_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
  11
  12 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
  13 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance};
  14 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  15 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight};
  16 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
  17 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
  18 use crate::ln::channel;
  19 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
  20 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
  21 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
  22 use crate::util::crypto::sign;
  23 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
  24 use crate::util::scid_utils::block_from_scid;
  25 use crate::util::test_utils;
  26
  27 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
  28 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  29 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
  31 use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, Script, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime, Witness};
  32 use bitcoin::util::sighash::SighashCache;
  33
  34 use crate::prelude::*;
  35
  36 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  37
  38 #[test]
  39 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
  40         // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
  41         // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
  42         // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
  43         // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
  44         // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
  45         // HTLC.
  46         //
  47         // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
  48         //
  49         // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
  50         // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
  51         //
  52         // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
  53         // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
  54         // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
  55         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
  56         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
  57         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
  58         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  59
  60         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
  61         let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
  62
  63         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
  64         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
  65                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
  66         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
  67
  68         let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
  69
  70         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  71         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
  72         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
  73
  74         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  75         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
  76         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  77
  78         // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
  79         // transaction for nodes[1].
  80         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
  81         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  82         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
  83         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
  84         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
  85
  86         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
  87         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
  88         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  89         let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
  90
  91         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
  92         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
  93         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
  94 }
  95
  96 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
  97         let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
  98         assert_eq!(spendable.len(), 1);
  99         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 100                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 101                 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 102                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 103                 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
 104                 outputs
 105         } else { panic!(); }
 106 }
 107
 108 #[test]
 109 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
 110         // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
 111         // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
 112         // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
 113         // confirmations.
 114         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 115         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 116         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 117         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 118
 119         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
 120
 121         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
 122
 123         // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
 124         // before forwarding.
 125         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
 126         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
 127
 128         // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
 129         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
 130
 131         // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
 132         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
 133         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 134         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 135         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 136
 137         let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 138         assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
 139         check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
 140
 141         // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
 142         // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
 143         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 144         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 145         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 146
 147         // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
 148         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
 149         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 150         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 151
 152         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 153         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
 154 }
 155
 156 #[test]
 157 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
 158         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
 159         // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
 160         // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
 161         // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
 162         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 163         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 164         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 165         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 166
 167         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 168                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 169         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 170         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 171
 172         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 173         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 174
 175         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 176                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000
 177                 }],
 178                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 179         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
 180                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 181
 182         nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 183         let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 184         nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
 185         let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 186         nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
 187
 188         let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 189         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
 190         let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 191         nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
 192         let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 193         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
 194         let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 195         assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
 196
 197         let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 198         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
 199         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
 200
 201         let shutdown_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]));
 202         let shutdown_tx_conf_height_b = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]));
 203
 204         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 205         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 206
 207         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 208         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 209
 210         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 211                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000,
 212                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 213                 }],
 214                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 215         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 216                         amount_satoshis: 1000,
 217                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 218                 }],
 219                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 220
 221         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 222         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 223
 224         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
 225                 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
 226         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id)
 227                 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b).is_empty());
 228
 229         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 230         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
 231
 232         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 233                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 234         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 235                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 236
 237         let spendable_outputs_a = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 238         assert_eq!(
 239                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a),
 240                 spendable_outputs_a
 241         );
 242
 243         let spendable_outputs_b = test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 244         assert_eq!(
 245                 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b),
 246                 spendable_outputs_b
 247         );
 248
 249         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 250         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 251 }
 252
 253 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
 254         v.sort_unstable();
 255         v
 256 }
 257
 258 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
 259 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
 260 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
 261 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
 262         let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 263         let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 264         eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
 265         assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
 266         assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
 267 }
 268
 269 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
 270         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
 271         // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
 272         // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
 273         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 274         if prev_commitment_tx {
 275                 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 276                 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 277                 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 278                 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
 279                 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
 280         }
 281         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 282         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 283         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 284
 285         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 286                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 287         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 288         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 289
 290         // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
 291         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
 292         // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
 293         // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
 294         let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
 295         // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
 296         let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
 297
 298         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 299
 300         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 301         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 302
 303         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
 304         let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 305                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 306                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 307                 payment_hash,
 308         };
 309         let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 310                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 311                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 312                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 313         };
 314         let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 315                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 316                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 317                 payment_hash,
 318         };
 319         let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 320                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 321                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 322                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 323         };
 324         let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 325                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 326                 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 327                 payment_hash,
 328                 payment_preimage,
 329         };
 330         let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 331                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 332                 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 333                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 334                 payment_preimage: timeout_payment_preimage,
 335         };
 336
 337         // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
 338         // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
 339         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 340                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 341                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 342                 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 343                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 344         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 345                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 346                 }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 347                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 348
 349         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
 350         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 351         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
 352
 353         let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 354         // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
 355         // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
 356         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
 357         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 358         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
 359
 360         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
 361         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 362         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
 363
 364         if prev_commitment_tx {
 365                 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
 366                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
 367                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
 368                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
 369                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 370                 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 371                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
 372                 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 373                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 374                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
 375                 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 376                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 377         }
 378
 379         // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
 380         // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
 381         let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 382                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
 383                                 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
 384                                 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
 385                                 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
 386                                 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
 387                                 // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
 388                                 chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) +
 389                                                                 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
 390                                                                 channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 391                 }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
 392         if !prev_commitment_tx {
 393                 a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
 394         }
 395         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
 396                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 397         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 398                         amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
 399                 }],
 400                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 401
 402         // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
 403         // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
 404         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 405         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 406         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 407
 408         let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 409         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 410         // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
 411         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 412         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 413         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 414         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 415         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 416         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 417
 418         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 419         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 420         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 421         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 422         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 423         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 424         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 425         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 426         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 427         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 428
 429         // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
 430         // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
 431         // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
 432         // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
 433         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 434         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 435
 436         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 437                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 438                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 439                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 440                 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 441                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 442         // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
 443         // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
 444         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 445                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 446                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 447                 },
 448                 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
 449                 // long.
 450                 received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 451                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 452
 453         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 454         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
 455         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 456
 457         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
 458         // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
 459         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 460                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 461         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 462                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 463                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 464                 }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 465                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 466
 467         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 468         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 469
 470         // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
 471         // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
 472         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 473         if prev_commitment_tx {
 474                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
 475         } else {
 476                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, false);
 477         }
 478         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 479                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 480         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 481         assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()],
 482                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 483
 484         // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
 485         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 486         let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 487         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 488         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 489         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 490         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 491         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 492         assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
 493                    a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
 494         // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
 495         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 496         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 497
 498         // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
 499         // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
 500         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 501         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 502         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 503                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 504                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 505                 }],
 506                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 507         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
 508         // balance entry.
 509         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 510         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 511                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 512         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
 513
 514         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 515
 516         // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
 517         // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
 518         // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
 519         let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 520         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 521
 522         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 523                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 524                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 525                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 526                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 527                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 528                 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 529                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 530
 531         // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
 532         // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
 533         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 534         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 535
 536         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 537                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 538                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 539                 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 540                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 541
 542         // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
 543         // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
 544         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 545         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 546
 547         assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
 548                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 549
 550         // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
 551         // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
 552         // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
 553         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 554         assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
 555                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 556         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 557         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 558                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 559
 560         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 561         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 562         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 563         for node in nodes.iter() {
 564                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 565                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 566                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 567                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 568         }
 569 }
 570
 571 #[test]
 572 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
 573         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
 574         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
 575 }
 576
 577 #[test]
 578 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
 579         // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
 580         // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
 581         // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
 582         // delay prior to spendability.
 583         //
 584         // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
 585         // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
 586         // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
 587         // claim by our counterparty).
 588         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 589         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 590         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 591         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 592
 593         // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
 594         // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
 595         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
 596         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 597
 598         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
 599         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 600         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
 601                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 602         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 603
 604         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 605         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 606         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 607
 608         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 609         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
 610
 611         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
 612         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
 613                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
 614         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 615
 616         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 617         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 618         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 619
 620         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 621         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
 622         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
 623         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 624         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 625         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
 626
 627         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 628         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 629
 630         // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions
 631         let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 632         assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 3);
 633         check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
 634         check_spends!(as_txn[2], as_txn[0]);
 635         check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
 636
 637         // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
 638         // claimable balances.
 639         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 640         let commitment_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]));
 641         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 642         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 643         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 644
 645         let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 646                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 647                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 648                 payment_hash,
 649         };
 650         let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 651                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 652                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 653                 payment_hash: payment_hash_2,
 654         };
 655
 656         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 657                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 658                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 659                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 660                 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 661                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 662
 663         // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
 664         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 665         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 666         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 667         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 668         let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 669         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
 670         check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]);
 671
 672         // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
 673         // transaction.
 674         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
 675         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 676                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 677                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 678                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 679                 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 680                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 681         assert_eq!(as_txn[1].lock_time.0, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1); // as_txn[1] can be included in the next block
 682
 683         // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
 684         // "awaiting confirmations" one.
 685         let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 686         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
 687         // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
 688         // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
 689         // call, as described, two hunks down.
 690         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 691                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 692                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 693                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 694                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 695                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 696                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 697                 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 698                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 699
 700         // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
 701         // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
 702         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
 703         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, true, false);
 704         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 705                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 706                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 707                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 708                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 709                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 710                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 711                 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 712                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 713
 714         // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
 715         // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
 716         // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
 717         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 718         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
 719
 720         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 721                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 722                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 723                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 724                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 725                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 726                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 727                 }]),
 728                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 729
 730         // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 731         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 732         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
 733         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
 734                 .get_spendable_outputs(&as_txn[0], commitment_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
 735         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 736         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 737                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 738                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 739                 }],
 740                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 741         let to_self_spendable_output = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 742         assert_eq!(
 743                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&as_txn[0], commitment_tx_conf_height_a),
 744                 to_self_spendable_output
 745         );
 746
 747         // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 748         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 749         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 750         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 751         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
 752
 753         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 754         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 755         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 756         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 757         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 758         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 759         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 760 }
 761
 762 #[test]
 763 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
 764         // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
 765         // have a preimage.
 766         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 767         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 768         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 769         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 770
 771         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
 772         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 773
 774         // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
 775         let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
 776         let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
 777         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 778
 779         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 780         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 781
 782         let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 783                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 784                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 785                 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
 786         };
 787         let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 788                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 789                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 790                 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
 791         };
 792         let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 793                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 794                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 795                 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
 796         };
 797         let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 798                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 799                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 800                 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
 801         };
 802
 803         // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
 804         // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
 805         // HTLC output is spent.
 806
 807         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 808                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 809                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 810                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
 811                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 812
 813         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 814                         amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
 815                 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
 816                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 817
 818         // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
 819         let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 820         assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
 821         check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
 822         check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
 823
 824         // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
 825         // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
 826         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 827         let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 828                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 829                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 830                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 831                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
 832
 833         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 834         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
 835         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 836         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 837         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 838
 839         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 840                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 841
 842         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 843         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 844         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 845         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 846
 847         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
 848         let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 849                         amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
 850                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 851                 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
 852         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 853                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 854
 855         // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
 856         // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
 857         // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
 858         // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
 859
 860         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
 861         let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 862         assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
 863         check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
 864         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
 865                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
 866
 867         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 868                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 869
 870         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 871         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 872                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 873
 874         // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
 875         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 876         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 877         bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
 878
 879         // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
 880         nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
 881         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1));
 882         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
 883                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
 884         let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 885         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
 886         check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
 887
 888         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 889                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 890
 891         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
 892         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 893                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 894
 895         // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
 896         // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
 897         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 898         let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
 899         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 900                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 901                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 902                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 903                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 904                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 905                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
 906                 }]),
 907                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 908
 909         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 910         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 911                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 912                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 913                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 914                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 915                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 916                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
 917                 }]),
 918                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 919
 920         // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
 921         // payment failure event.
 922         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 923         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
 924
 925         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 926         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 927                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 928                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 929                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 930                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 931                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 932                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
 933                 }]),
 934                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 935
 936         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 937         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 938                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 939                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
 940                 }],
 941                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 942         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 943
 944         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 945         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 946         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 947
 948         // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
 949         // was already claimed.
 950         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 951         let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
 952         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 953                         amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 954                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
 955                 }]),
 956                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 957
 958         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 959         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 960                         amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 961                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
 962                 }]),
 963                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 964
 965         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 966         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
 967
 968         assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
 969                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 970         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 971
 972         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
 973         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 974
 975         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 976         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 977         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 978         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
 979         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
 980         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 981         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 982 }
 983
 984 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
 985         let mut v = v_orig.clone();
 986         for t in extra_ts {
 987                 v.push((*t).clone());
 988         }
 989         v.sort_unstable();
 990         v
 991 }
 992
 993 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
 994         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
 995         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 996         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 997         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 998         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 999         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1000         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1001         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1002         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1003         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1004
1005         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1006                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1007         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1008         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1009
1010         // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
1011         //
1012         // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
1013         // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
1014         // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
1015         // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
1016         // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
1017         //     later commitment transaction updates
1018         //
1019         // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
1020         // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
1021         // HTLCs individually.
1022
1023         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
1024         let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1025         let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1026
1027         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1028
1029         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1030         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1031
1032         let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1033         let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1034
1035         // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1036         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1037         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1038
1039         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1040
1041         let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1042         let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1043
1044         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1045         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1046         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1047         let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1048
1049         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1050         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1051         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1052
1053         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1054         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1055         let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1056                 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1057                 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1058         events.retain(|ev| {
1059                 match ev {
1060                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1061                                 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1062                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1063                                 false
1064                         },
1065                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1066                                 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1067                                 false
1068                         },
1069                         _ => true,
1070                 }
1071         });
1072         assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1073         if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1074         match &events[1] {
1075                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, .. } => {},
1076                 _ => panic!(),
1077         }
1078
1079         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1080         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1081         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1082         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1083
1084         // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1085         // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1086         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1087                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1088                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1089                         amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1090                         claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1091                         payment_hash: missing_htlc_payment_hash,
1092                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1093                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1094                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1095                         payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
1096                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1097                         amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1098                         claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1099                         payment_hash: live_payment_hash,
1100                 }]),
1101                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1102
1103         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1104         let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1105         // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1106         // quite soon.
1107         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1108         claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
1109
1110         // The following constants were determined experimentally
1111         const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 483;
1112         const OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 571;
1113         const INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 578;
1114
1115         // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1116         // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1117         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1118         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1119         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1120         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1121
1122         // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1123         // claim balances separated out.
1124         let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1125                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1126                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1127                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1128                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1129                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1130                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1131                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1132                 }];
1133
1134         let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1135                 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1136                         (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1137         };
1138         let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1139         let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1140                 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1141         };
1142         let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1143
1144         // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1145         // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1146         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1147                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1148
1149         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1150                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1151                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1152                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1153         } else {
1154                 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1155                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1156                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1157                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1158         }
1159
1160         let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1161                 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1162                 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1163         };
1164         let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1165                 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1166                         (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1167                         - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1168                 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1169         };
1170
1171         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1172                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1173                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1174         } else {
1175                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1176                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1177         }
1178
1179         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1180                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1181         } else {
1182                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1183         }
1184         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1185                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1186
1187         // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1188         // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1189         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1190         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1191
1192         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1193                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1194                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1195                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1196                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1197                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1198                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1199                                 - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1200                         confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1201                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1202                         amount_satoshis: 3_000 - chan_feerate * OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1203                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1204                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1205                         amount_satoshis: 4_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1206                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1207                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1208                         amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1209                         confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1210                 }]),
1211                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1212
1213         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1214         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1215
1216         let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1217         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
1218                 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1219         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
1220                 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1221
1222         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1223         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }]);
1224         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1225         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }]);
1226         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1227         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1228         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1229         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1230         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1231         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1232         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1233
1234         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1235         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1236         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1237         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1238         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1239         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1240         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1241 }
1242
1243 #[test]
1244 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1245         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true);
1246         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false);
1247 }
1248
1249 #[test]
1250 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1251         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1252         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1253         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1254         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1255         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1256         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1257
1258         // Create some initial channels
1259         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1260                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 11_000_000);
1261         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1262         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1263
1264         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1265         let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1266         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1267         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1268         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1269
1270         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs and an output for both sides
1271         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
1272
1273         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1274
1275         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1276         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1277
1278         // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1279         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1280         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1281         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1282         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1283         let revoked_htlc_success = {
1284                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1285                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1286                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1287                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
1288                 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1289                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1290         };
1291
1292         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1293         let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
1294                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1295                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1296                 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
1297                         txn.remove(1)
1298                 } else {
1299                         txn.remove(0)
1300                 }
1301         };
1302         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1303         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
1304         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time.0, 0);
1305         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0, 0);
1306
1307         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1308         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1309         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1310         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1311         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1312         let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1313
1314         let as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1315         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), 1);
1316         check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1317
1318         // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1319         // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1320         // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1321         let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1322                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1323                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1324                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1325                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1326                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1327                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1328                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1329                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1330                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1331                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1332                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1333                 }]);
1334         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1335                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1336
1337         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
1338         let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1339         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1340         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
1341         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]); // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked
1342                                                                   // outputs (which no longer includes the spent HTLC output)
1343
1344         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1345                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1346
1347         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1348         fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1349                 3_000 - chan_feerate * (revoked_htlc_success.weight() + as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight()) as u64 / 1000);
1350
1351         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1352         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1353                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1354                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1355                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1356                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1357                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1358                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1359                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1360                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1361                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1362                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1363                         amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1364                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1365                 }]),
1366                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1367
1368         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1369         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1370         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1371                         // to_self output to B
1372                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1373                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1374                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1375                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1376                         amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1377                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1378                 }]),
1379                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1380
1381         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1382         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1383         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1384                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1385                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1386                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1387                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1388                 }]),
1389                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1390
1391         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1392         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1393                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1394         // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1395         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1396         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1397                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1398         }
1399
1400         // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1401         // claiming.
1402         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1403         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1404         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1405                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1406         }
1407
1408         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
1409         let as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1410         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1411
1412         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1413         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1414
1415         // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1416         // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1417         // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1418         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1419         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1420                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1421                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1422                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1423                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1424                 }]),
1425                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1426
1427         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1428         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1429                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1430                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1431                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1432                         amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1433                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1434                 }]),
1435                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1436
1437         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
1438         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1439                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1440                         amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].output[0].value,
1441                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1442                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1443                         amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1444                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1445                 }]),
1446                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1447
1448         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1449         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1450         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1451         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
1452
1453         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1454
1455         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1456         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1457         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1458         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1459         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1460         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1461         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1462 }
1463
1464 #[test]
1465 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
1466         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1467         // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1468         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1469         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1470         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1471         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1472         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1473         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1474         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1475         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1476         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1477
1478         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1479                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1480         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1481         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1482
1483         // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1484         // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1485         // revocation-claim transaction.
1486
1487         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1488         let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1489
1490         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1491
1492         // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1493         // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1494         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1495                 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1496
1497         // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1498         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1499
1500         assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), 2);
1501         check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1502         check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1503
1504         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1505         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1506
1507         {
1508                 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1509                 *feerate += 1;
1510         }
1511         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1512         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1513
1514         let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1515         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1516         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1517
1518         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1519         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1520         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1521         let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1522
1523         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1524                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1525                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1526                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1527                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1528                         payment_hash: revoked_payment_hash,
1529                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1530                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1531                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1532                         payment_hash: claimed_payment_hash,
1533                 }]),
1534                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1535
1536         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1537         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1538         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1539         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1540
1541         let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1542         // Currently the revoked commitment outputs are all claimed in one aggregated transaction
1543         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 1);
1544         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1545         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1546
1547         let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1548
1549         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1550                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1551                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1552                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1553                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1554                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1555                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1556                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1557                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1558                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1559                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1560                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1561                 }]),
1562                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1563
1564         // Confirm A's HTLC-Success tranasction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1565         // new claim.
1566         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[1]);
1567         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage, None, true, false);
1568         let mut claim_txn_2: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1569         claim_txn_2.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| if tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid()) { 0 } else { 1 });
1570         // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1571         // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1572         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1573         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 2);
1574         check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1575         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1576         check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1577
1578         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1579                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1580                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1581                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1582                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1583                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1584                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1585                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1586                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1587                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1588                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1589                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1590                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1591                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1592                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1593                 }]),
1594                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1595
1596         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1597         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1598
1599         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1600                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1601                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1602                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1603                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1604                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1605                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1606                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1607                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1608                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1609                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1610                 }]),
1611                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1612
1613         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1614         let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1615
1616         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1617                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1618                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1619                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1620                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1621                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1622                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1623                         amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1624                         confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1625                 }]),
1626                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1627
1628         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1629         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1630
1631         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1632                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1633                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1634                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1635                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1636                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1637                 }]),
1638                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1639
1640         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1641         let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1642
1643         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1644                         amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
1645                         confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1646                 }],
1647                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1648
1649         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1650
1651         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1652         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1653         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1654         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1655
1656         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1657         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1658         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1659         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1660         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1661         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1662         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1663 }
1664
1665 fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
1666         // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
1667         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1668         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1669         let persister;
1670         let new_chain_monitor;
1671
1672         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1673         let node_deserialized;
1674
1675         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1676
1677         // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
1678         // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
1679         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
1680         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
1681
1682         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
1683         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1684         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1685         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
1686                  [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1687
1688         let commitment_tx = {
1689                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1690                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1691                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
1692                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
1693                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1694         };
1695
1696         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
1697
1698         // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
1699         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1700         let htlc_timeout_tx = {
1701                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1702                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1703                 check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
1704                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1705         };
1706
1707         // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
1708         // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
1709         if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
1710                 let serialized_monitor = hex::decode(
1711 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1712                 ).unwrap();
1713                 reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
1714         }
1715
1716         // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
1717         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1718         if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
1719                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1720         }
1721         {
1722                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1723                 if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
1724                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
1725                 } else {
1726                         assert!(txn.len() < 6);
1727                 }
1728                 for tx in txn {
1729                         assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
1730                         assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
1731                         assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
1732                         assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
1733                 }
1734         }
1735 }
1736
1737 #[test]
1738 fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
1739         do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
1740         do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
1741 }
1742
1743 fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) {
1744         // Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every
1745         // `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call.
1746         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1747         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1748         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1749         if anchors {
1750                 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1751                 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1752         }
1753         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
1754         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1755
1756         let (_, _, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
1757                 &nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 500_000_000
1758         );
1759         const HTLC_AMT_MSAT: u64 = 1_000_000;
1760         const HTLC_AMT_SAT: u64 = HTLC_AMT_MSAT / 1000;
1761         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_AMT_MSAT);
1762
1763         let htlc_expiry = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1;
1764
1765         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(&nodes[0], &chan_id);
1766         assert_eq!(commitment_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 /* commitment tx only */} else { 2 /* commitment and htlc timeout tx */ });
1767         check_spends!(&commitment_txn[0], &funding_tx);
1768         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_txn[0]);
1769         check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
1770         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed,
1771                  false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1772         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1773
1774         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1775                 version: 2,
1776                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1777                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1778                 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` on anchors
1779                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1780                         script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1781                 }],
1782         };
1783         nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1784
1785         // Set up a helper closure we'll use throughout our test. We should only expect retries without
1786         // bumps if fees have not increased after a block has been connected (assuming the height timer
1787         // re-evaluates at every block) or after `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` is called.
1788         let mut prev_htlc_tx_feerate = None;
1789         let mut check_htlc_retry = |should_retry: bool, should_bump: bool| -> Option<Transaction> {
1790                 let (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) = if anchors {
1791                         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
1792                         let events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1793                         assert_eq!(events.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
1794                         if !should_retry {
1795                                 return None;
1796                         }
1797                         match &events[0] {
1798                                 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
1799                                         nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
1800                                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1801                                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1802                                         let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1803                                         check_spends!(&htlc_tx, &commitment_txn[0], &coinbase_tx);
1804                                         let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value -
1805                                                 htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>();
1806                                         let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
1807                                         (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
1808                                 }
1809                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1810                         }
1811                 } else {
1812                         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1813                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1814                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
1815                         if !should_retry {
1816                                 return None;
1817                         }
1818                         let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1819                         check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]);
1820                         let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value;
1821                         let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
1822                         (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
1823                 };
1824                 if should_bump {
1825                         assert!(htlc_tx_feerate > prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take().unwrap());
1826                 } else if let Some(prev_feerate) = prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take() {
1827                         assert_eq!(htlc_tx_feerate, prev_feerate);
1828                 }
1829                 prev_htlc_tx_feerate = Some(htlc_tx_feerate);
1830                 Some(htlc_tx)
1831         };
1832
1833         // Connect blocks up to one before the HTLC expires. This should not result in a claim/retry.
1834         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_expiry - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
1835         check_htlc_retry(false, false);
1836
1837         // Connect one more block, producing our first claim.
1838         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1839         check_htlc_retry(true, false);
1840
1841         // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
1842         // transactions pre-anchors.
1843         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1844         check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1845
1846         // Trigger a call and we should have another retry, but without a bump.
1847         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1848         check_htlc_retry(true, false);
1849
1850         // Double the feerate and trigger a call, expecting a fee-bumped retry.
1851         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
1852         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1853         check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1854
1855         // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
1856         // transactions pre-anchors.
1857         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1858         let htlc_tx = check_htlc_retry(true, anchors).unwrap();
1859
1860         // Mine the HTLC transaction to ensure we don't retry claims while they're confirmed.
1861         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_tx);
1862         // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transactions,
1863         // we'll receive an extra bumped claim.
1864         if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
1865                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1866                 nodes[0].wallet_source.remove_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 1 });
1867                 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1868         }
1869         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1870         check_htlc_retry(false, false);
1871 }
1872
1873 #[test]
1874 fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() {
1875         do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false);
1876         do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true);
1877 }
1878
1879 #[test]
1880 fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
1881         // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
1882         // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
1883         // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
1884         // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
1885         // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
1886         // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
1887         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1888         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1889         let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
1890         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
1891         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1892         anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1893         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
1894         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1895
1896         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
1897                 &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
1898         );
1899         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
1900         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000);
1901
1902         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1903         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1904
1905         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
1906
1907         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
1908         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
1909
1910         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
1911         {
1912                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1913                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1914                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
1915         }
1916
1917         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
1918                 &payment_hash_2, &payment_preimage_2, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
1919                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
1920         );
1921         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
1922                 &payment_hash_1, &payment_preimage_1, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
1923                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
1924         );
1925
1926         let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1927         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
1928         let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
1929                 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
1930                         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1931                                 version: 2,
1932                                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1933                                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1934                                 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
1935                                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1936                                         script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1937                                 }],
1938                         };
1939                         nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1940                         nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
1941                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1942                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1943                         let anchor_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1944                         let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1945                         check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
1946                         check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
1947                         (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
1948                 },
1949                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1950         };
1951
1952         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[2].value, 1_000); // HTLC A -> B
1953         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[3].value, 2_000); // HTLC B -> A
1954
1955         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
1956         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1957         mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
1958         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1959
1960         {
1961                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1962                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
1963
1964                 let htlc_preimage_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1965                 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1966                 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1967                 check_spends!(htlc_preimage_tx, commitment_tx);
1968
1969                 let htlc_timeout_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1970                 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1971                 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1972                 check_spends!(htlc_timeout_tx, commitment_tx);
1973
1974                 if let Some(commitment_tx) = txn.pop() {
1975                         check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
1976                 }
1977         }
1978
1979         let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1980         // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
1981         // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
1982         if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
1983                 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
1984                 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
1985                 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
1986         } else {
1987                 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2);
1988         }
1989         let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1990         for event in holder_events {
1991                 match event {
1992                         Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
1993                                 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
1994                                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1995                                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1996                                 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1997                                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx, anchor_tx);
1998                                 htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
1999                         },
2000                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2001                 }
2002         }
2003
2004         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
2005         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2006
2007         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2008
2009         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
2010
2011         let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2012         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2013         for event in holder_events {
2014                 match event {
2015                         Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
2016                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2017                 }
2018         }
2019
2020         // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
2021         nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2022         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2023         nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2024         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2025 }
2026
2027 #[test]
2028 fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
2029         // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
2030         // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
2031         // revoked commitment.
2032         let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2033         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2034         // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
2035         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2036         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2037         let bob_persister;
2038         let bob_chain_monitor;
2039
2040         let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
2041         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2042         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2043         anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2044         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2045         let bob_deserialized;
2046
2047         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2048
2049         let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2050         let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2051
2052         // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
2053         let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
2054
2055         // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
2056         let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2057         let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2058         let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2059         let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2060
2061         // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
2062         // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
2063         // present.
2064         let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
2065         let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
2066
2067         // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
2068         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
2069         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
2070         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
2071         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
2072
2073         // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
2074         // revoked state.
2075         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2076         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2077
2078         // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
2079         reload_node!(
2080                 nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
2081                 bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
2082         );
2083         for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
2084                 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
2085                 for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
2086                         monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
2087                                 &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2088                                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2089                         );
2090                 }
2091         }
2092
2093         // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
2094         // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
2095         // the HTLCs still pending.
2096         *nodes[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2097         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
2098         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
2099         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2100         let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = {
2101                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2102                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2103                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2104                 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2105                 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
2106                         check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
2107                         check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3);
2108                         (txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone())
2109                 } else {
2110                         check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3);
2111                         check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
2112                         (txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone())
2113                 }
2114         };
2115
2116         // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
2117         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2118         let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2119         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2120         let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2121         for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
2122                 let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat() * (idx + 1) as u64;
2123                 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2124                         version: 2,
2125                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2126                         input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2127                         output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2128                                 value: utxo_value,
2129                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2130                         }],
2131                 };
2132                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, utxo_value);
2133                 match event {
2134                         Event::BumpTransaction(event) => nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event),
2135                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2136                 };
2137                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2138                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2139                 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]);
2140                 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2141                 anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone());
2142         };
2143
2144         for node in &nodes {
2145                 mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_txs[1]]);
2146         }
2147         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
2148         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
2149         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2150
2151         // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
2152         // revoked outputs.
2153         {
2154                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2155                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
2156
2157                 let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() {
2158                         (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] })
2159                 } else {
2160                         (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] })
2161                 };
2162
2163                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2164                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
2165                 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
2166                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2167                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
2168                 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
2169         }
2170
2171         // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
2172         // through the success path.
2173         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2174         let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2175         // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2176         // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2177         match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
2178                 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
2179                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
2180                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
2181                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2182                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
2183                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2184
2185                 },
2186                 _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
2187         };
2188         let htlc_tx = {
2189                 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
2190                 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
2191                 let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2192                 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2193                         version: 2,
2194                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2195                         input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2196                         output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
2197                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2198                                 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
2199                         }],
2200                 };
2201                 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
2202                         version: 2,
2203                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2204                         input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
2205                                 previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2206                                 ..Default::default()
2207                         }],
2208                         output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
2209                                 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
2210                                 script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
2211                         }],
2212                 };
2213                 let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
2214                 for event in events {
2215                         // We don't use the `BumpTransactionEventHandler` here because it does not support
2216                         // creating one transaction from multiple `HTLCResolution` events.
2217                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
2218                                 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
2219                                 for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
2220                                         assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
2221                                         htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
2222                                         htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&secp));
2223                                 }
2224                                 descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
2225                                 htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
2226                         } else {
2227                                 panic!("Unexpected event");
2228                         }
2229                 }
2230                 for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
2231                         let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
2232                         let signer = htlc_descriptor.derive_channel_signer(&nodes[1].keys_manager);
2233                         let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
2234                         let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&secp);
2235                         htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
2236                 }
2237                 let fee_utxo_sig = {
2238                         let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
2239                         let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
2240                                 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2241                         ).unwrap()[..]);
2242                         let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2243                         let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2244                         sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2245                         sig
2246                 };
2247                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2248                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
2249                 htlc_tx
2250         };
2251
2252         for node in &nodes {
2253                 mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
2254         }
2255
2256         // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
2257         // the second level instead.
2258         let revoked_claim_transactions = {
2259                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2260                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2261
2262                 let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
2263                         tx.input.len() == 2 &&
2264                         tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2265                         tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
2266                 ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2267                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
2268                 for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
2269                         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
2270                 }
2271
2272                 let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = HashMap::new();
2273                 for current_tx in txn.into_iter() {
2274                         revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx);
2275                 }
2276                 revoked_claim_transaction_map
2277         };
2278         for node in &nodes {
2279                 mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claim_transactions.values().collect::<Vec<_>>());
2280         }
2281
2282
2283         // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
2284         // been reached.
2285         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2286         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
2287
2288         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2289         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2290
2291         // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2292         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2293         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2294
2295         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2296         let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2297         assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4);
2298         for event in spendable_output_events {
2299                 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event {
2300                         assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2301                         assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap()));
2302                         let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2303                                 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
2304                         ).unwrap();
2305
2306                         if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(_) = &outputs[0] {
2307                                 check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_a, &revoked_commitment_b);
2308                         } else {
2309                                 check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
2310                         }
2311                 } else {
2312                         panic!("unexpected event");
2313                 }
2314         }
2315
2316         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2317         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2318         // On the Alice side, the individual to_self_claim are still pending confirmation.
2319         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 2);
2320         // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
2321         // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
2322         // balances to claim.
2323         //
2324         // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
2325         // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
2326         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);
2327 }
2328
2329 fn do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(confirm_commitment_before_reload: bool) {
2330         // Tests that we'll fix a ChannelMonitor's `counterparty_payment_script` for an anchor outputs
2331         // channel upon deserialization.
2332         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2333         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2334         let persister;
2335         let chain_monitor;
2336         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2337         user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2338         user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2339         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2340         let node_deserialized;
2341         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2342
2343         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
2344
2345         // Set the monitor's `counterparty_payment_script` to a dummy P2WPKH script.
2346         let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2347         let privkey = bitcoin::PrivateKey::from_slice(&[1; 32], bitcoin::Network::Testnet).unwrap();
2348         let pubkey = bitcoin::PublicKey::from_private_key(&secp, &privkey);
2349         let p2wpkh_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&pubkey.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2350         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).set_counterparty_payment_script(p2wpkh_script.clone());
2351         assert_eq!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script(), p2wpkh_script);
2352
2353         // Confirm the counterparty's commitment and reload the monitor (either before or after) such
2354         // that we arrive at the correct `counterparty_payment_script` after the reload.
2355         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2356         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2357         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2358         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
2359                  [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2360
2361         let commitment_tx = {
2362                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2363                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2364                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 4);
2365                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2366                 txn.pop().unwrap()
2367         };
2368
2369         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2370         let commitment_tx_conf_height = if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2371                 // We should expect our round trip serialization check to fail as we're writing the monitor
2372                 // with the incorrect P2WPKH script but reading it with the correct P2WSH script.
2373                 *nodes[1].chain_monitor.expect_monitor_round_trip_fail.lock().unwrap() = Some(chan_id);
2374                 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2375                 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2376                 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2377                 commitment_tx_conf_height
2378         } else {
2379                 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2380                 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2381                 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2382                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2383                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
2384                 commitment_tx_conf_height
2385         };
2386         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2387                  [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2388         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script().is_v0_p2wsh());
2389
2390         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2391         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2392
2393         if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2394                 // If we saw the commitment before our `counterparty_payment_script` was fixed, we'll never
2395                 // get the spendable output event for the `to_remote` output, so we'll need to get it
2396                 // manually via `get_spendable_outputs`.
2397                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2398                 let outputs = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height);
2399                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2400                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2401                         &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
2402                         253, None, &secp
2403                 ).unwrap();
2404                 check_spends!(spend_tx, &commitment_tx);
2405         } else {
2406                 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
2407         }
2408 }
2409
2410 #[test]
2411 fn test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload() {
2412         do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(false);
2413         do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(true);
2414 }