git.bitcoin.ninja Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
  11
  12 #[cfg(anchors)]
  13 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner};
  14 #[cfg(anchors)]
  15 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
  16 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
  17 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  18 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
  19 #[cfg(anchors)]
  20 use crate::events::bump_transaction::BumpTransactionEvent;
  21 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
  22 use crate::ln::channel;
  23 #[cfg(anchors)]
  24 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
  25 #[cfg(anchors)]
  26 use crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager;
  27 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
  28 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
  29 #[cfg(anchors)]
  30 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
  31 #[cfg(anchors)]
  32 use crate::util::crypto::sign;
  33 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
  34 use crate::util::test_utils;
  35
  36 #[cfg(anchors)]
  37 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
  38 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  39 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  40 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  41 #[cfg(anchors)]
  42 use bitcoin::secp256k1::SecretKey;
  43 #[cfg(anchors)]
  44 use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, Script, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime, Witness};
  45 use bitcoin::Transaction;
  46 #[cfg(anchors)]
  47 use bitcoin::util::sighash::SighashCache;
  48
  49 use crate::prelude::*;
  50
  51 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  52
  53 #[test]
  54 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
  55         // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
  56         // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
  57         // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
  58         // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
  59         // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
  60         // HTLC.
  61         //
  62         // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
  63         //
  64         // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
  65         // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
  66         //
  67         // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
  68         // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
  69         // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
  70         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
  71         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
  72         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
  73         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  74
  75         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
  76         let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
  77
  78         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
  79         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
  80                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
  81         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
  82
  83         let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
  84
  85         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  86         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
  87         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
  88
  89         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  90         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
  91         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  92
  93         // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
  94         // transaction for nodes[1].
  95         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
  96         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  97         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
  98         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
  99         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 100
 101         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 102         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
 103         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 104         let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 105
 106         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
 107         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
 108         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
 109 }
 110
 111 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction) {
 112         let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 113         assert_eq!(spendable.len(), 1);
 114         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 115                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 116                 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 117                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 118                 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
 119         } else { panic!(); }
 120 }
 121
 122 #[test]
 123 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
 124         // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
 125         // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
 126         // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
 127         // confirmations.
 128         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 129         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 130         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 131         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 132
 133         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
 134
 135         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
 136
 137         // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
 138         // before forwarding.
 139         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
 140         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
 141
 142         // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
 143         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
 144
 145         // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
 146         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
 147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 148         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 149         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 150
 151         let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 152         assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
 153         check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
 154
 155         // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
 156         // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
 157         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 158         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 159         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 160
 161         // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
 162         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
 163         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 164         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 165
 166         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 167         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
 168 }
 169
 170 #[test]
 171 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
 172         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
 173         // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
 174         // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
 175         // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
 176         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 177         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 178         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 179         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 180
 181         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 182                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 183         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 184         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 185
 186         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 187         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 188
 189         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 190                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000
 191                 }],
 192                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 193         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
 194                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 195
 196         nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 197         let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 198         nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
 199         let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 200         nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
 201
 202         let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 203         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
 204         let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 205         nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
 206         let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 207         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
 208         let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 209         assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
 210
 211         let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 212         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
 213         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
 214
 215         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 216         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 217
 218         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 219         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 220
 221         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 222         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 223
 224         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 225                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000,
 226                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 227                 }],
 228                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 229         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 230                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1000,
 231                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 232                 }],
 233                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 234
 235         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 236         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 237
 238         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 239                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 240         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 241                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 242
 243         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 244         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 245
 246         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 247         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 248 }
 249
 250 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
 251         v.sort_unstable();
 252         v
 253 }
 254
 255 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
 256 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
 257 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
 258 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
 259         let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 260         let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 261         eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
 262         assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
 263         assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
 264 }
 265
 266 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
 267         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
 268         // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
 269         // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
 270         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 271         if prev_commitment_tx {
 272                 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 273                 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 274                 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 275                 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
 276                 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
 277         }
 278         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 279         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 280         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 281
 282         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 283                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 284         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 285         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 286
 287         // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
 288         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
 289         // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
 290         // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
 291         let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
 292         // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
 293         let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
 294
 295         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 296
 297         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 298         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 299
 300         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
 301         let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 302                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 303                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 304         };
 305         let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 306                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 307                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 308         };
 309         let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 310                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 311                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 312         };
 313         let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 314                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 315                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 316         };
 317         let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 318                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 319                 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 320                 payment_hash,
 321                 payment_preimage,
 322         };
 323         let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 324                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 325                 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 326                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 327                 payment_preimage: timeout_payment_preimage,
 328         };
 329
 330         // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
 331         // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
 332         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 333                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 334                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 335                 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 336                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 337         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 338                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 339                 }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 340                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 341
 342         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
 343         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 344         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
 345
 346         let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 347         // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
 348         // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
 349         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
 350         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 351         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
 352
 353         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
 354         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 355         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
 356
 357         if prev_commitment_tx {
 358                 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
 359                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
 360                 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
 361                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
 362                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 363                 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 364                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
 365                 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 366                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 367                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
 368                 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 369                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 370         }
 371
 372         // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
 373         // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
 374         let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 375                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
 376                                 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
 377                                 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
 378                                 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
 379                                 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
 380                                 // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
 381                                 chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) +
 382                                                                 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
 383                                                                 channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 384                 }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
 385         if !prev_commitment_tx {
 386                 a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
 387         }
 388         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
 389                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 390         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 391                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
 392                 }],
 393                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 394
 395         // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
 396         // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
 397         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 398         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 399         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 400
 401         let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 402         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 403         // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
 404         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 405         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 406         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 407         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 408         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 409         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 410
 411         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 412         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 413         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 414         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 415         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 416         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 417         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 418         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 419         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 420         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 421
 422         // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
 423         // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
 424         // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
 425         // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
 426         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 427         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 428
 429         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 430                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 431                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 432                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 433                 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 434                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 435         // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
 436         // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
 437         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 438                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 439                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 440                 },
 441                 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
 442                 // long.
 443                 received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 444                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 445
 446         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 447         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
 448         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 449
 450         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
 451         // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
 452         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 453                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 454         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 455                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 456                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 457                 }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 458                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 459
 460         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 461         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 462
 463         // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
 464         // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
 465         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 466         if prev_commitment_tx {
 467                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
 468         } else {
 469                 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
 470         }
 471         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 472                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 473         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 474         assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()],
 475                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 476
 477         // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
 478         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
 479         let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 480         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 481         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 482         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 483         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 484         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 485         assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
 486                    a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
 487         // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
 488         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 489         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 490
 491         // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
 492         // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
 493         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 494         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 495         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 496                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 497                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 498                 }],
 499                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 500         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
 501         // balance entry.
 502         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 503         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 504                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 505         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
 506
 507         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 508
 509         // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
 510         // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
 511         // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
 512         let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 513         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 514
 515         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 516                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 517                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 518                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 519                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 520                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 521                 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 522                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 523
 524         // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
 525         // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
 526         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 527         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 528
 529         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 530                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 531                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 532                 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 533                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 534
 535         // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
 536         // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
 537         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 538         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 539
 540         assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
 541                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 542
 543         // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
 544         // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
 545         // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
 546         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 547         assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
 548                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 549         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 550         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 551                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 552
 553         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 554         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 555         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 556         for node in nodes.iter() {
 557                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 558                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 559                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 560                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 561         }
 562 }
 563
 564 #[test]
 565 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
 566         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
 567         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
 568 }
 569
 570 #[test]
 571 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
 572         // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
 573         // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
 574         // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
 575         // delay prior to spendability.
 576         //
 577         // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
 578         // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
 579         // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
 580         // claim by our counterparty).
 581         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 582         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 583         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 584         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 585
 586         // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
 587         // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
 588         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
 589         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 590
 591         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
 592         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 593         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
 594                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 595         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 596
 597         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 598         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 599         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 600
 601         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 602         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
 603
 604         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
 605         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
 606                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
 607         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 608
 609         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 610         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 611         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 612
 613         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 614         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
 615         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
 616         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 617         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 618         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
 619
 620         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 621         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 622
 623         // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions
 624         let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 625         assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 3);
 626         check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
 627         check_spends!(as_txn[2], as_txn[0]);
 628         check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
 629
 630         // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
 631         // claimable balances.
 632         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 633         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 634         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 635         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 636         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 637
 638         let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 639                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 640                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 641         };
 642         let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 643                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 644                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 645         };
 646
 647         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 648                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 649                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 650                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 651                 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 652                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 653
 654         // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
 655         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 656         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 657         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 658         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 659         let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 660         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
 661         check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]);
 662
 663         // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
 664         // transaction.
 665         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
 666         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 667                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 668                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 669                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 670                 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 671                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 672         assert_eq!(as_txn[1].lock_time.0, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1); // as_txn[1] can be included in the next block
 673
 674         // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
 675         // "awaiting confirmations" one.
 676         let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 677         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
 678         // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
 679         // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
 680         // call, as described, two hunks down.
 681         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 682                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 683                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 684                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 685                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 686                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 687                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 688                 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 689                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 690
 691         // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
 692         // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
 693         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
 694         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
 695         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 696                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 697                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 698                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 699                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 700                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 701                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 702                 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 703                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 704
 705         // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
 706         // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
 707         // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
 708         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 709         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
 710
 711         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 712                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 713                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 714                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 715                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 716                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 717                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 718                 }]),
 719                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 720
 721         // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 722         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 723         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 724         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 725                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 726                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 727                 }],
 728                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 729         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 730
 731         // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 732         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 733         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 734         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 735         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
 736
 737         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 738         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 739         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 740         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 741         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 742         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 743         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 744 }
 745
 746 #[test]
 747 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
 748         // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
 749         // have a preimage.
 750         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 751         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 752         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 753         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 754
 755         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
 756         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 757
 758         // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
 759         let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
 760         let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
 761         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 762
 763         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 764         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 765
 766         let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 767                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 768                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 769         };
 770         let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 771                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 772                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 773         };
 774         let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 775                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 776                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 777         };
 778         let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 779                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 780                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 781         };
 782
 783         // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
 784         // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
 785         // HTLC output is spent.
 786
 787         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 788                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 789                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 790                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
 791                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 792
 793         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 794                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
 795                 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
 796                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 797
 798         // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
 799         let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 800         assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
 801         check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
 802         check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
 803
 804         // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
 805         // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
 806         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 807         let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 808                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 809                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 810                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 811                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
 812
 813         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 814         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
 815         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 816         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 817         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 818
 819         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 820                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 821
 822         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 823         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 824         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 825         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 826
 827         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
 828         let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 829                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
 830                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 831                 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
 832         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 833                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 834
 835         // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
 836         // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
 837         // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
 838         // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
 839
 840         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
 841         let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 842         assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
 843         check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
 844         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
 845                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
 846
 847         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 848                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 849
 850         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 851         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 852                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 853
 854         // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
 855         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 856         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 857         bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
 858
 859         // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
 860         nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
 861         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) - 1);
 862         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
 863                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
 864         let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 865         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
 866         check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
 867
 868         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 869                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 870
 871         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
 872         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 873                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 874
 875         // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
 876         // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
 877         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 878         let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
 879         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 880                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 881                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 882                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 883                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 884                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 885                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
 886                 }]),
 887                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 888
 889         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 890         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 891                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 892                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 893                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 894                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 895                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 896                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
 897                 }]),
 898                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 899
 900         // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
 901         // payment failure event.
 902         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 903         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
 904
 905         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 906         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 907                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 908                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 909                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 910                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 911                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 912                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
 913                 }]),
 914                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 915
 916         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 917         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 918                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 919                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
 920                 }],
 921                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 922         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 923
 924         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 925         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 926         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 927
 928         // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
 929         // was already claimed.
 930         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 931         let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
 932         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 933                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 934                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
 935                 }]),
 936                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 937
 938         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 939         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 940                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 941                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
 942                 }]),
 943                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 944
 945         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 946         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
 947
 948         assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
 949                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 950         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 951
 952         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
 953         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 954
 955         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 956         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 957         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 958         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
 959         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
 960         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 961         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 962 }
 963
 964 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
 965         let mut v = v_orig.clone();
 966         for t in extra_ts {
 967                 v.push((*t).clone());
 968         }
 969         v.sort_unstable();
 970         v
 971 }
 972
 973 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
 974         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
 975         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 976         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 977         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 978         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 979         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
 980         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
 981         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 982         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 983         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 984
 985         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 986                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
 987         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 988         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 989
 990         // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
 991         //
 992         // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
 993         // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
 994         // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
 995         // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
 996         // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
 997         //     later commitment transaction updates
 998         //
 999         // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
1000         // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
1001         // HTLCs individually.
1002
1003         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
1004         let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1005         let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1006
1007         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1008
1009         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1010         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1011
1012         let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1013         let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1014
1015         // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1016         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1017         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1018
1019         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1020
1021         let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1022         let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1023
1024         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1025         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1026         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1027         let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1028
1029         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1030         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1031         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1032
1033         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1034         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1035         let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1036                 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1037                 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1038         events.retain(|ev| {
1039                 match ev {
1040                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1041                                 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1042                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1043                                 false
1044                         },
1045                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1046                                 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1047                                 false
1048                         },
1049                         _ => true,
1050                 }
1051         });
1052         assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1053         if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1054         match &events[1] {
1055                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
1056                 _ => panic!(),
1057         }
1058
1059         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1060         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1061         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1062         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1063
1064         // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1065         // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1066         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1067                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1068                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1069                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1070                         claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1071                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1072                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1073                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1074                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1075                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1076                         claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1077                 }]),
1078                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1079
1080         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1081         let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1082         // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1083         // quite soon.
1084         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1085         claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
1086
1087         // The following constants were determined experimentally
1088         const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 483;
1089         const OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 571;
1090         const INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 578;
1091
1092         // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1093         // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1094         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1095         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1096         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1097         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1098
1099         // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1100         // claim balances separated out.
1101         let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1102                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1103                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1104                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1105                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1106                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1107                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1108                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1109                 }];
1110
1111         let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1112                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1113                         (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1114         };
1115         let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1116         let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1117                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1118         };
1119         let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1120
1121         // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1122         // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1123         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1124                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1125
1126         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1127                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1128                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1129                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1130         } else {
1131                 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1132                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1133                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1134                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1135         }
1136
1137         let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1138                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1139                 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1140         };
1141         let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1142                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1143                         (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1144                         - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1145                 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1146         };
1147
1148         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1149                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1150                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1151         } else {
1152                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1153                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1154         }
1155
1156         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1157                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1158         } else {
1159                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1160         }
1161         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1162                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1163
1164         // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1165         // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1166         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1167         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1168
1169         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1170                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1171                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1172                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1173                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1174                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1175                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1176                                 - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1177                         confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1178                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1179                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000 - chan_feerate * OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1180                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1181                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1182                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1183                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1184                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1185                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1186                         confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1187                 }]),
1188                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1189
1190         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1191         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1192
1193         let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1194         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
1195                 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1196         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
1197                 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1198
1199         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1200         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }]);
1201         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1202         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }]);
1203         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1204         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1205         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1206         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1207         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1208         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1209         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1210
1211         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1212         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1213         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1214         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1215         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1216         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1217         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1218 }
1219
1220 #[test]
1221 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1222         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true);
1223         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false);
1224 }
1225
1226 #[test]
1227 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1228         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1229         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1230         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1231         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1232         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1233         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1234
1235         // Create some initial channels
1236         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1237                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 11_000_000);
1238         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1239         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1240
1241         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1242         let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1243         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1244         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1245         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1246
1247         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs and an output for both sides
1248         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
1249
1250         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1251
1252         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1253         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1254
1255         // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1256         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1257         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1258         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1259         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1260         let revoked_htlc_success = {
1261                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1262                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1263                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1264                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
1265                 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1266                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1267         };
1268
1269         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1270         let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
1271                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1272                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1273                 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
1274                         txn.remove(1)
1275                 } else {
1276                         txn.remove(0)
1277                 }
1278         };
1279         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1280         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
1281         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time.0, 0);
1282         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0, 0);
1283
1284         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1285         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1286         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1287         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1288         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1289         let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1290
1291         let as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1292         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), 1);
1293         check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1294
1295         // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1296         // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1297         // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1298         let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1299                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1300                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1301                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1302                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1303                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1304                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1305                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1306                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1307                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1308                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1309                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1310                 }]);
1311         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1312                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1313
1314         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
1315         let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1316         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1317         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
1318         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]); // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked
1319                                                                   // outputs (which no longer includes the spent HTLC output)
1320
1321         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1322                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1323
1324         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1325         fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1326                 3_000 - chan_feerate * (revoked_htlc_success.weight() + as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight()) as u64 / 1000);
1327
1328         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1329         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1330                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1331                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1332                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1333                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1334                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1335                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1336                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1337                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1338                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1339                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1340                         claimable_amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1341                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1342                 }]),
1343                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1344
1345         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1346         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1347         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1348                         // to_self output to B
1349                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1350                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1351                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1352                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1353                         claimable_amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1354                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1355                 }]),
1356                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1357
1358         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1359         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1360         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1361                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1362                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1363                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1364                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1365                 }]),
1366                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1367
1368         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1369         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1370                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1371         // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1372         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1373         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1374                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1375         }
1376
1377         // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1378         // claiming.
1379         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1380         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1381         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1382                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1383         }
1384
1385         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
1386         let as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1387         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1388
1389         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1390         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1391
1392         // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1393         // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1394         // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1395         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1396         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1397                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1398                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1399                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1400                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1401                 }]),
1402                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1403
1404         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1405         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1406                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1407                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1408                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1409                         claimable_amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1410                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1411                 }]),
1412                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1413
1414         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
1415         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1416                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1417                         claimable_amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].output[0].value,
1418                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1419                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1420                         claimable_amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1421                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1422                 }]),
1423                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1424
1425         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1426         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1427         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1428         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
1429
1430         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1431
1432         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1433         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1434         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1435         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1436         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1437         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1438         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1439 }
1440
1441 #[test]
1442 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
1443         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1444         // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1445         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1446         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1447         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1448         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1449         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1450         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1451         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1452         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1453         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1454
1455         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1456                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1457         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1458         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1459
1460         // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1461         // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1462         // revocation-claim transaction.
1463
1464         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1465         let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1466
1467         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1468
1469         // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1470         // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1471         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1472                 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1473
1474         // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1475         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1476
1477         assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), 2);
1478         check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1479         check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1480
1481         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1482         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1483
1484         {
1485                 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1486                 *feerate += 1;
1487         }
1488         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1489         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1490
1491         let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1492         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1493         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1494
1495         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1496         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1497         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1498         let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1499
1500         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1501                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1502                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1503                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1504                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1505                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1506                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1507                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1508                 }]),
1509                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1510
1511         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1512         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1513         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1514         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1515
1516         let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1517         // Currently the revoked commitment outputs are all claimed in one aggregated transaction
1518         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 1);
1519         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1520         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1521
1522         let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1523
1524         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1525                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1526                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1527                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1528                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1529                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1530                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1531                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1532                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1533                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1534                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1535                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1536                 }]),
1537                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1538
1539         // Confirm A's HTLC-Success tranasction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1540         // new claim.
1541         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[1]);
1542         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage);
1543         let mut claim_txn_2: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1544         claim_txn_2.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| if tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid()) { 0 } else { 1 });
1545         // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1546         // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1547         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1548         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 2);
1549         check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1550         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1551         check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1552
1553         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1554                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1555                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1556                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1557                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1558                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1559                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1560                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1561                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1562                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1563                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1564                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1565                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1566                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1567                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1568                 }]),
1569                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1570
1571         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1572         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1573
1574         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1575                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1576                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1577                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1578                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1579                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1580                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1581                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1582                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1583                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1584                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1585                 }]),
1586                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1587
1588         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1589         let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1590
1591         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1592                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1593                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1594                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1595                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1596                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1597                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1598                         claimable_amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1599                         confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1600                 }]),
1601                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1602
1603         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1604         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1605
1606         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1607                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1608                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1609                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1610                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1611                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1612                 }]),
1613                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1614
1615         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1616         let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1617
1618         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1619                         claimable_amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
1620                         confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1621                 }],
1622                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1623
1624         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1625
1626         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1627         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1628         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1629         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1630
1631         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1632         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1633         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1634         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1635         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1636         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1637         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1638 }
1639
1640 fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
1641         // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
1642         let persister;
1643         let new_chain_monitor;
1644         let node_deserialized;
1645
1646         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1647         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1648         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1649         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1650
1651         // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
1652         // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
1653         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
1654         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
1655
1656         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
1657         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1658         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1659         check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false);
1660
1661         let commitment_tx = {
1662                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1663                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1664                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
1665                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
1666                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1667         };
1668
1669         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
1670
1671         // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
1672         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
1673         let htlc_timeout_tx = {
1674                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1675                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1676                 check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
1677                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1678         };
1679
1680         // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
1681         // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
1682         if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
1683                 let serialized_monitor = hex::decode(
1684                         "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1685                 ).unwrap();
1686                 reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
1687         }
1688
1689         // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
1690         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1691         if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
1692                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1693         }
1694         {
1695                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1696                 if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
1697                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
1698                 } else {
1699                         assert!(txn.len() < 6);
1700                 }
1701                 for tx in txn {
1702                         assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
1703                         assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
1704                         assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
1705                         assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
1706                 }
1707         }
1708 }
1709
1710 #[test]
1711 fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
1712         do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
1713         do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
1714 }
1715
1716 #[cfg(anchors)]
1717 #[test]
1718 fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
1719         // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
1720         // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
1721         // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
1722         // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
1723         // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
1724         // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
1725         let secp = Secp256k1::new();
1726         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1727         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1728         let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
1729         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
1730         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1731         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
1732         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1733
1734         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
1735                 &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
1736         ).2;
1737         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
1738         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1739
1740         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1741
1742         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
1743         check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
1744         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
1745
1746         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
1747                 &payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
1748                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
1749         );
1750
1751         let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1752         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
1753         let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
1754                 Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { commitment_tx, anchor_descriptor, .. })  => {
1755                         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.input.len(), 1);
1756                         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 6);
1757                         let mut anchor_tx = Transaction {
1758                                 version: 2,
1759                                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1760                                 input: vec![
1761                                         TxIn { previous_output: anchor_descriptor.outpoint, ..Default::default() },
1762                                         TxIn { ..Default::default() },
1763                                 ],
1764                                 output: vec![TxOut {
1765                                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1766                                         script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
1767                                 }],
1768                         };
1769                         let signer = nodes[0].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
1770                                 anchor_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &anchor_descriptor.channel_keys_id,
1771                         );
1772                         let funding_sig = signer.sign_holder_anchor_input(&mut anchor_tx, 0, &secp).unwrap();
1773                         anchor_tx.input[0].witness = chan_utils::build_anchor_input_witness(
1774                                 &signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, &funding_sig
1775                         );
1776                         (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
1777                 },
1778                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1779         };
1780
1781         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
1782         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1783
1784         let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1785         // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
1786         // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
1787         match *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow() {
1788                 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
1789                         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
1790                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
1791                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
1792
1793                 },
1794                 _ => assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2),
1795         };
1796         let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1797         for event in holder_events {
1798                 match event {
1799                         Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) => {
1800                                 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 1);
1801                                 let htlc_descriptor = &htlc_descriptors[0];
1802                                 let signer = nodes[0].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
1803                                         htlc_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id
1804                                 );
1805                                 let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp);
1806                                 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
1807                                         version: 2,
1808                                         lock_time: tx_lock_time,
1809                                         input: vec![
1810                                                 htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input(), // HTLC input
1811                                                 TxIn { ..Default::default() } // Fee input
1812                                         ],
1813                                         output: vec![
1814                                                 htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&per_commitment_point, &secp), // HTLC output
1815                                                 TxOut { // Fee input change
1816                                                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1817                                                         script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
1818                                                 }
1819                                         ]
1820                                 };
1821                                 let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, 0, htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
1822                                 let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&per_commitment_point, &secp);
1823                                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
1824                                 htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
1825                         },
1826                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1827                 }
1828         }
1829
1830         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
1831         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1832
1833         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1834
1835         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
1836
1837         let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1838         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
1839         for event in holder_events {
1840                 match event {
1841                         Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
1842                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1843                 }
1844         }
1845
1846         // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
1847         nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1848 }
1849
1850 #[cfg(anchors)]
1851 #[test]
1852 fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
1853         // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
1854         // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
1855         // revoked commitment.
1856         let secp = Secp256k1::new();
1857         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1858         // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
1859         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1860         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1861         let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
1862         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
1863         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1864         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
1865
1866         let bob_persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
1867         let bob_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
1868         let bob_deserialized: ChannelManager<
1869                 &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface,
1870                 &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
1871                 &test_utils::TestRouter, &test_utils::TestLogger,
1872         >;
1873
1874         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1875
1876         let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
1877         let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
1878
1879         // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
1880         let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
1881
1882         // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
1883         let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
1884         let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
1885         let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
1886         let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
1887
1888         // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
1889         // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
1890         // present.
1891         let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
1892         let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
1893
1894         // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
1895         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
1896         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
1897         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
1898         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
1899
1900         // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
1901         // revoked state.
1902         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
1903         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
1904
1905         // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
1906         reload_node!(
1907                 nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
1908                 bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
1909         );
1910         for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
1911                 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1912                 for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
1913                         monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
1914                                 &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
1915                                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
1916                         );
1917                 }
1918         }
1919
1920         // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
1921         // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
1922         // the HTLCs still pending.
1923         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1924         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
1925         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
1926         let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = {
1927                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1928                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1929                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
1930                 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
1931                 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
1932                         check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
1933                         check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3);
1934                         (txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone())
1935                 } else {
1936                         check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3);
1937                         check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
1938                         (txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone())
1939                 }
1940         };
1941
1942         // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
1943         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1944         let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1945         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1946         let anchor_tx = {
1947                 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
1948                 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
1949                 let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
1950                 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1951                         version: 2,
1952                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1953                         input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1954                         output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
1955                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1956                                 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
1957                         }],
1958                 };
1959                 let mut anchor_tx = Transaction {
1960                         version: 2,
1961                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1962                         input: vec![
1963                                 TxIn { // Fee input
1964                                         previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1965                                         ..Default::default()
1966                                 },
1967                         ],
1968                         output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
1969                                 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
1970                                 script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
1971                         }],
1972                 };
1973                 let mut signers = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1974                 for event in events {
1975                         match event {
1976                                 Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { anchor_descriptor, .. })  => {
1977                                         anchor_tx.input.push(TxIn {
1978                                                 previous_output: anchor_descriptor.outpoint,
1979                                                 ..Default::default()
1980                                         });
1981                                         let signer = nodes[1].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
1982                                                 anchor_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &anchor_descriptor.channel_keys_id,
1983                                         );
1984                                         signers.push(signer);
1985                                 },
1986                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1987                         }
1988                 }
1989                 for (i, signer) in signers.into_iter().enumerate() {
1990                         let anchor_idx = i + 1;
1991                         let funding_sig = signer.sign_holder_anchor_input(&mut anchor_tx, anchor_idx, &secp).unwrap();
1992                         anchor_tx.input[anchor_idx].witness = chan_utils::build_anchor_input_witness(
1993                                 &signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, &funding_sig
1994                         );
1995                 }
1996                 let fee_utxo_sig = {
1997                         let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
1998                         let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&anchor_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
1999                                 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2000                         ).unwrap()[..]);
2001                         let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2002                         let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2003                         sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2004                         sig
2005                 };
2006                 anchor_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2007                 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
2008                 anchor_tx
2009         };
2010
2011         for node in &nodes {
2012                 mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_tx]);
2013         }
2014         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
2015         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
2016         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2017
2018         // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
2019         // revoked outputs.
2020         {
2021                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2022                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2023
2024                 let (revoked_claim_a, revoked_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() {
2025                         (&txn[0], &txn[1])
2026                 } else {
2027                         (&txn[1], &txn[0])
2028                 };
2029
2030                 // TODO: to_self claim must be separate from HTLC claims
2031                 assert_eq!(revoked_claim_a.input.len(), 3); // Spends both HTLC outputs and to_self output
2032                 assert_eq!(revoked_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
2033                 check_spends!(revoked_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
2034                 assert_eq!(revoked_claim_b.input.len(), 3); // Spends both HTLC outputs and to_self output
2035                 assert_eq!(revoked_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
2036                 check_spends!(revoked_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
2037         }
2038
2039         // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
2040         // through the success path.
2041         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2042         let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2043         // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2044         // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2045         match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
2046                 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
2047                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
2048                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
2049                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2050                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
2051                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2052
2053                 },
2054                 _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
2055         };
2056         let htlc_tx = {
2057                 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
2058                 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
2059                 let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2060                 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2061                         version: 2,
2062                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2063                         input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2064                         output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
2065                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2066                                 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
2067                         }],
2068                 };
2069                 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
2070                         version: 2,
2071                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2072                         input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
2073                                 previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2074                                 ..Default::default()
2075                         }],
2076                         output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
2077                                 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
2078                                 script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
2079                         }],
2080                 };
2081                 let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
2082                 for event in events {
2083                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
2084                                 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
2085                                 for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
2086                                         assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
2087                                         let signer = nodes[1].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
2088                                                 htlc_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id
2089                                         );
2090                                         let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp);
2091                                         htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
2092                                         htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&per_commitment_point, &secp));
2093                                 }
2094                                 descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
2095                                 htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
2096                         } else {
2097                                 panic!("Unexpected event");
2098                         }
2099                 }
2100                 for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
2101                         let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
2102                         let signer = nodes[1].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
2103                                 htlc_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id
2104                         );
2105                         let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
2106                         let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp);
2107                         let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&per_commitment_point, &secp);
2108                         htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
2109                 }
2110                 let fee_utxo_sig = {
2111                         let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
2112                         let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
2113                                 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2114                         ).unwrap()[..]);
2115                         let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2116                         let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2117                         sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2118                         sig
2119                 };
2120                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2121                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
2122                 htlc_tx
2123         };
2124
2125         for node in &nodes {
2126                 mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
2127         }
2128
2129         // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
2130         // the second level instead.
2131         let revoked_claims = {
2132                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2133                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
2134
2135                 let revoked_to_self_claim_a = txn.iter().find(|tx|
2136                         tx.input.len() == 1 &&
2137                         tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2138                         tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid()
2139                 ).unwrap();
2140                 check_spends!(revoked_to_self_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
2141
2142                 let revoked_to_self_claim_b = txn.iter().find(|tx|
2143                         tx.input.len() == 1 &&
2144                         tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2145                         tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_b.txid()
2146                 ).unwrap();
2147                 check_spends!(revoked_to_self_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
2148
2149                 let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
2150                         tx.input.len() == 2 &&
2151                         tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2152                         tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
2153                 ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2154                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
2155                 for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
2156                         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
2157                 }
2158
2159                 txn
2160         };
2161         for node in &nodes {
2162                 mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claims.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>());
2163         }
2164
2165
2166         // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
2167         // been reached.
2168         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2169         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
2170
2171         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2172         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2173
2174         // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2175         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2176         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2177
2178         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2179         let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2180         assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4);
2181         for (idx, event) in spendable_output_events.iter().enumerate() {
2182                 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = event {
2183                         assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2184                         let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2185                                 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, &Secp256k1::new(),
2186                         ).unwrap();
2187                         check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claims[idx]);
2188                 } else {
2189                         panic!("unexpected event");
2190                 }
2191         }
2192
2193         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2194         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2195         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).is_empty());
2196         // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
2197         // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
2198         // balances to claim.
2199         //
2200         // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
2201         // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
2202         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);
2203 }