1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Wire messages, traits representing wire message handlers, and a few error types live here.
12 //! For a normal node you probably don't need to use anything here, however, if you wish to split a
13 //! node into an internet-facing route/message socket handling daemon and a separate daemon (or
14 //! server entirely) which handles only channel-related messages you may wish to implement
15 //! [`ChannelMessageHandler`] yourself and use it to re-serialize messages and pass them across
18 //! Note that if you go with such an architecture (instead of passing raw socket events to a
19 //! non-internet-facing system) you trust the frontend internet-facing system to not lie about the
20 //! source `node_id` of the message, however this does allow you to significantly reduce bandwidth
21 //! between the systems as routing messages can represent a significant chunk of bandwidth usage
22 //! (especially for non-channel-publicly-announcing nodes). As an alternate design which avoids
23 //! this issue, if you have sufficient bidirectional bandwidth between your systems, you may send
24 //! raw socket events into your non-internet-facing system and then send routing events back to
25 //! track the network on the less-secure system.
27 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
28 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature;
30 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Witness};
31 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::ScriptBuf;
32 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
34 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{BlindedPaymentTlvs, ForwardTlvs, ReceiveTlvs};
35 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
36 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
37 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
38 use crate::onion_message;
39 use crate::sign::{NodeSigner, Recipient};
41 use crate::prelude::*;
42 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
43 use core::convert::TryFrom;
47 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
48 use core::str::FromStr;
49 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
50 use std::net::SocketAddr;
51 use core::fmt::Display;
52 use crate::io::{self, Cursor, Read};
53 use crate::io_extras::read_to_end;
55 use crate::events::MessageSendEventsProvider;
56 use crate::util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaChaPolyReadAdapter;
57 use crate::util::logger;
58 use crate::util::ser::{LengthReadable, LengthReadableArgs, Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, WithoutLength, FixedLengthReader, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize, Hostname, TransactionU16LenLimited, BigSize};
59 use crate::util::base32;
61 use crate::routing::gossip::{NodeAlias, NodeId};
63 /// 21 million * 10^8 * 1000
64 pub(crate) const MAX_VALUE_MSAT: u64 = 21_000_000_0000_0000_000;
67 /// A partial signature that also contains the Musig2 nonce its signer used
68 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
69 pub struct PartialSignatureWithNonce(pub musig2::types::PartialSignature, pub musig2::types::PublicNonce);
71 /// An error in decoding a message or struct.
72 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
73 pub enum DecodeError {
74 /// A version byte specified something we don't know how to handle.
76 /// Includes unknown realm byte in an onion hop data packet.
78 /// Unknown feature mandating we fail to parse message (e.g., TLV with an even, unknown type)
79 UnknownRequiredFeature,
80 /// Value was invalid.
82 /// For example, a byte which was supposed to be a bool was something other than a 0
83 /// or 1, a public key/private key/signature was invalid, text wasn't UTF-8, TLV was
84 /// syntactically incorrect, etc.
86 /// The buffer to be read was too short.
88 /// A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly.
90 /// Error from [`std::io`].
92 /// The message included zlib-compressed values, which we don't support.
93 UnsupportedCompression,
96 /// An [`init`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
98 /// [`init`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-init-message
99 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
101 /// The relevant features which the sender supports.
102 pub features: InitFeatures,
103 /// Indicates chains the sender is interested in.
105 /// If there are no common chains, the connection will be closed.
106 pub networks: Option<Vec<ChainHash>>,
107 /// The receipient's network address.
109 /// This adds the option to report a remote IP address back to a connecting peer using the init
110 /// message. A node can decide to use that information to discover a potential update to its
111 /// public IPv4 address (NAT) and use that for a [`NodeAnnouncement`] update message containing
113 pub remote_network_address: Option<SocketAddress>,
116 /// An [`error`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
118 /// [`error`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-error-and-warning-messages
119 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
120 pub struct ErrorMessage {
121 /// The channel ID involved in the error.
123 /// All-0s indicates a general error unrelated to a specific channel, after which all channels
124 /// with the sending peer should be closed.
125 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
126 /// A possibly human-readable error description.
128 /// The string should be sanitized before it is used (e.g., emitted to logs or printed to
129 /// `stdout`). Otherwise, a well crafted error message may trigger a security vulnerability in
130 /// the terminal emulator or the logging subsystem.
134 /// A [`warning`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
136 /// [`warning`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-error-and-warning-messages
137 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
138 pub struct WarningMessage {
139 /// The channel ID involved in the warning.
141 /// All-0s indicates a warning unrelated to a specific channel.
142 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
143 /// A possibly human-readable warning description.
145 /// The string should be sanitized before it is used (e.g. emitted to logs or printed to
146 /// stdout). Otherwise, a well crafted error message may trigger a security vulnerability in
147 /// the terminal emulator or the logging subsystem.
151 /// A [`ping`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
153 /// [`ping`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-ping-and-pong-messages
154 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
156 /// The desired response length.
158 /// The ping packet size.
160 /// This field is not sent on the wire. byteslen zeros are sent.
164 /// A [`pong`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
166 /// [`pong`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-ping-and-pong-messages
167 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
169 /// The pong packet size.
171 /// This field is not sent on the wire. byteslen zeros are sent.
175 /// An [`open_channel`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
177 /// Used in V1 channel establishment
179 /// [`open_channel`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-open_channel-message
180 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub struct OpenChannel {
182 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
183 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
184 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
185 pub temporary_channel_id: ChannelId,
186 /// The channel value
187 pub funding_satoshis: u64,
188 /// The amount to push to the counterparty as part of the open, in milli-satoshi
190 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by sender will be omitted
191 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
192 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards sender, in milli-satoshi
193 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
194 /// The minimum value unencumbered by HTLCs for the counterparty to keep in the channel
195 pub channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
196 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
197 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
198 /// The feerate per 1000-weight of sender generated transactions, until updated by
200 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
201 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if
202 /// they broadcast a commitment transaction
203 pub to_self_delay: u16,
204 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards sender
205 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
206 /// The sender's key controlling the funding transaction
207 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
208 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
209 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
210 /// A payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
211 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
212 /// Used to derive a payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by sender
213 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
214 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to sender
215 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
216 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-sender transaction's per commitment point
217 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
218 /// The channel flags to be used
219 pub channel_flags: u8,
220 /// A request to pre-set the to-sender output's `scriptPubkey` for when we collaboratively close
221 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
222 /// The channel type that this channel will represent
224 /// If this is `None`, we derive the channel type from the intersection of our
225 /// feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from the [`Init`] message.
226 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
229 /// An open_channel2 message to be sent by or received from the channel initiator.
231 /// Used in V2 channel establishment
233 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `open_channel2`.
234 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
235 pub struct OpenChannelV2 {
236 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
237 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
238 /// A temporary channel ID derived using a zeroed out value for the channel acceptor's revocation basepoint
239 pub temporary_channel_id: ChannelId,
240 /// The feerate for the funding transaction set by the channel initiator
241 pub funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
242 /// The feerate for the commitment transaction set by the channel initiator
243 pub commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
244 /// Part of the channel value contributed by the channel initiator
245 pub funding_satoshis: u64,
246 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by the channel initiator will be
248 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
249 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards channel initiator, in milli-satoshi
250 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
251 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to channel initiator, in milli-satoshi
252 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
253 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if they
254 /// broadcast a commitment transaction
255 pub to_self_delay: u16,
256 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards channel initiator
257 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
258 /// The locktime for the funding transaction
260 /// The channel initiator's key controlling the funding transaction
261 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
262 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
263 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
264 /// A payment key to channel initiator for transactions broadcast by counterparty
265 pub payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
266 /// Used to derive a payment key to channel initiator for transactions broadcast by channel
268 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
269 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to channel initiator
270 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
271 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-channel-initiator transaction's per commitment point
272 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
273 /// The second to-be-broadcast-by-channel-initiator transaction's per commitment point
274 pub second_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
276 pub channel_flags: u8,
277 /// Optionally, a request to pre-set the to-channel-initiator output's scriptPubkey for when we
278 /// collaboratively close
279 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
280 /// The channel type that this channel will represent. If none is set, we derive the channel
281 /// type from the intersection of our feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from
282 /// the Init message.
283 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
284 /// Optionally, a requirement that only confirmed inputs can be added
285 pub require_confirmed_inputs: Option<()>,
288 /// An [`accept_channel`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
290 /// Used in V1 channel establishment
292 /// [`accept_channel`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-accept_channel-message
293 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
294 pub struct AcceptChannel {
295 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
296 pub temporary_channel_id: ChannelId,
297 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by sender will be omitted
298 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
299 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards sender, in milli-satoshi
300 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
301 /// The minimum value unencumbered by HTLCs for the counterparty to keep in the channel
302 pub channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
303 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
304 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
305 /// Minimum depth of the funding transaction before the channel is considered open
306 pub minimum_depth: u32,
307 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if they broadcast a commitment transaction
308 pub to_self_delay: u16,
309 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards sender
310 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
311 /// The sender's key controlling the funding transaction
312 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
313 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
314 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
315 /// A payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
316 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
317 /// Used to derive a payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by sender
318 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
319 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
320 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
321 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-sender transaction's per commitment point
322 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
323 /// A request to pre-set the to-sender output's scriptPubkey for when we collaboratively close
324 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
325 /// The channel type that this channel will represent.
327 /// If this is `None`, we derive the channel type from the intersection of
328 /// our feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from the [`Init`] message.
329 /// This is required to match the equivalent field in [`OpenChannel::channel_type`].
330 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
332 /// Next nonce the channel initiator should use to create a funding output signature against
333 pub next_local_nonce: Option<musig2::types::PublicNonce>,
336 /// An accept_channel2 message to be sent by or received from the channel accepter.
338 /// Used in V2 channel establishment
340 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `accept_channel2`.
341 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
342 pub struct AcceptChannelV2 {
343 /// The same `temporary_channel_id` received from the initiator's `open_channel2` message.
344 pub temporary_channel_id: ChannelId,
345 /// Part of the channel value contributed by the channel acceptor
346 pub funding_satoshis: u64,
347 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by the channel acceptor will be
349 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
350 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards channel acceptor, in milli-satoshi
351 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
352 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to channel acceptor, in milli-satoshi
353 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
354 /// Minimum depth of the funding transaction before the channel is considered open
355 pub minimum_depth: u32,
356 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if they
357 /// broadcast a commitment transaction
358 pub to_self_delay: u16,
359 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards channel acceptor
360 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
361 /// The channel acceptor's key controlling the funding transaction
362 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
363 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
364 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
365 /// A payment key to channel acceptor for transactions broadcast by counterparty
366 pub payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
367 /// Used to derive a payment key to channel acceptor for transactions broadcast by channel
369 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
370 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to channel acceptor for transactions broadcast by counterparty
371 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
372 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-channel-acceptor transaction's per commitment point
373 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
374 /// The second to-be-broadcast-by-channel-acceptor transaction's per commitment point
375 pub second_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
376 /// Optionally, a request to pre-set the to-channel-acceptor output's scriptPubkey for when we
377 /// collaboratively close
378 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
379 /// The channel type that this channel will represent. If none is set, we derive the channel
380 /// type from the intersection of our feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from
381 /// the Init message.
383 /// This is required to match the equivalent field in [`OpenChannelV2::channel_type`].
384 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
385 /// Optionally, a requirement that only confirmed inputs can be added
386 pub require_confirmed_inputs: Option<()>,
389 /// A [`funding_created`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
391 /// Used in V1 channel establishment
393 /// [`funding_created`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-funding_created-message
394 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
395 pub struct FundingCreated {
396 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding is established
397 pub temporary_channel_id: ChannelId,
398 /// The funding transaction ID
399 pub funding_txid: Txid,
400 /// The specific output index funding this channel
401 pub funding_output_index: u16,
402 /// The signature of the channel initiator (funder) on the initial commitment transaction
403 pub signature: Signature,
405 /// The partial signature of the channel initiator (funder)
406 pub partial_signature_with_nonce: Option<PartialSignatureWithNonce>,
408 /// Next nonce the channel acceptor should use to finalize the funding output signature
409 pub next_local_nonce: Option<musig2::types::PublicNonce>
412 /// A [`funding_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
414 /// Used in V1 channel establishment
416 /// [`funding_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-funding_signed-message
417 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
418 pub struct FundingSigned {
420 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
421 /// The signature of the channel acceptor (fundee) on the initial commitment transaction
422 pub signature: Signature,
424 /// The partial signature of the channel acceptor (fundee)
425 pub partial_signature_with_nonce: Option<PartialSignatureWithNonce>,
428 /// A [`channel_ready`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
430 /// [`channel_ready`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-channel_ready-message
431 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
432 pub struct ChannelReady {
434 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
435 /// The per-commitment point of the second commitment transaction
436 pub next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
437 /// If set, provides a `short_channel_id` alias for this channel.
439 /// The sender will accept payments to be forwarded over this SCID and forward them to this
440 /// messages' recipient.
441 pub short_channel_id_alias: Option<u64>,
444 /// An stfu (quiescence) message to be sent by or received from the stfu initiator.
445 // TODO(splicing): Add spec link for `stfu`; still in draft, using from https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/863
446 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
448 /// The channel ID where quiescence is intended
449 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
450 /// Initiator flag, 1 if initiating, 0 if replying to an stfu.
454 /// A splice message to be sent by or received from the stfu initiator (splice initiator).
455 // TODO(splicing): Add spec link for `splice`; still in draft, using from https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/863
456 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
458 /// The channel ID where splicing is intended
459 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
460 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is intended to be spliced
461 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
462 /// The intended change in channel capacity: the amount to be added (positive value)
463 /// or removed (negative value) by the sender (splice initiator) by splicing into/from the channel.
464 pub relative_satoshis: i64,
465 /// The feerate for the new funding transaction, set by the splice initiator
466 pub funding_feerate_perkw: u32,
467 /// The locktime for the new funding transaction
469 /// The key of the sender (splice initiator) controlling the new funding transaction
470 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
473 /// A splice_ack message to be received by or sent to the splice initiator.
475 // TODO(splicing): Add spec link for `splice_ack`; still in draft, using from https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/863
476 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
477 pub struct SpliceAck {
478 /// The channel ID where splicing is intended
479 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
480 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is intended to be spliced
481 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
482 /// The intended change in channel capacity: the amount to be added (positive value)
483 /// or removed (negative value) by the sender (splice acceptor) by splicing into/from the channel.
484 pub relative_satoshis: i64,
485 /// The key of the sender (splice acceptor) controlling the new funding transaction
486 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
489 /// A splice_locked message to be sent to or received from a peer.
491 // TODO(splicing): Add spec link for `splice_locked`; still in draft, using from https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/863
492 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
493 pub struct SpliceLocked {
495 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
498 /// A tx_add_input message for adding an input during interactive transaction construction
500 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `tx_add_input`.
501 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
502 pub struct TxAddInput {
504 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
505 /// A randomly chosen unique identifier for this input, which is even for initiators and odd for
508 /// Serialized transaction that contains the output this input spends to verify that it is non
510 pub prevtx: TransactionU16LenLimited,
511 /// The index of the output being spent
513 /// The sequence number of this input
517 /// A tx_add_output message for adding an output during interactive transaction construction.
519 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `tx_add_output`.
520 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
521 pub struct TxAddOutput {
523 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
524 /// A randomly chosen unique identifier for this output, which is even for initiators and odd for
527 /// The satoshi value of the output
529 /// The scriptPubKey for the output
530 pub script: ScriptBuf,
533 /// A tx_remove_input message for removing an input during interactive transaction construction.
535 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `tx_remove_input`.
536 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
537 pub struct TxRemoveInput {
539 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
540 /// The serial ID of the input to be removed
544 /// A tx_remove_output message for removing an output during interactive transaction construction.
546 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `tx_remove_output`.
547 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
548 pub struct TxRemoveOutput {
550 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
551 /// The serial ID of the output to be removed
555 /// A tx_complete message signalling the conclusion of a peer's transaction contributions during
556 /// interactive transaction construction.
558 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `tx_complete`.
559 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
560 pub struct TxComplete {
562 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
565 /// A tx_signatures message containing the sender's signatures for a transaction constructed with
566 /// interactive transaction construction.
568 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `tx_signatures`.
569 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
570 pub struct TxSignatures {
572 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
575 /// The list of witnesses
576 pub witnesses: Vec<Witness>,
579 /// A tx_init_rbf message which initiates a replacement of the transaction after it's been
582 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `tx_init_rbf`.
583 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
584 pub struct TxInitRbf {
586 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
587 /// The locktime of the transaction
589 /// The feerate of the transaction
590 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
591 /// The number of satoshis the sender will contribute to or, if negative, remove from
592 /// (e.g. splice-out) the funding output of the transaction
593 pub funding_output_contribution: Option<i64>,
596 /// A tx_ack_rbf message which acknowledges replacement of the transaction after it's been
599 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `tx_ack_rbf`.
600 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
601 pub struct TxAckRbf {
603 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
604 /// The number of satoshis the sender will contribute to or, if negative, remove from
605 /// (e.g. splice-out) the funding output of the transaction
606 pub funding_output_contribution: Option<i64>,
609 /// A tx_abort message which signals the cancellation of an in-progress transaction negotiation.
611 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `tx_abort`.
612 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
615 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
620 /// A [`shutdown`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
622 /// [`shutdown`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#closing-initiation-shutdown
623 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
624 pub struct Shutdown {
626 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
627 /// The destination of this peer's funds on closing.
629 /// Must be in one of these forms: P2PKH, P2SH, P2WPKH, P2WSH, P2TR.
630 pub scriptpubkey: ScriptBuf,
633 /// The minimum and maximum fees which the sender is willing to place on the closing transaction.
635 /// This is provided in [`ClosingSigned`] by both sides to indicate the fee range they are willing
637 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
638 pub struct ClosingSignedFeeRange {
639 /// The minimum absolute fee, in satoshis, which the sender is willing to place on the closing
641 pub min_fee_satoshis: u64,
642 /// The maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, which the sender is willing to place on the closing
644 pub max_fee_satoshis: u64,
647 /// A [`closing_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
649 /// [`closing_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#closing-negotiation-closing_signed
650 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
651 pub struct ClosingSigned {
653 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
654 /// The proposed total fee for the closing transaction
655 pub fee_satoshis: u64,
656 /// A signature on the closing transaction
657 pub signature: Signature,
658 /// The minimum and maximum fees which the sender is willing to accept, provided only by new
660 pub fee_range: Option<ClosingSignedFeeRange>,
663 /// An [`update_add_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
665 /// [`update_add_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#adding-an-htlc-update_add_htlc
666 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
667 pub struct UpdateAddHTLC {
669 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
672 /// The HTLC value in milli-satoshi
673 pub amount_msat: u64,
674 /// The payment hash, the pre-image of which controls HTLC redemption
675 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
676 /// The expiry height of the HTLC
677 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
678 /// The extra fee skimmed by the sender of this message. See
679 /// [`ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs`].
681 /// [`ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs
682 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
683 /// The onion routing packet with encrypted data for the next hop.
684 pub onion_routing_packet: OnionPacket,
685 /// Provided if we are relaying or receiving a payment within a blinded path, to decrypt the onion
686 /// routing packet and the recipient-provided encrypted payload within.
687 pub blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
690 /// An onion message to be sent to or received from a peer.
692 // TODO: update with link to OM when they are merged into the BOLTs
693 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
694 pub struct OnionMessage {
695 /// Used in decrypting the onion packet's payload.
696 pub blinding_point: PublicKey,
697 /// The full onion packet including hop data, pubkey, and hmac
698 pub onion_routing_packet: onion_message::Packet,
701 /// An [`update_fulfill_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
703 /// [`update_fulfill_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
704 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
705 pub struct UpdateFulfillHTLC {
707 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
710 /// The pre-image of the payment hash, allowing HTLC redemption
711 pub payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
714 /// An [`update_fail_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
716 /// [`update_fail_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
717 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
718 pub struct UpdateFailHTLC {
720 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
723 pub(crate) reason: OnionErrorPacket,
726 /// An [`update_fail_malformed_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
728 /// [`update_fail_malformed_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
729 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
730 pub struct UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
732 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
735 pub(crate) sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
737 pub failure_code: u16,
740 /// A [`commitment_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
742 /// [`commitment_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#committing-updates-so-far-commitment_signed
743 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
744 pub struct CommitmentSigned {
746 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
747 /// A signature on the commitment transaction
748 pub signature: Signature,
749 /// Signatures on the HTLC transactions
750 pub htlc_signatures: Vec<Signature>,
752 /// The partial Taproot signature on the commitment transaction
753 pub partial_signature_with_nonce: Option<PartialSignatureWithNonce>,
756 /// A [`revoke_and_ack`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
758 /// [`revoke_and_ack`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#completing-the-transition-to-the-updated-state-revoke_and_ack
759 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
760 pub struct RevokeAndACK {
762 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
763 /// The secret corresponding to the per-commitment point
764 pub per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
765 /// The next sender-broadcast commitment transaction's per-commitment point
766 pub next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
768 /// Musig nonce the recipient should use in their next commitment signature message
769 pub next_local_nonce: Option<musig2::types::PublicNonce>
772 /// An [`update_fee`] message to be sent to or received from a peer
774 /// [`update_fee`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#updating-fees-update_fee
775 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
776 pub struct UpdateFee {
778 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
779 /// Fee rate per 1000-weight of the transaction
780 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
783 /// A [`channel_reestablish`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
785 /// [`channel_reestablish`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#message-retransmission
786 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
787 pub struct ChannelReestablish {
789 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
790 /// The next commitment number for the sender
791 pub next_local_commitment_number: u64,
792 /// The next commitment number for the recipient
793 pub next_remote_commitment_number: u64,
794 /// Proof that the sender knows the per-commitment secret of a specific commitment transaction
795 /// belonging to the recipient
796 pub your_last_per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
797 /// The sender's per-commitment point for their current commitment transaction
798 pub my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
799 /// The next funding transaction ID
800 pub next_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
803 /// An [`announcement_signatures`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
805 /// [`announcement_signatures`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-announcement_signatures-message
806 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
807 pub struct AnnouncementSignatures {
809 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
810 /// The short channel ID
811 pub short_channel_id: u64,
812 /// A signature by the node key
813 pub node_signature: Signature,
814 /// A signature by the funding key
815 pub bitcoin_signature: Signature,
818 /// An address which can be used to connect to a remote peer.
819 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
820 pub enum SocketAddress {
821 /// An IPv4 address and port on which the peer is listening.
823 /// The 4-byte IPv4 address
825 /// The port on which the node is listening
828 /// An IPv6 address and port on which the peer is listening.
830 /// The 16-byte IPv6 address
832 /// The port on which the node is listening
835 /// An old-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening.
837 /// This field is deprecated and the Tor network generally no longer supports V2 Onion
838 /// addresses. Thus, the details are not parsed here.
840 /// A new-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening.
842 /// To create the human-readable "hostname", concatenate the ED25519 pubkey, checksum, and version,
843 /// wrap as base32 and append ".onion".
845 /// The ed25519 long-term public key of the peer
846 ed25519_pubkey: [u8; 32],
847 /// The checksum of the pubkey and version, as included in the onion address
849 /// The version byte, as defined by the Tor Onion v3 spec.
851 /// The port on which the node is listening
854 /// A hostname/port on which the peer is listening.
856 /// The hostname on which the node is listening.
858 /// The port on which the node is listening.
863 /// Gets the ID of this address type. Addresses in [`NodeAnnouncement`] messages should be sorted
865 pub(crate) fn get_id(&self) -> u8 {
867 &SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 {..} => { 1 },
868 &SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 {..} => { 2 },
869 &SocketAddress::OnionV2(_) => { 3 },
870 &SocketAddress::OnionV3 {..} => { 4 },
871 &SocketAddress::Hostname {..} => { 5 },
875 /// Strict byte-length of address descriptor, 1-byte type not recorded
876 fn len(&self) -> u16 {
878 &SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 { .. } => { 6 },
879 &SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 { .. } => { 18 },
880 &SocketAddress::OnionV2(_) => { 12 },
881 &SocketAddress::OnionV3 { .. } => { 37 },
882 // Consists of 1-byte hostname length, hostname bytes, and 2-byte port.
883 &SocketAddress::Hostname { ref hostname, .. } => { u16::from(hostname.len()) + 3 },
887 /// The maximum length of any address descriptor, not including the 1-byte type.
888 /// This maximum length is reached by a hostname address descriptor:
889 /// a hostname with a maximum length of 255, its 1-byte length and a 2-byte port.
890 pub(crate) const MAX_LEN: u16 = 258;
893 impl Writeable for SocketAddress {
894 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
896 &SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 { ref addr, ref port } => {
901 &SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 { ref addr, ref port } => {
906 &SocketAddress::OnionV2(bytes) => {
908 bytes.write(writer)?;
910 &SocketAddress::OnionV3 { ref ed25519_pubkey, ref checksum, ref version, ref port } => {
912 ed25519_pubkey.write(writer)?;
913 checksum.write(writer)?;
914 version.write(writer)?;
917 &SocketAddress::Hostname { ref hostname, ref port } => {
919 hostname.write(writer)?;
927 impl Readable for Result<SocketAddress, u8> {
928 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Result<SocketAddress, u8>, DecodeError> {
929 let byte = <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
932 Ok(Ok(SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 {
933 addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
934 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
938 Ok(Ok(SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 {
939 addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
940 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
943 3 => Ok(Ok(SocketAddress::OnionV2(Readable::read(reader)?))),
945 Ok(Ok(SocketAddress::OnionV3 {
946 ed25519_pubkey: Readable::read(reader)?,
947 checksum: Readable::read(reader)?,
948 version: Readable::read(reader)?,
949 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
953 Ok(Ok(SocketAddress::Hostname {
954 hostname: Readable::read(reader)?,
955 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
958 _ => return Ok(Err(byte)),
963 impl Readable for SocketAddress {
964 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<SocketAddress, DecodeError> {
965 match Readable::read(reader) {
966 Ok(Ok(res)) => Ok(res),
967 Ok(Err(_)) => Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion),
973 /// [`SocketAddress`] error variants
974 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
975 pub enum SocketAddressParseError {
976 /// Socket address (IPv4/IPv6) parsing error
978 /// Invalid input format
982 /// Invalid onion v3 address
986 impl fmt::Display for SocketAddressParseError {
987 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
989 SocketAddressParseError::SocketAddrParse => write!(f, "Socket address (IPv4/IPv6) parsing error"),
990 SocketAddressParseError::InvalidInput => write!(f, "Invalid input format. \
991 Expected: \"<ipv4>:<port>\", \"[<ipv6>]:<port>\", \"<onion address>.onion:<port>\" or \"<hostname>:<port>\""),
992 SocketAddressParseError::InvalidPort => write!(f, "Invalid port"),
993 SocketAddressParseError::InvalidOnionV3 => write!(f, "Invalid onion v3 address"),
998 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
999 impl From<std::net::SocketAddrV4> for SocketAddress {
1000 fn from(addr: std::net::SocketAddrV4) -> Self {
1001 SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 { addr: addr.ip().octets(), port: addr.port() }
1005 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1006 impl From<std::net::SocketAddrV6> for SocketAddress {
1007 fn from(addr: std::net::SocketAddrV6) -> Self {
1008 SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 { addr: addr.ip().octets(), port: addr.port() }
1012 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1013 impl From<std::net::SocketAddr> for SocketAddress {
1014 fn from(addr: std::net::SocketAddr) -> Self {
1016 std::net::SocketAddr::V4(addr) => addr.into(),
1017 std::net::SocketAddr::V6(addr) => addr.into(),
1022 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1023 impl std::net::ToSocketAddrs for SocketAddress {
1024 type Iter = std::vec::IntoIter<std::net::SocketAddr>;
1026 fn to_socket_addrs(&self) -> std::io::Result<Self::Iter> {
1028 SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 { addr, port } => {
1029 let ip_addr = std::net::Ipv4Addr::from(*addr);
1030 let socket_addr = SocketAddr::new(ip_addr.into(), *port);
1031 Ok(vec![socket_addr].into_iter())
1033 SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 { addr, port } => {
1034 let ip_addr = std::net::Ipv6Addr::from(*addr);
1035 let socket_addr = SocketAddr::new(ip_addr.into(), *port);
1036 Ok(vec![socket_addr].into_iter())
1038 SocketAddress::Hostname { ref hostname, port } => {
1039 (hostname.as_str(), *port).to_socket_addrs()
1041 SocketAddress::OnionV2(..) => {
1042 Err(std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::Other, "Resolution of OnionV2 \
1043 addresses is currently unsupported."))
1045 SocketAddress::OnionV3 { .. } => {
1046 Err(std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::Other, "Resolution of OnionV3 \
1047 addresses is currently unsupported."))
1053 /// Parses an OnionV3 host and port into a [`SocketAddress::OnionV3`].
1055 /// The host part must end with ".onion".
1056 pub fn parse_onion_address(host: &str, port: u16) -> Result<SocketAddress, SocketAddressParseError> {
1057 if host.ends_with(".onion") {
1058 let domain = &host[..host.len() - ".onion".len()];
1059 if domain.len() != 56 {
1060 return Err(SocketAddressParseError::InvalidOnionV3);
1062 let onion = base32::Alphabet::RFC4648 { padding: false }.decode(&domain).map_err(|_| SocketAddressParseError::InvalidOnionV3)?;
1063 if onion.len() != 35 {
1064 return Err(SocketAddressParseError::InvalidOnionV3);
1066 let version = onion[0];
1067 let first_checksum_flag = onion[1];
1068 let second_checksum_flag = onion[2];
1069 let mut ed25519_pubkey = [0; 32];
1070 ed25519_pubkey.copy_from_slice(&onion[3..35]);
1071 let checksum = u16::from_be_bytes([first_checksum_flag, second_checksum_flag]);
1072 return Ok(SocketAddress::OnionV3 { ed25519_pubkey, checksum, version, port });
1075 return Err(SocketAddressParseError::InvalidInput);
1079 impl Display for SocketAddress {
1080 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> core::fmt::Result {
1082 SocketAddress::TcpIpV4{addr, port} => write!(
1083 f, "{}.{}.{}.{}:{}", addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3], port)?,
1084 SocketAddress::TcpIpV6{addr, port} => write!(
1086 "[{:02x}{:02x}:{:02x}{:02x}:{:02x}{:02x}:{:02x}{:02x}:{:02x}{:02x}:{:02x}{:02x}:{:02x}{:02x}:{:02x}{:02x}]:{}",
1087 addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3], addr[4], addr[5], addr[6], addr[7], addr[8], addr[9], addr[10], addr[11], addr[12], addr[13], addr[14], addr[15], port
1089 SocketAddress::OnionV2(bytes) => write!(f, "OnionV2({:?})", bytes)?,
1090 SocketAddress::OnionV3 {
1096 let [first_checksum_flag, second_checksum_flag] = checksum.to_be_bytes();
1097 let mut addr = vec![*version, first_checksum_flag, second_checksum_flag];
1098 addr.extend_from_slice(ed25519_pubkey);
1099 let onion = base32::Alphabet::RFC4648 { padding: false }.encode(&addr);
1100 write!(f, "{}.onion:{}", onion, port)?
1102 SocketAddress::Hostname { hostname, port } => write!(f, "{}:{}", hostname, port)?,
1108 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1109 impl FromStr for SocketAddress {
1110 type Err = SocketAddressParseError;
1112 fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
1113 match std::net::SocketAddr::from_str(s) {
1114 Ok(addr) => Ok(addr.into()),
1116 let trimmed_input = match s.rfind(":") {
1118 None => return Err(SocketAddressParseError::InvalidInput),
1120 let host = &s[..trimmed_input];
1121 let port: u16 = s[trimmed_input + 1..].parse().map_err(|_| SocketAddressParseError::InvalidPort)?;
1122 if host.ends_with(".onion") {
1123 return parse_onion_address(host, port);
1125 if let Ok(hostname) = Hostname::try_from(s[..trimmed_input].to_string()) {
1126 return Ok(SocketAddress::Hostname { hostname, port });
1128 return Err(SocketAddressParseError::SocketAddrParse)
1134 /// Represents the set of gossip messages that require a signature from a node's identity key.
1135 pub enum UnsignedGossipMessage<'a> {
1136 /// An unsigned channel announcement.
1137 ChannelAnnouncement(&'a UnsignedChannelAnnouncement),
1138 /// An unsigned channel update.
1139 ChannelUpdate(&'a UnsignedChannelUpdate),
1140 /// An unsigned node announcement.
1141 NodeAnnouncement(&'a UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)
1144 impl<'a> Writeable for UnsignedGossipMessage<'a> {
1145 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1147 UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
1148 UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
1149 UnsignedGossipMessage::NodeAnnouncement(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
1154 /// The unsigned part of a [`node_announcement`] message.
1156 /// [`node_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-node_announcement-message
1157 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1158 pub struct UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1159 /// The advertised features
1160 pub features: NodeFeatures,
1161 /// A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed
1163 /// The `node_id` this announcement originated from (don't rebroadcast the `node_announcement` back
1165 pub node_id: NodeId,
1166 /// An RGB color for UI purposes
1168 /// An alias, for UI purposes.
1170 /// This should be sanitized before use. There is no guarantee of uniqueness.
1171 pub alias: NodeAlias,
1172 /// List of addresses on which this node is reachable
1173 pub addresses: Vec<SocketAddress>,
1174 pub(crate) excess_address_data: Vec<u8>,
1175 pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
1177 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1178 /// A [`node_announcement`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
1180 /// [`node_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-node_announcement-message
1181 pub struct NodeAnnouncement {
1182 /// The signature by the node key
1183 pub signature: Signature,
1184 /// The actual content of the announcement
1185 pub contents: UnsignedNodeAnnouncement,
1188 /// The unsigned part of a [`channel_announcement`] message.
1190 /// [`channel_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_announcement-message
1191 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1192 pub struct UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1193 /// The advertised channel features
1194 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
1195 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
1196 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
1197 /// The short channel ID
1198 pub short_channel_id: u64,
1199 /// One of the two `node_id`s which are endpoints of this channel
1200 pub node_id_1: NodeId,
1201 /// The other of the two `node_id`s which are endpoints of this channel
1202 pub node_id_2: NodeId,
1203 /// The funding key for the first node
1204 pub bitcoin_key_1: NodeId,
1205 /// The funding key for the second node
1206 pub bitcoin_key_2: NodeId,
1207 /// Excess data which was signed as a part of the message which we do not (yet) understand how
1210 /// This is stored to ensure forward-compatibility as new fields are added to the lightning gossip protocol.
1211 pub excess_data: Vec<u8>,
1213 /// A [`channel_announcement`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
1215 /// [`channel_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_announcement-message
1216 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1217 pub struct ChannelAnnouncement {
1218 /// Authentication of the announcement by the first public node
1219 pub node_signature_1: Signature,
1220 /// Authentication of the announcement by the second public node
1221 pub node_signature_2: Signature,
1222 /// Proof of funding UTXO ownership by the first public node
1223 pub bitcoin_signature_1: Signature,
1224 /// Proof of funding UTXO ownership by the second public node
1225 pub bitcoin_signature_2: Signature,
1226 /// The actual announcement
1227 pub contents: UnsignedChannelAnnouncement,
1230 /// The unsigned part of a [`channel_update`] message.
1232 /// [`channel_update`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_update-message
1233 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1234 pub struct UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1235 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
1236 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
1237 /// The short channel ID
1238 pub short_channel_id: u64,
1239 /// A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed, specific to this channel
1243 /// The number of blocks such that if:
1244 /// `incoming_htlc.cltv_expiry < outgoing_htlc.cltv_expiry + cltv_expiry_delta`
1245 /// then we need to fail the HTLC backwards. When forwarding an HTLC, `cltv_expiry_delta` determines
1246 /// the outgoing HTLC's minimum `cltv_expiry` value -- so, if an incoming HTLC comes in with a
1247 /// `cltv_expiry` of 100000, and the node we're forwarding to has a `cltv_expiry_delta` value of 10,
1248 /// then we'll check that the outgoing HTLC's `cltv_expiry` value is at least 100010 before
1249 /// forwarding. Note that the HTLC sender is the one who originally sets this value when
1250 /// constructing the route.
1251 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1252 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
1253 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1254 /// The maximum HTLC value incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi.
1256 /// This used to be optional.
1257 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
1258 /// The base HTLC fee charged by sender, in milli-satoshi
1259 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1260 /// The amount to fee multiplier, in micro-satoshi
1261 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1262 /// Excess data which was signed as a part of the message which we do not (yet) understand how
1265 /// This is stored to ensure forward-compatibility as new fields are added to the lightning gossip protocol.
1266 pub excess_data: Vec<u8>,
1268 /// A [`channel_update`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
1270 /// [`channel_update`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_update-message
1271 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1272 pub struct ChannelUpdate {
1273 /// A signature of the channel update
1274 pub signature: Signature,
1275 /// The actual channel update
1276 pub contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate,
1279 /// A [`query_channel_range`] message is used to query a peer for channel
1280 /// UTXOs in a range of blocks. The recipient of a query makes a best
1281 /// effort to reply to the query using one or more [`ReplyChannelRange`]
1284 /// [`query_channel_range`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_channel_range-and-reply_channel_range-messages
1285 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1286 pub struct QueryChannelRange {
1287 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
1288 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
1289 /// The height of the first block for the channel UTXOs being queried
1290 pub first_blocknum: u32,
1291 /// The number of blocks to include in the query results
1292 pub number_of_blocks: u32,
1295 /// A [`reply_channel_range`] message is a reply to a [`QueryChannelRange`]
1298 /// Multiple `reply_channel_range` messages can be sent in reply
1299 /// to a single [`QueryChannelRange`] message. The query recipient makes a
1300 /// best effort to respond based on their local network view which may
1301 /// not be a perfect view of the network. The `short_channel_id`s in the
1302 /// reply are encoded. We only support `encoding_type=0` uncompressed
1303 /// serialization and do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization.
1305 /// [`reply_channel_range`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_channel_range-and-reply_channel_range-messages
1306 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1307 pub struct ReplyChannelRange {
1308 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
1309 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
1310 /// The height of the first block in the range of the reply
1311 pub first_blocknum: u32,
1312 /// The number of blocks included in the range of the reply
1313 pub number_of_blocks: u32,
1314 /// True when this is the final reply for a query
1315 pub sync_complete: bool,
1316 /// The `short_channel_id`s in the channel range
1317 pub short_channel_ids: Vec<u64>,
1320 /// A [`query_short_channel_ids`] message is used to query a peer for
1321 /// routing gossip messages related to one or more `short_channel_id`s.
1323 /// The query recipient will reply with the latest, if available,
1324 /// [`ChannelAnnouncement`], [`ChannelUpdate`] and [`NodeAnnouncement`] messages
1325 /// it maintains for the requested `short_channel_id`s followed by a
1326 /// [`ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd`] message. The `short_channel_id`s sent in
1327 /// this query are encoded. We only support `encoding_type=0` uncompressed
1328 /// serialization and do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization.
1330 /// [`query_short_channel_ids`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_short_channel_idsreply_short_channel_ids_end-messages
1331 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1332 pub struct QueryShortChannelIds {
1333 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
1334 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
1335 /// The short_channel_ids that are being queried
1336 pub short_channel_ids: Vec<u64>,
1339 /// A [`reply_short_channel_ids_end`] message is sent as a reply to a
1340 /// message. The query recipient makes a best
1341 /// effort to respond based on their local network view which may not be
1342 /// a perfect view of the network.
1344 /// [`reply_short_channel_ids_end`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_short_channel_idsreply_short_channel_ids_end-messages
1345 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1346 pub struct ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
1347 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain that was queried
1348 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
1349 /// Indicates if the query recipient maintains up-to-date channel
1350 /// information for the `chain_hash`
1351 pub full_information: bool,
1354 /// A [`gossip_timestamp_filter`] message is used by a node to request
1355 /// gossip relay for messages in the requested time range when the
1356 /// `gossip_queries` feature has been negotiated.
1358 /// [`gossip_timestamp_filter`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-gossip_timestamp_filter-message
1359 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1360 pub struct GossipTimestampFilter {
1361 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain for channel and node information
1362 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
1363 /// The starting unix timestamp
1364 pub first_timestamp: u32,
1365 /// The range of information in seconds
1366 pub timestamp_range: u32,
1369 /// Encoding type for data compression of collections in gossip queries.
1371 /// We do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization [defined in BOLT
1372 /// #7](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#query-messages).
1374 Uncompressed = 0x00,
1377 /// Used to put an error message in a [`LightningError`].
1378 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq)]
1379 pub enum ErrorAction {
1380 /// The peer took some action which made us think they were useless. Disconnect them.
1382 /// An error message which we should make an effort to send before we disconnect.
1383 msg: Option<ErrorMessage>
1385 /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them without closing any channels and disconnect them.
1386 DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
1387 /// A warning message which we should make an effort to send before we disconnect.
1388 msg: WarningMessage,
1390 /// The peer did something harmless that we weren't able to process, just log and ignore
1391 // New code should *not* use this. New code must use IgnoreAndLog, below!
1393 /// The peer did something harmless that we weren't able to meaningfully process.
1394 /// If the error is logged, log it at the given level.
1395 IgnoreAndLog(logger::Level),
1396 /// The peer provided us with a gossip message which we'd already seen. In most cases this
1397 /// should be ignored, but it may result in the message being forwarded if it is a duplicate of
1398 /// our own channel announcements.
1399 IgnoreDuplicateGossip,
1400 /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them.
1402 /// The message to send.
1405 /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them without closing any channels.
1406 SendWarningMessage {
1407 /// The message to send.
1408 msg: WarningMessage,
1409 /// The peer may have done something harmless that we weren't able to meaningfully process,
1410 /// though we should still tell them about it.
1411 /// If this event is logged, log it at the given level.
1412 log_level: logger::Level,
1416 /// An Err type for failure to process messages.
1417 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1418 pub struct LightningError {
1419 /// A human-readable message describing the error
1421 /// The action which should be taken against the offending peer.
1422 pub action: ErrorAction,
1425 /// Struct used to return values from [`RevokeAndACK`] messages, containing a bunch of commitment
1426 /// transaction updates if they were pending.
1427 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1428 pub struct CommitmentUpdate {
1429 /// `update_add_htlc` messages which should be sent
1430 pub update_add_htlcs: Vec<UpdateAddHTLC>,
1431 /// `update_fulfill_htlc` messages which should be sent
1432 pub update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
1433 /// `update_fail_htlc` messages which should be sent
1434 pub update_fail_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFailHTLC>,
1435 /// `update_fail_malformed_htlc` messages which should be sent
1436 pub update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFailMalformedHTLC>,
1437 /// An `update_fee` message which should be sent
1438 pub update_fee: Option<UpdateFee>,
1439 /// A `commitment_signed` message which should be sent
1440 pub commitment_signed: CommitmentSigned,
1443 /// A trait to describe an object which can receive channel messages.
1445 /// Messages MAY be called in parallel when they originate from different `their_node_ids`, however
1446 /// they MUST NOT be called in parallel when the two calls have the same `their_node_id`.
1447 pub trait ChannelMessageHandler : MessageSendEventsProvider {
1449 /// Handle an incoming `open_channel` message from the given peer.
1450 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OpenChannel);
1451 /// Handle an incoming `open_channel2` message from the given peer.
1452 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OpenChannelV2);
1453 /// Handle an incoming `accept_channel` message from the given peer.
1454 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AcceptChannel);
1455 /// Handle an incoming `accept_channel2` message from the given peer.
1456 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AcceptChannelV2);
1457 /// Handle an incoming `funding_created` message from the given peer.
1458 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingCreated);
1459 /// Handle an incoming `funding_signed` message from the given peer.
1460 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingSigned);
1461 /// Handle an incoming `channel_ready` message from the given peer.
1462 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelReady);
1465 /// Handle an incoming `shutdown` message from the given peer.
1466 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Shutdown);
1467 /// Handle an incoming `closing_signed` message from the given peer.
1468 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ClosingSigned);
1471 /// Handle an incoming `stfu` message from the given peer.
1472 fn handle_stfu(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Stfu);
1475 /// Handle an incoming `splice` message from the given peer.
1476 fn handle_splice(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Splice);
1477 /// Handle an incoming `splice_ack` message from the given peer.
1478 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &SpliceAck);
1479 /// Handle an incoming `splice_locked` message from the given peer.
1480 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &SpliceLocked);
1482 // Interactive channel construction
1483 /// Handle an incoming `tx_add_input message` from the given peer.
1484 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &TxAddInput);
1485 /// Handle an incoming `tx_add_output` message from the given peer.
1486 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &TxAddOutput);
1487 /// Handle an incoming `tx_remove_input` message from the given peer.
1488 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &TxRemoveInput);
1489 /// Handle an incoming `tx_remove_output` message from the given peer.
1490 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &TxRemoveOutput);
1491 /// Handle an incoming `tx_complete message` from the given peer.
1492 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &TxComplete);
1493 /// Handle an incoming `tx_signatures` message from the given peer.
1494 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &TxSignatures);
1495 /// Handle an incoming `tx_init_rbf` message from the given peer.
1496 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &TxInitRbf);
1497 /// Handle an incoming `tx_ack_rbf` message from the given peer.
1498 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &TxAckRbf);
1499 /// Handle an incoming `tx_abort message` from the given peer.
1500 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &TxAbort);
1503 /// Handle an incoming `update_add_htlc` message from the given peer.
1504 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateAddHTLC);
1505 /// Handle an incoming `update_fulfill_htlc` message from the given peer.
1506 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFulfillHTLC);
1507 /// Handle an incoming `update_fail_htlc` message from the given peer.
1508 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFailHTLC);
1509 /// Handle an incoming `update_fail_malformed_htlc` message from the given peer.
1510 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFailMalformedHTLC);
1511 /// Handle an incoming `commitment_signed` message from the given peer.
1512 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &CommitmentSigned);
1513 /// Handle an incoming `revoke_and_ack` message from the given peer.
1514 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &RevokeAndACK);
1516 /// Handle an incoming `update_fee` message from the given peer.
1517 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFee);
1519 // Channel-to-announce:
1520 /// Handle an incoming `announcement_signatures` message from the given peer.
1521 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AnnouncementSignatures);
1523 // Connection loss/reestablish:
1524 /// Indicates a connection to the peer failed/an existing connection was lost.
1525 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey);
1527 /// Handle a peer reconnecting, possibly generating `channel_reestablish` message(s).
1529 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1530 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1531 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1532 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1533 /// Handle an incoming `channel_reestablish` message from the given peer.
1534 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelReestablish);
1536 /// Handle an incoming `channel_update` message from the given peer.
1537 fn handle_channel_update(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelUpdate);
1540 /// Handle an incoming `error` message from the given peer.
1541 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ErrorMessage);
1543 // Handler information:
1544 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1545 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1546 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1547 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1549 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1550 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1551 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1553 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1554 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1556 /// Gets the chain hashes for this `ChannelMessageHandler` indicating which chains it supports.
1558 /// If it's `None`, then no particular network chain hash compatibility will be enforced when
1559 /// connecting to peers.
1560 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>>;
1563 /// A trait to describe an object which can receive routing messages.
1565 /// # Implementor DoS Warnings
1567 /// For messages enabled with the `gossip_queries` feature there are potential DoS vectors when
1568 /// handling inbound queries. Implementors using an on-disk network graph should be aware of
1569 /// repeated disk I/O for queries accessing different parts of the network graph.
1570 pub trait RoutingMessageHandler : MessageSendEventsProvider {
1571 /// Handle an incoming `node_announcement` message, returning `true` if it should be forwarded on,
1572 /// `false` or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1573 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1574 /// Handle a `channel_announcement` message, returning `true` if it should be forwarded on, `false`
1575 /// or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1576 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1577 /// Handle an incoming `channel_update` message, returning true if it should be forwarded on,
1578 /// `false` or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1579 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1580 /// Gets channel announcements and updates required to dump our routing table to a remote node,
1581 /// starting at the `short_channel_id` indicated by `starting_point` and including announcements
1582 /// for a single channel.
1583 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)>;
1584 /// Gets a node announcement required to dump our routing table to a remote node, starting at
1585 /// the node *after* the provided pubkey and including up to one announcement immediately
1586 /// higher (as defined by `<PublicKey as Ord>::cmp`) than `starting_point`.
1587 /// If `None` is provided for `starting_point`, we start at the first node.
1588 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&NodeId>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement>;
1589 /// Called when a connection is established with a peer. This can be used to
1590 /// perform routing table synchronization using a strategy defined by the
1593 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1594 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1595 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1596 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1597 /// Handles the reply of a query we initiated to learn about channels
1598 /// for a given range of blocks. We can expect to receive one or more
1599 /// replies to a single query.
1600 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1601 /// Handles the reply of a query we initiated asking for routing gossip
1602 /// messages for a list of channels. We should receive this message when
1603 /// a node has completed its best effort to send us the pertaining routing
1604 /// gossip messages.
1605 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1606 /// Handles when a peer asks us to send a list of `short_channel_id`s
1607 /// for the requested range of blocks.
1608 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1609 /// Handles when a peer asks us to send routing gossip messages for a
1610 /// list of `short_channel_id`s.
1611 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1613 // Handler queueing status:
1614 /// Indicates that there are a large number of [`ChannelAnnouncement`] (or other) messages
1615 /// pending some async action. While there is no guarantee of the rate of future messages, the
1616 /// caller should seek to reduce the rate of new gossip messages handled, especially
1617 /// [`ChannelAnnouncement`]s.
1618 fn processing_queue_high(&self) -> bool;
1620 // Handler information:
1621 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1622 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1623 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1624 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1625 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1626 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1627 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1629 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1630 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1633 /// A handler for received [`OnionMessage`]s and for providing generated ones to send.
1634 pub trait OnionMessageHandler {
1635 /// Handle an incoming `onion_message` message from the given peer.
1636 fn handle_onion_message(&self, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OnionMessage);
1638 /// Returns the next pending onion message for the peer with the given node id.
1639 fn next_onion_message_for_peer(&self, peer_node_id: PublicKey) -> Option<OnionMessage>;
1641 /// Called when a connection is established with a peer. Can be used to track which peers
1642 /// advertise onion message support and are online.
1644 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1645 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1646 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1647 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1649 /// Indicates a connection to the peer failed/an existing connection was lost. Allows handlers to
1650 /// drop and refuse to forward onion messages to this peer.
1651 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey);
1653 // Handler information:
1654 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1655 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1656 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1657 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1659 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1660 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1661 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1663 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1664 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1667 mod fuzzy_internal_msgs {
1668 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1669 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, PaymentRelay};
1670 use crate::prelude::*;
1671 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
1672 use crate::ln::features::BlindedHopFeatures;
1674 // These types aren't intended to be pub, but are exposed for direct fuzzing (as we deserialize
1675 // them from untrusted input):
1677 pub struct FinalOnionHopData {
1678 pub payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
1679 /// The total value, in msat, of the payment as received by the ultimate recipient.
1680 /// Message serialization may panic if this value is more than 21 million Bitcoin.
1681 pub total_msat: u64,
1684 pub enum InboundOnionPayload {
1686 short_channel_id: u64,
1687 /// The value, in msat, of the payment after this hop's fee is deducted.
1688 amt_to_forward: u64,
1689 outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
1692 payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData>,
1693 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
1694 keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
1695 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
1697 outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
1700 short_channel_id: u64,
1701 payment_relay: PaymentRelay,
1702 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints,
1703 features: BlindedHopFeatures,
1704 intro_node_blinding_point: PublicKey,
1709 outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
1710 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
1711 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints,
1712 intro_node_blinding_point: PublicKey,
1716 pub(crate) enum OutboundOnionPayload {
1718 short_channel_id: u64,
1719 /// The value, in msat, of the payment after this hop's fee is deducted.
1720 amt_to_forward: u64,
1721 outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
1724 payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData>,
1725 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
1726 keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
1727 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
1729 outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
1732 encrypted_tlvs: Vec<u8>,
1733 intro_node_blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1738 outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
1739 encrypted_tlvs: Vec<u8>,
1740 intro_node_blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, // Set if the introduction node of the blinded path is the final node
1744 pub struct DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
1745 pub(crate) hmac: [u8; 32],
1746 pub(crate) failuremsg: Vec<u8>,
1747 pub(crate) pad: Vec<u8>,
1751 pub use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*;
1752 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
1753 pub(crate) use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*;
1755 /// BOLT 4 onion packet including hop data for the next peer.
1756 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1757 pub struct OnionPacket {
1758 /// BOLT 4 version number.
1760 /// In order to ensure we always return an error on onion decode in compliance with [BOLT
1761 /// #4](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md), we have to
1762 /// deserialize `OnionPacket`s contained in [`UpdateAddHTLC`] messages even if the ephemeral
1763 /// public key (here) is bogus, so we hold a [`Result`] instead of a [`PublicKey`] as we'd
1765 pub public_key: Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>,
1766 /// 1300 bytes encrypted payload for the next hop.
1767 pub hop_data: [u8; 20*65],
1768 /// HMAC to verify the integrity of hop_data.
1772 impl onion_utils::Packet for OnionPacket {
1773 type Data = onion_utils::FixedSizeOnionPacket;
1774 fn new(pubkey: PublicKey, hop_data: onion_utils::FixedSizeOnionPacket, hmac: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
1777 public_key: Ok(pubkey),
1778 hop_data: hop_data.0,
1784 impl fmt::Debug for OnionPacket {
1785 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
1786 f.write_fmt(format_args!("OnionPacket version {} with hmac {:?}", self.version, &self.hmac[..]))
1790 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1791 pub(crate) struct OnionErrorPacket {
1792 // This really should be a constant size slice, but the spec lets these things be up to 128KB?
1793 // (TODO) We limit it in decode to much lower...
1794 pub(crate) data: Vec<u8>,
1797 impl fmt::Display for DecodeError {
1798 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
1800 DecodeError::UnknownVersion => f.write_str("Unknown realm byte in Onion packet"),
1801 DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature => f.write_str("Unknown required feature preventing decode"),
1802 DecodeError::InvalidValue => f.write_str("Nonsense bytes didn't map to the type they were interpreted as"),
1803 DecodeError::ShortRead => f.write_str("Packet extended beyond the provided bytes"),
1804 DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor => f.write_str("A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly"),
1805 DecodeError::Io(ref e) => fmt::Debug::fmt(e, f),
1806 DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression => f.write_str("We don't support receiving messages with zlib-compressed fields"),
1811 impl From<io::Error> for DecodeError {
1812 fn from(e: io::Error) -> Self {
1813 if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof {
1814 DecodeError::ShortRead
1816 DecodeError::Io(e.kind())
1821 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
1822 impl_writeable_msg!(AcceptChannel, {
1823 temporary_channel_id,
1824 dust_limit_satoshis,
1825 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1826 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1832 revocation_basepoint,
1834 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1836 first_per_commitment_point,
1838 (0, shutdown_scriptpubkey, (option, encoding: (ScriptBuf, WithoutLength))), // Don't encode length twice.
1839 (1, channel_type, option),
1843 impl_writeable_msg!(AcceptChannel, {
1844 temporary_channel_id,
1845 dust_limit_satoshis,
1846 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1847 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1853 revocation_basepoint,
1855 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1857 first_per_commitment_point,
1859 (0, shutdown_scriptpubkey, (option, encoding: (ScriptBuf, WithoutLength))), // Don't encode length twice.
1860 (1, channel_type, option),
1861 (4, next_local_nonce, option),
1864 impl_writeable_msg!(AcceptChannelV2, {
1865 temporary_channel_id,
1867 dust_limit_satoshis,
1868 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1874 revocation_basepoint,
1876 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1878 first_per_commitment_point,
1879 second_per_commitment_point,
1881 (0, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
1882 (1, channel_type, option),
1883 (2, require_confirmed_inputs, option),
1886 impl_writeable_msg!(Stfu, {
1891 impl_writeable_msg!(Splice, {
1895 funding_feerate_perkw,
1900 impl_writeable_msg!(SpliceAck, {
1907 impl_writeable_msg!(SpliceLocked, {
1911 impl_writeable_msg!(TxAddInput, {
1919 impl_writeable_msg!(TxAddOutput, {
1926 impl_writeable_msg!(TxRemoveInput, {
1931 impl_writeable_msg!(TxRemoveOutput, {
1936 impl_writeable_msg!(TxComplete, {
1940 impl_writeable_msg!(TxSignatures, {
1946 impl_writeable_msg!(TxInitRbf, {
1949 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
1951 (0, funding_output_contribution, option),
1954 impl_writeable_msg!(TxAckRbf, {
1957 (0, funding_output_contribution, option),
1960 impl_writeable_msg!(TxAbort, {
1965 impl_writeable_msg!(AnnouncementSignatures, {
1972 impl_writeable_msg!(ChannelReestablish, {
1974 next_local_commitment_number,
1975 next_remote_commitment_number,
1976 your_last_per_commitment_secret,
1977 my_current_per_commitment_point,
1979 (0, next_funding_txid, option),
1982 impl_writeable_msg!(ClosingSigned,
1983 { channel_id, fee_satoshis, signature },
1984 { (1, fee_range, option) }
1987 impl_writeable!(ClosingSignedFeeRange, {
1992 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
1993 impl_writeable_msg!(CommitmentSigned, {
2000 impl_writeable_msg!(CommitmentSigned, {
2005 (2, partial_signature_with_nonce, option)
2008 impl_writeable!(DecodedOnionErrorPacket, {
2014 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
2015 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingCreated, {
2016 temporary_channel_id,
2018 funding_output_index,
2022 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingCreated, {
2023 temporary_channel_id,
2025 funding_output_index,
2028 (2, partial_signature_with_nonce, option),
2029 (4, next_local_nonce, option)
2032 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
2033 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingSigned, {
2039 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingSigned, {
2043 (2, partial_signature_with_nonce, option)
2046 impl_writeable_msg!(ChannelReady, {
2048 next_per_commitment_point,
2050 (1, short_channel_id_alias, option),
2053 impl Writeable for Init {
2054 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2055 // global_features gets the bottom 13 bits of our features, and local_features gets all of
2056 // our relevant feature bits. This keeps us compatible with old nodes.
2057 self.features.write_up_to_13(w)?;
2058 self.features.write(w)?;
2059 encode_tlv_stream!(w, {
2060 (1, self.networks.as_ref().map(|n| WithoutLength(n)), option),
2061 (3, self.remote_network_address, option),
2067 impl Readable for Init {
2068 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2069 let global_features: InitFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
2070 let features: InitFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
2071 let mut remote_network_address: Option<SocketAddress> = None;
2072 let mut networks: Option<WithoutLength<Vec<ChainHash>>> = None;
2073 decode_tlv_stream!(r, {
2074 (1, networks, option),
2075 (3, remote_network_address, option)
2078 features: features | global_features,
2079 networks: networks.map(|n| n.0),
2080 remote_network_address,
2085 impl_writeable_msg!(OpenChannel, {
2087 temporary_channel_id,
2090 dust_limit_satoshis,
2091 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
2092 channel_reserve_satoshis,
2098 revocation_basepoint,
2100 delayed_payment_basepoint,
2102 first_per_commitment_point,
2105 (0, shutdown_scriptpubkey, (option, encoding: (ScriptBuf, WithoutLength))), // Don't encode length twice.
2106 (1, channel_type, option),
2109 impl_writeable_msg!(OpenChannelV2, {
2111 temporary_channel_id,
2112 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
2113 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
2115 dust_limit_satoshis,
2116 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
2122 revocation_basepoint,
2124 delayed_payment_basepoint,
2126 first_per_commitment_point,
2127 second_per_commitment_point,
2130 (0, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
2131 (1, channel_type, option),
2132 (2, require_confirmed_inputs, option),
2135 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
2136 impl_writeable_msg!(RevokeAndACK, {
2138 per_commitment_secret,
2139 next_per_commitment_point
2143 impl_writeable_msg!(RevokeAndACK, {
2145 per_commitment_secret,
2146 next_per_commitment_point
2148 (4, next_local_nonce, option)
2151 impl_writeable_msg!(Shutdown, {
2156 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFailHTLC, {
2162 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, {
2169 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFee, {
2174 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFulfillHTLC, {
2180 // Note that this is written as a part of ChannelManager objects, and thus cannot change its
2181 // serialization format in a way which assumes we know the total serialized length/message end
2183 impl_writeable!(OnionErrorPacket, {
2187 // Note that this is written as a part of ChannelManager objects, and thus cannot change its
2188 // serialization format in a way which assumes we know the total serialized length/message end
2190 impl Writeable for OnionPacket {
2191 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2192 self.version.write(w)?;
2193 match self.public_key {
2194 Ok(pubkey) => pubkey.write(w)?,
2195 Err(_) => [0u8;33].write(w)?,
2197 w.write_all(&self.hop_data)?;
2198 self.hmac.write(w)?;
2203 impl Readable for OnionPacket {
2204 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2206 version: Readable::read(r)?,
2208 let mut buf = [0u8;33];
2209 r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
2210 PublicKey::from_slice(&buf)
2212 hop_data: Readable::read(r)?,
2213 hmac: Readable::read(r)?,
2218 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateAddHTLC, {
2224 onion_routing_packet,
2226 (0, blinding_point, option),
2227 (65537, skimmed_fee_msat, option)
2230 impl Readable for OnionMessage {
2231 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2232 let blinding_point: PublicKey = Readable::read(r)?;
2233 let len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
2234 let mut packet_reader = FixedLengthReader::new(r, len as u64);
2235 let onion_routing_packet: onion_message::Packet = <onion_message::Packet as LengthReadable>::read(&mut packet_reader)?;
2238 onion_routing_packet,
2243 impl Writeable for OnionMessage {
2244 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2245 self.blinding_point.write(w)?;
2246 let onion_packet_len = self.onion_routing_packet.serialized_length();
2247 (onion_packet_len as u16).write(w)?;
2248 self.onion_routing_packet.write(w)?;
2253 impl Writeable for FinalOnionHopData {
2254 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2255 self.payment_secret.0.write(w)?;
2256 HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.total_msat).write(w)
2260 impl Readable for FinalOnionHopData {
2261 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2262 let secret: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
2263 let amt: HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize<u64> = Readable::read(r)?;
2264 Ok(Self { payment_secret: PaymentSecret(secret), total_msat: amt.0 })
2268 impl Writeable for OutboundOnionPayload {
2269 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2271 Self::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } => {
2272 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
2273 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*amt_to_forward), required),
2274 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*outgoing_cltv_value), required),
2275 (6, short_channel_id, required)
2279 ref payment_data, ref payment_metadata, ref keysend_preimage, amt_msat,
2280 outgoing_cltv_value, ref custom_tlvs,
2282 // We need to update [`ln::outbound_payment::RecipientOnionFields::with_custom_tlvs`]
2283 // to reject any reserved types in the experimental range if new ones are ever
2285 let keysend_tlv = keysend_preimage.map(|preimage| (5482373484, preimage.encode()));
2286 let mut custom_tlvs: Vec<&(u64, Vec<u8>)> = custom_tlvs.iter().chain(keysend_tlv.iter()).collect();
2287 custom_tlvs.sort_unstable_by_key(|(typ, _)| *typ);
2288 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
2289 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*amt_msat), required),
2290 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*outgoing_cltv_value), required),
2291 (8, payment_data, option),
2292 (16, payment_metadata.as_ref().map(|m| WithoutLength(m)), option)
2293 }, custom_tlvs.iter());
2295 Self::BlindedForward { encrypted_tlvs, intro_node_blinding_point } => {
2296 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
2297 (10, *encrypted_tlvs, required_vec),
2298 (12, intro_node_blinding_point, option)
2301 Self::BlindedReceive {
2302 amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, encrypted_tlvs,
2303 intro_node_blinding_point,
2305 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
2306 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*amt_msat), required),
2307 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*outgoing_cltv_value), required),
2308 (10, *encrypted_tlvs, required_vec),
2309 (12, intro_node_blinding_point, option),
2310 (18, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*total_msat), required)
2318 impl<NS: Deref> ReadableArgs<&NS> for InboundOnionPayload where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
2319 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R, node_signer: &NS) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2321 let mut cltv_value = None;
2322 let mut short_id: Option<u64> = None;
2323 let mut payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData> = None;
2324 let mut encrypted_tlvs_opt: Option<WithoutLength<Vec<u8>>> = None;
2325 let mut intro_node_blinding_point = None;
2326 let mut payment_metadata: Option<WithoutLength<Vec<u8>>> = None;
2327 let mut total_msat = None;
2328 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
2329 let mut custom_tlvs = Vec::new();
2331 let tlv_len = BigSize::read(r)?;
2332 let rd = FixedLengthReader::new(r, tlv_len.0);
2333 decode_tlv_stream_with_custom_tlv_decode!(rd, {
2334 (2, amt, (option, encoding: (u64, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize))),
2335 (4, cltv_value, (option, encoding: (u32, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize))),
2336 (6, short_id, option),
2337 (8, payment_data, option),
2338 (10, encrypted_tlvs_opt, option),
2339 (12, intro_node_blinding_point, option),
2340 (16, payment_metadata, option),
2341 (18, total_msat, (option, encoding: (u64, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize))),
2342 // See https://github.com/lightning/blips/blob/master/blip-0003.md
2343 (5482373484, keysend_preimage, option)
2344 }, |msg_type: u64, msg_reader: &mut FixedLengthReader<_>| -> Result<bool, DecodeError> {
2345 if msg_type < 1 << 16 { return Ok(false) }
2346 let mut value = Vec::new();
2347 msg_reader.read_to_end(&mut value)?;
2348 custom_tlvs.push((msg_type, value));
2352 if amt.unwrap_or(0) > MAX_VALUE_MSAT { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
2354 if let Some(blinding_point) = intro_node_blinding_point {
2355 if short_id.is_some() || payment_data.is_some() || payment_metadata.is_some() {
2356 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
2358 let enc_tlvs = encrypted_tlvs_opt.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?.0;
2359 let enc_tlvs_ss = node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::Node, &blinding_point, None)
2360 .map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
2361 let rho = onion_utils::gen_rho_from_shared_secret(&enc_tlvs_ss.secret_bytes());
2362 let mut s = Cursor::new(&enc_tlvs);
2363 let mut reader = FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, enc_tlvs.len() as u64);
2364 match ChaChaPolyReadAdapter::read(&mut reader, rho)? {
2365 ChaChaPolyReadAdapter { readable: BlindedPaymentTlvs::Forward(ForwardTlvs {
2366 short_channel_id, payment_relay, payment_constraints, features
2368 if amt.is_some() || cltv_value.is_some() || total_msat.is_some() {
2369 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
2371 Ok(Self::BlindedForward {
2374 payment_constraints,
2376 intro_node_blinding_point: blinding_point,
2379 ChaChaPolyReadAdapter { readable: BlindedPaymentTlvs::Receive(ReceiveTlvs {
2380 payment_secret, payment_constraints
2382 if total_msat.unwrap_or(0) > MAX_VALUE_MSAT { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
2383 Ok(Self::BlindedReceive {
2384 amt_msat: amt.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
2385 total_msat: total_msat.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
2386 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv_value.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
2388 payment_constraints,
2389 intro_node_blinding_point: blinding_point,
2393 } else if let Some(short_channel_id) = short_id {
2394 if payment_data.is_some() || payment_metadata.is_some() || encrypted_tlvs_opt.is_some() ||
2395 total_msat.is_some()
2396 { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
2399 amt_to_forward: amt.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
2400 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv_value.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
2403 if encrypted_tlvs_opt.is_some() || total_msat.is_some() {
2404 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
2406 if let Some(data) = &payment_data {
2407 if data.total_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
2408 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2413 payment_metadata: payment_metadata.map(|w| w.0),
2415 amt_msat: amt.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
2416 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv_value.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
2423 impl Writeable for Ping {
2424 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2425 self.ponglen.write(w)?;
2426 vec![0u8; self.byteslen as usize].write(w)?; // size-unchecked write
2431 impl Readable for Ping {
2432 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2434 ponglen: Readable::read(r)?,
2436 let byteslen = Readable::read(r)?;
2437 r.read_exact(&mut vec![0u8; byteslen as usize][..])?;
2444 impl Writeable for Pong {
2445 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2446 vec![0u8; self.byteslen as usize].write(w)?; // size-unchecked write
2451 impl Readable for Pong {
2452 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2455 let byteslen = Readable::read(r)?;
2456 r.read_exact(&mut vec![0u8; byteslen as usize][..])?;
2463 impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2464 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2465 self.features.write(w)?;
2466 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
2467 self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
2468 self.node_id_1.write(w)?;
2469 self.node_id_2.write(w)?;
2470 self.bitcoin_key_1.write(w)?;
2471 self.bitcoin_key_2.write(w)?;
2472 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
2477 impl Readable for UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2478 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2480 features: Readable::read(r)?,
2481 chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
2482 short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
2483 node_id_1: Readable::read(r)?,
2484 node_id_2: Readable::read(r)?,
2485 bitcoin_key_1: Readable::read(r)?,
2486 bitcoin_key_2: Readable::read(r)?,
2487 excess_data: read_to_end(r)?,
2492 impl_writeable!(ChannelAnnouncement, {
2495 bitcoin_signature_1,
2496 bitcoin_signature_2,
2500 impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2501 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2502 // `message_flags` used to indicate presence of `htlc_maximum_msat`, but was deprecated in the spec.
2503 const MESSAGE_FLAGS: u8 = 1;
2504 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
2505 self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
2506 self.timestamp.write(w)?;
2507 let all_flags = self.flags as u16 | ((MESSAGE_FLAGS as u16) << 8);
2508 all_flags.write(w)?;
2509 self.cltv_expiry_delta.write(w)?;
2510 self.htlc_minimum_msat.write(w)?;
2511 self.fee_base_msat.write(w)?;
2512 self.fee_proportional_millionths.write(w)?;
2513 self.htlc_maximum_msat.write(w)?;
2514 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
2519 impl Readable for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2520 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2522 chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
2523 short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
2524 timestamp: Readable::read(r)?,
2526 let flags: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
2527 // Note: we ignore the `message_flags` for now, since it was deprecated by the spec.
2530 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(r)?,
2531 htlc_minimum_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
2532 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
2533 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(r)?,
2534 htlc_maximum_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
2535 excess_data: read_to_end(r)?,
2540 impl_writeable!(ChannelUpdate, {
2545 impl Writeable for ErrorMessage {
2546 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2547 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
2548 (self.data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
2549 w.write_all(self.data.as_bytes())?;
2554 impl Readable for ErrorMessage {
2555 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2557 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
2559 let sz: usize = <u16 as Readable>::read(r)? as usize;
2560 let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(sz);
2562 r.read_exact(&mut data)?;
2563 match String::from_utf8(data) {
2565 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2572 impl Writeable for WarningMessage {
2573 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2574 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
2575 (self.data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
2576 w.write_all(self.data.as_bytes())?;
2581 impl Readable for WarningMessage {
2582 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2584 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
2586 let sz: usize = <u16 as Readable>::read(r)? as usize;
2587 let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(sz);
2589 r.read_exact(&mut data)?;
2590 match String::from_utf8(data) {
2592 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2599 impl Writeable for UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2600 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2601 self.features.write(w)?;
2602 self.timestamp.write(w)?;
2603 self.node_id.write(w)?;
2604 w.write_all(&self.rgb)?;
2605 self.alias.write(w)?;
2607 let mut addr_len = 0;
2608 for addr in self.addresses.iter() {
2609 addr_len += 1 + addr.len();
2611 (addr_len + self.excess_address_data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
2612 for addr in self.addresses.iter() {
2615 w.write_all(&self.excess_address_data[..])?;
2616 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
2621 impl Readable for UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2622 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2623 let features: NodeFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
2624 let timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
2625 let node_id: NodeId = Readable::read(r)?;
2626 let mut rgb = [0; 3];
2627 r.read_exact(&mut rgb)?;
2628 let alias: NodeAlias = Readable::read(r)?;
2630 let addr_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
2631 let mut addresses: Vec<SocketAddress> = Vec::new();
2632 let mut addr_readpos = 0;
2633 let mut excess = false;
2634 let mut excess_byte = 0;
2636 if addr_len <= addr_readpos { break; }
2637 match Readable::read(r) {
2639 if addr_len < addr_readpos + 1 + addr.len() {
2640 return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor);
2642 addr_readpos += (1 + addr.len()) as u16;
2643 addresses.push(addr);
2645 Ok(Err(unknown_descriptor)) => {
2647 excess_byte = unknown_descriptor;
2650 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor),
2651 Err(e) => return Err(e),
2655 let mut excess_data = vec![];
2656 let excess_address_data = if addr_readpos < addr_len {
2657 let mut excess_address_data = vec![0; (addr_len - addr_readpos) as usize];
2658 r.read_exact(&mut excess_address_data[if excess { 1 } else { 0 }..])?;
2660 excess_address_data[0] = excess_byte;
2665 excess_data.push(excess_byte);
2669 excess_data.extend(read_to_end(r)?.iter());
2670 Ok(UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2677 excess_address_data,
2683 impl_writeable!(NodeAnnouncement, {
2688 impl Readable for QueryShortChannelIds {
2689 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2690 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(r)?;
2692 let encoding_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
2693 let encoding_type: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
2695 // Must be encoding_type=0 uncompressed serialization. We do not
2696 // support encoding_type=1 zlib serialization.
2697 if encoding_type != EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8 {
2698 return Err(DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression);
2701 // We expect the encoding_len to always includes the 1-byte
2702 // encoding_type and that short_channel_ids are 8-bytes each
2703 if encoding_len == 0 || (encoding_len - 1) % 8 != 0 {
2704 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2707 // Read short_channel_ids (8-bytes each), for the u16 encoding_len
2708 // less the 1-byte encoding_type
2709 let short_channel_id_count: u16 = (encoding_len - 1)/8;
2710 let mut short_channel_ids = Vec::with_capacity(short_channel_id_count as usize);
2711 for _ in 0..short_channel_id_count {
2712 short_channel_ids.push(Readable::read(r)?);
2715 Ok(QueryShortChannelIds {
2722 impl Writeable for QueryShortChannelIds {
2723 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2724 // Calculated from 1-byte encoding_type plus 8-bytes per short_channel_id
2725 let encoding_len: u16 = 1 + self.short_channel_ids.len() as u16 * 8;
2727 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
2728 encoding_len.write(w)?;
2730 // We only support type=0 uncompressed serialization
2731 (EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8).write(w)?;
2733 for scid in self.short_channel_ids.iter() {
2741 impl_writeable_msg!(ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd, {
2746 impl QueryChannelRange {
2747 /// Calculates the overflow safe ending block height for the query.
2749 /// Overflow returns `0xffffffff`, otherwise returns `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`.
2750 pub fn end_blocknum(&self) -> u32 {
2751 match self.first_blocknum.checked_add(self.number_of_blocks) {
2752 Some(block) => block,
2753 None => u32::max_value(),
2758 impl_writeable_msg!(QueryChannelRange, {
2764 impl Readable for ReplyChannelRange {
2765 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2766 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(r)?;
2767 let first_blocknum: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
2768 let number_of_blocks: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
2769 let sync_complete: bool = Readable::read(r)?;
2771 let encoding_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
2772 let encoding_type: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
2774 // Must be encoding_type=0 uncompressed serialization. We do not
2775 // support encoding_type=1 zlib serialization.
2776 if encoding_type != EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8 {
2777 return Err(DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression);
2780 // We expect the encoding_len to always includes the 1-byte
2781 // encoding_type and that short_channel_ids are 8-bytes each
2782 if encoding_len == 0 || (encoding_len - 1) % 8 != 0 {
2783 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2786 // Read short_channel_ids (8-bytes each), for the u16 encoding_len
2787 // less the 1-byte encoding_type
2788 let short_channel_id_count: u16 = (encoding_len - 1)/8;
2789 let mut short_channel_ids = Vec::with_capacity(short_channel_id_count as usize);
2790 for _ in 0..short_channel_id_count {
2791 short_channel_ids.push(Readable::read(r)?);
2794 Ok(ReplyChannelRange {
2804 impl Writeable for ReplyChannelRange {
2805 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2806 let encoding_len: u16 = 1 + self.short_channel_ids.len() as u16 * 8;
2807 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
2808 self.first_blocknum.write(w)?;
2809 self.number_of_blocks.write(w)?;
2810 self.sync_complete.write(w)?;
2812 encoding_len.write(w)?;
2813 (EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8).write(w)?;
2814 for scid in self.short_channel_ids.iter() {
2822 impl_writeable_msg!(GossipTimestampFilter, {
2830 use std::convert::TryFrom;
2831 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxIn, ScriptBuf, Sequence, Witness, TxOut};
2832 use hex::DisplayHex;
2833 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
2834 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
2835 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
2836 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, FinalOnionHopData, OnionErrorPacket};
2837 use crate::ln::msgs::SocketAddress;
2838 use crate::routing::gossip::{NodeAlias, NodeId};
2839 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, ReadableArgs, Hostname, TransactionU16LenLimited};
2840 use crate::util::test_utils;
2842 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2843 use bitcoin::address::Address;
2844 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2845 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
2846 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
2847 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2848 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
2849 use bitcoin::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
2851 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2852 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2854 use crate::io::{self, Cursor};
2855 use crate::prelude::*;
2856 use core::str::FromStr;
2857 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2859 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2860 use std::net::{Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr, SocketAddr, SocketAddrV4, SocketAddrV6, ToSocketAddrs};
2861 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2862 use crate::ln::msgs::SocketAddressParseError;
2865 fn encoding_channel_reestablish() {
2867 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2868 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
2871 let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
2872 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]),
2873 next_local_commitment_number: 3,
2874 next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
2875 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [9;32],
2876 my_current_per_commitment_point: public_key,
2877 next_funding_txid: None,
2880 let encoded_value = cr.encode();
2884 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, // channel_id
2885 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, // next_local_commitment_number
2886 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, // next_remote_commitment_number
2887 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, // your_last_per_commitment_secret
2888 3, 27, 132, 197, 86, 123, 18, 100, 64, 153, 93, 62, 213, 170, 186, 5, 101, 215, 30, 24, 52, 96, 72, 25, 255, 156, 23, 245, 233, 213, 221, 7, 143, // my_current_per_commitment_point
2894 fn encoding_channel_reestablish_with_next_funding_txid() {
2896 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2897 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
2900 let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
2901 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]),
2902 next_local_commitment_number: 3,
2903 next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
2904 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [9;32],
2905 my_current_per_commitment_point: public_key,
2906 next_funding_txid: Some(Txid::from_raw_hash(bitcoin::hashes::Hash::from_slice(&[
2907 48, 167, 250, 69, 152, 48, 103, 172, 164, 99, 59, 19, 23, 11, 92, 84, 15, 80, 4, 12, 98, 82, 75, 31, 201, 11, 91, 23, 98, 23, 53, 124,
2911 let encoded_value = cr.encode();
2915 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, // channel_id
2916 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, // next_local_commitment_number
2917 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, // next_remote_commitment_number
2918 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, // your_last_per_commitment_secret
2919 3, 27, 132, 197, 86, 123, 18, 100, 64, 153, 93, 62, 213, 170, 186, 5, 101, 215, 30, 24, 52, 96, 72, 25, 255, 156, 23, 245, 233, 213, 221, 7, 143, // my_current_per_commitment_point
2920 0, // Type (next_funding_txid)
2922 48, 167, 250, 69, 152, 48, 103, 172, 164, 99, 59, 19, 23, 11, 92, 84, 15, 80, 4, 12, 98, 82, 75, 31, 201, 11, 91, 23, 98, 23, 53, 124, // Value
2927 macro_rules! get_keys_from {
2928 ($slice: expr, $secp_ctx: expr) => {
2930 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($slice).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2931 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &privkey);
2937 macro_rules! get_sig_on {
2938 ($privkey: expr, $ctx: expr, $string: expr) => {
2940 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&$string.into_bytes()[..]).unwrap();
2941 $ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &$privkey)
2947 fn encoding_announcement_signatures() {
2948 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2949 let (privkey, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2950 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2951 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("02020202020202020202020202020202"));
2952 let announcement_signatures = msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2953 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]),
2954 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2955 node_signature: sig_1,
2956 bitcoin_signature: sig_2,
2959 let encoded_value = announcement_signatures.encode();
2960 assert_eq!(encoded_value, <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("040000000000000005000000000000000600000000000000070000000000000000083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073acf9953cef4700860f5967838eba2bae89288ad188ebf8b20bf995c3ea53a26df1876d0a3a0e13172ba286a673140190c02ba9da60a2e43a745188c8a83c7f3ef").unwrap());
2963 fn do_encoding_channel_announcement(unknown_features_bits: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2964 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2965 let (privkey_1, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2966 let (privkey_2, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2967 let (privkey_3, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2968 let (privkey_4, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2969 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2970 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey_2, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2971 let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2972 let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2973 let mut features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
2974 if unknown_features_bits {
2975 features = ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF]);
2977 let unsigned_channel_announcement = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2979 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
2980 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2981 node_id_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_1),
2982 node_id_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_2),
2983 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_3),
2984 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_4),
2985 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![10, 0, 0, 20, 0, 0, 30, 0, 0, 40] } else { Vec::new() },
2987 let channel_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2988 node_signature_1: sig_1,
2989 node_signature_2: sig_2,
2990 bitcoin_signature_1: sig_3,
2991 bitcoin_signature_2: sig_4,
2992 contents: unsigned_channel_announcement,
2994 let encoded_value = channel_announcement.encode();
2995 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("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").unwrap();
2996 if unknown_features_bits {
2997 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0002ffff").unwrap());
2999 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000").unwrap());
3001 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap());
3002 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00083a840000034d031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f024d4b6cd1361032ca9bd2aeb9d900aa4d45d9ead80ac9423374c451a7254d076602531fe6068134503d2723133227c867ac8fa6c83c537e9a44c3c5bdbdcb1fe33703462779ad4aad39514614751a71085f2f10e1c7a593e4e030efb5b8721ce55b0b").unwrap());
3004 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0a00001400001e000028").unwrap());
3006 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3010 fn encoding_channel_announcement() {
3011 do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, false);
3012 do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, true);
3013 do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, false);
3014 do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, true);
3017 fn do_encoding_node_announcement(unknown_features_bits: bool, ipv4: bool, ipv6: bool, onionv2: bool, onionv3: bool, hostname: bool, excess_address_data: bool, excess_data: bool) {
3018 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3019 let (privkey_1, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3020 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
3021 let features = if unknown_features_bits {
3022 NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF])
3024 // Set to some features we may support
3025 NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![2 | 1 << 5])
3027 let mut addresses = Vec::new();
3029 addresses.push(SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 {
3030 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252],
3035 addresses.push(SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 {
3036 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240],
3041 addresses.push(msgs::SocketAddress::OnionV2(
3042 [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 38, 7]
3046 addresses.push(msgs::SocketAddress::OnionV3 {
3047 ed25519_pubkey: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240, 239, 238, 237, 236, 235, 234, 233, 232, 231, 230, 229, 228, 227, 226, 225, 224],
3054 addresses.push(SocketAddress::Hostname {
3055 hostname: Hostname::try_from(String::from("host")).unwrap(),
3059 let mut addr_len = 0;
3060 for addr in &addresses {
3061 addr_len += addr.len() + 1;
3063 let unsigned_node_announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
3065 timestamp: 20190119,
3066 node_id: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_1),
3068 alias: NodeAlias([16;32]),
3070 excess_address_data: if excess_address_data { vec![33, 108, 40, 11, 83, 149, 162, 84, 110, 126, 75, 38, 99, 224, 79, 129, 22, 34, 241, 90, 79, 146, 232, 58, 162, 233, 43, 162, 165, 115, 193, 57, 20, 44, 84, 174, 99, 7, 42, 30, 193, 238, 125, 192, 192, 75, 222, 92, 132, 120, 6, 23, 42, 160, 92, 146, 194, 42, 232, 227, 8, 209, 210, 105] } else { Vec::new() },
3071 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![59, 18, 204, 25, 92, 224, 162, 209, 189, 166, 168, 139, 239, 161, 159, 160, 127, 81, 202, 167, 92, 232, 56, 55, 242, 137, 101, 96, 11, 138, 172, 171, 8, 85, 255, 176, 231, 65, 236, 95, 124, 65, 66, 30, 152, 41, 169, 212, 134, 17, 200, 200, 49, 247, 27, 229, 234, 115, 230, 101, 148, 151, 127, 253] } else { Vec::new() },
3073 addr_len += unsigned_node_announcement.excess_address_data.len() as u16;
3074 let node_announcement = msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
3076 contents: unsigned_node_announcement,
3078 let encoded_value = node_announcement.encode();
3079 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
3080 if unknown_features_bits {
3081 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0002ffff").unwrap());
3083 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000122").unwrap());
3085 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("013413a7031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f2020201010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010").unwrap());
3086 target_value.append(&mut vec![(addr_len >> 8) as u8, addr_len as u8]);
3088 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("01fffefdfc2607").unwrap());
3091 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f02607").unwrap());
3094 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("03fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f62607").unwrap());
3097 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("04fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0efeeedecebeae9e8e7e6e5e4e3e2e1e00020102607").unwrap());
3100 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0504686f73742607").unwrap());
3102 if excess_address_data {
3103 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f92e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d269").unwrap());
3106 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
3108 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3112 fn encoding_node_announcement() {
3113 do_encoding_node_announcement(true, true, true, true, true, true, true, true);
3114 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false);
3115 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, true, false, false, false, false, false, false);
3116 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, true, false, false, false, false, false);
3117 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, true, false, false, false, false);
3118 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, true, false, false, false);
3119 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, true, false, false);
3120 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, false, true, false);
3121 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, true, false, true, false, false, true, false);
3122 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, true, false, true, false, false, false);
3125 fn do_encoding_channel_update(direction: bool, disable: bool, excess_data: bool) {
3126 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3127 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3128 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
3129 let unsigned_channel_update = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3130 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
3131 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
3132 timestamp: 20190119,
3133 flags: if direction { 1 } else { 0 } | if disable { 1 << 1 } else { 0 },
3134 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
3135 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
3136 htlc_maximum_msat: 131355275467161,
3137 fee_base_msat: 10000,
3138 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
3139 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![0, 0, 0, 0, 59, 154, 202, 0] } else { Vec::new() }
3141 let channel_update = msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3143 contents: unsigned_channel_update
3145 let encoded_value = channel_update.encode();
3146 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
3147 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap());
3148 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00083a840000034d013413a7").unwrap());
3149 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("01").unwrap());
3150 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00").unwrap());
3152 let flag = target_value.last_mut().unwrap();
3156 let flag = target_value.last_mut().unwrap();
3157 *flag = *flag | 1 << 1;
3159 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap());
3160 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000777788889999").unwrap());
3162 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000000003b9aca00").unwrap());
3164 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3168 fn encoding_channel_update() {
3169 do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, false);
3170 do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, true);
3171 do_encoding_channel_update(true, false, false);
3172 do_encoding_channel_update(true, false, true);
3173 do_encoding_channel_update(false, true, false);
3174 do_encoding_channel_update(false, true, true);
3175 do_encoding_channel_update(true, true, false);
3176 do_encoding_channel_update(true, true, true);
3179 fn do_encoding_open_channel(random_bit: bool, shutdown: bool, incl_chan_type: bool) {
3180 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3181 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3182 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
3183 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
3184 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
3185 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
3186 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
3187 let open_channel = msgs::OpenChannel {
3188 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
3189 temporary_channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3190 funding_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
3191 push_msat: 2536655962884945560,
3192 dust_limit_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
3193 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 8517154655701053848,
3194 channel_reserve_satoshis: 8665828695742877976,
3195 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
3196 feerate_per_kw: 821716,
3197 to_self_delay: 49340,
3198 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
3199 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
3200 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
3201 payment_point: pubkey_3,
3202 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
3203 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
3204 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
3205 channel_flags: if random_bit { 1 << 5 } else { 0 },
3206 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { Some(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { None },
3207 channel_type: if incl_chan_type { Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::empty()) } else { None },
3209 let encoded_value = open_channel.encode();
3210 let mut target_value = Vec::new();
3211 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap());
3212 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("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").unwrap());
3214 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("20").unwrap());
3216 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00").unwrap());
3219 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
3222 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0100").unwrap());
3224 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3228 fn encoding_open_channel() {
3229 do_encoding_open_channel(false, false, false);
3230 do_encoding_open_channel(false, false, true);
3231 do_encoding_open_channel(false, true, false);
3232 do_encoding_open_channel(false, true, true);
3233 do_encoding_open_channel(true, false, false);
3234 do_encoding_open_channel(true, false, true);
3235 do_encoding_open_channel(true, true, false);
3236 do_encoding_open_channel(true, true, true);
3239 fn do_encoding_open_channelv2(random_bit: bool, shutdown: bool, incl_chan_type: bool, require_confirmed_inputs: bool) {
3240 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3241 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3242 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
3243 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
3244 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
3245 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
3246 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
3247 let (_, pubkey_7) = get_keys_from!("0707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707", secp_ctx);
3248 let open_channelv2 = msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
3249 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
3250 temporary_channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3251 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: 821716,
3252 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: 821716,
3253 funding_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
3254 dust_limit_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
3255 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 8517154655701053848,
3256 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
3257 to_self_delay: 49340,
3258 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
3259 locktime: 305419896,
3260 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
3261 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
3262 payment_basepoint: pubkey_3,
3263 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
3264 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
3265 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
3266 second_per_commitment_point: pubkey_7,
3267 channel_flags: if random_bit { 1 << 5 } else { 0 },
3268 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { Some(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { None },
3269 channel_type: if incl_chan_type { Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::empty()) } else { None },
3270 require_confirmed_inputs: if require_confirmed_inputs { Some(()) } else { None },
3272 let encoded_value = open_channelv2.encode();
3273 let mut target_value = Vec::new();
3274 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap());
3275 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap());
3276 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000c89d4").unwrap());
3277 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000c89d4").unwrap());
3278 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1234567890123456").unwrap());
3279 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3214466870114476").unwrap());
3280 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7633030896203198").unwrap());
3281 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00083a840000034d").unwrap());
3282 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c0bc").unwrap());
3283 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c0bc").unwrap());
3284 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("12345678").unwrap());
3285 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap());
3286 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("024d4b6cd1361032ca9bd2aeb9d900aa4d45d9ead80ac9423374c451a7254d0766").unwrap());
3287 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02531fe6068134503d2723133227c867ac8fa6c83c537e9a44c3c5bdbdcb1fe337").unwrap());
3288 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("03462779ad4aad39514614751a71085f2f10e1c7a593e4e030efb5b8721ce55b0b").unwrap());
3289 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0362c0a046dacce86ddd0343c6d3c7c79c2208ba0d9c9cf24a6d046d21d21f90f7").unwrap());
3290 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("03f006a18d5653c4edf5391ff23a61f03ff83d237e880ee61187fa9f379a028e0a").unwrap());
3291 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02989c0b76cb563971fdc9bef31ec06c3560f3249d6ee9e5d83c57625596e05f6f").unwrap());
3294 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("20").unwrap());
3296 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00").unwrap());
3299 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001b").unwrap()); // Type 0 + Length 27
3300 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
3303 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0100").unwrap());
3305 if require_confirmed_inputs {
3306 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0200").unwrap());
3308 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3312 fn encoding_open_channelv2() {
3313 do_encoding_open_channelv2(false, false, false, false);
3314 do_encoding_open_channelv2(false, false, false, true);
3315 do_encoding_open_channelv2(false, false, true, false);
3316 do_encoding_open_channelv2(false, false, true, true);
3317 do_encoding_open_channelv2(false, true, false, false);
3318 do_encoding_open_channelv2(false, true, false, true);
3319 do_encoding_open_channelv2(false, true, true, false);
3320 do_encoding_open_channelv2(false, true, true, true);
3321 do_encoding_open_channelv2(true, false, false, false);
3322 do_encoding_open_channelv2(true, false, false, true);
3323 do_encoding_open_channelv2(true, false, true, false);
3324 do_encoding_open_channelv2(true, false, true, true);
3325 do_encoding_open_channelv2(true, true, false, false);
3326 do_encoding_open_channelv2(true, true, false, true);
3327 do_encoding_open_channelv2(true, true, true, false);
3328 do_encoding_open_channelv2(true, true, true, true);
3331 fn do_encoding_accept_channel(shutdown: bool) {
3332 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3333 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3334 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
3335 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
3336 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
3337 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
3338 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
3339 let accept_channel = msgs::AcceptChannel {
3340 temporary_channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3341 dust_limit_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
3342 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 2536655962884945560,
3343 channel_reserve_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
3344 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
3345 minimum_depth: 821716,
3346 to_self_delay: 49340,
3347 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
3348 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
3349 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
3350 payment_point: pubkey_3,
3351 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
3352 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
3353 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
3354 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { Some(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { None },
3357 next_local_nonce: None,
3359 let encoded_value = accept_channel.encode();
3360 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("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").unwrap();
3362 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
3364 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3368 fn encoding_accept_channel() {
3369 do_encoding_accept_channel(false);
3370 do_encoding_accept_channel(true);
3373 fn do_encoding_accept_channelv2(shutdown: bool) {
3374 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3375 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3376 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
3377 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
3378 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
3379 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
3380 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
3381 let (_, pubkey_7) = get_keys_from!("0707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707", secp_ctx);
3382 let accept_channelv2 = msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
3383 temporary_channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3384 funding_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
3385 dust_limit_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
3386 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 2536655962884945560,
3387 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
3388 minimum_depth: 821716,
3389 to_self_delay: 49340,
3390 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
3391 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
3392 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
3393 payment_basepoint: pubkey_3,
3394 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
3395 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
3396 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
3397 second_per_commitment_point: pubkey_7,
3398 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { Some(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { None },
3400 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
3402 let encoded_value = accept_channelv2.encode();
3403 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap(); // temporary_channel_id
3404 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1234567890123456").unwrap()); // funding_satoshis
3405 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1234567890123456").unwrap()); // dust_limit_satoshis
3406 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2334032891223698").unwrap()); // max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3407 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00083a840000034d").unwrap()); // htlc_minimum_msat
3408 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000c89d4").unwrap()); // minimum_depth
3409 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c0bc").unwrap()); // to_self_delay
3410 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c0bc").unwrap()); // max_accepted_htlcs
3411 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap()); // funding_pubkey
3412 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("024d4b6cd1361032ca9bd2aeb9d900aa4d45d9ead80ac9423374c451a7254d0766").unwrap()); // revocation_basepoint
3413 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02531fe6068134503d2723133227c867ac8fa6c83c537e9a44c3c5bdbdcb1fe337").unwrap()); // payment_basepoint
3414 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("03462779ad4aad39514614751a71085f2f10e1c7a593e4e030efb5b8721ce55b0b").unwrap()); // delayed_payment_basepoint
3415 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0362c0a046dacce86ddd0343c6d3c7c79c2208ba0d9c9cf24a6d046d21d21f90f7").unwrap()); // htlc_basepoint
3416 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("03f006a18d5653c4edf5391ff23a61f03ff83d237e880ee61187fa9f379a028e0a").unwrap()); // first_per_commitment_point
3417 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02989c0b76cb563971fdc9bef31ec06c3560f3249d6ee9e5d83c57625596e05f6f").unwrap()); // second_per_commitment_point
3419 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001b").unwrap()); // Type 0 + Length 27
3420 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
3422 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3426 fn encoding_accept_channelv2() {
3427 do_encoding_accept_channelv2(false);
3428 do_encoding_accept_channelv2(true);
3432 fn encoding_funding_created() {
3433 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3434 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3435 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
3436 let funding_created = msgs::FundingCreated {
3437 temporary_channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3438 funding_txid: Txid::from_str("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap(),
3439 funding_output_index: 255,
3442 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
3444 next_local_nonce: None,
3446 let encoded_value = funding_created.encode();
3447 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202026e96fe9f8b0ddcd729ba03cfafa5a27b050b39d354dd980814268dfa9a44d4c200ffd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
3448 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3452 fn encoding_funding_signed() {
3453 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3454 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3455 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
3456 let funding_signed = msgs::FundingSigned {
3457 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3460 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
3462 let encoded_value = funding_signed.encode();
3463 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
3464 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3468 fn encoding_channel_ready() {
3469 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3470 let (_, pubkey_1,) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3471 let channel_ready = msgs::ChannelReady {
3472 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3473 next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
3474 short_channel_id_alias: None,
3476 let encoded_value = channel_ready.encode();
3477 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap();
3478 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3482 fn encoding_splice() {
3483 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3484 let (_, pubkey_1,) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3485 let splice = msgs::Splice {
3486 chain_hash: ChainHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
3487 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3488 relative_satoshis: 123456,
3489 funding_feerate_perkw: 2000,
3491 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
3493 let encoded_value = splice.encode();
3494 assert_eq!(encoded_value.as_hex().to_string(), "02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202026fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000000000000001e240000007d000000000031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f");
3498 fn encoding_stfu() {
3499 let stfu = msgs::Stfu {
3500 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3503 let encoded_value = stfu.encode();
3504 assert_eq!(encoded_value.as_hex().to_string(), "020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020201");
3508 fn encoding_splice_ack() {
3509 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3510 let (_, pubkey_1,) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3511 let splice = msgs::SpliceAck {
3512 chain_hash: ChainHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
3513 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3514 relative_satoshis: 123456,
3515 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
3517 let encoded_value = splice.encode();
3518 assert_eq!(encoded_value.as_hex().to_string(), "02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202026fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000000000000001e240031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f");
3522 fn encoding_splice_locked() {
3523 let splice = msgs::SpliceLocked {
3524 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3526 let encoded_value = splice.encode();
3527 assert_eq!(encoded_value.as_hex().to_string(), "0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202");
3531 fn encoding_tx_add_input() {
3532 let tx_add_input = msgs::TxAddInput {
3533 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3534 serial_id: 4886718345,
3535 prevtx: TransactionU16LenLimited::new(Transaction {
3537 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
3539 previous_output: OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_str("305bab643ee297b8b6b76b320792c8223d55082122cb606bf89382146ced9c77").unwrap(), index: 2 }.into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
3540 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
3541 sequence: Sequence(0xfffffffd),
3542 witness: Witness::from_slice(&vec![
3543 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("304402206af85b7dd67450ad12c979302fac49dfacbc6a8620f49c5da2b5721cf9565ca502207002b32fed9ce1bf095f57aeb10c36928ac60b12e723d97d2964a54640ceefa701").unwrap(),
3544 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0301ab7dc16488303549bfcdd80f6ae5ee4c20bf97ab5410bbd6b1bfa85dcd6944").unwrap()]),
3549 script_pubkey: Address::from_str("bc1qzlffunw52jav8vwdu5x3jfk6sr8u22rmq3xzw2").unwrap().payload.script_pubkey(),
3553 script_pubkey: Address::from_str("bc1qxmk834g5marzm227dgqvynd23y2nvt2ztwcw2z").unwrap().payload.script_pubkey(),
3557 prevtx_out: 305419896,
3558 sequence: 305419896,
3560 let encoded_value = tx_add_input.encode();
3561 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("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").unwrap();
3562 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3566 fn encoding_tx_add_output() {
3567 let tx_add_output = msgs::TxAddOutput {
3568 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3569 serial_id: 4886718345,
3571 script: Address::from_str("bc1qxmk834g5marzm227dgqvynd23y2nvt2ztwcw2z").unwrap().payload.script_pubkey(),
3573 let encoded_value = tx_add_output.encode();
3574 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000000012345678900000001234567890016001436ec78d514df462da95e6a00c24daa8915362d42").unwrap();
3575 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3579 fn encoding_tx_remove_input() {
3580 let tx_remove_input = msgs::TxRemoveInput {
3581 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3582 serial_id: 4886718345,
3584 let encoded_value = tx_remove_input.encode();
3585 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020000000123456789").unwrap();
3586 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3590 fn encoding_tx_remove_output() {
3591 let tx_remove_output = msgs::TxRemoveOutput {
3592 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3593 serial_id: 4886718345,
3595 let encoded_value = tx_remove_output.encode();
3596 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020000000123456789").unwrap();
3597 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3601 fn encoding_tx_complete() {
3602 let tx_complete = msgs::TxComplete {
3603 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3605 let encoded_value = tx_complete.encode();
3606 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap();
3607 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3611 fn encoding_tx_signatures() {
3612 let tx_signatures = msgs::TxSignatures {
3613 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3614 tx_hash: Txid::from_str("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap(),
3616 Witness::from_slice(&vec![
3617 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("304402206af85b7dd67450ad12c979302fac49dfacbc6a8620f49c5da2b5721cf9565ca502207002b32fed9ce1bf095f57aeb10c36928ac60b12e723d97d2964a54640ceefa701").unwrap(),
3618 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0301ab7dc16488303549bfcdd80f6ae5ee4c20bf97ab5410bbd6b1bfa85dcd6944").unwrap()]),
3619 Witness::from_slice(&vec![
3620 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3045022100ee00dbf4a862463e837d7c08509de814d620e4d9830fa84818713e0fa358f145022021c3c7060c4d53fe84fd165d60208451108a778c13b92ca4c6bad439236126cc01").unwrap(),
3621 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("028fbbf0b16f5ba5bcb5dd37cd4047ce6f726a21c06682f9ec2f52b057de1dbdb5").unwrap()]),
3624 let encoded_value = tx_signatures.encode();
3625 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap(); // channel_id
3626 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("6e96fe9f8b0ddcd729ba03cfafa5a27b050b39d354dd980814268dfa9a44d4c2").unwrap()); // tx_hash (sha256) (big endian byte order)
3627 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0002").unwrap()); // num_witnesses (u16)
3629 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("006b").unwrap()); // len of witness_data
3630 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02").unwrap()); // num_witness_elements (VarInt)
3631 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("47").unwrap()); // len of witness element data (VarInt)
3632 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("304402206af85b7dd67450ad12c979302fac49dfacbc6a8620f49c5da2b5721cf9565ca502207002b32fed9ce1bf095f57aeb10c36928ac60b12e723d97d2964a54640ceefa701").unwrap());
3633 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("21").unwrap()); // len of witness element data (VarInt)
3634 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0301ab7dc16488303549bfcdd80f6ae5ee4c20bf97ab5410bbd6b1bfa85dcd6944").unwrap());
3636 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("006c").unwrap()); // len of witness_data
3637 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02").unwrap()); // num_witness_elements (VarInt)
3638 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("48").unwrap()); // len of witness element data (VarInt)
3639 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3045022100ee00dbf4a862463e837d7c08509de814d620e4d9830fa84818713e0fa358f145022021c3c7060c4d53fe84fd165d60208451108a778c13b92ca4c6bad439236126cc01").unwrap());
3640 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("21").unwrap()); // len of witness element data (VarInt)
3641 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("028fbbf0b16f5ba5bcb5dd37cd4047ce6f726a21c06682f9ec2f52b057de1dbdb5").unwrap());
3642 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3645 fn do_encoding_tx_init_rbf(funding_value_with_hex_target: Option<(i64, &str)>) {
3646 let tx_init_rbf = msgs::TxInitRbf {
3647 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3648 locktime: 305419896,
3649 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: 20190119,
3650 funding_output_contribution: if let Some((value, _)) = funding_value_with_hex_target { Some(value) } else { None },
3652 let encoded_value = tx_init_rbf.encode();
3653 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap(); // channel_id
3654 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("12345678").unwrap()); // locktime
3655 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("013413a7").unwrap()); // feerate_sat_per_1000_weight
3656 if let Some((_, target)) = funding_value_with_hex_target {
3657 target_value.push(0x00); // Type
3658 target_value.push(target.len() as u8 / 2); // Length
3659 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(target).unwrap()); // Value (i64)
3661 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3665 fn encoding_tx_init_rbf() {
3666 do_encoding_tx_init_rbf(Some((1311768467284833366, "1234567890123456")));
3667 do_encoding_tx_init_rbf(Some((13117684672, "000000030DDFFBC0")));
3668 do_encoding_tx_init_rbf(None);
3671 fn do_encoding_tx_ack_rbf(funding_value_with_hex_target: Option<(i64, &str)>) {
3672 let tx_ack_rbf = msgs::TxAckRbf {
3673 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3674 funding_output_contribution: if let Some((value, _)) = funding_value_with_hex_target { Some(value) } else { None },
3676 let encoded_value = tx_ack_rbf.encode();
3677 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap();
3678 if let Some((_, target)) = funding_value_with_hex_target {
3679 target_value.push(0x00); // Type
3680 target_value.push(target.len() as u8 / 2); // Length
3681 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(target).unwrap()); // Value (i64)
3683 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3687 fn encoding_tx_ack_rbf() {
3688 do_encoding_tx_ack_rbf(Some((1311768467284833366, "1234567890123456")));
3689 do_encoding_tx_ack_rbf(Some((13117684672, "000000030DDFFBC0")));
3690 do_encoding_tx_ack_rbf(None);
3694 fn encoding_tx_abort() {
3695 let tx_abort = msgs::TxAbort {
3696 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3697 data: <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("54686520717569636B2062726F776E20666F78206A756D7073206F76657220746865206C617A7920646F672E").unwrap(),
3699 let encoded_value = tx_abort.encode();
3700 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202002C54686520717569636B2062726F776E20666F78206A756D7073206F76657220746865206C617A7920646F672E").unwrap();
3701 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3704 fn do_encoding_shutdown(script_type: u8) {
3705 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3706 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3707 let script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::OP_TRUE).into_script();
3708 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
3709 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3711 if script_type == 1 { Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() }
3712 else if script_type == 2 { Address::p2sh(&script, Network::Testnet).unwrap().script_pubkey() }
3713 else if script_type == 3 { Address::p2wpkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).unwrap().script_pubkey() }
3714 else { Address::p2wsh(&script, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() },
3716 let encoded_value = shutdown.encode();
3717 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap();
3718 if script_type == 1 {
3719 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
3720 } else if script_type == 2 {
3721 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0017a914da1745e9b549bd0bfa1a569971c77eba30cd5a4b87").unwrap());
3722 } else if script_type == 3 {
3723 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0016001479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b235983").unwrap());
3724 } else if script_type == 4 {
3725 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("002200204ae81572f06e1b88fd5ced7a1a000945432e83e1551e6f721ee9c00b8cc33260").unwrap());
3727 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3731 fn encoding_shutdown() {
3732 do_encoding_shutdown(1);
3733 do_encoding_shutdown(2);
3734 do_encoding_shutdown(3);
3735 do_encoding_shutdown(4);
3739 fn encoding_closing_signed() {
3740 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3741 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3742 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
3743 let closing_signed = msgs::ClosingSigned {
3744 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3745 fee_satoshis: 2316138423780173,
3749 let encoded_value = closing_signed.encode();
3750 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
3751 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3752 assert_eq!(msgs::ClosingSigned::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value)).unwrap(), closing_signed);
3754 let closing_signed_with_range = msgs::ClosingSigned {
3755 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3756 fee_satoshis: 2316138423780173,
3758 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
3759 min_fee_satoshis: 0xdeadbeef,
3760 max_fee_satoshis: 0x1badcafe01234567,
3763 let encoded_value_with_range = closing_signed_with_range.encode();
3764 let target_value_with_range = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a011000000000deadbeef1badcafe01234567").unwrap();
3765 assert_eq!(encoded_value_with_range, target_value_with_range);
3766 assert_eq!(msgs::ClosingSigned::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value_with_range)).unwrap(),
3767 closing_signed_with_range);
3771 fn encoding_update_add_htlc() {
3772 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3773 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3774 let onion_routing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
3776 public_key: Ok(pubkey_1),
3777 hop_data: [1; 20*65],
3780 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3781 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3782 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
3783 amount_msat: 3608586615801332854,
3784 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3785 cltv_expiry: 821716,
3786 onion_routing_packet,
3787 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
3788 blinding_point: None,
3790 let encoded_value = update_add_htlc.encode();
3791 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("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").unwrap();
3792 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3796 fn encoding_update_fulfill_htlc() {
3797 let update_fulfill_htlc = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3798 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3799 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
3800 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([1; 32]),
3802 let encoded_value = update_fulfill_htlc.encode();
3803 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap();
3804 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3808 fn encoding_update_fail_htlc() {
3809 let reason = OnionErrorPacket {
3810 data: [1; 32].to_vec(),
3812 let update_fail_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3813 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3814 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
3817 let encoded_value = update_fail_htlc.encode();
3818 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d00200101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap();
3819 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3823 fn encoding_update_fail_malformed_htlc() {
3824 let update_fail_malformed_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3825 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3826 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
3827 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
3830 let encoded_value = update_fail_malformed_htlc.encode();
3831 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010100ff").unwrap();
3832 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3835 fn do_encoding_commitment_signed(htlcs: bool) {
3836 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3837 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3838 let (privkey_2, _) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
3839 let (privkey_3, _) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
3840 let (privkey_4, _) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
3841 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
3842 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey_2, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
3843 let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
3844 let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
3845 let commitment_signed = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
3846 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3848 htlc_signatures: if htlcs { vec![sig_2, sig_3, sig_4] } else { Vec::new() },
3850 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
3852 let encoded_value = commitment_signed.encode();
3853 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
3855 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00031735b6a427e80d5fe7cd90a2f4ee08dc9c27cda7c35a4172e5d85b12c49d4232537e98f9b1f3c5e6989a8b9644e90e8918127680dbd0d4043510840fc0f1e11a216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f91e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d2692b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
3857 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000").unwrap());
3859 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3863 fn encoding_commitment_signed() {
3864 do_encoding_commitment_signed(true);
3865 do_encoding_commitment_signed(false);
3869 fn encoding_revoke_and_ack() {
3870 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3871 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3872 let raa = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3873 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3874 per_commitment_secret: [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1],
3875 next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
3877 next_local_nonce: None,
3879 let encoded_value = raa.encode();
3880 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap();
3881 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3885 fn encoding_update_fee() {
3886 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
3887 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3888 feerate_per_kw: 20190119,
3890 let encoded_value = update_fee.encode();
3891 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202013413a7").unwrap();
3892 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3896 fn encoding_init() {
3897 let mainnet_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin);
3898 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
3899 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF]),
3900 networks: Some(vec![mainnet_hash]),
3901 remote_network_address: None,
3902 }.encode(), <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00023fff0003ffffff01206fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap());
3903 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
3904 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF]),
3906 remote_network_address: None,
3907 }.encode(), <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0001ff0001ff").unwrap());
3908 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
3909 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
3910 networks: Some(vec![mainnet_hash]),
3911 remote_network_address: None,
3912 }.encode(), <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000001206fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap());
3913 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
3914 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
3915 networks: Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&[1; 32]), ChainHash::from(&[2; 32])]),
3916 remote_network_address: None,
3917 }.encode(), <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00000000014001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap());
3918 let init_msg = msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
3919 networks: Some(vec![mainnet_hash]),
3920 remote_network_address: Some(SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 {
3921 addr: [127, 0, 0, 1],
3925 let encoded_value = init_msg.encode();
3926 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000001206fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d61900000000000307017f00000103e8").unwrap();
3927 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3928 assert_eq!(msgs::Init::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value)).unwrap(), init_msg);
3932 fn encoding_error() {
3933 let error = msgs::ErrorMessage {
3934 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3935 data: String::from("rust-lightning"),
3937 let encoded_value = error.encode();
3938 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000e727573742d6c696768746e696e67").unwrap();
3939 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3943 fn encoding_warning() {
3944 let error = msgs::WarningMessage {
3945 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3946 data: String::from("rust-lightning"),
3948 let encoded_value = error.encode();
3949 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000e727573742d6c696768746e696e67").unwrap();
3950 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3954 fn encoding_ping() {
3955 let ping = msgs::Ping {
3959 let encoded_value = ping.encode();
3960 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0040004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap();
3961 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3965 fn encoding_pong() {
3966 let pong = msgs::Pong {
3969 let encoded_value = pong.encode();
3970 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap();
3971 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3975 fn encoding_nonfinal_onion_hop_data() {
3976 let outbound_msg = msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Forward {
3977 short_channel_id: 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea,
3978 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
3979 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
3981 let encoded_value = outbound_msg.encode();
3982 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1a02080badf00d010203040404ffffffff0608deadbeef1bad1dea").unwrap();
3983 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3985 let node_signer = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], Network::Testnet);
3986 let inbound_msg = ReadableArgs::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]), &&node_signer).unwrap();
3987 if let msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
3988 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
3990 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea);
3991 assert_eq!(amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
3992 assert_eq!(outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
3993 } else { panic!(); }
3997 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data() {
3998 let outbound_msg = msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive {
4000 payment_metadata: None,
4001 keysend_preimage: None,
4002 amt_msat: 0x0badf00d01020304,
4003 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
4004 custom_tlvs: vec![],
4006 let encoded_value = outbound_msg.encode();
4007 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1002080badf00d010203040404ffffffff").unwrap();
4008 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
4010 let node_signer = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], Network::Testnet);
4011 let inbound_msg = ReadableArgs::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]), &&node_signer).unwrap();
4012 if let msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
4013 payment_data: None, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4015 assert_eq!(amt_msat, 0x0badf00d01020304);
4016 assert_eq!(outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
4017 } else { panic!(); }
4021 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data_with_secret() {
4022 let expected_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([0x42u8; 32]);
4023 let outbound_msg = msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive {
4024 payment_data: Some(FinalOnionHopData {
4025 payment_secret: expected_payment_secret,
4026 total_msat: 0x1badca1f
4028 payment_metadata: None,
4029 keysend_preimage: None,
4030 amt_msat: 0x0badf00d01020304,
4031 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
4032 custom_tlvs: vec![],
4034 let encoded_value = outbound_msg.encode();
4035 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3602080badf00d010203040404ffffffff082442424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242421badca1f").unwrap();
4036 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
4038 let node_signer = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], Network::Testnet);
4039 let inbound_msg = ReadableArgs::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]), &&node_signer).unwrap();
4040 if let msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
4041 payment_data: Some(FinalOnionHopData {
4043 total_msat: 0x1badca1f
4045 amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4046 payment_metadata: None,
4047 keysend_preimage: None,
4050 assert_eq!(payment_secret, expected_payment_secret);
4051 assert_eq!(amt_msat, 0x0badf00d01020304);
4052 assert_eq!(outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
4053 assert_eq!(custom_tlvs, vec![]);
4054 } else { panic!(); }
4058 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data_with_bad_custom_tlvs() {
4059 // If custom TLVs have type number within the range reserved for protocol, treat them as if
4061 let bad_type_range_tlvs = vec![
4062 ((1 << 16) - 4, vec![42]),
4063 ((1 << 16) - 2, vec![42; 32]),
4065 let mut msg = msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive {
4067 payment_metadata: None,
4068 keysend_preimage: None,
4069 custom_tlvs: bad_type_range_tlvs,
4070 amt_msat: 0x0badf00d01020304,
4071 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
4073 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
4074 let node_signer = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], Network::Testnet);
4075 assert!(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::read(&mut Cursor::new(&encoded_value[..]), &&node_signer).is_err());
4076 let good_type_range_tlvs = vec![
4077 ((1 << 16) - 3, vec![42]),
4078 ((1 << 16) - 1, vec![42; 32]),
4080 if let msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive { ref mut custom_tlvs, .. } = msg {
4081 *custom_tlvs = good_type_range_tlvs.clone();
4083 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
4084 let inbound_msg = ReadableArgs::read(&mut Cursor::new(&encoded_value[..]), &&node_signer).unwrap();
4086 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { custom_tlvs, .. } => assert!(custom_tlvs.is_empty()),
4092 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data_with_custom_tlvs() {
4093 let expected_custom_tlvs = vec![
4094 (5482373483, vec![0x12, 0x34]),
4095 (5482373487, vec![0x42u8; 8]),
4097 let msg = msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive {
4099 payment_metadata: None,
4100 keysend_preimage: None,
4101 custom_tlvs: expected_custom_tlvs.clone(),
4102 amt_msat: 0x0badf00d01020304,
4103 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
4105 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
4106 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2e02080badf00d010203040404ffffffffff0000000146c6616b021234ff0000000146c6616f084242424242424242").unwrap();
4107 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
4108 let node_signer = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], Network::Testnet);
4109 let inbound_msg: msgs::InboundOnionPayload = ReadableArgs::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]), &&node_signer).unwrap();
4110 if let msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
4112 payment_metadata: None,
4113 keysend_preimage: None,
4116 outgoing_cltv_value,
4119 assert_eq!(custom_tlvs, expected_custom_tlvs);
4120 assert_eq!(amt_msat, 0x0badf00d01020304);
4121 assert_eq!(outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
4122 } else { panic!(); }
4126 fn query_channel_range_end_blocknum() {
4127 let tests: Vec<(u32, u32, u32)> = vec![
4128 (10000, 1500, 11500),
4129 (0, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
4130 (1, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
4133 for (first_blocknum, number_of_blocks, expected) in tests.into_iter() {
4134 let sut = msgs::QueryChannelRange {
4135 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Regtest),
4139 assert_eq!(sut.end_blocknum(), expected);
4144 fn encoding_query_channel_range() {
4145 let mut query_channel_range = msgs::QueryChannelRange {
4146 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Regtest),
4147 first_blocknum: 100000,
4148 number_of_blocks: 1500,
4150 let encoded_value = query_channel_range.encode();
4151 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f000186a0000005dc").unwrap();
4152 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
4154 query_channel_range = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
4155 assert_eq!(query_channel_range.first_blocknum, 100000);
4156 assert_eq!(query_channel_range.number_of_blocks, 1500);
4160 fn encoding_reply_channel_range() {
4161 do_encoding_reply_channel_range(0);
4162 do_encoding_reply_channel_range(1);
4165 fn do_encoding_reply_channel_range(encoding_type: u8) {
4166 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f000b8a06000005dc01").unwrap();
4167 let expected_chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Regtest);
4168 let mut reply_channel_range = msgs::ReplyChannelRange {
4169 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
4170 first_blocknum: 756230,
4171 number_of_blocks: 1500,
4172 sync_complete: true,
4173 short_channel_ids: vec![0x000000000000008e, 0x0000000000003c69, 0x000000000045a6c4],
4176 if encoding_type == 0 {
4177 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001900000000000000008e0000000000003c69000000000045a6c4").unwrap());
4178 let encoded_value = reply_channel_range.encode();
4179 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
4181 reply_channel_range = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
4182 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
4183 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.first_blocknum, 756230);
4184 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.number_of_blocks, 1500);
4185 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.sync_complete, true);
4186 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[0], 0x000000000000008e);
4187 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[1], 0x0000000000003c69);
4188 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[2], 0x000000000045a6c4);
4190 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001601789c636000833e08659309a65878be010010a9023a").unwrap());
4191 let result: Result<msgs::ReplyChannelRange, msgs::DecodeError> = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]));
4192 assert!(result.is_err(), "Expected decode failure with unsupported zlib encoding");
4197 fn encoding_query_short_channel_ids() {
4198 do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(0);
4199 do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(1);
4202 fn do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(encoding_type: u8) {
4203 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
4204 let expected_chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Regtest);
4205 let mut query_short_channel_ids = msgs::QueryShortChannelIds {
4206 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
4207 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0000000000008e, 0x0000000000003c69, 0x000000000045a6c4],
4210 if encoding_type == 0 {
4211 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001900000000000000008e0000000000003c69000000000045a6c4").unwrap());
4212 let encoded_value = query_short_channel_ids.encode();
4213 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
4215 query_short_channel_ids = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
4216 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
4217 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[0], 0x000000000000008e);
4218 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[1], 0x0000000000003c69);
4219 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[2], 0x000000000045a6c4);
4221 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001601789c636000833e08659309a65878be010010a9023a").unwrap());
4222 let result: Result<msgs::QueryShortChannelIds, msgs::DecodeError> = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]));
4223 assert!(result.is_err(), "Expected decode failure with unsupported zlib encoding");
4228 fn encoding_reply_short_channel_ids_end() {
4229 let expected_chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Regtest);
4230 let mut reply_short_channel_ids_end = msgs::ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
4231 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
4232 full_information: true,
4234 let encoded_value = reply_short_channel_ids_end.encode();
4235 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f01").unwrap();
4236 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
4238 reply_short_channel_ids_end = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
4239 assert_eq!(reply_short_channel_ids_end.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
4240 assert_eq!(reply_short_channel_ids_end.full_information, true);
4244 fn encoding_gossip_timestamp_filter(){
4245 let expected_chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Regtest);
4246 let mut gossip_timestamp_filter = msgs::GossipTimestampFilter {
4247 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
4248 first_timestamp: 1590000000,
4249 timestamp_range: 0xffff_ffff,
4251 let encoded_value = gossip_timestamp_filter.encode();
4252 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f5ec57980ffffffff").unwrap();
4253 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
4255 gossip_timestamp_filter = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
4256 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
4257 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.first_timestamp, 1590000000);
4258 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.timestamp_range, 0xffff_ffff);
4262 fn decode_onion_hop_data_len_as_bigsize() {
4263 // Tests that we can decode an onion payload that is >253 bytes.
4264 // Previously, receiving a payload of this size could've caused us to fail to decode a valid
4265 // payload, because we were decoding the length (a BigSize, big-endian) as a VarInt
4268 // Encode a test onion payload with a big custom TLV such that it's >253 bytes, forcing the
4269 // payload length to be encoded over multiple bytes rather than a single u8.
4270 let big_payload = encode_big_payload().unwrap();
4271 let mut rd = Cursor::new(&big_payload[..]);
4273 let node_signer = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], Network::Testnet);
4274 <msgs::InboundOnionPayload as ReadableArgs<&&test_utils::TestKeysInterface>>
4275 ::read(&mut rd, &&node_signer).unwrap();
4277 // see above test, needs to be a separate method for use of the serialization macros.
4278 fn encode_big_payload() -> Result<Vec<u8>, io::Error> {
4279 use crate::util::ser::HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize;
4280 let payload = msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Forward {
4281 short_channel_id: 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea,
4282 amt_to_forward: 1000,
4283 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
4285 let mut encoded_payload = Vec::new();
4286 let test_bytes = vec![42u8; 1000];
4287 if let msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } = payload {
4288 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(&mut encoded_payload, {
4289 (1, test_bytes, required_vec),
4290 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(amt_to_forward), required),
4291 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(outgoing_cltv_value), required),
4292 (6, short_channel_id, required)
4299 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
4300 fn test_socket_address_from_str() {
4301 let tcpip_v4 = SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 {
4302 addr: Ipv4Addr::new(127, 0, 0, 1).octets(),
4305 assert_eq!(tcpip_v4, SocketAddress::from_str("127.0.0.1:1234").unwrap());
4306 assert_eq!(tcpip_v4, SocketAddress::from_str(&tcpip_v4.to_string()).unwrap());
4308 let tcpip_v6 = SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 {
4309 addr: Ipv6Addr::new(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1).octets(),
4312 assert_eq!(tcpip_v6, SocketAddress::from_str("[0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1]:1234").unwrap());
4313 assert_eq!(tcpip_v6, SocketAddress::from_str(&tcpip_v6.to_string()).unwrap());
4315 let hostname = SocketAddress::Hostname {
4316 hostname: Hostname::try_from("lightning-node.mydomain.com".to_string()).unwrap(),
4319 assert_eq!(hostname, SocketAddress::from_str("lightning-node.mydomain.com:1234").unwrap());
4320 assert_eq!(hostname, SocketAddress::from_str(&hostname.to_string()).unwrap());
4322 let onion_v2 = SocketAddress::OnionV2 ([40, 4, 64, 185, 202, 19, 162, 75, 90, 200, 38, 7],);
4323 assert_eq!("OnionV2([40, 4, 64, 185, 202, 19, 162, 75, 90, 200, 38, 7])", &onion_v2.to_string());
4324 assert_eq!(Err(SocketAddressParseError::InvalidOnionV3), SocketAddress::from_str("FACEBOOKCOREWWWI.onion:9735"));
4326 let onion_v3 = SocketAddress::OnionV3 {
4327 ed25519_pubkey: [37, 24, 75, 5, 25, 73, 117, 194, 139, 102, 182, 107, 4, 105, 247, 246, 85,
4328 111, 177, 172, 49, 137, 167, 155, 64, 221, 163, 47, 31, 33, 71, 3],
4333 assert_eq!(onion_v3, SocketAddress::from_str("pg6mmjiyjmcrsslvykfwnntlaru7p5svn6y2ymmju6nubxndf4pscryd.onion:1234").unwrap());
4334 assert_eq!(onion_v3, SocketAddress::from_str(&onion_v3.to_string()).unwrap());
4336 assert_eq!(Err(SocketAddressParseError::InvalidOnionV3), SocketAddress::from_str("pg6mmjiyjmcrsslvykfwnntlaru7p5svn6.onion:1234"));
4337 assert_eq!(Err(SocketAddressParseError::InvalidInput), SocketAddress::from_str("127.0.0.1@1234"));
4338 assert_eq!(Err(SocketAddressParseError::InvalidInput), "".parse::<SocketAddress>());
4339 assert!(SocketAddress::from_str("pg6mmjiyjmcrsslvykfwnntlaru7p5svn6y2ymmju6nubxndf4pscryd.onion.onion:9735:94").is_err());
4340 assert!(SocketAddress::from_str("wrong$%#.com:1234").is_err());
4341 assert_eq!(Err(SocketAddressParseError::InvalidPort), SocketAddress::from_str("example.com:wrong"));
4342 assert!("localhost".parse::<SocketAddress>().is_err());
4343 assert!("localhost:invalid-port".parse::<SocketAddress>().is_err());
4344 assert!( "invalid-onion-v3-hostname.onion:8080".parse::<SocketAddress>().is_err());
4345 assert!("b32.example.onion:invalid-port".parse::<SocketAddress>().is_err());
4346 assert!("invalid-address".parse::<SocketAddress>().is_err());
4347 assert!(SocketAddress::from_str("pg6mmjiyjmcrsslvykfwnntlaru7p5svn6y2ymmju6nubxndf4pscryd.onion.onion:1234").is_err());
4351 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
4352 fn test_socket_address_to_socket_addrs() {
4353 assert_eq!(SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 {addr:[0u8; 4], port: 1337,}.to_socket_addrs().unwrap().next().unwrap(),
4354 SocketAddr::V4(SocketAddrV4::new(Ipv4Addr::new(0,0,0,0), 1337)));
4355 assert_eq!(SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 {addr:[0u8; 16], port: 1337,}.to_socket_addrs().unwrap().next().unwrap(),
4356 SocketAddr::V6(SocketAddrV6::new(Ipv6Addr::from([0u8; 16]), 1337, 0, 0)));
4357 assert_eq!(SocketAddress::Hostname { hostname: Hostname::try_from("0.0.0.0".to_string()).unwrap(), port: 0 }
4358 .to_socket_addrs().unwrap().next().unwrap(), SocketAddr::V4(SocketAddrV4::new(Ipv4Addr::from([0u8; 4]),0)));
4359 assert!(SocketAddress::OnionV2([0u8; 12]).to_socket_addrs().is_err());
4360 assert!(SocketAddress::OnionV3{ ed25519_pubkey: [37, 24, 75, 5, 25, 73, 117, 194, 139, 102,
4361 182, 107, 4, 105, 247, 246, 85, 111, 177, 172, 49, 137, 167, 155, 64, 221, 163, 47, 31,
4365 port: 1234 }.to_socket_addrs().is_err());