1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
12 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
13 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance};
14 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
15 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight};
16 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
17 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
18 use crate::ln::channel;
19 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
20 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
21 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
22 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
23 use crate::util::crypto::sign;
24 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
25 use crate::util::scid_utils::block_from_scid;
26 use crate::util::test_utils;
28 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
29 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
30 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
32 use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, Script, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime, Witness};
33 use bitcoin::util::sighash::SighashCache;
35 use crate::prelude::*;
37 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
40 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
41 // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
42 // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
43 // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
44 // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
45 // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
48 // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
50 // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
51 // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
53 // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
54 // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
55 // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
56 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
57 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
58 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
59 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
61 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
62 let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
64 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
65 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
66 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
67 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
69 let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
71 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
72 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
73 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
75 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
76 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
77 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
79 // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
80 // transaction for nodes[1].
81 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
82 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
83 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
84 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
85 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
87 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
88 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
89 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
90 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
92 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
93 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
94 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
97 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction, has_anchors_htlc_event: bool) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
98 let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
99 assert_eq!(spendable.len(), if has_anchors_htlc_event { 2 } else { 1 });
100 if has_anchors_htlc_event {
101 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { .. }) = spendable.pop().unwrap() {}
104 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
105 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
106 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
107 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
108 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
114 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
115 // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
116 // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
117 // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
119 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
120 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
121 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
122 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
124 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
126 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
128 // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
129 // before forwarding.
130 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
131 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
133 // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
134 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
136 // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
137 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
139 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
140 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
142 let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
143 assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
144 check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
146 // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
147 // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
148 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
149 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
150 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
152 // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
153 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
154 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
155 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
157 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
158 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
161 fn do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(anchors: bool) {
162 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
163 // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
164 // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
165 // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
166 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
167 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
168 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
170 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
171 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
173 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
174 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
176 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
177 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
178 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
179 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
181 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
182 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
184 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate * chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000;
185 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
186 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
187 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value
189 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
190 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
191 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
193 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
194 let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
195 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
196 let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
197 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
199 let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
200 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
201 let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
202 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
203 let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
204 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
205 let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
206 assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
208 let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
209 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
210 assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
212 let shutdown_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]));
213 let shutdown_tx_conf_height_b = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]));
215 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
216 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
218 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
219 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
221 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
222 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
223 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
225 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
226 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
227 amount_satoshis: 1000,
228 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
230 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
232 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
233 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
235 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
236 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
237 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id)
238 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b).is_empty());
240 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
241 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
243 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
244 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
245 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
246 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
248 let spendable_outputs_a = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
250 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a),
254 let spendable_outputs_b = test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
256 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b),
260 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
261 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
265 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
266 do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(false);
267 do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(true);
270 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
275 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
276 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
277 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
278 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
279 let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
280 let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
281 eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
282 assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
283 assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
286 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(anchors: bool, prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
287 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
288 // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
289 // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
290 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
291 if prev_commitment_tx {
292 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
293 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
294 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
295 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
296 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
298 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
299 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
301 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
302 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
304 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
305 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
307 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
309 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
310 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
313 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
314 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
317 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
318 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
323 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
324 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
327 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
328 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
329 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
330 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
332 // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
333 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
334 // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
335 // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
336 let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
337 // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
338 let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
340 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
342 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
343 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
345 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
346 let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
347 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
348 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
350 outbound_payment: true,
352 let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
353 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
354 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
355 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
356 outbound_payment: true,
358 let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
359 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
360 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
363 let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
364 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
365 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
366 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
368 let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
369 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
370 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
374 let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
375 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
376 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
377 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
378 payment_preimage: timeout_payment_preimage,
381 // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
382 // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
383 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
384 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
385 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
386 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
387 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
388 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
389 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
390 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
391 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
392 }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
393 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
395 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
396 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
397 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
399 let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
400 // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
401 // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
402 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
403 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
404 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
406 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
408 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
410 if prev_commitment_tx {
411 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
412 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
413 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
414 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
416 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
417 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
418 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
419 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
420 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
421 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
422 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
425 // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
426 // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
427 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
428 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) +
429 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
430 let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
431 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
432 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
433 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
434 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
435 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
436 commitment_tx_fee - // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs
437 anchor_outputs_value, // The anchor outputs value in satoshis
438 }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
439 if !prev_commitment_tx {
440 a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
442 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
443 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
444 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
445 amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
447 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
449 // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
450 // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
451 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
452 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
453 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
456 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
457 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
458 match events.pop().unwrap() {
459 Event::BumpTransaction(bump_event) => {
460 let mut first_htlc_event = bump_event.clone();
461 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut first_htlc_event {
462 htlc_descriptors.remove(1);
464 panic!("Unexpected event");
466 let mut second_htlc_event = bump_event;
467 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut second_htlc_event {
468 htlc_descriptors.remove(0);
470 panic!("Unexpected event");
472 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&first_htlc_event);
473 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&second_htlc_event);
475 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
479 let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
480 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
481 // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
482 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
483 check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
484 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
485 assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
486 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
487 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
489 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
490 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
492 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
493 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
494 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
495 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
496 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
497 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
498 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
500 // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
501 // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
502 // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
503 // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
504 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
505 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
506 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
507 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
508 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
509 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
510 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
511 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
512 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
513 // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
514 // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
515 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
516 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
517 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
519 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
521 received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
522 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
524 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
525 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
526 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
528 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
529 // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
530 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
531 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
532 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
533 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
534 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
535 }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
536 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
538 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0], false);
539 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
541 // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
542 // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
543 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
544 if prev_commitment_tx {
545 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
547 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, false);
549 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
550 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
551 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
552 assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()],
553 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
555 // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
556 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
557 let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
558 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
559 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
560 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
561 assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
562 check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
563 assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
564 a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
565 // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
566 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
567 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
569 // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
570 // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
571 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
572 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
573 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
574 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
575 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
577 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
578 // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
580 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
581 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
582 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
583 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
585 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1], false);
587 // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
588 // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
589 // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
590 let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
591 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
593 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
594 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
595 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
596 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
597 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
598 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
599 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
600 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
602 // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
603 // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
604 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
605 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0], anchors);
607 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
608 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
609 confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
610 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
611 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
613 // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
614 // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
615 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
616 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0], anchors);
618 assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
619 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
621 // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
622 // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
623 // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
624 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
625 assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
626 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
627 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
628 assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
629 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
631 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
632 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
633 // monitor events or claimable balances.
634 for node in nodes.iter() {
635 connect_blocks(node, 6);
636 connect_blocks(node, 6);
637 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
638 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
643 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
644 do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, true);
645 do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, false);
646 do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, true);
647 do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, false);
650 fn do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(anchors: bool) {
651 // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
652 // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
653 // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
654 // delay prior to spendability.
656 // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
657 // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
658 // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
659 // claim by our counterparty).
660 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
661 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
662 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
664 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
665 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
667 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
668 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
670 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
672 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
673 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
676 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
677 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
680 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
681 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
686 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
687 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
690 // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
691 // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
692 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
693 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
695 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
696 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
697 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
698 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
699 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
701 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
702 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
703 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
705 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
706 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
708 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
709 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
710 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
711 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
713 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
714 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
715 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
717 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
718 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
719 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
720 get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
722 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
724 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
725 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
727 // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
728 // claimable balances.
729 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
730 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
732 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
733 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
734 let commitment_tx = {
735 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
736 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
737 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
738 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
741 let commitment_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx));
742 if anchors && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
743 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
744 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
745 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid());
748 let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
749 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
750 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
752 outbound_payment: true,
754 let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
755 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
756 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
757 payment_hash: payment_hash_2,
758 outbound_payment: true,
761 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
762 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
763 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
764 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
765 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
766 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
767 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
768 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
770 // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
771 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
773 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
774 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
775 let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
776 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
777 check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], commitment_tx);
779 // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
781 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
782 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
783 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
784 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
785 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
786 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
788 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 2);
790 let timeout_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
791 assert_eq!(timeout_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
792 check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[0], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
793 check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[1], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
795 // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
796 // "awaiting confirmations" one.
797 let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
798 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0]);
799 // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
800 // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
801 // call, as described, two hunks down.
802 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
803 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
804 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
805 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
806 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
807 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
808 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
809 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
811 // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
812 // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
813 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
814 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, true, false);
815 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
816 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
817 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
818 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
819 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
820 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
821 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
822 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
824 // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
825 // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
826 // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
827 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
828 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
830 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
831 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
832 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
833 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
834 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
835 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
837 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
839 // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
840 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
841 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
842 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
843 .get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
844 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
845 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
846 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
847 confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
849 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
850 let to_self_spendable_output = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
852 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a),
853 to_self_spendable_output
856 // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
857 // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
858 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
859 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
860 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0], false);
862 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
863 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
864 // monitor events or claimable balances.
865 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
866 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
867 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
868 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
872 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
873 do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(false);
874 do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(true);
878 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
879 // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
881 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
882 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
883 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
884 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
886 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
887 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
889 // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
890 let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
891 let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
892 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
894 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
895 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
897 let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
898 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
899 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
900 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
901 outbound_payment: true,
903 let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
904 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
905 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
906 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
908 let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
909 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
910 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
911 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
913 let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
914 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
915 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
916 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
917 outbound_payment: true,
920 // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
921 // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
922 // HTLC output is spent.
924 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
925 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
926 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
927 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
928 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
930 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
931 amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
932 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
933 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
935 // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
936 let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
937 assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
938 check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
939 check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
941 // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
942 // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
943 let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
944 let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
945 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
946 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
947 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
948 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
950 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
951 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
953 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
954 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
956 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
957 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
959 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
960 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
961 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
962 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
964 let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
965 let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
966 amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
967 confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
968 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
969 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
970 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
972 // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
973 // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
974 // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
975 // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
977 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
978 let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
979 assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
980 check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
981 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
982 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
984 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
985 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
987 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
988 assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
989 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
991 // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
992 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
993 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0], false);
994 bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
996 // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
997 nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
998 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1));
999 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
1000 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
1001 let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1002 assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
1003 check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
1005 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1006 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1008 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1009 assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1010 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1012 // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
1013 // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
1014 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1015 let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
1016 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1017 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1018 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1019 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1020 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1021 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1022 confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
1024 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1026 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1027 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1028 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1029 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1030 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1031 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1032 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1033 confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
1035 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1037 // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
1038 // payment failure event.
1039 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1040 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
1042 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1043 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1044 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1045 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1046 confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1047 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1048 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1049 confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1051 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1053 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1054 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1055 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1056 confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1058 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1059 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0], false);
1061 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1062 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1063 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1065 // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
1066 // was already claimed.
1067 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1068 let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1069 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1070 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1071 confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1073 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1075 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1076 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1077 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1078 confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1080 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1082 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1083 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
1085 assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
1086 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1087 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1089 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1090 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1092 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1093 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1094 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1095 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1096 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1097 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1098 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1101 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
1102 let mut v = v_orig.clone();
1104 v.push((*t).clone());
1110 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(anchors: bool, confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
1111 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
1112 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1113 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1114 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1115 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1116 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1117 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1118 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1119 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1121 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1122 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1124 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1125 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1127 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1128 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1129 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1130 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1132 // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
1134 // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
1135 // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
1136 // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
1137 // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
1138 // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
1139 // later commitment transaction updates
1141 // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
1142 // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
1143 // HTLCs individually.
1145 let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
1146 let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1147 let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1149 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1151 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1152 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1154 let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1155 let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1157 // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1158 let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1159 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1161 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1163 let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1164 let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1166 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1167 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1169 let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1171 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1172 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1175 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1176 assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1177 let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1178 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1179 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1180 events.retain(|ev| {
1182 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1183 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1184 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1187 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1188 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1194 assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1195 if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1197 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, .. } => {},
1201 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1202 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1204 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1206 // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1207 // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1208 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1209 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1210 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1211 amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1212 claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1213 payment_hash: missing_htlc_payment_hash,
1214 outbound_payment: true,
1215 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1216 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1217 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1218 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
1219 outbound_payment: true,
1220 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1221 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1222 claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1223 payment_hash: live_payment_hash,
1224 outbound_payment: true,
1226 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1228 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1229 let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1230 // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1232 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1233 claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
1235 // The following constants were determined experimentally
1236 const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: usize = 483;
1237 let outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: usize = if anchors { 574 } else { 571 };
1238 let inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: usize = if anchors { 582 } else { 578 };
1240 // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1241 // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1242 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight(), outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1243 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1244 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1245 fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1247 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1248 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1249 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1250 let inbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight as u64 / 1000;
1251 let outbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight as u64 / 1000;
1252 let to_self_claim_fee = chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight() as u64 / 1000;
1254 // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1255 // claim balances separated out.
1256 let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1257 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1258 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1259 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1260 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1261 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1262 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1263 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1266 let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1267 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1269 let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1270 let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1271 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1273 let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1275 // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1276 // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1277 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1278 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1280 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1281 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1282 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1283 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1285 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1286 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1287 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1288 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1291 let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1292 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1293 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1295 let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1296 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
1297 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1300 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1301 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1302 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1304 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1305 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1308 if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1309 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1311 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1313 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1314 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1316 // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1317 // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1318 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1319 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1321 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1322 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1323 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1324 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1325 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1326 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
1327 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1328 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1329 amount_satoshis: 3_000 - outbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1330 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1331 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1332 amount_satoshis: 4_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1333 confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1334 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1335 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1336 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1338 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1340 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1341 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1343 let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1344 expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
1345 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1346 expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
1347 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1349 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1350 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }], false);
1351 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1352 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }], false);
1353 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1354 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1355 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0], false);
1356 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1357 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1], false);
1358 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1359 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1361 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1362 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1363 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1364 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1365 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1366 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1367 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1371 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1372 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, true);
1373 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, false);
1374 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, true);
1375 do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, false);
1378 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(anchors: bool) {
1379 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1380 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1381 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1382 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1383 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1385 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1386 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1388 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1389 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1391 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1393 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1394 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1397 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1398 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1401 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1402 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1407 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1408 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
1411 // Create some initial channels
1412 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1413 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 12_000_000);
1414 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1415 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1417 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1418 let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1419 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1420 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1421 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1423 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[4].value, 11000); // to_self output
1425 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[2].value, 11000); // to_self output
1428 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs, an output for each side, and an
1429 // anchor output for each side if enabled.
1430 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if anchors { 6 } else { 4 });
1432 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1434 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1435 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1437 // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1438 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1439 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1441 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1443 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 1);
1445 let revoked_htlc_success = {
1446 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1447 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1448 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1449 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, if anchors { 3 } else { 1 });
1450 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(),
1451 if anchors { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS } else { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT });
1452 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1455 let revoked_htlc_success_fee = chan_feerate * revoked_htlc_success.weight() as u64 / 1000;
1457 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1459 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 2);
1461 let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
1462 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1463 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1464 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
1470 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1471 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
1472 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time.0, 0);
1473 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0, 0);
1475 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1476 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1477 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1479 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1480 let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1482 let revoked_to_self_claim = {
1483 let mut as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1484 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1486 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1487 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 4); // Separate to_remote claim
1488 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1489 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
1490 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1491 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
1492 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1493 Some(as_commitment_claim_txn.remove(0))
1495 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1496 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1497 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1498 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
1499 check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1504 // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1505 // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1506 // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1507 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1508 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1509 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1510 let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1511 // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1512 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1513 confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1514 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1515 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1516 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1517 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1518 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1519 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1520 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1522 assert_eq!(as_balances,
1523 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1525 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
1526 let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1527 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1528 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1529 check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
1530 // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked outputs (which no longer includes the
1531 // spent HTLC output)
1532 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1533 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1535 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1537 check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1539 assert_eq!(as_balances,
1540 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1542 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1543 let as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee = chan_feerate * as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight() as u64 / 1000;
1545 // With anchors, B can pay for revoked_htlc_success's fee with additional inputs, rather
1546 // than with the HTLC itself.
1547 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1548 3_000 - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
1550 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1551 3_000 - revoked_htlc_success_fee - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
1554 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1555 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1556 // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1557 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1558 confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1559 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1560 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1561 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1562 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1563 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1564 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1565 amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1566 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1568 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1570 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1571 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], false);
1572 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1573 // to_self output to B
1574 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1575 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1576 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1577 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1578 amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1579 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1581 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1583 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1584 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0], false);
1585 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1586 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1587 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1588 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1589 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1591 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1593 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.0 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1594 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1595 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1596 // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1597 let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1598 for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1599 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1602 // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1604 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1605 let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1606 for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1607 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1610 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
1611 let (revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, revoked_to_self_claim) = {
1612 let mut as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1613 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1615 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1616 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1617 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1618 (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), revoked_to_self_claim.unwrap())
1620 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1621 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1622 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1623 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), 1);
1624 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1625 check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1626 (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0))
1630 // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1631 // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1632 // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1633 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1634 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1635 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1636 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1637 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1638 amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1640 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1642 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim);
1643 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1644 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1645 amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1646 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1647 amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value,
1648 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1650 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1652 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim);
1653 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1654 // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1655 amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.output[0].value,
1656 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1657 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1658 amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value,
1659 confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1661 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1663 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1664 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, false);
1665 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1666 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim, false);
1668 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1670 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1671 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1672 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1673 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1674 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1675 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1676 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1680 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1681 do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(false);
1682 do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(true);
1685 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(anchors: bool) {
1686 // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1687 // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1688 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1689 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1690 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1691 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1692 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1693 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1694 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1695 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1697 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1698 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1700 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1701 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1703 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1705 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
1706 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1707 output: vec![TxOut {
1708 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1709 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1712 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1714 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1715 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1716 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1717 assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
1719 // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1720 // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1721 // revocation-claim transaction.
1723 let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1724 let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1726 let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1728 // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1729 // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1730 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1731 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1733 // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1734 let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1736 assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1737 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1739 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1742 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1743 let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1746 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1749 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1750 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1752 let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1753 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1754 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1756 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1757 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1759 let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1761 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1762 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1763 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1764 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1765 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1766 payment_hash: revoked_payment_hash,
1767 outbound_payment: true,
1768 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1769 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1770 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1771 payment_hash: claimed_payment_hash,
1772 outbound_payment: true,
1774 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1776 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1777 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1778 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1779 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1781 let mut claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1782 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1783 let revoked_to_self_claim = if anchors {
1784 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1785 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 5); // Separate to_remote claim
1786 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1787 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
1788 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1789 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
1790 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1791 Some(claim_txn.remove(0))
1793 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1794 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1795 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1796 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
1797 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1801 let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1803 let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1804 (chan_utils::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * chan_utils::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1805 let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1806 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1807 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1808 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1809 confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1810 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1811 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1812 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1813 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1814 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1815 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1816 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1818 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1820 // Confirm A's HTLC-Success transaction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1823 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1824 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1825 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1826 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
1827 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
1829 let htlc_success_claim = if anchors {
1830 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1831 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1832 check_spends!(txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1835 as_revoked_txn[1].clone()
1837 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_claim);
1838 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage, None, true, false);
1840 let mut claim_txn_2 = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1841 // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1842 // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1843 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1845 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1);
1846 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1847 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], &htlc_success_claim);
1848 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1849 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1850 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1852 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1);
1853 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1854 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1855 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 2);
1856 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1857 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 1);
1858 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1861 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1862 // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1863 amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1864 confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1865 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1866 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1867 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1868 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1869 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1870 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1871 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1872 // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1873 // anyway, so its not a big change.
1874 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1876 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1878 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1879 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1881 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1882 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1883 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1884 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1885 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1886 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1887 // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1888 // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1889 // anyway, so its not a big change.
1890 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1892 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1894 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1895 let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1897 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1898 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1899 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1900 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1901 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1902 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1903 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
1904 confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1906 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1908 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1909 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0], false);
1911 assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1912 // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1913 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1914 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1915 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1917 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1920 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&claim_txn_2[1], revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap()]);
1922 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1924 let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1927 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1928 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1929 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1930 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1931 amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap().output[0].value,
1932 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1934 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1936 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1937 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1938 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1940 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1943 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1945 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1946 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1948 let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1949 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1950 for (i, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
1951 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = event {
1952 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
1953 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
1954 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
1955 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()
1957 check_spends!(spend_tx, if i == 0 { &claim_txn_2[1] } else { revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap() });
1958 } else { panic!(); }
1961 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1], false);
1963 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1965 // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1966 // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1967 // monitor events or claimable balances.
1968 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1969 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1970 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1971 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1975 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
1976 do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(false);
1977 do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(true);
1980 fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
1981 // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
1982 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1983 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1985 let new_chain_monitor;
1987 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1988 let node_deserialized;
1990 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1992 // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
1993 // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
1994 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
1995 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
1997 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
1998 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1999 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2000 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
2001 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2003 let commitment_tx = {
2004 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2005 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2006 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
2007 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2011 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2013 // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
2014 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
2015 let htlc_timeout_tx = {
2016 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2017 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2018 check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
2022 // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
2023 // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
2024 if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
2025 let serialized_monitor = hex::decode(
2026 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0",
2028 reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2031 // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
2032 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
2033 if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
2034 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2037 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2038 if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
2039 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
2041 assert!(txn.len() < 6);
2044 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
2045 assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
2046 assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
2047 assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
2053 fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
2054 do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
2055 do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
2058 fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) {
2059 // Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every
2060 // `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call.
2061 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2062 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2063 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
2065 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2066 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2068 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
2069 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2071 let (_, _, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
2072 &nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 500_000_000
2074 const HTLC_AMT_MSAT: u64 = 1_000_000;
2075 const HTLC_AMT_SAT: u64 = HTLC_AMT_MSAT / 1000;
2076 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_AMT_MSAT);
2078 let htlc_expiry = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1;
2080 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(&nodes[0], &chan_id);
2081 assert_eq!(commitment_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 /* commitment tx only */} else { 2 /* commitment and htlc timeout tx */ });
2082 check_spends!(&commitment_txn[0], &funding_tx);
2083 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_txn[0]);
2084 check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
2085 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed,
2086 false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
2087 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2089 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2091 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2092 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2093 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` on anchors
2094 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2095 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2098 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2100 // Set up a helper closure we'll use throughout our test. We should only expect retries without
2101 // bumps if fees have not increased after a block has been connected (assuming the height timer
2102 // re-evaluates at every block) or after `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` is called.
2103 let mut prev_htlc_tx_feerate = None;
2104 let mut check_htlc_retry = |should_retry: bool, should_bump: bool| -> Option<Transaction> {
2105 let (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) = if anchors {
2106 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
2107 let events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2108 assert_eq!(events.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
2113 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2114 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2115 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2116 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2117 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2118 check_spends!(&htlc_tx, &commitment_txn[0], &coinbase_tx);
2119 let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value -
2120 htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>();
2121 let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
2122 (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
2124 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2127 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2128 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2129 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
2133 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2134 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]);
2135 let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value;
2136 let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight() as u64;
2137 (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
2140 assert!(htlc_tx_feerate > prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take().unwrap());
2141 } else if let Some(prev_feerate) = prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take() {
2142 assert_eq!(htlc_tx_feerate, prev_feerate);
2144 prev_htlc_tx_feerate = Some(htlc_tx_feerate);
2148 // Connect blocks up to one before the HTLC expires. This should not result in a claim/retry.
2149 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_expiry - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
2150 check_htlc_retry(false, false);
2152 // Connect one more block, producing our first claim.
2153 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2154 check_htlc_retry(true, false);
2156 // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
2157 // transactions pre-anchors.
2158 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2159 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2161 // Trigger a call and we should have another retry, but without a bump.
2162 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2163 check_htlc_retry(true, false);
2165 // Double the feerate and trigger a call, expecting a fee-bumped retry.
2166 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2167 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2168 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2170 // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
2171 // transactions pre-anchors.
2172 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2173 let htlc_tx = check_htlc_retry(true, anchors).unwrap();
2175 // Mine the HTLC transaction to ensure we don't retry claims while they're confirmed.
2176 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_tx);
2177 // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transactions,
2178 // we'll receive an extra bumped claim.
2179 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2180 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2181 nodes[0].wallet_source.remove_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 1 });
2182 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2184 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2185 check_htlc_retry(false, false);
2189 fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() {
2190 do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false);
2191 do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true);
2195 fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
2196 // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
2197 // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
2198 // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
2199 // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
2200 // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
2201 // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
2202 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2203 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2204 let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
2205 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2206 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2207 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2208 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2209 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2211 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
2212 &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
2214 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
2215 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000);
2217 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2218 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2220 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2222 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2223 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
2225 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2227 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2228 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2229 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2232 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
2233 &payment_hash_2, &payment_preimage_2, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
2234 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
2236 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
2237 &payment_hash_1, &payment_preimage_1, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2238 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2241 let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2242 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
2243 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
2244 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2245 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2247 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2248 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2249 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2250 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2251 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2254 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2255 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2256 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2257 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2258 let anchor_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2259 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2260 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2261 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2262 (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
2264 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2267 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[2].value, 1_000); // HTLC A -> B
2268 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[3].value, 2_000); // HTLC B -> A
2270 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2272 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2276 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2277 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
2279 let htlc_preimage_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2280 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
2281 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
2282 check_spends!(htlc_preimage_tx, commitment_tx);
2284 let htlc_timeout_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2285 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
2286 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
2287 check_spends!(htlc_timeout_tx, commitment_tx);
2289 if let Some(commitment_tx) = txn.pop() {
2290 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2294 let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2295 // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2296 // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2297 if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2298 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2299 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
2300 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2302 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2);
2304 let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2305 for event in holder_events {
2307 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2308 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2309 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2310 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2311 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2312 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx, anchor_tx);
2313 htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
2315 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2319 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
2320 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2322 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2324 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
2326 let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2327 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2328 for event in holder_events {
2330 Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
2331 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2335 // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
2336 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2337 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2338 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2339 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2343 fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
2344 // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
2345 // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
2346 // revoked commitment.
2347 let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2348 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2349 // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
2350 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2351 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2353 let bob_chain_monitor;
2355 let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
2356 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2357 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2358 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2359 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2360 let bob_deserialized;
2362 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2364 let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2365 let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2367 // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
2368 let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
2370 // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
2371 let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2372 let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2373 let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2374 let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2376 // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
2377 // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
2379 let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
2380 let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
2382 // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
2383 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
2384 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
2385 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
2386 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
2388 // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
2390 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2391 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2393 // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
2395 nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
2396 bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
2398 for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
2399 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
2400 for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
2401 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
2402 &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2403 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2408 // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
2409 // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
2410 // the HTLCs still pending.
2411 *nodes[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2412 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
2413 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
2414 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2415 let (revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b) = {
2416 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2417 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2418 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2419 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2420 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
2421 check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
2422 check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_b.3);
2423 (txn[0].clone(), txn[1].clone())
2425 check_spends!(&txn[1], &chan_a.3);
2426 check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
2427 (txn[1].clone(), txn[0].clone())
2431 // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
2432 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2433 let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2434 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2435 let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2436 for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
2437 let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat() * (idx + 1) as u64;
2438 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2440 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2441 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2442 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2444 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2447 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, utxo_value);
2449 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event),
2450 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2452 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2453 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2454 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]);
2455 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2456 anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone());
2459 for node in &nodes {
2460 mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_a, &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_b, &anchor_txs[1]]);
2462 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
2463 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
2464 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2466 // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
2469 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2470 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
2472 let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_a.txid() {
2473 (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] })
2475 (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] })
2478 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2479 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
2480 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_a);
2481 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2482 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
2483 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_b);
2486 // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
2487 // through the success path.
2488 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2489 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2490 // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2491 // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2492 match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
2493 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
2494 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
2495 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
2496 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2497 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
2498 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2501 _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
2504 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
2505 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
2506 let fee_utxo_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2507 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2509 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2510 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2511 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
2512 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2513 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
2516 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
2518 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2519 input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
2520 previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2521 ..Default::default()
2523 output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
2524 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
2525 script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
2528 let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
2529 for event in events {
2530 // We don't use the `BumpTransactionEventHandler` here because it does not support
2531 // creating one transaction from multiple `HTLCResolution` events.
2532 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
2533 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
2534 for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
2535 assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
2536 htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
2537 htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&secp));
2539 descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
2540 htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
2542 panic!("Unexpected event");
2545 for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
2546 let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
2547 let signer = htlc_descriptor.derive_channel_signer(&nodes[1].keys_manager);
2548 let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
2549 let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&secp);
2550 htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
2552 let fee_utxo_sig = {
2553 let witness_script = Script::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
2554 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
2555 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2557 let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2558 let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2559 sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2562 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_vec(vec![fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2563 check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_a, revoked_commitment_b);
2567 for node in &nodes {
2568 mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
2571 // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
2572 // the second level instead.
2573 let revoked_claim_transactions = {
2574 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2575 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2577 let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
2578 tx.input.len() == 2 &&
2579 tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2580 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
2581 ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2582 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
2583 for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
2584 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
2587 let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = HashMap::new();
2588 for current_tx in txn.into_iter() {
2589 revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx);
2591 revoked_claim_transaction_map
2593 for node in &nodes {
2594 mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claim_transactions.values().collect::<Vec<_>>());
2598 // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
2600 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2601 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
2603 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2604 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2606 // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2607 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2608 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2610 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2611 let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2612 assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4);
2613 for event in spendable_output_events {
2614 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event {
2615 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2616 assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap()));
2617 let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2618 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
2621 if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(_) = &outputs[0] {
2622 check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_a, &revoked_commitment_b);
2624 check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
2627 panic!("unexpected event");
2631 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2632 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2633 // On the Alice side, the individual to_self_claim are still pending confirmation.
2634 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 2);
2635 // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
2636 // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
2637 // balances to claim.
2639 // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
2640 // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
2641 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);
2644 fn do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(confirm_commitment_before_reload: bool) {
2645 // Tests that we'll fix a ChannelMonitor's `counterparty_payment_script` for an anchor outputs
2646 // channel upon deserialization.
2647 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2648 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2651 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2652 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2653 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2654 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2655 let node_deserialized;
2656 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2658 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
2660 // Set the monitor's `counterparty_payment_script` to a dummy P2WPKH script.
2661 let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2662 let privkey = bitcoin::PrivateKey::from_slice(&[1; 32], bitcoin::Network::Testnet).unwrap();
2663 let pubkey = bitcoin::PublicKey::from_private_key(&secp, &privkey);
2664 let p2wpkh_script = Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&pubkey.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2665 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).set_counterparty_payment_script(p2wpkh_script.clone());
2666 assert_eq!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script(), p2wpkh_script);
2668 // Confirm the counterparty's commitment and reload the monitor (either before or after) such
2669 // that we arrive at the correct `counterparty_payment_script` after the reload.
2670 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2671 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2672 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2673 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
2674 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2676 let commitment_tx = {
2677 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2678 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2679 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 4);
2680 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2684 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2685 let commitment_tx_conf_height = if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2686 // We should expect our round trip serialization check to fail as we're writing the monitor
2687 // with the incorrect P2WPKH script but reading it with the correct P2WSH script.
2688 *nodes[1].chain_monitor.expect_monitor_round_trip_fail.lock().unwrap() = Some(chan_id);
2689 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2690 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2691 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2692 commitment_tx_conf_height
2694 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2695 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2696 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(&mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2697 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2698 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
2699 commitment_tx_conf_height
2701 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2702 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2703 assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script().is_v0_p2wsh());
2705 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2706 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2708 if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2709 // If we saw the commitment before our `counterparty_payment_script` was fixed, we'll never
2710 // get the spendable output event for the `to_remote` output, so we'll need to get it
2711 // manually via `get_spendable_outputs`.
2712 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2713 let outputs = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height);
2714 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2715 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2716 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
2719 check_spends!(spend_tx, &commitment_tx);
2721 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx, false);
2726 fn test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload() {
2727 do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(false);
2728 do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(true);
2731 #[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
2732 fn do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(anchors: bool, confirm_counterparty_commitment: bool) {
2733 // Tests that our monitor claims will always use fresh random signatures (ensuring a unique
2734 // wtxid) to prevent certain classes of transaction replacement at the bitcoin P2P layer.
2735 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2736 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2737 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2739 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2740 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2742 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2743 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2745 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2747 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
2748 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2751 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2752 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2757 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2760 // Open a channel and route a payment. We'll let it timeout to claim it.
2761 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
2762 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
2764 let (closing_node, other_node) = if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2765 (&nodes[1], &nodes[0])
2767 (&nodes[0], &nodes[1])
2770 closing_node.node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &other_node.node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2772 // The commitment transaction comes first.
2773 let commitment_tx = {
2774 let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2775 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2776 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2780 mine_transaction(closing_node, &commitment_tx);
2781 check_added_monitors!(closing_node, 1);
2782 check_closed_broadcast!(closing_node, true);
2783 check_closed_event!(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
2785 mine_transaction(other_node, &commitment_tx);
2786 check_added_monitors!(other_node, 1);
2787 check_closed_broadcast!(other_node, true);
2788 check_closed_event!(other_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [closing_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
2790 // If we update the best block to the new height before providing the confirmed transactions,
2791 // we'll see another broadcast of the commitment transaction.
2792 if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2793 let _ = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2796 // Then comes the HTLC timeout transaction.
2797 if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2798 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 5);
2799 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
2800 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
2802 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
2804 if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2805 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
2807 let htlc_timeout_tx = {
2808 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2809 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2810 let tx = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == commitment_tx.txid() {
2815 check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
2819 // Check we rebroadcast it with a different wtxid.
2820 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2821 if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2822 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
2825 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2826 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2827 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), htlc_timeout_tx.txid());
2828 assert_ne!(txn[0].wtxid(), htlc_timeout_tx.wtxid());
2832 #[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
2834 fn test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures() {
2835 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, false);
2836 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, true);
2837 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, false);
2838 do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, true);