1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
12 use crate::sign::{ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner, OutputSpender, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
13 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance};
14 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
15 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight};
16 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
17 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
18 use crate::ln::{channel, ChannelId};
19 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
20 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
21 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
22 use crate::crypto::utils::sign;
23 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
24 use crate::util::scid_utils::block_from_scid;
25 use crate::util::test_utils;
27 use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, ScriptBuf, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
28 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
29 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
30 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
31 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
33 use bitcoin::sighash::{SighashCache, EcdsaSighashType};
35 use crate::prelude::*;
37 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
40 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
41 // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
42 // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
43 // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
44 // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
45 // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
48 // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
50 // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
51 // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
53 // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
54 // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
55 // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
56 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
57 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
58 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
59 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
61 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
62 let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
64 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
65 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
66 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
67 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
69 let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
71 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
72 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
73 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
75 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
76 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
77 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
79 // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
80 // transaction for nodes[1].
81 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
82 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
83 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
84 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
85 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
87 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
88 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
89 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
90 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
92 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
93 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
94 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
97 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction, has_anchors_htlc_event: bool) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
98 let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
99 assert_eq!(spendable.len(), if has_anchors_htlc_event { 2 } else { 1 });
100 if has_anchors_htlc_event {
101 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { .. }) = spendable.pop().unwrap() {}
104 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
105 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
106 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
107 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
108 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
114 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
115 // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
116 // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
117 // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
119 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
120 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
121 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
122 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
124 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
126 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
128 // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
129 // before forwarding.
130 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
131 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
133 // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
134 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
136 // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
137 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
139 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
140 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
142 let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
143 assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
144 check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
146 // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
147 // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
148 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
149 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
150 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
152 // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
153 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
154 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
155 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
157 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
158 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
162 fn archive_fully_resolved_monitors() {
163 // Test we can archive fully resolved channel monitor.
164 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
165 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
166 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
167 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
168 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
170 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
171 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
173 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
174 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
175 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
176 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
177 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
179 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
180 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
181 let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
182 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
183 let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
184 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
185 let (_, _) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
187 let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
189 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
190 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
192 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
193 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
195 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
196 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
198 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors().len(), 1);
199 // First archive should set balances_empty_height to current block height
200 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.archive_fully_resolved_channel_monitors();
201 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors().len(), 1);
202 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4032);
203 // Second call after 4032 blocks, should archive the monitor
204 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.archive_fully_resolved_channel_monitors();
205 // Should have no monitors left
206 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors().len(), 0);
207 // Remove the corresponding outputs and transactions the chain source is
208 // watching. This is to make sure the `Drop` function assertions pass.
209 nodes.get_mut(0).unwrap().chain_source.remove_watched_txn_and_outputs(
210 OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 },
211 funding_tx.output[0].script_pubkey.clone()
215 fn do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(anchors: bool) {
216 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
217 // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
218 // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
219 // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
220 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
221 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
222 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
224 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
225 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
227 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
228 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
230 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
231 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
232 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
233 assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
235 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
236 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
238 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000;
239 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
240 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
241 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value
243 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
244 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
245 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
247 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
248 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
249 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
250 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
251 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
253 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
254 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
255 let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
256 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
257 let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
258 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
259 let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
260 assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
262 let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
263 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
264 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
266 let shutdown_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]));
267 let shutdown_tx_conf_height_b = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]));
269 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
270 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
272 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
273 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
275 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
276 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
277 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
279 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
280 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
281 amount_satoshis: 1000,
282 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
284 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
286 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
287 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
289 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
290 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
291 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id)
292 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b).is_empty());
294 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
295 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
297 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
298 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
299 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
300 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
302 let spendable_outputs_a = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
304 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a),
308 let spendable_outputs_b = test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
310 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b),
314 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
315 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
319 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
320 do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(false);
321 do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(true);
324 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
329 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
330 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
331 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
332 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
333 let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
334 let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
335 eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
336 assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
337 assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
340 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(anchors: bool, prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
341 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
342 // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
343 // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
344 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
345 if prev_commitment_tx {
346 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
347 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
348 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
349 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
350 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
352 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
353 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
355 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
356 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
358 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
359 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
361 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
363 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
364 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
367 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
368 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
371 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
372 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
377 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
378 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
381 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
382 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
383 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
384 assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
386 // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
387 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
388 // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
389 // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
390 let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
391 // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
392 let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
394 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
396 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
397 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
399 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
400 let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
401 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
402 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
405 let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
406 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
407 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
408 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
410 let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
411 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
412 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
415 let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
416 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
417 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
418 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
420 let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
421 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
422 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
426 let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
427 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
428 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
429 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
430 payment_preimage: timeout_payment_preimage,
433 // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
434 // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
435 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
436 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
437 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
438 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
439 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
440 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
441 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
442 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
443 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
444 }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
445 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
447 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
448 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
449 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
451 let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
452 // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
453 // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
454 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
455 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
456 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
458 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
460 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
462 if prev_commitment_tx {
463 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
464 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
465 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
466 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
468 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
469 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
470 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
472 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
473 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
474 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
477 // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
478 // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
479 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
480 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) +
481 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
482 let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
483 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
484 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
485 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
486 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
487 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
488 commitment_tx_fee - // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs
489 anchor_outputs_value, // The anchor outputs value in satoshis
490 }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
491 if !prev_commitment_tx {
492 a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
494 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
495 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
496 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
497 amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
499 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
501 // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
502 // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
503 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
504 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
505 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
508 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
509 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
510 match events.pop().unwrap() {
511 Event::BumpTransaction(bump_event) => {
512 let mut first_htlc_event = bump_event.clone();
513 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut first_htlc_event {
514 htlc_descriptors.remove(1);
516 panic!("Unexpected event");
518 let mut second_htlc_event = bump_event;
519 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut second_htlc_event {
520 htlc_descriptors.remove(0);
522 panic!("Unexpected event");
524 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&first_htlc_event);
525 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&second_htlc_event);
527 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
531 let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
532 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
533 // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
534 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
535 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
536 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
537 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
538 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
539 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
541 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
542 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
544 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
545 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
546 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
548 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
549 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
550 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
552 // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
553 // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
554 // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
555 // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
556 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
557 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
558 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
559 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
560 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
561 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
562 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
563 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
564 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
565 // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
566 // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
567 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
568 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
569 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
571 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
573 received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
574 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
576 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
577 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
578 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
580 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
581 // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
582 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
583 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
584 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
585 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
586 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
587 }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
588 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
590 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0], false);
591 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
593 // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
594 // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
595 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
596 if prev_commitment_tx {
597 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
599 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, false);
601 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
602 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
603 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
604 assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()],
605 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
607 // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
608 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
609 let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
610 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
611 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
612 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
613 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
614 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
615 assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
616 a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
617 // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
618 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
619 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
621 // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
622 // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
623 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
624 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
625 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
626 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
627 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
629 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
630 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
632 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
633 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
634 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
635 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
637 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1], false);
639 // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
640 // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
641 // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
642 let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
643 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
645 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
646 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
647 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
648 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
649 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
650 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
651 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
652 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
654 // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
655 // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
656 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
657 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0], anchors);
659 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
660 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
661 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
662 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
663 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
665 // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
666 // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
667 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
668 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0], anchors);
670 assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
671 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
673 // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
674 // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
675 // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
676 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
677 assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
678 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
679 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
680 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
681 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
683 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
684 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
685 // monitor events or claimable balances.
686 for node in nodes.iter() {
687 connect_blocks(node, 6);
688 connect_blocks(node, 6);
689 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
690 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
695 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
696 do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, true);
697 do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, false);
698 do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, true);
699 do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, false);
702 fn do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(anchors: bool) {
703 // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
704 // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
705 // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
706 // delay prior to spendability.
708 // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
709 // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
710 // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
711 // claim by our counterparty).
712 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
713 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
714 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
716 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
717 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
719 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
720 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
722 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
724 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
725 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
728 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
729 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
732 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
733 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
738 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
739 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
742 // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
743 // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
744 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
745 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
747 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
748 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
749 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
750 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
751 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
753 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
754 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
755 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
757 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
758 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
760 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
761 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
762 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
763 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
765 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
766 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
767 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
769 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
770 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
771 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
772 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
773 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
774 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
776 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
777 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
779 // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
780 // claimable balances.
781 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
782 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
784 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
785 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
786 let commitment_tx = {
787 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
788 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
789 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
790 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
793 let commitment_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx));
794 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
795 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
796 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
797 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid());
800 let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
801 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
802 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
805 let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
806 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
807 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
808 payment_hash: payment_hash_2,
811 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
812 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
813 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
814 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
815 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
816 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
817 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
818 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
820 // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
821 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
823 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
824 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
825 let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
826 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
827 check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], commitment_tx);
829 // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
831 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
832 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
833 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
834 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
835 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
836 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
838 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 2);
840 let timeout_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
841 assert_eq!(timeout_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
842 check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[0], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
843 check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[1], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
845 // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
846 // "awaiting confirmations" one.
847 let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
848 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0]);
849 // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
850 // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
851 // call, as described, two hunks down.
852 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
853 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
854 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
855 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
856 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
857 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
858 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
859 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
861 // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
862 // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
863 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
864 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, true, false);
865 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
866 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
867 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
868 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
869 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
870 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
871 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
872 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
874 // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
875 // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
876 // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
877 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
878 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
880 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
881 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
882 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
883 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
884 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
885 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
887 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
889 // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
890 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
891 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
892 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
893 .get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
894 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
895 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
896 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
897 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
899 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
900 let to_self_spendable_output = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
902 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a),
903 to_self_spendable_output
906 // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
907 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
908 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
909 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
910 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0], false);
912 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
913 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
914 // monitor events or claimable balances.
915 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
916 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
917 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
918 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
922 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
923 do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(false);
924 do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(true);
928 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
929 // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
931 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
932 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
933 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
934 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
936 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
937 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
939 // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
940 let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
941 let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
942 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
944 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
945 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
947 let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
948 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
949 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
950 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
952 let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
953 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
954 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
955 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
957 let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
958 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
959 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
960 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
962 let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
963 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
964 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
965 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
968 // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
969 // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
970 // HTLC output is spent.
972 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
973 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
974 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
975 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
976 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
978 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
979 amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
980 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
981 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
983 // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
984 let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
985 assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
986 check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
987 check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
989 // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
990 // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
991 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
992 let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
993 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
994 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
995 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
996 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
998 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
999 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
1000 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1001 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1002 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1004 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
1005 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1007 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
1008 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1009 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1010 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1012 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1013 let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1014 amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
1015 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
1016 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
1017 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1018 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1020 // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
1021 // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
1022 // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
1023 // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
1025 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1026 let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1027 assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
1028 check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
1029 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
1030 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
1032 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
1033 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1035 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1036 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
1037 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1039 // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
1040 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1041 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0], false);
1042 bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
1044 // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
1045 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
1046 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1));
1047 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
1048 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
1049 let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1050 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
1051 check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
1053 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1054 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1056 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1057 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1058 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1060 // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
1061 // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
1062 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1063 let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
1064 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1065 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1066 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1067 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1068 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1069 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1070 confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
1072 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1074 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1075 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1076 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1077 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1078 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1079 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1080 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1081 confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
1083 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1085 // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
1086 // payment failure event.
1087 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1088 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
1090 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1091 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1092 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1093 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1094 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1095 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1096 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1097 confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1099 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1101 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1102 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1103 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1104 confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1106 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1107 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0], false);
1109 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1110 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1111 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1113 // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
1114 // was already claimed.
1115 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1116 let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1117 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1118 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1119 confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1121 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1123 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1124 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1125 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1126 confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1128 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1130 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1131 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
1133 assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
1134 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1135 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1137 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1138 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1140 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1141 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1142 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1143 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1144 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1145 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1146 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1149 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
1150 let mut v = v_orig.clone();
1152 v.push((*t).clone());
1158 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(anchors: bool, confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
1159 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
1160 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1161 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1162 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1163 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1164 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1165 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1166 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1167 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1169 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1170 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1172 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1173 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1175 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1176 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1177 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1178 assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
1180 // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
1182 // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
1183 // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
1184 // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
1185 // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
1186 // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
1187 // later commitment transaction updates
1189 // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
1190 // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
1191 // HTLCs individually.
1193 let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
1194 let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1195 let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1197 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1199 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1200 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1202 let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1203 let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1205 // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1206 let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1207 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1209 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1211 let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1212 let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1214 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1215 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1217 let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1219 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1220 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1221 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1223 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1224 assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1225 let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1226 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1227 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1228 events.retain(|ev| {
1230 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1231 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1232 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1235 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1236 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1242 assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1243 if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1245 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, .. } => {},
1249 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1250 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1251 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1252 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1254 // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1255 // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1256 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1257 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1258 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1259 amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1260 claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1261 payment_hash: missing_htlc_payment_hash,
1262 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1263 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1264 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1265 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
1266 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1267 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1268 claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1269 payment_hash: live_payment_hash,
1271 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1273 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1274 let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1275 // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1277 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1278 claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
1280 // The following constants were determined experimentally
1281 const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: u64 = 483;
1282 let outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: u64 = if anchors { 574 } else { 571 };
1283 let inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: u64 = if anchors { 582 } else { 578 };
1285 // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1286 // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1287 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight().to_wu(), outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1288 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight().to_wu(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1289 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight().to_wu(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1290 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight().to_wu(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1292 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1293 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1294 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1295 let inbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight / 1000;
1296 let outbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight / 1000;
1297 let to_self_claim_fee = chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight().to_wu() / 1000;
1299 // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1300 // claim balances separated out.
1301 let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1302 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1303 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1304 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1305 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1306 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1307 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1308 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1311 let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1312 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1314 let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1315 let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1316 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1318 let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1320 // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1321 // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1322 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1323 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1325 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1326 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1327 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1328 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1330 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1331 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1332 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1333 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1336 let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1337 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1338 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1340 let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1341 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
1342 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1345 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1346 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1347 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1349 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1350 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1353 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1354 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1356 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1358 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1359 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1361 // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1362 // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1363 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1364 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1366 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1367 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1368 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1369 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1370 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1371 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
1372 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1373 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1374 amount_satoshis: 3_000 - outbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1375 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1376 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1377 amount_satoshis: 4_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1378 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1379 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1380 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1381 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1383 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1385 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1386 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1388 let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1389 expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
1390 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1391 expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
1392 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1394 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1395 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }], false);
1396 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1397 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }], false);
1398 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1399 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1400 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0], false);
1401 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1402 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1], false);
1403 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1404 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1406 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1407 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1408 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1409 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1410 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1411 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1412 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1416 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1417 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, true);
1418 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, false);
1419 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, true);
1420 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, false);
1423 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(anchors: bool) {
1424 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1425 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1426 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1427 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1428 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1430 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1431 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1433 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1434 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1436 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1438 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
1439 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1442 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1443 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1446 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1447 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1452 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1453 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
1456 // Create some initial channels
1457 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1458 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 12_000_000);
1459 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1460 assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
1462 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1463 let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1464 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1465 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1466 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1468 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[4].value, 11000); // to_self output
1470 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[2].value, 11000); // to_self output
1473 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs, an output for each side, and an
1474 // anchor output for each side if enabled.
1475 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if anchors { 6 } else { 4 });
1477 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1479 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1480 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1482 // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1483 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1484 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1486 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1488 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 1);
1490 let revoked_htlc_success = {
1491 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1492 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1493 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1494 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, if anchors { 3 } else { 1 });
1495 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(),
1496 if anchors { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS } else { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT });
1497 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1500 let revoked_htlc_success_fee = chan_feerate * revoked_htlc_success.weight().to_wu() / 1000;
1502 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1504 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 2);
1506 let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
1507 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1508 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1509 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
1515 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1516 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
1517 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
1518 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
1520 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1521 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1522 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1523 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1524 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1525 let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1527 let revoked_to_self_claim = {
1528 let mut as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1529 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1531 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1532 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 4); // Separate to_remote claim
1533 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1534 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
1535 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1536 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
1537 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1538 Some(as_commitment_claim_txn.remove(0))
1540 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1541 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1542 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1543 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
1544 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1549 // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1550 // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1551 // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1552 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1553 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1554 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1555 let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1556 // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1557 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1558 confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1559 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1560 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1561 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1562 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1563 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1564 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1565 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1567 assert_eq!(as_balances,
1568 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1570 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
1571 let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1572 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1573 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1574 check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
1575 // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked outputs (which no longer includes the
1576 // spent HTLC output)
1577 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1578 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1580 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1582 check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1584 assert_eq!(as_balances,
1585 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1587 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1588 let as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee = chan_feerate * as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight().to_wu() / 1000;
1590 // With anchors, B can pay for revoked_htlc_success's fee with additional inputs, rather
1591 // than with the HTLC itself.
1592 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1593 3_000 - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
1595 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1596 3_000 - revoked_htlc_success_fee - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
1599 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1600 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1601 // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1602 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1603 confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1604 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1605 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1606 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1607 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1608 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1609 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1610 amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1611 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1613 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1615 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1616 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], false);
1617 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1618 // to_self output to B
1619 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1620 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1621 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1622 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1623 amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1624 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1626 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1628 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1629 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0], false);
1630 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1631 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1632 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1633 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1634 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1636 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1638 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1639 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1640 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1641 // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1642 let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1643 for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1644 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1647 // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1649 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1650 let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1651 for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1652 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1655 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
1656 let (revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, revoked_to_self_claim) = {
1657 let mut as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1658 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1660 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1661 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1662 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1663 (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), revoked_to_self_claim.unwrap())
1665 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1666 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1667 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1668 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), 1);
1669 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1670 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1671 (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0))
1675 // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1676 // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1677 // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1678 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1679 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1680 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1681 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1682 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1683 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1685 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1687 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim);
1688 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1689 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1690 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1691 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1692 amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value,
1693 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1695 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1697 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim);
1698 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1699 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1700 amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.output[0].value,
1701 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1702 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1703 amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value,
1704 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1706 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1708 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1709 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, false);
1710 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1711 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim, false);
1713 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1715 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1716 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1717 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1718 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1719 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1720 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1721 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1725 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1726 do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(false);
1727 do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(true);
1730 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(anchors: bool) {
1731 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1732 // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1733 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1734 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1735 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1736 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1737 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1738 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1739 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1740 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1742 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1743 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1745 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1746 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1748 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1750 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
1751 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1752 output: vec![TxOut {
1753 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1754 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1757 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1759 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1760 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1761 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1762 assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
1764 // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1765 // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1766 // revocation-claim transaction.
1768 let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1769 let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1771 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1773 // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1774 // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1775 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1776 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1778 // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1779 let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1781 assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1782 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1784 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1787 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1788 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1791 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1794 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1795 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1797 let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1798 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1799 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1801 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1802 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1804 let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1806 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1807 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1808 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1809 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1810 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1811 payment_hash: revoked_payment_hash,
1812 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1813 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1814 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1815 payment_hash: claimed_payment_hash,
1817 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1819 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1820 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1821 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1824 let mut claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1825 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1826 let revoked_to_self_claim = if anchors {
1827 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1828 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 5); // Separate to_remote claim
1829 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1830 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
1831 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1832 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
1833 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1834 Some(claim_txn.remove(0))
1836 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1837 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1838 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1839 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
1840 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1844 let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1846 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1847 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1848 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1849 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1850 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1851 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1852 confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1853 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1854 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1855 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1856 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1857 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1858 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1859 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1861 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1863 // Confirm A's HTLC-Success transaction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1866 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1867 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1868 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1869 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
1870 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
1872 let htlc_success_claim = if anchors {
1873 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1874 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1875 check_spends!(txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1878 as_revoked_txn[1].clone()
1880 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_claim);
1881 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage, None, true, false);
1883 let mut claim_txn_2 = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1884 // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1885 // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1886 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1888 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1);
1889 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1890 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], &htlc_success_claim);
1891 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1892 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1893 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1895 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1);
1896 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1897 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1898 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 2);
1899 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1900 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 1);
1901 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1904 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1905 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1906 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1907 confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1908 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1909 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1910 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1911 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1912 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1913 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1914 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1915 // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1916 // anyway, so its not a big change.
1917 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1919 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1921 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1922 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1924 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1925 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1926 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1927 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1928 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1929 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1930 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1931 // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1932 // anyway, so its not a big change.
1933 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1935 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1937 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1938 let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1940 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1941 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1942 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1943 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1944 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1945 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1946 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
1947 confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1949 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1951 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1952 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0], false);
1954 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1955 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1956 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1957 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1958 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1960 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1963 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&claim_txn_2[1], revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap()]);
1965 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1967 let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1970 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1971 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1972 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1973 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1974 amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap().output[0].value,
1975 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1977 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1979 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1980 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1981 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1983 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1986 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1988 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1989 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1991 let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1992 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1993 for (i, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
1994 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = event {
1995 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
1996 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
1997 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
1998 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()
2000 check_spends!(spend_tx, if i == 0 { &claim_txn_2[1] } else { revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap() });
2001 } else { panic!(); }
2004 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1], false);
2006 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
2008 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
2009 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
2010 // monitor events or claimable balances.
2011 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
2012 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
2013 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2014 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
2018 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
2019 do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(false);
2020 do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(true);
2023 fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
2024 // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
2025 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2026 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2028 let new_chain_monitor;
2030 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2031 let node_deserialized;
2033 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2035 // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
2036 // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
2037 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
2038 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
2040 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2041 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2042 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2043 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
2044 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2046 let commitment_tx = {
2047 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2048 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2049 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
2050 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2054 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2055 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2056 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2057 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2058 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid());
2061 // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
2062 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
2063 let htlc_timeout_tx = {
2064 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2065 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2066 check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
2070 // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
2071 // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
2072 if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
2073 let serialized_monitor = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(
2074 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2076 reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2079 // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
2080 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
2081 if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
2082 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2085 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2086 if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
2087 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
2089 assert!(txn.len() < 6);
2092 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
2093 assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
2094 assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
2095 assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
2101 fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
2102 do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
2103 do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
2106 fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) {
2107 // Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every
2108 // `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call.
2109 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2110 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2111 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
2113 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2114 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2116 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
2117 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2119 let (_, _, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
2120 &nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 500_000_000
2122 const HTLC_AMT_MSAT: u64 = 1_000_000;
2123 const HTLC_AMT_SAT: u64 = HTLC_AMT_MSAT / 1000;
2124 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_AMT_MSAT);
2126 let htlc_expiry = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1;
2128 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(&nodes[0], &chan_id);
2129 assert_eq!(commitment_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 /* commitment tx only */} else { 2 /* commitment and htlc timeout tx */ });
2130 check_spends!(&commitment_txn[0], &funding_tx);
2131 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_txn[0]);
2132 check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
2133 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed,
2134 false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
2135 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2137 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2139 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2140 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2141 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` on anchors
2142 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2143 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2146 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2148 // Set up a helper closure we'll use throughout our test. We should only expect retries without
2149 // bumps if fees have not increased after a block has been connected (assuming the height timer
2150 // re-evaluates at every block) or after `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` is called.
2151 let mut prev_htlc_tx_feerate = None;
2152 let mut check_htlc_retry = |should_retry: bool, should_bump: bool| -> Option<Transaction> {
2153 let (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) = if anchors {
2154 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
2155 let events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2156 assert_eq!(events.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
2161 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2162 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2163 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2164 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2165 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2166 check_spends!(&htlc_tx, &commitment_txn[0], &coinbase_tx);
2167 let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value -
2168 htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>();
2169 let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight().to_wu();
2170 (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
2172 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2175 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2176 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2177 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
2181 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2182 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]);
2183 let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value;
2184 let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight().to_wu();
2185 (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
2188 assert!(htlc_tx_feerate > prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take().unwrap());
2189 } else if let Some(prev_feerate) = prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take() {
2190 assert_eq!(htlc_tx_feerate, prev_feerate);
2192 prev_htlc_tx_feerate = Some(htlc_tx_feerate);
2196 // Connect blocks up to one before the HTLC expires. This should not result in a claim/retry.
2197 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_expiry - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
2198 check_htlc_retry(false, false);
2200 // Connect one more block, producing our first claim.
2201 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2202 check_htlc_retry(true, false);
2204 // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
2205 // transactions pre-anchors.
2206 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2207 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2209 // Trigger a call and we should have another retry, but without a bump.
2210 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2211 check_htlc_retry(true, false);
2213 // Double the feerate and trigger a call, expecting a fee-bumped retry.
2214 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2215 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2216 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2218 // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
2219 // transactions pre-anchors.
2220 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2221 let htlc_tx = check_htlc_retry(true, anchors).unwrap();
2223 // Mine the HTLC transaction to ensure we don't retry claims while they're confirmed.
2224 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_tx);
2225 // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transactions,
2226 // we'll receive an extra bumped claim.
2227 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2228 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2229 nodes[0].wallet_source.remove_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 1 });
2230 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2232 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2233 check_htlc_retry(false, false);
2237 fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() {
2238 do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false);
2239 do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true);
2243 fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
2244 // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
2245 // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
2246 // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
2247 // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
2248 // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
2249 // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
2250 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2251 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2252 let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
2253 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2254 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2255 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2256 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2257 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2259 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
2260 &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
2262 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
2263 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000);
2265 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2266 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2268 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2270 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2271 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
2273 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2275 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2276 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2277 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2280 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
2281 &payment_hash_2, &payment_preimage_2, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
2282 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
2284 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
2285 &payment_hash_1, &payment_preimage_1, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2286 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2289 let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2290 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
2291 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
2292 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2293 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2295 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2296 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2297 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2298 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2299 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2302 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2303 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2304 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2305 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2306 let anchor_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2307 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2308 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2309 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2310 (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
2312 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2315 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[2].value, 1_000); // HTLC A -> B
2316 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[3].value, 2_000); // HTLC B -> A
2318 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2320 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2324 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2325 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
2327 let htlc_preimage_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2328 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
2329 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
2330 check_spends!(htlc_preimage_tx, commitment_tx);
2332 let htlc_timeout_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2333 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
2334 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
2335 check_spends!(htlc_timeout_tx, commitment_tx);
2337 if let Some(commitment_tx) = txn.pop() {
2338 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2342 let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2343 // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2344 // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2345 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2346 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2347 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
2348 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2350 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2);
2352 let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2353 for event in holder_events {
2355 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2356 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2357 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2358 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2359 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2360 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx, anchor_tx);
2361 htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
2363 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2367 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
2368 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2370 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2372 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
2374 let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2375 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2376 for event in holder_events {
2378 Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
2379 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2383 // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
2384 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2385 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2386 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2387 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2391 fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
2392 // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
2393 // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
2394 // revoked commitment.
2395 let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2396 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2397 // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
2398 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2399 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2401 let bob_chain_monitor;
2403 let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
2404 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2405 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2406 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2407 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2408 let bob_deserialized;
2410 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2412 let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2413 let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2415 // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
2416 let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
2418 // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
2419 let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2420 let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2421 let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2422 let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2424 // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
2425 // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
2427 let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
2428 let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
2430 // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
2431 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
2432 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
2433 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
2434 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
2436 // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
2438 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2439 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2441 // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
2443 nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
2444 bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
2446 for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
2447 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
2448 for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
2449 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
2450 &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2451 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2456 // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
2457 // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
2458 // the HTLCs still pending.
2459 *nodes[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2460 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
2461 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
2462 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2464 // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
2465 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2466 let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2467 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2468 let mut revoked_commitment_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2469 let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2470 for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
2471 let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat() * (idx + 1) as u64;
2472 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2474 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2475 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2476 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2478 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2481 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, utxo_value);
2483 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event),
2484 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2486 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2487 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2488 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2489 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
2490 check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
2492 check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
2494 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]);
2495 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2497 revoked_commitment_txs.push(commitment_tx.clone());
2498 anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone());
2501 for node in &nodes {
2502 mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_txs[0], &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_txs[1], &anchor_txs[1]]);
2504 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
2505 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
2506 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2508 // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
2511 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2512 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
2514 let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_txs[0].txid() {
2515 (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] })
2517 (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] })
2520 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2521 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
2522 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_txs[0]);
2523 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2524 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
2525 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_txs[1]);
2528 // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
2529 // through the success path.
2530 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2531 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2532 // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2533 // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2534 match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
2535 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
2536 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
2537 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
2538 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2539 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
2540 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2543 _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
2546 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
2547 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
2548 let fee_utxo_script = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2549 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2551 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2552 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2553 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
2554 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2555 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
2558 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
2560 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2561 input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
2562 previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2563 ..Default::default()
2565 output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
2566 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
2567 script_pubkey: ScriptBuf::new_op_return(&[]),
2570 let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
2571 for event in events {
2572 // We don't use the `BumpTransactionEventHandler` here because it does not support
2573 // creating one transaction from multiple `HTLCResolution` events.
2574 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
2575 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
2576 for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
2577 assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
2578 htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
2579 htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&secp));
2581 descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
2582 htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
2584 panic!("Unexpected event");
2587 for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
2588 let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
2589 let signer = htlc_descriptor.derive_channel_signer(&nodes[1].keys_manager);
2590 let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
2591 let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&secp);
2592 htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
2594 let fee_utxo_sig = {
2595 let witness_script = ScriptBuf::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
2596 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
2597 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2599 let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2600 let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2601 sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2604 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_slice(&[fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2605 check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_txs[0], revoked_commitment_txs[1]);
2609 for node in &nodes {
2610 mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
2613 // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
2614 // the second level instead.
2615 let revoked_claim_transactions = {
2616 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2617 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2619 let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
2620 tx.input.len() == 2 &&
2621 tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2622 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
2623 ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2624 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
2625 for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
2626 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
2629 let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = new_hash_map();
2630 for current_tx in txn.into_iter() {
2631 revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx);
2633 revoked_claim_transaction_map
2635 for node in &nodes {
2636 mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claim_transactions.values().collect::<Vec<_>>());
2640 // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
2642 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2643 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
2645 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2646 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2648 // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2649 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2650 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2652 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2653 let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2654 assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4);
2655 for event in spendable_output_events {
2656 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event {
2657 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2658 assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap()));
2659 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2660 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), ScriptBuf::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
2663 if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(_) = &outputs[0] {
2664 check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_txs[1]);
2666 check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
2669 panic!("unexpected event");
2673 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2674 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2675 // On the Alice side, the individual to_self_claim are still pending confirmation.
2676 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 2);
2677 // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
2678 // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
2679 // balances to claim.
2681 // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
2682 // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
2683 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);
2686 fn do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(confirm_commitment_before_reload: bool) {
2687 // Tests that we'll fix a ChannelMonitor's `counterparty_payment_script` for an anchor outputs
2688 // channel upon deserialization.
2689 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2690 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2693 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2694 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2695 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2696 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2697 let node_deserialized;
2698 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2700 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
2702 // Set the monitor's `counterparty_payment_script` to a dummy P2WPKH script.
2703 let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2704 let privkey = bitcoin::PrivateKey::from_slice(&[1; 32], bitcoin::Network::Testnet).unwrap();
2705 let pubkey = bitcoin::PublicKey::from_private_key(&secp, &privkey);
2706 let p2wpkh_script = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wpkh(&pubkey.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2707 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).set_counterparty_payment_script(p2wpkh_script.clone());
2708 assert_eq!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script(), p2wpkh_script);
2710 // Confirm the counterparty's commitment and reload the monitor (either before or after) such
2711 // that we arrive at the correct `counterparty_payment_script` after the reload.
2712 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2713 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2714 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2715 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
2716 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2718 let commitment_tx = {
2719 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2720 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2721 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 4);
2722 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2726 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2727 let commitment_tx_conf_height = if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2728 // We should expect our round trip serialization check to fail as we're writing the monitor
2729 // with the incorrect P2WPKH script but reading it with the correct P2WSH script.
2730 *nodes[1].chain_monitor.expect_monitor_round_trip_fail.lock().unwrap() = Some(chan_id);
2731 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2732 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2733 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2734 commitment_tx_conf_height
2736 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2737 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2738 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2739 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2740 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
2741 commitment_tx_conf_height
2743 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2744 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2745 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script().is_v0_p2wsh());
2747 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2748 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2750 if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2751 // If we saw the commitment before our `counterparty_payment_script` was fixed, we'll never
2752 // get the spendable output event for the `to_remote` output, so we'll need to get it
2753 // manually via `get_spendable_outputs`.
2754 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2755 let outputs = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height);
2756 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2757 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2758 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
2761 check_spends!(spend_tx, &commitment_tx);
2763 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx, false);
2768 fn test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload() {
2769 do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(false);
2770 do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(true);
2773 #[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
2774 fn do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(anchors: bool, confirm_counterparty_commitment: bool) {
2775 // Tests that our monitor claims will always use fresh random signatures (ensuring a unique
2776 // wtxid) to prevent certain classes of transaction replacement at the bitcoin P2P layer.
2777 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2778 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2779 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2781 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2782 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2784 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2785 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2787 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2789 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2790 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2793 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2794 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2799 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2802 // Open a channel and route a payment. We'll let it timeout to claim it.
2803 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
2804 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
2806 let (closing_node, other_node) = if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2807 (&nodes[1], &nodes[0])
2809 (&nodes[0], &nodes[1])
2812 get_monitor!(closing_node, chan_id).broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(
2813 &closing_node.tx_broadcaster, &closing_node.fee_estimator, &closing_node.logger
2816 // The commitment transaction comes first.
2817 let commitment_tx = {
2818 let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2819 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2820 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2824 mine_transaction(closing_node, &commitment_tx);
2825 check_added_monitors!(closing_node, 1);
2826 check_closed_broadcast!(closing_node, true);
2827 check_closed_event!(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
2829 mine_transaction(other_node, &commitment_tx);
2830 check_added_monitors!(other_node, 1);
2831 check_closed_broadcast!(other_node, true);
2832 check_closed_event!(other_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [closing_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
2834 // If we update the best block to the new height before providing the confirmed transactions,
2835 // we'll see another broadcast of the commitment transaction.
2836 if !confirm_counterparty_commitment && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2837 let _ = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2840 // Then comes the HTLC timeout transaction.
2841 if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2842 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 5);
2843 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
2844 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
2846 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
2848 if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2849 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
2851 let htlc_timeout_tx = {
2852 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2853 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2854 let tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2855 check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
2859 // Check we rebroadcast it with a different wtxid.
2860 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2861 if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2862 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
2865 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2866 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2867 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), htlc_timeout_tx.txid());
2868 assert_ne!(txn[0].wtxid(), htlc_timeout_tx.wtxid());
2872 #[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
2874 fn test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures() {
2875 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, false);
2876 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, true);
2877 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, false);
2878 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, true);
2882 fn test_event_replay_causing_monitor_replay() {
2883 // In LDK 0.0.121 there was a bug where if a `PaymentSent` event caused an RAA
2884 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` hold and then the node was restarted after the `PaymentSent` event
2885 // and `ChannelMonitorUpdate` both completed but without persisting the `ChannelManager` we'd
2886 // replay the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` on restart (which is fine, but triggered a safety panic).
2887 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2888 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2890 let new_chain_monitor;
2891 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2892 let node_deserialized;
2893 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2895 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
2897 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000).0;
2899 do_claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1]]], false, payment_preimage);
2901 // At this point the `PaymentSent` event has not been processed but the full commitment signed
2902 // dance has completed.
2903 let serialized_channel_manager = nodes[0].node.encode();
2905 // Now process the `PaymentSent` to get the final RAA `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, checking that it
2906 // resulted in a `ChannelManager` persistence request.
2907 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_needs_persistence();
2908 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, true /* expected post-event monitor update*/);
2909 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_needs_persistence());
2911 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).encode();
2912 reload_node!(nodes[0], &serialized_channel_manager, &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2914 // Expect the `PaymentSent` to get replayed, this time without the duplicate monitor update
2915 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false /* expected post-event monitor update*/);