_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
  11
  12 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
  13 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance};
  14 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  15 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight};
  16 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
  17 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
  18 use crate::ln::channel;
  19 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
  20 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
  21 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
  22 use crate::util::crypto::sign;
  23 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
  24 use crate::util::scid_utils::block_from_scid;
  25 use crate::util::test_utils;
  26
  27 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
  28 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  29 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
  31 use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, Script, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime, Witness};
  32 use bitcoin::util::sighash::SighashCache;
  33
  34 use crate::prelude::*;
  35
  36 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  37
  38 #[test]
  39 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
  40         // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
  41         // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
  42         // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
  43         // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
  44         // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
  45         // HTLC.
  46         //
  47         // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
  48         //
  49         // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
  50         // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
  51         //
  52         // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
  53         // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
  54         // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
  55         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
  56         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
  57         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
  58         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  59
  60         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
  61         let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
  62
  63         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
  64         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
  65                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
  66         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
  67
  68         let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
  69
  70         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  71         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
  72         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
  73
  74         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  75         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
  76         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  77
  78         // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
  79         // transaction for nodes[1].
  80         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
  81         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  82         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
  83         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
  84         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
  85
  86         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
  87         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
  88         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  89         let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
  90
  91         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
  92         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
  93         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
  94 }
  95
  96 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction, has_anchors_htlc_event: bool) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
  97         let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
  98         assert_eq!(spendable.len(), if has_anchors_htlc_event { 2 } else { 1 });
  99         if has_anchors_htlc_event {
 100                 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { .. }) = spendable.pop().unwrap() {}
 101                 else { panic!(); }
 102         }
 103         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 104                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 105                 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 106                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 107                 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
 108                 outputs
 109         } else { panic!(); }
 110 }
 111
 112 #[test]
 113 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
 114         // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
 115         // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
 116         // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
 117         // confirmations.
 118         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 119         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 120         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 121         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 122
 123         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
 124
 125         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
 126
 127         // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
 128         // before forwarding.
 129         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
 130         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
 131
 132         // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
 133         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
 134
 135         // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
 136         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
 137         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 138         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 139         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 140
 141         let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 142         assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
 143         check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
 144
 145         // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
 146         // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
 147         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 148         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 149         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 150
 151         // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
 152         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
 153         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 154         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 155
 156         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 157         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
 158 }
 159
 160 fn do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(anchors: bool) {
 161         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
 162         // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
 163         // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
 164         // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
 165         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 166         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 167         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
 168         if anchors {
 169                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
 170                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
 171         }
 172         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
 173         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 174
 175         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 176                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 177         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 178         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 179
 180         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 181         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 182
 183         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000;
 184         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
 185         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 186                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value
 187                 }],
 188                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 189         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
 190                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 191
 192         nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 193         let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 194         nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
 195         let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 196         nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
 197
 198         let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 199         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
 200         let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 201         nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
 202         let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 203         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
 204         let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 205         assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
 206
 207         let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 208         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
 209         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
 210
 211         let shutdown_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]));
 212         let shutdown_tx_conf_height_b = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]));
 213
 214         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 215         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 216
 217         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 218         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 219
 220         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 221                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 222                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 223                 }],
 224                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 225         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 226                         amount_satoshis: 1000,
 227                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 228                 }],
 229                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 230
 231         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 232         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 233
 234         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
 235                 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
 236         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id)
 237                 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b).is_empty());
 238
 239         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 240         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
 241
 242         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 243                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 244         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 245                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 246
 247         let spendable_outputs_a = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
 248         assert_eq!(
 249                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a),
 250                 spendable_outputs_a
 251         );
 252
 253         let spendable_outputs_b = test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
 254         assert_eq!(
 255                 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b),
 256                 spendable_outputs_b
 257         );
 258
 259         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 260         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 261 }
 262
 263 #[test]
 264 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
 265         do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(false);
 266         do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(true);
 267 }
 268
 269 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
 270         v.sort_unstable();
 271         v
 272 }
 273
 274 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
 275 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
 276 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
 277 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
 278         let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 279         let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 280         eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
 281         assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
 282         assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
 283 }
 284
 285 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(anchors: bool, prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
 286         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
 287         // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
 288         // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
 289         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 290         if prev_commitment_tx {
 291                 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 292                 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 293                 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 294                 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
 295                 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
 296         }
 297         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 298         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
 299         if anchors {
 300                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
 301                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
 302         }
 303         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
 304         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 305
 306         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
 307                 version: 2,
 308                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
 309                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
 310                 output: vec![
 311                         TxOut {
 312                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
 313                                 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
 314                         },
 315                         TxOut {
 316                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
 317                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
 318                         },
 319                 ],
 320         };
 321         if anchors {
 322                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
 323                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
 324         }
 325
 326         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 327                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 328         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 329         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 330
 331         // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
 332         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
 333         // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
 334         // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
 335         let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
 336         // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
 337         let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
 338
 339         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 340
 341         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 342         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 343
 344         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
 345         let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 346                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 347                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 348                 payment_hash,
 349         };
 350         let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 351                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 352                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 353                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 354         };
 355         let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 356                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 357                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 358                 payment_hash,
 359         };
 360         let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 361                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 362                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 363                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 364         };
 365         let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 366                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 367                 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 368                 payment_hash,
 369                 payment_preimage,
 370         };
 371         let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 372                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 373                 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 374                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 375                 payment_preimage: timeout_payment_preimage,
 376         };
 377
 378         // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
 379         // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
 380         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
 381                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 382         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
 383         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 384                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 385                 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 386                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 387         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 388                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 389                 }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 390                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 391
 392         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
 393         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 394         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
 395
 396         let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 397         // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
 398         // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
 399         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
 400         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 401         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
 402
 403         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
 404         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 405         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
 406
 407         if prev_commitment_tx {
 408                 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
 409                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
 410                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
 411                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
 412                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 413                 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 414                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
 415                 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 416                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 417                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
 418                 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 419                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 420         }
 421
 422         // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
 423         // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
 424         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
 425                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) +
 426                 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 427         let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 428                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
 429                                 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
 430                                 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
 431                                 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
 432                                 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
 433                                 commitment_tx_fee - // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs
 434                                 anchor_outputs_value, // The anchor outputs value in satoshis
 435                 }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
 436         if !prev_commitment_tx {
 437                 a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
 438         }
 439         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
 440                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 441         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 442                         amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
 443                 }],
 444                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 445
 446         // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
 447         // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
 448         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 449         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 450         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 451
 452         if anchors {
 453                 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 454                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 455                 match events.pop().unwrap() {
 456                         Event::BumpTransaction(bump_event) => {
 457                                 let mut first_htlc_event = bump_event.clone();
 458                                 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut first_htlc_event {
 459                                         htlc_descriptors.remove(1);
 460                                 } else {
 461                                         panic!("Unexpected event");
 462                                 }
 463                                 let mut second_htlc_event = bump_event;
 464                                 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut second_htlc_event {
 465                                         htlc_descriptors.remove(0);
 466                                 } else {
 467                                         panic!("Unexpected event");
 468                                 }
 469                                 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&first_htlc_event);
 470                                 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&second_htlc_event);
 471                         },
 472                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 473                 }
 474         }
 475
 476         let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
 477         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 478         // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
 479         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
 480         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
 481         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
 482         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
 483         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 484         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 485
 486         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 487         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 488         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 489         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 490         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 491         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 492         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 493         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 494         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 495         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 496
 497         // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
 498         // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
 499         // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
 500         // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
 501         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 502         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 503         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
 504                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 505         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 506                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 507                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 508                 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 509                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 510         // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
 511         // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
 512         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 513                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 514                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 515                 },
 516                 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
 517                 // long.
 518                 received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 519                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 520
 521         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 522         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
 523         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 524
 525         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
 526         // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
 527         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 528                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 529         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 530                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 531                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 532                 }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 533                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 534
 535         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0], false);
 536         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 537
 538         // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
 539         // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
 540         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 541         if prev_commitment_tx {
 542                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
 543         } else {
 544                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, false);
 545         }
 546         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 547                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 548         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 549         assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()],
 550                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 551
 552         // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
 553         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 554         let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 555         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 556         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 557         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 558         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 559         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 560         assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
 561                    a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
 562         // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
 563         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 564         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 565
 566         // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
 567         // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
 568         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 569         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 570         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 571                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 572                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 573                 }],
 574                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 575         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
 576         // balance entry.
 577         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 578         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 579                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 580         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
 581
 582         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1], false);
 583
 584         // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
 585         // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
 586         // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
 587         let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 588         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 589
 590         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 591                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 592                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 593                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 594                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 595                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 596                 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 597                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 598
 599         // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
 600         // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
 601         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 602         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0], anchors);
 603
 604         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 605                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 606                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 607                 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 608                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 609
 610         // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
 611         // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
 612         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 613         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0], anchors);
 614
 615         assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
 616                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 617
 618         // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
 619         // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
 620         // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
 621         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 622         assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
 623                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 624         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 625         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 626                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 627
 628         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 629         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 630         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 631         for node in nodes.iter() {
 632                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 633                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 634                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 635                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 636         }
 637 }
 638
 639 #[test]
 640 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
 641         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, true);
 642         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, false);
 643         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, true);
 644         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, false);
 645 }
 646
 647 fn do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(anchors: bool) {
 648         // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
 649         // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
 650         // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
 651         // delay prior to spendability.
 652         //
 653         // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
 654         // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
 655         // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
 656         // claim by our counterparty).
 657         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 658         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 659         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
 660         if anchors {
 661                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
 662                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
 663         }
 664         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
 665         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 666
 667         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
 668                 version: 2,
 669                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
 670                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
 671                 output: vec![
 672                         TxOut {
 673                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
 674                                 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
 675                         },
 676                         TxOut {
 677                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
 678                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
 679                         },
 680                 ],
 681         };
 682         if anchors {
 683                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
 684                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
 685         }
 686
 687         // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
 688         // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
 689         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
 690         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 691
 692         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
 693         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 694         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
 695                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 696         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 697
 698         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 699         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 700         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 701
 702         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 703         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
 704
 705         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
 706         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
 707                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
 708         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 709
 710         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 711         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 712         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 713
 714         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 715         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
 716         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
 717         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 718         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 719         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
 720
 721         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 722         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 723
 724         // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
 725         // claimable balances.
 726         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 727         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 728         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 729         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 730         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 731         let commitment_tx = {
 732                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
 733                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
 734                 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
 735                 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
 736                 commitment_tx
 737         };
 738         let commitment_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx));
 739         if anchors && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
 740                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
 741                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
 742                 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid());
 743         }
 744
 745         let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 746                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 747                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 748                 payment_hash,
 749         };
 750         let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 751                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 752                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 753                 payment_hash: payment_hash_2,
 754         };
 755
 756         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
 757                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 758         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
 759         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 760                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 761                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 762                 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 763                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 764
 765         // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
 766         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
 767         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 768         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 769         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 770         let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 771         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
 772         check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], commitment_tx);
 773
 774         // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
 775         // transaction.
 776         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
 777         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 778                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 779                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 780                 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 781                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 782         if anchors {
 783                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 2);
 784         }
 785         let timeout_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
 786         assert_eq!(timeout_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
 787         check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[0], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
 788         check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[1], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
 789
 790         // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
 791         // "awaiting confirmations" one.
 792         let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 793         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0]);
 794         // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
 795         // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
 796         // call, as described, two hunks down.
 797         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 798                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 799                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 800                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 801                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 802                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 803                 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 804                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 805
 806         // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
 807         // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
 808         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
 809         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, true, false);
 810         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 811                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 812                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 813                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 814                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 815                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 816                 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 817                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 818
 819         // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
 820         // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
 821         // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
 822         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 823         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
 824
 825         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 826                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 827                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 828                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 829                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 830                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 831                 }]),
 832                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 833
 834         // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 835         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 836         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
 837         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
 838                 .get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
 839         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 840         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 841                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 842                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 843                 }],
 844                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 845         let to_self_spendable_output = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
 846         assert_eq!(
 847                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a),
 848                 to_self_spendable_output
 849         );
 850
 851         // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 852         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 853         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 854         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 855         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0], false);
 856
 857         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 858         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 859         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 860         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 861         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 862         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 863         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 864 }
 865
 866 #[test]
 867 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
 868         do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(false);
 869         do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(true);
 870 }
 871
 872 #[test]
 873 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
 874         // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
 875         // have a preimage.
 876         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 877         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 878         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 879         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 880
 881         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
 882         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 883
 884         // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
 885         let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
 886         let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
 887         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 888
 889         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 890         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 891
 892         let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 893                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 894                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 895                 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
 896         };
 897         let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 898                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 899                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 900                 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
 901         };
 902         let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 903                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 904                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 905                 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
 906         };
 907         let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 908                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 909                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 910                 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
 911         };
 912
 913         // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
 914         // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
 915         // HTLC output is spent.
 916
 917         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 918                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 919                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 920                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
 921                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 922
 923         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 924                         amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
 925                 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
 926                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 927
 928         // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
 929         let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 930         assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
 931         check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
 932         check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
 933
 934         // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
 935         // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
 936         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 937         let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 938                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 939                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 940                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 941                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
 942
 943         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 944         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
 945         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 946         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 947         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 948
 949         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 950                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 951
 952         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 953         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 954         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 955         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 956
 957         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
 958         let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 959                         amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
 960                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 961                 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
 962         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 963                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 964
 965         // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
 966         // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
 967         // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
 968         // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
 969
 970         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
 971         let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 972         assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
 973         check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
 974         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
 975                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
 976
 977         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 978                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 979
 980         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 981         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 982                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 983
 984         // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
 985         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 986         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0], false);
 987         bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
 988
 989         // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
 990         nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
 991         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1));
 992         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
 993                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
 994         let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 995         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
 996         check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
 997
 998         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 999                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1000
1001         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1002         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1003                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1004
1005         // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
1006         // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
1007         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1008         let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
1009         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1010                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1011                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1012                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1013                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1014                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1015                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
1016                 }]),
1017                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1018
1019         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1020         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1021                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1022                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1023                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1024                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1025                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1026                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
1027                 }]),
1028                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1029
1030         // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
1031         // payment failure event.
1032         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1033         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
1034
1035         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1036         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1037                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1038                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1039                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1040                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1041                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1042                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1043                 }]),
1044                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1045
1046         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1047         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1048                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1049                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1050                 }],
1051                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1052         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0], false);
1053
1054         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1055         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1056         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1057
1058         // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
1059         // was already claimed.
1060         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1061         let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1062         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1063                         amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1064                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1065                 }]),
1066                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1067
1068         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1069         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1070                         amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1071                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1072                 }]),
1073                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1074
1075         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1076         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
1077
1078         assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
1079                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1080         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1081
1082         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1083         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1084
1085         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1086         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1087         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1088         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1089         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1090         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1091         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1092 }
1093
1094 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
1095         let mut v = v_orig.clone();
1096         for t in extra_ts {
1097                 v.push((*t).clone());
1098         }
1099         v.sort_unstable();
1100         v
1101 }
1102
1103 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(anchors: bool, confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
1104         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
1105         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1106         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1107         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1108         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1109         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1110         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1111         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1112         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1113         if anchors {
1114                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1115                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1116         }
1117         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1118         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1119
1120         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1121                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1122         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1123         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1124
1125         // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
1126         //
1127         // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
1128         // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
1129         // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
1130         // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
1131         // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
1132         //     later commitment transaction updates
1133         //
1134         // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
1135         // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
1136         // HTLCs individually.
1137
1138         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
1139         let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1140         let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1141
1142         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1143
1144         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1145         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1146
1147         let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1148         let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1149
1150         // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1151         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1152         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1153
1154         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1155
1156         let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1157         let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1158
1159         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1160         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1161         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1162         let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1163
1164         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1165         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1166         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1167
1168         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1169         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1170         let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1171                 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1172                 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1173         events.retain(|ev| {
1174                 match ev {
1175                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1176                                 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1177                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1178                                 false
1179                         },
1180                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1181                                 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1182                                 false
1183                         },
1184                         _ => true,
1185                 }
1186         });
1187         assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1188         if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1189         match &events[1] {
1190                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, .. } => {},
1191                 _ => panic!(),
1192         }
1193
1194         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1195         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1196         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1197         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1198
1199         // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1200         // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1201         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1202                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1203                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1204                         amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1205                         claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1206                         payment_hash: missing_htlc_payment_hash,
1207                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1208                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1209                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1210                         payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
1211                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1212                         amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1213                         claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1214                         payment_hash: live_payment_hash,
1215                 }]),
1216                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1217
1218         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1219         let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1220         // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1221         // quite soon.
1222         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1223         claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
1224
1225         // The following constants were determined experimentally
1226         const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 483;
1227         let outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: usize = if anchors { 574 } else { 571 };
1228         let inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: usize = if anchors { 582 } else { 578 };
1229
1230         // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1231         // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1232         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1233         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1234         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1235         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1236
1237         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1238                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1239         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1240         let inbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight as u64 / 1000;
1241         let outbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight as u64 / 1000;
1242         let to_self_claim_fee = chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000;
1243
1244         // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1245         // claim balances separated out.
1246         let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1247                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1248                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1249                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1250                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1251                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1252                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1253                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1254                 }];
1255
1256         let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1257                 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1258         };
1259         let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1260         let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1261                 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1262         };
1263         let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1264
1265         // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1266         // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1267         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1268                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1269
1270         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1271                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1272                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1273                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1274         } else {
1275                 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1276                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1277                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1278                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1279         }
1280
1281         let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1282                 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1283                 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1284         };
1285         let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1286                 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
1287                 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1288         };
1289
1290         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1291                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1292                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1293         } else {
1294                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1295                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1296         }
1297
1298         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1299                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1300         } else {
1301                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1302         }
1303         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1304                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1305
1306         // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1307         // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1308         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1309         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1310
1311         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1312                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1313                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1314                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1315                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1316                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
1317                         confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1318                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1319                         amount_satoshis: 3_000 - outbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1320                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1321                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1322                         amount_satoshis: 4_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1323                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1324                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1325                         amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1326                         confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1327                 }]),
1328                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1329
1330         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1331         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1332
1333         let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1334         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
1335                 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1336         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
1337                 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1338
1339         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1340         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }], false);
1341         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1342         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }], false);
1343         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1344         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1345         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0], false);
1346         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1347         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1], false);
1348         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1349         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1350
1351         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1352         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1353         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1354         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1355         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1356         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1357         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1358 }
1359
1360 #[test]
1361 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1362         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, true);
1363         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, false);
1364         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, true);
1365         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, false);
1366 }
1367
1368 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(anchors: bool) {
1369         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1370         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1371         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1372         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1373         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1374         if anchors {
1375                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1376                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1377         }
1378         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1379         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1380
1381         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1382                 version: 2,
1383                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1384                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1385                 output: vec![
1386                         TxOut {
1387                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1388                                 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1389                         },
1390                         TxOut {
1391                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1392                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1393                         },
1394                 ],
1395         };
1396         if anchors {
1397                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1398                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
1399         }
1400
1401         // Create some initial channels
1402         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1403                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 11_000_000);
1404         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1405         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1406
1407         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1408         let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1409         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1410         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1411         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1412         if anchors {
1413                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[4].value, 10000); // to_self output
1414         } else {
1415                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[2].value, 10000); // to_self output
1416         }
1417
1418         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs, an output for each side, and an
1419         // anchor output for each side if enabled.
1420         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if anchors { 6 } else { 4 });
1421
1422         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1423
1424         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1425         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1426
1427         // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1428         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1429         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1430         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1431         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1432         if anchors {
1433                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 1);
1434         }
1435         let revoked_htlc_success = {
1436                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1437                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1438                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1439                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, if anchors { 3 } else { 1 });
1440                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(),
1441                         if anchors { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS } else { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT });
1442                 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1443                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1444         };
1445         let revoked_htlc_success_fee = chan_feerate * revoked_htlc_success.weight() as u64 / 1000;
1446
1447         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1448         if anchors {
1449                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 2);
1450         }
1451         let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
1452                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1453                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1454                 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
1455                         txn.remove(1)
1456                 } else {
1457                         txn.remove(0)
1458                 }
1459         };
1460         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1461         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
1462         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time.0, 0);
1463         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0, 0);
1464
1465         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1466         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1467         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1468         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1469         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1470         let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1471
1472         let revoked_to_self_claim = {
1473                 let mut as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1474                 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1475                 if anchors {
1476                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1477                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 4); // Separate to_remote claim
1478                         check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1479                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
1480                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1481                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
1482                         check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1483                         Some(as_commitment_claim_txn.remove(0))
1484                 } else {
1485                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1486                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1487                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1488                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
1489                         check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1490                         None
1491                 }
1492         };
1493
1494         // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1495         // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1496         // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1497         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1498                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1499         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1500         let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1501                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1502                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1503                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1504                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1505                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1506                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1507                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1508                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1509                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1510                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1511                 }]);
1512         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1513                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1514
1515         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
1516         let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1517         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1518         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1519         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
1520         // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked outputs (which no longer includes the
1521         // spent HTLC output)
1522         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1523         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1524         if !anchors {
1525                 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1526         }
1527         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1528
1529         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1530                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1531
1532         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1533         let as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee = chan_feerate * as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight() as u64 / 1000;
1534         if anchors {
1535                 // With anchors, B can pay for revoked_htlc_success's fee with additional inputs, rather
1536                 // than with the HTLC itself.
1537                 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1538                         3_000 - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
1539         } else {
1540                 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1541                         3_000 - revoked_htlc_success_fee - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
1542         }
1543
1544         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1545         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1546                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1547                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1548                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1549                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1550                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1551                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1552                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1553                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1554                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1555                         amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1556                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1557                 }]),
1558                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1559
1560         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1561         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], false);
1562         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1563                         // to_self output to B
1564                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1565                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1566                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1567                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1568                         amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1569                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1570                 }]),
1571                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1572
1573         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1574         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0], false);
1575         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1576                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1577                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1578                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1579                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1580                 }]),
1581                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1582
1583         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1584         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1585                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1586         // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1587         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1588         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1589                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1590         }
1591
1592         // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1593         // claiming.
1594         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1595         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1596         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1597                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1598         }
1599
1600         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
1601         let (revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, revoked_to_self_claim) = {
1602                 let mut as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1603                 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1604                 if anchors {
1605                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1606                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1607                         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1608                         (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), revoked_to_self_claim.unwrap())
1609                 } else {
1610                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1611                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1612                         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1613                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), 1);
1614                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1615                         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1616                         (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0))
1617                 }
1618         };
1619
1620         // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1621         // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1622         // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1623         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1624         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1625                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1626                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1627                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1628                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1629                 }]),
1630                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1631
1632         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim);
1633         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1634                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1635                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1636                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1637                         amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value,
1638                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1639                 }]),
1640                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1641
1642         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim);
1643         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1644                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1645                         amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.output[0].value,
1646                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1647                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1648                         amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value,
1649                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1650                 }]),
1651                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1652
1653         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1654         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, false);
1655         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1656         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim, false);
1657
1658         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1659
1660         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1661         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1662         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1663         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1664         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1665         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1666         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1667 }
1668
1669 #[test]
1670 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1671         do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(false);
1672         do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(true);
1673 }
1674
1675 #[test]
1676 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
1677         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1678         // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1679         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1680         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1681         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1682         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1683         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1684         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1685         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1686         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1687         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1688
1689         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1690                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1691         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1692         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1693
1694         // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1695         // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1696         // revocation-claim transaction.
1697
1698         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1699         let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1700
1701         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1702
1703         // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1704         // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1705         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1706                 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1707
1708         // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1709         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1710
1711         assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), 2);
1712         check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1713         check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1714
1715         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1716         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1717
1718         {
1719                 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1720                 *feerate += 1;
1721         }
1722         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1723         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1724
1725         let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1726         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1727         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1728
1729         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1730         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1731         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1732         let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1733
1734         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1735                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1736                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1737                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1738                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1739                         payment_hash: revoked_payment_hash,
1740                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1741                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1742                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1743                         payment_hash: claimed_payment_hash,
1744                 }]),
1745                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1746
1747         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1748         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1749         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1750         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1751
1752         let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1753         // Currently the revoked commitment outputs are all claimed in one aggregated transaction
1754         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 1);
1755         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1756         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1757
1758         let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1759
1760         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1761                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1762                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1763                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1764                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1765                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1766                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1767                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1768                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1769                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1770                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1771                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1772                 }]),
1773                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1774
1775         // Confirm A's HTLC-Success tranasction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1776         // new claim.
1777         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[1]);
1778         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage, None, true, false);
1779         let mut claim_txn_2: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1780         claim_txn_2.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| if tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid()) { 0 } else { 1 });
1781         // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1782         // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1783         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1784         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 2);
1785         check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1786         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1787         check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1788
1789         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1790                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1791                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1792                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1793                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1794                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1795                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1796                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1797                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1798                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1799                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1800                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1801                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1802                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1803                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1804                 }]),
1805                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1806
1807         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1808         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1809
1810         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1811                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1812                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1813                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1814                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1815                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1816                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1817                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1818                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1819                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1820                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1821                 }]),
1822                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1823
1824         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1825         let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1826
1827         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1828                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1829                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1830                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1831                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1832                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1833                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1834                         amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1835                         confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1836                 }]),
1837                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1838
1839         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1840         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1], false);
1841
1842         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1843                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1844                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1845                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1846                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1847                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1848                 }]),
1849                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1850
1851         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1852         let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1853
1854         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1855                         amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
1856                         confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1857                 }],
1858                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1859
1860         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1861
1862         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1863         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1864         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0], false);
1865         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1866
1867         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1868         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1869         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1870         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1871         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1872         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1873         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1874 }
1875
1876 fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
1877         // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
1878         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1879         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1880         let persister;
1881         let new_chain_monitor;
1882
1883         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1884         let node_deserialized;
1885
1886         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1887
1888         // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
1889         // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
1890         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
1891         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
1892
1893         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
1894         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1895         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1896         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
1897                  [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1898
1899         let commitment_tx = {
1900                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1901                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1902                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
1903                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
1904                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1905         };
1906
1907         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
1908
1909         // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
1910         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1911         let htlc_timeout_tx = {
1912                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1913                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1914                 check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
1915                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1916         };
1917
1918         // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
1919         // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
1920         if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
1921                 let serialized_monitor = hex::decode(
1922 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1923                 ).unwrap();
1924                 reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
1925         }
1926
1927         // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
1928         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1929         if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
1930                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1931         }
1932         {
1933                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1934                 if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
1935                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
1936                 } else {
1937                         assert!(txn.len() < 6);
1938                 }
1939                 for tx in txn {
1940                         assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
1941                         assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
1942                         assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
1943                         assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
1944                 }
1945         }
1946 }
1947
1948 #[test]
1949 fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
1950         do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
1951         do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
1952 }
1953
1954 fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) {
1955         // Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every
1956         // `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call.
1957         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1958         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1959         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1960         if anchors {
1961                 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1962                 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1963         }
1964         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
1965         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1966
1967         let (_, _, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
1968                 &nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 500_000_000
1969         );
1970         const HTLC_AMT_MSAT: u64 = 1_000_000;
1971         const HTLC_AMT_SAT: u64 = HTLC_AMT_MSAT / 1000;
1972         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_AMT_MSAT);
1973
1974         let htlc_expiry = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1;
1975
1976         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(&nodes[0], &chan_id);
1977         assert_eq!(commitment_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 /* commitment tx only */} else { 2 /* commitment and htlc timeout tx */ });
1978         check_spends!(&commitment_txn[0], &funding_tx);
1979         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_txn[0]);
1980         check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
1981         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed,
1982                  false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1983         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1984
1985         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1986                 version: 2,
1987                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1988                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1989                 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` on anchors
1990                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1991                         script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1992                 }],
1993         };
1994         nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1995
1996         // Set up a helper closure we'll use throughout our test. We should only expect retries without
1997         // bumps if fees have not increased after a block has been connected (assuming the height timer
1998         // re-evaluates at every block) or after `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` is called.
1999         let mut prev_htlc_tx_feerate = None;
2000         let mut check_htlc_retry = |should_retry: bool, should_bump: bool| -> Option<Transaction> {
2001                 let (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) = if anchors {
2002                         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
2003                         let events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2004                         assert_eq!(events.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
2005                         if !should_retry {
2006                                 return None;
2007                         }
2008                         match &events[0] {
2009                                 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2010                                         nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2011                                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2012                                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2013                                         let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2014                                         check_spends!(&htlc_tx, &commitment_txn[0], &coinbase_tx);
2015                                         let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value -
2016                                                 htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>();
2017                                         let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
2018                                         (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
2019                                 }
2020                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2021                         }
2022                 } else {
2023                         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2024                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2025                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
2026                         if !should_retry {
2027                                 return None;
2028                         }
2029                         let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2030                         check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]);
2031                         let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value;
2032                         let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
2033                         (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
2034                 };
2035                 if should_bump {
2036                         assert!(htlc_tx_feerate > prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take().unwrap());
2037                 } else if let Some(prev_feerate) = prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take() {
2038                         assert_eq!(htlc_tx_feerate, prev_feerate);
2039                 }
2040                 prev_htlc_tx_feerate = Some(htlc_tx_feerate);
2041                 Some(htlc_tx)
2042         };
2043
2044         // Connect blocks up to one before the HTLC expires. This should not result in a claim/retry.
2045         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_expiry - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
2046         check_htlc_retry(false, false);
2047
2048         // Connect one more block, producing our first claim.
2049         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2050         check_htlc_retry(true, false);
2051
2052         // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
2053         // transactions pre-anchors.
2054         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2055         check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2056
2057         // Trigger a call and we should have another retry, but without a bump.
2058         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2059         check_htlc_retry(true, false);
2060
2061         // Double the feerate and trigger a call, expecting a fee-bumped retry.
2062         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2063         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2064         check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2065
2066         // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
2067         // transactions pre-anchors.
2068         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2069         let htlc_tx = check_htlc_retry(true, anchors).unwrap();
2070
2071         // Mine the HTLC transaction to ensure we don't retry claims while they're confirmed.
2072         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_tx);
2073         // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transactions,
2074         // we'll receive an extra bumped claim.
2075         if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2076                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2077                 nodes[0].wallet_source.remove_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 1 });
2078                 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2079         }
2080         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2081         check_htlc_retry(false, false);
2082 }
2083
2084 #[test]
2085 fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() {
2086         do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false);
2087         do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true);
2088 }
2089
2090 #[test]
2091 fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
2092         // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
2093         // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
2094         // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
2095         // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
2096         // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
2097         // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
2098         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2099         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2100         let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
2101         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2102         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2103         anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2104         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2105         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2106
2107         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
2108                 &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
2109         );
2110         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
2111         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000);
2112
2113         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2114         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2115
2116         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2117
2118         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2119         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
2120
2121         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2122         {
2123                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2124                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2125                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2126         }
2127
2128         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
2129                 &payment_hash_2, &payment_preimage_2, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
2130                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
2131         );
2132         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
2133                 &payment_hash_1, &payment_preimage_1, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
2134                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2135         );
2136
2137         let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2138         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
2139         let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
2140                 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2141                         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2142                                 version: 2,
2143                                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2144                                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2145                                 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2146                                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2147                                         script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2148                                 }],
2149                         };
2150                         nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2151                         nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2152                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2153                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2154                         let anchor_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2155                         let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2156                         check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2157                         check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2158                         (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
2159                 },
2160                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2161         };
2162
2163         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[2].value, 1_000); // HTLC A -> B
2164         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[3].value, 2_000); // HTLC B -> A
2165
2166         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2167         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2168         mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2169         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2170
2171         {
2172                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2173                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
2174
2175                 let htlc_preimage_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2176                 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
2177                 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
2178                 check_spends!(htlc_preimage_tx, commitment_tx);
2179
2180                 let htlc_timeout_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2181                 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
2182                 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
2183                 check_spends!(htlc_timeout_tx, commitment_tx);
2184
2185                 if let Some(commitment_tx) = txn.pop() {
2186                         check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2187                 }
2188         }
2189
2190         let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2191         // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2192         // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2193         if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2194                 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2195                 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
2196                 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2197         } else {
2198                 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2);
2199         }
2200         let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2201         for event in holder_events {
2202                 match event {
2203                         Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2204                                 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2205                                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2206                                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2207                                 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2208                                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx, anchor_tx);
2209                                 htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
2210                         },
2211                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2212                 }
2213         }
2214
2215         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
2216         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2217
2218         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2219
2220         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
2221
2222         let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2223         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2224         for event in holder_events {
2225                 match event {
2226                         Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
2227                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2228                 }
2229         }
2230
2231         // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
2232         nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2233         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2234         nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2235         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2236 }
2237
2238 #[test]
2239 fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
2240         // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
2241         // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
2242         // revoked commitment.
2243         let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2244         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2245         // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
2246         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2247         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2248         let bob_persister;
2249         let bob_chain_monitor;
2250
2251         let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
2252         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2253         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2254         anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2255         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2256         let bob_deserialized;
2257
2258         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2259
2260         let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2261         let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2262
2263         // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
2264         let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
2265
2266         // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
2267         let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2268         let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2269         let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2270         let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2271
2272         // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
2273         // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
2274         // present.
2275         let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
2276         let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
2277
2278         // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
2279         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
2280         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
2281         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
2282         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
2283
2284         // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
2285         // revoked state.
2286         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2287         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2288
2289         // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
2290         reload_node!(
2291                 nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
2292                 bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
2293         );
2294         for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
2295                 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
2296                 for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
2297                         monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
2298                                 &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2299                                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2300                         );
2301                 }
2302         }
2303
2304         // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
2305         // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
2306         // the HTLCs still pending.
2307         *nodes[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2308         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
2309         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
2310         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2311         let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = {
2312                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2313                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2314                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2315                 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2316                 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
2317                         check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
2318                         check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3);
2319                         (txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone())
2320                 } else {
2321                         check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3);
2322                         check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
2323                         (txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone())
2324                 }
2325         };
2326
2327         // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
2328         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2329         let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2330         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2331         let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2332         for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
2333                 let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat() * (idx + 1) as u64;
2334                 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2335                         version: 2,
2336                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2337                         input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2338                         output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2339                                 value: utxo_value,
2340                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2341                         }],
2342                 };
2343                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, utxo_value);
2344                 match event {
2345                         Event::BumpTransaction(event) => nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event),
2346                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2347                 };
2348                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2349                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2350                 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]);
2351                 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2352                 anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone());
2353         };
2354
2355         for node in &nodes {
2356                 mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_txs[1]]);
2357         }
2358         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
2359         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
2360         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2361
2362         // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
2363         // revoked outputs.
2364         {
2365                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2366                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
2367
2368                 let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() {
2369                         (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] })
2370                 } else {
2371                         (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] })
2372                 };
2373
2374                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2375                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
2376                 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
2377                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2378                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
2379                 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
2380         }
2381
2382         // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
2383         // through the success path.
2384         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2385         let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2386         // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2387         // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2388         match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
2389                 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
2390                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
2391                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
2392                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2393                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
2394                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2395
2396                 },
2397                 _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
2398         };
2399         let htlc_tx = {
2400                 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
2401                 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
2402                 let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2403                 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2404                         version: 2,
2405                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2406                         input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2407                         output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
2408                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2409                                 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
2410                         }],
2411                 };
2412                 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
2413                         version: 2,
2414                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2415                         input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
2416                                 previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2417                                 ..Default::default()
2418                         }],
2419                         output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
2420                                 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
2421                                 script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
2422                         }],
2423                 };
2424                 let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
2425                 for event in events {
2426                         // We don't use the `BumpTransactionEventHandler` here because it does not support
2427                         // creating one transaction from multiple `HTLCResolution` events.
2428                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
2429                                 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
2430                                 for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
2431                                         assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
2432                                         htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
2433                                         htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&secp));
2434                                 }
2435                                 descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
2436                                 htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
2437                         } else {
2438                                 panic!("Unexpected event");
2439                         }
2440                 }
2441                 for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
2442                         let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
2443                         let signer = htlc_descriptor.derive_channel_signer(&nodes[1].keys_manager);
2444                         let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
2445                         let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&secp);
2446                         htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
2447                 }
2448                 let fee_utxo_sig = {
2449                         let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
2450                         let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
2451                                 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2452                         ).unwrap()[..]);
2453                         let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2454                         let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2455                         sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2456                         sig
2457                 };
2458                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2459                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
2460                 htlc_tx
2461         };
2462
2463         for node in &nodes {
2464                 mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
2465         }
2466
2467         // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
2468         // the second level instead.
2469         let revoked_claim_transactions = {
2470                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2471                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2472
2473                 let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
2474                         tx.input.len() == 2 &&
2475                         tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2476                         tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
2477                 ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2478                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
2479                 for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
2480                         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
2481                 }
2482
2483                 let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = HashMap::new();
2484                 for current_tx in txn.into_iter() {
2485                         revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx);
2486                 }
2487                 revoked_claim_transaction_map
2488         };
2489         for node in &nodes {
2490                 mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claim_transactions.values().collect::<Vec<_>>());
2491         }
2492
2493
2494         // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
2495         // been reached.
2496         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2497         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
2498
2499         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2500         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2501
2502         // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2503         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2504         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2505
2506         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2507         let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2508         assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4);
2509         for event in spendable_output_events {
2510                 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event {
2511                         assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2512                         assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap()));
2513                         let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2514                                 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
2515                         ).unwrap();
2516
2517                         if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(_) = &outputs[0] {
2518                                 check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_a, &revoked_commitment_b);
2519                         } else {
2520                                 check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
2521                         }
2522                 } else {
2523                         panic!("unexpected event");
2524                 }
2525         }
2526
2527         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2528         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2529         // On the Alice side, the individual to_self_claim are still pending confirmation.
2530         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 2);
2531         // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
2532         // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
2533         // balances to claim.
2534         //
2535         // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
2536         // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
2537         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);
2538 }
2539
2540 fn do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(confirm_commitment_before_reload: bool) {
2541         // Tests that we'll fix a ChannelMonitor's `counterparty_payment_script` for an anchor outputs
2542         // channel upon deserialization.
2543         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2544         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2545         let persister;
2546         let chain_monitor;
2547         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2548         user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2549         user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2550         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2551         let node_deserialized;
2552         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2553
2554         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
2555
2556         // Set the monitor's `counterparty_payment_script` to a dummy P2WPKH script.
2557         let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2558         let privkey = bitcoin::PrivateKey::from_slice(&[1; 32], bitcoin::Network::Testnet).unwrap();
2559         let pubkey = bitcoin::PublicKey::from_private_key(&secp, &privkey);
2560         let p2wpkh_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&pubkey.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2561         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).set_counterparty_payment_script(p2wpkh_script.clone());
2562         assert_eq!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script(), p2wpkh_script);
2563
2564         // Confirm the counterparty's commitment and reload the monitor (either before or after) such
2565         // that we arrive at the correct `counterparty_payment_script` after the reload.
2566         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2567         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2568         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2569         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
2570                  [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2571
2572         let commitment_tx = {
2573                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2574                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2575                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 4);
2576                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2577                 txn.pop().unwrap()
2578         };
2579
2580         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2581         let commitment_tx_conf_height = if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2582                 // We should expect our round trip serialization check to fail as we're writing the monitor
2583                 // with the incorrect P2WPKH script but reading it with the correct P2WSH script.
2584                 *nodes[1].chain_monitor.expect_monitor_round_trip_fail.lock().unwrap() = Some(chan_id);
2585                 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2586                 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2587                 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2588                 commitment_tx_conf_height
2589         } else {
2590                 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2591                 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2592                 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2593                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2594                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
2595                 commitment_tx_conf_height
2596         };
2597         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2598                  [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2599         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script().is_v0_p2wsh());
2600
2601         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2602         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2603
2604         if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2605                 // If we saw the commitment before our `counterparty_payment_script` was fixed, we'll never
2606                 // get the spendable output event for the `to_remote` output, so we'll need to get it
2607                 // manually via `get_spendable_outputs`.
2608                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2609                 let outputs = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height);
2610                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2611                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2612                         &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
2613                         253, None, &secp
2614                 ).unwrap();
2615                 check_spends!(spend_tx, &commitment_tx);
2616         } else {
2617                 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx, false);
2618         }
2619 }
2620
2621 #[test]
2622 fn test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload() {
2623         do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(false);
2624         do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(true);
2625 }