_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
  11
  12 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
  13 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance};
  14 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  15 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight};
  16 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
  17 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
  18 use crate::ln::channel;
  19 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
  20 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
  21 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
  22 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
  23 use crate::util::crypto::sign;
  24 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
  25 use crate::util::scid_utils::block_from_scid;
  26 use crate::util::test_utils;
  27
  28 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
  29 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  30 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
  32 use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, Script, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime, Witness};
  33 use bitcoin::util::sighash::SighashCache;
  34
  35 use crate::prelude::*;
  36
  37 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  38
  39 #[test]
  40 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
  41         // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
  42         // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
  43         // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
  44         // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
  45         // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
  46         // HTLC.
  47         //
  48         // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
  49         //
  50         // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
  51         // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
  52         //
  53         // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
  54         // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
  55         // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
  56         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
  57         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
  58         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
  59         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  60
  61         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
  62         let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
  63
  64         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
  65         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
  66                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
  67         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
  68
  69         let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
  70
  71         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  72         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
  73         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
  74
  75         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  76         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
  77         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  78
  79         // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
  80         // transaction for nodes[1].
  81         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
  82         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  83         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
  84         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
  85         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
  86
  87         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
  88         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
  89         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  90         let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
  91
  92         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
  93         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
  94         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
  95 }
  96
  97 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction, has_anchors_htlc_event: bool) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
  98         let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
  99         assert_eq!(spendable.len(), if has_anchors_htlc_event { 2 } else { 1 });
 100         if has_anchors_htlc_event {
 101                 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { .. }) = spendable.pop().unwrap() {}
 102                 else { panic!(); }
 103         }
 104         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 105                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 106                 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 107                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 108                 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
 109                 outputs
 110         } else { panic!(); }
 111 }
 112
 113 #[test]
 114 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
 115         // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
 116         // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
 117         // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
 118         // confirmations.
 119         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 120         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 121         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 122         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 123
 124         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
 125
 126         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
 127
 128         // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
 129         // before forwarding.
 130         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
 131         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
 132
 133         // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
 134         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
 135
 136         // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
 137         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
 138         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 139         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 140         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 141
 142         let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 143         assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
 144         check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
 145
 146         // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
 147         // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
 148         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 149         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 150         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 151
 152         // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
 153         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
 154         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 155         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 156
 157         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 158         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
 159 }
 160
 161 fn do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(anchors: bool) {
 162         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
 163         // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
 164         // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
 165         // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
 166         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 167         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 168         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
 169         if anchors {
 170                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
 171                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
 172         }
 173         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
 174         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 175
 176         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 177                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 178         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 179         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 180
 181         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 182         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 183
 184         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate * chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000;
 185         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
 186         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 187                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 188                         transaction_fee_satoshis: commitment_tx_fee,
 189                 }],
 190                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 191         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis: 1_000, transaction_fee_satoshis: 0 }],
 192                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 193
 194         nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 195         let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 196         nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
 197         let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 198         nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
 199
 200         let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 201         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
 202         let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 203         nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
 204         let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 205         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
 206         let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 207         assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
 208
 209         let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 210         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
 211         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
 212
 213         let shutdown_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]));
 214         let shutdown_tx_conf_height_b = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]));
 215
 216         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 217         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 218
 219         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 220         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 221
 222         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 223                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 224                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 225                 }],
 226                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 227         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 228                         amount_satoshis: 1000,
 229                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 230                 }],
 231                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 232
 233         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 234         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 235
 236         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
 237                 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
 238         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id)
 239                 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b).is_empty());
 240
 241         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 242         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
 243
 244         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 245                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 246         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 247                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 248
 249         let spendable_outputs_a = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
 250         assert_eq!(
 251                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a),
 252                 spendable_outputs_a
 253         );
 254
 255         let spendable_outputs_b = test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
 256         assert_eq!(
 257                 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b),
 258                 spendable_outputs_b
 259         );
 260
 261         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 262         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 263 }
 264
 265 #[test]
 266 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
 267         do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(false);
 268         do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(true);
 269 }
 270
 271 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
 272         v.sort_unstable();
 273         v
 274 }
 275
 276 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
 277 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
 278 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
 279 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
 280         let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 281         let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 282         eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
 283         assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
 284         assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
 285 }
 286
 287 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(anchors: bool, prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
 288         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
 289         // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
 290         // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
 291         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 292         if prev_commitment_tx {
 293                 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 294                 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 295                 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 296                 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
 297                 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
 298         }
 299         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 300         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
 301         if anchors {
 302                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
 303                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
 304         }
 305         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
 306         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 307
 308         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
 309                 version: 2,
 310                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
 311                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
 312                 output: vec![
 313                         TxOut {
 314                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
 315                                 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
 316                         },
 317                         TxOut {
 318                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
 319                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
 320                         },
 321                 ],
 322         };
 323         if anchors {
 324                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
 325                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
 326         }
 327
 328         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 329                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 330         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 331         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 332
 333         // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
 334         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
 335         // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
 336         // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
 337         let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
 338         // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
 339         let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
 340
 341         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 342
 343         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 344         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 345
 346         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
 347         let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 348                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 349                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 350                 payment_hash,
 351                 outbound_payment: true,
 352         };
 353         let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 354                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 355                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 356                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 357                 outbound_payment: true,
 358         };
 359         let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 360                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 361                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 362                 payment_hash,
 363         };
 364         let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 365                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 366                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 367                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 368         };
 369         let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 370                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 371                 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 372                 payment_hash,
 373                 payment_preimage,
 374         };
 375         let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 376                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 377                 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 378                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 379                 payment_preimage: timeout_payment_preimage,
 380         };
 381
 382         // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
 383         // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
 384         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
 385                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 386         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
 387         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 388                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 389                         transaction_fee_satoshis: commitment_tx_fee,
 390                 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 391                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 392         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 393                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 394                         transaction_fee_satoshis: 0,
 395                 }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 396                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 397
 398         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
 399         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 400         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
 401
 402         let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 403         // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
 404         // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
 405         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
 406         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 407         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
 408
 409         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
 410         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 411         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
 412
 413         if prev_commitment_tx {
 414                 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
 415                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
 416                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
 417                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
 418                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 419                 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 420                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
 421                 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 422                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 423                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
 424                 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 425                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 426         }
 427
 428         // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
 429         // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
 430         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
 431                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) +
 432                 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 433         let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 434                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
 435                                 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
 436                                 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
 437                                 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
 438                                 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
 439                                 commitment_tx_fee - // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs
 440                                 anchor_outputs_value, // The anchor outputs value in satoshis
 441                         transaction_fee_satoshis: commitment_tx_fee,
 442                 }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
 443         if !prev_commitment_tx {
 444                 a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
 445         }
 446         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
 447                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 448         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 449                         amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
 450                         transaction_fee_satoshis: 0,
 451                 }],
 452                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 453
 454         // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
 455         // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
 456         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 457         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 458         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 459
 460         if anchors {
 461                 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 462                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 463                 match events.pop().unwrap() {
 464                         Event::BumpTransaction(bump_event) => {
 465                                 let mut first_htlc_event = bump_event.clone();
 466                                 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut first_htlc_event {
 467                                         htlc_descriptors.remove(1);
 468                                 } else {
 469                                         panic!("Unexpected event");
 470                                 }
 471                                 let mut second_htlc_event = bump_event;
 472                                 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut second_htlc_event {
 473                                         htlc_descriptors.remove(0);
 474                                 } else {
 475                                         panic!("Unexpected event");
 476                                 }
 477                                 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&first_htlc_event);
 478                                 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&second_htlc_event);
 479                         },
 480                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 481                 }
 482         }
 483
 484         let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
 485         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 486         // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
 487         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
 488         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
 489         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
 490         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
 491         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 492         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 493
 494         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 495         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 496         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 497         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 498         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 499         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 500         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 501         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 502         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 503         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 504
 505         // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
 506         // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
 507         // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
 508         // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
 509         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 510         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 511         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
 512                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 513         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 514                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 515                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 516                 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 517                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 518         // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
 519         // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
 520         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 521                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 522                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 523                 },
 524                 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
 525                 // long.
 526                 received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 527                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 528
 529         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 530         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
 531         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 532
 533         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
 534         // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
 535         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 536                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 537         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 538                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 539                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 540                 }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 541                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 542
 543         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0], false);
 544         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 545
 546         // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
 547         // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
 548         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 549         if prev_commitment_tx {
 550                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
 551         } else {
 552                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, false);
 553         }
 554         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 555                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 556         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 557         assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()],
 558                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 559
 560         // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
 561         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 562         let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 563         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 564         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 565         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 566         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 567         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 568         assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
 569                    a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
 570         // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
 571         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 572         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 573
 574         // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
 575         // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
 576         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 577         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 578         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 579                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 580                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 581                 }],
 582                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 583         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
 584         // balance entry.
 585         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 586         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 587                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 588         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
 589
 590         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1], false);
 591
 592         // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
 593         // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
 594         // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
 595         let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 596         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 597
 598         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 599                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 600                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 601                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 602                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 603                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 604                 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 605                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 606
 607         // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
 608         // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
 609         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 610         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0], anchors);
 611
 612         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 613                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 614                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 615                 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 616                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 617
 618         // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
 619         // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
 620         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 621         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0], anchors);
 622
 623         assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
 624                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 625
 626         // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
 627         // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
 628         // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
 629         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 630         assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
 631                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 632         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 633         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 634                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 635
 636         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 637         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 638         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 639         for node in nodes.iter() {
 640                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 641                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 642                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 643                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 644         }
 645 }
 646
 647 #[test]
 648 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
 649         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, true);
 650         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, false);
 651         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, true);
 652         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, false);
 653 }
 654
 655 fn do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(anchors: bool) {
 656         // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
 657         // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
 658         // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
 659         // delay prior to spendability.
 660         //
 661         // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
 662         // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
 663         // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
 664         // claim by our counterparty).
 665         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 666         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 667         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
 668         if anchors {
 669                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
 670                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
 671         }
 672         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
 673         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 674
 675         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
 676                 version: 2,
 677                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
 678                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
 679                 output: vec![
 680                         TxOut {
 681                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
 682                                 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
 683                         },
 684                         TxOut {
 685                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
 686                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
 687                         },
 688                 ],
 689         };
 690         if anchors {
 691                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
 692                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
 693         }
 694
 695         // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
 696         // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
 697         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
 698         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 699
 700         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
 701         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 702         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
 703                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 704         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 705
 706         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 707         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 708         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 709
 710         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 711         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
 712
 713         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
 714         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
 715                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
 716         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 717
 718         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 719         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 720         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 721
 722         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 723         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
 724         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
 725         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 726         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 727         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
 728
 729         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 730         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 731
 732         // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
 733         // claimable balances.
 734         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 735         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 736         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 737         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 738         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 739         let commitment_tx = {
 740                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
 741                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
 742                 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
 743                 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
 744                 commitment_tx
 745         };
 746         let commitment_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx));
 747         if anchors && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
 748                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
 749                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
 750                 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid());
 751         }
 752
 753         let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 754                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 755                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 756                 payment_hash,
 757                 outbound_payment: true,
 758         };
 759         let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 760                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 761                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 762                 payment_hash: payment_hash_2,
 763                 outbound_payment: true,
 764         };
 765
 766         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
 767                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 768         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
 769         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 770                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 771                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 772                 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 773                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 774
 775         // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
 776         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
 777         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 778         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 779         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 780         let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 781         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
 782         check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], commitment_tx);
 783
 784         // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
 785         // transaction.
 786         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
 787         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 788                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 789                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 790                 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 791                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 792         if anchors {
 793                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 2);
 794         }
 795         let timeout_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
 796         assert_eq!(timeout_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
 797         check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[0], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
 798         check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[1], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
 799
 800         // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
 801         // "awaiting confirmations" one.
 802         let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 803         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0]);
 804         // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
 805         // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
 806         // call, as described, two hunks down.
 807         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 808                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 809                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 810                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 811                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 812                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 813                 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 814                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 815
 816         // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
 817         // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
 818         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
 819         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, true, false);
 820         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 821                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 822                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 823                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 824                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 825                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 826                 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 827                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 828
 829         // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
 830         // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
 831         // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
 832         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 833         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
 834
 835         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 836                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 837                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 838                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 839                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 840                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 841                 }]),
 842                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 843
 844         // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 845         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 846         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
 847         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
 848                 .get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
 849         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 850         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 851                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 852                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 853                 }],
 854                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 855         let to_self_spendable_output = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
 856         assert_eq!(
 857                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a),
 858                 to_self_spendable_output
 859         );
 860
 861         // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 862         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 863         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 864         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 865         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0], false);
 866
 867         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 868         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 869         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 870         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 871         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 872         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 873         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 874 }
 875
 876 #[test]
 877 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
 878         do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(false);
 879         do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(true);
 880 }
 881
 882 #[test]
 883 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
 884         // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
 885         // have a preimage.
 886         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 887         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 888         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 889         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 890
 891         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
 892         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 893
 894         // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
 895         let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
 896         let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
 897         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 898
 899         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 900         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 901
 902         let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 903                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 904                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 905                 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
 906                 outbound_payment: true,
 907         };
 908         let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 909                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 910                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 911                 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
 912         };
 913         let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 914                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 915                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 916                 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
 917         };
 918         let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 919                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 920                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 921                 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
 922                 outbound_payment: true,
 923         };
 924
 925         // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
 926         // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
 927         // HTLC output is spent.
 928         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
 929                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 930         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 931                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - commitment_tx_fee,
 932                         transaction_fee_satoshis: commitment_tx_fee,
 933                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
 934                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 935
 936         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 937                         amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
 938                         transaction_fee_satoshis: 0,
 939                 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
 940                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 941
 942         // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
 943         let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 944         assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
 945         check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
 946         check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
 947
 948         // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
 949         // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
 950         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 951         let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 952                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 953                                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 954                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 955                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
 956
 957         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 958         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
 959         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 960         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 961         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 962
 963         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 964                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 965
 966         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 967         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 968         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 969         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 970
 971         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
 972         let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 973                         amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
 974                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 975                 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
 976         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 977                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 978
 979         // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
 980         // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
 981         // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
 982         // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
 983
 984         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
 985         let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 986         assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
 987         check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
 988         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
 989                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
 990
 991         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 992                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 993
 994         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 995         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 996                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 997
 998         // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
 999         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1000         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0], false);
1001         bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
1002
1003         // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
1004         nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
1005         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1));
1006         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
1007                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
1008         let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1009         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
1010         check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
1011
1012         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1013                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1014
1015         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1016         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1017                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1018
1019         // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
1020         // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
1021         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1022         let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
1023         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1024                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1025                                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1026                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1027                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1028                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1029                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
1030                 }]),
1031                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1032
1033         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1034         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1035                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1036                                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1037                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1038                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1039                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1040                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
1041                 }]),
1042                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1043
1044         // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
1045         // payment failure event.
1046         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1047         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
1048
1049         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1050         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1051                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1052                                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1053                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1054                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1055                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1056                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1057                 }]),
1058                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1059
1060         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1061         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1062                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1063                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1064                 }],
1065                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1066         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0], false);
1067
1068         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1069         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1070         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1071
1072         // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
1073         // was already claimed.
1074         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1075         let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1076         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1077                         amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1078                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1079                 }]),
1080                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1081
1082         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1083         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1084                         amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1085                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1086                 }]),
1087                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1088
1089         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1090         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
1091
1092         assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
1093                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1094         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1095
1096         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1097         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1098
1099         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1100         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1101         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1102         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1103         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1104         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1105         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1106 }
1107
1108 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
1109         let mut v = v_orig.clone();
1110         for t in extra_ts {
1111                 v.push((*t).clone());
1112         }
1113         v.sort_unstable();
1114         v
1115 }
1116
1117 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(anchors: bool, confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
1118         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
1119         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1120         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1121         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1122         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1123         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1124         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1125         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1126         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1127         if anchors {
1128                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1129                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1130         }
1131         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1132         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1133
1134         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1135                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1136         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1137         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1138
1139         // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
1140         //
1141         // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
1142         // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
1143         // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
1144         // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
1145         // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
1146         //     later commitment transaction updates
1147         //
1148         // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
1149         // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
1150         // HTLCs individually.
1151
1152         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
1153         let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1154         let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1155
1156         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1157
1158         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1159         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1160
1161         let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1162         let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1163
1164         // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1165         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1166         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1167
1168         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1169
1170         let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1171         let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1172
1173         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1174         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1175         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1176         let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1177
1178         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1179         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1180         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1181
1182         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1183         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1184         let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1185                 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1186                 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1187         events.retain(|ev| {
1188                 match ev {
1189                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1190                                 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1191                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1192                                 false
1193                         },
1194                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1195                                 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1196                                 false
1197                         },
1198                         _ => true,
1199                 }
1200         });
1201         assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1202         if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1203         match &events[1] {
1204                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, .. } => {},
1205                 _ => panic!(),
1206         }
1207
1208         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1209         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1210         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1211         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1212
1213         // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1214         // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1215         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1216                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1217                         transaction_fee_satoshis: 0,
1218                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1219                         amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1220                         claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1221                         payment_hash: missing_htlc_payment_hash,
1222                         outbound_payment: true,
1223                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1224                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1225                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1226                         payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
1227                         outbound_payment: true,
1228                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1229                         amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1230                         claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1231                         payment_hash: live_payment_hash,
1232                         outbound_payment: true,
1233                 }]),
1234                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1235
1236         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1237         let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1238         // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1239         // quite soon.
1240         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1241         claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
1242
1243         // The following constants were determined experimentally
1244         const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 483;
1245         let outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: usize = if anchors { 574 } else { 571 };
1246         let inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: usize = if anchors { 582 } else { 578 };
1247
1248         // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1249         // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1250         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1251         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1252         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1253         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1254
1255         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1256                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1257         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1258         let inbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight as u64 / 1000;
1259         let outbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight as u64 / 1000;
1260         let to_self_claim_fee = chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000;
1261
1262         // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1263         // claim balances separated out.
1264         let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1265                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1266                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1267                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1268                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1269                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1270                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1271                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1272                 }];
1273
1274         let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1275                 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1276         };
1277         let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1278         let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1279                 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1280         };
1281         let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1282
1283         // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1284         // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1285         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1286                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1287
1288         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1289                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1290                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1291                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1292         } else {
1293                 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1294                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1295                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1296                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1297         }
1298
1299         let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1300                 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1301                 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1302         };
1303         let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1304                 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
1305                 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1306         };
1307
1308         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1309                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1310                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1311         } else {
1312                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1313                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1314         }
1315
1316         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1317                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1318         } else {
1319                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1320         }
1321         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1322                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1323
1324         // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1325         // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1326         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1327         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1328
1329         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1330                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1331                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1332                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1333                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1334                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
1335                         confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1336                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1337                         amount_satoshis: 3_000 - outbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1338                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1339                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1340                         amount_satoshis: 4_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1341                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1342                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1343                         amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1344                         confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1345                 }]),
1346                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1347
1348         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1349         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1350
1351         let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1352         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
1353                 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1354         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
1355                 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1356
1357         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1358         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }], false);
1359         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1360         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }], false);
1361         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1362         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1363         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0], false);
1364         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1365         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1], false);
1366         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1367         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1368
1369         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1370         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1371         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1372         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1373         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1374         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1375         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1376 }
1377
1378 #[test]
1379 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1380         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, true);
1381         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, false);
1382         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, true);
1383         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, false);
1384 }
1385
1386 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(anchors: bool) {
1387         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1388         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1389         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1390         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1391         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1392         if anchors {
1393                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1394                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1395         }
1396         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1397         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1398
1399         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1400                 version: 2,
1401                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1402                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1403                 output: vec![
1404                         TxOut {
1405                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1406                                 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1407                         },
1408                         TxOut {
1409                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1410                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1411                         },
1412                 ],
1413         };
1414         if anchors {
1415                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1416                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
1417         }
1418
1419         // Create some initial channels
1420         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1421                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 12_000_000);
1422         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1423         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1424
1425         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1426         let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1427         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1428         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1429         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1430         if anchors {
1431                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[4].value, 11000); // to_self output
1432         } else {
1433                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[2].value, 11000); // to_self output
1434         }
1435
1436         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs, an output for each side, and an
1437         // anchor output for each side if enabled.
1438         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if anchors { 6 } else { 4 });
1439
1440         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1441
1442         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1443         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1444
1445         // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1446         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1447         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1448         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1449         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1450         if anchors {
1451                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 1);
1452         }
1453         let revoked_htlc_success = {
1454                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1455                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1456                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1457                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, if anchors { 3 } else { 1 });
1458                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(),
1459                         if anchors { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS } else { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT });
1460                 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1461                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1462         };
1463         let revoked_htlc_success_fee = chan_feerate * revoked_htlc_success.weight() as u64 / 1000;
1464
1465         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1466         if anchors {
1467                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 2);
1468         }
1469         let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
1470                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1471                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1472                 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
1473                         txn.remove(1)
1474                 } else {
1475                         txn.remove(0)
1476                 }
1477         };
1478         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1479         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
1480         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time.0, 0);
1481         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0, 0);
1482
1483         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1484         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1485         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1486         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1487         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1488         let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1489
1490         let revoked_to_self_claim = {
1491                 let mut as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1492                 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1493                 if anchors {
1494                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1495                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 4); // Separate to_remote claim
1496                         check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1497                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
1498                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1499                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
1500                         check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1501                         Some(as_commitment_claim_txn.remove(0))
1502                 } else {
1503                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1504                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1505                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1506                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
1507                         check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1508                         None
1509                 }
1510         };
1511
1512         // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1513         // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1514         // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1515         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1516                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1517         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1518         let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1519                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1520                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1521                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1522                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1523                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1524                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1525                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1526                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1527                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1528                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1529                 }]);
1530         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1531                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1532
1533         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
1534         let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1535         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1536         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1537         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
1538         // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked outputs (which no longer includes the
1539         // spent HTLC output)
1540         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1541         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1542         if !anchors {
1543                 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1544         }
1545         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1546
1547         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1548                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1549
1550         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1551         let as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee = chan_feerate * as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight() as u64 / 1000;
1552         if anchors {
1553                 // With anchors, B can pay for revoked_htlc_success's fee with additional inputs, rather
1554                 // than with the HTLC itself.
1555                 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1556                         3_000 - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
1557         } else {
1558                 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1559                         3_000 - revoked_htlc_success_fee - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
1560         }
1561
1562         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1563         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1564                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1565                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1566                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1567                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1568                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1569                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1570                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1571                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1572                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1573                         amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1574                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1575                 }]),
1576                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1577
1578         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1579         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], false);
1580         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1581                         // to_self output to B
1582                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1583                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1584                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1585                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1586                         amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1587                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1588                 }]),
1589                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1590
1591         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1592         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0], false);
1593         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1594                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1595                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1596                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1597                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1598                 }]),
1599                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1600
1601         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1602         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1603                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1604         // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1605         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1606         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1607                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1608         }
1609
1610         // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1611         // claiming.
1612         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1613         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1614         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1615                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1616         }
1617
1618         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
1619         let (revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, revoked_to_self_claim) = {
1620                 let mut as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1621                 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1622                 if anchors {
1623                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1624                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1625                         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1626                         (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), revoked_to_self_claim.unwrap())
1627                 } else {
1628                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1629                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1630                         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1631                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), 1);
1632                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1633                         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1634                         (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0))
1635                 }
1636         };
1637
1638         // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1639         // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1640         // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1641         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1642         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1643                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1644                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1645                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1646                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1647                 }]),
1648                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1649
1650         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim);
1651         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1652                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1653                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1654                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1655                         amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value,
1656                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1657                 }]),
1658                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1659
1660         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim);
1661         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1662                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1663                         amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.output[0].value,
1664                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1665                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1666                         amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value,
1667                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1668                 }]),
1669                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1670
1671         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1672         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, false);
1673         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1674         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim, false);
1675
1676         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1677
1678         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1679         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1680         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1681         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1682         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1683         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1684         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1685 }
1686
1687 #[test]
1688 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1689         do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(false);
1690         do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(true);
1691 }
1692
1693 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(anchors: bool) {
1694         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1695         // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1696         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1697         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1698         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1699         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1700         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1701         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1702         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1703         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1704         if anchors {
1705                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1706                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1707         }
1708         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1709         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1710
1711         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1712                 version: 2,
1713                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1714                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1715                 output: vec![TxOut {
1716                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1717                         script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1718                 }],
1719         };
1720         nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1721
1722         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1723                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1724         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1725         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1726
1727         // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1728         // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1729         // revocation-claim transaction.
1730
1731         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1732         let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1733
1734         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1735
1736         // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1737         // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1738         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1739                 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1740
1741         // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1742         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1743
1744         assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1745         check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1746         if !anchors {
1747                 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1748         }
1749
1750         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1751         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1752
1753         {
1754                 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1755                 *feerate += 1;
1756         }
1757         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1758         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1759
1760         let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1761         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1762         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1763
1764         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1765         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1766         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1767         let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1768
1769         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1770                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1771                         transaction_fee_satoshis: 0,
1772                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1773                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1774                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1775                         payment_hash: revoked_payment_hash,
1776                         outbound_payment: true,
1777                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1778                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1779                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1780                         payment_hash: claimed_payment_hash,
1781                         outbound_payment: true,
1782                 }]),
1783                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1784
1785         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1786         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1787         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1788         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1789
1790         let mut claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1791         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1792         let revoked_to_self_claim = if anchors {
1793                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1794                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 5); // Separate to_remote claim
1795                 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1796                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
1797                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1798                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
1799                 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1800                 Some(claim_txn.remove(0))
1801         } else {
1802                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1803                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1804                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1805                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
1806                 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1807                 None
1808         };
1809
1810         let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1811
1812         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1813                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1814         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1815         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1816                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1817                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1818                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1819                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1820                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1821                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1822                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1823                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1824                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1825                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1826                 }]),
1827                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1828
1829         // Confirm A's HTLC-Success transaction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1830         // new claim.
1831         if anchors {
1832                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1833                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1834                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1835                 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
1836                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
1837         }
1838         let htlc_success_claim = if anchors {
1839                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1840                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1841                 check_spends!(txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1842                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1843         } else {
1844                 as_revoked_txn[1].clone()
1845         };
1846         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_claim);
1847         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage, None, true, false);
1848
1849         let mut claim_txn_2 = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1850         // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1851         // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1852         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1853         if anchors {
1854                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1);
1855                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1856                 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], &htlc_success_claim);
1857                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1858                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1859                 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1860         } else {
1861                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1);
1862                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1863                 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1864                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 2);
1865                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1866                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 1);
1867                 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1868         }
1869
1870         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1871                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1872                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1873                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1874                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1875                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1876                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1877                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1878                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1879                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1880                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1881                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1882                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1883                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1884                 }]),
1885                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1886
1887         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1888         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1889
1890         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1891                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1892                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1893                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1894                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1895                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1896                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1897                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1898                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1899                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1900                 }]),
1901                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1902
1903         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1904         let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1905
1906         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1907                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1908                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1909                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1910                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1911                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1912                         amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
1913                         confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1914                 }]),
1915                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1916
1917         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1918         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0], false);
1919
1920         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1921                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1922                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1923                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1924                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1925                 }]),
1926                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1927
1928         if anchors {
1929                 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&claim_txn_2[1], revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap()]);
1930         } else {
1931                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1932         }
1933         let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1934
1935         if anchors {
1936                 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1937                                 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1938                                 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1939                         }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1940                                 amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap().output[0].value,
1941                                 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1942                         }],
1943                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1944         } else {
1945                 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1946                                 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1947                                 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1948                         }],
1949                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1950         }
1951
1952         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1953
1954         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1955         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1956         if anchors {
1957                 let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1958                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1959                 for (i, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
1960                         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = event {
1961                                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
1962                                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
1963                                         &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
1964                                         253, None, &Secp256k1::new()
1965                                 ).unwrap();
1966                                 check_spends!(spend_tx, if i == 0 { &claim_txn_2[1] } else { revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap() });
1967                         } else { panic!(); }
1968                 }
1969         } else {
1970                 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1], false);
1971         }
1972         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1973
1974         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1975         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1976         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1977         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1978         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1979         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1980         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1981 }
1982
1983 #[test]
1984 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
1985         do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(false);
1986         do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(true);
1987 }
1988
1989 fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
1990         // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
1991         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1992         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1993         let persister;
1994         let new_chain_monitor;
1995
1996         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1997         let node_deserialized;
1998
1999         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2000
2001         // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
2002         // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
2003         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
2004         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
2005
2006         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2007         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2008         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2009         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
2010                  [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2011
2012         let commitment_tx = {
2013                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2014                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2015                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
2016                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2017                 txn.pop().unwrap()
2018         };
2019
2020         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2021
2022         // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
2023         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
2024         let htlc_timeout_tx = {
2025                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2026                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2027                 check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
2028                 txn.pop().unwrap()
2029         };
2030
2031         // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
2032         // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
2033         if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
2034                 let serialized_monitor = hex::decode(
2035                         "0101fffffffffffffffff9550f22c95100160014d5a9aa98b89acc215fc3d23d6fec0ad59ca3665f00002200204c5f18e5e95b184f34d02ba6de8a2a4e36ae3d4ec87299ad81f3284dc7195c6302d7dde8e10a5a22c9bd0d7ef5494d85683ac050253b917615d4f97af633f0a8e2035f5e9d58b4328566223c107d86cf853e6b9fae1d26ff6d969be0178d1423c4ea0016001467822698d782e8421ebdf96d010de99382b7ec2300160014caf6d80fe2bab80473b021f57588a9c384bf23170000000000000000000000004d49e5da0000000000000000000000000000002a0270b20ad0f2c2bb30a55590fc77778495bc1b38c96476901145dda57491237f0f74c52ab4f11296d62b66a6dba9513b04a3e7fb5a09a30cee22fce7294ab55b7e00000022002034c0cc0ad0dd5fe61dcf7ef58f995e3d34f8dbd24aa2a6fae68fefe102bf025c21391732ce658e1fe167300bb689a81e7db5399b9ee4095e217b0e997e8dd3d17a0000000000000000004a002103adde8029d3ee281a32e9db929b39f503ff9d7e93cd308eb157955344dc6def84022103205087e2dc1f6b9937e887dfa712c5bdfa950b01dbda3ebac4c85efdde48ee6a04020090004752210307a78def56cba9fc4db22a25928181de538ee59ba1a475ae113af7790acd0db32103c21e841cbc0b48197d060c71e116c185fa0ac281b7d0aa5924f535154437ca3b52ae00000000000186a0ffffffffffff0291e7c0a3232fb8650a6b4089568a81062b48a768780e5a74bb4a4a74e33aec2c029d5760248ec86c4a76d9df8308555785a06a65472fb995f5b392d520bbd000650090c1c94b11625690c9d84c5daa67b6ad19fcc7f9f23e194384140b08fcab9e8e810000ffffffffffff000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000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2036                 ).unwrap();
2037                 reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2038         }
2039
2040         // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
2041         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
2042         if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
2043                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2044         }
2045         {
2046                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2047                 if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
2048                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
2049                 } else {
2050                         assert!(txn.len() < 6);
2051                 }
2052                 for tx in txn {
2053                         assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
2054                         assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
2055                         assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
2056                         assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
2057                 }
2058         }
2059 }
2060
2061 #[test]
2062 fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
2063         do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
2064         do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
2065 }
2066
2067 fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) {
2068         // Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every
2069         // `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call.
2070         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2071         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2072         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
2073         if anchors {
2074                 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2075                 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2076         }
2077         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
2078         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2079
2080         let (_, _, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
2081                 &nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 500_000_000
2082         );
2083         const HTLC_AMT_MSAT: u64 = 1_000_000;
2084         const HTLC_AMT_SAT: u64 = HTLC_AMT_MSAT / 1000;
2085         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_AMT_MSAT);
2086
2087         let htlc_expiry = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1;
2088
2089         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(&nodes[0], &chan_id);
2090         assert_eq!(commitment_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 /* commitment tx only */} else { 2 /* commitment and htlc timeout tx */ });
2091         check_spends!(&commitment_txn[0], &funding_tx);
2092         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_txn[0]);
2093         check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
2094         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed,
2095                  false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
2096         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2097
2098         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2099                 version: 2,
2100                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2101                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2102                 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` on anchors
2103                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2104                         script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2105                 }],
2106         };
2107         nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2108
2109         // Set up a helper closure we'll use throughout our test. We should only expect retries without
2110         // bumps if fees have not increased after a block has been connected (assuming the height timer
2111         // re-evaluates at every block) or after `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` is called.
2112         let mut prev_htlc_tx_feerate = None;
2113         let mut check_htlc_retry = |should_retry: bool, should_bump: bool| -> Option<Transaction> {
2114                 let (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) = if anchors {
2115                         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
2116                         let events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2117                         assert_eq!(events.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
2118                         if !should_retry {
2119                                 return None;
2120                         }
2121                         match &events[0] {
2122                                 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2123                                         nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2124                                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2125                                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2126                                         let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2127                                         check_spends!(&htlc_tx, &commitment_txn[0], &coinbase_tx);
2128                                         let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value -
2129                                                 htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>();
2130                                         let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
2131                                         (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
2132                                 }
2133                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2134                         }
2135                 } else {
2136                         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2137                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2138                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
2139                         if !should_retry {
2140                                 return None;
2141                         }
2142                         let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2143                         check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]);
2144                         let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value;
2145                         let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
2146                         (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
2147                 };
2148                 if should_bump {
2149                         assert!(htlc_tx_feerate > prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take().unwrap());
2150                 } else if let Some(prev_feerate) = prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take() {
2151                         assert_eq!(htlc_tx_feerate, prev_feerate);
2152                 }
2153                 prev_htlc_tx_feerate = Some(htlc_tx_feerate);
2154                 Some(htlc_tx)
2155         };
2156
2157         // Connect blocks up to one before the HTLC expires. This should not result in a claim/retry.
2158         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_expiry - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
2159         check_htlc_retry(false, false);
2160
2161         // Connect one more block, producing our first claim.
2162         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2163         check_htlc_retry(true, false);
2164
2165         // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
2166         // transactions pre-anchors.
2167         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2168         check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2169
2170         // Trigger a call and we should have another retry, but without a bump.
2171         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2172         check_htlc_retry(true, false);
2173
2174         // Double the feerate and trigger a call, expecting a fee-bumped retry.
2175         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2176         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2177         check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2178
2179         // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
2180         // transactions pre-anchors.
2181         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2182         let htlc_tx = check_htlc_retry(true, anchors).unwrap();
2183
2184         // Mine the HTLC transaction to ensure we don't retry claims while they're confirmed.
2185         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_tx);
2186         // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transactions,
2187         // we'll receive an extra bumped claim.
2188         if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2189                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2190                 nodes[0].wallet_source.remove_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 1 });
2191                 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2192         }
2193         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2194         check_htlc_retry(false, false);
2195 }
2196
2197 #[test]
2198 fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() {
2199         do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false);
2200         do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true);
2201 }
2202
2203 #[test]
2204 fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
2205         // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
2206         // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
2207         // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
2208         // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
2209         // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
2210         // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
2211         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2212         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2213         let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
2214         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2215         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2216         anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2217         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2218         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2219
2220         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
2221                 &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
2222         );
2223         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
2224         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000);
2225
2226         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2227         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2228
2229         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2230
2231         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2232         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
2233
2234         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2235         {
2236                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2237                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2238                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2239         }
2240
2241         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
2242                 &payment_hash_2, &payment_preimage_2, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
2243                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
2244         );
2245         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
2246                 &payment_hash_1, &payment_preimage_1, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2247                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2248         );
2249
2250         let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2251         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
2252         let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
2253                 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2254                         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2255                                 version: 2,
2256                                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2257                                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2258                                 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2259                                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2260                                         script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2261                                 }],
2262                         };
2263                         nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2264                         nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2265                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2266                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2267                         let anchor_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2268                         let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2269                         check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2270                         check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2271                         (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
2272                 },
2273                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2274         };
2275
2276         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[2].value, 1_000); // HTLC A -> B
2277         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[3].value, 2_000); // HTLC B -> A
2278
2279         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2280         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2281         mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2282         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2283
2284         {
2285                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2286                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
2287
2288                 let htlc_preimage_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2289                 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
2290                 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
2291                 check_spends!(htlc_preimage_tx, commitment_tx);
2292
2293                 let htlc_timeout_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2294                 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
2295                 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
2296                 check_spends!(htlc_timeout_tx, commitment_tx);
2297
2298                 if let Some(commitment_tx) = txn.pop() {
2299                         check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2300                 }
2301         }
2302
2303         let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2304         // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2305         // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2306         if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2307                 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2308                 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
2309                 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2310         } else {
2311                 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2);
2312         }
2313         let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2314         for event in holder_events {
2315                 match event {
2316                         Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2317                                 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2318                                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2319                                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2320                                 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2321                                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx, anchor_tx);
2322                                 htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
2323                         },
2324                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2325                 }
2326         }
2327
2328         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
2329         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2330
2331         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2332
2333         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
2334
2335         let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2336         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2337         for event in holder_events {
2338                 match event {
2339                         Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
2340                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2341                 }
2342         }
2343
2344         // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
2345         nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2346         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2347         nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2348         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2349 }
2350
2351 #[test]
2352 fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
2353         // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
2354         // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
2355         // revoked commitment.
2356         let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2357         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2358         // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
2359         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2360         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2361         let bob_persister;
2362         let bob_chain_monitor;
2363
2364         let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
2365         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2366         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2367         anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2368         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2369         let bob_deserialized;
2370
2371         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2372
2373         let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2374         let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2375
2376         // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
2377         let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
2378
2379         // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
2380         let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2381         let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2382         let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2383         let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2384
2385         // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
2386         // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
2387         // present.
2388         let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
2389         let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
2390
2391         // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
2392         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
2393         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
2394         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
2395         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
2396
2397         // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
2398         // revoked state.
2399         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2400         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2401
2402         // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
2403         reload_node!(
2404                 nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
2405                 bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
2406         );
2407         for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
2408                 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
2409                 for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
2410                         monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
2411                                 &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2412                                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2413                         );
2414                 }
2415         }
2416
2417         // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
2418         // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
2419         // the HTLCs still pending.
2420         *nodes[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2421         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
2422         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
2423         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2424         let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = {
2425                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2426                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2427                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2428                 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2429                 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
2430                         check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
2431                         check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3);
2432                         (txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone())
2433                 } else {
2434                         check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3);
2435                         check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
2436                         (txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone())
2437                 }
2438         };
2439
2440         // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
2441         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2442         let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2443         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2444         let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2445         for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
2446                 let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat() * (idx + 1) as u64;
2447                 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2448                         version: 2,
2449                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2450                         input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2451                         output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2452                                 value: utxo_value,
2453                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2454                         }],
2455                 };
2456                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, utxo_value);
2457                 match event {
2458                         Event::BumpTransaction(event) => nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event),
2459                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2460                 };
2461                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2462                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2463                 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]);
2464                 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2465                 anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone());
2466         };
2467
2468         for node in &nodes {
2469                 mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_txs[1]]);
2470         }
2471         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
2472         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
2473         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2474
2475         // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
2476         // revoked outputs.
2477         {
2478                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2479                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
2480
2481                 let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() {
2482                         (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] })
2483                 } else {
2484                         (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] })
2485                 };
2486
2487                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2488                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
2489                 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
2490                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2491                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
2492                 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
2493         }
2494
2495         // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
2496         // through the success path.
2497         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2498         let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2499         // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2500         // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2501         match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
2502                 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
2503                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
2504                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
2505                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2506                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
2507                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2508
2509                 },
2510                 _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
2511         };
2512         let htlc_tx = {
2513                 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
2514                 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
2515                 let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2516                 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2517                         version: 2,
2518                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2519                         input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2520                         output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
2521                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2522                                 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
2523                         }],
2524                 };
2525                 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
2526                         version: 2,
2527                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2528                         input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
2529                                 previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2530                                 ..Default::default()
2531                         }],
2532                         output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
2533                                 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
2534                                 script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
2535                         }],
2536                 };
2537                 let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
2538                 for event in events {
2539                         // We don't use the `BumpTransactionEventHandler` here because it does not support
2540                         // creating one transaction from multiple `HTLCResolution` events.
2541                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
2542                                 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
2543                                 for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
2544                                         assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
2545                                         htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
2546                                         htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&secp));
2547                                 }
2548                                 descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
2549                                 htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
2550                         } else {
2551                                 panic!("Unexpected event");
2552                         }
2553                 }
2554                 for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
2555                         let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
2556                         let signer = htlc_descriptor.derive_channel_signer(&nodes[1].keys_manager);
2557                         let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
2558                         let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&secp);
2559                         htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
2560                 }
2561                 let fee_utxo_sig = {
2562                         let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
2563                         let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
2564                                 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2565                         ).unwrap()[..]);
2566                         let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2567                         let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2568                         sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2569                         sig
2570                 };
2571                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2572                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
2573                 htlc_tx
2574         };
2575
2576         for node in &nodes {
2577                 mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
2578         }
2579
2580         // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
2581         // the second level instead.
2582         let revoked_claim_transactions = {
2583                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2584                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2585
2586                 let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
2587                         tx.input.len() == 2 &&
2588                         tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2589                         tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
2590                 ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2591                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
2592                 for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
2593                         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
2594                 }
2595
2596                 let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = HashMap::new();
2597                 for current_tx in txn.into_iter() {
2598                         revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx);
2599                 }
2600                 revoked_claim_transaction_map
2601         };
2602         for node in &nodes {
2603                 mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claim_transactions.values().collect::<Vec<_>>());
2604         }
2605
2606
2607         // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
2608         // been reached.
2609         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2610         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
2611
2612         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2613         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2614
2615         // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2616         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2617         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2618
2619         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2620         let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2621         assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4);
2622         for event in spendable_output_events {
2623                 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event {
2624                         assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2625                         assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap()));
2626                         let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2627                                 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
2628                         ).unwrap();
2629
2630                         if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(_) = &outputs[0] {
2631                                 check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_a, &revoked_commitment_b);
2632                         } else {
2633                                 check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
2634                         }
2635                 } else {
2636                         panic!("unexpected event");
2637                 }
2638         }
2639
2640         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2641         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2642         // On the Alice side, the individual to_self_claim are still pending confirmation.
2643         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 2);
2644         // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
2645         // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
2646         // balances to claim.
2647         //
2648         // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
2649         // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
2650         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);
2651 }
2652
2653 fn do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(confirm_commitment_before_reload: bool) {
2654         // Tests that we'll fix a ChannelMonitor's `counterparty_payment_script` for an anchor outputs
2655         // channel upon deserialization.
2656         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2657         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2658         let persister;
2659         let chain_monitor;
2660         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2661         user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2662         user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2663         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2664         let node_deserialized;
2665         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2666
2667         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
2668
2669         // Set the monitor's `counterparty_payment_script` to a dummy P2WPKH script.
2670         let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2671         let privkey = bitcoin::PrivateKey::from_slice(&[1; 32], bitcoin::Network::Testnet).unwrap();
2672         let pubkey = bitcoin::PublicKey::from_private_key(&secp, &privkey);
2673         let p2wpkh_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&pubkey.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2674         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).set_counterparty_payment_script(p2wpkh_script.clone());
2675         assert_eq!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script(), p2wpkh_script);
2676
2677         // Confirm the counterparty's commitment and reload the monitor (either before or after) such
2678         // that we arrive at the correct `counterparty_payment_script` after the reload.
2679         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2680         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2681         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2682         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
2683                  [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2684
2685         let commitment_tx = {
2686                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2687                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2688                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 4);
2689                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2690                 txn.pop().unwrap()
2691         };
2692
2693         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2694         let commitment_tx_conf_height = if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2695                 // We should expect our round trip serialization check to fail as we're writing the monitor
2696                 // with the incorrect P2WPKH script but reading it with the correct P2WSH script.
2697                 *nodes[1].chain_monitor.expect_monitor_round_trip_fail.lock().unwrap() = Some(chan_id);
2698                 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2699                 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2700                 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2701                 commitment_tx_conf_height
2702         } else {
2703                 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2704                 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2705                 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2706                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2707                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
2708                 commitment_tx_conf_height
2709         };
2710         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2711                  [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2712         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script().is_v0_p2wsh());
2713
2714         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2715         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2716
2717         if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2718                 // If we saw the commitment before our `counterparty_payment_script` was fixed, we'll never
2719                 // get the spendable output event for the `to_remote` output, so we'll need to get it
2720                 // manually via `get_spendable_outputs`.
2721                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2722                 let outputs = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height);
2723                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2724                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2725                         &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
2726                         253, None, &secp
2727                 ).unwrap();
2728                 check_spends!(spend_tx, &commitment_tx);
2729         } else {
2730                 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx, false);
2731         }
2732 }
2733
2734 #[test]
2735 fn test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload() {
2736         do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(false);
2737         do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(true);
2738 }
2739
2740 #[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
2741 fn do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(anchors: bool, confirm_counterparty_commitment: bool) {
2742         // Tests that our monitor claims will always use fresh random signatures (ensuring a unique
2743         // wtxid) to prevent certain classes of transaction replacement at the bitcoin P2P layer.
2744         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2745         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2746         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2747         if anchors {
2748                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2749                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2750         }
2751         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2752         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2753
2754         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2755                 version: 2,
2756                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2757                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2758                 output: vec![
2759                         TxOut {
2760                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2761                                 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2762                         },
2763                 ],
2764         };
2765         if anchors {
2766                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2767         }
2768
2769         // Open a channel and route a payment. We'll let it timeout to claim it.
2770         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
2771         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
2772
2773         let (closing_node, other_node) = if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2774                 (&nodes[1], &nodes[0])
2775         } else {
2776                 (&nodes[0], &nodes[1])
2777         };
2778
2779         closing_node.node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &other_node.node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2780
2781         // The commitment transaction comes first.
2782         let commitment_tx = {
2783                 let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2784                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2785                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2786                 txn.pop().unwrap()
2787         };
2788
2789         mine_transaction(closing_node, &commitment_tx);
2790         check_added_monitors!(closing_node, 1);
2791         check_closed_broadcast!(closing_node, true);
2792         check_closed_event!(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
2793
2794         mine_transaction(other_node, &commitment_tx);
2795         check_added_monitors!(other_node, 1);
2796         check_closed_broadcast!(other_node, true);
2797         check_closed_event!(other_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [closing_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
2798
2799         // If we update the best block to the new height before providing the confirmed transactions,
2800         // we'll see another broadcast of the commitment transaction.
2801         if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2802                 let _ = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2803         }
2804
2805         // Then comes the HTLC timeout transaction.
2806         if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2807                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 5);
2808                 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
2809                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
2810         } else {
2811                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
2812         }
2813         if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2814                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
2815         }
2816         let htlc_timeout_tx = {
2817                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2818                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2819                 let tx = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == commitment_tx.txid() {
2820                         txn[0].clone()
2821                 } else {
2822                         txn[1].clone()
2823                 };
2824                 check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
2825                 tx
2826         };
2827
2828         // Check we rebroadcast it with a different wtxid.
2829         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2830         if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2831                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
2832         }
2833         {
2834                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2835                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2836                 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), htlc_timeout_tx.txid());
2837                 assert_ne!(txn[0].wtxid(), htlc_timeout_tx.wtxid());
2838         }
2839 }
2840
2841 #[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
2842 #[test]
2843 fn test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures() {
2844         do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, false);
2845         do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, true);
2846         do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, false);
2847         do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, true);
2848 }