_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
  11
  12 use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
  13 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  14 use ln::{channel, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
  15 use ln::channelmanager::BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
  16 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
  17 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  18 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
  19 use routing::network_graph::NetworkUpdate;
  20 use routing::router::get_route;
  21
  22 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  23 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  24
  25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  26 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  27 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  28
  29 use prelude::*;
  30
  31 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  32
  33 #[test]
  34 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
  35         // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
  36         // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
  37         // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
  38         // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
  39         // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
  40         // HTLC.
  41         //
  42         // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
  43         //
  44         // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
  45         // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
  46         //
  47         // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
  48         // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
  49         // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
  50         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
  51         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
  52         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
  53         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  54
  55         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
  56         let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
  57
  58         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
  59         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
  60         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
  61
  62         let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
  63
  64         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  65         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
  66         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
  67
  68         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  69         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
  70         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  71
  72         // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
  73         // transaction for nodes[1].
  74         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
  75         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  76         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
  77         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
  78
  79         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
  80         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  81         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  82         let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
  83
  84         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
  85         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
  86         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
  87 }
  88
  89 #[test]
  90 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
  91         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
  92         // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
  93         // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
  94         // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
  95         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  96         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  97         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
  98         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  99
 100         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 101                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 102         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 103         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 104
 105         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
 106
 107         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 108                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000
 109                 }],
 110                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 111         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
 112                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 113
 114         nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id).unwrap();
 115         let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 116         nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown);
 117         let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 118         nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_1_shutdown);
 119
 120         let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 121         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
 122         let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 123         nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
 124         let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 125         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
 126         let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 127         assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
 128
 129         let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 130         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
 131         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
 132
 133         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 134         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 135
 136         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 137         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 138
 139         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 140         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 141
 142         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 143                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000,
 144                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 145                 }],
 146                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 147         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 148                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1000,
 149                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 150                 }],
 151                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 152
 153         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 154         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 155
 156         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 157                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 158         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 159                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 160
 161         let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 162         assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
 163         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 164                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 165                 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 166                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 167                 check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
 168         }
 169
 170         let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 171         assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
 172         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 173                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 174                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 175                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 176                 check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
 177         }
 178 }
 179
 180 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
 181         v.sort_unstable();
 182         v
 183 }
 184
 185 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
 186         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
 187         // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
 188         // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
 189         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 190         if prev_commitment_tx {
 191                 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 192                 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 193                 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 194                 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
 195                 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
 196         }
 197         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 198         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 199         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 200
 201         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 202                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 203         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 204         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 205
 206         // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
 207         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
 208         // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
 209         // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
 210         let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
 211         // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
 212         let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
 213
 214         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 215
 216         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
 217
 218         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
 219         // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
 220         // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
 221         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 222                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 223                                 (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 224                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 225                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 226                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 227                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 228                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 229                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 230                 }]),
 231                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 232         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 233                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 234                 }],
 235                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 236
 237         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
 238         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 239         let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 240         // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
 241         // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
 242         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
 243         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 244         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
 245         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 246
 247         if prev_commitment_tx {
 248                 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
 249                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
 250                 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
 251                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
 252                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 253                 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 254                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
 255                 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 256                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 257                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
 258                 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 259                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 260         }
 261
 262         // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
 263         // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
 264         let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 265                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
 266                                 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
 267                                 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
 268                                 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
 269                                 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
 270                                 // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
 271                                 chan_feerate * (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT +
 272                                                                 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
 273                                                                 channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 274                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 275                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 276                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 277                 }];
 278         if !prev_commitment_tx {
 279                 a_expected_balances.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 280                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 281                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 282                 });
 283         }
 284         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
 285                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 286         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 287                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
 288                 }],
 289                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 290
 291         // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
 292         // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
 293         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 294         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 295         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 296
 297         let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 298         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), if prev_commitment_tx { 4 } else { 5 });
 299         if prev_commitment_tx {
 300                 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[3], b_broadcast_txn[2]);
 301         } else {
 302                 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0], b_broadcast_txn[3]);
 303                 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1], b_broadcast_txn[4]);
 304         }
 305         // b_broadcast_txn[0] should spend the HTLC output of the commitment tx for 3_000 sats
 306         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 307         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 308         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 309         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 310         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 311         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 312         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[2], funding_tx);
 313
 314         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 315         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 316         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 317         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 318         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 319         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 320         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 321         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 322
 323         // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
 324         // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
 325         // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
 326         // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
 327         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 328         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 329
 330         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 331                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 332                                 (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 333                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 334                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 335                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 336                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 337                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 338                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 339                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 340                 }]),
 341                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 342         // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
 343         // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
 344         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 345                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 346                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 347                 },
 348                 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
 349                 // long.
 350                 Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 351                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 352                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 353                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 354                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 355                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 356                 }]),
 357                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 358
 359         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 360         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, true);
 361         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 362
 363         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
 364         // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
 365         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 366                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 367                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 368                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 369                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 370                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 371                 }]),
 372                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 373         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 374                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 375                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 376                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 377                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 378                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 379                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 380                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 381                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 382                 }]),
 383                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 384
 385         let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 386         assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
 387         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 388                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 389                 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 390                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 391                 check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
 392         }
 393
 394         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 395
 396         // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
 397         // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
 398         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 399         if !prev_commitment_tx {
 400                 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
 401         }
 402         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 403                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 404                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 405                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 406                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 407                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 408                 }]),
 409                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 410         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 411         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 412                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 413                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 414                 }],
 415                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 416
 417         // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
 418         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
 419         let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 420         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 3);
 421         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], funding_tx);
 422         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 423         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 424         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
 425         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
 426         assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout,
 427                    a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
 428         // a_broadcast_txn [1] and [2] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
 429         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 430         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 431
 432         // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
 433         // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
 434         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
 435         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 436         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 437                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 438                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 439                 }],
 440                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 441         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
 442         // balance entry.
 443         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 444         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 445                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 446         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, true);
 447
 448         let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 449         assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
 450         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 451                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 452                 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 453                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 454                 check_spends!(spend_tx, a_broadcast_txn[2]);
 455         } else { panic!(); }
 456
 457         // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
 458         // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
 459         // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
 460         let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 461         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 462
 463         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 464                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 465                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 466                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 467                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 468                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 469                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 470                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 471                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 472                 }]),
 473                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 474
 475         // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
 476         // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
 477         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 478
 479         let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 480         assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
 481         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 482                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 483                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 484                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 485                 check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
 486         }
 487
 488         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 489                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 490                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 491                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 492                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 493                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 494                 }]),
 495                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 496
 497         // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
 498         // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
 499         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 500
 501         let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 502         assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
 503         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 504                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 505                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 506                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 507                 check_spends!(spend_tx, b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 508         } else { panic!(); }
 509
 510         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 511                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 512                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 513                 }],
 514         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 515
 516         // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
 517         // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
 518         // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
 519         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
 520         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 521                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 522                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 523                 }],
 524         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 525         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 526         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 527                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 528 }
 529
 530 #[test]
 531 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
 532         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
 533         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
 534 }