_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
  11
  12 use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
  13 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  14 use ln::{channel, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
  15 use ln::channelmanager::BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
  16 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
  17 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  18 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
  19 use routing::network_graph::NetworkUpdate;
  20 use routing::router::get_route;
  21
  22 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  23 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  24
  25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  26 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  27 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  28
  29 use prelude::*;
  30
  31 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  32
  33 #[test]
  34 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
  35         // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
  36         // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
  37         // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
  38         // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
  39         // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
  40         // HTLC.
  41         //
  42         // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
  43         //
  44         // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
  45         // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
  46         //
  47         // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
  48         // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
  49         // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
  50         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
  51         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
  52         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
  53         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  54
  55         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
  56         let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
  57
  58         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
  59         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
  60         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
  61
  62         let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
  63
  64         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  65         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
  66         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
  67
  68         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  69         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
  70         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  71
  72         // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
  73         // transaction for nodes[1].
  74         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
  75         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  76         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
  77         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxBroadcasted);
  78         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
  79
  80         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
  81         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  82         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  83         let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
  84
  85         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
  86         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
  87         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
  88 }
  89
  90 #[test]
  91 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
  92         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
  93         // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
  94         // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
  95         // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
  96         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  97         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  98         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
  99         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 100
 101         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 102                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 103         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 104         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 105
 106         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
 107
 108         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 109                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000
 110                 }],
 111                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 112         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
 113                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 114
 115         nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id).unwrap();
 116         let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 117         nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown);
 118         let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 119         nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_1_shutdown);
 120
 121         let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 122         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
 123         let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 124         nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
 125         let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 126         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
 127         let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 128         assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
 129
 130         let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 131         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
 132         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
 133
 134         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 135         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 136
 137         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 138         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 139
 140         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 141         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 142
 143         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 144                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000,
 145                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 146                 }],
 147                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 148         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 149                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1000,
 150                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 151                 }],
 152                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 153
 154         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 155         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 156
 157         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 158                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 159         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 160                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 161
 162         let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 163         assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
 164         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 165                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 166                 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 167                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 168                 check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
 169         }
 170
 171         let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 172         assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
 173         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 174                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 175                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 176                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 177                 check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
 178         }
 179         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 180         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 181 }
 182
 183 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
 184         v.sort_unstable();
 185         v
 186 }
 187
 188 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
 189         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
 190         // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
 191         // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
 192         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 193         if prev_commitment_tx {
 194                 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 195                 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 196                 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 197                 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
 198                 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
 199         }
 200         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 201         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 202         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 203
 204         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 205                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 206         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 207         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 208
 209         // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
 210         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
 211         // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
 212         // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
 213         let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
 214         // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
 215         let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
 216
 217         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 218
 219         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
 220
 221         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
 222         // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
 223         // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
 224         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 225                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 226                                 (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 227                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 228                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 229                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 230                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 231                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 232                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 233                 }]),
 234                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 235         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 236                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 237                 }],
 238                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 239
 240         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
 241         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 242         let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 243         // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
 244         // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
 245         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
 246         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 247         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
 248         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 249
 250         if prev_commitment_tx {
 251                 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
 252                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
 253                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 254                 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage, events);
 255                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
 256                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 257                 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 258                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
 259                 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 260                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 261                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
 262                 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 263                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 264         }
 265
 266         // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
 267         // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
 268         let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 269                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
 270                                 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
 271                                 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
 272                                 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
 273                                 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
 274                                 // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
 275                                 chan_feerate * (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT +
 276                                                                 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
 277                                                                 channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 278                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 279                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 280                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 281                 }];
 282         if !prev_commitment_tx {
 283                 a_expected_balances.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 284                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 285                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 286                 });
 287         }
 288         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
 289                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 290         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 291                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
 292                 }],
 293                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 294
 295         // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
 296         // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
 297         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 298         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 299         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 300
 301         let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 302         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), if prev_commitment_tx { 4 } else { 5 });
 303         if prev_commitment_tx {
 304                 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[3], b_broadcast_txn[2]);
 305         } else {
 306                 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0], b_broadcast_txn[3]);
 307                 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1], b_broadcast_txn[4]);
 308         }
 309         // b_broadcast_txn[0] should spend the HTLC output of the commitment tx for 3_000 sats
 310         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 311         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 312         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 313         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 314         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 315         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 316         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[2], funding_tx);
 317
 318         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 319         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 320         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 321         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxBroadcasted);
 322         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 323         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 324         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 325         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxBroadcasted);
 326         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 327         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 328
 329         // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
 330         // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
 331         // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
 332         // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
 333         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 334         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 335
 336         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 337                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 338                                 (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 339                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 340                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 341                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 342                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 343                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 344                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 345                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 346                 }]),
 347                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 348         // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
 349         // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
 350         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 351                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 352                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 353                 },
 354                 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
 355                 // long.
 356                 Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 357                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 358                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 359                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 360                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 361                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 362                 }]),
 363                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 364
 365         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 366         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 367         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], events, dust_payment_hash, true);
 368         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 369
 370         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
 371         // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
 372         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 373                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 374                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 375                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 376                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 377                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 378                 }]),
 379                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 380         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 381                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 382                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 383                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 384                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 385                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 386                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 387                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 388                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 389                 }]),
 390                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 391
 392         let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 393         assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
 394         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 395                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 396                 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 397                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 398                 check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
 399         }
 400
 401         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 402
 403         // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
 404         // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
 405         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 406         if !prev_commitment_tx {
 407                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 408                 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage, events);
 409         }
 410         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 411                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 412                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 413                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 414                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 415                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 416                 }]),
 417                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 418         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 419         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 420                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 421                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 422                 }],
 423                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 424
 425         // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
 426         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
 427         let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 428         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 3);
 429         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], funding_tx);
 430         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 431         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 432         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
 433         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
 434         assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout,
 435                    a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
 436         // a_broadcast_txn [1] and [2] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
 437         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 438         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 439
 440         // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
 441         // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
 442         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
 443         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 444         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 445                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 446                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 447                 }],
 448                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 449         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
 450         // balance entry.
 451         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 452         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 453                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 454         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 455         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], events, timeout_payment_hash, true);
 456
 457         let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 458         assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
 459         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 460                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 461                 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 462                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 463                 check_spends!(spend_tx, a_broadcast_txn[2]);
 464         } else { panic!(); }
 465
 466         // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
 467         // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
 468         // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
 469         let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 470         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 471
 472         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 473                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 474                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 475                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 476                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 477                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 478                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 479                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 480                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 481                 }]),
 482                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 483
 484         // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
 485         // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
 486         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 487
 488         let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 489         assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
 490         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 491                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 492                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 493                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 494                 check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
 495         }
 496
 497         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 498                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 499                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 500                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 501                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 502                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 503                 }]),
 504                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 505
 506         // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
 507         // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
 508         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 509
 510         let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 511         assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
 512         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 513                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 514                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 515                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 516                 check_spends!(spend_tx, b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 517         } else { panic!(); }
 518
 519         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 520                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 521                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 522                 }],
 523         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 524
 525         // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
 526         // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
 527         // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
 528         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
 529         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 530                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 531                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 532                 }],
 533         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 534         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 535         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 536                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 537 }
 538
 539 #[test]
 540 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
 541         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
 542         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
 543 }