1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
12 use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
13 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
14 use ln::{channel, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
15 use ln::channelmanager::BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
16 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
17 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
18 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
19 use routing::network_graph::NetworkUpdate;
20 use routing::router::get_route;
22 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
23 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
27 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
34 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
35 // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
36 // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
37 // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
38 // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
39 // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
42 // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
44 // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
45 // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
47 // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
48 // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
49 // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
50 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
51 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
52 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
53 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
55 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
56 let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
58 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
59 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
60 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
62 let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
64 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
65 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
66 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
68 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
69 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1], events);
70 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
71 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
73 // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
74 // transaction for nodes[1].
75 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
76 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
77 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
78 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1);
79 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
81 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
82 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
83 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1], events);
84 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
85 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
87 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
88 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
89 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
93 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
94 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
95 // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
96 // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
97 // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
98 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
99 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
100 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
101 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
103 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
104 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
105 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
106 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
108 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
110 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
111 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000
113 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
114 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
115 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
117 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id).unwrap();
118 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
119 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown);
120 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
121 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_1_shutdown);
123 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
124 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
125 let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
126 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
127 let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
128 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
129 let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
130 assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
132 let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
133 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
134 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
136 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
137 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
139 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
140 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
142 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
143 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
145 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
146 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000,
147 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
149 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
150 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
151 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1000,
152 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
154 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
156 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
157 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
159 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
160 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
161 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
162 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
164 let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
165 assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
166 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
167 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
168 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
169 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
170 check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
173 let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
174 assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
175 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
176 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
177 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
178 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
179 check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
183 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
188 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
189 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
190 // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
191 // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
192 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
193 if prev_commitment_tx {
194 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
195 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
196 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
197 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
198 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
200 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
201 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
202 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
204 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
205 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
206 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
207 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
209 // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
210 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
211 // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
212 // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
213 let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
214 // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
215 let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
217 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
219 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
221 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
222 // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
223 // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
224 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
225 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
226 (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
227 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
228 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
229 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
230 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
231 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
232 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
234 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
235 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
236 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
238 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
240 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
242 let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
243 // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
244 // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
245 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
246 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
247 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
248 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
250 if prev_commitment_tx {
251 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
252 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
253 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
254 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage, events);
255 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
256 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
257 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
258 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
259 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
260 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
261 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
262 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
263 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
266 // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
267 // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
268 let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
269 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
270 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
271 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
272 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
273 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
274 // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
275 chan_feerate * (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT +
276 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
277 channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
278 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
279 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
280 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
282 if !prev_commitment_tx {
283 a_expected_balances.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
284 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
285 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
288 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
289 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
290 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
291 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
293 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
295 // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
296 // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
297 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
298 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
299 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
301 let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
302 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), if prev_commitment_tx { 4 } else { 5 });
303 if prev_commitment_tx {
304 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[3], b_broadcast_txn[2]);
306 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0], b_broadcast_txn[3]);
307 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1], b_broadcast_txn[4]);
309 // b_broadcast_txn[0] should spend the HTLC output of the commitment tx for 3_000 sats
310 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
311 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
312 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
313 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
314 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
315 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
316 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[2], funding_tx);
318 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
319 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
321 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
322 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
323 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
324 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
325 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
327 // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
328 // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
329 // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
330 // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
331 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
332 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
334 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
335 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
336 (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
337 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
338 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
339 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
340 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
341 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
342 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
343 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
345 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
346 // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
347 // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
348 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
349 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
350 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
352 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
354 Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
355 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
356 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
357 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
358 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
359 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
361 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
363 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
364 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
365 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], events, dust_payment_hash, true);
366 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
368 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
369 // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
370 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
371 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
372 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
373 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
374 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
375 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
377 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
378 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
379 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
380 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
381 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
382 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
383 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
384 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
385 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
386 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
388 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
390 let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
391 assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
392 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
393 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
394 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
395 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
396 check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
399 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
401 // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
402 // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
403 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
404 if !prev_commitment_tx {
405 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
406 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage, events);
408 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
409 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
410 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
411 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
412 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
413 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
415 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
416 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
417 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
418 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
419 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
421 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
423 // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
424 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
425 let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
426 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 3);
427 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], funding_tx);
428 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
429 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
430 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
431 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
432 assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout,
433 a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
434 // a_broadcast_txn [1] and [2] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
435 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
436 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
438 // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
439 // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
440 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
441 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
442 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
443 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
444 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
446 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
447 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
449 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
450 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
451 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
452 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
453 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], events, timeout_payment_hash, true);
455 let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
456 assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
457 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
458 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
459 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
460 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
461 check_spends!(spend_tx, a_broadcast_txn[2]);
464 // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
465 // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
466 // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
467 let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
468 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
470 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
471 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
472 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
473 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
474 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
475 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
476 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
477 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
478 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
480 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
482 // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
483 // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
484 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
486 let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
487 assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
488 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
489 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
490 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
491 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
492 check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
495 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
496 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
497 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
498 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
499 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
500 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
502 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
504 // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
505 // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
506 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
508 let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
509 assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
510 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
511 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
512 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
513 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
514 check_spends!(spend_tx, b_broadcast_txn[0]);
517 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
518 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
519 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
521 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
523 // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
524 // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
525 // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
526 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
527 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
528 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
529 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
531 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
532 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
533 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
534 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
538 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
539 do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
540 do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);