_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
  11
  12 use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
  13 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  14 use ln::channel;
  15 use ln::channelmanager::BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
  16 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
  17 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
  18 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
  19 use routing::network_graph::NetworkUpdate;
  20
  21 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  22 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  24
  25 use prelude::*;
  26
  27 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  28
  29 #[test]
  30 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
  31         // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
  32         // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
  33         // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
  34         // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
  35         // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
  36         // HTLC.
  37         //
  38         // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
  39         //
  40         // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
  41         // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
  42         //
  43         // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
  44         // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
  45         // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
  46         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
  47         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
  48         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
  49         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  50
  51         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
  52         let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
  53
  54         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
  55         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
  56         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
  57
  58         let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
  59
  60         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  61         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
  62         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
  63
  64         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  65         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
  66         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  67
  68         // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
  69         // transaction for nodes[1].
  70         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
  71         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  72         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
  73         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
  74         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
  75
  76         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
  77         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  78         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  79         let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
  80
  81         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
  82         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
  83         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
  84 }
  85
  86 #[test]
  87 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
  88         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
  89         // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
  90         // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
  91         // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
  92         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  93         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  94         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
  95         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  96
  97         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
  98                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
  99         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 100         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 101
 102         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
 103
 104         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 105                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000
 106                 }],
 107                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 108         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
 109                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 110
 111         nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id).unwrap();
 112         let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 113         nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown);
 114         let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 115         nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_1_shutdown);
 116
 117         let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 118         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
 119         let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 120         nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
 121         let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 122         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
 123         let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 124         assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
 125
 126         let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 127         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
 128         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
 129
 130         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 131         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 132
 133         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 134         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 135
 136         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 137         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 138
 139         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 140                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000,
 141                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 142                 }],
 143                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 144         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 145                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1000,
 146                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 147                 }],
 148                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 149
 150         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 151         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 152
 153         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 154                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 155         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 156                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 157
 158         let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 159         assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
 160         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 161                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 162                 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 163                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 164                 check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
 165         }
 166
 167         let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 168         assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
 169         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 170                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 171                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 172                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 173                 check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
 174         }
 175         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 176         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 177 }
 178
 179 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
 180         v.sort_unstable();
 181         v
 182 }
 183
 184 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
 185         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
 186         // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
 187         // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
 188         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 189         if prev_commitment_tx {
 190                 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 191                 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 192                 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 193                 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
 194                 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
 195         }
 196         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 197         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 198         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 199
 200         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 201                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 202         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 203         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 204
 205         // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
 206         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
 207         // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
 208         // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
 209         let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
 210         // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
 211         let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
 212
 213         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 214
 215         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
 216
 217         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
 218         // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
 219         // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
 220         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 221                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 222                                 (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 223                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 224                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 225                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 226                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 227                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 228                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 229                 }]),
 230                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 231         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 232                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 233                 }],
 234                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 235
 236         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
 237         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 238         let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 239         // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
 240         // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
 241         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
 242         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 243         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
 244         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 245
 246         if prev_commitment_tx {
 247                 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
 248                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
 249                 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
 250                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
 251                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 252                 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 253                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
 254                 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 255                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 256                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
 257                 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 258                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 259         }
 260
 261         // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
 262         // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
 263         let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 264                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
 265                                 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
 266                                 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
 267                                 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
 268                                 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
 269                                 // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
 270                                 chan_feerate * (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT +
 271                                                                 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
 272                                                                 channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 273                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 274                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 275                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 276                 }];
 277         if !prev_commitment_tx {
 278                 a_expected_balances.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 279                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 280                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 281                 });
 282         }
 283         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
 284                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 285         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 286                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
 287                 }],
 288                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 289
 290         // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
 291         // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
 292         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 293         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 294         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 295
 296         let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 297         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), if prev_commitment_tx { 4 } else { 5 });
 298         if prev_commitment_tx {
 299                 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[3], b_broadcast_txn[2]);
 300         } else {
 301                 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0], b_broadcast_txn[3]);
 302                 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1], b_broadcast_txn[4]);
 303         }
 304         // b_broadcast_txn[0] should spend the HTLC output of the commitment tx for 3_000 sats
 305         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 306         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 307         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 308         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 309         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 310         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 311         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[2], funding_tx);
 312
 313         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 314         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 315         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 316         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 317         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 318         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 319         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 320         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 321         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 322         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 323
 324         // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
 325         // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
 326         // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
 327         // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
 328         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 329         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 330
 331         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 332                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 333                                 (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 334                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 335                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 336                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 337                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 338                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 339                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 340                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 341                 }]),
 342                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 343         // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
 344         // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
 345         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 346                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 347                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 348                 },
 349                 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
 350                 // long.
 351                 Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 352                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 353                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 354                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 355                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 356                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 357                 }]),
 358                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 359
 360         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 361         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, true);
 362         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 363
 364         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
 365         // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
 366         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 367                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 368                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 369                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 370                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 371                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 372                 }]),
 373                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 374         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 375                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 376                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 377                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 378                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 379                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 380                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 381                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 382                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 383                 }]),
 384                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 385
 386         let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 387         assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
 388         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 389                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 390                 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 391                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 392                 check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
 393         }
 394
 395         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 396
 397         // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
 398         // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
 399         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 400         if prev_commitment_tx {
 401                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
 402         } else {
 403                 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
 404         }
 405         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 406                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 407                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 408                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 409                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 410                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 411                 }]),
 412                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 413         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 414         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 415                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 416                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 417                 }],
 418                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 419
 420         // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
 421         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
 422         let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 423         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 3);
 424         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], funding_tx);
 425         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 426         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 427         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
 428         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
 429         assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout,
 430                    a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
 431         // a_broadcast_txn [1] and [2] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
 432         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 433         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 434
 435         // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
 436         // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
 437         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
 438         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 439         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 440                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 441                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 442                 }],
 443                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 444         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
 445         // balance entry.
 446         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 447         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 448                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 449         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, true);
 450
 451         let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 452         assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
 453         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 454                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 455                 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 456                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 457                 check_spends!(spend_tx, a_broadcast_txn[2]);
 458         } else { panic!(); }
 459
 460         // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
 461         // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
 462         // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
 463         let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 464         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 465
 466         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 467                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 468                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 469                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 470                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 471                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 472                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 473                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 474                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 475                 }]),
 476                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 477
 478         // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
 479         // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
 480         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 481
 482         let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 483         assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
 484         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 485                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 486                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 487                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 488                 check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
 489         }
 490
 491         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 492                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 493                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 494                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 495                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 496                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 497                 }]),
 498                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 499
 500         // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
 501         // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
 502         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 503
 504         let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 505         assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
 506         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 507                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 508                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 509                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 510                 check_spends!(spend_tx, b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 511         } else { panic!(); }
 512
 513         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 514                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 515                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 516                 }],
 517                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 518
 519         // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
 520         // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
 521         // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
 522         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
 523         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 524                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 525                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 526                 }],
 527                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 528         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 529         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 530                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 531 }
 532
 533 #[test]
 534 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
 535         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
 536         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
 537 }