_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
  11
  12 use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
  13 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  14 use ln::channel;
  15 use ln::channelmanager::BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
  16 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
  17 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
  18 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
  19
  20 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  21 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  23 use bitcoin::Transaction;
  24
  25 use prelude::*;
  26
  27 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  28
  29 #[test]
  30 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
  31         // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
  32         // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
  33         // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
  34         // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
  35         // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
  36         // HTLC.
  37         //
  38         // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
  39         //
  40         // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
  41         // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
  42         //
  43         // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
  44         // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
  45         // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
  46         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
  47         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
  48         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
  49         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  50
  51         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
  52         let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
  53
  54         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
  55         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
  56         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
  57
  58         let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
  59
  60         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  61         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
  62         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
  63
  64         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  65         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
  66         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  67
  68         // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
  69         // transaction for nodes[1].
  70         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
  71         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  72         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
  73         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
  74         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
  75
  76         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
  77         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  78         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  79         let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
  80
  81         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
  82         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
  83         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
  84 }
  85
  86 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction) {
  87         let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
  88         assert_eq!(spendable.len(), 1);
  89         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
  90                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
  91                 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
  92                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
  93                 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
  94         } else { panic!(); }
  95 }
  96
  97 #[test]
  98 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
  99         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
 100         // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
 101         // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
 102         // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
 103         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 104         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 105         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 106         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 107
 108         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 109                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 110         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 111         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 112
 113         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
 114         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 115
 116         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 117                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000
 118                 }],
 119                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 120         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
 121                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 122
 123         nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 124         let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 125         nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown);
 126         let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 127         nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_1_shutdown);
 128
 129         let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 130         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
 131         let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 132         nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
 133         let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 134         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
 135         let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 136         assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
 137
 138         let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 139         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
 140         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
 141
 142         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 143         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 144
 145         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 146         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 147
 148         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 149         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 150
 151         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 152                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000,
 153                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 154                 }],
 155                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 156         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 157                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1000,
 158                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 159                 }],
 160                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 161
 162         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 163         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 164
 165         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 166                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 167         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 168                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 169
 170         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 171         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
 172
 173         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 174         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 175 }
 176
 177 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
 178         v.sort_unstable();
 179         v
 180 }
 181
 182 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
 183         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
 184         // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
 185         // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
 186         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 187         if prev_commitment_tx {
 188                 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 189                 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 190                 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 191                 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
 192                 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
 193         }
 194         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 195         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 196         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 197
 198         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 199                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 200         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 201         assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
 202
 203         // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
 204         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
 205         // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
 206         // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
 207         let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
 208         // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
 209         let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
 210
 211         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 212
 213         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
 214         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 215
 216         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
 217         // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
 218         // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
 219         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 220                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 221                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 222                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 223                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 224                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 225                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 226                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 227                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 228                 }]),
 229                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 230         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 231                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 232                 }],
 233                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 234
 235         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
 236         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 237         let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 238         // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
 239         // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
 240         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
 241         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 242         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
 243         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 244
 245         if prev_commitment_tx {
 246                 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
 247                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
 248                 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
 249                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
 250                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 251                 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 252                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
 253                 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 254                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 255                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
 256                 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 257                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 258         }
 259
 260         // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
 261         // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
 262         let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 263                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
 264                                 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
 265                                 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
 266                                 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
 267                                 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
 268                                 // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
 269                                 chan_feerate * (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) +
 270                                                                 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
 271                                                                 channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 272                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 273                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 274                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 275                 }];
 276         if !prev_commitment_tx {
 277                 a_expected_balances.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 278                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 279                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 280                 });
 281         }
 282         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
 283                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 284         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 285                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
 286                 }],
 287                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 288
 289         // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
 290         // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
 291         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 292         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 293         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 294
 295         let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 296         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), if prev_commitment_tx { 4 } else { 5 });
 297         if prev_commitment_tx {
 298                 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[3], b_broadcast_txn[2]);
 299         } else {
 300                 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0], b_broadcast_txn[3]);
 301                 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1], b_broadcast_txn[4]);
 302         }
 303         // b_broadcast_txn[0] should spend the HTLC output of the commitment tx for 3_000 sats
 304         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 305         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 306         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 307         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 308         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 309         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 310         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[2], funding_tx);
 311
 312         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 313         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 314         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 315         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 316         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 317         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 318         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 319         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 320         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 321         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 322
 323         // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
 324         // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
 325         // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
 326         // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
 327         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 328         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 329
 330         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 331                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
 332                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 333                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 334                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 335                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 336                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 337                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 338                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 339                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 340                 }]),
 341                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 342         // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
 343         // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
 344         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 345                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 346                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 347                 },
 348                 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
 349                 // long.
 350                 Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 351                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 352                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 353                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 354                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 355                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 356                 }]),
 357                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 358
 359         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 360         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, true);
 361         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 362
 363         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
 364         // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
 365         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 366                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 367                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 368                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 369                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 370                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 371                 }]),
 372                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 373         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 374                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 375                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 376                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 377                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 378                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 379                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 380                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 381                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 382                 }]),
 383                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 384
 385         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 386         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 387
 388         // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
 389         // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
 390         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 391         if prev_commitment_tx {
 392                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
 393         } else {
 394                 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
 395         }
 396         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 397                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 398                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 399                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 400                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 401                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 402                 }]),
 403                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 404         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 405         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 406                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 407                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 408                 }],
 409                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 410
 411         // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
 412         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
 413         let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 414         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 3);
 415         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], funding_tx);
 416         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 417         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 418         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
 419         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
 420         assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout,
 421                    a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
 422         // a_broadcast_txn [1] and [2] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
 423         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 424         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 425
 426         // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
 427         // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
 428         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
 429         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 430         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 431                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 432                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 433                 }],
 434                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 435         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
 436         // balance entry.
 437         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 438         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 439                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 440         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, true);
 441
 442         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
 443
 444         // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
 445         // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
 446         // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
 447         let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 448         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 449
 450         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 451                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 452                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 453                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 454                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 455                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 456                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 457                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 458                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 459                 }]),
 460                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 461
 462         // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
 463         // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
 464         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 465         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 466
 467         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 468                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 469                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 470                 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 471                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 472                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 473                 }]),
 474                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 475
 476         // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
 477         // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
 478         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 479         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 480
 481         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 482                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 483                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 484                 }],
 485                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 486
 487         // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
 488         // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
 489         // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
 490         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
 491         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 492                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 493                         timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 494                 }],
 495                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 496         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 497         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 498                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 499 }
 500
 501 #[test]
 502 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
 503         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
 504         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
 505 }
 506
 507 #[test]
 508 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
 509         // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
 510         // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
 511         // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
 512         // delay prior to spendability.
 513         //
 514         // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
 515         // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
 516         // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
 517         // claim by our counterparty).
 518         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 519         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 520         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 521         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 522
 523         // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
 524         // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
 525         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 526         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 527
 528         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
 529         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 530         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
 531         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 532
 533         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 534         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 535         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 536
 537         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 538         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
 539
 540         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
 541         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
 542         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 543
 544         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 545         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 546         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 547
 548         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 549         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
 550         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
 551         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 552         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 553
 554         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
 555         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 556
 557         // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transactions
 558         let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 559         assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 3);
 560         check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
 561         check_spends!(as_txn[2], as_txn[0]);
 562         check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
 563
 564         // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
 565         // claimable balances.
 566         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 567         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 568         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 569         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 570         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 571
 572         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 573                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 574                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 575                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 576                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 577                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 578                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 579                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 580                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 581                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 582                 }]),
 583                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 584
 585         // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
 586         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 587         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 588         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 589         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
 590         let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 591         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 3);
 592         check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], as_txn[0]);
 593         check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[1], funding_tx);
 594         check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[2], bs_htlc_claim_txn[1]);
 595
 596         // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
 597         // transaction.
 598         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
 599         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 600                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 601                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 602                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 603                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 604                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 605                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 606                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 607                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 608                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 609                 }]),
 610                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 611         assert_eq!(as_txn[1].lock_time, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1); // as_txn[1] can be included in the next block
 612
 613         // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
 614         // "awaiting confirmations" one.
 615         let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 616         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
 617         // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
 618         // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
 619         // call, as described, two hunks down.
 620         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 621                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 622                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 623                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 624                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 625                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 626                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 627                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 628                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 629                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 630                 }]),
 631                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 632
 633         // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
 634         // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
 635         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
 636         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
 637         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 638                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 639                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 640                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 641                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 642                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 643                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 644                 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
 645                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 646                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 647                 }]),
 648                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 649
 650         // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
 651         // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
 652         // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
 653         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 654         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
 655
 656         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 657                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - chan_feerate *
 658                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 659                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 660                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 661                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 662                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 663                 }]),
 664                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 665
 666         // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 667         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 668         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 669         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 670                         claimable_amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 671                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 672                 }],
 673                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 674         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 675
 676         // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 677         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 678         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 679         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 680         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[1]);
 681 }