1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
12 use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
13 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
15 use ln::channelmanager::BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
16 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
17 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
18 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
19 use routing::network_graph::NetworkUpdate;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
27 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
30 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
31 // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
32 // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
33 // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
34 // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
35 // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
38 // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
40 // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
41 // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
43 // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
44 // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
45 // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
46 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
47 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
48 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
49 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
51 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
52 let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
54 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
55 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
56 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
58 let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
60 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
61 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
62 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
64 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
65 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
66 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
68 // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
69 // transaction for nodes[1].
70 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
71 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
72 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
73 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
74 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
76 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
77 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
78 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
79 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
81 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
82 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
83 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
87 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
88 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
89 // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
90 // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
91 // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
92 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
93 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
94 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
95 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
97 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
98 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
99 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
100 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
102 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
104 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
105 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000
107 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
108 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
109 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
111 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id).unwrap();
112 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
113 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown);
114 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
115 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_1_shutdown);
117 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
118 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
119 let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
120 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
121 let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
122 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
123 let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
124 assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
126 let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
127 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
128 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
130 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
131 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
133 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
134 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
136 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
137 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
139 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
140 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000,
141 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
143 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
144 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
145 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1000,
146 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
148 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
150 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
151 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
153 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
154 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
155 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
156 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
158 let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
159 assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
160 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
161 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
162 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
163 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
164 check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
167 let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
168 assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
169 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
170 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
171 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
172 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
173 check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
175 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
176 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
179 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
184 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
185 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
186 // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
187 // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
188 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
189 if prev_commitment_tx {
190 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
191 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
192 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
193 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
194 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
196 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
197 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
198 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
200 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
201 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
202 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
203 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
205 // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
206 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
207 // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
208 // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
209 let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
210 // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
211 let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
213 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
215 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
217 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
218 // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
219 // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
220 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
221 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
222 (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
223 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
224 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
225 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
226 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
227 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
228 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
230 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
231 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
232 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
234 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
236 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
237 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
238 let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
239 // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
240 // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
241 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
243 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
246 if prev_commitment_tx {
247 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
248 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
249 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
250 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
251 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
252 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
253 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
254 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
255 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
256 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
257 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
261 // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
262 // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
263 let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
264 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
265 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
266 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
267 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
268 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
269 // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
270 chan_feerate * (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT +
271 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
272 channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
273 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
274 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
275 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
277 if !prev_commitment_tx {
278 a_expected_balances.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
279 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
280 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
283 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
284 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
285 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
286 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
288 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
290 // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
291 // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
292 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
293 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
294 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
296 let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
297 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), if prev_commitment_tx { 4 } else { 5 });
298 if prev_commitment_tx {
299 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[3], b_broadcast_txn[2]);
301 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0], b_broadcast_txn[3]);
302 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1], b_broadcast_txn[4]);
304 // b_broadcast_txn[0] should spend the HTLC output of the commitment tx for 3_000 sats
305 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
306 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
307 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
308 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
309 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
310 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
311 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[2], funding_tx);
313 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
314 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
316 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
317 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
318 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
320 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
321 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
322 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
324 // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
325 // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
326 // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
327 // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
328 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
329 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
331 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
332 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
333 (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
334 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
335 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
336 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
337 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
338 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
339 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
340 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
342 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
343 // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
344 // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
345 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
346 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
347 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
349 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
351 Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
352 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
353 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
354 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
355 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
356 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
358 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
360 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
361 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, true);
362 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
364 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
365 // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
366 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
367 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
368 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
369 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
370 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
371 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
373 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
374 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
375 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
376 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
377 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
378 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
379 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
380 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
381 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
382 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
384 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
386 let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
387 assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
388 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
389 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
390 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
391 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
392 check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
395 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
397 // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
398 // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
399 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
400 if prev_commitment_tx {
401 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
403 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
405 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
406 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
407 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
408 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
409 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
410 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
412 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
413 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
414 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
415 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
416 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
418 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
420 // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
421 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
422 let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
423 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 3);
424 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], funding_tx);
425 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
426 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
427 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
428 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
429 assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout,
430 a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
431 // a_broadcast_txn [1] and [2] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
432 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
433 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
435 // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
436 // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
437 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
438 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
439 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
440 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
441 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
443 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
444 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
446 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
447 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
448 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
449 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, true);
451 let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
452 assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
453 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
454 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
455 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
456 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
457 check_spends!(spend_tx, a_broadcast_txn[2]);
460 // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
461 // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
462 // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
463 let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
464 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
466 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
467 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
468 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
469 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
470 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
471 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
472 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
473 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
474 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
476 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
478 // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
479 // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
480 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
482 let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
483 assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
484 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
485 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
486 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
487 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
488 check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
491 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
492 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
493 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
494 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
495 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
496 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
498 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
500 // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
501 // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
502 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
504 let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
505 assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
506 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
507 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
508 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
509 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
510 check_spends!(spend_tx, b_broadcast_txn[0]);
513 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
514 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
515 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
517 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
519 // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
520 // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
521 // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
522 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
523 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
524 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
525 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
527 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
528 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
529 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
530 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
534 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
535 do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
536 do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);