_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
  11
  12 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
  13 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance};
  14 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  15 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight};
  16 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
  17 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
  18 use crate::ln::channel;
  19 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
  20 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
  21 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
  22 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
  23 use crate::util::crypto::sign;
  24 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
  25 use crate::util::scid_utils::block_from_scid;
  26 use crate::util::test_utils;
  27
  28 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
  29 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  30 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
  32 use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, Script, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime, Witness};
  33 use bitcoin::util::sighash::SighashCache;
  34
  35 use crate::prelude::*;
  36
  37 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  38
  39 #[test]
  40 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
  41         // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
  42         // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
  43         // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
  44         // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
  45         // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
  46         // HTLC.
  47         //
  48         // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
  49         //
  50         // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
  51         // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
  52         //
  53         // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
  54         // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
  55         // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
  56         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
  57         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
  58         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
  59         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  60
  61         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
  62         let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
  63
  64         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
  65         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
  66                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
  67         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
  68
  69         let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
  70
  71         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  72         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
  73         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
  74
  75         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  76         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
  77         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  78
  79         // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
  80         // transaction for nodes[1].
  81         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
  82         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  83         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
  84         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
  85         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
  86
  87         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
  88         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
  89         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  90         let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
  91
  92         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
  93         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
  94         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
  95 }
  96
  97 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction, has_anchors_htlc_event: bool) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
  98         let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
  99         assert_eq!(spendable.len(), if has_anchors_htlc_event { 2 } else { 1 });
 100         if has_anchors_htlc_event {
 101                 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { .. }) = spendable.pop().unwrap() {}
 102                 else { panic!(); }
 103         }
 104         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 105                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 106                 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 107                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 108                 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
 109                 outputs
 110         } else { panic!(); }
 111 }
 112
 113 #[test]
 114 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
 115         // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
 116         // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
 117         // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
 118         // confirmations.
 119         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 120         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 121         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 122         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 123
 124         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
 125
 126         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
 127
 128         // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
 129         // before forwarding.
 130         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
 131         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
 132
 133         // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
 134         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
 135
 136         // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
 137         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
 138         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 139         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 140         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 141
 142         let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 143         assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
 144         check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
 145
 146         // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
 147         // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
 148         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 149         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 150         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 151
 152         // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
 153         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
 154         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 155         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 156
 157         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 158         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
 159 }
 160
 161 fn do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(anchors: bool) {
 162         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
 163         // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
 164         // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
 165         // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
 166         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 167         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 168         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
 169         if anchors {
 170                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
 171                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
 172         }
 173         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
 174         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 175
 176         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 177                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 178         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 179         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 180
 181         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 182         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 183
 184         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate * chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000;
 185         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
 186         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 187                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value
 188                 }],
 189                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 190         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
 191                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 192
 193         nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 194         let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 195         nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
 196         let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 197         nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
 198
 199         let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 200         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
 201         let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 202         nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
 203         let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 204         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
 205         let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 206         assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
 207
 208         let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 209         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
 210         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
 211
 212         let shutdown_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]));
 213         let shutdown_tx_conf_height_b = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]));
 214
 215         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 216         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 217
 218         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 219         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 220
 221         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 222                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 223                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 224                 }],
 225                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 226         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 227                         amount_satoshis: 1000,
 228                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 229                 }],
 230                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 231
 232         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 233         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 234
 235         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
 236                 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
 237         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id)
 238                 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b).is_empty());
 239
 240         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 241         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
 242
 243         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 244                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 245         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 246                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 247
 248         let spendable_outputs_a = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
 249         assert_eq!(
 250                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a),
 251                 spendable_outputs_a
 252         );
 253
 254         let spendable_outputs_b = test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
 255         assert_eq!(
 256                 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b),
 257                 spendable_outputs_b
 258         );
 259
 260         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 261         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 262 }
 263
 264 #[test]
 265 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
 266         do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(false);
 267         do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(true);
 268 }
 269
 270 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
 271         v.sort_unstable();
 272         v
 273 }
 274
 275 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
 276 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
 277 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
 278 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
 279         let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 280         let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 281         eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
 282         assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
 283         assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
 284 }
 285
 286 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(anchors: bool, prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
 287         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
 288         // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
 289         // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
 290         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 291         if prev_commitment_tx {
 292                 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 293                 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 294                 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 295                 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
 296                 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
 297         }
 298         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 299         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
 300         if anchors {
 301                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
 302                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
 303         }
 304         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
 305         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 306
 307         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
 308                 version: 2,
 309                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
 310                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
 311                 output: vec![
 312                         TxOut {
 313                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
 314                                 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
 315                         },
 316                         TxOut {
 317                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
 318                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
 319                         },
 320                 ],
 321         };
 322         if anchors {
 323                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
 324                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
 325         }
 326
 327         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 328                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 329         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 330         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 331
 332         // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
 333         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
 334         // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
 335         // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
 336         let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
 337         // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
 338         let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
 339
 340         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 341
 342         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 343         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 344
 345         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
 346         let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 347                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 348                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 349                 payment_hash,
 350                 outbound_payment: true,
 351         };
 352         let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 353                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 354                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 355                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 356                 outbound_payment: true,
 357         };
 358         let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 359                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 360                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 361                 payment_hash,
 362         };
 363         let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 364                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 365                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 366                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 367         };
 368         let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 369                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 370                 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 371                 payment_hash,
 372                 payment_preimage,
 373         };
 374         let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 375                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 376                 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 377                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 378                 payment_preimage: timeout_payment_preimage,
 379         };
 380
 381         // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
 382         // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
 383         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
 384                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 385         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
 386         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 387                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 388                 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 389                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 390         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 391                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 392                 }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 393                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 394
 395         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
 396         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 397         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
 398
 399         let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 400         // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
 401         // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
 402         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
 403         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 404         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
 405
 406         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
 407         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 408         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
 409
 410         if prev_commitment_tx {
 411                 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
 412                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
 413                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
 414                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
 415                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 416                 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 417                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
 418                 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 419                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 420                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
 421                 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 422                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 423         }
 424
 425         // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
 426         // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
 427         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
 428                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) +
 429                 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 430         let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 431                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
 432                                 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
 433                                 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
 434                                 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
 435                                 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
 436                                 commitment_tx_fee - // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs
 437                                 anchor_outputs_value, // The anchor outputs value in satoshis
 438                 }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
 439         if !prev_commitment_tx {
 440                 a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
 441         }
 442         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
 443                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 444         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 445                         amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
 446                 }],
 447                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 448
 449         // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
 450         // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
 451         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 452         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 453         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 454
 455         if anchors {
 456                 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 457                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 458                 match events.pop().unwrap() {
 459                         Event::BumpTransaction(bump_event) => {
 460                                 let mut first_htlc_event = bump_event.clone();
 461                                 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut first_htlc_event {
 462                                         htlc_descriptors.remove(1);
 463                                 } else {
 464                                         panic!("Unexpected event");
 465                                 }
 466                                 let mut second_htlc_event = bump_event;
 467                                 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut second_htlc_event {
 468                                         htlc_descriptors.remove(0);
 469                                 } else {
 470                                         panic!("Unexpected event");
 471                                 }
 472                                 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&first_htlc_event);
 473                                 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&second_htlc_event);
 474                         },
 475                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 476                 }
 477         }
 478
 479         let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
 480         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 481         // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
 482         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
 483         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
 484         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
 485         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
 486         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 487         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 488
 489         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 490         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 491         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 492         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 493         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 494         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 495         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 496         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 497         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 498         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 499
 500         // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
 501         // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
 502         // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
 503         // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
 504         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 505         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 506         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
 507                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 508         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 509                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 510                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 511                 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 512                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 513         // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
 514         // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
 515         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 516                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 517                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 518                 },
 519                 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
 520                 // long.
 521                 received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 522                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 523
 524         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 525         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
 526         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 527
 528         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
 529         // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
 530         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 531                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 532         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 533                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 534                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 535                 }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 536                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 537
 538         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0], false);
 539         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 540
 541         // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
 542         // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
 543         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 544         if prev_commitment_tx {
 545                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
 546         } else {
 547                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, false);
 548         }
 549         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 550                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 551         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 552         assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()],
 553                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 554
 555         // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
 556         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 557         let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 558         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 559         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 560         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 561         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 562         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 563         assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
 564                    a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
 565         // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
 566         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 567         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 568
 569         // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
 570         // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
 571         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 572         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 573         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 574                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 575                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 576                 }],
 577                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 578         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
 579         // balance entry.
 580         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 581         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 582                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 583         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
 584
 585         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1], false);
 586
 587         // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
 588         // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
 589         // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
 590         let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 591         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 592
 593         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 594                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 595                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 596                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 597                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 598                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 599                 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 600                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 601
 602         // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
 603         // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
 604         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 605         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0], anchors);
 606
 607         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 608                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 609                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 610                 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 611                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 612
 613         // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
 614         // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
 615         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 616         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0], anchors);
 617
 618         assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
 619                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 620
 621         // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
 622         // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
 623         // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
 624         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 625         assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
 626                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 627         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 628         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 629                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 630
 631         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 632         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 633         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 634         for node in nodes.iter() {
 635                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 636                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 637                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 638                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 639         }
 640 }
 641
 642 #[test]
 643 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
 644         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, true);
 645         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, false);
 646         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, true);
 647         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, false);
 648 }
 649
 650 fn do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(anchors: bool) {
 651         // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
 652         // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
 653         // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
 654         // delay prior to spendability.
 655         //
 656         // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
 657         // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
 658         // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
 659         // claim by our counterparty).
 660         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 661         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 662         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
 663         if anchors {
 664                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
 665                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
 666         }
 667         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
 668         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 669
 670         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
 671                 version: 2,
 672                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
 673                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
 674                 output: vec![
 675                         TxOut {
 676                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
 677                                 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
 678                         },
 679                         TxOut {
 680                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
 681                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
 682                         },
 683                 ],
 684         };
 685         if anchors {
 686                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
 687                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
 688         }
 689
 690         // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
 691         // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
 692         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
 693         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 694
 695         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
 696         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 697         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
 698                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 699         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 700
 701         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 702         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 703         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 704
 705         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 706         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
 707
 708         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
 709         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
 710                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
 711         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 712
 713         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 714         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 715         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 716
 717         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 718         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
 719         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
 720         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 721         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 722         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
 723
 724         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 725         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 726
 727         // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
 728         // claimable balances.
 729         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 730         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 731         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 732         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 733         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 734         let commitment_tx = {
 735                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
 736                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
 737                 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
 738                 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
 739                 commitment_tx
 740         };
 741         let commitment_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx));
 742         if anchors && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
 743                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
 744                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
 745                 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid());
 746         }
 747
 748         let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 749                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 750                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 751                 payment_hash,
 752                 outbound_payment: true,
 753         };
 754         let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 755                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 756                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 757                 payment_hash: payment_hash_2,
 758                 outbound_payment: true,
 759         };
 760
 761         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
 762                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 763         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
 764         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 765                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 766                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 767                 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 768                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 769
 770         // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
 771         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
 772         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 773         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 774         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 775         let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 776         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
 777         check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], commitment_tx);
 778
 779         // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
 780         // transaction.
 781         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
 782         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 783                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 784                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 785                 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 786                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 787         if anchors {
 788                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 2);
 789         }
 790         let timeout_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
 791         assert_eq!(timeout_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
 792         check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[0], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
 793         check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[1], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
 794
 795         // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
 796         // "awaiting confirmations" one.
 797         let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 798         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0]);
 799         // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
 800         // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
 801         // call, as described, two hunks down.
 802         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 803                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 804                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 805                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 806                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 807                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 808                 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 809                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 810
 811         // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
 812         // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
 813         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
 814         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, true, false);
 815         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 816                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 817                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 818                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 819                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 820                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 821                 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 822                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 823
 824         // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
 825         // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
 826         // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
 827         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 828         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
 829
 830         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 831                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 832                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 833                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 834                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 835                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 836                 }]),
 837                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 838
 839         // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 840         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 841         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
 842         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
 843                 .get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
 844         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 845         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 846                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 847                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 848                 }],
 849                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 850         let to_self_spendable_output = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
 851         assert_eq!(
 852                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a),
 853                 to_self_spendable_output
 854         );
 855
 856         // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 857         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 858         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 859         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 860         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0], false);
 861
 862         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 863         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 864         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 865         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 866         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 867         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 868         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 869 }
 870
 871 #[test]
 872 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
 873         do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(false);
 874         do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(true);
 875 }
 876
 877 #[test]
 878 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
 879         // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
 880         // have a preimage.
 881         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 882         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 883         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 884         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 885
 886         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
 887         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 888
 889         // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
 890         let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
 891         let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
 892         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 893
 894         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 895         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 896
 897         let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 898                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 899                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 900                 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
 901                 outbound_payment: true,
 902         };
 903         let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 904                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 905                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 906                 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
 907         };
 908         let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 909                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 910                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 911                 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
 912         };
 913         let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 914                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 915                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 916                 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
 917                 outbound_payment: true,
 918         };
 919
 920         // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
 921         // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
 922         // HTLC output is spent.
 923
 924         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 925                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 926                                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 927                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
 928                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 929
 930         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 931                         amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
 932                 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
 933                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 934
 935         // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
 936         let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 937         assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
 938         check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
 939         check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
 940
 941         // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
 942         // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
 943         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 944         let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 945                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 946                                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 947                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 948                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
 949
 950         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 951         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
 952         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 953         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 954         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 955
 956         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 957                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 958
 959         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 960         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 961         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 962         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 963
 964         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
 965         let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 966                         amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
 967                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 968                 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
 969         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 970                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 971
 972         // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
 973         // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
 974         // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
 975         // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
 976
 977         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
 978         let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 979         assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
 980         check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
 981         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
 982                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
 983
 984         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 985                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 986
 987         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 988         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 989                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 990
 991         // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
 992         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 993         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0], false);
 994         bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
 995
 996         // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
 997         nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
 998         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1));
 999         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
1000                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
1001         let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1002         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
1003         check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
1004
1005         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1006                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1007
1008         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1009         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1010                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1011
1012         // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
1013         // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
1014         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1015         let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
1016         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1017                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1018                                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1019                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1020                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1021                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1022                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
1023                 }]),
1024                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1025
1026         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1027         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1028                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1029                                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1030                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1031                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1032                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1033                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
1034                 }]),
1035                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1036
1037         // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
1038         // payment failure event.
1039         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1040         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
1041
1042         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1043         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1044                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1045                                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1046                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1047                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1048                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1049                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1050                 }]),
1051                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1052
1053         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1054         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1055                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1056                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1057                 }],
1058                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1059         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0], false);
1060
1061         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1062         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1063         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1064
1065         // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
1066         // was already claimed.
1067         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1068         let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1069         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1070                         amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1071                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1072                 }]),
1073                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1074
1075         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1076         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1077                         amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1078                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1079                 }]),
1080                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1081
1082         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1083         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
1084
1085         assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
1086                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1087         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1088
1089         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1090         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1091
1092         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1093         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1094         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1095         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1096         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1097         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1098         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1099 }
1100
1101 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
1102         let mut v = v_orig.clone();
1103         for t in extra_ts {
1104                 v.push((*t).clone());
1105         }
1106         v.sort_unstable();
1107         v
1108 }
1109
1110 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(anchors: bool, confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
1111         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
1112         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1113         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1114         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1115         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1116         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1117         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1118         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1119         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1120         if anchors {
1121                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1122                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1123         }
1124         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1125         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1126
1127         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1128                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1129         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1130         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1131
1132         // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
1133         //
1134         // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
1135         // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
1136         // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
1137         // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
1138         // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
1139         //     later commitment transaction updates
1140         //
1141         // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
1142         // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
1143         // HTLCs individually.
1144
1145         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
1146         let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1147         let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1148
1149         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1150
1151         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1152         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1153
1154         let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1155         let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1156
1157         // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1158         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1159         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1160
1161         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1162
1163         let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1164         let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1165
1166         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1167         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1168         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1169         let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1170
1171         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1172         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1173         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1174
1175         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1176         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1177         let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1178                 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1179                 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1180         events.retain(|ev| {
1181                 match ev {
1182                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1183                                 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1184                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1185                                 false
1186                         },
1187                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1188                                 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1189                                 false
1190                         },
1191                         _ => true,
1192                 }
1193         });
1194         assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1195         if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1196         match &events[1] {
1197                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, .. } => {},
1198                 _ => panic!(),
1199         }
1200
1201         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1202         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1203         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1204         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1205
1206         // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1207         // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1208         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1209                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1210                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1211                         amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1212                         claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1213                         payment_hash: missing_htlc_payment_hash,
1214                         outbound_payment: true,
1215                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1216                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1217                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1218                         payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
1219                         outbound_payment: true,
1220                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1221                         amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1222                         claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1223                         payment_hash: live_payment_hash,
1224                         outbound_payment: true,
1225                 }]),
1226                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1227
1228         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1229         let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1230         // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1231         // quite soon.
1232         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1233         claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
1234
1235         // The following constants were determined experimentally
1236         const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 483;
1237         let outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: usize = if anchors { 574 } else { 571 };
1238         let inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: usize = if anchors { 582 } else { 578 };
1239
1240         // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1241         // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1242         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1243         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1244         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1245         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1246
1247         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1248                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1249         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1250         let inbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight as u64 / 1000;
1251         let outbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight as u64 / 1000;
1252         let to_self_claim_fee = chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000;
1253
1254         // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1255         // claim balances separated out.
1256         let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1257                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1258                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1259                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1260                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1261                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1262                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1263                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1264                 }];
1265
1266         let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1267                 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1268         };
1269         let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1270         let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1271                 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1272         };
1273         let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1274
1275         // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1276         // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1277         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1278                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1279
1280         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1281                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1282                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1283                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1284         } else {
1285                 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1286                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1287                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1288                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1289         }
1290
1291         let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1292                 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1293                 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1294         };
1295         let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1296                 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
1297                 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1298         };
1299
1300         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1301                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1302                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1303         } else {
1304                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1305                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1306         }
1307
1308         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1309                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1310         } else {
1311                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1312         }
1313         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1314                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1315
1316         // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1317         // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1318         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1319         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1320
1321         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1322                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1323                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1324                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1325                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1326                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
1327                         confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1328                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1329                         amount_satoshis: 3_000 - outbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1330                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1331                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1332                         amount_satoshis: 4_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1333                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1334                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1335                         amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1336                         confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1337                 }]),
1338                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1339
1340         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1341         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1342
1343         let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1344         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
1345                 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1346         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
1347                 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1348
1349         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1350         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }], false);
1351         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1352         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }], false);
1353         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1354         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1355         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0], false);
1356         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1357         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1], false);
1358         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1359         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1360
1361         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1362         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1363         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1364         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1365         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1366         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1367         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1368 }
1369
1370 #[test]
1371 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1372         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, true);
1373         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, false);
1374         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, true);
1375         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, false);
1376 }
1377
1378 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(anchors: bool) {
1379         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1380         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1381         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1382         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1383         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1384         if anchors {
1385                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1386                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1387         }
1388         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1389         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1390
1391         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1392                 version: 2,
1393                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1394                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1395                 output: vec![
1396                         TxOut {
1397                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1398                                 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1399                         },
1400                         TxOut {
1401                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1402                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1403                         },
1404                 ],
1405         };
1406         if anchors {
1407                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1408                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
1409         }
1410
1411         // Create some initial channels
1412         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1413                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 12_000_000);
1414         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1415         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1416
1417         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1418         let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1419         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1420         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1421         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1422         if anchors {
1423                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[4].value, 11000); // to_self output
1424         } else {
1425                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[2].value, 11000); // to_self output
1426         }
1427
1428         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs, an output for each side, and an
1429         // anchor output for each side if enabled.
1430         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if anchors { 6 } else { 4 });
1431
1432         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1433
1434         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1435         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1436
1437         // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1438         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1439         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1440         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1441         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1442         if anchors {
1443                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 1);
1444         }
1445         let revoked_htlc_success = {
1446                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1447                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1448                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1449                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, if anchors { 3 } else { 1 });
1450                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(),
1451                         if anchors { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS } else { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT });
1452                 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1453                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1454         };
1455         let revoked_htlc_success_fee = chan_feerate * revoked_htlc_success.weight() as u64 / 1000;
1456
1457         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1458         if anchors {
1459                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 2);
1460         }
1461         let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
1462                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1463                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1464                 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
1465                         txn.remove(1)
1466                 } else {
1467                         txn.remove(0)
1468                 }
1469         };
1470         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1471         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
1472         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time.0, 0);
1473         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0, 0);
1474
1475         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1476         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1477         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1478         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1479         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1480         let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1481
1482         let revoked_to_self_claim = {
1483                 let mut as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1484                 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1485                 if anchors {
1486                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1487                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 4); // Separate to_remote claim
1488                         check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1489                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
1490                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1491                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
1492                         check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1493                         Some(as_commitment_claim_txn.remove(0))
1494                 } else {
1495                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1496                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1497                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1498                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
1499                         check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1500                         None
1501                 }
1502         };
1503
1504         // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1505         // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1506         // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1507         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1508                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1509         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1510         let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1511                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1512                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1513                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1514                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1515                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1516                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1517                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1518                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1519                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1520                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1521                 }]);
1522         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1523                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1524
1525         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
1526         let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1527         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1528         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1529         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
1530         // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked outputs (which no longer includes the
1531         // spent HTLC output)
1532         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1533         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1534         if !anchors {
1535                 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1536         }
1537         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1538
1539         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1540                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1541
1542         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1543         let as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee = chan_feerate * as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight() as u64 / 1000;
1544         if anchors {
1545                 // With anchors, B can pay for revoked_htlc_success's fee with additional inputs, rather
1546                 // than with the HTLC itself.
1547                 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1548                         3_000 - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
1549         } else {
1550                 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1551                         3_000 - revoked_htlc_success_fee - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
1552         }
1553
1554         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1555         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1556                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1557                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1558                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1559                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1560                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1561                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1562                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1563                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1564                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1565                         amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1566                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1567                 }]),
1568                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1569
1570         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1571         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], false);
1572         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1573                         // to_self output to B
1574                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1575                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1576                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1577                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1578                         amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1579                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1580                 }]),
1581                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1582
1583         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1584         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0], false);
1585         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1586                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1587                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1588                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1589                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1590                 }]),
1591                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1592
1593         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1594         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1595                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1596         // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1597         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1598         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1599                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1600         }
1601
1602         // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1603         // claiming.
1604         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1605         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1606         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1607                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1608         }
1609
1610         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
1611         let (revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, revoked_to_self_claim) = {
1612                 let mut as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1613                 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1614                 if anchors {
1615                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1616                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1617                         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1618                         (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), revoked_to_self_claim.unwrap())
1619                 } else {
1620                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1621                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1622                         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1623                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), 1);
1624                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1625                         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1626                         (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0))
1627                 }
1628         };
1629
1630         // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1631         // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1632         // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1633         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1634         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1635                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1636                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1637                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1638                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1639                 }]),
1640                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1641
1642         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim);
1643         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1644                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1645                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1646                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1647                         amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value,
1648                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1649                 }]),
1650                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1651
1652         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim);
1653         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1654                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1655                         amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.output[0].value,
1656                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1657                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1658                         amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value,
1659                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1660                 }]),
1661                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1662
1663         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1664         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, false);
1665         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1666         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim, false);
1667
1668         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1669
1670         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1671         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1672         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1673         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1674         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1675         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1676         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1677 }
1678
1679 #[test]
1680 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1681         do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(false);
1682         do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(true);
1683 }
1684
1685 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(anchors: bool) {
1686         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1687         // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1688         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1689         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1690         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1691         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1692         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1693         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1694         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1695         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1696         if anchors {
1697                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1698                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1699         }
1700         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1701         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1702
1703         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1704                 version: 2,
1705                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1706                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1707                 output: vec![TxOut {
1708                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1709                         script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1710                 }],
1711         };
1712         nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1713
1714         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1715                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1716         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1717         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1718
1719         // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1720         // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1721         // revocation-claim transaction.
1722
1723         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1724         let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1725
1726         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1727
1728         // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1729         // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1730         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1731                 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1732
1733         // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1734         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1735
1736         assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1737         check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1738         if !anchors {
1739                 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1740         }
1741
1742         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1743         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1744
1745         {
1746                 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1747                 *feerate += 1;
1748         }
1749         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1750         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1751
1752         let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1753         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1754         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1755
1756         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1757         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1758         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1759         let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1760
1761         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1762                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1763                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1764                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1765                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1766                         payment_hash: revoked_payment_hash,
1767                         outbound_payment: true,
1768                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1769                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1770                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1771                         payment_hash: claimed_payment_hash,
1772                         outbound_payment: true,
1773                 }]),
1774                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1775
1776         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1777         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1778         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1779         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1780
1781         let mut claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1782         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1783         let revoked_to_self_claim = if anchors {
1784                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1785                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 5); // Separate to_remote claim
1786                 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1787                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
1788                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1789                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
1790                 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1791                 Some(claim_txn.remove(0))
1792         } else {
1793                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1794                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1795                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1796                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
1797                 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1798                 None
1799         };
1800
1801         let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1802
1803         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1804                 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1805         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1806         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1807                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1808                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1809                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1810                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1811                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1812                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1813                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1814                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1815                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1816                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1817                 }]),
1818                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1819
1820         // Confirm A's HTLC-Success transaction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1821         // new claim.
1822         if anchors {
1823                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1824                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1825                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1826                 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
1827                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
1828         }
1829         let htlc_success_claim = if anchors {
1830                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1831                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1832                 check_spends!(txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1833                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1834         } else {
1835                 as_revoked_txn[1].clone()
1836         };
1837         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_claim);
1838         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage, None, true, false);
1839
1840         let mut claim_txn_2 = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1841         // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1842         // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1843         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1844         if anchors {
1845                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1);
1846                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1847                 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], &htlc_success_claim);
1848                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1849                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1850                 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1851         } else {
1852                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1);
1853                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1854                 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1855                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 2);
1856                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1857                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 1);
1858                 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1859         }
1860
1861         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1862                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1863                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1864                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1865                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1866                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1867                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1868                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1869                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1870                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1871                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1872                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1873                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1874                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1875                 }]),
1876                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1877
1878         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1879         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1880
1881         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1882                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1883                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1884                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1885                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1886                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1887                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1888                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1889                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1890                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1891                 }]),
1892                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1893
1894         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1895         let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1896
1897         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1898                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1899                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1900                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1901                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1902                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1903                         amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
1904                         confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1905                 }]),
1906                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1907
1908         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1909         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0], false);
1910
1911         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1912                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1913                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1914                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1915                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1916                 }]),
1917                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1918
1919         if anchors {
1920                 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&claim_txn_2[1], revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap()]);
1921         } else {
1922                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1923         }
1924         let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1925
1926         if anchors {
1927                 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1928                                 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1929                                 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1930                         }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1931                                 amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap().output[0].value,
1932                                 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1933                         }],
1934                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1935         } else {
1936                 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1937                                 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1938                                 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1939                         }],
1940                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1941         }
1942
1943         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1944
1945         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1946         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1947         if anchors {
1948                 let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1949                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1950                 for (i, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
1951                         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = event {
1952                                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
1953                                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
1954                                         &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
1955                                         253, None, &Secp256k1::new()
1956                                 ).unwrap();
1957                                 check_spends!(spend_tx, if i == 0 { &claim_txn_2[1] } else { revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap() });
1958                         } else { panic!(); }
1959                 }
1960         } else {
1961                 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1], false);
1962         }
1963         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1964
1965         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1966         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1967         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1968         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1969         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1970         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1971         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1972 }
1973
1974 #[test]
1975 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
1976         do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(false);
1977         do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(true);
1978 }
1979
1980 fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
1981         // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
1982         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1983         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1984         let persister;
1985         let new_chain_monitor;
1986
1987         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1988         let node_deserialized;
1989
1990         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1991
1992         // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
1993         // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
1994         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
1995         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
1996
1997         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
1998         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1999         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2000         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
2001                  [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2002
2003         let commitment_tx = {
2004                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2005                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2006                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
2007                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2008                 txn.pop().unwrap()
2009         };
2010
2011         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2012
2013         // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
2014         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
2015         let htlc_timeout_tx = {
2016                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2017                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2018                 check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
2019                 txn.pop().unwrap()
2020         };
2021
2022         // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
2023         // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
2024         if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
2025                 let serialized_monitor = hex::decode(
2026                         "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2027                 ).unwrap();
2028                 reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2029         }
2030
2031         // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
2032         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
2033         if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
2034                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2035         }
2036         {
2037                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2038                 if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
2039                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
2040                 } else {
2041                         assert!(txn.len() < 6);
2042                 }
2043                 for tx in txn {
2044                         assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
2045                         assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
2046                         assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
2047                         assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
2048                 }
2049         }
2050 }
2051
2052 #[test]
2053 fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
2054         do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
2055         do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
2056 }
2057
2058 fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) {
2059         // Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every
2060         // `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call.
2061         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2062         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2063         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
2064         if anchors {
2065                 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2066                 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2067         }
2068         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
2069         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2070
2071         let (_, _, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
2072                 &nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 500_000_000
2073         );
2074         const HTLC_AMT_MSAT: u64 = 1_000_000;
2075         const HTLC_AMT_SAT: u64 = HTLC_AMT_MSAT / 1000;
2076         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_AMT_MSAT);
2077
2078         let htlc_expiry = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1;
2079
2080         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(&nodes[0], &chan_id);
2081         assert_eq!(commitment_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 /* commitment tx only */} else { 2 /* commitment and htlc timeout tx */ });
2082         check_spends!(&commitment_txn[0], &funding_tx);
2083         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_txn[0]);
2084         check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
2085         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed,
2086                  false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
2087         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2088
2089         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2090                 version: 2,
2091                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2092                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2093                 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` on anchors
2094                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2095                         script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2096                 }],
2097         };
2098         nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2099
2100         // Set up a helper closure we'll use throughout our test. We should only expect retries without
2101         // bumps if fees have not increased after a block has been connected (assuming the height timer
2102         // re-evaluates at every block) or after `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` is called.
2103         let mut prev_htlc_tx_feerate = None;
2104         let mut check_htlc_retry = |should_retry: bool, should_bump: bool| -> Option<Transaction> {
2105                 let (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) = if anchors {
2106                         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
2107                         let events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2108                         assert_eq!(events.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
2109                         if !should_retry {
2110                                 return None;
2111                         }
2112                         match &events[0] {
2113                                 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2114                                         nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2115                                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2116                                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2117                                         let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2118                                         check_spends!(&htlc_tx, &commitment_txn[0], &coinbase_tx);
2119                                         let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value -
2120                                                 htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>();
2121                                         let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
2122                                         (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
2123                                 }
2124                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2125                         }
2126                 } else {
2127                         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2128                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2129                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
2130                         if !should_retry {
2131                                 return None;
2132                         }
2133                         let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2134                         check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]);
2135                         let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value;
2136                         let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
2137                         (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
2138                 };
2139                 if should_bump {
2140                         assert!(htlc_tx_feerate > prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take().unwrap());
2141                 } else if let Some(prev_feerate) = prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take() {
2142                         assert_eq!(htlc_tx_feerate, prev_feerate);
2143                 }
2144                 prev_htlc_tx_feerate = Some(htlc_tx_feerate);
2145                 Some(htlc_tx)
2146         };
2147
2148         // Connect blocks up to one before the HTLC expires. This should not result in a claim/retry.
2149         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_expiry - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
2150         check_htlc_retry(false, false);
2151
2152         // Connect one more block, producing our first claim.
2153         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2154         check_htlc_retry(true, false);
2155
2156         // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
2157         // transactions pre-anchors.
2158         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2159         check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2160
2161         // Trigger a call and we should have another retry, but without a bump.
2162         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2163         check_htlc_retry(true, false);
2164
2165         // Double the feerate and trigger a call, expecting a fee-bumped retry.
2166         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2167         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2168         check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2169
2170         // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
2171         // transactions pre-anchors.
2172         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2173         let htlc_tx = check_htlc_retry(true, anchors).unwrap();
2174
2175         // Mine the HTLC transaction to ensure we don't retry claims while they're confirmed.
2176         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_tx);
2177         // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transactions,
2178         // we'll receive an extra bumped claim.
2179         if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2180                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2181                 nodes[0].wallet_source.remove_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 1 });
2182                 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2183         }
2184         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2185         check_htlc_retry(false, false);
2186 }
2187
2188 #[test]
2189 fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() {
2190         do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false);
2191         do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true);
2192 }
2193
2194 #[test]
2195 fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
2196         // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
2197         // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
2198         // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
2199         // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
2200         // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
2201         // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
2202         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2203         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2204         let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
2205         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2206         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2207         anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2208         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2209         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2210
2211         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
2212                 &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
2213         );
2214         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
2215         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000);
2216
2217         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2218         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2219
2220         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2221
2222         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2223         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
2224
2225         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2226         {
2227                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2228                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2229                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2230         }
2231
2232         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
2233                 &payment_hash_2, &payment_preimage_2, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
2234                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
2235         );
2236         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
2237                 &payment_hash_1, &payment_preimage_1, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2238                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2239         );
2240
2241         let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2242         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
2243         let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
2244                 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2245                         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2246                                 version: 2,
2247                                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2248                                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2249                                 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2250                                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2251                                         script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2252                                 }],
2253                         };
2254                         nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2255                         nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2256                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2257                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2258                         let anchor_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2259                         let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2260                         check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2261                         check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2262                         (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
2263                 },
2264                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2265         };
2266
2267         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[2].value, 1_000); // HTLC A -> B
2268         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[3].value, 2_000); // HTLC B -> A
2269
2270         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2271         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2272         mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2273         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2274
2275         {
2276                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2277                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
2278
2279                 let htlc_preimage_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2280                 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
2281                 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
2282                 check_spends!(htlc_preimage_tx, commitment_tx);
2283
2284                 let htlc_timeout_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2285                 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
2286                 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
2287                 check_spends!(htlc_timeout_tx, commitment_tx);
2288
2289                 if let Some(commitment_tx) = txn.pop() {
2290                         check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2291                 }
2292         }
2293
2294         let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2295         // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2296         // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2297         if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2298                 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2299                 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
2300                 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2301         } else {
2302                 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2);
2303         }
2304         let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2305         for event in holder_events {
2306                 match event {
2307                         Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2308                                 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2309                                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2310                                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2311                                 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2312                                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx, anchor_tx);
2313                                 htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
2314                         },
2315                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2316                 }
2317         }
2318
2319         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
2320         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2321
2322         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2323
2324         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
2325
2326         let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2327         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2328         for event in holder_events {
2329                 match event {
2330                         Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
2331                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2332                 }
2333         }
2334
2335         // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
2336         nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2337         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2338         nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2339         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2340 }
2341
2342 #[test]
2343 fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
2344         // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
2345         // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
2346         // revoked commitment.
2347         let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2348         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2349         // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
2350         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2351         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2352         let bob_persister;
2353         let bob_chain_monitor;
2354
2355         let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
2356         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2357         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2358         anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2359         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2360         let bob_deserialized;
2361
2362         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2363
2364         let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2365         let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2366
2367         // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
2368         let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
2369
2370         // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
2371         let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2372         let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2373         let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2374         let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2375
2376         // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
2377         // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
2378         // present.
2379         let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
2380         let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
2381
2382         // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
2383         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
2384         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
2385         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
2386         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
2387
2388         // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
2389         // revoked state.
2390         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2391         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2392
2393         // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
2394         reload_node!(
2395                 nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
2396                 bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
2397         );
2398         for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
2399                 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
2400                 for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
2401                         monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
2402                                 &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2403                                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2404                         );
2405                 }
2406         }
2407
2408         // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
2409         // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
2410         // the HTLCs still pending.
2411         *nodes[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2412         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
2413         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
2414         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2415         let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = {
2416                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2417                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2418                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2419                 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2420                 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
2421                         check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
2422                         check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3);
2423                         (txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone())
2424                 } else {
2425                         check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3);
2426                         check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
2427                         (txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone())
2428                 }
2429         };
2430
2431         // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
2432         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2433         let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2434         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2435         let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2436         for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
2437                 let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat() * (idx + 1) as u64;
2438                 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2439                         version: 2,
2440                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2441                         input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2442                         output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2443                                 value: utxo_value,
2444                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2445                         }],
2446                 };
2447                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, utxo_value);
2448                 match event {
2449                         Event::BumpTransaction(event) => nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event),
2450                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2451                 };
2452                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2453                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2454                 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]);
2455                 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2456                 anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone());
2457         };
2458
2459         for node in &nodes {
2460                 mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_txs[1]]);
2461         }
2462         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
2463         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
2464         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2465
2466         // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
2467         // revoked outputs.
2468         {
2469                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2470                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
2471
2472                 let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() {
2473                         (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] })
2474                 } else {
2475                         (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] })
2476                 };
2477
2478                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2479                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
2480                 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
2481                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2482                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
2483                 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
2484         }
2485
2486         // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
2487         // through the success path.
2488         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2489         let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2490         // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2491         // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2492         match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
2493                 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
2494                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
2495                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
2496                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2497                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
2498                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2499
2500                 },
2501                 _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
2502         };
2503         let htlc_tx = {
2504                 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
2505                 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
2506                 let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2507                 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2508                         version: 2,
2509                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2510                         input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2511                         output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
2512                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2513                                 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
2514                         }],
2515                 };
2516                 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
2517                         version: 2,
2518                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2519                         input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
2520                                 previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2521                                 ..Default::default()
2522                         }],
2523                         output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
2524                                 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
2525                                 script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
2526                         }],
2527                 };
2528                 let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
2529                 for event in events {
2530                         // We don't use the `BumpTransactionEventHandler` here because it does not support
2531                         // creating one transaction from multiple `HTLCResolution` events.
2532                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
2533                                 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
2534                                 for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
2535                                         assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
2536                                         htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
2537                                         htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&secp));
2538                                 }
2539                                 descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
2540                                 htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
2541                         } else {
2542                                 panic!("Unexpected event");
2543                         }
2544                 }
2545                 for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
2546                         let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
2547                         let signer = htlc_descriptor.derive_channel_signer(&nodes[1].keys_manager);
2548                         let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
2549                         let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&secp);
2550                         htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
2551                 }
2552                 let fee_utxo_sig = {
2553                         let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
2554                         let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
2555                                 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2556                         ).unwrap()[..]);
2557                         let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2558                         let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2559                         sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2560                         sig
2561                 };
2562                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2563                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
2564                 htlc_tx
2565         };
2566
2567         for node in &nodes {
2568                 mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
2569         }
2570
2571         // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
2572         // the second level instead.
2573         let revoked_claim_transactions = {
2574                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2575                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2576
2577                 let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
2578                         tx.input.len() == 2 &&
2579                         tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2580                         tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
2581                 ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2582                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
2583                 for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
2584                         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
2585                 }
2586
2587                 let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = HashMap::new();
2588                 for current_tx in txn.into_iter() {
2589                         revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx);
2590                 }
2591                 revoked_claim_transaction_map
2592         };
2593         for node in &nodes {
2594                 mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claim_transactions.values().collect::<Vec<_>>());
2595         }
2596
2597
2598         // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
2599         // been reached.
2600         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2601         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
2602
2603         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2604         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2605
2606         // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2607         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2608         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2609
2610         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2611         let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2612         assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4);
2613         for event in spendable_output_events {
2614                 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event {
2615                         assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2616                         assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap()));
2617                         let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2618                                 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
2619                         ).unwrap();
2620
2621                         if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(_) = &outputs[0] {
2622                                 check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_a, &revoked_commitment_b);
2623                         } else {
2624                                 check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
2625                         }
2626                 } else {
2627                         panic!("unexpected event");
2628                 }
2629         }
2630
2631         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2632         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2633         // On the Alice side, the individual to_self_claim are still pending confirmation.
2634         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 2);
2635         // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
2636         // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
2637         // balances to claim.
2638         //
2639         // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
2640         // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
2641         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);
2642 }
2643
2644 fn do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(confirm_commitment_before_reload: bool) {
2645         // Tests that we'll fix a ChannelMonitor's `counterparty_payment_script` for an anchor outputs
2646         // channel upon deserialization.
2647         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2648         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2649         let persister;
2650         let chain_monitor;
2651         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2652         user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2653         user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2654         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2655         let node_deserialized;
2656         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2657
2658         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
2659
2660         // Set the monitor's `counterparty_payment_script` to a dummy P2WPKH script.
2661         let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2662         let privkey = bitcoin::PrivateKey::from_slice(&[1; 32], bitcoin::Network::Testnet).unwrap();
2663         let pubkey = bitcoin::PublicKey::from_private_key(&secp, &privkey);
2664         let p2wpkh_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&pubkey.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2665         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).set_counterparty_payment_script(p2wpkh_script.clone());
2666         assert_eq!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script(), p2wpkh_script);
2667
2668         // Confirm the counterparty's commitment and reload the monitor (either before or after) such
2669         // that we arrive at the correct `counterparty_payment_script` after the reload.
2670         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2671         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2672         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2673         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
2674                  [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2675
2676         let commitment_tx = {
2677                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2678                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2679                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 4);
2680                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2681                 txn.pop().unwrap()
2682         };
2683
2684         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2685         let commitment_tx_conf_height = if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2686                 // We should expect our round trip serialization check to fail as we're writing the monitor
2687                 // with the incorrect P2WPKH script but reading it with the correct P2WSH script.
2688                 *nodes[1].chain_monitor.expect_monitor_round_trip_fail.lock().unwrap() = Some(chan_id);
2689                 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2690                 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2691                 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2692                 commitment_tx_conf_height
2693         } else {
2694                 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2695                 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2696                 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2697                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2698                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
2699                 commitment_tx_conf_height
2700         };
2701         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2702                  [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2703         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script().is_v0_p2wsh());
2704
2705         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2706         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2707
2708         if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2709                 // If we saw the commitment before our `counterparty_payment_script` was fixed, we'll never
2710                 // get the spendable output event for the `to_remote` output, so we'll need to get it
2711                 // manually via `get_spendable_outputs`.
2712                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2713                 let outputs = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height);
2714                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2715                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2716                         &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
2717                         253, None, &secp
2718                 ).unwrap();
2719                 check_spends!(spend_tx, &commitment_tx);
2720         } else {
2721                 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx, false);
2722         }
2723 }
2724
2725 #[test]
2726 fn test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload() {
2727         do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(false);
2728         do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(true);
2729 }
2730
2731 #[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
2732 fn do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(anchors: bool, confirm_counterparty_commitment: bool) {
2733         // Tests that our monitor claims will always use fresh random signatures (ensuring a unique
2734         // wtxid) to prevent certain classes of transaction replacement at the bitcoin P2P layer.
2735         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2736         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2737         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2738         if anchors {
2739                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2740                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2741         }
2742         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2743         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2744
2745         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2746                 version: 2,
2747                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2748                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2749                 output: vec![
2750                         TxOut {
2751                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2752                                 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2753                         },
2754                 ],
2755         };
2756         if anchors {
2757                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2758         }
2759
2760         // Open a channel and route a payment. We'll let it timeout to claim it.
2761         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
2762         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
2763
2764         let (closing_node, other_node) = if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2765                 (&nodes[1], &nodes[0])
2766         } else {
2767                 (&nodes[0], &nodes[1])
2768         };
2769
2770         closing_node.node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &other_node.node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2771
2772         // The commitment transaction comes first.
2773         let commitment_tx = {
2774                 let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2775                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2776                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2777                 txn.pop().unwrap()
2778         };
2779
2780         mine_transaction(closing_node, &commitment_tx);
2781         check_added_monitors!(closing_node, 1);
2782         check_closed_broadcast!(closing_node, true);
2783         check_closed_event!(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
2784
2785         mine_transaction(other_node, &commitment_tx);
2786         check_added_monitors!(other_node, 1);
2787         check_closed_broadcast!(other_node, true);
2788         check_closed_event!(other_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [closing_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
2789
2790         // If we update the best block to the new height before providing the confirmed transactions,
2791         // we'll see another broadcast of the commitment transaction.
2792         if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2793                 let _ = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2794         }
2795
2796         // Then comes the HTLC timeout transaction.
2797         if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2798                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 5);
2799                 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
2800                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
2801         } else {
2802                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
2803         }
2804         if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2805                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
2806         }
2807         let htlc_timeout_tx = {
2808                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2809                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2810                 let tx = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == commitment_tx.txid() {
2811                         txn[0].clone()
2812                 } else {
2813                         txn[1].clone()
2814                 };
2815                 check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
2816                 tx
2817         };
2818
2819         // Check we rebroadcast it with a different wtxid.
2820         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2821         if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2822                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
2823         }
2824         {
2825                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2826                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2827                 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), htlc_timeout_tx.txid());
2828                 assert_ne!(txn[0].wtxid(), htlc_timeout_tx.wtxid());
2829         }
2830 }
2831
2832 #[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
2833 #[test]
2834 fn test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures() {
2835         do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, false);
2836         do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, true);
2837         do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, false);
2838         do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, true);
2839 }