_signer(&nodes[1].keys_manager);
2557 let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
2558 let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&secp);
2559 htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
2561 let fee_utxo_sig = {
2562 let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
2563 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
2564 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2566 let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2567 let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2568 sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2571 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2572 check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
2576 for node in &nodes {
2577 mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
2580 // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
2581 // the second level instead.
2582 let revoked_claim_transactions = {
2583 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2584 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2586 let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
2587 tx.input.len() == 2 &&
2588 tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2589 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
2590 ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2591 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
2592 for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
2593 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
2596 let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = HashMap::new();
2597 for current_tx in txn.into_iter() {
2598 revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx);
2600 revoked_claim_transaction_map
2602 for node in &nodes {
2603 mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claim_transactions.values().collect::<Vec<_>>());
2607 // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
2609 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2610 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
2612 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2613 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2615 // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2616 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2617 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2619 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2620 let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2621 assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4);
2622 for event in spendable_output_events {
2623 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event {
2624 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2625 assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap()));
2626 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2627 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
2630 if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(_) = &outputs[0] {
2631 check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_a, &revoked_commitment_b);
2633 check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
2636 panic!("unexpected event");
2640 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2641 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2642 // On the Alice side, the individual to_self_claim are still pending confirmation.
2643 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 2);
2644 // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
2645 // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
2646 // balances to claim.
2648 // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
2649 // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
2650 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);
2653 fn do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(confirm_commitment_before_reload: bool) {
2654 // Tests that we'll fix a ChannelMonitor's `counterparty_payment_script` for an anchor outputs
2655 // channel upon deserialization.
2656 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2657 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2660 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2661 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2662 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2663 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2664 let node_deserialized;
2665 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2667 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
2669 // Set the monitor's `counterparty_payment_script` to a dummy P2WPKH script.
2670 let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2671 let privkey = bitcoin::PrivateKey::from_slice(&[1; 32], bitcoin::Network::Testnet).unwrap();
2672 let pubkey = bitcoin::PublicKey::from_private_key(&secp, &privkey);
2673 let p2wpkh_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&pubkey.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2674 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).set_counterparty_payment_script(p2wpkh_script.clone());
2675 assert_eq!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script(), p2wpkh_script);
2677 // Confirm the counterparty's commitment and reload the monitor (either before or after) such
2678 // that we arrive at the correct `counterparty_payment_script` after the reload.
2679 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2680 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2681 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2682 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
2683 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2685 let commitment_tx = {
2686 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2687 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2688 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 4);
2689 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2693 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2694 let commitment_tx_conf_height = if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2695 // We should expect our round trip serialization check to fail as we're writing the monitor
2696 // with the incorrect P2WPKH script but reading it with the correct P2WSH script.
2697 *nodes[1].chain_monitor.expect_monitor_round_trip_fail.lock().unwrap() = Some(chan_id);
2698 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2699 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2700 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2701 commitment_tx_conf_height
2703 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2704 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2705 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2706 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2707 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
2708 commitment_tx_conf_height
2710 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2711 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2712 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script().is_v0_p2wsh());
2714 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2715 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2717 if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2718 // If we saw the commitment before our `counterparty_payment_script` was fixed, we'll never
2719 // get the spendable output event for the `to_remote` output, so we'll need to get it
2720 // manually via `get_spendable_outputs`.
2721 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2722 let outputs = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height);
2723 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2724 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2725 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
2728 check_spends!(spend_tx, &commitment_tx);
2730 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx, false);
2735 fn test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload() {
2736 do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(false);
2737 do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(true);
2740 #[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
2741 fn do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(anchors: bool, confirm_counterparty_commitment: bool) {
2742 // Tests that our monitor claims will always use fresh random signatures (ensuring a unique
2743 // wtxid) to prevent certain classes of transaction replacement at the bitcoin P2P layer.
2744 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2745 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2746 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2748 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2749 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2751 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2752 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2754 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2756 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2757 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2760 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2761 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2766 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2769 // Open a channel and route a payment. We'll let it timeout to claim it.
2770 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
2771 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
2773 let (closing_node, other_node) = if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2774 (&nodes[1], &nodes[0])
2776 (&nodes[0], &nodes[1])
2779 closing_node.node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &other_node.node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2781 // The commitment transaction comes first.
2782 let commitment_tx = {
2783 let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2784 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2785 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2789 mine_transaction(closing_node, &commitment_tx);
2790 check_added_monitors!(closing_node, 1);
2791 check_closed_broadcast!(closing_node, true);
2792 check_closed_event!(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
2794 mine_transaction(other_node, &commitment_tx);
2795 check_added_monitors!(other_node, 1);
2796 check_closed_broadcast!(other_node, true);
2797 check_closed_event!(other_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [closing_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
2799 // If we update the best block to the new height before providing the confirmed transactions,
2800 // we'll see another broadcast of the commitment transaction.
2801 if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2802 let _ = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2805 // Then comes the HTLC timeout transaction.
2806 if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2807 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 5);
2808 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
2809 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
2811 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
2813 if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2814 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
2816 let htlc_timeout_tx = {
2817 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2818 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2819 let tx = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == commitment_tx.txid() {
2824 check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
2828 // Check we rebroadcast it with a different wtxid.
2829 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2830 if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2831 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
2834 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2835 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2836 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), htlc_timeout_tx.txid());
2837 assert_ne!(txn[0].wtxid(), htlc_timeout_tx.wtxid());
2841 #[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
2843 fn test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures() {
2844 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, false);
2845 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, true);
2846 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, false);
2847 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, true);