1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
12 use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
13 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
14 use ln::{channel, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
15 use ln::channelmanager::BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
16 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
17 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
18 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
19 use routing::network_graph::NetworkUpdate;
20 use routing::router::get_route;
22 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
23 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
27 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
34 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
35 // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
36 // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
37 // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
38 // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
39 // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
42 // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
44 // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
45 // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
47 // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
48 // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
49 // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
50 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
51 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
52 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
53 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
55 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
56 let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
58 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
59 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
60 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
62 let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
64 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
65 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
66 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
68 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
69 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
70 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
72 // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
73 // transaction for nodes[1].
74 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
75 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
76 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
77 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
79 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
80 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
81 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
82 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
84 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
85 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
86 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
90 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
91 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
92 // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
93 // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
94 // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
95 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
96 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
97 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
98 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
100 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
101 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
102 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
103 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
105 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
107 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
108 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000
110 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
111 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
112 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
114 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id).unwrap();
115 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
116 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown);
117 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
118 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_1_shutdown);
120 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
121 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
122 let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
123 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
124 let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
125 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
126 let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
127 assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
129 let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
130 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
131 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
133 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
134 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
136 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
137 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
139 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
140 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
142 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
143 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000,
144 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
146 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
147 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
148 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1000,
149 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
151 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
153 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
154 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
156 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
157 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
158 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
159 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
161 let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
162 assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
163 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
164 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
165 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
166 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
167 check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
170 let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
171 assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
172 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
173 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
174 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
175 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
176 check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
180 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
185 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
186 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
187 // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
188 // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
189 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
190 if prev_commitment_tx {
191 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
192 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
193 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
194 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
195 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
197 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
198 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
199 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
201 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
202 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
203 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
204 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
206 // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
207 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
208 // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
209 // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
210 let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
211 // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
212 let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
214 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
216 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
218 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
219 // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
220 // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
221 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
222 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
223 (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
224 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
225 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
226 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
227 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
228 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
229 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
231 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
232 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
233 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
235 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
237 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
238 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
239 let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
240 // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
241 // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
242 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
244 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
245 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
247 if prev_commitment_tx {
248 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
249 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
250 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
251 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
253 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
254 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
255 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
256 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
257 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
258 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
262 // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
263 // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
264 let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
265 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
266 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
267 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
268 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
269 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
270 // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
271 chan_feerate * (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT +
272 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
273 channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
274 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
275 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
276 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
278 if !prev_commitment_tx {
279 a_expected_balances.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
280 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
281 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
284 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
285 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
286 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
287 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
289 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
291 // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
292 // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
293 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
294 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
295 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
297 let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
298 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), if prev_commitment_tx { 4 } else { 5 });
299 if prev_commitment_tx {
300 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[3], b_broadcast_txn[2]);
302 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0], b_broadcast_txn[3]);
303 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1], b_broadcast_txn[4]);
305 // b_broadcast_txn[0] should spend the HTLC output of the commitment tx for 3_000 sats
306 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
307 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
308 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
309 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
310 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
311 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
312 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[2], funding_tx);
314 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
315 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
316 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
317 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
318 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
320 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
321 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
323 // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
324 // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
325 // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
326 // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
327 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
328 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
330 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
331 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
332 (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
333 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
334 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
335 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
336 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
337 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
338 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
339 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
341 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
342 // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
343 // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
344 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
345 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
346 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
348 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
350 Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
351 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
352 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
353 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
354 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
355 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
357 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
359 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
360 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, true);
361 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
363 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
364 // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
365 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
366 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
367 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
368 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
369 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
370 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
372 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
373 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
374 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
375 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
376 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
377 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
378 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
379 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
380 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
381 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
383 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
385 let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
386 assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
387 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
388 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
389 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
390 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
391 check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
394 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
396 // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
397 // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
398 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
399 if !prev_commitment_tx {
400 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
402 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
403 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
404 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
405 }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
406 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
407 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
409 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
410 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
411 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
412 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
413 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
415 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
417 // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
418 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
419 let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
420 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 3);
421 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], funding_tx);
422 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
423 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
424 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
425 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
426 assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout,
427 a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
428 // a_broadcast_txn [1] and [2] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
429 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
430 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
432 // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
433 // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
434 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
435 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
436 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
437 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
438 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
440 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
441 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
443 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
444 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
445 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
446 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, true);
448 let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
449 assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
450 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
451 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
452 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
453 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
454 check_spends!(spend_tx, a_broadcast_txn[2]);
457 // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
458 // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
459 // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
460 let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
461 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
463 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
464 claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
465 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
466 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
467 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
468 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
469 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
470 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
471 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
473 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
475 // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
476 // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
477 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
479 let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
480 assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
481 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
482 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
483 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
484 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
485 check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
488 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
489 claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
490 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
491 }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
492 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
493 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
495 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
497 // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
498 // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
499 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
501 let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
502 assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
503 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
504 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
505 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
506 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
507 check_spends!(spend_tx, b_broadcast_txn[0]);
510 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
511 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
512 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
514 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
516 // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
517 // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
518 // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
519 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
520 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
521 claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
522 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
524 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
525 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
526 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
527 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
531 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
532 do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
533 do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);