_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
  11
  12 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
  13 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance};
  14 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  15 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight};
  16 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
  17 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
  18 use crate::ln::channel;
  19 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
  20 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
  21 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
  22 use crate::util::crypto::sign;
  23 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
  24 use crate::util::scid_utils::block_from_scid;
  25 use crate::util::test_utils;
  26
  27 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
  28 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  29 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
  31 use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, Script, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime, Witness};
  32 use bitcoin::util::sighash::SighashCache;
  33
  34 use crate::prelude::*;
  35
  36 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  37
  38 #[test]
  39 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
  40         // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
  41         // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
  42         // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
  43         // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
  44         // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
  45         // HTLC.
  46         //
  47         // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
  48         //
  49         // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
  50         // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
  51         //
  52         // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
  53         // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
  54         // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
  55         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
  56         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
  57         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
  58         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  59
  60         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
  61         let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
  62
  63         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
  64         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
  65                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
  66         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
  67
  68         let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
  69
  70         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  71         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
  72         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
  73
  74         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  75         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
  76         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  77
  78         // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
  79         // transaction for nodes[1].
  80         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
  81         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  82         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
  83         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
  84         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
  85
  86         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
  87         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
  88         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  89         let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
  90
  91         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
  92         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
  93         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
  94 }
  95
  96 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction, has_anchors_htlc_event: bool) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
  97         let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
  98         assert_eq!(spendable.len(), if has_anchors_htlc_event { 2 } else { 1 });
  99         if has_anchors_htlc_event {
 100                 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { .. }) = spendable.pop().unwrap() {}
 101                 else { panic!(); }
 102         }
 103         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 104                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 105                 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 106                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 107                 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
 108                 outputs
 109         } else { panic!(); }
 110 }
 111
 112 #[test]
 113 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
 114         // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
 115         // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
 116         // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
 117         // confirmations.
 118         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 119         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 120         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 121         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 122
 123         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
 124
 125         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
 126
 127         // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
 128         // before forwarding.
 129         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
 130         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
 131
 132         // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
 133         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
 134
 135         // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
 136         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
 137         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 138         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 139         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 140
 141         let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 142         assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
 143         check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
 144
 145         // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
 146         // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
 147         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 148         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 149         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 150
 151         // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
 152         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
 153         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 154         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 155
 156         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 157         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
 158 }
 159
 160 fn do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(anchors: bool) {
 161         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
 162         // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
 163         // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
 164         // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
 165         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 166         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 167         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
 168         if anchors {
 169                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
 170                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
 171         }
 172         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
 173         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 174
 175         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 176                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 177         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 178         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 179
 180         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 181         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 182
 183         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000;
 184         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
 185         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 186                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value
 187                 }],
 188                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 189         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
 190                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 191
 192         nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 193         let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 194         nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
 195         let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 196         nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
 197
 198         let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 199         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
 200         let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 201         nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
 202         let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 203         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
 204         let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 205         assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
 206
 207         let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 208         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
 209         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
 210
 211         let shutdown_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]));
 212         let shutdown_tx_conf_height_b = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]));
 213
 214         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 215         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 216
 217         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 218         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 219
 220         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 221                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 222                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 223                 }],
 224                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 225         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 226                         amount_satoshis: 1000,
 227                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 228                 }],
 229                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 230
 231         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 232         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 233
 234         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
 235                 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
 236         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id)
 237                 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b).is_empty());
 238
 239         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 240         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
 241
 242         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 243                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 244         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 245                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 246
 247         let spendable_outputs_a = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
 248         assert_eq!(
 249                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a),
 250                 spendable_outputs_a
 251         );
 252
 253         let spendable_outputs_b = test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
 254         assert_eq!(
 255                 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b),
 256                 spendable_outputs_b
 257         );
 258
 259         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 260         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 261 }
 262
 263 #[test]
 264 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
 265         do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(false);
 266         do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(true);
 267 }
 268
 269 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
 270         v.sort_unstable();
 271         v
 272 }
 273
 274 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
 275 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
 276 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
 277 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
 278         let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 279         let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 280         eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
 281         assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
 282         assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
 283 }
 284
 285 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(anchors: bool, prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
 286         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
 287         // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
 288         // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
 289         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 290         if prev_commitment_tx {
 291                 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 292                 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 293                 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 294                 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
 295                 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
 296         }
 297         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 298         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
 299         if anchors {
 300                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
 301                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
 302         }
 303         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
 304         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 305
 306         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
 307                 version: 2,
 308                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
 309                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
 310                 output: vec![
 311                         TxOut {
 312                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
 313                                 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
 314                         },
 315                         TxOut {
 316                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
 317                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
 318                         },
 319                 ],
 320         };
 321         if anchors {
 322                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
 323                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
 324         }
 325
 326         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 327                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 328         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 329         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 330
 331         // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
 332         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
 333         // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
 334         // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
 335         let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
 336         // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
 337         let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
 338
 339         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 340
 341         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 342         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 343
 344         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
 345         let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 346                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 347                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 348                 payment_hash,
 349         };
 350         let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 351                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 352                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 353                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 354         };
 355         let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 356                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 357                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 358                 payment_hash,
 359         };
 360         let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 361                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 362                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 363                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 364         };
 365         let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 366                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 367                 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 368                 payment_hash,
 369                 payment_preimage,
 370         };
 371         let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 372                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 373                 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 374                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 375                 payment_preimage: timeout_payment_preimage,
 376         };
 377
 378         // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
 379         // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
 380         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
 381                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 382         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
 383         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 384                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 385                 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 386                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 387         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 388                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 389                 }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 390                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 391
 392         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
 393         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 394         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
 395
 396         let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 397         // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
 398         // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
 399         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
 400         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 401         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
 402
 403         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
 404         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 405         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
 406
 407         if prev_commitment_tx {
 408                 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
 409                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
 410                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
 411                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
 412                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 413                 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 414                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
 415                 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 416                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 417                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
 418                 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 419                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 420         }
 421
 422         // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
 423         // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
 424         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
 425                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) +
 426                 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 427         let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 428                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
 429                                 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
 430                                 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
 431                                 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
 432                                 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
 433                                 commitment_tx_fee - // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs
 434                                 anchor_outputs_value, // The anchor outputs value in satoshis
 435                 }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
 436         if !prev_commitment_tx {
 437                 a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
 438         }
 439         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
 440                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 441         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 442                         amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
 443                 }],
 444                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 445
 446         // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
 447         // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
 448         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 449         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 450         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 451
 452         if anchors {
 453                 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 454                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 455                 match events.pop().unwrap() {
 456                         Event::BumpTransaction(bump_event) => {
 457                                 let mut first_htlc_event = bump_event.clone();
 458                                 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut first_htlc_event {
 459                                         htlc_descriptors.remove(1);
 460                                 } else {
 461                                         panic!("Unexpected event");
 462                                 }
 463                                 let mut second_htlc_event = bump_event;
 464                                 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut second_htlc_event {
 465                                         htlc_descriptors.remove(0);
 466                                 } else {
 467                                         panic!("Unexpected event");
 468                                 }
 469                                 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&first_htlc_event);
 470                                 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&second_htlc_event);
 471                         },
 472                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 473                 }
 474         }
 475
 476         let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
 477         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 478         // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
 479         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
 480         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
 481         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
 482         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
 483         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 484         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 485
 486         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 487         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 488         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 489         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 490         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 491         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 492         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 493         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 494         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 495         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 496
 497         // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
 498         // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
 499         // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
 500         // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
 501         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 502         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 503         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
 504                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 505         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 506                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 507                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 508                 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 509                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 510         // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
 511         // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
 512         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 513                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 514                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 515                 },
 516                 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
 517                 // long.
 518                 received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 519                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 520
 521         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 522         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
 523         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 524
 525         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
 526         // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
 527         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 528                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 529         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 530                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 531                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 532                 }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 533                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 534
 535         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0], false);
 536         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 537
 538         // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
 539         // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
 540         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 541         if prev_commitment_tx {
 542                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
 543         } else {
 544                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, false);
 545         }
 546         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 547                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 548         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 549         assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()],
 550                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 551
 552         // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
 553         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 554         let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 555         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 556         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 557         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 558         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 559         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 560         assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
 561                    a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
 562         // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
 563         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 564         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 565
 566         // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
 567         // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
 568         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 569         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 570         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 571                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 572                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 573                 }],
 574                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 575         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
 576         // balance entry.
 577         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 578         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 579                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 580         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
 581
 582         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1], false);
 583
 584         // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
 585         // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
 586         // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
 587         let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 588         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 589
 590         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 591                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 592                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 593                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 594                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 595                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 596                 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 597                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 598
 599         // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
 600         // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
 601         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 602         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0], anchors);
 603
 604         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 605                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 606                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 607                 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 608                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 609
 610         // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
 611         // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
 612         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 613         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0], anchors);
 614
 615         assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
 616                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 617
 618         // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
 619         // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
 620         // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
 621         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 622         assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
 623                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 624         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 625         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 626                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 627
 628         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 629         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 630         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 631         for node in nodes.iter() {
 632                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 633                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 634                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 635                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 636         }
 637 }
 638
 639 #[test]
 640 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
 641         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, true);
 642         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, false);
 643         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, true);
 644         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, false);
 645 }
 646
 647 #[test]
 648 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
 649         // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
 650         // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
 651         // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
 652         // delay prior to spendability.
 653         //
 654         // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
 655         // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
 656         // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
 657         // claim by our counterparty).
 658         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 659         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 660         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 661         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 662
 663         // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
 664         // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
 665         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
 666         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 667
 668         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
 669         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 670         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
 671                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 672         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 673
 674         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 675         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 676         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 677
 678         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 679         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
 680
 681         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
 682         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
 683                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
 684         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 685
 686         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 687         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 688         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 689
 690         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 691         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
 692         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
 693         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 694         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 695         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
 696
 697         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 698         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 699
 700         // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions
 701         let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 702         assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 3);
 703         check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
 704         check_spends!(as_txn[2], as_txn[0]);
 705         check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
 706
 707         // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
 708         // claimable balances.
 709         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 710         let commitment_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]));
 711         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 712         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 713         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 714
 715         let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 716                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 717                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 718                 payment_hash,
 719         };
 720         let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 721                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 722                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 723                 payment_hash: payment_hash_2,
 724         };
 725
 726         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 727                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 728                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 729                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 730                 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 731                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 732
 733         // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
 734         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 735         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 736         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 737         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 738         let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 739         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
 740         check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]);
 741
 742         // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
 743         // transaction.
 744         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
 745         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 746                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 747                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 748                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 749                 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 750                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 751         assert_eq!(as_txn[1].lock_time.0, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1); // as_txn[1] can be included in the next block
 752
 753         // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
 754         // "awaiting confirmations" one.
 755         let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 756         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
 757         // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
 758         // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
 759         // call, as described, two hunks down.
 760         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 761                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 762                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 763                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 764                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 765                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 766                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 767                 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 768                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 769
 770         // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
 771         // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
 772         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
 773         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, true, false);
 774         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 775                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 776                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 777                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 778                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 779                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 780                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 781                 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 782                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 783
 784         // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
 785         // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
 786         // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
 787         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 788         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
 789
 790         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 791                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 792                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 793                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 794                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 795                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 796                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 797                 }]),
 798                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 799
 800         // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 801         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 802         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
 803         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
 804                 .get_spendable_outputs(&as_txn[0], commitment_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
 805         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 806         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 807                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 808                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 809                 }],
 810                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 811         let to_self_spendable_output = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0], false);
 812         assert_eq!(
 813                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&as_txn[0], commitment_tx_conf_height_a),
 814                 to_self_spendable_output
 815         );
 816
 817         // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 818         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 819         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 820         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 821         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0], false);
 822
 823         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 824         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 825         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 826         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 827         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 828         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 829         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 830 }
 831
 832 #[test]
 833 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
 834         // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
 835         // have a preimage.
 836         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 837         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 838         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 839         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 840
 841         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
 842         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 843
 844         // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
 845         let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
 846         let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
 847         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 848
 849         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 850         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 851
 852         let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 853                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 854                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 855                 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
 856         };
 857         let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 858                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 859                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 860                 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
 861         };
 862         let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 863                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 864                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 865                 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
 866         };
 867         let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 868                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 869                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 870                 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
 871         };
 872
 873         // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
 874         // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
 875         // HTLC output is spent.
 876
 877         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 878                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 879                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 880                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
 881                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 882
 883         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 884                         amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
 885                 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
 886                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 887
 888         // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
 889         let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 890         assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
 891         check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
 892         check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
 893
 894         // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
 895         // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
 896         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 897         let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 898                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 899                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 900                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 901                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
 902
 903         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 904         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
 905         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 906         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 907         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 908
 909         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 910                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 911
 912         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 913         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 914         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 915         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 916
 917         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
 918         let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 919                         amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
 920                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 921                 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
 922         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 923                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 924
 925         // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
 926         // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
 927         // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
 928         // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
 929
 930         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
 931         let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 932         assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
 933         check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
 934         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
 935                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
 936
 937         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 938                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 939
 940         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 941         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 942                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 943
 944         // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
 945         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 946         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0], false);
 947         bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
 948
 949         // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
 950         nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
 951         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1));
 952         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
 953                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
 954         let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 955         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
 956         check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
 957
 958         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 959                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 960
 961         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
 962         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 963                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 964
 965         // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
 966         // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
 967         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 968         let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
 969         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 970                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 971                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 972                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 973                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 974                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 975                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
 976                 }]),
 977                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 978
 979         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 980         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 981                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 982                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 983                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 984                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 985                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 986                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
 987                 }]),
 988                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 989
 990         // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
 991         // payment failure event.
 992         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 993         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
 994
 995         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 996         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 997                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 998                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 999                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1000                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1001                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1002                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1003                 }]),
1004                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1005
1006         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1007         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1008                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1009                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1010                 }],
1011                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1012         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0], false);
1013
1014         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1015         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1016         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1017
1018         // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
1019         // was already claimed.
1020         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1021         let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1022         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1023                         amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1024                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1025                 }]),
1026                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1027
1028         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1029         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1030                         amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1031                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1032                 }]),
1033                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1034
1035         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1036         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
1037
1038         assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
1039                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1040         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1041
1042         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1043         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1044
1045         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1046         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1047         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1048         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1049         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1050         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1051         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1052 }
1053
1054 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
1055         let mut v = v_orig.clone();
1056         for t in extra_ts {
1057                 v.push((*t).clone());
1058         }
1059         v.sort_unstable();
1060         v
1061 }
1062
1063 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
1064         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
1065         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1066         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1067         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1068         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1069         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1070         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1071         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1072         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1073         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1074
1075         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1076                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1077         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1078         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1079
1080         // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
1081         //
1082         // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
1083         // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
1084         // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
1085         // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
1086         // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
1087         //     later commitment transaction updates
1088         //
1089         // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
1090         // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
1091         // HTLCs individually.
1092
1093         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
1094         let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1095         let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1096
1097         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1098
1099         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1100         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1101
1102         let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1103         let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1104
1105         // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1106         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1107         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1108
1109         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1110
1111         let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1112         let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1113
1114         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1115         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1116         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1117         let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1118
1119         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1120         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1121         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1122
1123         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1124         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1125         let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1126                 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1127                 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1128         events.retain(|ev| {
1129                 match ev {
1130                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1131                                 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1132                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1133                                 false
1134                         },
1135                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1136                                 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1137                                 false
1138                         },
1139                         _ => true,
1140                 }
1141         });
1142         assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1143         if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1144         match &events[1] {
1145                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, .. } => {},
1146                 _ => panic!(),
1147         }
1148
1149         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1150         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1151         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1152         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1153
1154         // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1155         // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1156         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1157                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1158                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1159                         amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1160                         claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1161                         payment_hash: missing_htlc_payment_hash,
1162                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1163                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1164                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1165                         payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
1166                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1167                         amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1168                         claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1169                         payment_hash: live_payment_hash,
1170                 }]),
1171                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1172
1173         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1174         let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1175         // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1176         // quite soon.
1177         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1178         claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
1179
1180         // The following constants were determined experimentally
1181         const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 483;
1182         const OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 571;
1183         const INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 578;
1184
1185         // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1186         // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1187         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1188         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1189         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1190         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1191
1192         // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1193         // claim balances separated out.
1194         let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1195                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1196                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1197                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1198                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1199                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1200                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1201                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1202                 }];
1203
1204         let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1205                 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1206                         (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1207         };
1208         let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1209         let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1210                 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1211         };
1212         let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1213
1214         // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1215         // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1216         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1217                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1218
1219         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1220                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1221                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1222                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1223         } else {
1224                 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1225                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1226                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1227                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1228         }
1229
1230         let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1231                 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1232                 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1233         };
1234         let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1235                 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1236                         (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1237                         - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1238                 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1239         };
1240
1241         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1242                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1243                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1244         } else {
1245                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1246                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1247         }
1248
1249         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1250                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1251         } else {
1252                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1253         }
1254         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1255                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1256
1257         // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1258         // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1259         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1260         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1261
1262         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1263                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1264                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1265                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1266                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1267                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1268                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1269                                 - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1270                         confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1271                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1272                         amount_satoshis: 3_000 - chan_feerate * OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1273                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1274                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1275                         amount_satoshis: 4_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1276                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1277                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1278                         amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1279                         confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1280                 }]),
1281                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1282
1283         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1284         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1285
1286         let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1287         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
1288                 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1289         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
1290                 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1291
1292         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1293         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }], false);
1294         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1295         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }], false);
1296         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1297         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1298         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0], false);
1299         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1300         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1], false);
1301         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1302         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1303
1304         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1305         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1306         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1307         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1308         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1309         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1310         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1311 }
1312
1313 #[test]
1314 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1315         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true);
1316         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false);
1317 }
1318
1319 #[test]
1320 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1321         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1322         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1323         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1324         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1325         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1326         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1327
1328         // Create some initial channels
1329         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1330                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 11_000_000);
1331         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1332         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1333
1334         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1335         let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1336         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1337         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1338         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1339
1340         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs and an output for both sides
1341         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
1342
1343         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1344
1345         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1346         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1347
1348         // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1349         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1350         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1351         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1352         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1353         let revoked_htlc_success = {
1354                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1355                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1356                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1357                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
1358                 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1359                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1360         };
1361
1362         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1363         let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
1364                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1365                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1366                 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
1367                         txn.remove(1)
1368                 } else {
1369                         txn.remove(0)
1370                 }
1371         };
1372         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1373         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
1374         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time.0, 0);
1375         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0, 0);
1376
1377         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1378         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1379         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1380         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1381         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1382         let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1383
1384         let as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1385         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), 1);
1386         check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1387
1388         // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1389         // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1390         // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1391         let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1392                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1393                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1394                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1395                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1396                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1397                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1398                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1399                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1400                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1401                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1402                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1403                 }]);
1404         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1405                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1406
1407         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
1408         let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1409         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1410         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
1411         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]); // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked
1412                                                                   // outputs (which no longer includes the spent HTLC output)
1413
1414         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1415                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1416
1417         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1418         fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1419                 3_000 - chan_feerate * (revoked_htlc_success.weight() + as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight()) as u64 / 1000);
1420
1421         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1422         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1423                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1424                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1425                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1426                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1427                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1428                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1429                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1430                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1431                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1432                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1433                         amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1434                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1435                 }]),
1436                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1437
1438         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1439         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], false);
1440         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1441                         // to_self output to B
1442                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1443                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1444                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1445                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1446                         amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1447                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1448                 }]),
1449                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1450
1451         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1452         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0], false);
1453         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1454                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1455                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1456                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1457                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1458                 }]),
1459                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1460
1461         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1462         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1463                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1464         // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1465         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1466         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1467                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1468         }
1469
1470         // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1471         // claiming.
1472         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1473         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1474         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1475                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1476         }
1477
1478         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
1479         let as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1480         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1481
1482         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1483         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1484
1485         // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1486         // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1487         // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1488         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1489         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1490                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1491                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1492                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1493                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1494                 }]),
1495                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1496
1497         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1498         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1499                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1500                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1501                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1502                         amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1503                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1504                 }]),
1505                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1506
1507         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
1508         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1509                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1510                         amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].output[0].value,
1511                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1512                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1513                         amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1514                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1515                 }]),
1516                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1517
1518         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1519         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], false);
1520         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1521         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], false);
1522
1523         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1524
1525         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1526         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1527         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1528         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1529         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1530         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1531         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1532 }
1533
1534 #[test]
1535 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
1536         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1537         // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1538         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1539         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1540         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1541         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1542         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1543         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1544         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1545         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1546         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1547
1548         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1549                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1550         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1551         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1552
1553         // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1554         // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1555         // revocation-claim transaction.
1556
1557         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1558         let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1559
1560         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1561
1562         // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1563         // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1564         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1565                 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1566
1567         // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1568         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1569
1570         assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), 2);
1571         check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1572         check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1573
1574         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1575         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1576
1577         {
1578                 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1579                 *feerate += 1;
1580         }
1581         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1582         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1583
1584         let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1585         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1586         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1587
1588         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1589         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1590         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1591         let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1592
1593         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1594                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1595                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1596                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1597                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1598                         payment_hash: revoked_payment_hash,
1599                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1600                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1601                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1602                         payment_hash: claimed_payment_hash,
1603                 }]),
1604                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1605
1606         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1607         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1608         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1609         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1610
1611         let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1612         // Currently the revoked commitment outputs are all claimed in one aggregated transaction
1613         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 1);
1614         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1615         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1616
1617         let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1618
1619         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1620                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1621                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1622                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1623                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1624                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1625                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1626                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1627                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1628                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1629                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1630                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1631                 }]),
1632                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1633
1634         // Confirm A's HTLC-Success tranasction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1635         // new claim.
1636         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[1]);
1637         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage, None, true, false);
1638         let mut claim_txn_2: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1639         claim_txn_2.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| if tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid()) { 0 } else { 1 });
1640         // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1641         // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1642         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1643         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 2);
1644         check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1645         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1646         check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1647
1648         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1649                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1650                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1651                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1652                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1653                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1654                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1655                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1656                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1657                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1658                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1659                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1660                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1661                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1662                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1663                 }]),
1664                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1665
1666         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1667         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1668
1669         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1670                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1671                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1672                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1673                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1674                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1675                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1676                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1677                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1678                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1679                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1680                 }]),
1681                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1682
1683         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1684         let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1685
1686         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1687                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1688                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1689                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1690                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1691                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1692                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1693                         amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1694                         confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1695                 }]),
1696                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1697
1698         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1699         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1], false);
1700
1701         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1702                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1703                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1704                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1705                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1706                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1707                 }]),
1708                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1709
1710         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1711         let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1712
1713         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1714                         amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
1715                         confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1716                 }],
1717                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1718
1719         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1720
1721         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1722         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1723         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0], false);
1724         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1725
1726         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1727         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1728         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1729         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1730         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1731         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1732         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1733 }
1734
1735 fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
1736         // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
1737         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1738         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1739         let persister;
1740         let new_chain_monitor;
1741
1742         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1743         let node_deserialized;
1744
1745         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1746
1747         // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
1748         // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
1749         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
1750         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
1751
1752         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
1753         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1754         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1755         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
1756                  [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1757
1758         let commitment_tx = {
1759                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1760                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1761                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
1762                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
1763                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1764         };
1765
1766         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
1767
1768         // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
1769         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1770         let htlc_timeout_tx = {
1771                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1772                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1773                 check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
1774                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1775         };
1776
1777         // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
1778         // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
1779         if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
1780                 let serialized_monitor = hex::decode(
1781                         "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1782                 ).unwrap();
1783                 reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
1784         }
1785
1786         // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
1787         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1788         if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
1789                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1790         }
1791         {
1792                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1793                 if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
1794                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
1795                 } else {
1796                         assert!(txn.len() < 6);
1797                 }
1798                 for tx in txn {
1799                         assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
1800                         assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
1801                         assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
1802                         assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
1803                 }
1804         }
1805 }
1806
1807 #[test]
1808 fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
1809         do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
1810         do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
1811 }
1812
1813 fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) {
1814         // Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every
1815         // `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call.
1816         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1817         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1818         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1819         if anchors {
1820                 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1821                 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1822         }
1823         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
1824         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1825
1826         let (_, _, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
1827                 &nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 500_000_000
1828         );
1829         const HTLC_AMT_MSAT: u64 = 1_000_000;
1830         const HTLC_AMT_SAT: u64 = HTLC_AMT_MSAT / 1000;
1831         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_AMT_MSAT);
1832
1833         let htlc_expiry = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1;
1834
1835         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(&nodes[0], &chan_id);
1836         assert_eq!(commitment_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 /* commitment tx only */} else { 2 /* commitment and htlc timeout tx */ });
1837         check_spends!(&commitment_txn[0], &funding_tx);
1838         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_txn[0]);
1839         check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
1840         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed,
1841                  false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1842         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1843
1844         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1845                 version: 2,
1846                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1847                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1848                 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` on anchors
1849                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1850                         script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1851                 }],
1852         };
1853         nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1854
1855         // Set up a helper closure we'll use throughout our test. We should only expect retries without
1856         // bumps if fees have not increased after a block has been connected (assuming the height timer
1857         // re-evaluates at every block) or after `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` is called.
1858         let mut prev_htlc_tx_feerate = None;
1859         let mut check_htlc_retry = |should_retry: bool, should_bump: bool| -> Option<Transaction> {
1860                 let (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) = if anchors {
1861                         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
1862                         let events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1863                         assert_eq!(events.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
1864                         if !should_retry {
1865                                 return None;
1866                         }
1867                         match &events[0] {
1868                                 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
1869                                         nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
1870                                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1871                                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1872                                         let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1873                                         check_spends!(&htlc_tx, &commitment_txn[0], &coinbase_tx);
1874                                         let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value -
1875                                                 htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>();
1876                                         let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
1877                                         (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
1878                                 }
1879                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1880                         }
1881                 } else {
1882                         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1883                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1884                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
1885                         if !should_retry {
1886                                 return None;
1887                         }
1888                         let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
1889                         check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]);
1890                         let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value;
1891                         let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
1892                         (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
1893                 };
1894                 if should_bump {
1895                         assert!(htlc_tx_feerate > prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take().unwrap());
1896                 } else if let Some(prev_feerate) = prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take() {
1897                         assert_eq!(htlc_tx_feerate, prev_feerate);
1898                 }
1899                 prev_htlc_tx_feerate = Some(htlc_tx_feerate);
1900                 Some(htlc_tx)
1901         };
1902
1903         // Connect blocks up to one before the HTLC expires. This should not result in a claim/retry.
1904         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_expiry - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
1905         check_htlc_retry(false, false);
1906
1907         // Connect one more block, producing our first claim.
1908         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1909         check_htlc_retry(true, false);
1910
1911         // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
1912         // transactions pre-anchors.
1913         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1914         check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1915
1916         // Trigger a call and we should have another retry, but without a bump.
1917         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1918         check_htlc_retry(true, false);
1919
1920         // Double the feerate and trigger a call, expecting a fee-bumped retry.
1921         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
1922         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1923         check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1924
1925         // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
1926         // transactions pre-anchors.
1927         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1928         let htlc_tx = check_htlc_retry(true, anchors).unwrap();
1929
1930         // Mine the HTLC transaction to ensure we don't retry claims while they're confirmed.
1931         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_tx);
1932         // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transactions,
1933         // we'll receive an extra bumped claim.
1934         if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
1935                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1936                 nodes[0].wallet_source.remove_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 1 });
1937                 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
1938         }
1939         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
1940         check_htlc_retry(false, false);
1941 }
1942
1943 #[test]
1944 fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() {
1945         do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false);
1946         do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true);
1947 }
1948
1949 #[test]
1950 fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
1951         // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
1952         // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
1953         // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
1954         // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
1955         // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
1956         // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
1957         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1958         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1959         let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
1960         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
1961         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1962         anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1963         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
1964         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1965
1966         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
1967                 &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
1968         );
1969         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
1970         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000);
1971
1972         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1973         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1974
1975         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
1976
1977         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
1978         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
1979
1980         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
1981         {
1982                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1983                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1984                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
1985         }
1986
1987         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
1988                 &payment_hash_2, &payment_preimage_2, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
1989                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
1990         );
1991         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
1992                 &payment_hash_1, &payment_preimage_1, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
1993                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
1994         );
1995
1996         let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1997         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
1998         let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
1999                 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2000                         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2001                                 version: 2,
2002                                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2003                                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2004                                 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2005                                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2006                                         script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2007                                 }],
2008                         };
2009                         nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2010                         nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2011                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2012                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2013                         let anchor_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2014                         let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2015                         check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2016                         check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2017                         (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
2018                 },
2019                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2020         };
2021
2022         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[2].value, 1_000); // HTLC A -> B
2023         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[3].value, 2_000); // HTLC B -> A
2024
2025         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2026         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2027         mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2028         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2029
2030         {
2031                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2032                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
2033
2034                 let htlc_preimage_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2035                 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
2036                 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
2037                 check_spends!(htlc_preimage_tx, commitment_tx);
2038
2039                 let htlc_timeout_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2040                 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
2041                 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
2042                 check_spends!(htlc_timeout_tx, commitment_tx);
2043
2044                 if let Some(commitment_tx) = txn.pop() {
2045                         check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2046                 }
2047         }
2048
2049         let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2050         // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2051         // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2052         if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2053                 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2054                 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
2055                 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2056         } else {
2057                 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2);
2058         }
2059         let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2060         for event in holder_events {
2061                 match event {
2062                         Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2063                                 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2064                                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2065                                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2066                                 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2067                                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx, anchor_tx);
2068                                 htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
2069                         },
2070                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2071                 }
2072         }
2073
2074         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
2075         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2076
2077         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2078
2079         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
2080
2081         let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2082         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2083         for event in holder_events {
2084                 match event {
2085                         Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
2086                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2087                 }
2088         }
2089
2090         // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
2091         nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2092         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2093         nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2094         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2095 }
2096
2097 #[test]
2098 fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
2099         // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
2100         // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
2101         // revoked commitment.
2102         let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2103         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2104         // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
2105         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2106         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2107         let bob_persister;
2108         let bob_chain_monitor;
2109
2110         let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
2111         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2112         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2113         anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2114         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2115         let bob_deserialized;
2116
2117         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2118
2119         let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2120         let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2121
2122         // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
2123         let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
2124
2125         // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
2126         let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2127         let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2128         let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2129         let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2130
2131         // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
2132         // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
2133         // present.
2134         let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
2135         let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
2136
2137         // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
2138         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
2139         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
2140         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
2141         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
2142
2143         // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
2144         // revoked state.
2145         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2146         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2147
2148         // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
2149         reload_node!(
2150                 nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
2151                 bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
2152         );
2153         for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
2154                 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
2155                 for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
2156                         monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
2157                                 &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2158                                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2159                         );
2160                 }
2161         }
2162
2163         // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
2164         // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
2165         // the HTLCs still pending.
2166         *nodes[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2167         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
2168         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
2169         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2170         let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = {
2171                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2172                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2173                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2174                 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2175                 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
2176                         check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
2177                         check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3);
2178                         (txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone())
2179                 } else {
2180                         check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3);
2181                         check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
2182                         (txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone())
2183                 }
2184         };
2185
2186         // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
2187         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2188         let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2189         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2190         let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2191         for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
2192                 let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat() * (idx + 1) as u64;
2193                 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2194                         version: 2,
2195                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2196                         input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2197                         output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2198                                 value: utxo_value,
2199                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2200                         }],
2201                 };
2202                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, utxo_value);
2203                 match event {
2204                         Event::BumpTransaction(event) => nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event),
2205                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2206                 };
2207                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2208                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2209                 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]);
2210                 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2211                 anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone());
2212         };
2213
2214         for node in &nodes {
2215                 mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_txs[1]]);
2216         }
2217         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
2218         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
2219         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2220
2221         // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
2222         // revoked outputs.
2223         {
2224                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2225                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
2226
2227                 let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() {
2228                         (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] })
2229                 } else {
2230                         (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] })
2231                 };
2232
2233                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2234                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
2235                 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
2236                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2237                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
2238                 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
2239         }
2240
2241         // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
2242         // through the success path.
2243         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2244         let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2245         // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2246         // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2247         match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
2248                 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
2249                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
2250                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
2251                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2252                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
2253                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2254
2255                 },
2256                 _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
2257         };
2258         let htlc_tx = {
2259                 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
2260                 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
2261                 let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2262                 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2263                         version: 2,
2264                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2265                         input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2266                         output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
2267                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2268                                 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
2269                         }],
2270                 };
2271                 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
2272                         version: 2,
2273                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2274                         input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
2275                                 previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2276                                 ..Default::default()
2277                         }],
2278                         output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
2279                                 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
2280                                 script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
2281                         }],
2282                 };
2283                 let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
2284                 for event in events {
2285                         // We don't use the `BumpTransactionEventHandler` here because it does not support
2286                         // creating one transaction from multiple `HTLCResolution` events.
2287                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
2288                                 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
2289                                 for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
2290                                         assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
2291                                         htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
2292                                         htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&secp));
2293                                 }
2294                                 descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
2295                                 htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
2296                         } else {
2297                                 panic!("Unexpected event");
2298                         }
2299                 }
2300                 for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
2301                         let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
2302                         let signer = htlc_descriptor.derive_channel_signer(&nodes[1].keys_manager);
2303                         let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
2304                         let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&secp);
2305                         htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
2306                 }
2307                 let fee_utxo_sig = {
2308                         let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
2309                         let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
2310                                 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2311                         ).unwrap()[..]);
2312                         let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2313                         let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2314                         sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2315                         sig
2316                 };
2317                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2318                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
2319                 htlc_tx
2320         };
2321
2322         for node in &nodes {
2323                 mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
2324         }
2325
2326         // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
2327         // the second level instead.
2328         let revoked_claim_transactions = {
2329                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2330                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2331
2332                 let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
2333                         tx.input.len() == 2 &&
2334                         tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2335                         tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
2336                 ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2337                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
2338                 for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
2339                         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
2340                 }
2341
2342                 let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = HashMap::new();
2343                 for current_tx in txn.into_iter() {
2344                         revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx);
2345                 }
2346                 revoked_claim_transaction_map
2347         };
2348         for node in &nodes {
2349                 mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claim_transactions.values().collect::<Vec<_>>());
2350         }
2351
2352
2353         // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
2354         // been reached.
2355         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2356         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
2357
2358         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2359         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2360
2361         // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2362         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2363         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2364
2365         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2366         let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2367         assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4);
2368         for event in spendable_output_events {
2369                 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event {
2370                         assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2371                         assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap()));
2372                         let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2373                                 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
2374                         ).unwrap();
2375
2376                         if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(_) = &outputs[0] {
2377                                 check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_a, &revoked_commitment_b);
2378                         } else {
2379                                 check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
2380                         }
2381                 } else {
2382                         panic!("unexpected event");
2383                 }
2384         }
2385
2386         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2387         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2388         // On the Alice side, the individual to_self_claim are still pending confirmation.
2389         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 2);
2390         // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
2391         // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
2392         // balances to claim.
2393         //
2394         // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
2395         // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
2396         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);
2397 }
2398
2399 fn do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(confirm_commitment_before_reload: bool) {
2400         // Tests that we'll fix a ChannelMonitor's `counterparty_payment_script` for an anchor outputs
2401         // channel upon deserialization.
2402         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2403         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2404         let persister;
2405         let chain_monitor;
2406         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2407         user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2408         user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2409         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2410         let node_deserialized;
2411         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2412
2413         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
2414
2415         // Set the monitor's `counterparty_payment_script` to a dummy P2WPKH script.
2416         let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2417         let privkey = bitcoin::PrivateKey::from_slice(&[1; 32], bitcoin::Network::Testnet).unwrap();
2418         let pubkey = bitcoin::PublicKey::from_private_key(&secp, &privkey);
2419         let p2wpkh_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&pubkey.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2420         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).set_counterparty_payment_script(p2wpkh_script.clone());
2421         assert_eq!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script(), p2wpkh_script);
2422
2423         // Confirm the counterparty's commitment and reload the monitor (either before or after) such
2424         // that we arrive at the correct `counterparty_payment_script` after the reload.
2425         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2426         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2427         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2428         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
2429                  [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2430
2431         let commitment_tx = {
2432                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2433                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2434                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 4);
2435                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2436                 txn.pop().unwrap()
2437         };
2438
2439         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2440         let commitment_tx_conf_height = if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2441                 // We should expect our round trip serialization check to fail as we're writing the monitor
2442                 // with the incorrect P2WPKH script but reading it with the correct P2WSH script.
2443                 *nodes[1].chain_monitor.expect_monitor_round_trip_fail.lock().unwrap() = Some(chan_id);
2444                 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2445                 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2446                 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2447                 commitment_tx_conf_height
2448         } else {
2449                 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2450                 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2451                 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2452                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2453                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
2454                 commitment_tx_conf_height
2455         };
2456         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2457                  [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2458         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script().is_v0_p2wsh());
2459
2460         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2461         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2462
2463         if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2464                 // If we saw the commitment before our `counterparty_payment_script` was fixed, we'll never
2465                 // get the spendable output event for the `to_remote` output, so we'll need to get it
2466                 // manually via `get_spendable_outputs`.
2467                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2468                 let outputs = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height);
2469                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2470                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2471                         &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
2472                         253, None, &secp
2473                 ).unwrap();
2474                 check_spends!(spend_tx, &commitment_tx);
2475         } else {
2476                 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx, false);
2477         }
2478 }
2479
2480 #[test]
2481 fn test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload() {
2482         do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(false);
2483         do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(true);
2484 }