_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
  11
  12 use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
  13 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  14 use ln::{channel, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
  15 use ln::channelmanager::BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
  16 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
  17 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  18 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
  19 use routing::network_graph::NetworkUpdate;
  20
  21 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  22 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  23
  24 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  25 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  26 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  27
  28 use prelude::*;
  29
  30 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  31
  32 #[test]
  33 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
  34         // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
  35         // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
  36         // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
  37         // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
  38         // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
  39         // HTLC.
  40         //
  41         // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
  42         //
  43         // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
  44         // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
  45         //
  46         // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
  47         // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
  48         // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
  49         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
  50         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
  51         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
  52         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  53
  54         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
  55         let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
  56
  57         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
  58         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
  59         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
  60
  61         let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
  62
  63         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  64         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
  65         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
  66
  67         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  68         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
  69         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  70
  71         // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
  72         // transaction for nodes[1].
  73         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
  74         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  75         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
  76         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
  77         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
  78
  79         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
  80         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  81         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  82         let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
  83
  84         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
  85         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
  86         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
  87 }
  88
  89 #[test]
  90 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
  91         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
  92         // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
  93         // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
  94         // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
  95         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  96         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  97         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
  98         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  99
 100         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 101                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 102         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 103         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 104
 105         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
 106
 107         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 108                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000
 109                 }],
 110                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 111         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
 112                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 113
 114         nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id).unwrap();
 115         let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 116         nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown);
 117         let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 118         nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_1_shutdown);
 119
 120         let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 121         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
 122         let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 123         nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
 124         let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 125         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
 126         let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 127         assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
 128
 129         let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 130         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
 131         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
 132
 133         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 134         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 135
 136         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 137         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 138
 139         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 140         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 141
 142         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 143                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000,
 144                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 145                 }],
 146                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 147         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 148                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1000,
 149                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 150                 }],
 151                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 152
 153         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 154         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 155
 156         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 157                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 158         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 159                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 160
 161         let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 162         assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
 163         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 164                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 165                 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 166                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 167                 check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
 168         }
 169
 170         let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 171         assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
 172         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 173                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 174                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 175                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 176                 check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
 177         }
 178         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 179         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 180 }
 181
 182 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
 183         v.sort_unstable();
 184         v
 185 }
 186
 187 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
 188         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
 189         // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
 190         // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
 191         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 192         if prev_commitment_tx {
 193                 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 194                 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 195                 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 196                 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
 197                 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
 198         }
 199         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 200         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 201         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 202
 203         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 204                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 205         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 206         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 207
 208         // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
 209         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
 210         // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
 211         // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
 212         let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
 213         // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
 214         let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
 215
 216         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 217
 218         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
 219
 220         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
 221         // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
 222         // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
 223         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 224                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 225                                 (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 226                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 227                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 228                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 229                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 230                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 231                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 232                 }]),
 233                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 234         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 235                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 236                 }],
 237                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 238
 239         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
 240         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 241         let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 242         // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
 243         // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
 244         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
 245         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 246         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
 247         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 248
 249         if prev_commitment_tx {
 250                 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
 251                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
 252                 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
 253                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
 254                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 255                 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 256                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
 257                 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 258                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 259                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
 260                 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 261                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 262         }
 263
 264         // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
 265         // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
 266         let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 267                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
 268                                 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
 269                                 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
 270                                 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
 271                                 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
 272                                 // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
 273                                 chan_feerate * (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT +
 274                                                                 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
 275                                                                 channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 276                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 277                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 278                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 279                 }];
 280         if !prev_commitment_tx {
 281                 a_expected_balances.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 282                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 283                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 284                 });
 285         }
 286         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
 287                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 288         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 289                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
 290                 }],
 291                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 292
 293         // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
 294         // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
 295         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 296         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 297         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 298
 299         let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 300         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), if prev_commitment_tx { 4 } else { 5 });
 301         if prev_commitment_tx {
 302                 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[3], b_broadcast_txn[2]);
 303         } else {
 304                 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0], b_broadcast_txn[3]);
 305                 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1], b_broadcast_txn[4]);
 306         }
 307         // b_broadcast_txn[0] should spend the HTLC output of the commitment tx for 3_000 sats
 308         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 309         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 310         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 311         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 312         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 313         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 314         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[2], funding_tx);
 315
 316         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 317         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 318         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 319         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 320         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 321         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 322         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 323         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 324         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 325         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 326
 327         // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
 328         // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
 329         // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
 330         // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
 331         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 332         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 333
 334         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 335                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 336                                 (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 337                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 338                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 339                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 340                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 341                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 342                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 343                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 344                 }]),
 345                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 346         // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
 347         // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
 348         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 349                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 350                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 351                 },
 352                 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
 353                 // long.
 354                 Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 355                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 356                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 357                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 358                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 359                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 360                 }]),
 361                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 362
 363         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 364         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, true);
 365         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 366
 367         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
 368         // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
 369         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 370                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 371                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 372                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 373                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 374                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 375                 }]),
 376                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 377         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 378                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 379                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 380                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 381                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 382                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 383                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 384                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 385                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 386                 }]),
 387                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 388
 389         let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 390         assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
 391         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 392                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 393                 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 394                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 395                 check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
 396         }
 397
 398         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 399
 400         // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
 401         // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
 402         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 403         if prev_commitment_tx {
 404                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
 405         } else {
 406                 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
 407         }
 408         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 409                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 410                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 411                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 412                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 413                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 414                 }]),
 415                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 416         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 417         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 418                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 419                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 420                 }],
 421                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 422
 423         // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
 424         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
 425         let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 426         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 3);
 427         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], funding_tx);
 428         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 429         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 430         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
 431         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
 432         assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout,
 433                    a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
 434         // a_broadcast_txn [1] and [2] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
 435         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 436         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 437
 438         // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
 439         // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
 440         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
 441         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 442         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 443                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 444                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 445                 }],
 446                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 447         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
 448         // balance entry.
 449         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 450         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 451                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 452         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, true);
 453
 454         let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 455         assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
 456         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 457                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 458                 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 459                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 460                 check_spends!(spend_tx, a_broadcast_txn[2]);
 461         } else { panic!(); }
 462
 463         // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
 464         // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
 465         // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
 466         let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 467         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 468
 469         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 470                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 471                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 472                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 473                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 474                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 475                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 476                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 477                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 478                 }]),
 479                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 480
 481         // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
 482         // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
 483         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 484
 485         let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 486         assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
 487         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 488                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 489                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 490                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 491                 check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
 492         }
 493
 494         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 495                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 496                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 497                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 498                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 499                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 500                 }]),
 501                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 502
 503         // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
 504         // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
 505         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 506
 507         let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 508         assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
 509         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 510                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 511                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 512                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 513                 check_spends!(spend_tx, b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 514         } else { panic!(); }
 515
 516         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 517                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 518                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 519                 }],
 520                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 521
 522         // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
 523         // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
 524         // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
 525         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
 526         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 527                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 528                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 529                 }],
 530                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 531         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 532         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 533                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 534 }
 535
 536 #[test]
 537 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
 538         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
 539         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
 540 }