_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
  11
  12 use crate::sign::{ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner, OutputSpender, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
  13 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance};
  14 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  15 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight};
  16 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
  17 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
  18 use crate::ln::channel;
  19 use crate::ln::types::ChannelId;
  20 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
  21 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
  22 use crate::crypto::utils::sign;
  23 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
  24 use crate::util::scid_utils::block_from_scid;
  25 use crate::util::test_utils;
  26
  27 use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, ScriptBuf, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
  28 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
  29 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  30 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  31 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
  32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
  33 use bitcoin::sighash::{SighashCache, EcdsaSighashType};
  34 use bitcoin::transaction::Version;
  35
  36 use crate::prelude::*;
  37
  38 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  39
  40 #[test]
  41 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
  42         // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
  43         // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
  44         // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
  45         // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
  46         // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
  47         // HTLC.
  48         //
  49         // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
  50         //
  51         // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
  52         // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
  53         //
  54         // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
  55         // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
  56         // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
  57         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
  58         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
  59         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
  60         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  61
  62         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
  63         let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
  64
  65         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
  66         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
  67                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
  68         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
  69
  70         let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
  71
  72         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  73         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
  74         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
  75
  76         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  77         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
  78         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  79
  80         // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
  81         // transaction for nodes[1].
  82         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
  83         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  84         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
  85         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
  86         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
  87
  88         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
  89         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
  90         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  91         let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
  92
  93         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
  94         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
  95         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
  96 }
  97
  98 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction, has_anchors_htlc_event: bool) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
  99         let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 100         assert_eq!(spendable.len(), if has_anchors_htlc_event { 2 } else { 1 });
 101         if has_anchors_htlc_event {
 102                 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { .. }) = spendable.pop().unwrap() {}
 103                 else { panic!(); }
 104         }
 105         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 106                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 107                 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 108                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 109                 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
 110                 outputs
 111         } else { panic!(); }
 112 }
 113
 114 #[test]
 115 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
 116         // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
 117         // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
 118         // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
 119         // confirmations.
 120         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 121         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 122         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 123         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 124
 125         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
 126
 127         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
 128
 129         // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
 130         // before forwarding.
 131         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
 132         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
 133
 134         // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
 135         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
 136
 137         // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
 138         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
 139         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 140         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 141         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 142
 143         let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 144         assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
 145         check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
 146
 147         // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
 148         // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
 149         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 150         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 151         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 152
 153         // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
 154         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
 155         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 156         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 157
 158         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 159         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
 160 }
 161
 162 #[test]
 163 fn archive_fully_resolved_monitors() {
 164         // Test we can archive fully resolved channel monitor.
 165         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 166         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 167         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
 168         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
 169         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 170
 171         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 172                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 173
 174         nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 175         let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 176         nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
 177         let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 178         nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
 179
 180         let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 181         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
 182         let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 183         nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
 184         let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 185         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
 186         let (_, _) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 187
 188         let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 189
 190         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 191         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 192
 193         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 194         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
 195
 196         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 197         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 198
 199         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors().len(), 1);
 200         // First archive should set balances_empty_height to current block height
 201         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.archive_fully_resolved_channel_monitors();
 202         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors().len(), 1);
 203         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4032);
 204         // Second call after 4032 blocks, should archive the monitor
 205         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.archive_fully_resolved_channel_monitors();
 206         // Should have no monitors left
 207         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors().len(), 0);
 208         // Remove the corresponding outputs and transactions the chain source is
 209         // watching. This is to make sure the `Drop` function assertions pass.
 210         nodes.get_mut(0).unwrap().chain_source.remove_watched_txn_and_outputs(
 211                 OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 },
 212                 funding_tx.output[0].script_pubkey.clone()
 213         );
 214 }
 215
 216 fn do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(anchors: bool) {
 217         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
 218         // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
 219         // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
 220         // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
 221         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 222         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 223         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
 224         if anchors {
 225                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
 226                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
 227         }
 228         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
 229         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 230
 231         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 232                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 233         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 234         assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
 235
 236         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 237         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 238
 239         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000;
 240         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
 241         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 242                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value
 243                 }],
 244                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 245         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
 246                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 247
 248         nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 249         let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 250         nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
 251         let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 252         nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
 253
 254         let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 255         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
 256         let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 257         nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
 258         let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 259         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
 260         let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 261         assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
 262
 263         let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 264         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
 265         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
 266
 267         let shutdown_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]));
 268         let shutdown_tx_conf_height_b = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]));
 269
 270         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 271         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 272
 273         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 274         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 275
 276         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 277                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 278                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 279                 }],
 280                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 281         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 282                         amount_satoshis: 1000,
 283                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 284                 }],
 285                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 286
 287         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 288         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 289
 290         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
 291                 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
 292         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id)
 293                 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b).is_empty());
 294
 295         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 296         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
 297
 298         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 299                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 300         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 301                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 302
 303         let spendable_outputs_a = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
 304         assert_eq!(
 305                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a),
 306                 spendable_outputs_a
 307         );
 308
 309         let spendable_outputs_b = test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
 310         assert_eq!(
 311                 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b),
 312                 spendable_outputs_b
 313         );
 314
 315         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 316         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 317 }
 318
 319 #[test]
 320 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
 321         do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(false);
 322         do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(true);
 323 }
 324
 325 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
 326         v.sort_unstable();
 327         v
 328 }
 329
 330 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
 331 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
 332 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
 333 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
 334         let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 335         let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 336         eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
 337         assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
 338         assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
 339 }
 340
 341 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(anchors: bool, prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
 342         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
 343         // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
 344         // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
 345         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 346         if prev_commitment_tx {
 347                 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 348                 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 349                 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 350                 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
 351                 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
 352         }
 353         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 354         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
 355         if anchors {
 356                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
 357                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
 358         }
 359         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
 360         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 361
 362         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
 363                 version: Version::TWO,
 364                 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
 365                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
 366                 output: vec![
 367                         TxOut {
 368                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
 369                                 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
 370                         },
 371                         TxOut {
 372                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
 373                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
 374                         },
 375                 ],
 376         };
 377         if anchors {
 378                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
 379                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
 380         }
 381
 382         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 383                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 384         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 385         assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
 386
 387         // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
 388         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
 389         // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
 390         // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
 391         let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
 392         // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
 393         let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
 394
 395         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 396
 397         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 398         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 399
 400         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
 401         let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 402                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 403                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 404                 payment_hash,
 405         };
 406         let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 407                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 408                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 409                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 410         };
 411         let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 412                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 413                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 414                 payment_hash,
 415         };
 416         let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 417                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 418                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 419                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 420         };
 421         let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 422                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 423                 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 424                 payment_hash,
 425                 payment_preimage,
 426         };
 427         let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 428                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 429                 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 430                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 431                 payment_preimage: timeout_payment_preimage,
 432         };
 433
 434         // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
 435         // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
 436         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
 437                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 438         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
 439         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 440                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 441                 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 442                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 443         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 444                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 445                 }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 446                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 447
 448         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
 449         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 450         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
 451
 452         let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 453         // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
 454         // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
 455         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
 456         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 457         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
 458
 459         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
 460         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 461         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
 462
 463         if prev_commitment_tx {
 464                 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
 465                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
 466                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
 467                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
 468                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 469                 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 470                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
 471                 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 472                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 473                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
 474                 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 475                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 476         }
 477
 478         // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
 479         // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
 480         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
 481                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) +
 482                 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 483         let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 484                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
 485                                 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
 486                                 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
 487                                 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
 488                                 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
 489                                 commitment_tx_fee - // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs
 490                                 anchor_outputs_value, // The anchor outputs value in satoshis
 491                 }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
 492         if !prev_commitment_tx {
 493                 a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
 494         }
 495         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
 496                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 497         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 498                         amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
 499                 }],
 500                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 501
 502         // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
 503         // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
 504         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 505         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 506         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 507
 508         if anchors {
 509                 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 510                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 511                 match events.pop().unwrap() {
 512                         Event::BumpTransaction(bump_event) => {
 513                                 let mut first_htlc_event = bump_event.clone();
 514                                 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut first_htlc_event {
 515                                         htlc_descriptors.remove(1);
 516                                 } else {
 517                                         panic!("Unexpected event");
 518                                 }
 519                                 let mut second_htlc_event = bump_event;
 520                                 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut second_htlc_event {
 521                                         htlc_descriptors.remove(0);
 522                                 } else {
 523                                         panic!("Unexpected event");
 524                                 }
 525                                 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&first_htlc_event);
 526                                 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&second_htlc_event);
 527                         },
 528                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 529                 }
 530         }
 531
 532         let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
 533         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 534         // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
 535         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
 536         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
 537         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
 538         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
 539         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value.to_sat(), 3_000);
 540         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value.to_sat(), 4_000);
 541
 542         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 543         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 544         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 545         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 546         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 547         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 548         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 549         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 550         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 551         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 552
 553         // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
 554         // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
 555         // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
 556         // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
 557         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 558         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 559         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
 560                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 561         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 562                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 563                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 564                 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 565                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 566         // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
 567         // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
 568         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 569                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 570                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 571                 },
 572                 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
 573                 // long.
 574                 received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 575                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 576
 577         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 578         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
 579         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 580
 581         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
 582         // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
 583         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 584                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 585         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 586                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 587                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 588                 }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 589                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 590
 591         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0], false);
 592         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 593
 594         // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
 595         // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
 596         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 597         if prev_commitment_tx {
 598                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
 599         } else {
 600                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, false);
 601         }
 602         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 603                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 604         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 605         assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()],
 606                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 607
 608         // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
 609         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 610         let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 611         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 612         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 613         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 614         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 615         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 616         assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
 617                    a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
 618         // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
 619         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value.to_sat(), 3_000);
 620         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value.to_sat(), 4_000);
 621
 622         // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
 623         // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
 624         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 625         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 626         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 627                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 628                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 629                 }],
 630                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 631         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
 632         // balance entry.
 633         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 634         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 635                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 636         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
 637
 638         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1], false);
 639
 640         // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
 641         // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
 642         // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
 643         let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 644         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 645
 646         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 647                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 648                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 649                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 650                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 651                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 652                 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 653                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 654
 655         // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
 656         // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
 657         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 658         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0], anchors);
 659
 660         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 661                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 662                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 663                 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 664                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 665
 666         // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
 667         // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
 668         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 669         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0], anchors);
 670
 671         assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
 672                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 673
 674         // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
 675         // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
 676         // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
 677         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 678         assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
 679                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 680         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 681         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 682                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 683
 684         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 685         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 686         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 687         for node in nodes.iter() {
 688                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 689                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 690                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 691                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 692         }
 693 }
 694
 695 #[test]
 696 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
 697         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, true);
 698         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, false);
 699         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, true);
 700         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, false);
 701 }
 702
 703 fn do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(anchors: bool) {
 704         // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
 705         // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
 706         // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
 707         // delay prior to spendability.
 708         //
 709         // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
 710         // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
 711         // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
 712         // claim by our counterparty).
 713         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 714         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 715         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
 716         if anchors {
 717                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
 718                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
 719         }
 720         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
 721         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 722
 723         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
 724                 version: Version::TWO,
 725                 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
 726                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
 727                 output: vec![
 728                         TxOut {
 729                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
 730                                 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
 731                         },
 732                         TxOut {
 733                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
 734                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
 735                         },
 736                 ],
 737         };
 738         if anchors {
 739                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
 740                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
 741         }
 742
 743         // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
 744         // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
 745         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
 746         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 747
 748         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
 749         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 750         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
 751                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 752         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 753
 754         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 755         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 756         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 757
 758         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 759         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
 760
 761         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
 762         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
 763                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
 764         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 765
 766         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 767         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 768         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 769
 770         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 771         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
 772         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
 773         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 774         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 775         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
 776
 777         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 778         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 779
 780         // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
 781         // claimable balances.
 782         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
 783         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 784         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
 785         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 786         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 787         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 788         let commitment_tx = {
 789                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
 790                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
 791                 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
 792                 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
 793                 commitment_tx
 794         };
 795         let commitment_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx));
 796         if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
 797                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
 798                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
 799                 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid());
 800         }
 801
 802         let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 803                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 804                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 805                 payment_hash,
 806         };
 807         let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 808                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 809                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 810                 payment_hash: payment_hash_2,
 811         };
 812
 813         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
 814                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 815         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
 816         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 817                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 818                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 819                 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 820                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 821
 822         // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
 823         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
 824         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 825         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 826         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 827         let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 828         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
 829         check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], commitment_tx);
 830
 831         // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
 832         // transaction.
 833         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
 834         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 835                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 836                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 837                 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 838                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 839         if anchors {
 840                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 2);
 841         }
 842         let timeout_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
 843         assert_eq!(timeout_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
 844         check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[0], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
 845         check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[1], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
 846
 847         // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
 848         // "awaiting confirmations" one.
 849         let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 850         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0]);
 851         // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
 852         // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
 853         // call, as described, two hunks down.
 854         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 855                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 856                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 857                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 858                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 859                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 860                 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 861                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 862
 863         // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
 864         // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
 865         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
 866         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, true, false);
 867         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 868                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 869                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 870                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 871                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 872                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 873                 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 874                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 875
 876         // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
 877         // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
 878         // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
 879         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 880         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
 881
 882         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 883                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 884                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 885                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 886                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 887                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 888                 }]),
 889                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 890
 891         // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 892         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 893         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
 894         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
 895                 .get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
 896         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 897         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 898                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 899                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 900                 }],
 901                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 902         let to_self_spendable_output = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
 903         assert_eq!(
 904                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a),
 905                 to_self_spendable_output
 906         );
 907
 908         // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 909         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 910         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 911         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 912         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0], false);
 913
 914         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 915         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 916         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 917         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 918         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 919         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 920         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 921 }
 922
 923 #[test]
 924 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
 925         do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(false);
 926         do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(true);
 927 }
 928
 929 #[test]
 930 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
 931         // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
 932         // have a preimage.
 933         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 934         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 935         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 936         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 937
 938         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
 939         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 940
 941         // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
 942         let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
 943         let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
 944         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 945
 946         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 947         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 948
 949         let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 950                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 951                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 952                 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
 953         };
 954         let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 955                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 956                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 957                 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
 958         };
 959         let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 960                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 961                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 962                 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
 963         };
 964         let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 965                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 966                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 967                 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
 968         };
 969
 970         // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
 971         // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
 972         // HTLC output is spent.
 973
 974         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 975                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 976                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 977                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
 978                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 979
 980         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 981                         amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
 982                 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
 983                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 984
 985         // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
 986         let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 987         assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
 988         check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
 989         check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
 990
 991         // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
 992         // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
 993         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 994         let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 995                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 996                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 997                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 998                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
 999
1000         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
1001         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
1002         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1003         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1004         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1005
1006         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
1007                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1008
1009         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
1010         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1011         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1012         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1013
1014         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1015         let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1016                         amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
1017                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
1018                 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
1019         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1020                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1021
1022         // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
1023         // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
1024         // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
1025         // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
1026
1027         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1028         let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1029         assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
1030         check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
1031         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
1032                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
1033
1034         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
1035                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1036
1037         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1038         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
1039                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1040
1041         // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
1042         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1043         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0], false);
1044         bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
1045
1046         // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
1047         nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
1048         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1));
1049         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
1050                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
1051         let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1052         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
1053         check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
1054
1055         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1056                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1057
1058         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1059         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1060                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1061
1062         // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
1063         // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
1064         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1065         let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
1066         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1067                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1068                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1069                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1070                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1071                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1072                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
1073                 }]),
1074                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1075
1076         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1077         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1078                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1079                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1080                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1081                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1082                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1083                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
1084                 }]),
1085                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1086
1087         // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
1088         // payment failure event.
1089         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1090         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
1091
1092         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1093         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1094                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1095                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1096                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1097                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1098                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1099                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1100                 }]),
1101                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1102
1103         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1104         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1105                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1106                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1107                 }],
1108                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1109         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0], false);
1110
1111         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1112         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1113         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1114
1115         // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
1116         // was already claimed.
1117         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1118         let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1119         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1120                         amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1121                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1122                 }]),
1123                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1124
1125         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1126         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1127                         amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1128                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1129                 }]),
1130                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1131
1132         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1133         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
1134
1135         assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
1136                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1137         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1138
1139         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1140         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1141
1142         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1143         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1144         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1145         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1146         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1147         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1148         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1149 }
1150
1151 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
1152         let mut v = v_orig.clone();
1153         for t in extra_ts {
1154                 v.push((*t).clone());
1155         }
1156         v.sort_unstable();
1157         v
1158 }
1159
1160 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(anchors: bool, confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
1161         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
1162         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1163         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1164         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1165         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1166         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1167         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1168         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1169         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1170         if anchors {
1171                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1172                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1173         }
1174         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1175         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1176
1177         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1178                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1179         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1180         assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
1181
1182         // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
1183         //
1184         // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
1185         // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
1186         // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
1187         // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
1188         // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
1189         //     later commitment transaction updates
1190         //
1191         // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
1192         // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
1193         // HTLCs individually.
1194
1195         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
1196         let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1197         let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1198
1199         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1200
1201         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1202         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1203
1204         let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1205         let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1206
1207         // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1208         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1209         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1210
1211         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1212
1213         let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1214         let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1215
1216         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1217         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1218         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1219         let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1220
1221         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1222         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1223         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1224
1225         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1226         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1227         let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1228                 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1229                 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1230         events.retain(|ev| {
1231                 match ev {
1232                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1233                                 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1234                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1235                                 false
1236                         },
1237                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1238                                 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1239                                 false
1240                         },
1241                         _ => true,
1242                 }
1243         });
1244         assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1245         if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1246         match &events[1] {
1247                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, .. } => {},
1248                 _ => panic!(),
1249         }
1250
1251         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1252         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1253         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1254         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1255
1256         // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1257         // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1258         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1259                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1260                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1261                         amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1262                         claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1263                         payment_hash: missing_htlc_payment_hash,
1264                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1265                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1266                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1267                         payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
1268                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1269                         amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1270                         claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1271                         payment_hash: live_payment_hash,
1272                 }]),
1273                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1274
1275         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1276         let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1277         // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1278         // quite soon.
1279         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1280         claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value.to_sat()).sum::<u64>());
1281
1282         // The following constants were determined experimentally
1283         const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: u64 = 483;
1284         let outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: u64 = if anchors { 574 } else { 571 };
1285         let inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: u64 = if anchors { 582 } else { 578 };
1286
1287         // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1288         // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1289         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight().to_wu(), outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1290         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight().to_wu(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1291         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight().to_wu(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1292         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight().to_wu(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1293
1294         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1295                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1296         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1297         let inbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight / 1000;
1298         let outbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight / 1000;
1299         let to_self_claim_fee = chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight().to_wu() / 1000;
1300
1301         // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1302         // claim balances separated out.
1303         let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1304                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1305                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1306                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1307                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1308                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1309                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1310                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1311                 }];
1312
1313         let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1314                 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1315         };
1316         let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1317         let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1318                 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1319         };
1320         let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1321
1322         // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1323         // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1324         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1325                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1326
1327         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1328                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1329                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1330                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1331         } else {
1332                 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1333                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1334                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1335                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1336         }
1337
1338         let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1339                 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1340                 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1341         };
1342         let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1343                 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
1344                 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1345         };
1346
1347         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1348                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1349                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1350         } else {
1351                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1352                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1353         }
1354
1355         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1356                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1357         } else {
1358                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1359         }
1360         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1361                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1362
1363         // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1364         // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1365         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1366         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1367
1368         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1369                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1370                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1371                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1372                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1373                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
1374                         confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1375                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1376                         amount_satoshis: 3_000 - outbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1377                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1378                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1379                         amount_satoshis: 4_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1380                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1381                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1382                         amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1383                         confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1384                 }]),
1385                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1386
1387         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1388         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1389
1390         let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1391         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
1392                 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1393         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
1394                 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1395
1396         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1397         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }], false);
1398         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1399         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }], false);
1400         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1401         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1402         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0], false);
1403         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1404         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1], false);
1405         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1406         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1407
1408         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1409         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1410         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1411         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1412         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1413         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1414         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1415 }
1416
1417 #[test]
1418 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1419         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, true);
1420         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, false);
1421         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, true);
1422         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, false);
1423 }
1424
1425 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(anchors: bool) {
1426         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1427         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1428         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1429         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1430         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1431         if anchors {
1432                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1433                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1434         }
1435         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1436         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1437
1438         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1439                 version: Version::TWO,
1440                 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
1441                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1442                 output: vec![
1443                         TxOut {
1444                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
1445                                 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1446                         },
1447                         TxOut {
1448                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
1449                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1450                         },
1451                 ],
1452         };
1453         if anchors {
1454                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1455                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
1456         }
1457
1458         // Create some initial channels
1459         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1460                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 12_000_000);
1461         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1462         assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
1463
1464         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1465         let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1466         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1467         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1468         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1469         if anchors {
1470                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[4].value.to_sat(), 11000); // to_self output
1471         } else {
1472                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[2].value.to_sat(), 11000); // to_self output
1473         }
1474
1475         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs, an output for each side, and an
1476         // anchor output for each side if enabled.
1477         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if anchors { 6 } else { 4 });
1478
1479         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1480
1481         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1482         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1483
1484         // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1485         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1486         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1487         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1488         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1489         if anchors {
1490                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 1);
1491         }
1492         let revoked_htlc_success = {
1493                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1494                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1495                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1496                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, if anchors { 3 } else { 1 });
1497                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(),
1498                         if anchors { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS } else { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT });
1499                 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1500                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1501         };
1502         let revoked_htlc_success_fee = chan_feerate * revoked_htlc_success.weight().to_wu() / 1000;
1503
1504         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1505         if anchors {
1506                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 2);
1507         }
1508         let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
1509                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1510                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1511                 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
1512                         txn.remove(1)
1513                 } else {
1514                         txn.remove(0)
1515                 }
1516         };
1517         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1518         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
1519         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
1520         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
1521
1522         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1523         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1524         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1525         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1526         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1527         let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1528
1529         let revoked_to_self_claim = {
1530                 let mut as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1531                 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1532                 if anchors {
1533                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1534                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 4); // Separate to_remote claim
1535                         check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1536                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
1537                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1538                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
1539                         check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1540                         Some(as_commitment_claim_txn.remove(0))
1541                 } else {
1542                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1543                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1544                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1545                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
1546                         check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1547                         None
1548                 }
1549         };
1550
1551         // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1552         // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1553         // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1554         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1555                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1556         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1557         let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1558                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1559                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1560                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1561                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1562                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1563                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1564                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1565                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1566                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1567                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1568                 }]);
1569         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1570                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1571
1572         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
1573         let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1574         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1575         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1576         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
1577         // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked outputs (which no longer includes the
1578         // spent HTLC output)
1579         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1580         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1581         if !anchors {
1582                 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1583         }
1584         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1585
1586         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1587                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1588
1589         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1590         let as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee = chan_feerate * as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight().to_wu() / 1000;
1591         if anchors {
1592                 // With anchors, B can pay for revoked_htlc_success's fee with additional inputs, rather
1593                 // than with the HTLC itself.
1594                 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value.to_sat(),
1595                         3_000 - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
1596         } else {
1597                 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value.to_sat(),
1598                         3_000 - revoked_htlc_success_fee - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
1599         }
1600
1601         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1602         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1603                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1604                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1605                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1606                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1607                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1608                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1609                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1610                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1611                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1612                         amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value.to_sat(),
1613                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1614                 }]),
1615                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1616
1617         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1618         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], false);
1619         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1620                         // to_self output to B
1621                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1622                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1623                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1624                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1625                         amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value.to_sat(),
1626                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1627                 }]),
1628                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1629
1630         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1631         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0], false);
1632         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1633                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1634                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1635                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1636                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1637                 }]),
1638                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1639
1640         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1641         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1642                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1643         // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1644         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1645         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1646                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1647         }
1648
1649         // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1650         // claiming.
1651         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1652         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1653         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1654                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1655         }
1656
1657         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
1658         let (revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, revoked_to_self_claim) = {
1659                 let mut as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1660                 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1661                 if anchors {
1662                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1663                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1664                         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1665                         (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), revoked_to_self_claim.unwrap())
1666                 } else {
1667                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1668                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1669                         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1670                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), 1);
1671                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1672                         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1673                         (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0))
1674                 }
1675         };
1676
1677         // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1678         // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1679         // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1680         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1681         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1682                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1683                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1684                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1685                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1686                 }]),
1687                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1688
1689         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim);
1690         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1691                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1692                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1693                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1694                         amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value.to_sat(),
1695                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1696                 }]),
1697                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1698
1699         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim);
1700         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1701                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1702                         amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.output[0].value.to_sat(),
1703                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1704                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1705                         amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value.to_sat(),
1706                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1707                 }]),
1708                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1709
1710         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1711         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, false);
1712         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1713         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim, false);
1714
1715         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1716
1717         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1718         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1719         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1720         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1721         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1722         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1723         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1724 }
1725
1726 #[test]
1727 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1728         do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(false);
1729         do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(true);
1730 }
1731
1732 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(anchors: bool) {
1733         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1734         // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1735         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1736         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1737         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1738         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1739         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1740         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1741         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1742         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1743         if anchors {
1744                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1745                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1746         }
1747         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1748         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1749
1750         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1751                 version: Version::TWO,
1752                 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
1753                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1754                 output: vec![TxOut {
1755                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
1756                         script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1757                 }],
1758         };
1759         nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1760
1761         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1762                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1763         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1764         assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
1765
1766         // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1767         // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1768         // revocation-claim transaction.
1769
1770         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1771         let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1772
1773         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1774
1775         // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1776         // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1777         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1778                 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1779
1780         // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1781         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1782
1783         assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1784         check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1785         if !anchors {
1786                 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1787         }
1788
1789         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1790         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1791
1792         {
1793                 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1794                 *feerate += 1;
1795         }
1796         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1797         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1798
1799         let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1800         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1801         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1802
1803         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1804         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1805         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1806         let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1807
1808         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1809                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1810                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1811                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1812                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1813                         payment_hash: revoked_payment_hash,
1814                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1815                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1816                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1817                         payment_hash: claimed_payment_hash,
1818                 }]),
1819                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1820
1821         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1822         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1823         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1824         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1825
1826         let mut claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1827         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1828         let revoked_to_self_claim = if anchors {
1829                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1830                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 5); // Separate to_remote claim
1831                 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1832                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
1833                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1834                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
1835                 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1836                 Some(claim_txn.remove(0))
1837         } else {
1838                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1839                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1840                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1841                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
1842                 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1843                 None
1844         };
1845
1846         let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1847
1848         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1849                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1850         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1851         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1852                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1853                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1854                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1855                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1856                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1857                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1858                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1859                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1860                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1861                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1862                 }]),
1863                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1864
1865         // Confirm A's HTLC-Success transaction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1866         // new claim.
1867         if anchors {
1868                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1869                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1870                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1871                 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
1872                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
1873         }
1874         let htlc_success_claim = if anchors {
1875                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1876                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1877                 check_spends!(txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1878                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1879         } else {
1880                 as_revoked_txn[1].clone()
1881         };
1882         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_claim);
1883         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage, None, true, false);
1884
1885         let mut claim_txn_2 = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1886         // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1887         // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1888         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1889         if anchors {
1890                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1);
1891                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1892                 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], &htlc_success_claim);
1893                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1894                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1895                 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1896         } else {
1897                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1);
1898                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1899                 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1900                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 2);
1901                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1902                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 1);
1903                 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1904         }
1905
1906         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1907                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1908                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1909                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1910                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1911                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1912                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1913                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1914                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1915                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1916                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1917                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1918                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1919                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1920                 }]),
1921                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1922
1923         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1924         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1925
1926         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1927                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1928                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1929                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1930                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1931                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1932                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1933                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1934                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1935                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1936                 }]),
1937                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1938
1939         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1940         let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1941
1942         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1943                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1944                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1945                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1946                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1947                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1948                         amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value.to_sat(),
1949                         confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1950                 }]),
1951                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1952
1953         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1954         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0], false);
1955
1956         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1957                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1958                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1959                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1960                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1961                 }]),
1962                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1963
1964         if anchors {
1965                 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&claim_txn_2[1], revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap()]);
1966         } else {
1967                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1968         }
1969         let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1970
1971         if anchors {
1972                 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1973                                 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value.to_sat(),
1974                                 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1975                         }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1976                                 amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap().output[0].value.to_sat(),
1977                                 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1978                         }],
1979                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1980         } else {
1981                 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1982                                 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value.to_sat(),
1983                                 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1984                         }],
1985                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1986         }
1987
1988         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1989
1990         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1991         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1992         if anchors {
1993                 let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1994                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1995                 for (i, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
1996                         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = event {
1997                                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
1998                                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
1999                                         &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
2000                                         253, None, &Secp256k1::new()
2001                                 ).unwrap();
2002                                 check_spends!(spend_tx, if i == 0 { &claim_txn_2[1] } else { revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap() });
2003                         } else { panic!(); }
2004                 }
2005         } else {
2006                 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1], false);
2007         }
2008         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
2009
2010         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
2011         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
2012         // monitor events or claimable balances.
2013         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
2014         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
2015         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2016         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
2017 }
2018
2019 #[test]
2020 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
2021         do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(false);
2022         do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(true);
2023 }
2024
2025 fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
2026         // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
2027         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2028         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2029         let persister;
2030         let new_chain_monitor;
2031
2032         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2033         let node_deserialized;
2034
2035         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2036
2037         // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
2038         // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
2039         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
2040         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
2041         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
2042         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
2043         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2044         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2045         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, false,
2046                  [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2047
2048         let commitment_tx = {
2049                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2050                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2051                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
2052                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2053                 txn.pop().unwrap()
2054         };
2055
2056         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2057         if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2058                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2059                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2060                 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid());
2061         }
2062
2063         // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
2064         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
2065         let htlc_timeout_tx = {
2066                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2067                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2068                 check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
2069                 txn.pop().unwrap()
2070         };
2071
2072         // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
2073         // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
2074         if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
2075                 let serialized_monitor = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(
2076                         "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2077                 ).unwrap();
2078                 reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2079         }
2080
2081         // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
2082         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
2083         if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
2084                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2085         }
2086         {
2087                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2088                 if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
2089                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
2090                 } else {
2091                         assert!(txn.len() < 6);
2092                 }
2093                 for tx in txn {
2094                         assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
2095                         assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
2096                         assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
2097                         assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
2098                 }
2099         }
2100 }
2101
2102 #[test]
2103 fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
2104         do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
2105         do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
2106 }
2107
2108 fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) {
2109         // Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every
2110         // `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call.
2111         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2112         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2113         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
2114         if anchors {
2115                 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2116                 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2117         }
2118         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
2119         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2120
2121         let (_, _, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
2122                 &nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 500_000_000
2123         );
2124         const HTLC_AMT_MSAT: u64 = 1_000_000;
2125         const HTLC_AMT_SAT: u64 = HTLC_AMT_MSAT / 1000;
2126         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_AMT_MSAT);
2127
2128         let htlc_expiry = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1;
2129
2130         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(&nodes[0], &chan_id);
2131         assert_eq!(commitment_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 /* commitment tx only */} else { 2 /* commitment and htlc timeout tx */ });
2132         check_spends!(&commitment_txn[0], &funding_tx);
2133         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_txn[0]);
2134         check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
2135         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed,
2136                  false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
2137         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2138
2139         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2140                 version: Version::TWO,
2141                 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2142                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2143                 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` on anchors
2144                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
2145                         script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2146                 }],
2147         };
2148         nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2149
2150         // Set up a helper closure we'll use throughout our test. We should only expect retries without
2151         // bumps if fees have not increased after a block has been connected (assuming the height timer
2152         // re-evaluates at every block) or after `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` is called.
2153         let mut prev_htlc_tx_feerate = None;
2154         let mut check_htlc_retry = |should_retry: bool, should_bump: bool| -> Option<Transaction> {
2155                 let (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) = if anchors {
2156                         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
2157                         let events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2158                         assert_eq!(events.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
2159                         if !should_retry {
2160                                 return None;
2161                         }
2162                         match &events[0] {
2163                                 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2164                                         nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2165                                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2166                                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2167                                         let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2168                                         check_spends!(&htlc_tx, &commitment_txn[0], &coinbase_tx);
2169                                         let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value.to_sat() -
2170                                                 htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value.to_sat()).sum::<u64>();
2171                                         let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight().to_wu();
2172                                         (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
2173                                 }
2174                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2175                         }
2176                 } else {
2177                         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2178                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2179                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
2180                         if !should_retry {
2181                                 return None;
2182                         }
2183                         let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2184                         check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]);
2185                         let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value.to_sat();
2186                         let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight().to_wu();
2187                         (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
2188                 };
2189                 if should_bump {
2190                         assert!(htlc_tx_feerate > prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take().unwrap());
2191                 } else if let Some(prev_feerate) = prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take() {
2192                         assert_eq!(htlc_tx_feerate, prev_feerate);
2193                 }
2194                 prev_htlc_tx_feerate = Some(htlc_tx_feerate);
2195                 Some(htlc_tx)
2196         };
2197
2198         // Connect blocks up to one before the HTLC expires. This should not result in a claim/retry.
2199         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_expiry - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
2200         check_htlc_retry(false, false);
2201
2202         // Connect one more block, producing our first claim.
2203         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2204         check_htlc_retry(true, false);
2205
2206         // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
2207         // transactions pre-anchors.
2208         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2209         check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2210
2211         // Trigger a call and we should have another retry, but without a bump.
2212         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2213         check_htlc_retry(true, false);
2214
2215         // Double the feerate and trigger a call, expecting a fee-bumped retry.
2216         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2217         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2218         check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2219
2220         // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
2221         // transactions pre-anchors.
2222         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2223         let htlc_tx = check_htlc_retry(true, anchors).unwrap();
2224
2225         // Mine the HTLC transaction to ensure we don't retry claims while they're confirmed.
2226         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_tx);
2227         // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transactions,
2228         // we'll receive an extra bumped claim.
2229         if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2230                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2231                 nodes[0].wallet_source.remove_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 1 });
2232                 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2233         }
2234         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2235         check_htlc_retry(false, false);
2236 }
2237
2238 #[test]
2239 fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() {
2240         do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false);
2241         do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true);
2242 }
2243
2244 #[test]
2245 fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
2246         // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
2247         // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
2248         // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
2249         // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
2250         // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
2251         // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
2252         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2253         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2254         let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
2255         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2256         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2257         anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2258         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2259         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2260
2261         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
2262                 &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
2263         );
2264         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
2265         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000);
2266
2267         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2268         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2269
2270         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2271
2272         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2273         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
2274
2275         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2276         {
2277                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2278                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2279                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2280         }
2281
2282         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
2283                 &payment_hash_2, &payment_preimage_2, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
2284                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
2285         );
2286         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
2287                 &payment_hash_1, &payment_preimage_1, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2288                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2289         );
2290
2291         let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2292         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
2293         let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
2294                 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2295                         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2296                                 version: Version::TWO,
2297                                 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2298                                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2299                                 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2300                                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
2301                                         script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2302                                 }],
2303                         };
2304                         nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2305                         nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2306                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2307                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2308                         let anchor_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2309                         let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2310                         check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2311                         check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2312                         (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
2313                 },
2314                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2315         };
2316
2317         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[2].value.to_sat(), 1_000); // HTLC A -> B
2318         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[3].value.to_sat(), 2_000); // HTLC B -> A
2319
2320         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2321         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2322         mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2323         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2324
2325         {
2326                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2327                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
2328
2329                 let htlc_preimage_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2330                 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
2331                 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
2332                 check_spends!(htlc_preimage_tx, commitment_tx);
2333
2334                 let htlc_timeout_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2335                 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
2336                 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
2337                 check_spends!(htlc_timeout_tx, commitment_tx);
2338
2339                 if let Some(commitment_tx) = txn.pop() {
2340                         check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2341                 }
2342         }
2343
2344         let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2345         // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2346         // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2347         if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2348                 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2349                 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
2350                 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2351         } else {
2352                 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2);
2353         }
2354         let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2355         for event in holder_events {
2356                 match event {
2357                         Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2358                                 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2359                                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2360                                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2361                                 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2362                                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx, anchor_tx);
2363                                 htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
2364                         },
2365                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2366                 }
2367         }
2368
2369         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
2370         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2371
2372         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2373
2374         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
2375
2376         let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2377         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2378         for event in holder_events {
2379                 match event {
2380                         Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
2381                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2382                 }
2383         }
2384
2385         // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
2386         nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2387         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2388         nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2389         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2390 }
2391
2392 #[test]
2393 fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
2394         // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
2395         // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
2396         // revoked commitment.
2397         let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2398         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2399         // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
2400         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2401         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2402         let bob_persister;
2403         let bob_chain_monitor;
2404
2405         let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
2406         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2407         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2408         anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2409         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2410         let bob_deserialized;
2411
2412         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2413
2414         let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2415         let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2416
2417         // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
2418         let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
2419
2420         // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
2421         let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2422         let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2423         let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2424         let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2425
2426         // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
2427         // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
2428         // present.
2429         let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
2430         let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
2431
2432         // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
2433         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
2434         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
2435         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
2436         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
2437
2438         // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
2439         // revoked state.
2440         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2441         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2442
2443         // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
2444         reload_node!(
2445                 nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
2446                 bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
2447         );
2448         for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
2449                 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
2450                 for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
2451                         monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
2452                                 &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2453                                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2454                         );
2455                 }
2456         }
2457
2458         // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
2459         // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
2460         // the HTLCs still pending.
2461         *nodes[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2462         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
2463         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
2464         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2465
2466         // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
2467         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2468         let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2469         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2470         let mut revoked_commitment_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2471         let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2472         for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
2473                 let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC * (idx + 1) as u64;
2474                 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2475                         version: Version::TWO,
2476                         lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2477                         input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2478                         output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2479                                 value: utxo_value,
2480                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2481                         }],
2482                 };
2483                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, utxo_value);
2484                 match event {
2485                         Event::BumpTransaction(event) => nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event),
2486                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2487                 };
2488                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2489                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2490                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2491                 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
2492                         check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
2493                 } else {
2494                         check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
2495                 }
2496                 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]);
2497                 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2498
2499                 revoked_commitment_txs.push(commitment_tx.clone());
2500                 anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone());
2501         };
2502
2503         for node in &nodes {
2504                 mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_txs[0], &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_txs[1], &anchor_txs[1]]);
2505         }
2506         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
2507         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
2508         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2509
2510         // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
2511         // revoked outputs.
2512         {
2513                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2514                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
2515
2516                 let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_txs[0].txid() {
2517                         (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] })
2518                 } else {
2519                         (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] })
2520                 };
2521
2522                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2523                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
2524                 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_txs[0]);
2525                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2526                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
2527                 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_txs[1]);
2528         }
2529
2530         // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
2531         // through the success path.
2532         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2533         let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2534         // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2535         // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2536         match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
2537                 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
2538                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
2539                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
2540                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2541                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
2542                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2543
2544                 },
2545                 _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
2546         };
2547         let htlc_tx = {
2548                 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
2549                 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
2550                 let fee_utxo_script = ScriptBuf::new_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2551                 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2552                         version: Version::TWO,
2553                         lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2554                         input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2555                         output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
2556                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
2557                                 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
2558                         }],
2559                 };
2560                 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
2561                         version: Version::TWO,
2562                         lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2563                         input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
2564                                 previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2565                                 ..Default::default()
2566                         }],
2567                         output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
2568                                 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
2569                                 script_pubkey: ScriptBuf::new_op_return(&[]),
2570                         }],
2571                 };
2572                 let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
2573                 for event in events {
2574                         // We don't use the `BumpTransactionEventHandler` here because it does not support
2575                         // creating one transaction from multiple `HTLCResolution` events.
2576                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
2577                                 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
2578                                 for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
2579                                         assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
2580                                         htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
2581                                         htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&secp));
2582                                 }
2583                                 descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
2584                                 htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
2585                         } else {
2586                                 panic!("Unexpected event");
2587                         }
2588                 }
2589                 for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
2590                         let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
2591                         let signer = htlc_descriptor.derive_channel_signer(&nodes[1].keys_manager);
2592                         let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
2593                         let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&secp);
2594                         htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
2595                 }
2596                 let fee_utxo_sig = {
2597                         let witness_script = ScriptBuf::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
2598                         let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).p2wsh_signature_hash(
2599                                 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2600                         ).unwrap()[..]);
2601                         let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2602                         let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2603                         sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2604                         sig
2605                 };
2606                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_slice(&[fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2607                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_txs[0], revoked_commitment_txs[1]);
2608                 htlc_tx
2609         };
2610
2611         for node in &nodes {
2612                 mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
2613         }
2614
2615         // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
2616         // the second level instead.
2617         let revoked_claim_transactions = {
2618                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2619                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2620
2621                 let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
2622                         tx.input.len() == 2 &&
2623                         tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2624                         tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
2625                 ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2626                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
2627                 for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
2628                         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
2629                 }
2630
2631                 let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = new_hash_map();
2632                 for current_tx in txn.into_iter() {
2633                         revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx);
2634                 }
2635                 revoked_claim_transaction_map
2636         };
2637         for node in &nodes {
2638                 mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claim_transactions.values().collect::<Vec<_>>());
2639         }
2640
2641
2642         // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
2643         // been reached.
2644         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2645         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
2646
2647         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2648         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2649
2650         // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2651         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2652         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2653
2654         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2655         let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2656         assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4);
2657         for event in spendable_output_events {
2658                 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event {
2659                         assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2660                         assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap()));
2661                         let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2662                                 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), ScriptBuf::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
2663                         ).unwrap();
2664
2665                         if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(_) = &outputs[0] {
2666                                 check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_txs[1]);
2667                         } else {
2668                                 check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
2669                         }
2670                 } else {
2671                         panic!("unexpected event");
2672                 }
2673         }
2674
2675         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2676         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2677         // On the Alice side, the individual to_self_claim are still pending confirmation.
2678         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 2);
2679         // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
2680         // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
2681         // balances to claim.
2682         //
2683         // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
2684         // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
2685         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);
2686 }
2687
2688 fn do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(confirm_commitment_before_reload: bool) {
2689         // Tests that we'll fix a ChannelMonitor's `counterparty_payment_script` for an anchor outputs
2690         // channel upon deserialization.
2691         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2692         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2693         let persister;
2694         let chain_monitor;
2695         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2696         user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2697         user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2698         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2699         let node_deserialized;
2700         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2701
2702         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
2703
2704         // Set the monitor's `counterparty_payment_script` to a dummy P2WPKH script.
2705         let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2706         let privkey = bitcoin::PrivateKey::from_slice(&[1; 32], bitcoin::Network::Testnet).unwrap();
2707         let pubkey = bitcoin::PublicKey::from_private_key(&secp, &privkey);
2708         let p2wpkh_script = ScriptBuf::new_p2wpkh(&pubkey.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2709         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).set_counterparty_payment_script(p2wpkh_script.clone());
2710         assert_eq!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script(), p2wpkh_script);
2711
2712         // Confirm the counterparty's commitment and reload the monitor (either before or after) such
2713         // that we arrive at the correct `counterparty_payment_script` after the reload.
2714         let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
2715         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
2716         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2717         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2718         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, false,
2719                  [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2720
2721         let commitment_tx = {
2722                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2723                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2724                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 4);
2725                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2726                 txn.pop().unwrap()
2727         };
2728
2729         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2730         let commitment_tx_conf_height = if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2731                 // We should expect our round trip serialization check to fail as we're writing the monitor
2732                 // with the incorrect P2WPKH script but reading it with the correct P2WSH script.
2733                 *nodes[1].chain_monitor.expect_monitor_round_trip_fail.lock().unwrap() = Some(chan_id);
2734                 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2735                 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2736                 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2737                 commitment_tx_conf_height
2738         } else {
2739                 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2740                 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2741                 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2742                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2743                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
2744                 commitment_tx_conf_height
2745         };
2746         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2747                  [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2748         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script().is_p2wsh());
2749
2750         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2751         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2752
2753         if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2754                 // If we saw the commitment before our `counterparty_payment_script` was fixed, we'll never
2755                 // get the spendable output event for the `to_remote` output, so we'll need to get it
2756                 // manually via `get_spendable_outputs`.
2757                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2758                 let outputs = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height);
2759                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2760                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2761                         &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
2762                         253, None, &secp
2763                 ).unwrap();
2764                 check_spends!(spend_tx, &commitment_tx);
2765         } else {
2766                 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx, false);
2767         }
2768 }
2769
2770 #[test]
2771 fn test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload() {
2772         do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(false);
2773         do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(true);
2774 }
2775
2776 #[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
2777 fn do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(anchors: bool, confirm_counterparty_commitment: bool) {
2778         // Tests that our monitor claims will always use fresh random signatures (ensuring a unique
2779         // wtxid) to prevent certain classes of transaction replacement at the bitcoin P2P layer.
2780         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2781         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2782         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2783         if anchors {
2784                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2785                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2786         }
2787         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2788         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2789
2790         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2791                 version: Version::TWO,
2792                 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2793                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2794                 output: vec![
2795                         TxOut {
2796                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC,
2797                                 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2798                         },
2799                 ],
2800         };
2801         if anchors {
2802                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2803         }
2804
2805         // Open a channel and route a payment. We'll let it timeout to claim it.
2806         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
2807         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
2808
2809         let (closing_node, other_node) = if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2810                 (&nodes[1], &nodes[0])
2811         } else {
2812                 (&nodes[0], &nodes[1])
2813         };
2814
2815         get_monitor!(closing_node, chan_id).broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(
2816                 &closing_node.tx_broadcaster, &closing_node.fee_estimator, &closing_node.logger
2817         );
2818
2819         // The commitment transaction comes first.
2820         let commitment_tx = {
2821                 let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2822                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2823                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2824                 txn.pop().unwrap()
2825         };
2826
2827         mine_transaction(closing_node, &commitment_tx);
2828         check_added_monitors!(closing_node, 1);
2829         check_closed_broadcast!(closing_node, true);
2830         check_closed_event!(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
2831
2832         mine_transaction(other_node, &commitment_tx);
2833         check_added_monitors!(other_node, 1);
2834         check_closed_broadcast!(other_node, true);
2835         check_closed_event!(other_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [closing_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
2836
2837         // If we update the best block to the new height before providing the confirmed transactions,
2838         // we'll see another broadcast of the commitment transaction.
2839         if !confirm_counterparty_commitment && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2840                 let _ = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2841         }
2842
2843         // Then comes the HTLC timeout transaction.
2844         if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2845                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 5);
2846                 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
2847                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
2848         } else {
2849                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
2850         }
2851         if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2852                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
2853         }
2854         let htlc_timeout_tx = {
2855                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2856                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2857                 let tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2858                 check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
2859                 tx
2860         };
2861
2862         // Check we rebroadcast it with a different wtxid.
2863         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2864         if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2865                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
2866         }
2867         {
2868                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2869                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2870                 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), htlc_timeout_tx.txid());
2871                 assert_ne!(txn[0].wtxid(), htlc_timeout_tx.wtxid());
2872         }
2873 }
2874
2875 #[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
2876 #[test]
2877 fn test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures() {
2878         do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, false);
2879         do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, true);
2880         do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, false);
2881         do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, true);
2882 }
2883
2884 #[test]
2885 fn test_event_replay_causing_monitor_replay() {
2886         // In LDK 0.0.121 there was a bug where if a `PaymentSent` event caused an RAA
2887         // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` hold and then the node was restarted after the `PaymentSent` event
2888         // and `ChannelMonitorUpdate` both completed but without persisting the `ChannelManager` we'd
2889         // replay the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` on restart (which is fine, but triggered a safety panic).
2890         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2891         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2892         let persister;
2893         let new_chain_monitor;
2894         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2895         let node_deserialized;
2896         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2897
2898         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
2899
2900         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000).0;
2901
2902         do_claim_payment_along_route(
2903                 ClaimAlongRouteArgs::new(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1]]], payment_preimage)
2904         );
2905
2906         // At this point the `PaymentSent` event has not been processed but the full commitment signed
2907         // dance has completed.
2908         let serialized_channel_manager = nodes[0].node.encode();
2909
2910         // Now process the `PaymentSent` to get the final RAA `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, checking that it
2911         // resulted in a `ChannelManager` persistence request.
2912         nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_needs_persistence();
2913         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, true /* expected post-event monitor update*/);
2914         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_needs_persistence());
2915
2916         let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).encode();
2917         reload_node!(nodes[0], &serialized_channel_manager, &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2918
2919         // Expect the `PaymentSent` to get replayed, this time without the duplicate monitor update
2920         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false /* expected post-event monitor update*/);
2921 }