1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
12 use crate::sign::{ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner, OutputSpender, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
13 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance};
14 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
15 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight};
16 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
17 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
18 use crate::ln::{channel, ChannelId};
19 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
20 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
21 use crate::crypto::utils::sign;
22 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
23 use crate::util::scid_utils::block_from_scid;
24 use crate::util::test_utils;
26 use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, ScriptBuf, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
27 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
28 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
29 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
32 use bitcoin::sighash::{SighashCache, EcdsaSighashType};
34 use crate::prelude::*;
36 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
39 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
40 // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
41 // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
42 // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
43 // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
44 // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
47 // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
49 // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
50 // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
52 // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
53 // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
54 // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
55 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
56 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
57 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
58 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
60 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
61 let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
63 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
64 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
65 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
66 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
68 let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
70 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
71 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
72 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
74 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
75 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
76 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
78 // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
79 // transaction for nodes[1].
80 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
81 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
82 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
83 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
84 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
86 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
87 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
88 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
89 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
91 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
92 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
93 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
96 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction, has_anchors_htlc_event: bool) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
97 let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
98 assert_eq!(spendable.len(), if has_anchors_htlc_event { 2 } else { 1 });
99 if has_anchors_htlc_event {
100 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { .. }) = spendable.pop().unwrap() {}
103 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
104 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
105 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
106 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
107 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
113 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
114 // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
115 // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
116 // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
118 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
119 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
120 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
121 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
123 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
125 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
127 // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
128 // before forwarding.
129 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
130 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
132 // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
133 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
135 // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
136 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
138 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
139 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
141 let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
142 assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
143 check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
145 // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
146 // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
147 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
148 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
149 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
151 // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
152 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
153 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
154 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
156 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
157 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
161 fn archive_fully_resolved_monitors() {
162 // Test we can archive fully resolved channel monitor.
163 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
164 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
165 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
166 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
167 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
169 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
170 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
172 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
173 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
174 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
175 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
176 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
178 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
179 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
180 let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
181 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
182 let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
183 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
184 let (_, _) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
186 let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
188 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
189 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
191 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
192 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
194 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
195 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
197 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors().len(), 1);
198 // First archive should set balances_empty_height to current block height
199 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.archive_fully_resolved_channel_monitors();
200 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors().len(), 1);
201 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4032);
202 // Second call after 4032 blocks, should archive the monitor
203 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.archive_fully_resolved_channel_monitors();
204 // Should have no monitors left
205 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors().len(), 0);
206 // Remove the corresponding outputs and transactions the chain source is
207 // watching. This is to make sure the `Drop` function assertions pass.
208 nodes.get_mut(0).unwrap().chain_source.remove_watched_txn_and_outputs(
209 OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 },
210 funding_tx.output[0].script_pubkey.clone()
214 fn do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(anchors: bool) {
215 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
216 // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
217 // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
218 // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
219 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
220 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
221 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
223 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
224 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
226 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
227 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
229 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
230 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
231 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
232 assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
234 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
235 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
237 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000;
238 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
239 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
240 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value
242 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
243 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
244 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
246 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
247 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
248 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
249 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
250 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
252 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
253 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
254 let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
255 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
256 let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
257 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
258 let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
259 assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
261 let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
262 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
263 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
265 let shutdown_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]));
266 let shutdown_tx_conf_height_b = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]));
268 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
269 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
271 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
272 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
274 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
275 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
276 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
278 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
279 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
280 amount_satoshis: 1000,
281 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
283 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
285 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
286 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
288 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
289 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
290 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id)
291 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b).is_empty());
293 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
294 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
296 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
297 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
298 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
299 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
301 let spendable_outputs_a = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
303 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a),
307 let spendable_outputs_b = test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
309 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b),
313 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
314 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
318 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
319 do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(false);
320 do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(true);
323 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
328 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
329 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
330 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
331 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
332 let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
333 let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
334 eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
335 assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
336 assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
339 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(anchors: bool, prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
340 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
341 // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
342 // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
343 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
344 if prev_commitment_tx {
345 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
346 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
347 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
348 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
349 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
351 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
352 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
354 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
355 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
357 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
358 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
360 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
362 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
363 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
366 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
367 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
370 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
371 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
376 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
377 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
380 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
381 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
382 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
383 assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
385 // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
386 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
387 // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
388 // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
389 let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
390 // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
391 let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
393 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
395 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
396 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
398 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
399 let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
400 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
401 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
404 let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
405 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
406 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
407 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
409 let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
410 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
411 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
414 let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
415 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
416 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
417 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
419 let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
420 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
421 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
425 let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
426 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
427 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
428 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
429 payment_preimage: timeout_payment_preimage,
432 // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
433 // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
434 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
435 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
436 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
437 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
438 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
439 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
440 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
441 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
442 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
443 }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
444 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
446 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
448 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
450 let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
451 // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
452 // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
453 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
455 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
457 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
458 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
459 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
461 if prev_commitment_tx {
462 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
463 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
464 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
465 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
467 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
468 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
469 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
470 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
471 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
472 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
476 // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
477 // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
478 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
479 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) +
480 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
481 let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
482 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
483 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
484 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
485 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
486 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
487 commitment_tx_fee - // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs
488 anchor_outputs_value, // The anchor outputs value in satoshis
489 }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
490 if !prev_commitment_tx {
491 a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
493 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
494 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
495 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
496 amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
498 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
500 // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
501 // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
502 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
503 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
504 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
507 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
508 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
509 match events.pop().unwrap() {
510 Event::BumpTransaction(bump_event) => {
511 let mut first_htlc_event = bump_event.clone();
512 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut first_htlc_event {
513 htlc_descriptors.remove(1);
515 panic!("Unexpected event");
517 let mut second_htlc_event = bump_event;
518 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut second_htlc_event {
519 htlc_descriptors.remove(0);
521 panic!("Unexpected event");
523 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&first_htlc_event);
524 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&second_htlc_event);
526 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
530 let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
531 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
532 // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
533 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
534 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
535 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
536 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
537 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
538 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
540 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
541 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
542 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
543 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
544 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
545 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
546 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
547 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
548 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
549 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
551 // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
552 // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
553 // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
554 // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
555 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
556 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
557 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
558 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
559 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
560 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
561 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
562 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
563 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
564 // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
565 // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
566 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
567 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
568 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
570 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
572 received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
573 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
575 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
576 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
577 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
579 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
580 // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
581 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
582 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
583 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
584 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
585 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
586 }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
587 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
589 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0], false);
590 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
592 // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
593 // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
594 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
595 if prev_commitment_tx {
596 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
598 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, false);
600 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
601 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
602 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
603 assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()],
604 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
606 // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
607 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
608 let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
609 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
610 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
611 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
612 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
613 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
614 assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
615 a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
616 // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
617 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
618 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
620 // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
621 // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
622 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
623 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
624 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
625 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
626 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
628 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
629 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
631 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
632 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
633 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
634 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
636 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1], false);
638 // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
639 // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
640 // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
641 let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
642 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
644 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
645 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
646 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
647 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
648 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
649 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
650 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
651 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
653 // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
654 // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
655 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
656 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0], anchors);
658 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
659 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
660 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
661 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
662 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
664 // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
665 // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
666 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
667 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0], anchors);
669 assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
670 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
672 // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
673 // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
674 // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
675 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
676 assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
677 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
678 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
679 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
680 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
682 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
683 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
684 // monitor events or claimable balances.
685 for node in nodes.iter() {
686 connect_blocks(node, 6);
687 connect_blocks(node, 6);
688 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
689 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
694 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
695 do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, true);
696 do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, false);
697 do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, true);
698 do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, false);
701 fn do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(anchors: bool) {
702 // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
703 // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
704 // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
705 // delay prior to spendability.
707 // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
708 // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
709 // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
710 // claim by our counterparty).
711 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
712 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
713 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
715 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
716 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
718 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
719 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
721 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
723 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
724 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
727 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
728 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
731 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
732 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
737 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
738 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
741 // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
742 // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
743 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
744 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
746 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
747 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
748 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
749 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
750 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
752 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
753 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
754 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
756 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
757 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
759 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
760 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
761 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
762 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
764 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
765 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
766 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
768 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
769 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
770 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
771 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
773 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
775 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
776 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
778 // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
779 // claimable balances.
780 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
781 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
782 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
783 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
784 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
785 let commitment_tx = {
786 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
787 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
788 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
789 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
792 let commitment_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx));
793 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
794 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
795 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
796 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid());
799 let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
800 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
801 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
804 let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
805 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
806 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
807 payment_hash: payment_hash_2,
810 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
811 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
812 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
813 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
814 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
815 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
816 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
817 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
819 // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
820 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
821 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
822 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
823 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
824 let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
825 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
826 check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], commitment_tx);
828 // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
830 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
831 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
832 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
833 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
834 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
835 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
837 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 2);
839 let timeout_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
840 assert_eq!(timeout_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
841 check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[0], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
842 check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[1], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
844 // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
845 // "awaiting confirmations" one.
846 let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
847 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0]);
848 // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
849 // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
850 // call, as described, two hunks down.
851 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
852 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
853 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
854 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
855 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
856 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
857 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
858 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
860 // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
861 // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
862 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
863 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, true, false);
864 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
865 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
866 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
867 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
868 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
869 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
870 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
871 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
873 // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
874 // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
875 // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
876 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
877 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
879 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
880 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
881 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
882 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
883 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
884 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
886 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
888 // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
889 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
890 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
891 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
892 .get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
893 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
894 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
895 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
896 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
898 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
899 let to_self_spendable_output = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
901 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a),
902 to_self_spendable_output
905 // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
906 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
907 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
908 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
909 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0], false);
911 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
912 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
913 // monitor events or claimable balances.
914 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
915 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
916 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
917 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
921 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
922 do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(false);
923 do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(true);
927 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
928 // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
930 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
931 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
932 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
933 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
935 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
936 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
938 // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
939 let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
940 let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
941 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
943 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
944 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
946 let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
947 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
948 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
949 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
951 let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
952 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
953 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
954 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
956 let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
957 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
958 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
959 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
961 let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
962 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
963 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
964 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
967 // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
968 // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
969 // HTLC output is spent.
971 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
972 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
973 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
974 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
975 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
977 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
978 amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
979 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
980 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
982 // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
983 let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
984 assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
985 check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
986 check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
988 // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
989 // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
990 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
991 let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
992 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
993 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
994 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
995 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
997 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
998 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
999 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1000 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1001 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1003 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
1004 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1006 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
1007 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1008 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1009 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1011 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1012 let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1013 amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
1014 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
1015 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
1016 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1017 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1019 // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
1020 // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
1021 // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
1022 // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
1024 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1025 let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1026 assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
1027 check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
1028 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
1029 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
1031 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
1032 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1034 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1035 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
1036 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1038 // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
1039 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1040 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0], false);
1041 bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
1043 // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
1044 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
1045 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1));
1046 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
1047 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
1048 let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1049 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
1050 check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
1052 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1053 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1055 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1056 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1057 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1059 // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
1060 // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
1061 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1062 let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
1063 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1064 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1065 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1066 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1067 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1068 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1069 confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
1071 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1073 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1074 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1075 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1076 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1077 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1078 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1079 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1080 confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
1082 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1084 // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
1085 // payment failure event.
1086 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1087 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
1089 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1090 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1091 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1092 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1093 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1094 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1095 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1096 confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1098 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1100 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1101 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1102 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1103 confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1105 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1106 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0], false);
1108 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1109 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1110 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1112 // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
1113 // was already claimed.
1114 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1115 let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1116 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1117 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1118 confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1120 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1122 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1123 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1124 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1125 confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1127 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1129 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1130 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
1132 assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
1133 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1134 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1136 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1137 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1139 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1140 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1141 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1142 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1143 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1144 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1145 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1148 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
1149 let mut v = v_orig.clone();
1151 v.push((*t).clone());
1157 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(anchors: bool, confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
1158 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
1159 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1160 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1161 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1162 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1163 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1164 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1165 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1166 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1168 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1169 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1171 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1172 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1174 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1175 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1176 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1177 assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
1179 // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
1181 // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
1182 // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
1183 // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
1184 // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
1185 // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
1186 // later commitment transaction updates
1188 // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
1189 // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
1190 // HTLCs individually.
1192 let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
1193 let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1194 let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1196 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1198 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1199 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1201 let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1202 let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1204 // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1205 let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1206 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1208 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1210 let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1211 let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1213 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1214 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1216 let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1218 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1219 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1222 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1223 assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1224 let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1225 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1226 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1227 events.retain(|ev| {
1229 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1230 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1231 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1234 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1235 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1241 assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1242 if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1244 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, .. } => {},
1248 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1249 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1251 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1253 // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1254 // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1255 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1256 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1257 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1258 amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1259 claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1260 payment_hash: missing_htlc_payment_hash,
1261 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1262 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1263 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1264 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
1265 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1266 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1267 claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1268 payment_hash: live_payment_hash,
1270 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1272 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1273 let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1274 // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1276 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1277 claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
1279 // The following constants were determined experimentally
1280 const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: u64 = 483;
1281 let outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: u64 = if anchors { 574 } else { 571 };
1282 let inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: u64 = if anchors { 582 } else { 578 };
1284 // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1285 // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1286 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight().to_wu(), outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1287 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight().to_wu(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1288 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight().to_wu(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1289 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight().to_wu(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1291 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1292 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1293 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1294 let inbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight / 1000;
1295 let outbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight / 1000;
1296 let to_self_claim_fee = chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight().to_wu() / 1000;
1298 // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1299 // claim balances separated out.
1300 let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1301 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1302 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1303 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1304 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1305 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1306 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1307 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1310 let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1311 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1313 let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1314 let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1315 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1317 let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1319 // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1320 // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1321 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1322 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1324 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1325 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1326 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1327 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1329 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1330 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1331 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1332 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1335 let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1336 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1337 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1339 let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1340 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
1341 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1344 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1345 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1346 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1348 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1349 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1352 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1353 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1355 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1357 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1358 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1360 // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1361 // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1362 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1363 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1365 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1366 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1367 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1368 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1369 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1370 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
1371 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1372 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1373 amount_satoshis: 3_000 - outbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1374 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1375 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1376 amount_satoshis: 4_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1377 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1378 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1379 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1380 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1382 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1384 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1385 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1387 let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1388 expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
1389 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1390 expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
1391 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1393 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1394 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }], false);
1395 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1396 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }], false);
1397 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1398 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1399 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0], false);
1400 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1401 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1], false);
1402 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1403 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1405 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1406 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1407 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1408 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1409 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1410 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1411 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1415 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1416 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, true);
1417 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, false);
1418 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, true);
1419 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, false);
1422 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(anchors: bool) {
1423 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1424 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1425 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1426 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1427 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1429 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1430 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1432 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1433 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1435 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1437 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
1438 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1441 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1442 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1445 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1446 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1451 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1452 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
1455 // Create some initial channels
1456 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1457 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 12_000_000);
1458 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1459 assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
1461 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1462 let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1463 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1464 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1465 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1467 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[4].value, 11000); // to_self output
1469 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[2].value, 11000); // to_self output
1472 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs, an output for each side, and an
1473 // anchor output for each side if enabled.
1474 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if anchors { 6 } else { 4 });
1476 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1478 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1479 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1481 // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1482 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1483 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1485 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1487 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 1);
1489 let revoked_htlc_success = {
1490 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1491 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1492 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1493 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, if anchors { 3 } else { 1 });
1494 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(),
1495 if anchors { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS } else { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT });
1496 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1499 let revoked_htlc_success_fee = chan_feerate * revoked_htlc_success.weight().to_wu() / 1000;
1501 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1503 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 2);
1505 let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
1506 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1507 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1508 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
1514 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1515 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
1516 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
1517 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
1519 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1520 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1521 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1523 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1524 let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1526 let revoked_to_self_claim = {
1527 let mut as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1528 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1530 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1531 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 4); // Separate to_remote claim
1532 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1533 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
1534 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1535 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
1536 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1537 Some(as_commitment_claim_txn.remove(0))
1539 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1540 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1541 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1542 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
1543 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1548 // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1549 // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1550 // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1551 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1552 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1553 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1554 let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1555 // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1556 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1557 confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1558 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1559 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1560 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1561 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1562 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1563 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1564 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1566 assert_eq!(as_balances,
1567 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1569 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
1570 let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1571 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1572 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1573 check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
1574 // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked outputs (which no longer includes the
1575 // spent HTLC output)
1576 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1577 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1579 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1581 check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1583 assert_eq!(as_balances,
1584 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1586 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1587 let as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee = chan_feerate * as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight().to_wu() / 1000;
1589 // With anchors, B can pay for revoked_htlc_success's fee with additional inputs, rather
1590 // than with the HTLC itself.
1591 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1592 3_000 - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
1594 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1595 3_000 - revoked_htlc_success_fee - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
1598 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1599 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1600 // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1601 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1602 confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1603 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1604 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1605 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1606 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1607 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1608 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1609 amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1610 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1612 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1614 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1615 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], false);
1616 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1617 // to_self output to B
1618 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1619 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1620 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1621 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1622 amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1623 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1625 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1627 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1628 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0], false);
1629 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1630 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1631 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1632 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1633 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1635 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1637 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1638 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1639 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1640 // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1641 let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1642 for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1643 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1646 // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1648 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1649 let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1650 for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1651 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1654 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
1655 let (revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, revoked_to_self_claim) = {
1656 let mut as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1657 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1659 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1660 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1661 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1662 (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), revoked_to_self_claim.unwrap())
1664 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1665 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1666 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1667 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), 1);
1668 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1669 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1670 (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0))
1674 // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1675 // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1676 // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1677 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1678 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1679 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1680 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1681 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1682 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1684 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1686 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim);
1687 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1688 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1689 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1690 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1691 amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value,
1692 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1694 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1696 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim);
1697 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1698 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1699 amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.output[0].value,
1700 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1701 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1702 amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value,
1703 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1705 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1707 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1708 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, false);
1709 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1710 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim, false);
1712 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1714 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1715 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1716 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1717 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1718 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1719 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1720 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1724 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1725 do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(false);
1726 do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(true);
1729 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(anchors: bool) {
1730 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1731 // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1732 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1733 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1734 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1735 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1736 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1737 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1738 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1739 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1741 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1742 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1744 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1745 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1747 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1749 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
1750 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1751 output: vec![TxOut {
1752 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1753 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1756 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1758 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1759 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1760 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1761 assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
1763 // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1764 // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1765 // revocation-claim transaction.
1767 let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1768 let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1770 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1772 // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1773 // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1774 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1775 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1777 // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1778 let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1780 assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1781 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1783 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1786 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1787 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1790 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1793 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1794 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1796 let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1797 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1798 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1800 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1801 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1803 let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1805 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1806 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1807 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1808 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1809 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1810 payment_hash: revoked_payment_hash,
1811 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1812 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1813 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1814 payment_hash: claimed_payment_hash,
1816 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1818 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1819 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1820 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1821 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1823 let mut claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1824 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1825 let revoked_to_self_claim = if anchors {
1826 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1827 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 5); // Separate to_remote claim
1828 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1829 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
1830 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1831 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
1832 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1833 Some(claim_txn.remove(0))
1835 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1836 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1837 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1838 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
1839 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1843 let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1845 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1846 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1847 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1848 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1849 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1850 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1851 confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1852 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1853 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1854 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1855 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1856 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1857 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1858 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1860 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1862 // Confirm A's HTLC-Success transaction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1865 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1866 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1867 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1868 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
1869 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
1871 let htlc_success_claim = if anchors {
1872 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1873 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1874 check_spends!(txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1877 as_revoked_txn[1].clone()
1879 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_claim);
1880 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage, None, true, false);
1882 let mut claim_txn_2 = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1883 // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1884 // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1885 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1887 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1);
1888 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1889 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], &htlc_success_claim);
1890 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1891 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1892 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1894 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1);
1895 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1896 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1897 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 2);
1898 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1899 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 1);
1900 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1903 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1904 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1905 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1906 confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1907 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1908 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1909 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1910 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1911 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1912 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1913 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1914 // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1915 // anyway, so its not a big change.
1916 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1918 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1920 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1921 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1923 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1924 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1925 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1926 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1927 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1928 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1929 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1930 // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1931 // anyway, so its not a big change.
1932 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1934 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1936 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1937 let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1939 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1940 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1941 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1942 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1943 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1944 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1945 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
1946 confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1948 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1950 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1951 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0], false);
1953 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1954 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1955 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1956 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1957 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1959 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1962 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&claim_txn_2[1], revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap()]);
1964 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1966 let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1969 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1970 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1971 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1972 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1973 amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap().output[0].value,
1974 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1976 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1978 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1979 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1980 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1982 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1985 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1987 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1988 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1990 let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1991 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1992 for (i, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
1993 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = event {
1994 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
1995 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
1996 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
1997 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()
1999 check_spends!(spend_tx, if i == 0 { &claim_txn_2[1] } else { revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap() });
2000 } else { panic!(); }
2003 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1], false);
2005 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
2007 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
2008 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
2009 // monitor events or claimable balances.
2010 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
2011 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
2012 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2013 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
2017 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
2018 do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(false);
2019 do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(true);
2022 fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
2023 // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
2024 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2025 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2027 let new_chain_monitor;
2029 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2030 let node_deserialized;
2032 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2034 // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
2035 // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
2036 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
2037 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
2039 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2040 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2041 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2042 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
2043 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2045 let commitment_tx = {
2046 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2047 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2048 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
2049 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2053 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2054 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2055 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2056 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2057 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid());
2060 // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
2061 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
2062 let htlc_timeout_tx = {
2063 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2064 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2065 check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
2069 // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
2070 // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
2071 if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
2072 let serialized_monitor = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(
2073 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2075 reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2078 // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
2079 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
2080 if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
2081 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2084 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2085 if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
2086 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
2088 assert!(txn.len() < 6);
2091 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
2092 assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
2093 assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
2094 assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
2100 fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
2101 do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
2102 do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
2105 fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) {
2106 // Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every
2107 // `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call.
2108 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2109 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2110 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
2112 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2113 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2115 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
2116 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2118 let (_, _, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
2119 &nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 500_000_000
2121 const HTLC_AMT_MSAT: u64 = 1_000_000;
2122 const HTLC_AMT_SAT: u64 = HTLC_AMT_MSAT / 1000;
2123 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_AMT_MSAT);
2125 let htlc_expiry = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1;
2127 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(&nodes[0], &chan_id);
2128 assert_eq!(commitment_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 /* commitment tx only */} else { 2 /* commitment and htlc timeout tx */ });
2129 check_spends!(&commitment_txn[0], &funding_tx);
2130 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_txn[0]);
2131 check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
2132 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed,
2133 false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
2134 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2136 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2138 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2139 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2140 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` on anchors
2141 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2142 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2145 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2147 // Set up a helper closure we'll use throughout our test. We should only expect retries without
2148 // bumps if fees have not increased after a block has been connected (assuming the height timer
2149 // re-evaluates at every block) or after `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` is called.
2150 let mut prev_htlc_tx_feerate = None;
2151 let mut check_htlc_retry = |should_retry: bool, should_bump: bool| -> Option<Transaction> {
2152 let (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) = if anchors {
2153 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
2154 let events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2155 assert_eq!(events.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
2160 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2161 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2162 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2163 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2164 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2165 check_spends!(&htlc_tx, &commitment_txn[0], &coinbase_tx);
2166 let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value -
2167 htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>();
2168 let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight().to_wu();
2169 (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
2171 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2174 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2175 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2176 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
2180 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2181 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]);
2182 let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value;
2183 let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight().to_wu();
2184 (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
2187 assert!(htlc_tx_feerate > prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take().unwrap());
2188 } else if let Some(prev_feerate) = prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take() {
2189 assert_eq!(htlc_tx_feerate, prev_feerate);
2191 prev_htlc_tx_feerate = Some(htlc_tx_feerate);
2195 // Connect blocks up to one before the HTLC expires. This should not result in a claim/retry.
2196 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_expiry - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
2197 check_htlc_retry(false, false);
2199 // Connect one more block, producing our first claim.
2200 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2201 check_htlc_retry(true, false);
2203 // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
2204 // transactions pre-anchors.
2205 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2206 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2208 // Trigger a call and we should have another retry, but without a bump.
2209 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2210 check_htlc_retry(true, false);
2212 // Double the feerate and trigger a call, expecting a fee-bumped retry.
2213 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2214 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2215 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2217 // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
2218 // transactions pre-anchors.
2219 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2220 let htlc_tx = check_htlc_retry(true, anchors).unwrap();
2222 // Mine the HTLC transaction to ensure we don't retry claims while they're confirmed.
2223 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_tx);
2224 // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transactions,
2225 // we'll receive an extra bumped claim.
2226 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2227 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2228 nodes[0].wallet_source.remove_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 1 });
2229 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2231 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2232 check_htlc_retry(false, false);
2236 fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() {
2237 do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false);
2238 do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true);
2242 fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
2243 // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
2244 // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
2245 // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
2246 // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
2247 // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
2248 // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
2249 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2250 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2251 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
2252 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2253 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2254 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2255 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2256 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2258 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
2259 &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
2261 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
2262 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000);
2264 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2265 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2267 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2269 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2270 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
2272 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2274 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2275 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2276 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2279 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
2280 &payment_hash_2, &payment_preimage_2, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
2281 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
2283 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
2284 &payment_hash_1, &payment_preimage_1, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2285 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2288 let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2289 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
2290 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
2291 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2292 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2294 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2295 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2296 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2297 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2298 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2301 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2302 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2303 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2304 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2305 let anchor_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2306 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2307 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2308 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2309 (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
2311 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2314 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[2].value, 1_000); // HTLC A -> B
2315 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[3].value, 2_000); // HTLC B -> A
2317 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2319 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2323 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2324 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
2326 let htlc_preimage_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2327 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
2328 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
2329 check_spends!(htlc_preimage_tx, commitment_tx);
2331 let htlc_timeout_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2332 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
2333 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
2334 check_spends!(htlc_timeout_tx, commitment_tx);
2336 if let Some(commitment_tx) = txn.pop() {
2337 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2341 let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2342 // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2343 // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2344 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2345 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2346 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
2347 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2349 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2);
2351 let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2352 for event in holder_events {
2354 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2355 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2356 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2357 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2358 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2359 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx, anchor_tx);
2360 htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
2362 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2366 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
2367 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2369 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2371 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
2373 let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2374 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2375 for event in holder_events {
2377 Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
2378 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2382 // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
2383 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2384 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2385 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2386 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2390 fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
2391 // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
2392 // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
2393 // revoked commitment.
2394 let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2395 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2396 // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
2397 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2398 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2400 let bob_chain_monitor;
2402 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
2403 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2404 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2405 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2406 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2407 let bob_deserialized;
2409 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2411 let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2412 let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2414 // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
2415 let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
2417 // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
2418 let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2419 let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2420 let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2421 let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2423 // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
2424 // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
2426 let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
2427 let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
2429 // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
2430 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
2431 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
2432 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
2433 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
2435 // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
2437 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2438 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2440 // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
2442 nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
2443 bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
2445 for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
2446 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
2447 for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
2448 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
2449 &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2450 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2455 // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
2456 // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
2457 // the HTLCs still pending.
2458 *nodes[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2459 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
2460 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
2461 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2463 // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
2464 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2465 let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2466 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2467 let mut revoked_commitment_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2468 let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2469 for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
2470 let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat() * (idx + 1) as u64;
2471 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2473 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2474 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2475 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2477 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2480 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, utxo_value);
2482 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event),
2483 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2485 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2486 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2487 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2488 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
2489 check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
2491 check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
2493 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]);
2494 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2496 revoked_commitment_txs.push(commitment_tx.clone());
2497 anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone());
2500 for node in &nodes {
2501 mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_txs[0], &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_txs[1], &anchor_txs[1]]);
2503 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
2504 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
2505 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2507 // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
2510 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2511 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
2513 let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_txs[0].txid() {
2514 (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] })
2516 (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] })
2519 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2520 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
2521 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_txs[0]);
2522 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2523 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
2524 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_txs[1]);
2527 // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
2528 // through the success path.
2529 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2530 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2531 // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2532 // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2533 match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
2534 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
2535 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
2536 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
2537 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2538 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
2539 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2542 _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
2545 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
2546 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
2547 let fee_utxo_script = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2548 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2550 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2551 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2552 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
2553 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2554 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
2557 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
2559 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2560 input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
2561 previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2562 ..Default::default()
2564 output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
2565 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
2566 script_pubkey: ScriptBuf::new_op_return(&[]),
2569 let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
2570 for event in events {
2571 // We don't use the `BumpTransactionEventHandler` here because it does not support
2572 // creating one transaction from multiple `HTLCResolution` events.
2573 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
2574 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
2575 for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
2576 assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
2577 htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
2578 htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&secp));
2580 descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
2581 htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
2583 panic!("Unexpected event");
2586 for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
2587 let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
2588 let signer = htlc_descriptor.derive_channel_signer(&nodes[1].keys_manager);
2589 let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
2590 let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&secp);
2591 htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
2593 let fee_utxo_sig = {
2594 let witness_script = ScriptBuf::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
2595 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
2596 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2598 let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2599 let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2600 sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2603 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_slice(&[fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2604 check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_txs[0], revoked_commitment_txs[1]);
2608 for node in &nodes {
2609 mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
2612 // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
2613 // the second level instead.
2614 let revoked_claim_transactions = {
2615 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2616 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2618 let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
2619 tx.input.len() == 2 &&
2620 tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2621 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
2622 ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2623 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
2624 for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
2625 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
2628 let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = new_hash_map();
2629 for current_tx in txn.into_iter() {
2630 revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx);
2632 revoked_claim_transaction_map
2634 for node in &nodes {
2635 mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claim_transactions.values().collect::<Vec<_>>());
2639 // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
2641 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2642 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
2644 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2645 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2647 // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2648 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2649 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2651 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2652 let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2653 assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4);
2654 for event in spendable_output_events {
2655 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event {
2656 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2657 assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap()));
2658 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2659 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), ScriptBuf::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
2662 if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(_) = &outputs[0] {
2663 check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_txs[1]);
2665 check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
2668 panic!("unexpected event");
2672 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2673 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2674 // On the Alice side, the individual to_self_claim are still pending confirmation.
2675 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 2);
2676 // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
2677 // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
2678 // balances to claim.
2680 // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
2681 // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
2682 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);
2685 fn do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(confirm_commitment_before_reload: bool) {
2686 // Tests that we'll fix a ChannelMonitor's `counterparty_payment_script` for an anchor outputs
2687 // channel upon deserialization.
2688 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2689 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2692 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2693 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2694 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2695 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2696 let node_deserialized;
2697 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2699 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
2701 // Set the monitor's `counterparty_payment_script` to a dummy P2WPKH script.
2702 let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2703 let privkey = bitcoin::PrivateKey::from_slice(&[1; 32], bitcoin::Network::Testnet).unwrap();
2704 let pubkey = bitcoin::PublicKey::from_private_key(&secp, &privkey);
2705 let p2wpkh_script = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wpkh(&pubkey.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2706 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).set_counterparty_payment_script(p2wpkh_script.clone());
2707 assert_eq!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script(), p2wpkh_script);
2709 // Confirm the counterparty's commitment and reload the monitor (either before or after) such
2710 // that we arrive at the correct `counterparty_payment_script` after the reload.
2711 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2712 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2713 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2714 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
2715 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2717 let commitment_tx = {
2718 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2719 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2720 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 4);
2721 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2725 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2726 let commitment_tx_conf_height = if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2727 // We should expect our round trip serialization check to fail as we're writing the monitor
2728 // with the incorrect P2WPKH script but reading it with the correct P2WSH script.
2729 *nodes[1].chain_monitor.expect_monitor_round_trip_fail.lock().unwrap() = Some(chan_id);
2730 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2731 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2732 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2733 commitment_tx_conf_height
2735 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2736 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2737 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2738 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2739 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
2740 commitment_tx_conf_height
2742 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2743 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2744 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script().is_v0_p2wsh());
2746 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2747 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2749 if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2750 // If we saw the commitment before our `counterparty_payment_script` was fixed, we'll never
2751 // get the spendable output event for the `to_remote` output, so we'll need to get it
2752 // manually via `get_spendable_outputs`.
2753 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2754 let outputs = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height);
2755 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2756 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2757 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
2760 check_spends!(spend_tx, &commitment_tx);
2762 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx, false);
2767 fn test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload() {
2768 do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(false);
2769 do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(true);
2772 #[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
2773 fn do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(anchors: bool, confirm_counterparty_commitment: bool) {
2774 // Tests that our monitor claims will always use fresh random signatures (ensuring a unique
2775 // wtxid) to prevent certain classes of transaction replacement at the bitcoin P2P layer.
2776 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2777 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2778 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2780 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2781 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2783 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2784 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2786 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2788 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2789 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2792 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2793 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2798 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2801 // Open a channel and route a payment. We'll let it timeout to claim it.
2802 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
2803 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
2805 let (closing_node, other_node) = if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2806 (&nodes[1], &nodes[0])
2808 (&nodes[0], &nodes[1])
2811 get_monitor!(closing_node, chan_id).broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(
2812 &closing_node.tx_broadcaster, &closing_node.fee_estimator, &closing_node.logger
2815 // The commitment transaction comes first.
2816 let commitment_tx = {
2817 let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2818 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2819 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2823 mine_transaction(closing_node, &commitment_tx);
2824 check_added_monitors!(closing_node, 1);
2825 check_closed_broadcast!(closing_node, true);
2826 check_closed_event!(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
2828 mine_transaction(other_node, &commitment_tx);
2829 check_added_monitors!(other_node, 1);
2830 check_closed_broadcast!(other_node, true);
2831 check_closed_event!(other_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [closing_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
2833 // If we update the best block to the new height before providing the confirmed transactions,
2834 // we'll see another broadcast of the commitment transaction.
2835 if !confirm_counterparty_commitment && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2836 let _ = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2839 // Then comes the HTLC timeout transaction.
2840 if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2841 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 5);
2842 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
2843 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
2845 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
2847 if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2848 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
2850 let htlc_timeout_tx = {
2851 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2852 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2853 let tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2854 check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
2858 // Check we rebroadcast it with a different wtxid.
2859 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2860 if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2861 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
2864 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2865 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2866 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), htlc_timeout_tx.txid());
2867 assert_ne!(txn[0].wtxid(), htlc_timeout_tx.wtxid());
2871 #[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
2873 fn test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures() {
2874 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, false);
2875 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, true);
2876 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, false);
2877 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, true);
2881 fn test_event_replay_causing_monitor_replay() {
2882 // In LDK 0.0.121 there was a bug where if a `PaymentSent` event caused an RAA
2883 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` hold and then the node was restarted after the `PaymentSent` event
2884 // and `ChannelMonitorUpdate` both completed but without persisting the `ChannelManager` we'd
2885 // replay the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` on restart (which is fine, but triggered a safety panic).
2886 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2887 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2889 let new_chain_monitor;
2890 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2891 let node_deserialized;
2892 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2894 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
2896 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000).0;
2898 do_claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1]]], false, payment_preimage);
2900 // At this point the `PaymentSent` event has not been processed but the full commitment signed
2901 // dance has completed.
2902 let serialized_channel_manager = nodes[0].node.encode();
2904 // Now process the `PaymentSent` to get the final RAA `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, checking that it
2905 // resulted in a `ChannelManager` persistence request.
2906 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_needs_persistence();
2907 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, true /* expected post-event monitor update*/);
2908 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_needs_persistence());
2910 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).encode();
2911 reload_node!(nodes[0], &serialized_channel_manager, &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2913 // Expect the `PaymentSent` to get replayed, this time without the duplicate monitor update
2914 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false /* expected post-event monitor update*/);