_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
  11
  12 use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
  13 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  14 use ln::channel;
  15 use ln::channelmanager::BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
  16 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
  17 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
  18 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
  19
  20 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  21 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  23
  24 use prelude::*;
  25
  26 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  27
  28 #[test]
  29 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
  30         // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
  31         // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
  32         // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
  33         // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
  34         // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
  35         // HTLC.
  36         //
  37         // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
  38         //
  39         // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
  40         // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
  41         //
  42         // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
  43         // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
  44         // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
  45         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
  46         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
  47         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
  48         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  49
  50         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
  51         let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
  52
  53         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
  54         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
  55         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
  56
  57         let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
  58
  59         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  60         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
  61         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
  62
  63         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  64         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
  65         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  66
  67         // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
  68         // transaction for nodes[1].
  69         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
  70         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  71         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
  72         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
  73         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
  74
  75         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
  76         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  77         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  78         let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
  79
  80         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
  81         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
  82         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
  83 }
  84
  85 #[test]
  86 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
  87         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
  88         // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
  89         // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
  90         // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
  91         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  92         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  93         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
  94         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  95
  96         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
  97                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
  98         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
  99         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 100
 101         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
 102
 103         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 104                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000
 105                 }],
 106                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 107         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
 108                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 109
 110         nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id).unwrap();
 111         let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 112         nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown);
 113         let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 114         nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_1_shutdown);
 115
 116         let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 117         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
 118         let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 119         nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
 120         let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 121         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
 122         let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 123         assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
 124
 125         let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 126         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
 127         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
 128
 129         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 130         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 131
 132         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 133         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 134
 135         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 136         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 137
 138         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 139                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000,
 140                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 141                 }],
 142                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 143         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 144                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1000,
 145                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 146                 }],
 147                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 148
 149         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 150         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 151
 152         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 153                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 154         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 155                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 156
 157         let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 158         assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
 159         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 160                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 161                 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 162                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 163                 check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
 164         }
 165
 166         let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 167         assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
 168         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 169                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 170                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 171                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 172                 check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
 173         }
 174         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 175         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 176 }
 177
 178 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
 179         v.sort_unstable();
 180         v
 181 }
 182
 183 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
 184         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
 185         // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
 186         // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
 187         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 188         if prev_commitment_tx {
 189                 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 190                 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 191                 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 192                 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
 193                 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
 194         }
 195         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 196         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 197         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 198
 199         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 200                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 201         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 202         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 203
 204         // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
 205         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
 206         // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
 207         // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
 208         let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
 209         // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
 210         let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
 211
 212         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 213
 214         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
 215
 216         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
 217         // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
 218         // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
 219         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 220                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 221                                 (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 222                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 223                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 224                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 225                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 226                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 227                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 228                 }]),
 229                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 230         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 231                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 232                 }],
 233                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 234
 235         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
 236         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 237         let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 238         // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
 239         // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
 240         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
 241         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 242         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
 243         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 244
 245         if prev_commitment_tx {
 246                 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
 247                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
 248                 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
 249                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
 250                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 251                 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 252                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
 253                 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 254                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 255                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
 256                 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 257                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 258         }
 259
 260         // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
 261         // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
 262         let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 263                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
 264                                 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
 265                                 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
 266                                 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
 267                                 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
 268                                 // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
 269                                 chan_feerate * (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT +
 270                                                                 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
 271                                                                 channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 272                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 273                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 274                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 275                 }];
 276         if !prev_commitment_tx {
 277                 a_expected_balances.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 278                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 279                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 280                 });
 281         }
 282         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
 283                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 284         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 285                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
 286                 }],
 287                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 288
 289         // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
 290         // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
 291         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 292         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 293         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 294
 295         let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 296         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), if prev_commitment_tx { 4 } else { 5 });
 297         if prev_commitment_tx {
 298                 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[3], b_broadcast_txn[2]);
 299         } else {
 300                 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0], b_broadcast_txn[3]);
 301                 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1], b_broadcast_txn[4]);
 302         }
 303         // b_broadcast_txn[0] should spend the HTLC output of the commitment tx for 3_000 sats
 304         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 305         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 306         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 307         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 308         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 309         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 310         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[2], funding_tx);
 311
 312         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 313         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 314         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 315         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 316         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 317         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 318         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 319         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 320         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 321         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 322
 323         // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
 324         // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
 325         // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
 326         // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
 327         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 328         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 329
 330         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 331                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 332                                 (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 333                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 334                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 335                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 336                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 337                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 338                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 339                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 340                 }]),
 341                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 342         // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
 343         // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
 344         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 345                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 346                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 347                 },
 348                 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
 349                 // long.
 350                 Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 351                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 352                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 353                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 354                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 355                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 356                 }]),
 357                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 358
 359         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 360         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, true);
 361         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 362
 363         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
 364         // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
 365         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 366                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 367                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 368                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 369                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 370                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 371                 }]),
 372                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 373         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 374                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 375                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 376                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 377                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 378                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 379                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 380                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 381                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 382                 }]),
 383                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 384
 385         let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 386         assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
 387         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 388                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 389                 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 390                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 391                 check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
 392         }
 393
 394         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 395
 396         // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
 397         // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
 398         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 399         if prev_commitment_tx {
 400                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
 401         } else {
 402                 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
 403         }
 404         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 405                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 406                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 407                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 408                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 409                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 410                 }]),
 411                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 412         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 413         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 414                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 415                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 416                 }],
 417                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 418
 419         // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
 420         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
 421         let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 422         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 3);
 423         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], funding_tx);
 424         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 425         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 426         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
 427         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
 428         assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout,
 429                    a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
 430         // a_broadcast_txn [1] and [2] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
 431         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 432         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 433
 434         // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
 435         // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
 436         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
 437         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 438         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 439                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 440                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 441                 }],
 442                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 443         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
 444         // balance entry.
 445         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 446         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 447                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 448         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, true);
 449
 450         let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 451         assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
 452         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 453                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 454                 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 455                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 456                 check_spends!(spend_tx, a_broadcast_txn[2]);
 457         } else { panic!(); }
 458
 459         // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
 460         // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
 461         // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
 462         let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 463         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 464
 465         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 466                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 467                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 468                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 469                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 470                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 471                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 472                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 473                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 474                 }]),
 475                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 476
 477         // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
 478         // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
 479         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 480
 481         let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 482         assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
 483         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 484                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 485                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 486                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 487                 check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
 488         }
 489
 490         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 491                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 492                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 493                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 494                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 495                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 496                 }]),
 497                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 498
 499         // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
 500         // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
 501         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 502
 503         let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 504         assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
 505         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 506                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 507                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 508                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 509                 check_spends!(spend_tx, b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 510         } else { panic!(); }
 511
 512         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 513                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 514                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 515                 }],
 516                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 517
 518         // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
 519         // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
 520         // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
 521         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
 522         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 523                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 524                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 525                 }],
 526                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 527         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 528         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 529                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 530 }
 531
 532 #[test]
 533 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
 534         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
 535         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
 536 }