1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
12 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
13 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance};
14 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
15 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight};
16 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
17 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
18 use crate::ln::channel;
19 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
20 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
21 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
22 use crate::util::crypto::sign;
23 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
24 use crate::util::scid_utils::block_from_scid;
25 use crate::util::test_utils;
27 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
28 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
29 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
31 use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, Script, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime, Witness};
32 use bitcoin::util::sighash::SighashCache;
34 use crate::prelude::*;
36 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
39 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
40 // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
41 // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
42 // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
43 // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
44 // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
47 // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
49 // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
50 // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
52 // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
53 // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
54 // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
55 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
56 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
57 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
58 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
60 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
61 let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
63 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
64 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
65 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
66 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
68 let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
70 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
71 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
72 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
74 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
75 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
76 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
78 // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
79 // transaction for nodes[1].
80 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
81 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
82 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
83 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
84 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
86 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
87 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
88 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
89 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
91 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
92 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
93 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
96 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
97 let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
98 assert_eq!(spendable.len(), 1);
99 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
100 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
101 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
102 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
103 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
109 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
110 // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
111 // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
112 // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
114 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
115 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
116 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
117 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
119 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
121 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
123 // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
124 // before forwarding.
125 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
126 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
128 // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
129 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
131 // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
132 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
134 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
135 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
137 let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
138 assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
139 check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
141 // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
142 // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
143 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
144 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
145 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
147 // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
148 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
149 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
150 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
152 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
153 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
157 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
158 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
159 // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
160 // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
161 // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
162 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
163 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
164 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
165 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
167 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
168 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
169 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
170 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
172 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
173 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
175 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
176 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000
178 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
179 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
180 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
182 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
183 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
184 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
185 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
186 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
188 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
189 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
190 let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
191 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
192 let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
193 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
194 let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
195 assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
197 let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
198 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
199 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
201 let shutdown_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]));
202 let shutdown_tx_conf_height_b = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]));
204 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
205 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
207 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
208 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
210 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
211 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000,
212 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
214 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
215 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
216 amount_satoshis: 1000,
217 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
219 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
221 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
222 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
224 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
225 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
226 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id)
227 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b).is_empty());
229 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
230 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
232 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
233 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
234 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
235 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
237 let spendable_outputs_a = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
239 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a),
243 let spendable_outputs_b = test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
245 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b),
249 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
250 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
253 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
258 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
259 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
260 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
261 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
262 let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
263 let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
264 eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
265 assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
266 assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
269 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
270 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
271 // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
272 // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
273 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
274 if prev_commitment_tx {
275 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
276 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
277 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
278 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
279 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
281 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
282 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
283 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
285 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
286 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
287 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
288 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
290 // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
291 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
292 // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
293 // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
294 let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
295 // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
296 let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
298 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
300 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
301 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
303 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
304 let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
305 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
306 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
309 let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
310 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
311 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
312 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
314 let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
315 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
316 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
319 let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
320 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
321 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
322 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
324 let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
325 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
326 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
330 let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
331 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
332 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
333 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
334 payment_preimage: timeout_payment_preimage,
337 // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
338 // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
339 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
340 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
341 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
342 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
343 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
344 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
345 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
346 }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
347 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
349 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
350 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
351 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
353 let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
354 // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
355 // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
356 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
357 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
358 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
360 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
361 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
362 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
364 if prev_commitment_tx {
365 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
366 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
367 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
368 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
369 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
370 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
371 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
372 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
374 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
375 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
376 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
379 // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
380 // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
381 let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
382 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
383 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
384 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
385 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
386 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
387 // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
388 chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) +
389 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
390 channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
391 }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
392 if !prev_commitment_tx {
393 a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
395 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
396 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
397 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
398 amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
400 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
402 // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
403 // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
404 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
405 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
406 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
408 let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
409 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
410 // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
411 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
412 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
413 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
414 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
415 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
416 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
418 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
419 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
421 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
422 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
423 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
424 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
425 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
426 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
427 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
429 // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
430 // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
431 // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
432 // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
433 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
434 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
436 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
437 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
438 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
439 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
440 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
441 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
442 // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
443 // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
444 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
445 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
446 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
448 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
450 received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
451 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
453 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
454 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
455 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
457 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
458 // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
459 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
460 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
461 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
462 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
463 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
464 }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
465 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
467 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
468 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
470 // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
471 // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
472 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
473 if prev_commitment_tx {
474 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
476 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, false);
478 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
479 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
480 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
481 assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()],
482 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
484 // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
485 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
486 let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
487 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
488 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
489 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
490 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
491 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
492 assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
493 a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
494 // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
495 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
496 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
498 // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
499 // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
500 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
501 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
502 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
503 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
504 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
506 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
507 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
509 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
510 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
511 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
512 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
514 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
516 // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
517 // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
518 // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
519 let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
520 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
522 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
523 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
524 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
525 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
526 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
527 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
528 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
529 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
531 // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
532 // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
533 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
534 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
536 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
537 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
538 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
539 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
540 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
542 // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
543 // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
544 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
545 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
547 assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
548 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
550 // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
551 // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
552 // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
553 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
554 assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
555 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
556 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
557 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
558 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
560 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
561 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
562 // monitor events or claimable balances.
563 for node in nodes.iter() {
564 connect_blocks(node, 6);
565 connect_blocks(node, 6);
566 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
567 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
572 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
573 do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
574 do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
578 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
579 // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
580 // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
581 // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
582 // delay prior to spendability.
584 // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
585 // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
586 // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
587 // claim by our counterparty).
588 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
589 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
590 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
591 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
593 // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
594 // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
595 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
596 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
598 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
599 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
600 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
601 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
602 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
604 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
605 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
606 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
608 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
609 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
611 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
612 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
613 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
614 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
616 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
617 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
618 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
620 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
621 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
622 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
623 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
624 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
625 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
627 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
628 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
630 // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions
631 let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
632 assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 3);
633 check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
634 check_spends!(as_txn[2], as_txn[0]);
635 check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
637 // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
638 // claimable balances.
639 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
640 let commitment_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]));
641 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
642 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
643 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
645 let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
646 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
647 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
650 let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
651 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
652 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
653 payment_hash: payment_hash_2,
656 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
657 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
658 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
659 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
660 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
661 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
663 // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
664 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
665 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
666 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
667 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
668 let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
669 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
670 check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]);
672 // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
674 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
675 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
676 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
677 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
678 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
679 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
680 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
681 assert_eq!(as_txn[1].lock_time.0, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1); // as_txn[1] can be included in the next block
683 // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
684 // "awaiting confirmations" one.
685 let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
686 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
687 // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
688 // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
689 // call, as described, two hunks down.
690 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
691 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
692 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
693 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
694 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
695 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
696 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
697 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
698 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
700 // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
701 // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
702 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
703 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, true, false);
704 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
705 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
706 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
707 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
708 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
709 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
710 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
711 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
712 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
714 // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
715 // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
716 // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
717 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
718 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
720 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
721 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
722 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
723 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
724 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
725 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
726 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
728 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
730 // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
731 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
732 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
733 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
734 .get_spendable_outputs(&as_txn[0], commitment_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
735 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
736 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
737 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
738 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
740 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
741 let to_self_spendable_output = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
743 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&as_txn[0], commitment_tx_conf_height_a),
744 to_self_spendable_output
747 // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
748 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
749 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
750 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
751 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
753 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
754 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
755 // monitor events or claimable balances.
756 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
757 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
758 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
759 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
763 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
764 // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
766 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
767 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
768 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
769 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
771 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
772 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
774 // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
775 let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
776 let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
777 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
779 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
780 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
782 let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
783 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
784 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
785 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
787 let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
788 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
789 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
790 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
792 let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
793 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
794 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
795 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
797 let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
798 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
799 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
800 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
803 // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
804 // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
805 // HTLC output is spent.
807 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
808 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
809 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
810 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
811 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
813 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
814 amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
815 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
816 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
818 // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
819 let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
820 assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
821 check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
822 check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
824 // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
825 // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
826 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
827 let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
828 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
829 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
830 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
831 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
833 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
834 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
835 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
836 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
837 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
839 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
840 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
842 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
843 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
844 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
845 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
847 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
848 let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
849 amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
850 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
851 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
852 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
853 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
855 // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
856 // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
857 // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
858 // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
860 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
861 let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
862 assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
863 check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
864 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
865 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
867 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
868 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
870 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
871 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
872 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
874 // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
875 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
876 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
877 bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
879 // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
880 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
881 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1));
882 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
883 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
884 let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
885 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
886 check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
888 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
889 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
891 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
892 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
893 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
895 // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
896 // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
897 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
898 let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
899 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
900 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
901 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
902 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
903 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
904 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
905 confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
907 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
909 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
910 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
911 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
912 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
913 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
914 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
915 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
916 confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
918 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
920 // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
921 // payment failure event.
922 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
923 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
925 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
926 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
927 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
928 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
929 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
930 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
931 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
932 confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
934 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
936 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
937 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
938 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
939 confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
941 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
942 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
944 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
945 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
946 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
948 // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
949 // was already claimed.
950 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
951 let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
952 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
953 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
954 confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
956 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
958 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
959 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
960 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
961 confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
963 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
965 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
966 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
968 assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
969 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
970 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
972 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
973 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
975 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
976 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
977 // monitor events or claimable balances.
978 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
979 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
980 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
981 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
984 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
985 let mut v = v_orig.clone();
987 v.push((*t).clone());
993 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
994 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
995 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
996 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
997 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
998 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
999 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1000 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1001 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1002 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1003 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1005 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1006 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1007 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1008 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1010 // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
1012 // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
1013 // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
1014 // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
1015 // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
1016 // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
1017 // later commitment transaction updates
1019 // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
1020 // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
1021 // HTLCs individually.
1023 let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
1024 let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1025 let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1027 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1029 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1030 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1032 let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1033 let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1035 // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1036 let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1037 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1039 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1041 let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1042 let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1044 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1045 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1047 let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1049 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1050 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1051 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1053 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1054 assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1055 let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1056 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1057 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1058 events.retain(|ev| {
1060 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1061 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1062 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1065 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1066 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1072 assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1073 if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1075 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, .. } => {},
1079 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1080 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1081 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1082 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1084 // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1085 // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1086 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1087 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1088 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1089 amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1090 claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1091 payment_hash: missing_htlc_payment_hash,
1092 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1093 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1094 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1095 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
1096 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1097 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1098 claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1099 payment_hash: live_payment_hash,
1101 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1103 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1104 let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1105 // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1107 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1108 claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
1110 // The following constants were determined experimentally
1111 const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 483;
1112 const OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 571;
1113 const INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 578;
1115 // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1116 // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1117 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1118 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1119 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1120 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1122 // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1123 // claim balances separated out.
1124 let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1125 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1126 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1127 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1128 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1129 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1130 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1131 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1134 let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1135 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1136 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1138 let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1139 let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1140 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1142 let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1144 // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1145 // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1146 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1147 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1149 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1150 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1151 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1152 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1154 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1155 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1156 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1157 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1160 let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1161 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1162 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1164 let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1165 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1166 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1167 - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1168 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1171 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1172 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1173 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1175 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1176 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1179 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1180 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1182 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1184 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1185 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1187 // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1188 // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1189 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1190 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1192 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1193 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1194 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1195 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1196 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1197 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1198 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1199 - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1200 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1201 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1202 amount_satoshis: 3_000 - chan_feerate * OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1203 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1204 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1205 amount_satoshis: 4_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1206 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1207 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1208 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1209 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1211 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1213 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1214 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1216 let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1217 expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
1218 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1219 expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
1220 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1222 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1223 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }]);
1224 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1225 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }]);
1226 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1227 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1228 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1229 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1230 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1231 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1232 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1234 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1235 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1236 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1237 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1238 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1239 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1240 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1244 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1245 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true);
1246 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false);
1250 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1251 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1252 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1253 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1254 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1255 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1256 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1258 // Create some initial channels
1259 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1260 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 11_000_000);
1261 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1262 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1264 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1265 let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1266 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1267 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1268 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1270 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs and an output for both sides
1271 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
1273 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1275 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1276 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1278 // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1279 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1280 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1282 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1283 let revoked_htlc_success = {
1284 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1285 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1286 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1287 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
1288 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1292 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1293 let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
1294 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1295 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1296 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
1302 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1303 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
1304 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time.0, 0);
1305 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0, 0);
1307 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1308 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1309 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1310 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1311 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1312 let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1314 let as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1315 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), 1);
1316 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1318 // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1319 // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1320 // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1321 let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1322 // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1323 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1324 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1325 confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1326 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1327 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1328 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1329 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1330 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1331 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1332 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1334 assert_eq!(as_balances,
1335 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1337 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
1338 let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1339 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1340 check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
1341 check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]); // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked
1342 // outputs (which no longer includes the spent HTLC output)
1344 assert_eq!(as_balances,
1345 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1347 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1348 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1349 3_000 - chan_feerate * (revoked_htlc_success.weight() + as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight()) as u64 / 1000);
1351 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1352 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1353 // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1354 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1355 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1356 confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1357 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1358 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1359 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1360 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1361 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1362 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1363 amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1364 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1366 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1368 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1369 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1370 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1371 // to_self output to B
1372 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1373 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1374 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1375 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1376 amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1377 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1379 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1381 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1382 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1383 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1384 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1385 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1386 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1387 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1389 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1391 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1392 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1393 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1394 // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1395 let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1396 for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1397 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1400 // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1402 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1403 let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1404 for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1405 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1408 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
1409 let as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1410 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1412 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1413 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1415 // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1416 // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1417 // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1418 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1419 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1420 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1421 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1422 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1423 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1425 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1427 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1428 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1429 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1430 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1431 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1432 amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1433 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1435 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1437 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
1438 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1439 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1440 amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].output[0].value,
1441 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1442 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1443 amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1444 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1446 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1448 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1449 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1450 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1451 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
1453 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1455 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1456 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1457 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1458 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1459 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1460 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1461 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1465 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
1466 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1467 // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1468 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1469 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1470 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1471 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1472 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1473 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1474 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1475 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1476 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1478 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1479 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1480 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1481 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1483 // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1484 // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1485 // revocation-claim transaction.
1487 let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1488 let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1490 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1492 // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1493 // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1494 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1495 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1497 // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1498 let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1500 assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), 2);
1501 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1502 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1504 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1505 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1508 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1511 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1514 let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1515 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1516 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1518 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1519 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1521 let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1523 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1524 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1525 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1526 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1527 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1528 payment_hash: revoked_payment_hash,
1529 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1530 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1531 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1532 payment_hash: claimed_payment_hash,
1534 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1536 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1537 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1538 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1541 let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1542 // Currently the revoked commitment outputs are all claimed in one aggregated transaction
1543 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 1);
1544 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1545 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1547 let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1549 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1550 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1551 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1552 confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1553 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1554 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1555 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1556 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1557 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1558 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1559 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1560 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1562 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1564 // Confirm A's HTLC-Success tranasction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1566 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[1]);
1567 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage, None, true, false);
1568 let mut claim_txn_2: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1569 claim_txn_2.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| if tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid()) { 0 } else { 1 });
1570 // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1571 // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1572 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1573 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 2);
1574 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1575 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1576 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1578 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1579 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1580 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1581 confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1582 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1583 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1584 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1585 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1586 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1587 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1588 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1589 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1590 // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1591 // anyway, so its not a big change.
1592 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1594 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1596 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1597 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1599 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1600 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1601 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1602 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1603 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1604 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1605 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1606 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1607 // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1608 // anyway, so its not a big change.
1609 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1611 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1613 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1614 let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1616 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1617 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1618 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1619 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1620 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1621 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1622 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1623 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1624 confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1626 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1628 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1629 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1631 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1632 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1633 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1634 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1635 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1636 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1638 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1640 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1641 let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1643 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1644 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
1645 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1647 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1649 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1651 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1652 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1653 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1654 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1656 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1657 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1658 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1659 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1660 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1661 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1662 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1665 fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
1666 // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
1667 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1668 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1670 let new_chain_monitor;
1672 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1673 let node_deserialized;
1675 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1677 // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
1678 // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
1679 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
1680 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
1682 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
1683 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1684 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1685 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
1686 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1688 let commitment_tx = {
1689 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1690 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1691 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
1692 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
1696 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
1698 // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
1699 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1700 let htlc_timeout_tx = {
1701 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1702 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1703 check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
1707 // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
1708 // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
1709 if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
1710 let serialized_monitor = hex::decode(
1711 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0",
1713 reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
1716 // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
1717 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1718 if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
1719 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1722 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1723 if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
1724 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
1726 assert!(txn.len() < 6);
1729 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
1730 assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
1731 assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
1732 assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
1738 fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
1739 do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
1740 do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
1743 fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) {
1744 // Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every
1745 // `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call.
1746 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1747 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1748 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1750 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1751 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1753 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
1754 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1756 let (_, _, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
1757 &nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 500_000_000
1759 const HTLC_AMT_MSAT: u64 = 1_000_000;
1760 const HTLC_AMT_SAT: u64 = HTLC_AMT_MSAT / 1000;
1761 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_AMT_MSAT);
1763 let htlc_expiry = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1;
1765 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(&nodes[0], &chan_id);
1766 assert_eq!(commitment_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 /* commitment tx only */} else { 2 /* commitment and htlc timeout tx */ });
1767 check_spends!(&commitment_txn[0], &funding_tx);
1768 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_txn[0]);
1769 check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
1770 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed,
1771 false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1772 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1774 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1776 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1777 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1778 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` on anchors
1779 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1780 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1783 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1785 // Set up a helper closure we'll use throughout our test. We should only expect retries without
1786 // bumps if fees have not increased after a block has been connected (assuming the height timer
1787 // re-evaluates at every block) or after `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` is called.
1788 let mut prev_htlc_tx_feerate = None;
1789 let mut check_htlc_retry = |should_retry: bool, should_bump: bool| -> Option<Transaction> {
1790 let (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) = if anchors {
1791 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
1792 let events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1793 assert_eq!(events.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
1798 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
1799 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
1800 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1801 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1802 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1803 check_spends!(&htlc_tx, &commitment_txn[0], &coinbase_tx);
1804 let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value -
1805 htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>();
1806 let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
1807 (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
1809 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1812 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1813 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1814 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
1818 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1819 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]);
1820 let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value;
1821 let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
1822 (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
1825 assert!(htlc_tx_feerate > prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take().unwrap());
1826 } else if let Some(prev_feerate) = prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take() {
1827 assert_eq!(htlc_tx_feerate, prev_feerate);
1829 prev_htlc_tx_feerate = Some(htlc_tx_feerate);
1833 // Connect blocks up to one before the HTLC expires. This should not result in a claim/retry.
1834 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_expiry - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
1835 check_htlc_retry(false, false);
1837 // Connect one more block, producing our first claim.
1838 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1839 check_htlc_retry(true, false);
1841 // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
1842 // transactions pre-anchors.
1843 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1844 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1846 // Trigger a call and we should have another retry, but without a bump.
1847 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1848 check_htlc_retry(true, false);
1850 // Double the feerate and trigger a call, expecting a fee-bumped retry.
1851 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
1852 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1853 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1855 // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
1856 // transactions pre-anchors.
1857 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1858 let htlc_tx = check_htlc_retry(true, anchors).unwrap();
1860 // Mine the HTLC transaction to ensure we don't retry claims while they're confirmed.
1861 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_tx);
1862 // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transactions,
1863 // we'll receive an extra bumped claim.
1864 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
1865 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1866 nodes[0].wallet_source.remove_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 1 });
1867 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1869 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1870 check_htlc_retry(false, false);
1874 fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() {
1875 do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false);
1876 do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true);
1880 fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
1881 // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
1882 // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
1883 // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
1884 // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
1885 // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
1886 // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
1887 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1888 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1889 let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
1890 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
1891 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1892 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1893 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
1894 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1896 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
1897 &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
1899 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
1900 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000);
1902 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1903 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1905 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
1907 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
1908 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
1910 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
1912 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1913 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1914 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
1917 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
1918 &payment_hash_2, &payment_preimage_2, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
1919 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
1921 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
1922 &payment_hash_1, &payment_preimage_1, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
1923 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
1926 let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1927 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
1928 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
1929 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
1930 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1932 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1933 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1934 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
1935 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1936 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1939 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1940 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
1941 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1942 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1943 let anchor_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1944 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1945 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
1946 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
1947 (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
1949 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1952 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[2].value, 1_000); // HTLC A -> B
1953 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[3].value, 2_000); // HTLC B -> A
1955 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
1956 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1957 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
1958 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1961 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1962 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
1964 let htlc_preimage_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1965 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1966 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1967 check_spends!(htlc_preimage_tx, commitment_tx);
1969 let htlc_timeout_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1970 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1971 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1972 check_spends!(htlc_timeout_tx, commitment_tx);
1974 if let Some(commitment_tx) = txn.pop() {
1975 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
1979 let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1980 // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
1981 // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
1982 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
1983 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
1984 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
1985 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
1987 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2);
1989 let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1990 for event in holder_events {
1992 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
1993 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
1994 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1995 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1996 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1997 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx, anchor_tx);
1998 htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
2000 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2004 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
2005 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2007 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2009 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
2011 let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2012 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2013 for event in holder_events {
2015 Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
2016 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2020 // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
2021 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2022 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2023 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2024 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2028 fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
2029 // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
2030 // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
2031 // revoked commitment.
2032 let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2033 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2034 // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
2035 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2036 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2038 let bob_chain_monitor;
2040 let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
2041 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2042 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2043 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2044 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2045 let bob_deserialized;
2047 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2049 let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2050 let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2052 // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
2053 let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
2055 // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
2056 let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2057 let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2058 let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2059 let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2061 // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
2062 // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
2064 let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
2065 let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
2067 // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
2068 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
2069 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
2070 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
2071 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
2073 // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
2075 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2076 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2078 // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
2080 nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
2081 bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
2083 for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
2084 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
2085 for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
2086 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
2087 &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2088 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2093 // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
2094 // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
2095 // the HTLCs still pending.
2096 *nodes[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2097 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
2098 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
2099 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2100 let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = {
2101 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2102 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2103 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2104 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2105 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
2106 check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
2107 check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3);
2108 (txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone())
2110 check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3);
2111 check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
2112 (txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone())
2116 // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
2117 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2118 let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2119 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2120 let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2121 for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
2122 let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat() * (idx + 1) as u64;
2123 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2125 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2126 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2127 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2129 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2132 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, utxo_value);
2134 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event),
2135 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2137 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2138 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2139 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]);
2140 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2141 anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone());
2144 for node in &nodes {
2145 mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_txs[1]]);
2147 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
2148 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
2149 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2151 // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
2154 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2155 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
2157 let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() {
2158 (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] })
2160 (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] })
2163 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2164 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
2165 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
2166 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2167 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
2168 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
2171 // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
2172 // through the success path.
2173 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2174 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2175 // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2176 // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2177 match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
2178 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
2179 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
2180 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
2181 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2182 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
2183 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2186 _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
2189 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
2190 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
2191 let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2192 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2194 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2195 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2196 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
2197 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2198 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
2201 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
2203 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2204 input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
2205 previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2206 ..Default::default()
2208 output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
2209 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
2210 script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
2213 let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
2214 for event in events {
2215 // We don't use the `BumpTransactionEventHandler` here because it does not support
2216 // creating one transaction from multiple `HTLCResolution` events.
2217 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
2218 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
2219 for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
2220 assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
2221 htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
2222 htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&secp));
2224 descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
2225 htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
2227 panic!("Unexpected event");
2230 for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
2231 let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
2232 let signer = htlc_descriptor.derive_channel_signer(&nodes[1].keys_manager);
2233 let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
2234 let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&secp);
2235 htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
2237 let fee_utxo_sig = {
2238 let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
2239 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
2240 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2242 let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2243 let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2244 sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2247 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2248 check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
2252 for node in &nodes {
2253 mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
2256 // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
2257 // the second level instead.
2258 let revoked_claim_transactions = {
2259 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2260 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2262 let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
2263 tx.input.len() == 2 &&
2264 tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2265 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
2266 ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2267 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
2268 for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
2269 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
2272 let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = HashMap::new();
2273 for current_tx in txn.into_iter() {
2274 revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx);
2276 revoked_claim_transaction_map
2278 for node in &nodes {
2279 mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claim_transactions.values().collect::<Vec<_>>());
2283 // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
2285 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2286 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
2288 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2289 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2291 // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2292 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2293 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2295 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2296 let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2297 assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 2);
2298 for event in spendable_output_events.iter() {
2299 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event {
2300 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2301 assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap()));
2302 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2303 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
2306 check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
2308 panic!("unexpected event");
2312 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2313 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2314 // On the Alice side, the individual to_self_claim are still pending confirmation.
2315 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 2);
2316 // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
2317 // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
2318 // balances to claim.
2320 // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
2321 // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
2322 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);