git.bitcoin.ninja Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
  11
  12 #[cfg(anchors)]
  13 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner};
  14 #[cfg(anchors)]
  15 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
  16 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
  17 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  18 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
  19 #[cfg(anchors)]
  20 use crate::events::bump_transaction::BumpTransactionEvent;
  21 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
  22 use crate::ln::channel;
  23 #[cfg(anchors)]
  24 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
  25 #[cfg(anchors)]
  26 use crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager;
  27 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
  28 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
  29 #[cfg(anchors)]
  30 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
  31 #[cfg(anchors)]
  32 use crate::util::crypto::sign;
  33 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
  34 use crate::util::test_utils;
  35
  36 #[cfg(anchors)]
  37 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
  38 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  39 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  40 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  41 #[cfg(anchors)]
  42 use bitcoin::secp256k1::SecretKey;
  43 #[cfg(anchors)]
  44 use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, Script, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime, Witness};
  45 use bitcoin::Transaction;
  46 #[cfg(anchors)]
  47 use bitcoin::util::sighash::SighashCache;
  48
  49 use crate::prelude::*;
  50
  51 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  52
  53 #[test]
  54 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
  55         // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
  56         // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
  57         // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
  58         // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
  59         // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
  60         // HTLC.
  61         //
  62         // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
  63         //
  64         // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
  65         // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
  66         //
  67         // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
  68         // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
  69         // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
  70         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
  71         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
  72         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
  73         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  74
  75         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
  76         let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
  77
  78         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
  79         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
  80                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
  81         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
  82
  83         let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
  84
  85         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  86         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
  87         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
  88
  89         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  90         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
  91         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  92
  93         // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
  94         // transaction for nodes[1].
  95         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
  96         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  97         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
  98         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
  99         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 100
 101         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 102         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
 103         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 104         let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 105
 106         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
 107         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
 108         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
 109 }
 110
 111 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction) {
 112         let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 113         assert_eq!(spendable.len(), 1);
 114         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 115                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 116                 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 117                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 118                 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
 119         } else { panic!(); }
 120 }
 121
 122 #[test]
 123 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
 124         // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
 125         // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
 126         // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
 127         // confirmations.
 128         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 129         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 130         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 131         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 132
 133         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
 134
 135         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
 136
 137         // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
 138         // before forwarding.
 139         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
 140         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
 141
 142         // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
 143         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
 144
 145         // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
 146         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
 147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 148         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 149         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 150
 151         let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 152         assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
 153         check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
 154
 155         // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
 156         // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
 157         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 158         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 159         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 160
 161         // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
 162         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
 163         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 164         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 165
 166         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 167         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
 168 }
 169
 170 #[test]
 171 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
 172         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
 173         // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
 174         // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
 175         // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
 176         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 177         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 178         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 179         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 180
 181         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 182                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 183         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 184         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 185
 186         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 187         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 188
 189         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 190                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000
 191                 }],
 192                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 193         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
 194                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 195
 196         nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 197         let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 198         nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
 199         let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 200         nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
 201
 202         let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 203         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
 204         let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 205         nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
 206         let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 207         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
 208         let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 209         assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
 210
 211         let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 212         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
 213         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
 214
 215         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 216         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 217
 218         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 219         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 220
 221         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 222         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 223
 224         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 225                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000,
 226                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 227                 }],
 228                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 229         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 230                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1000,
 231                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 232                 }],
 233                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 234
 235         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 236         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 237
 238         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 239                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 240         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 241                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 242
 243         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 244         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 245
 246         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 247         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 248 }
 249
 250 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
 251         v.sort_unstable();
 252         v
 253 }
 254
 255 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
 256 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
 257 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
 258 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
 259         let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 260         let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 261         eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
 262         assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
 263         assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
 264 }
 265
 266 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
 267         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
 268         // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
 269         // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
 270         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 271         if prev_commitment_tx {
 272                 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 273                 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 274                 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 275                 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
 276                 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
 277         }
 278         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 279         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 280         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 281
 282         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 283                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 284         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 285         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 286
 287         // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
 288         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
 289         // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
 290         // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
 291         let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
 292         // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
 293         let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
 294
 295         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 296
 297         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 298         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 299
 300         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
 301         let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 302                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 303                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 304         };
 305         let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 306                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 307                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 308         };
 309         let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 310                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 311                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 312         };
 313         let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 314                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 315                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 316         };
 317         let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 318                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 319                 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 320         };
 321         let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 322                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 323                 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 324         };
 325
 326         // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
 327         // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
 328         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 329                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 330                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 331                 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 332                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 333         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 334                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 335                 }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 336                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 337
 338         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
 339         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 340         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
 341
 342         let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 343         // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
 344         // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
 345         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
 346         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 347         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
 348
 349         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
 350         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 351         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
 352
 353         if prev_commitment_tx {
 354                 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
 355                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
 356                 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
 357                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
 358                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 359                 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 360                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
 361                 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 362                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 363                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
 364                 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 365                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 366         }
 367
 368         // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
 369         // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
 370         let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 371                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
 372                                 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
 373                                 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
 374                                 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
 375                                 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
 376                                 // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
 377                                 chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) +
 378                                                                 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
 379                                                                 channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 380                 }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
 381         if !prev_commitment_tx {
 382                 a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
 383         }
 384         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
 385                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 386         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 387                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
 388                 }],
 389                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 390
 391         // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
 392         // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
 393         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 394         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 395         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 396
 397         let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 398         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 399         // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
 400         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 401         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 402         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 403         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 404         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 405         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 406
 407         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 408         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 409         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 410         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 411         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 412         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 413         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 414         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 415         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 416         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 417
 418         // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
 419         // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
 420         // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
 421         // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
 422         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 423         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 424
 425         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 426                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 427                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 428                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 429                 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 430                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 431         // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
 432         // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
 433         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 434                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 435                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 436                 },
 437                 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
 438                 // long.
 439                 received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 440                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 441
 442         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 443         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
 444         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 445
 446         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
 447         // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
 448         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 449                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 450         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 451                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 452                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 453                 }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 454                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 455
 456         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 457         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 458
 459         // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
 460         // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
 461         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 462         if prev_commitment_tx {
 463                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
 464         } else {
 465                 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
 466         }
 467         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 468                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 469         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 470         assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()],
 471                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 472
 473         // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
 474         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
 475         let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 476         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 477         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 478         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 479         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 480         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 481         assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
 482                    a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
 483         // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
 484         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 485         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 486
 487         // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
 488         // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
 489         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 490         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 491         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 492                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 493                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 494                 }],
 495                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 496         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
 497         // balance entry.
 498         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 499         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 500                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 501         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
 502
 503         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 504
 505         // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
 506         // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
 507         // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
 508         let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 509         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 510
 511         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 512                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 513                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 514                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 515                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 516                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 517                 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 518                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 519
 520         // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
 521         // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
 522         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 523         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 524
 525         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 526                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 527                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 528                 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 529                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 530
 531         // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
 532         // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
 533         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 534         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 535
 536         assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
 537                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 538
 539         // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
 540         // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
 541         // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
 542         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 543         assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
 544                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 545         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 546         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 547                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 548
 549         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 550         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 551         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 552         for node in nodes.iter() {
 553                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 554                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 555                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 556                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 557         }
 558 }
 559
 560 #[test]
 561 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
 562         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
 563         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
 564 }
 565
 566 #[test]
 567 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
 568         // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
 569         // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
 570         // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
 571         // delay prior to spendability.
 572         //
 573         // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
 574         // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
 575         // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
 576         // claim by our counterparty).
 577         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 578         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 579         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 580         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 581
 582         // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
 583         // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
 584         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
 585         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 586
 587         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
 588         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 589         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
 590                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 591         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 592
 593         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 594         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 595         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 596
 597         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 598         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
 599
 600         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
 601         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
 602                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
 603         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 604
 605         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 606         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 607         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 608
 609         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 610         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
 611         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
 612         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 613         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 614         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
 615
 616         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 617         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 618
 619         // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions
 620         let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 621         assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 3);
 622         check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
 623         check_spends!(as_txn[2], as_txn[0]);
 624         check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
 625
 626         // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
 627         // claimable balances.
 628         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 629         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 630         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 631         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 632         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 633
 634         let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 635                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 636                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 637         };
 638         let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 639                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 640                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 641         };
 642
 643         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 644                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 645                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 646                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 647                 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 648                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 649
 650         // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
 651         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 652         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 653         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 654         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 655         let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 656         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
 657         check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]);
 658
 659         // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
 660         // transaction.
 661         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
 662         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 663                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 664                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 665                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 666                 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 667                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 668         assert_eq!(as_txn[1].lock_time.0, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1); // as_txn[1] can be included in the next block
 669
 670         // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
 671         // "awaiting confirmations" one.
 672         let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 673         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
 674         // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
 675         // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
 676         // call, as described, two hunks down.
 677         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 678                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 679                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 680                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 681                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 682                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 683                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 684                 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 685                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 686
 687         // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
 688         // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
 689         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
 690         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
 691         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 692                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 693                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 694                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 695                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 696                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 697                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 698                 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 699                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 700
 701         // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
 702         // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
 703         // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
 704         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 705         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
 706
 707         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 708                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 709                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 710                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 711                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 712                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 713                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 714                 }]),
 715                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 716
 717         // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 718         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 719         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 720         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 721                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 722                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 723                 }],
 724                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 725         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 726
 727         // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 728         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 729         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 730         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 731         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
 732
 733         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 734         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 735         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 736         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 737         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 738         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 739         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 740 }
 741
 742 #[test]
 743 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
 744         // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
 745         // have a preimage.
 746         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 747         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 748         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 749         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 750
 751         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
 752         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 753
 754         // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
 755         let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
 756         let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
 757         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 758
 759         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 760         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 761
 762         let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 763                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 764                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 765         };
 766         let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 767                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 768                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 769         };
 770         let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 771                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 772                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 773         };
 774         let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 775                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 776                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 777         };
 778
 779         // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
 780         // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
 781         // HTLC output is spent.
 782
 783         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 784                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 785                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 786                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
 787                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 788
 789         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 790                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
 791                 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
 792                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 793
 794         // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
 795         let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 796         assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
 797         check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
 798         check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
 799
 800         // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
 801         // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
 802         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 803         let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 804                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 805                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 806                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 807                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
 808
 809         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 810         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
 811         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 812         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 813         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 814
 815         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 816                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 817
 818         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 819         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 820         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 821         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 822
 823         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
 824         let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 825                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
 826                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 827                 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
 828         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 829                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 830
 831         // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
 832         // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
 833         // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
 834         // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
 835
 836         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
 837         let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 838         assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
 839         check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
 840         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
 841                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
 842
 843         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 844                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 845
 846         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 847         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 848                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 849
 850         // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
 851         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 852         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 853         bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
 854
 855         // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
 856         nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
 857         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) - 1);
 858         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
 859                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
 860         let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 861         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
 862         check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
 863
 864         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 865                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 866
 867         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
 868         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 869                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 870
 871         // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
 872         // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
 873         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 874         let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
 875         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 876                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 877                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 878                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 879                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 880                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 881                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
 882                 }]),
 883                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 884
 885         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 886         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 887                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 888                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 889                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 890                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 891                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 892                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
 893                 }]),
 894                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 895
 896         // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
 897         // payment failure event.
 898         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 899         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
 900
 901         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 902         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 903                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 904                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 905                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 906                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 907                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 908                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
 909                 }]),
 910                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 911
 912         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 913         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 914                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 915                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
 916                 }],
 917                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 918         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 919
 920         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 921         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 922         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 923
 924         // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
 925         // was already claimed.
 926         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 927         let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
 928         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 929                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 930                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
 931                 }]),
 932                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 933
 934         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 935         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 936                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 937                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
 938                 }]),
 939                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 940
 941         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 942         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
 943
 944         assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
 945                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 946         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
 947
 948         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
 949         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 950
 951         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 952         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 953         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 954         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
 955         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
 956         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 957         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 958 }
 959
 960 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
 961         let mut v = v_orig.clone();
 962         for t in extra_ts {
 963                 v.push((*t).clone());
 964         }
 965         v.sort_unstable();
 966         v
 967 }
 968
 969 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
 970         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
 971         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 972         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 973         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 974         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 975         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
 976         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
 977         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 978         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 979         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 980
 981         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 982                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
 983         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 984         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 985
 986         // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
 987         //
 988         // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
 989         // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
 990         // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
 991         // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
 992         // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
 993         //     later commitment transaction updates
 994         //
 995         // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
 996         // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
 997         // HTLCs individually.
 998
 999         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
1000         let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1001         let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1002
1003         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1004
1005         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1006         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1007
1008         let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1009         let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1010
1011         // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1012         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1013         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1014
1015         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1016
1017         let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1018         let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1019
1020         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1021         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1022         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1023         let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1024
1025         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1026         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1027         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1028
1029         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1030         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1031         let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1032                 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1033                 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1034         events.retain(|ev| {
1035                 match ev {
1036                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1037                                 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1038                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1039                                 false
1040                         },
1041                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1042                                 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1043                                 false
1044                         },
1045                         _ => true,
1046                 }
1047         });
1048         assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1049         if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1050         match &events[1] {
1051                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
1052                 _ => panic!(),
1053         }
1054
1055         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1056         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1057         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1058         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1059
1060         // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1061         // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1062         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1063                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1064                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1065                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1066                         claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1067                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1068                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1069                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1070                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1071                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1072                         claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1073                 }]),
1074                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1075
1076         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1077         let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1078         // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1079         // quite soon.
1080         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1081         claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
1082
1083         // The following constants were determined experimentally
1084         const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 483;
1085         const OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 571;
1086         const INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 578;
1087
1088         // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1089         // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1090         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1091         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1092         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1093         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1094
1095         // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1096         // claim balances separated out.
1097         let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1098                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1099                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1100                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1101                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1102                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1103                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1104                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1105                 }];
1106
1107         let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1108                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1109                         (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1110         };
1111         let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1112         let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1113                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1114         };
1115         let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1116
1117         // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1118         // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1119         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1120                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1121
1122         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1123                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1124                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1125                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1126         } else {
1127                 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1128                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1129                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1130                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1131         }
1132
1133         let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1134                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1135                 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1136         };
1137         let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1138                 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1139                         (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1140                         - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1141                 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1142         };
1143
1144         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1145                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1146                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1147         } else {
1148                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1149                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1150         }
1151
1152         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1153                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1154         } else {
1155                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1156         }
1157         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1158                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1159
1160         // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1161         // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1162         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1163         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1164
1165         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1166                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1167                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1168                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1169                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1170                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1171                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1172                                 - chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000,
1173                         confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1174                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1175                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000 - chan_feerate * OUTBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1176                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1177                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1178                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1179                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1180                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1181                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 5_000 - chan_feerate * INBOUND_HTLC_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT as u64 / 1000,
1182                         confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1183                 }]),
1184                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1185
1186         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1187         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1188
1189         let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1190         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
1191                 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1192         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
1193                 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1194
1195         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1196         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }]);
1197         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1198         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }]);
1199         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1200         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1201         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1202         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1203         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1204         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1205         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1206
1207         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1208         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1209         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1210         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1211         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1212         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1213         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1214 }
1215
1216 #[test]
1217 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1218         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true);
1219         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false);
1220 }
1221
1222 #[test]
1223 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1224         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1225         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1226         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1227         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1228         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1229         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1230
1231         // Create some initial channels
1232         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1233                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 11_000_000);
1234         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1235         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1236
1237         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1238         let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1239         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1240         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1241         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1242
1243         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs and an output for both sides
1244         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
1245
1246         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1247
1248         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1249         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1250
1251         // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1252         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1253         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1254         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1255         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1256         let revoked_htlc_success = {
1257                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1258                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1259                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1260                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
1261                 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1262                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1263         };
1264
1265         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1266         let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
1267                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1268                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1269                 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
1270                         txn.remove(1)
1271                 } else {
1272                         txn.remove(0)
1273                 }
1274         };
1275         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1276         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
1277         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time.0, 0);
1278         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0, 0);
1279
1280         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1281         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1282         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1283         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1284         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1285         let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1286
1287         let as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1288         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), 1);
1289         check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1290
1291         // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1292         // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1293         // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1294         let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1295                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1296                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1297                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1298                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1299                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1300                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1301                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1302                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1303                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1304                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1305                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1306                 }]);
1307         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1308                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1309
1310         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
1311         let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1312         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1313         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
1314         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]); // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked
1315                                                                   // outputs (which no longer includes the spent HTLC output)
1316
1317         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1318                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1319
1320         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1321         fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1322                 3_000 - chan_feerate * (revoked_htlc_success.weight() + as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight()) as u64 / 1000);
1323
1324         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1325         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1326                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1327                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 11_000 - 3_000 - chan_feerate *
1328                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1329                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1330                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1331                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1332                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1333                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1334                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1335                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1336                         claimable_amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1337                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1338                 }]),
1339                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1340
1341         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1342         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1343         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1344                         // to_self output to B
1345                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1346                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1347                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1348                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1349                         claimable_amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1350                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1351                 }]),
1352                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1353
1354         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1355         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1356         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1357                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1358                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1359                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1360                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1361                 }]),
1362                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1363
1364         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1365         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1366                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1367         // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1368         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1369         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1370                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1371         }
1372
1373         // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1374         // claiming.
1375         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1376         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1377         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1378                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1379         }
1380
1381         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
1382         let as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1383         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1384
1385         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1386         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1387
1388         // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1389         // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1390         // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1391         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1392         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1393                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1394                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1395                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1396                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1397                 }]),
1398                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1399
1400         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1401         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1402                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1403                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1404                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1405                         claimable_amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1406                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1407                 }]),
1408                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1409
1410         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
1411         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1412                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1413                         claimable_amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].output[0].value,
1414                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1415                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1416                         claimable_amount_satoshis: as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1417                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1418                 }]),
1419                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1420
1421         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1422         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1423         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1424         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1]);
1425
1426         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1427
1428         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1429         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1430         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1431         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1432         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1433         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1434         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1435 }
1436
1437 #[test]
1438 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
1439         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1440         // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1441         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1442         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1443         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1444         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1445         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1446         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1447         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1448         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1449         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1450
1451         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1452                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1453         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1454         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1455
1456         // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1457         // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1458         // revocation-claim transaction.
1459
1460         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1461         let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1462
1463         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1464
1465         // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1466         // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1467         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1468                 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1469
1470         // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1471         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1472
1473         assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), 2);
1474         check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1475         check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1476
1477         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1478         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1479
1480         {
1481                 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1482                 *feerate += 1;
1483         }
1484         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1485         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1486
1487         let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1488         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1489         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1490
1491         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1492         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1493         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1494         let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1495
1496         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1497                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1498                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1499                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1500                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1501                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1502                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1503                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1504                 }]),
1505                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1506
1507         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1508         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1509         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1510         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1511
1512         let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1513         // Currently the revoked commitment outputs are all claimed in one aggregated transaction
1514         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 1);
1515         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1516         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1517
1518         let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1519
1520         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1521                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1522                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1523                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1524                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1525                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1526                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1527                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1528                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1529                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1530                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1531                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1532                 }]),
1533                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1534
1535         // Confirm A's HTLC-Success tranasction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1536         // new claim.
1537         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[1]);
1538         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage);
1539         let mut claim_txn_2: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1540         claim_txn_2.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| if tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid()) { 0 } else { 1 });
1541         // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1542         // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1543         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1544         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 2);
1545         check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1546         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1547         check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1548
1549         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1550                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1551                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1552                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1553                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1554                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1555                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1556                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1557                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1558                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1559                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1560                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1561                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1562                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1563                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1564                 }]),
1565                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1566
1567         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1568         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1569
1570         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1571                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1572                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1573                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1574                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1575                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1576                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1577                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1578                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1579                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1580                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1581                 }]),
1582                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1583
1584         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1585         let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1586
1587         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1588                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1589                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1590                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1591                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1592                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1593                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1594                         claimable_amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1595                         confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1596                 }]),
1597                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1598
1599         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1600         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1601
1602         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1603                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1604                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - chan_feerate *
1605                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1606                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1607                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1608                 }]),
1609                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1610
1611         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1612         let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1613
1614         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1615                         claimable_amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
1616                         confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1617                 }],
1618                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1619
1620         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1621
1622         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1623         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1624         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1625         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1626
1627         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1628         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1629         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1630         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1631         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1632         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1633         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1634 }
1635
1636 fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
1637         // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
1638         let persister;
1639         let new_chain_monitor;
1640         let node_deserialized;
1641
1642         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1643         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1644         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1645         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1646
1647         // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
1648         // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
1649         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
1650         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
1651
1652         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
1653         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1654         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1655         check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false);
1656
1657         let commitment_tx = {
1658                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1659                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1660                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
1661                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
1662                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1663         };
1664
1665         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
1666
1667         // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
1668         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
1669         let htlc_timeout_tx = {
1670                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1671                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1672                 check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
1673                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1674         };
1675
1676         // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
1677         // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
1678         if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
1679                 let serialized_monitor = hex::decode(
1680 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1681                 ).unwrap();
1682                 reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
1683         }
1684
1685         // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
1686         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1687         if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
1688                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1689         }
1690         {
1691                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1692                 if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
1693                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
1694                 } else {
1695                         assert!(txn.len() < 6);
1696                 }
1697                 for tx in txn {
1698                         assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
1699                         assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
1700                         assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
1701                         assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
1702                 }
1703         }
1704 }
1705
1706 #[test]
1707 fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
1708         do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
1709         do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
1710 }
1711
1712 #[cfg(anchors)]
1713 #[test]
1714 fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
1715         // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
1716         // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
1717         // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
1718         // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
1719         // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
1720         // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
1721         let secp = Secp256k1::new();
1722         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1723         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1724         let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
1725         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
1726         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1727         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
1728         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1729
1730         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
1731                 &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
1732         ).2;
1733         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
1734         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1735
1736         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1737
1738         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
1739         check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
1740         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
1741
1742         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
1743                 &payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
1744                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
1745         );
1746
1747         let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1748         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
1749         let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
1750                 Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { commitment_tx, anchor_descriptor, .. })  => {
1751                         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.input.len(), 1);
1752                         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 6);
1753                         let mut anchor_tx = Transaction {
1754                                 version: 2,
1755                                 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1756                                 input: vec![
1757                                         TxIn { previous_output: anchor_descriptor.outpoint, ..Default::default() },
1758                                         TxIn { ..Default::default() },
1759                                 ],
1760                                 output: vec![TxOut {
1761                                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1762                                         script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
1763                                 }],
1764                         };
1765                         let signer = nodes[0].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
1766                                 anchor_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &anchor_descriptor.channel_keys_id,
1767                         );
1768                         let funding_sig = signer.sign_holder_anchor_input(&mut anchor_tx, 0, &secp).unwrap();
1769                         anchor_tx.input[0].witness = chan_utils::build_anchor_input_witness(
1770                                 &signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, &funding_sig
1771                         );
1772                         (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
1773                 },
1774                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1775         };
1776
1777         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
1778         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1779
1780         let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1781         // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
1782         // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
1783         match *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow() {
1784                 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
1785                         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
1786                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
1787                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
1788
1789                 },
1790                 _ => assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2),
1791         };
1792         let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1793         for event in holder_events {
1794                 match event {
1795                         Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) => {
1796                                 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 1);
1797                                 let htlc_descriptor = &htlc_descriptors[0];
1798                                 let signer = nodes[0].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
1799                                         htlc_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id
1800                                 );
1801                                 let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp);
1802                                 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
1803                                         version: 2,
1804                                         lock_time: tx_lock_time,
1805                                         input: vec![
1806                                                 htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input(), // HTLC input
1807                                                 TxIn { ..Default::default() } // Fee input
1808                                         ],
1809                                         output: vec![
1810                                                 htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&per_commitment_point, &secp), // HTLC output
1811                                                 TxOut { // Fee input change
1812                                                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1813                                                         script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
1814                                                 }
1815                                         ]
1816                                 };
1817                                 let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, 0, htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
1818                                 let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&per_commitment_point, &secp);
1819                                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
1820                                 htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
1821                         },
1822                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1823                 }
1824         }
1825
1826         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
1827         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1828
1829         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1830
1831         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
1832
1833         let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1834         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
1835         for event in holder_events {
1836                 match event {
1837                         Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
1838                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1839                 }
1840         }
1841
1842         // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
1843         nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1844 }
1845
1846 #[cfg(anchors)]
1847 #[test]
1848 fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
1849         // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
1850         // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
1851         // revoked commitment.
1852         let secp = Secp256k1::new();
1853         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1854         // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
1855         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1856         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1857         let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
1858         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
1859         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1860         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
1861
1862         let bob_persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
1863         let bob_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
1864         let bob_deserialized: ChannelManager<
1865                 &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface,
1866                 &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
1867                 &test_utils::TestRouter, &test_utils::TestLogger,
1868         >;
1869
1870         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1871
1872         let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
1873         let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
1874
1875         // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
1876         let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
1877
1878         // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
1879         let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
1880         let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
1881         let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
1882         let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
1883
1884         // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
1885         // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
1886         // present.
1887         let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
1888         let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
1889
1890         // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
1891         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
1892         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
1893         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
1894         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
1895
1896         // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
1897         // revoked state.
1898         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
1899         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
1900
1901         // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
1902         reload_node!(
1903                 nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
1904                 bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
1905         );
1906         for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
1907                 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1908                 for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
1909                         monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
1910                                 &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
1911                                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
1912                         );
1913                 }
1914         }
1915
1916         // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
1917         // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
1918         // the HTLCs still pending.
1919         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1920         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
1921         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
1922         let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = {
1923                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1924                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1925                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
1926                 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
1927                 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
1928                         check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
1929                         check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3);
1930                         (txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone())
1931                 } else {
1932                         check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3);
1933                         check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
1934                         (txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone())
1935                 }
1936         };
1937
1938         // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
1939         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1940         let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1941         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1942         let anchor_tx = {
1943                 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
1944                 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
1945                 let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
1946                 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1947                         version: 2,
1948                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1949                         input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1950                         output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
1951                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1952                                 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
1953                         }],
1954                 };
1955                 let mut anchor_tx = Transaction {
1956                         version: 2,
1957                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1958                         input: vec![
1959                                 TxIn { // Fee input
1960                                         previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1961                                         ..Default::default()
1962                                 },
1963                         ],
1964                         output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
1965                                 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
1966                                 script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
1967                         }],
1968                 };
1969                 let mut signers = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1970                 for event in events {
1971                         match event {
1972                                 Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { anchor_descriptor, .. })  => {
1973                                         anchor_tx.input.push(TxIn {
1974                                                 previous_output: anchor_descriptor.outpoint,
1975                                                 ..Default::default()
1976                                         });
1977                                         let signer = nodes[1].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
1978                                                 anchor_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &anchor_descriptor.channel_keys_id,
1979                                         );
1980                                         signers.push(signer);
1981                                 },
1982                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1983                         }
1984                 }
1985                 for (i, signer) in signers.into_iter().enumerate() {
1986                         let anchor_idx = i + 1;
1987                         let funding_sig = signer.sign_holder_anchor_input(&mut anchor_tx, anchor_idx, &secp).unwrap();
1988                         anchor_tx.input[anchor_idx].witness = chan_utils::build_anchor_input_witness(
1989                                 &signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, &funding_sig
1990                         );
1991                 }
1992                 let fee_utxo_sig = {
1993                         let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
1994                         let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&anchor_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
1995                                 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
1996                         ).unwrap()[..]);
1997                         let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
1998                         let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
1999                         sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2000                         sig
2001                 };
2002                 anchor_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2003                 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
2004                 anchor_tx
2005         };
2006
2007         for node in &nodes {
2008                 mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_tx]);
2009         }
2010         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
2011         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
2012         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2013
2014         // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
2015         // revoked outputs.
2016         {
2017                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2018                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2019
2020                 let (revoked_claim_a, revoked_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() {
2021                         (&txn[0], &txn[1])
2022                 } else {
2023                         (&txn[1], &txn[0])
2024                 };
2025
2026                 // TODO: to_self claim must be separate from HTLC claims
2027                 assert_eq!(revoked_claim_a.input.len(), 3); // Spends both HTLC outputs and to_self output
2028                 assert_eq!(revoked_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
2029                 check_spends!(revoked_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
2030                 assert_eq!(revoked_claim_b.input.len(), 3); // Spends both HTLC outputs and to_self output
2031                 assert_eq!(revoked_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
2032                 check_spends!(revoked_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
2033         }
2034
2035         // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
2036         // through the success path.
2037         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2038         let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2039         // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2040         // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2041         match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
2042                 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
2043                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
2044                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
2045                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2046                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
2047                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2048
2049                 },
2050                 _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
2051         };
2052         let htlc_tx = {
2053                 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
2054                 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
2055                 let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2056                 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2057                         version: 2,
2058                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2059                         input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2060                         output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
2061                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2062                                 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
2063                         }],
2064                 };
2065                 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
2066                         version: 2,
2067                         lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2068                         input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
2069                                 previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2070                                 ..Default::default()
2071                         }],
2072                         output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
2073                                 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
2074                                 script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
2075                         }],
2076                 };
2077                 let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
2078                 for event in events {
2079                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
2080                                 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
2081                                 for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
2082                                         assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
2083                                         let signer = nodes[1].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
2084                                                 htlc_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id
2085                                         );
2086                                         let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp);
2087                                         htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
2088                                         htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&per_commitment_point, &secp));
2089                                 }
2090                                 descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
2091                                 htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
2092                         } else {
2093                                 panic!("Unexpected event");
2094                         }
2095                 }
2096                 for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
2097                         let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
2098                         let signer = nodes[1].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
2099                                 htlc_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id
2100                         );
2101                         let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
2102                         let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp);
2103                         let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&per_commitment_point, &secp);
2104                         htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
2105                 }
2106                 let fee_utxo_sig = {
2107                         let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
2108                         let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
2109                                 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2110                         ).unwrap()[..]);
2111                         let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2112                         let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2113                         sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2114                         sig
2115                 };
2116                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2117                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
2118                 htlc_tx
2119         };
2120
2121         for node in &nodes {
2122                 mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
2123         }
2124
2125         // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
2126         // the second level instead.
2127         let revoked_claims = {
2128                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2129                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
2130
2131                 let revoked_to_self_claim_a = txn.iter().find(|tx|
2132                         tx.input.len() == 1 &&
2133                         tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2134                         tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid()
2135                 ).unwrap();
2136                 check_spends!(revoked_to_self_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
2137
2138                 let revoked_to_self_claim_b = txn.iter().find(|tx|
2139                         tx.input.len() == 1 &&
2140                         tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2141                         tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_b.txid()
2142                 ).unwrap();
2143                 check_spends!(revoked_to_self_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
2144
2145                 let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
2146                         tx.input.len() == 2 &&
2147                         tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2148                         tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
2149                 ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2150                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
2151                 for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
2152                         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
2153                 }
2154
2155                 txn
2156         };
2157         for node in &nodes {
2158                 mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claims.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>());
2159         }
2160
2161
2162         // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
2163         // been reached.
2164         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2165         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
2166
2167         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2168         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2169
2170         // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2171         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2172         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2173
2174         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2175         let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2176         assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4);
2177         for (idx, event) in spendable_output_events.iter().enumerate() {
2178                 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = event {
2179                         assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2180                         let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2181                                 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, &Secp256k1::new(),
2182                         ).unwrap();
2183                         check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claims[idx]);
2184                 } else {
2185                         panic!("unexpected event");
2186                 }
2187         }
2188
2189         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2190         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2191         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).is_empty());
2192         // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
2193         // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
2194         // balances to claim.
2195         //
2196         // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
2197         // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
2198         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);
2199 }