1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Wire messages, traits representing wire message handlers, and a few error types live here.
12 //! For a normal node you probably don't need to use anything here, however, if you wish to split a
13 //! node into an internet-facing route/message socket handling daemon and a separate daemon (or
14 //! server entirely) which handles only channel-related messages you may wish to implement
15 //! [`ChannelMessageHandler`] yourself and use it to re-serialize messages and pass them across
18 //! Note that if you go with such an architecture (instead of passing raw socket events to a
19 //! non-internet-facing system) you trust the frontend internet-facing system to not lie about the
20 //! source `node_id` of the message, however this does allow you to significantly reduce bandwidth
21 //! between the systems as routing messages can represent a significant chunk of bandwidth usage
22 //! (especially for non-channel-publicly-announcing nodes). As an alternate design which avoids
23 //! this issue, if you have sufficient bidirectional bandwidth between your systems, you may send
24 //! raw socket events into your non-internet-facing system and then send routing events back to
25 //! track the network on the less-secure system.
27 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
28 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature;
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
30 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
33 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
34 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
35 use crate::onion_message;
37 use crate::prelude::*;
40 use crate::io::{self, Read};
41 use crate::io_extras::read_to_end;
43 use crate::util::events::{MessageSendEventsProvider, OnionMessageProvider};
44 use crate::util::logger;
45 use crate::util::ser::{LengthReadable, Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, FixedLengthReader, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize, Hostname};
47 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
49 /// 21 million * 10^8 * 1000
50 pub(crate) const MAX_VALUE_MSAT: u64 = 21_000_000_0000_0000_000;
52 /// An error in decoding a message or struct.
53 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
54 pub enum DecodeError {
55 /// A version byte specified something we don't know how to handle.
57 /// Includes unknown realm byte in an onion hop data packet.
59 /// Unknown feature mandating we fail to parse message (e.g., TLV with an even, unknown type)
60 UnknownRequiredFeature,
61 /// Value was invalid.
63 /// For example, a byte which was supposed to be a bool was something other than a 0
64 /// or 1, a public key/private key/signature was invalid, text wasn't UTF-8, TLV was
65 /// syntactically incorrect, etc.
67 /// The buffer to be read was too short.
69 /// A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly.
71 /// Error from [`std::io`].
73 /// The message included zlib-compressed values, which we don't support.
74 UnsupportedCompression,
77 /// An [`init`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
79 /// [`init`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-init-message
80 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
82 /// The relevant features which the sender supports.
83 pub features: InitFeatures,
84 /// The receipient's network address.
86 /// This adds the option to report a remote IP address back to a connecting peer using the init
87 /// message. A node can decide to use that information to discover a potential update to its
88 /// public IPv4 address (NAT) and use that for a [`NodeAnnouncement`] update message containing
90 pub remote_network_address: Option<NetAddress>,
93 /// An [`error`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
95 /// [`error`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-error-and-warning-messages
96 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
97 pub struct ErrorMessage {
98 /// The channel ID involved in the error.
100 /// All-0s indicates a general error unrelated to a specific channel, after which all channels
101 /// with the sending peer should be closed.
102 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
103 /// A possibly human-readable error description.
105 /// The string should be sanitized before it is used (e.g., emitted to logs or printed to
106 /// `stdout`). Otherwise, a well crafted error message may trigger a security vulnerability in
107 /// the terminal emulator or the logging subsystem.
111 /// A [`warning`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
113 /// [`warning`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-error-and-warning-messages
114 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
115 pub struct WarningMessage {
116 /// The channel ID involved in the warning.
118 /// All-0s indicates a warning unrelated to a specific channel.
119 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
120 /// A possibly human-readable warning description.
122 /// The string should be sanitized before it is used (e.g. emitted to logs or printed to
123 /// stdout). Otherwise, a well crafted error message may trigger a security vulnerability in
124 /// the terminal emulator or the logging subsystem.
128 /// A [`ping`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
130 /// [`ping`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-ping-and-pong-messages
131 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
133 /// The desired response length.
135 /// The ping packet size.
137 /// This field is not sent on the wire. byteslen zeros are sent.
141 /// A [`pong`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
143 /// [`pong`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-ping-and-pong-messages
144 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
146 /// The pong packet size.
148 /// This field is not sent on the wire. byteslen zeros are sent.
152 /// An [`open_channel`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
154 /// [`open_channel`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-open_channel-message
155 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
156 pub struct OpenChannel {
157 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
158 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
159 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
160 pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
161 /// The channel value
162 pub funding_satoshis: u64,
163 /// The amount to push to the counterparty as part of the open, in milli-satoshi
165 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by sender will be omitted
166 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
167 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards sender, in milli-satoshi
168 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
169 /// The minimum value unencumbered by HTLCs for the counterparty to keep in the channel
170 pub channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
171 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
172 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
173 /// The feerate per 1000-weight of sender generated transactions, until updated by
175 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
176 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if
177 /// they broadcast a commitment transaction
178 pub to_self_delay: u16,
179 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards sender
180 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
181 /// The sender's key controlling the funding transaction
182 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
183 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
184 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
185 /// A payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
186 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
187 /// Used to derive a payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by sender
188 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
189 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to sender
190 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
191 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-sender transaction's per commitment point
192 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
193 /// The channel flags to be used
194 pub channel_flags: u8,
195 /// Optionally, a request to pre-set the to-sender output's `scriptPubkey` for when we collaboratively close
196 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField<Script>,
197 /// The channel type that this channel will represent
199 /// If this is `None`, we derive the channel type from the intersection of our
200 /// feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from the [`Init`] message.
201 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
204 /// An [`accept_channel`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
206 /// [`accept_channel`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-accept_channel-message
207 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
208 pub struct AcceptChannel {
209 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
210 pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
211 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by sender will be omitted
212 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
213 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards sender, in milli-satoshi
214 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
215 /// The minimum value unencumbered by HTLCs for the counterparty to keep in the channel
216 pub channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
217 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
218 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
219 /// Minimum depth of the funding transaction before the channel is considered open
220 pub minimum_depth: u32,
221 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if they broadcast a commitment transaction
222 pub to_self_delay: u16,
223 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards sender
224 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
225 /// The sender's key controlling the funding transaction
226 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
227 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
228 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
229 /// A payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
230 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
231 /// Used to derive a payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by sender
232 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
233 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
234 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
235 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-sender transaction's per commitment point
236 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
237 /// Optionally, a request to pre-set the to-sender output's scriptPubkey for when we collaboratively close
238 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField<Script>,
239 /// The channel type that this channel will represent.
241 /// If this is `None`, we derive the channel type from the intersection of
242 /// our feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from the [`Init`] message.
243 /// This is required to match the equivalent field in [`OpenChannel::channel_type`].
244 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
247 /// A [`funding_created`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
249 /// [`funding_created`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-funding_created-message
250 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
251 pub struct FundingCreated {
252 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding is established
253 pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
254 /// The funding transaction ID
255 pub funding_txid: Txid,
256 /// The specific output index funding this channel
257 pub funding_output_index: u16,
258 /// The signature of the channel initiator (funder) on the initial commitment transaction
259 pub signature: Signature,
262 /// A [`funding_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
264 /// [`funding_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-funding_signed-message
265 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
266 pub struct FundingSigned {
268 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
269 /// The signature of the channel acceptor (fundee) on the initial commitment transaction
270 pub signature: Signature,
273 /// A [`channel_ready`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
275 /// [`channel_ready`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-channel_ready-message
276 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
277 pub struct ChannelReady {
279 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
280 /// The per-commitment point of the second commitment transaction
281 pub next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
282 /// If set, provides a `short_channel_id` alias for this channel.
284 /// The sender will accept payments to be forwarded over this SCID and forward them to this
285 /// messages' recipient.
286 pub short_channel_id_alias: Option<u64>,
289 /// A [`shutdown`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
291 /// [`shutdown`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#closing-initiation-shutdown
292 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
293 pub struct Shutdown {
295 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
296 /// The destination of this peer's funds on closing.
298 /// Must be in one of these forms: P2PKH, P2SH, P2WPKH, P2WSH, P2TR.
299 pub scriptpubkey: Script,
302 /// The minimum and maximum fees which the sender is willing to place on the closing transaction.
304 /// This is provided in [`ClosingSigned`] by both sides to indicate the fee range they are willing
306 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
307 pub struct ClosingSignedFeeRange {
308 /// The minimum absolute fee, in satoshis, which the sender is willing to place on the closing
310 pub min_fee_satoshis: u64,
311 /// The maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, which the sender is willing to place on the closing
313 pub max_fee_satoshis: u64,
316 /// A [`closing_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
318 /// [`closing_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#closing-negotiation-closing_signed
319 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
320 pub struct ClosingSigned {
322 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
323 /// The proposed total fee for the closing transaction
324 pub fee_satoshis: u64,
325 /// A signature on the closing transaction
326 pub signature: Signature,
327 /// The minimum and maximum fees which the sender is willing to accept, provided only by new
329 pub fee_range: Option<ClosingSignedFeeRange>,
332 /// An [`update_add_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
334 /// [`update_add_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#adding-an-htlc-update_add_htlc
335 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
336 pub struct UpdateAddHTLC {
338 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
341 /// The HTLC value in milli-satoshi
342 pub amount_msat: u64,
343 /// The payment hash, the pre-image of which controls HTLC redemption
344 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
345 /// The expiry height of the HTLC
346 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
347 pub(crate) onion_routing_packet: OnionPacket,
350 /// An onion message to be sent to or received from a peer.
352 // TODO: update with link to OM when they are merged into the BOLTs
353 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
354 pub struct OnionMessage {
355 /// Used in decrypting the onion packet's payload.
356 pub blinding_point: PublicKey,
357 pub(crate) onion_routing_packet: onion_message::Packet,
360 /// An [`update_fulfill_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
362 /// [`update_fulfill_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
363 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
364 pub struct UpdateFulfillHTLC {
366 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
369 /// The pre-image of the payment hash, allowing HTLC redemption
370 pub payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
373 /// An [`update_fail_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
375 /// [`update_fail_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
376 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
377 pub struct UpdateFailHTLC {
379 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
382 pub(crate) reason: OnionErrorPacket,
385 /// An [`update_fail_malformed_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
387 /// [`update_fail_malformed_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
388 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
389 pub struct UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
391 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
394 pub(crate) sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
396 pub failure_code: u16,
399 /// A [`commitment_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
401 /// [`commitment_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#committing-updates-so-far-commitment_signed
402 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
403 pub struct CommitmentSigned {
405 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
406 /// A signature on the commitment transaction
407 pub signature: Signature,
408 /// Signatures on the HTLC transactions
409 pub htlc_signatures: Vec<Signature>,
412 /// A [`revoke_and_ack`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
414 /// [`revoke_and_ack`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#completing-the-transition-to-the-updated-state-revoke_and_ack
415 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
416 pub struct RevokeAndACK {
418 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
419 /// The secret corresponding to the per-commitment point
420 pub per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
421 /// The next sender-broadcast commitment transaction's per-commitment point
422 pub next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
425 /// An [`update_fee`] message to be sent to or received from a peer
427 /// [`update_fee`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#updating-fees-update_fee
428 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
429 pub struct UpdateFee {
431 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
432 /// Fee rate per 1000-weight of the transaction
433 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
436 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
437 /// Proof that the sender knows the per-commitment secret of the previous commitment transaction.
439 /// This is used to convince the recipient that the channel is at a certain commitment
440 /// number even if they lost that data due to a local failure. Of course, the peer may lie
441 /// and even later commitments may have been revoked.
442 pub struct DataLossProtect {
443 /// Proof that the sender knows the per-commitment secret of a specific commitment transaction
444 /// belonging to the recipient
445 pub your_last_per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
446 /// The sender's per-commitment point for their current commitment transaction
447 pub my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
450 /// A [`channel_reestablish`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
452 /// [`channel_reestablish`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#message-retransmission
453 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
454 pub struct ChannelReestablish {
456 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
457 /// The next commitment number for the sender
458 pub next_local_commitment_number: u64,
459 /// The next commitment number for the recipient
460 pub next_remote_commitment_number: u64,
461 /// Optionally, a field proving that next_remote_commitment_number-1 has been revoked
462 pub data_loss_protect: OptionalField<DataLossProtect>,
465 /// An [`announcement_signatures`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
467 /// [`announcement_signatures`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-announcement_signatures-message
468 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
469 pub struct AnnouncementSignatures {
471 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
472 /// The short channel ID
473 pub short_channel_id: u64,
474 /// A signature by the node key
475 pub node_signature: Signature,
476 /// A signature by the funding key
477 pub bitcoin_signature: Signature,
480 /// An address which can be used to connect to a remote peer.
481 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
482 pub enum NetAddress {
483 /// An IPv4 address/port on which the peer is listening.
485 /// The 4-byte IPv4 address
487 /// The port on which the node is listening
490 /// An IPv6 address/port on which the peer is listening.
492 /// The 16-byte IPv6 address
494 /// The port on which the node is listening
497 /// An old-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening.
499 /// This field is deprecated and the Tor network generally no longer supports V2 Onion
500 /// addresses. Thus, the details are not parsed here.
502 /// A new-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening.
504 /// To create the human-readable "hostname", concatenate the ED25519 pubkey, checksum, and version,
505 /// wrap as base32 and append ".onion".
507 /// The ed25519 long-term public key of the peer
508 ed25519_pubkey: [u8; 32],
509 /// The checksum of the pubkey and version, as included in the onion address
511 /// The version byte, as defined by the Tor Onion v3 spec.
513 /// The port on which the node is listening
516 /// A hostname/port on which the peer is listening.
518 /// The hostname on which the node is listening.
520 /// The port on which the node is listening.
525 /// Gets the ID of this address type. Addresses in [`NodeAnnouncement`] messages should be sorted
527 pub(crate) fn get_id(&self) -> u8 {
529 &NetAddress::IPv4 {..} => { 1 },
530 &NetAddress::IPv6 {..} => { 2 },
531 &NetAddress::OnionV2(_) => { 3 },
532 &NetAddress::OnionV3 {..} => { 4 },
533 &NetAddress::Hostname {..} => { 5 },
537 /// Strict byte-length of address descriptor, 1-byte type not recorded
538 fn len(&self) -> u16 {
540 &NetAddress::IPv4 { .. } => { 6 },
541 &NetAddress::IPv6 { .. } => { 18 },
542 &NetAddress::OnionV2(_) => { 12 },
543 &NetAddress::OnionV3 { .. } => { 37 },
544 // Consists of 1-byte hostname length, hostname bytes, and 2-byte port.
545 &NetAddress::Hostname { ref hostname, .. } => { u16::from(hostname.len()) + 3 },
549 /// The maximum length of any address descriptor, not including the 1-byte type.
550 /// This maximum length is reached by a hostname address descriptor:
551 /// a hostname with a maximum length of 255, its 1-byte length and a 2-byte port.
552 pub(crate) const MAX_LEN: u16 = 258;
555 impl Writeable for NetAddress {
556 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
558 &NetAddress::IPv4 { ref addr, ref port } => {
563 &NetAddress::IPv6 { ref addr, ref port } => {
568 &NetAddress::OnionV2(bytes) => {
570 bytes.write(writer)?;
572 &NetAddress::OnionV3 { ref ed25519_pubkey, ref checksum, ref version, ref port } => {
574 ed25519_pubkey.write(writer)?;
575 checksum.write(writer)?;
576 version.write(writer)?;
579 &NetAddress::Hostname { ref hostname, ref port } => {
581 hostname.write(writer)?;
589 impl Readable for Result<NetAddress, u8> {
590 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Result<NetAddress, u8>, DecodeError> {
591 let byte = <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
594 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::IPv4 {
595 addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
596 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
600 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::IPv6 {
601 addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
602 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
605 3 => Ok(Ok(NetAddress::OnionV2(Readable::read(reader)?))),
607 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::OnionV3 {
608 ed25519_pubkey: Readable::read(reader)?,
609 checksum: Readable::read(reader)?,
610 version: Readable::read(reader)?,
611 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
615 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::Hostname {
616 hostname: Readable::read(reader)?,
617 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
620 _ => return Ok(Err(byte)),
625 impl Readable for NetAddress {
626 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NetAddress, DecodeError> {
627 match Readable::read(reader) {
628 Ok(Ok(res)) => Ok(res),
629 Ok(Err(_)) => Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion),
635 /// Represents the set of gossip messages that require a signature from a node's identity key.
636 pub enum UnsignedGossipMessage<'a> {
637 /// An unsigned channel announcement.
638 ChannelAnnouncement(&'a UnsignedChannelAnnouncement),
639 /// An unsigned channel update.
640 ChannelUpdate(&'a UnsignedChannelUpdate),
641 /// An unsigned node announcement.
642 NodeAnnouncement(&'a UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)
645 impl<'a> Writeable for UnsignedGossipMessage<'a> {
646 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
648 UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
649 UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
650 UnsignedGossipMessage::NodeAnnouncement(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
655 /// The unsigned part of a [`node_announcement`] message.
657 /// [`node_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-node_announcement-message
658 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
659 pub struct UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
660 /// The advertised features
661 pub features: NodeFeatures,
662 /// A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed
664 /// The `node_id` this announcement originated from (don't rebroadcast the `node_announcement` back
666 pub node_id: PublicKey,
667 /// An RGB color for UI purposes
669 /// An alias, for UI purposes.
671 /// This should be sanitized before use. There is no guarantee of uniqueness.
673 /// List of addresses on which this node is reachable
674 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
675 pub(crate) excess_address_data: Vec<u8>,
676 pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
678 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
679 /// A [`node_announcement`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
681 /// [`node_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-node_announcement-message
682 pub struct NodeAnnouncement {
683 /// The signature by the node key
684 pub signature: Signature,
685 /// The actual content of the announcement
686 pub contents: UnsignedNodeAnnouncement,
689 /// The unsigned part of a [`channel_announcement`] message.
691 /// [`channel_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_announcement-message
692 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
693 pub struct UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
694 /// The advertised channel features
695 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
696 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
697 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
698 /// The short channel ID
699 pub short_channel_id: u64,
700 /// One of the two `node_id`s which are endpoints of this channel
701 pub node_id_1: PublicKey,
702 /// The other of the two `node_id`s which are endpoints of this channel
703 pub node_id_2: PublicKey,
704 /// The funding key for the first node
705 pub bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey,
706 /// The funding key for the second node
707 pub bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey,
708 pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
710 /// A [`channel_announcement`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
712 /// [`channel_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_announcement-message
713 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
714 pub struct ChannelAnnouncement {
715 /// Authentication of the announcement by the first public node
716 pub node_signature_1: Signature,
717 /// Authentication of the announcement by the second public node
718 pub node_signature_2: Signature,
719 /// Proof of funding UTXO ownership by the first public node
720 pub bitcoin_signature_1: Signature,
721 /// Proof of funding UTXO ownership by the second public node
722 pub bitcoin_signature_2: Signature,
723 /// The actual announcement
724 pub contents: UnsignedChannelAnnouncement,
727 /// The unsigned part of a [`channel_update`] message.
729 /// [`channel_update`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_update-message
730 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
731 pub struct UnsignedChannelUpdate {
732 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
733 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
734 /// The short channel ID
735 pub short_channel_id: u64,
736 /// A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed, specific to this channel
740 /// The number of blocks such that if:
741 /// `incoming_htlc.cltv_expiry < outgoing_htlc.cltv_expiry + cltv_expiry_delta`
742 /// then we need to fail the HTLC backwards. When forwarding an HTLC, `cltv_expiry_delta` determines
743 /// the outgoing HTLC's minimum `cltv_expiry` value -- so, if an incoming HTLC comes in with a
744 /// `cltv_expiry` of 100000, and the node we're forwarding to has a `cltv_expiry_delta` value of 10,
745 /// then we'll check that the outgoing HTLC's `cltv_expiry` value is at least 100010 before
746 /// forwarding. Note that the HTLC sender is the one who originally sets this value when
747 /// constructing the route.
748 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
749 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
750 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
751 /// The maximum HTLC value incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi.
753 /// This used to be optional.
754 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
755 /// The base HTLC fee charged by sender, in milli-satoshi
756 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
757 /// The amount to fee multiplier, in micro-satoshi
758 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
759 /// Excess data which was signed as a part of the message which we do not (yet) understand how
762 /// This is stored to ensure forward-compatibility as new fields are added to the lightning gossip protocol.
763 pub excess_data: Vec<u8>,
765 /// A [`channel_update`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
767 /// [`channel_update`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_update-message
768 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
769 pub struct ChannelUpdate {
770 /// A signature of the channel update
771 pub signature: Signature,
772 /// The actual channel update
773 pub contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate,
776 /// A [`query_channel_range`] message is used to query a peer for channel
777 /// UTXOs in a range of blocks. The recipient of a query makes a best
778 /// effort to reply to the query using one or more [`ReplyChannelRange`]
781 /// [`query_channel_range`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_channel_range-and-reply_channel_range-messages
782 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
783 pub struct QueryChannelRange {
784 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
785 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
786 /// The height of the first block for the channel UTXOs being queried
787 pub first_blocknum: u32,
788 /// The number of blocks to include in the query results
789 pub number_of_blocks: u32,
792 /// A [`reply_channel_range`] message is a reply to a [`QueryChannelRange`]
795 /// Multiple `reply_channel_range` messages can be sent in reply
796 /// to a single [`QueryChannelRange`] message. The query recipient makes a
797 /// best effort to respond based on their local network view which may
798 /// not be a perfect view of the network. The `short_channel_id`s in the
799 /// reply are encoded. We only support `encoding_type=0` uncompressed
800 /// serialization and do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization.
802 /// [`reply_channel_range`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_channel_range-and-reply_channel_range-messages
803 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
804 pub struct ReplyChannelRange {
805 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
806 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
807 /// The height of the first block in the range of the reply
808 pub first_blocknum: u32,
809 /// The number of blocks included in the range of the reply
810 pub number_of_blocks: u32,
811 /// True when this is the final reply for a query
812 pub sync_complete: bool,
813 /// The `short_channel_id`s in the channel range
814 pub short_channel_ids: Vec<u64>,
817 /// A [`query_short_channel_ids`] message is used to query a peer for
818 /// routing gossip messages related to one or more `short_channel_id`s.
820 /// The query recipient will reply with the latest, if available,
821 /// [`ChannelAnnouncement`], [`ChannelUpdate`] and [`NodeAnnouncement`] messages
822 /// it maintains for the requested `short_channel_id`s followed by a
823 /// [`ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd`] message. The `short_channel_id`s sent in
824 /// this query are encoded. We only support `encoding_type=0` uncompressed
825 /// serialization and do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization.
827 /// [`query_short_channel_ids`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_short_channel_idsreply_short_channel_ids_end-messages
828 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
829 pub struct QueryShortChannelIds {
830 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
831 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
832 /// The short_channel_ids that are being queried
833 pub short_channel_ids: Vec<u64>,
836 /// A [`reply_short_channel_ids_end`] message is sent as a reply to a
837 /// message. The query recipient makes a best
838 /// effort to respond based on their local network view which may not be
839 /// a perfect view of the network.
841 /// [`reply_short_channel_ids_end`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_short_channel_idsreply_short_channel_ids_end-messages
842 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
843 pub struct ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
844 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain that was queried
845 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
846 /// Indicates if the query recipient maintains up-to-date channel
847 /// information for the `chain_hash`
848 pub full_information: bool,
851 /// A [`gossip_timestamp_filter`] message is used by a node to request
852 /// gossip relay for messages in the requested time range when the
853 /// `gossip_queries` feature has been negotiated.
855 /// [`gossip_timestamp_filter`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-gossip_timestamp_filter-message
856 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
857 pub struct GossipTimestampFilter {
858 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain for channel and node information
859 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
860 /// The starting unix timestamp
861 pub first_timestamp: u32,
862 /// The range of information in seconds
863 pub timestamp_range: u32,
866 /// Encoding type for data compression of collections in gossip queries.
868 /// We do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization [defined in BOLT
869 /// #7](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#query-messages).
874 /// Used to put an error message in a [`LightningError`].
875 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
876 pub enum ErrorAction {
877 /// The peer took some action which made us think they were useless. Disconnect them.
879 /// An error message which we should make an effort to send before we disconnect.
880 msg: Option<ErrorMessage>
882 /// The peer did something harmless that we weren't able to process, just log and ignore
883 // New code should *not* use this. New code must use IgnoreAndLog, below!
885 /// The peer did something harmless that we weren't able to meaningfully process.
886 /// If the error is logged, log it at the given level.
887 IgnoreAndLog(logger::Level),
888 /// The peer provided us with a gossip message which we'd already seen. In most cases this
889 /// should be ignored, but it may result in the message being forwarded if it is a duplicate of
890 /// our own channel announcements.
891 IgnoreDuplicateGossip,
892 /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them.
894 /// The message to send.
897 /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them without closing any channels.
899 /// The message to send.
901 /// The peer may have done something harmless that we weren't able to meaningfully process,
902 /// though we should still tell them about it.
903 /// If this event is logged, log it at the given level.
904 log_level: logger::Level,
908 /// An Err type for failure to process messages.
909 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
910 pub struct LightningError {
911 /// A human-readable message describing the error
913 /// The action which should be taken against the offending peer.
914 pub action: ErrorAction,
917 /// Struct used to return values from [`RevokeAndACK`] messages, containing a bunch of commitment
918 /// transaction updates if they were pending.
919 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
920 pub struct CommitmentUpdate {
921 /// `update_add_htlc` messages which should be sent
922 pub update_add_htlcs: Vec<UpdateAddHTLC>,
923 /// `update_fulfill_htlc` messages which should be sent
924 pub update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
925 /// `update_fail_htlc` messages which should be sent
926 pub update_fail_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFailHTLC>,
927 /// `update_fail_malformed_htlc` messages which should be sent
928 pub update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFailMalformedHTLC>,
929 /// An `update_fee` message which should be sent
930 pub update_fee: Option<UpdateFee>,
931 /// A `commitment_signed` message which should be sent
932 pub commitment_signed: CommitmentSigned,
935 /// Messages could have optional fields to use with extended features
936 /// As we wish to serialize these differently from `Option<T>`s (`Options` get a tag byte, but
937 /// [`OptionalField`] simply gets `Present` if there are enough bytes to read into it), we have a
938 /// separate enum type for them.
940 /// (C-not exported) due to a free generic in `T`
941 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
942 pub enum OptionalField<T> {
943 /// Optional field is included in message
945 /// Optional field is absent in message
949 /// A trait to describe an object which can receive channel messages.
951 /// Messages MAY be called in parallel when they originate from different `their_node_ids`, however
952 /// they MUST NOT be called in parallel when the two calls have the same `their_node_id`.
953 pub trait ChannelMessageHandler : MessageSendEventsProvider {
955 /// Handle an incoming `open_channel` message from the given peer.
956 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OpenChannel);
957 /// Handle an incoming `accept_channel` message from the given peer.
958 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AcceptChannel);
959 /// Handle an incoming `funding_created` message from the given peer.
960 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingCreated);
961 /// Handle an incoming `funding_signed` message from the given peer.
962 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingSigned);
963 /// Handle an incoming `channel_ready` message from the given peer.
964 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelReady);
967 /// Handle an incoming `shutdown` message from the given peer.
968 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Shutdown);
969 /// Handle an incoming `closing_signed` message from the given peer.
970 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ClosingSigned);
973 /// Handle an incoming `update_add_htlc` message from the given peer.
974 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateAddHTLC);
975 /// Handle an incoming `update_fulfill_htlc` message from the given peer.
976 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFulfillHTLC);
977 /// Handle an incoming `update_fail_htlc` message from the given peer.
978 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFailHTLC);
979 /// Handle an incoming `update_fail_malformed_htlc` message from the given peer.
980 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFailMalformedHTLC);
981 /// Handle an incoming `commitment_signed` message from the given peer.
982 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &CommitmentSigned);
983 /// Handle an incoming `revoke_and_ack` message from the given peer.
984 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &RevokeAndACK);
986 /// Handle an incoming `update_fee` message from the given peer.
987 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFee);
989 // Channel-to-announce:
990 /// Handle an incoming `announcement_signatures` message from the given peer.
991 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AnnouncementSignatures);
993 // Connection loss/reestablish:
994 /// Indicates a connection to the peer failed/an existing connection was lost. If no connection
995 /// is believed to be possible in the future (eg they're sending us messages we don't
996 /// understand or indicate they require unknown feature bits), `no_connection_possible` is set
997 /// and any outstanding channels should be failed.
999 /// Note that in some rare cases this may be called without a corresponding
1000 /// [`Self::peer_connected`].
1001 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool);
1003 /// Handle a peer reconnecting, possibly generating `channel_reestablish` message(s).
1005 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1006 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1007 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1008 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Init) -> Result<(), ()>;
1009 /// Handle an incoming `channel_reestablish` message from the given peer.
1010 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelReestablish);
1012 /// Handle an incoming `channel_update` message from the given peer.
1013 fn handle_channel_update(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelUpdate);
1016 /// Handle an incoming `error` message from the given peer.
1017 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ErrorMessage);
1019 // Handler information:
1020 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1021 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1022 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1023 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1025 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1026 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1027 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1029 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1030 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1033 /// A trait to describe an object which can receive routing messages.
1035 /// # Implementor DoS Warnings
1037 /// For messages enabled with the `gossip_queries` feature there are potential DoS vectors when
1038 /// handling inbound queries. Implementors using an on-disk network graph should be aware of
1039 /// repeated disk I/O for queries accessing different parts of the network graph.
1040 pub trait RoutingMessageHandler : MessageSendEventsProvider {
1041 /// Handle an incoming `node_announcement` message, returning `true` if it should be forwarded on,
1042 /// `false` or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1043 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1044 /// Handle a `channel_announcement` message, returning `true` if it should be forwarded on, `false`
1045 /// or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1046 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1047 /// Handle an incoming `channel_update` message, returning true if it should be forwarded on,
1048 /// `false` or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1049 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1050 /// Gets channel announcements and updates required to dump our routing table to a remote node,
1051 /// starting at the `short_channel_id` indicated by `starting_point` and including announcements
1052 /// for a single channel.
1053 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)>;
1054 /// Gets a node announcement required to dump our routing table to a remote node, starting at
1055 /// the node *after* the provided pubkey and including up to one announcement immediately
1056 /// higher (as defined by `<PublicKey as Ord>::cmp`) than `starting_point`.
1057 /// If `None` is provided for `starting_point`, we start at the first node.
1058 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement>;
1059 /// Called when a connection is established with a peer. This can be used to
1060 /// perform routing table synchronization using a strategy defined by the
1063 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1064 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1065 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1066 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init: &Init) -> Result<(), ()>;
1067 /// Handles the reply of a query we initiated to learn about channels
1068 /// for a given range of blocks. We can expect to receive one or more
1069 /// replies to a single query.
1070 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1071 /// Handles the reply of a query we initiated asking for routing gossip
1072 /// messages for a list of channels. We should receive this message when
1073 /// a node has completed its best effort to send us the pertaining routing
1074 /// gossip messages.
1075 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1076 /// Handles when a peer asks us to send a list of `short_channel_id`s
1077 /// for the requested range of blocks.
1078 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1079 /// Handles when a peer asks us to send routing gossip messages for a
1080 /// list of `short_channel_id`s.
1081 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1083 // Handler information:
1084 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1085 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1086 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1087 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1088 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1089 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1090 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1092 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1093 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1096 /// A trait to describe an object that can receive onion messages.
1097 pub trait OnionMessageHandler : OnionMessageProvider {
1098 /// Handle an incoming `onion_message` message from the given peer.
1099 fn handle_onion_message(&self, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OnionMessage);
1100 /// Called when a connection is established with a peer. Can be used to track which peers
1101 /// advertise onion message support and are online.
1103 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1104 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1105 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1106 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init: &Init) -> Result<(), ()>;
1107 /// Indicates a connection to the peer failed/an existing connection was lost. Allows handlers to
1108 /// drop and refuse to forward onion messages to this peer.
1110 /// Note that in some rare cases this may be called without a corresponding
1111 /// [`Self::peer_connected`].
1112 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool);
1114 // Handler information:
1115 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1116 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1117 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1118 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1120 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1121 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1122 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1124 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1125 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1128 mod fuzzy_internal_msgs {
1129 use crate::prelude::*;
1130 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
1132 // These types aren't intended to be pub, but are exposed for direct fuzzing (as we deserialize
1133 // them from untrusted input):
1135 pub(crate) struct FinalOnionHopData {
1136 pub(crate) payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
1137 /// The total value, in msat, of the payment as received by the ultimate recipient.
1138 /// Message serialization may panic if this value is more than 21 million Bitcoin.
1139 pub(crate) total_msat: u64,
1142 pub(crate) enum OnionHopDataFormat {
1144 short_channel_id: u64,
1147 payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData>,
1148 keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
1152 pub struct OnionHopData {
1153 pub(crate) format: OnionHopDataFormat,
1154 /// The value, in msat, of the payment after this hop's fee is deducted.
1155 /// Message serialization may panic if this value is more than 21 million Bitcoin.
1156 pub(crate) amt_to_forward: u64,
1157 pub(crate) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
1160 pub struct DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
1161 pub(crate) hmac: [u8; 32],
1162 pub(crate) failuremsg: Vec<u8>,
1163 pub(crate) pad: Vec<u8>,
1167 pub use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*;
1168 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
1169 pub(crate) use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*;
1172 pub(crate) struct OnionPacket {
1173 pub(crate) version: u8,
1174 /// In order to ensure we always return an error on onion decode in compliance with [BOLT
1175 /// #4](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md), we have to
1176 /// deserialize `OnionPacket`s contained in [`UpdateAddHTLC`] messages even if the ephemeral
1177 /// public key (here) is bogus, so we hold a [`Result`] instead of a [`PublicKey`] as we'd
1179 pub(crate) public_key: Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>,
1180 pub(crate) hop_data: [u8; 20*65],
1181 pub(crate) hmac: [u8; 32],
1184 impl onion_utils::Packet for OnionPacket {
1185 type Data = onion_utils::FixedSizeOnionPacket;
1186 fn new(pubkey: PublicKey, hop_data: onion_utils::FixedSizeOnionPacket, hmac: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
1189 public_key: Ok(pubkey),
1190 hop_data: hop_data.0,
1196 impl Eq for OnionPacket { }
1197 impl PartialEq for OnionPacket {
1198 fn eq(&self, other: &OnionPacket) -> bool {
1199 for (i, j) in self.hop_data.iter().zip(other.hop_data.iter()) {
1200 if i != j { return false; }
1202 self.version == other.version &&
1203 self.public_key == other.public_key &&
1204 self.hmac == other.hmac
1208 impl fmt::Debug for OnionPacket {
1209 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
1210 f.write_fmt(format_args!("OnionPacket version {} with hmac {:?}", self.version, &self.hmac[..]))
1214 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1215 pub(crate) struct OnionErrorPacket {
1216 // This really should be a constant size slice, but the spec lets these things be up to 128KB?
1217 // (TODO) We limit it in decode to much lower...
1218 pub(crate) data: Vec<u8>,
1221 impl fmt::Display for DecodeError {
1222 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
1224 DecodeError::UnknownVersion => f.write_str("Unknown realm byte in Onion packet"),
1225 DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature => f.write_str("Unknown required feature preventing decode"),
1226 DecodeError::InvalidValue => f.write_str("Nonsense bytes didn't map to the type they were interpreted as"),
1227 DecodeError::ShortRead => f.write_str("Packet extended beyond the provided bytes"),
1228 DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor => f.write_str("A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly"),
1229 DecodeError::Io(ref e) => fmt::Debug::fmt(e, f),
1230 DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression => f.write_str("We don't support receiving messages with zlib-compressed fields"),
1235 impl From<io::Error> for DecodeError {
1236 fn from(e: io::Error) -> Self {
1237 if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof {
1238 DecodeError::ShortRead
1240 DecodeError::Io(e.kind())
1245 impl Writeable for OptionalField<Script> {
1246 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1248 OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1249 // Note that Writeable for script includes the 16-bit length tag for us
1252 OptionalField::Absent => {}
1258 impl Readable for OptionalField<Script> {
1259 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1260 match <u16 as Readable>::read(r) {
1262 let mut buf = vec![0; len as usize];
1263 r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
1264 Ok(OptionalField::Present(Script::from(buf)))
1266 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(OptionalField::Absent),
1272 impl Writeable for OptionalField<u64> {
1273 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1275 OptionalField::Present(ref value) => {
1278 OptionalField::Absent => {}
1284 impl Readable for OptionalField<u64> {
1285 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1286 let value: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
1287 Ok(OptionalField::Present(value))
1292 impl_writeable_msg!(AcceptChannel, {
1293 temporary_channel_id,
1294 dust_limit_satoshis,
1295 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1296 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1302 revocation_basepoint,
1304 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1306 first_per_commitment_point,
1307 shutdown_scriptpubkey
1309 (1, channel_type, option),
1312 impl_writeable_msg!(AnnouncementSignatures, {
1319 impl Writeable for ChannelReestablish {
1320 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1321 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
1322 self.next_local_commitment_number.write(w)?;
1323 self.next_remote_commitment_number.write(w)?;
1324 match self.data_loss_protect {
1325 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss_protect) => {
1326 (*data_loss_protect).your_last_per_commitment_secret.write(w)?;
1327 (*data_loss_protect).my_current_per_commitment_point.write(w)?;
1329 OptionalField::Absent => {}
1335 impl Readable for ChannelReestablish{
1336 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1338 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1339 next_local_commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
1340 next_remote_commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
1341 data_loss_protect: {
1342 match <[u8; 32] as Readable>::read(r) {
1343 Ok(your_last_per_commitment_secret) =>
1344 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
1345 your_last_per_commitment_secret,
1346 my_current_per_commitment_point: Readable::read(r)?,
1348 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => OptionalField::Absent,
1349 Err(e) => return Err(e)
1356 impl_writeable_msg!(ClosingSigned,
1357 { channel_id, fee_satoshis, signature },
1358 { (1, fee_range, option) }
1361 impl_writeable!(ClosingSignedFeeRange, {
1366 impl_writeable_msg!(CommitmentSigned, {
1372 impl_writeable!(DecodedOnionErrorPacket, {
1378 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingCreated, {
1379 temporary_channel_id,
1381 funding_output_index,
1385 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingSigned, {
1390 impl_writeable_msg!(ChannelReady, {
1392 next_per_commitment_point,
1394 (1, short_channel_id_alias, option),
1397 impl Writeable for Init {
1398 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1399 // global_features gets the bottom 13 bits of our features, and local_features gets all of
1400 // our relevant feature bits. This keeps us compatible with old nodes.
1401 self.features.write_up_to_13(w)?;
1402 self.features.write(w)?;
1403 encode_tlv_stream!(w, {
1404 (3, self.remote_network_address, option)
1410 impl Readable for Init {
1411 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1412 let global_features: InitFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
1413 let features: InitFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
1414 let mut remote_network_address: Option<NetAddress> = None;
1415 decode_tlv_stream!(r, {
1416 (3, remote_network_address, option)
1419 features: features.or(global_features),
1420 remote_network_address,
1425 impl_writeable_msg!(OpenChannel, {
1427 temporary_channel_id,
1430 dust_limit_satoshis,
1431 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1432 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1438 revocation_basepoint,
1440 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1442 first_per_commitment_point,
1444 shutdown_scriptpubkey
1446 (1, channel_type, option),
1449 impl_writeable_msg!(RevokeAndACK, {
1451 per_commitment_secret,
1452 next_per_commitment_point
1455 impl_writeable_msg!(Shutdown, {
1460 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFailHTLC, {
1466 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, {
1473 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFee, {
1478 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFulfillHTLC, {
1484 // Note that this is written as a part of ChannelManager objects, and thus cannot change its
1485 // serialization format in a way which assumes we know the total serialized length/message end
1487 impl_writeable!(OnionErrorPacket, {
1491 // Note that this is written as a part of ChannelManager objects, and thus cannot change its
1492 // serialization format in a way which assumes we know the total serialized length/message end
1494 impl Writeable for OnionPacket {
1495 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1496 self.version.write(w)?;
1497 match self.public_key {
1498 Ok(pubkey) => pubkey.write(w)?,
1499 Err(_) => [0u8;33].write(w)?,
1501 w.write_all(&self.hop_data)?;
1502 self.hmac.write(w)?;
1507 impl Readable for OnionPacket {
1508 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1510 version: Readable::read(r)?,
1512 let mut buf = [0u8;33];
1513 r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
1514 PublicKey::from_slice(&buf)
1516 hop_data: Readable::read(r)?,
1517 hmac: Readable::read(r)?,
1522 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateAddHTLC, {
1528 onion_routing_packet
1531 impl Readable for OnionMessage {
1532 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1533 let blinding_point: PublicKey = Readable::read(r)?;
1534 let len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1535 let mut packet_reader = FixedLengthReader::new(r, len as u64);
1536 let onion_routing_packet: onion_message::Packet = <onion_message::Packet as LengthReadable>::read(&mut packet_reader)?;
1539 onion_routing_packet,
1544 impl Writeable for OnionMessage {
1545 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1546 self.blinding_point.write(w)?;
1547 let onion_packet_len = self.onion_routing_packet.serialized_length();
1548 (onion_packet_len as u16).write(w)?;
1549 self.onion_routing_packet.write(w)?;
1554 impl Writeable for FinalOnionHopData {
1555 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1556 self.payment_secret.0.write(w)?;
1557 HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.total_msat).write(w)
1561 impl Readable for FinalOnionHopData {
1562 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1563 let secret: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
1564 let amt: HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize<u64> = Readable::read(r)?;
1565 Ok(Self { payment_secret: PaymentSecret(secret), total_msat: amt.0 })
1569 impl Writeable for OnionHopData {
1570 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1572 OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => {
1573 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
1574 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.amt_to_forward), required),
1575 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
1576 (6, short_channel_id, required)
1579 OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { ref payment_data, ref keysend_preimage } => {
1580 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
1581 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.amt_to_forward), required),
1582 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
1583 (8, payment_data, option),
1584 (5482373484, keysend_preimage, option)
1592 impl Readable for OnionHopData {
1593 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1594 let mut amt = HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(0u64);
1595 let mut cltv_value = HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(0u32);
1596 let mut short_id: Option<u64> = None;
1597 let mut payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData> = None;
1598 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
1599 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
1601 (4, cltv_value, required),
1602 (6, short_id, option),
1603 (8, payment_data, option),
1604 // See https://github.com/lightning/blips/blob/master/blip-0003.md
1605 (5482373484, keysend_preimage, option)
1608 let format = if let Some(short_channel_id) = short_id {
1609 if payment_data.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
1610 OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
1614 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1615 if data.total_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1616 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1619 OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
1625 if amt.0 > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1626 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1630 amt_to_forward: amt.0,
1631 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv_value.0,
1636 // ReadableArgs because we need onion_utils::decode_next_hop to accommodate payment packets and
1637 // onion message packets.
1638 impl ReadableArgs<()> for OnionHopData {
1639 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R, _arg: ()) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1640 <Self as Readable>::read(r)
1644 impl Writeable for Ping {
1645 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1646 self.ponglen.write(w)?;
1647 vec![0u8; self.byteslen as usize].write(w)?; // size-unchecked write
1652 impl Readable for Ping {
1653 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1655 ponglen: Readable::read(r)?,
1657 let byteslen = Readable::read(r)?;
1658 r.read_exact(&mut vec![0u8; byteslen as usize][..])?;
1665 impl Writeable for Pong {
1666 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1667 vec![0u8; self.byteslen as usize].write(w)?; // size-unchecked write
1672 impl Readable for Pong {
1673 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1676 let byteslen = Readable::read(r)?;
1677 r.read_exact(&mut vec![0u8; byteslen as usize][..])?;
1684 impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1685 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1686 self.features.write(w)?;
1687 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
1688 self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
1689 self.node_id_1.write(w)?;
1690 self.node_id_2.write(w)?;
1691 self.bitcoin_key_1.write(w)?;
1692 self.bitcoin_key_2.write(w)?;
1693 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
1698 impl Readable for UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1699 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1701 features: Readable::read(r)?,
1702 chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
1703 short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1704 node_id_1: Readable::read(r)?,
1705 node_id_2: Readable::read(r)?,
1706 bitcoin_key_1: Readable::read(r)?,
1707 bitcoin_key_2: Readable::read(r)?,
1708 excess_data: read_to_end(r)?,
1713 impl_writeable!(ChannelAnnouncement, {
1716 bitcoin_signature_1,
1717 bitcoin_signature_2,
1721 impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1722 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1723 // `message_flags` used to indicate presence of `htlc_maximum_msat`, but was deprecated in the spec.
1724 const MESSAGE_FLAGS: u8 = 1;
1725 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
1726 self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
1727 self.timestamp.write(w)?;
1728 let all_flags = self.flags as u16 | ((MESSAGE_FLAGS as u16) << 8);
1729 all_flags.write(w)?;
1730 self.cltv_expiry_delta.write(w)?;
1731 self.htlc_minimum_msat.write(w)?;
1732 self.fee_base_msat.write(w)?;
1733 self.fee_proportional_millionths.write(w)?;
1734 self.htlc_maximum_msat.write(w)?;
1735 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
1740 impl Readable for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1741 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1743 chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
1744 short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1745 timestamp: Readable::read(r)?,
1747 let flags: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1748 // Note: we ignore the `message_flags` for now, since it was deprecated by the spec.
1751 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(r)?,
1752 htlc_minimum_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
1753 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
1754 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(r)?,
1755 htlc_maximum_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
1756 excess_data: read_to_end(r)?,
1761 impl_writeable!(ChannelUpdate, {
1766 impl Writeable for ErrorMessage {
1767 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1768 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
1769 (self.data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
1770 w.write_all(self.data.as_bytes())?;
1775 impl Readable for ErrorMessage {
1776 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1778 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1780 let sz: usize = <u16 as Readable>::read(r)? as usize;
1781 let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(sz);
1783 r.read_exact(&mut data)?;
1784 match String::from_utf8(data) {
1786 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1793 impl Writeable for WarningMessage {
1794 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1795 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
1796 (self.data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
1797 w.write_all(self.data.as_bytes())?;
1802 impl Readable for WarningMessage {
1803 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1805 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1807 let sz: usize = <u16 as Readable>::read(r)? as usize;
1808 let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(sz);
1810 r.read_exact(&mut data)?;
1811 match String::from_utf8(data) {
1813 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1820 impl Writeable for UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1821 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1822 self.features.write(w)?;
1823 self.timestamp.write(w)?;
1824 self.node_id.write(w)?;
1825 w.write_all(&self.rgb)?;
1826 self.alias.write(w)?;
1828 let mut addr_len = 0;
1829 for addr in self.addresses.iter() {
1830 addr_len += 1 + addr.len();
1832 (addr_len + self.excess_address_data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
1833 for addr in self.addresses.iter() {
1836 w.write_all(&self.excess_address_data[..])?;
1837 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
1842 impl Readable for UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1843 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1844 let features: NodeFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
1845 let timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
1846 let node_id: PublicKey = Readable::read(r)?;
1847 let mut rgb = [0; 3];
1848 r.read_exact(&mut rgb)?;
1849 let alias: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
1851 let addr_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1852 let mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress> = Vec::new();
1853 let mut addr_readpos = 0;
1854 let mut excess = false;
1855 let mut excess_byte = 0;
1857 if addr_len <= addr_readpos { break; }
1858 match Readable::read(r) {
1860 if addr_len < addr_readpos + 1 + addr.len() {
1861 return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor);
1863 addr_readpos += (1 + addr.len()) as u16;
1864 addresses.push(addr);
1866 Ok(Err(unknown_descriptor)) => {
1868 excess_byte = unknown_descriptor;
1871 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor),
1872 Err(e) => return Err(e),
1876 let mut excess_data = vec![];
1877 let excess_address_data = if addr_readpos < addr_len {
1878 let mut excess_address_data = vec![0; (addr_len - addr_readpos) as usize];
1879 r.read_exact(&mut excess_address_data[if excess { 1 } else { 0 }..])?;
1881 excess_address_data[0] = excess_byte;
1886 excess_data.push(excess_byte);
1890 excess_data.extend(read_to_end(r)?.iter());
1891 Ok(UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1898 excess_address_data,
1904 impl_writeable!(NodeAnnouncement, {
1909 impl Readable for QueryShortChannelIds {
1910 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1911 let chain_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(r)?;
1913 let encoding_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1914 let encoding_type: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
1916 // Must be encoding_type=0 uncompressed serialization. We do not
1917 // support encoding_type=1 zlib serialization.
1918 if encoding_type != EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8 {
1919 return Err(DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression);
1922 // We expect the encoding_len to always includes the 1-byte
1923 // encoding_type and that short_channel_ids are 8-bytes each
1924 if encoding_len == 0 || (encoding_len - 1) % 8 != 0 {
1925 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1928 // Read short_channel_ids (8-bytes each), for the u16 encoding_len
1929 // less the 1-byte encoding_type
1930 let short_channel_id_count: u16 = (encoding_len - 1)/8;
1931 let mut short_channel_ids = Vec::with_capacity(short_channel_id_count as usize);
1932 for _ in 0..short_channel_id_count {
1933 short_channel_ids.push(Readable::read(r)?);
1936 Ok(QueryShortChannelIds {
1943 impl Writeable for QueryShortChannelIds {
1944 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1945 // Calculated from 1-byte encoding_type plus 8-bytes per short_channel_id
1946 let encoding_len: u16 = 1 + self.short_channel_ids.len() as u16 * 8;
1948 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
1949 encoding_len.write(w)?;
1951 // We only support type=0 uncompressed serialization
1952 (EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8).write(w)?;
1954 for scid in self.short_channel_ids.iter() {
1962 impl_writeable_msg!(ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd, {
1967 impl QueryChannelRange {
1968 /// Calculates the overflow safe ending block height for the query.
1970 /// Overflow returns `0xffffffff`, otherwise returns `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`.
1971 pub fn end_blocknum(&self) -> u32 {
1972 match self.first_blocknum.checked_add(self.number_of_blocks) {
1973 Some(block) => block,
1974 None => u32::max_value(),
1979 impl_writeable_msg!(QueryChannelRange, {
1985 impl Readable for ReplyChannelRange {
1986 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1987 let chain_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(r)?;
1988 let first_blocknum: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
1989 let number_of_blocks: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
1990 let sync_complete: bool = Readable::read(r)?;
1992 let encoding_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1993 let encoding_type: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
1995 // Must be encoding_type=0 uncompressed serialization. We do not
1996 // support encoding_type=1 zlib serialization.
1997 if encoding_type != EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8 {
1998 return Err(DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression);
2001 // We expect the encoding_len to always includes the 1-byte
2002 // encoding_type and that short_channel_ids are 8-bytes each
2003 if encoding_len == 0 || (encoding_len - 1) % 8 != 0 {
2004 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2007 // Read short_channel_ids (8-bytes each), for the u16 encoding_len
2008 // less the 1-byte encoding_type
2009 let short_channel_id_count: u16 = (encoding_len - 1)/8;
2010 let mut short_channel_ids = Vec::with_capacity(short_channel_id_count as usize);
2011 for _ in 0..short_channel_id_count {
2012 short_channel_ids.push(Readable::read(r)?);
2015 Ok(ReplyChannelRange {
2025 impl Writeable for ReplyChannelRange {
2026 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2027 let encoding_len: u16 = 1 + self.short_channel_ids.len() as u16 * 8;
2028 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
2029 self.first_blocknum.write(w)?;
2030 self.number_of_blocks.write(w)?;
2031 self.sync_complete.write(w)?;
2033 encoding_len.write(w)?;
2034 (EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8).write(w)?;
2035 for scid in self.short_channel_ids.iter() {
2043 impl_writeable_msg!(GossipTimestampFilter, {
2052 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
2053 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
2054 use crate::ln::msgs;
2055 use crate::ln::msgs::{FinalOnionHopData, OptionalField, OnionErrorPacket, OnionHopDataFormat};
2056 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Hostname};
2058 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2059 use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
2060 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2061 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
2062 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2063 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
2065 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2066 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2068 use crate::io::{self, Cursor};
2069 use crate::prelude::*;
2070 use core::convert::TryFrom;
2073 fn encoding_channel_reestablish_no_secret() {
2074 let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
2075 channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
2076 next_local_commitment_number: 3,
2077 next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
2078 data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Absent,
2081 let encoded_value = cr.encode();
2084 vec![4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4]
2089 fn encoding_channel_reestablish_with_secret() {
2091 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2092 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
2095 let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
2096 channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
2097 next_local_commitment_number: 3,
2098 next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
2099 data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Present(msgs::DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret: [9;32], my_current_per_commitment_point: public_key}),
2102 let encoded_value = cr.encode();
2105 vec![4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 3, 27, 132, 197, 86, 123, 18, 100, 64, 153, 93, 62, 213, 170, 186, 5, 101, 215, 30, 24, 52, 96, 72, 25, 255, 156, 23, 245, 233, 213, 221, 7, 143]
2109 macro_rules! get_keys_from {
2110 ($slice: expr, $secp_ctx: expr) => {
2112 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode($slice).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2113 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &privkey);
2119 macro_rules! get_sig_on {
2120 ($privkey: expr, $ctx: expr, $string: expr) => {
2122 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&$string.into_bytes()[..]).unwrap();
2123 $ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &$privkey)
2129 fn encoding_announcement_signatures() {
2130 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2131 let (privkey, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2132 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2133 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("02020202020202020202020202020202"));
2134 let announcement_signatures = msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2135 channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
2136 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2137 node_signature: sig_1,
2138 bitcoin_signature: sig_2,
2141 let encoded_value = announcement_signatures.encode();
2142 assert_eq!(encoded_value, hex::decode("040000000000000005000000000000000600000000000000070000000000000000083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073acf9953cef4700860f5967838eba2bae89288ad188ebf8b20bf995c3ea53a26df1876d0a3a0e13172ba286a673140190c02ba9da60a2e43a745188c8a83c7f3ef").unwrap());
2145 fn do_encoding_channel_announcement(unknown_features_bits: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2146 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2147 let (privkey_1, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2148 let (privkey_2, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2149 let (privkey_3, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2150 let (privkey_4, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2151 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2152 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey_2, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2153 let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2154 let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2155 let mut features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
2156 if unknown_features_bits {
2157 features = ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF]);
2159 let unsigned_channel_announcement = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2161 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
2162 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2163 node_id_1: pubkey_1,
2164 node_id_2: pubkey_2,
2165 bitcoin_key_1: pubkey_3,
2166 bitcoin_key_2: pubkey_4,
2167 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![10, 0, 0, 20, 0, 0, 30, 0, 0, 40] } else { Vec::new() },
2169 let channel_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2170 node_signature_1: sig_1,
2171 node_signature_2: sig_2,
2172 bitcoin_signature_1: sig_3,
2173 bitcoin_signature_2: sig_4,
2174 contents: unsigned_channel_announcement,
2176 let encoded_value = channel_announcement.encode();
2177 let mut target_value = hex::decode("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a1735b6a427e80d5fe7cd90a2f4ee08dc9c27cda7c35a4172e5d85b12c49d4232537e98f9b1f3c5e6989a8b9644e90e8918127680dbd0d4043510840fc0f1e11a216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f91e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d2692b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap();
2178 if unknown_features_bits {
2179 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0002ffff").unwrap());
2181 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000").unwrap());
2183 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
2184 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00083a840000034d031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f024d4b6cd1361032ca9bd2aeb9d900aa4d45d9ead80ac9423374c451a7254d076602531fe6068134503d2723133227c867ac8fa6c83c537e9a44c3c5bdbdcb1fe33703462779ad4aad39514614751a71085f2f10e1c7a593e4e030efb5b8721ce55b0b").unwrap());
2186 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0a00001400001e000028").unwrap());
2188 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2192 fn encoding_channel_announcement() {
2193 do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, false);
2194 do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, true);
2195 do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, false);
2196 do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, true);
2199 fn do_encoding_node_announcement(unknown_features_bits: bool, ipv4: bool, ipv6: bool, onionv2: bool, onionv3: bool, hostname: bool, excess_address_data: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2200 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2201 let (privkey_1, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2202 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2203 let features = if unknown_features_bits {
2204 NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF])
2206 // Set to some features we may support
2207 NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![2 | 1 << 5])
2209 let mut addresses = Vec::new();
2211 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::IPv4 {
2212 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252],
2217 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::IPv6 {
2218 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240],
2223 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::OnionV2(
2224 [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 38, 7]
2228 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::OnionV3 {
2229 ed25519_pubkey: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240, 239, 238, 237, 236, 235, 234, 233, 232, 231, 230, 229, 228, 227, 226, 225, 224],
2236 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::Hostname {
2237 hostname: Hostname::try_from(String::from("host")).unwrap(),
2241 let mut addr_len = 0;
2242 for addr in &addresses {
2243 addr_len += addr.len() + 1;
2245 let unsigned_node_announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2247 timestamp: 20190119,
2252 excess_address_data: if excess_address_data { vec![33, 108, 40, 11, 83, 149, 162, 84, 110, 126, 75, 38, 99, 224, 79, 129, 22, 34, 241, 90, 79, 146, 232, 58, 162, 233, 43, 162, 165, 115, 193, 57, 20, 44, 84, 174, 99, 7, 42, 30, 193, 238, 125, 192, 192, 75, 222, 92, 132, 120, 6, 23, 42, 160, 92, 146, 194, 42, 232, 227, 8, 209, 210, 105] } else { Vec::new() },
2253 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![59, 18, 204, 25, 92, 224, 162, 209, 189, 166, 168, 139, 239, 161, 159, 160, 127, 81, 202, 167, 92, 232, 56, 55, 242, 137, 101, 96, 11, 138, 172, 171, 8, 85, 255, 176, 231, 65, 236, 95, 124, 65, 66, 30, 152, 41, 169, 212, 134, 17, 200, 200, 49, 247, 27, 229, 234, 115, 230, 101, 148, 151, 127, 253] } else { Vec::new() },
2255 addr_len += unsigned_node_announcement.excess_address_data.len() as u16;
2256 let node_announcement = msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2258 contents: unsigned_node_announcement,
2260 let encoded_value = node_announcement.encode();
2261 let mut target_value = hex::decode("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2262 if unknown_features_bits {
2263 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0002ffff").unwrap());
2265 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000122").unwrap());
2267 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("013413a7031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f2020201010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010").unwrap());
2268 target_value.append(&mut vec![(addr_len >> 8) as u8, addr_len as u8]);
2270 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("01fffefdfc2607").unwrap());
2273 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("02fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f02607").unwrap());
2276 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("03fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f62607").unwrap());
2279 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("04fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0efeeedecebeae9e8e7e6e5e4e3e2e1e00020102607").unwrap());
2282 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0504686f73742607").unwrap());
2284 if excess_address_data {
2285 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f92e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d269").unwrap());
2288 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("3b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
2290 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2294 fn encoding_node_announcement() {
2295 do_encoding_node_announcement(true, true, true, true, true, true, true, true);
2296 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false);
2297 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, true, false, false, false, false, false, false);
2298 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, true, false, false, false, false, false);
2299 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, true, false, false, false, false);
2300 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, true, false, false, false);
2301 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, true, false, false);
2302 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, false, true, false);
2303 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, true, false, true, false, false, true, false);
2304 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, true, false, true, false, false, false);
2307 fn do_encoding_channel_update(direction: bool, disable: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2308 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2309 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2310 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2311 let unsigned_channel_update = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2312 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
2313 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2314 timestamp: 20190119,
2315 flags: if direction { 1 } else { 0 } | if disable { 1 << 1 } else { 0 },
2316 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2317 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
2318 htlc_maximum_msat: 131355275467161,
2319 fee_base_msat: 10000,
2320 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2321 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![0, 0, 0, 0, 59, 154, 202, 0] } else { Vec::new() }
2323 let channel_update = msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2325 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2327 let encoded_value = channel_update.encode();
2328 let mut target_value = hex::decode("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2329 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
2330 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00083a840000034d013413a7").unwrap());
2331 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("01").unwrap());
2332 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00").unwrap());
2334 let flag = target_value.last_mut().unwrap();
2338 let flag = target_value.last_mut().unwrap();
2339 *flag = *flag | 1 << 1;
2341 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap());
2342 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000777788889999").unwrap());
2344 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000003b9aca00").unwrap());
2346 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2350 fn encoding_channel_update() {
2351 do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, false);
2352 do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, true);
2353 do_encoding_channel_update(true, false, false);
2354 do_encoding_channel_update(true, false, true);
2355 do_encoding_channel_update(false, true, false);
2356 do_encoding_channel_update(false, true, true);
2357 do_encoding_channel_update(true, true, false);
2358 do_encoding_channel_update(true, true, true);
2361 fn do_encoding_open_channel(random_bit: bool, shutdown: bool, incl_chan_type: bool) {
2362 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2363 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2364 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2365 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2366 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2367 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
2368 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
2369 let open_channel = msgs::OpenChannel {
2370 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
2371 temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
2372 funding_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
2373 push_msat: 2536655962884945560,
2374 dust_limit_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
2375 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 8517154655701053848,
2376 channel_reserve_satoshis: 8665828695742877976,
2377 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
2378 feerate_per_kw: 821716,
2379 to_self_delay: 49340,
2380 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
2381 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
2382 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
2383 payment_point: pubkey_3,
2384 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
2385 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
2386 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
2387 channel_flags: if random_bit { 1 << 5 } else { 0 },
2388 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { OptionalField::Present(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { OptionalField::Absent },
2389 channel_type: if incl_chan_type { Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::empty()) } else { None },
2391 let encoded_value = open_channel.encode();
2392 let mut target_value = Vec::new();
2393 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
2394 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202021234567890123456233403289122369832144668701144767633030896203198784335490624111800083a840000034d000c89d4c0bcc0bc031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f024d4b6cd1361032ca9bd2aeb9d900aa4d45d9ead80ac9423374c451a7254d076602531fe6068134503d2723133227c867ac8fa6c83c537e9a44c3c5bdbdcb1fe33703462779ad4aad39514614751a71085f2f10e1c7a593e4e030efb5b8721ce55b0b0362c0a046dacce86ddd0343c6d3c7c79c2208ba0d9c9cf24a6d046d21d21f90f703f006a18d5653c4edf5391ff23a61f03ff83d237e880ee61187fa9f379a028e0a").unwrap());
2396 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("20").unwrap());
2398 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00").unwrap());
2401 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
2404 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0100").unwrap());
2406 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2410 fn encoding_open_channel() {
2411 do_encoding_open_channel(false, false, false);
2412 do_encoding_open_channel(false, false, true);
2413 do_encoding_open_channel(false, true, false);
2414 do_encoding_open_channel(false, true, true);
2415 do_encoding_open_channel(true, false, false);
2416 do_encoding_open_channel(true, false, true);
2417 do_encoding_open_channel(true, true, false);
2418 do_encoding_open_channel(true, true, true);
2421 fn do_encoding_accept_channel(shutdown: bool) {
2422 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2423 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2424 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2425 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2426 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2427 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
2428 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
2429 let accept_channel = msgs::AcceptChannel {
2430 temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
2431 dust_limit_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
2432 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 2536655962884945560,
2433 channel_reserve_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
2434 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
2435 minimum_depth: 821716,
2436 to_self_delay: 49340,
2437 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
2438 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
2439 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
2440 payment_point: pubkey_3,
2441 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
2442 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
2443 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
2444 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { OptionalField::Present(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { OptionalField::Absent },
2447 let encoded_value = accept_channel.encode();
2448 let mut target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
2450 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
2452 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2456 fn encoding_accept_channel() {
2457 do_encoding_accept_channel(false);
2458 do_encoding_accept_channel(true);
2462 fn encoding_funding_created() {
2463 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2464 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2465 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2466 let funding_created = msgs::FundingCreated {
2467 temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
2468 funding_txid: Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap(),
2469 funding_output_index: 255,
2472 let encoded_value = funding_created.encode();
2473 let target_value = hex::decode("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202026e96fe9f8b0ddcd729ba03cfafa5a27b050b39d354dd980814268dfa9a44d4c200ffd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2474 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2478 fn encoding_funding_signed() {
2479 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2480 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2481 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2482 let funding_signed = msgs::FundingSigned {
2483 channel_id: [2; 32],
2486 let encoded_value = funding_signed.encode();
2487 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2488 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2492 fn encoding_channel_ready() {
2493 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2494 let (_, pubkey_1,) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2495 let channel_ready = msgs::ChannelReady {
2496 channel_id: [2; 32],
2497 next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
2498 short_channel_id_alias: None,
2500 let encoded_value = channel_ready.encode();
2501 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap();
2502 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2505 fn do_encoding_shutdown(script_type: u8) {
2506 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2507 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2508 let script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::OP_TRUE).into_script();
2509 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
2510 channel_id: [2; 32],
2512 if script_type == 1 { Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() }
2513 else if script_type == 2 { Address::p2sh(&script, Network::Testnet).unwrap().script_pubkey() }
2514 else if script_type == 3 { Address::p2wpkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).unwrap().script_pubkey() }
2515 else { Address::p2wsh(&script, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() },
2517 let encoded_value = shutdown.encode();
2518 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap();
2519 if script_type == 1 {
2520 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
2521 } else if script_type == 2 {
2522 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0017a914da1745e9b549bd0bfa1a569971c77eba30cd5a4b87").unwrap());
2523 } else if script_type == 3 {
2524 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0016001479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b235983").unwrap());
2525 } else if script_type == 4 {
2526 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("002200204ae81572f06e1b88fd5ced7a1a000945432e83e1551e6f721ee9c00b8cc33260").unwrap());
2528 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2532 fn encoding_shutdown() {
2533 do_encoding_shutdown(1);
2534 do_encoding_shutdown(2);
2535 do_encoding_shutdown(3);
2536 do_encoding_shutdown(4);
2540 fn encoding_closing_signed() {
2541 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2542 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2543 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2544 let closing_signed = msgs::ClosingSigned {
2545 channel_id: [2; 32],
2546 fee_satoshis: 2316138423780173,
2550 let encoded_value = closing_signed.encode();
2551 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2552 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2553 assert_eq!(msgs::ClosingSigned::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value)).unwrap(), closing_signed);
2555 let closing_signed_with_range = msgs::ClosingSigned {
2556 channel_id: [2; 32],
2557 fee_satoshis: 2316138423780173,
2559 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
2560 min_fee_satoshis: 0xdeadbeef,
2561 max_fee_satoshis: 0x1badcafe01234567,
2564 let encoded_value_with_range = closing_signed_with_range.encode();
2565 let target_value_with_range = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a011000000000deadbeef1badcafe01234567").unwrap();
2566 assert_eq!(encoded_value_with_range, target_value_with_range);
2567 assert_eq!(msgs::ClosingSigned::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value_with_range)).unwrap(),
2568 closing_signed_with_range);
2572 fn encoding_update_add_htlc() {
2573 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2574 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2575 let onion_routing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2577 public_key: Ok(pubkey_1),
2578 hop_data: [1; 20*65],
2581 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2582 channel_id: [2; 32],
2583 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2584 amount_msat: 3608586615801332854,
2585 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
2586 cltv_expiry: 821716,
2587 onion_routing_packet
2589 let encoded_value = update_add_htlc.encode();
2590 let target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
2591 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2595 fn encoding_update_fulfill_htlc() {
2596 let update_fulfill_htlc = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2597 channel_id: [2; 32],
2598 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2599 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([1; 32]),
2601 let encoded_value = update_fulfill_htlc.encode();
2602 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap();
2603 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2607 fn encoding_update_fail_htlc() {
2608 let reason = OnionErrorPacket {
2609 data: [1; 32].to_vec(),
2611 let update_fail_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2612 channel_id: [2; 32],
2613 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2616 let encoded_value = update_fail_htlc.encode();
2617 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d00200101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap();
2618 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2622 fn encoding_update_fail_malformed_htlc() {
2623 let update_fail_malformed_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2624 channel_id: [2; 32],
2625 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2626 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
2629 let encoded_value = update_fail_malformed_htlc.encode();
2630 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010100ff").unwrap();
2631 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2634 fn do_encoding_commitment_signed(htlcs: bool) {
2635 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2636 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2637 let (privkey_2, _) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2638 let (privkey_3, _) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2639 let (privkey_4, _) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2640 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2641 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey_2, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2642 let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2643 let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2644 let commitment_signed = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
2645 channel_id: [2; 32],
2647 htlc_signatures: if htlcs { vec![sig_2, sig_3, sig_4] } else { Vec::new() },
2649 let encoded_value = commitment_signed.encode();
2650 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2652 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00031735b6a427e80d5fe7cd90a2f4ee08dc9c27cda7c35a4172e5d85b12c49d4232537e98f9b1f3c5e6989a8b9644e90e8918127680dbd0d4043510840fc0f1e11a216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f91e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d2692b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
2654 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000").unwrap());
2656 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2660 fn encoding_commitment_signed() {
2661 do_encoding_commitment_signed(true);
2662 do_encoding_commitment_signed(false);
2666 fn encoding_revoke_and_ack() {
2667 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2668 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2669 let raa = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2670 channel_id: [2; 32],
2671 per_commitment_secret: [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1],
2672 next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
2674 let encoded_value = raa.encode();
2675 let target_value = hex::decode("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap();
2676 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2680 fn encoding_update_fee() {
2681 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
2682 channel_id: [2; 32],
2683 feerate_per_kw: 20190119,
2685 let encoded_value = update_fee.encode();
2686 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202013413a7").unwrap();
2687 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2691 fn encoding_init() {
2692 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
2693 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF]),
2694 remote_network_address: None,
2695 }.encode(), hex::decode("00023fff0003ffffff").unwrap());
2696 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
2697 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF]),
2698 remote_network_address: None,
2699 }.encode(), hex::decode("0001ff0001ff").unwrap());
2700 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
2701 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
2702 remote_network_address: None,
2703 }.encode(), hex::decode("00000000").unwrap());
2705 let init_msg = msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
2706 remote_network_address: Some(msgs::NetAddress::IPv4 {
2707 addr: [127, 0, 0, 1],
2711 let encoded_value = init_msg.encode();
2712 let target_value = hex::decode("000000000307017f00000103e8").unwrap();
2713 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2714 assert_eq!(msgs::Init::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value)).unwrap(), init_msg);
2718 fn encoding_error() {
2719 let error = msgs::ErrorMessage {
2720 channel_id: [2; 32],
2721 data: String::from("rust-lightning"),
2723 let encoded_value = error.encode();
2724 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000e727573742d6c696768746e696e67").unwrap();
2725 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2729 fn encoding_warning() {
2730 let error = msgs::WarningMessage {
2731 channel_id: [2; 32],
2732 data: String::from("rust-lightning"),
2734 let encoded_value = error.encode();
2735 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000e727573742d6c696768746e696e67").unwrap();
2736 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2740 fn encoding_ping() {
2741 let ping = msgs::Ping {
2745 let encoded_value = ping.encode();
2746 let target_value = hex::decode("0040004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap();
2747 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2751 fn encoding_pong() {
2752 let pong = msgs::Pong {
2755 let encoded_value = pong.encode();
2756 let target_value = hex::decode("004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap();
2757 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2761 fn encoding_nonfinal_onion_hop_data() {
2762 let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
2763 format: OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
2764 short_channel_id: 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea,
2766 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
2767 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2769 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
2770 let target_value = hex::decode("1a02080badf00d010203040404ffffffff0608deadbeef1bad1dea").unwrap();
2771 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2772 msg = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2773 if let OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } = msg.format {
2774 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea);
2775 } else { panic!(); }
2776 assert_eq!(msg.amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
2777 assert_eq!(msg.outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
2781 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data() {
2782 let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
2783 format: OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
2785 keysend_preimage: None,
2787 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
2788 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2790 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
2791 let target_value = hex::decode("1002080badf00d010203040404ffffffff").unwrap();
2792 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2793 msg = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2794 if let OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data: None, .. } = msg.format { } else { panic!(); }
2795 assert_eq!(msg.amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
2796 assert_eq!(msg.outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
2800 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data_with_secret() {
2801 let expected_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([0x42u8; 32]);
2802 let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
2803 format: OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
2804 payment_data: Some(FinalOnionHopData {
2805 payment_secret: expected_payment_secret,
2806 total_msat: 0x1badca1f
2808 keysend_preimage: None,
2810 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
2811 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2813 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
2814 let target_value = hex::decode("3602080badf00d010203040404ffffffff082442424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242421badca1f").unwrap();
2815 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2816 msg = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2817 if let OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
2818 payment_data: Some(FinalOnionHopData {
2820 total_msat: 0x1badca1f
2822 keysend_preimage: None,
2824 assert_eq!(payment_secret, expected_payment_secret);
2825 } else { panic!(); }
2826 assert_eq!(msg.amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
2827 assert_eq!(msg.outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
2831 fn query_channel_range_end_blocknum() {
2832 let tests: Vec<(u32, u32, u32)> = vec![
2833 (10000, 1500, 11500),
2834 (0, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
2835 (1, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
2838 for (first_blocknum, number_of_blocks, expected) in tests.into_iter() {
2839 let sut = msgs::QueryChannelRange {
2840 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap(),
2844 assert_eq!(sut.end_blocknum(), expected);
2849 fn encoding_query_channel_range() {
2850 let mut query_channel_range = msgs::QueryChannelRange {
2851 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap(),
2852 first_blocknum: 100000,
2853 number_of_blocks: 1500,
2855 let encoded_value = query_channel_range.encode();
2856 let target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206000186a0000005dc").unwrap();
2857 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2859 query_channel_range = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2860 assert_eq!(query_channel_range.first_blocknum, 100000);
2861 assert_eq!(query_channel_range.number_of_blocks, 1500);
2865 fn encoding_reply_channel_range() {
2866 do_encoding_reply_channel_range(0);
2867 do_encoding_reply_channel_range(1);
2870 fn do_encoding_reply_channel_range(encoding_type: u8) {
2871 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206000b8a06000005dc01").unwrap();
2872 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2873 let mut reply_channel_range = msgs::ReplyChannelRange {
2874 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2875 first_blocknum: 756230,
2876 number_of_blocks: 1500,
2877 sync_complete: true,
2878 short_channel_ids: vec![0x000000000000008e, 0x0000000000003c69, 0x000000000045a6c4],
2881 if encoding_type == 0 {
2882 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001900000000000000008e0000000000003c69000000000045a6c4").unwrap());
2883 let encoded_value = reply_channel_range.encode();
2884 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2886 reply_channel_range = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2887 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2888 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.first_blocknum, 756230);
2889 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.number_of_blocks, 1500);
2890 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.sync_complete, true);
2891 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[0], 0x000000000000008e);
2892 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[1], 0x0000000000003c69);
2893 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[2], 0x000000000045a6c4);
2895 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001601789c636000833e08659309a65878be010010a9023a").unwrap());
2896 let result: Result<msgs::ReplyChannelRange, msgs::DecodeError> = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]));
2897 assert!(result.is_err(), "Expected decode failure with unsupported zlib encoding");
2902 fn encoding_query_short_channel_ids() {
2903 do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(0);
2904 do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(1);
2907 fn do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(encoding_type: u8) {
2908 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206").unwrap();
2909 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2910 let mut query_short_channel_ids = msgs::QueryShortChannelIds {
2911 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2912 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0000000000008e, 0x0000000000003c69, 0x000000000045a6c4],
2915 if encoding_type == 0 {
2916 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001900000000000000008e0000000000003c69000000000045a6c4").unwrap());
2917 let encoded_value = query_short_channel_ids.encode();
2918 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2920 query_short_channel_ids = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2921 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2922 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[0], 0x000000000000008e);
2923 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[1], 0x0000000000003c69);
2924 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[2], 0x000000000045a6c4);
2926 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001601789c636000833e08659309a65878be010010a9023a").unwrap());
2927 let result: Result<msgs::QueryShortChannelIds, msgs::DecodeError> = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]));
2928 assert!(result.is_err(), "Expected decode failure with unsupported zlib encoding");
2933 fn encoding_reply_short_channel_ids_end() {
2934 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2935 let mut reply_short_channel_ids_end = msgs::ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
2936 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2937 full_information: true,
2939 let encoded_value = reply_short_channel_ids_end.encode();
2940 let target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e220601").unwrap();
2941 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2943 reply_short_channel_ids_end = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2944 assert_eq!(reply_short_channel_ids_end.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2945 assert_eq!(reply_short_channel_ids_end.full_information, true);
2949 fn encoding_gossip_timestamp_filter(){
2950 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2951 let mut gossip_timestamp_filter = msgs::GossipTimestampFilter {
2952 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2953 first_timestamp: 1590000000,
2954 timestamp_range: 0xffff_ffff,
2956 let encoded_value = gossip_timestamp_filter.encode();
2957 let target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e22065ec57980ffffffff").unwrap();
2958 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2960 gossip_timestamp_filter = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2961 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2962 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.first_timestamp, 1590000000);
2963 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.timestamp_range, 0xffff_ffff);
2967 fn decode_onion_hop_data_len_as_bigsize() {
2968 // Tests that we can decode an onion payload that is >253 bytes.
2969 // Previously, receiving a payload of this size could've caused us to fail to decode a valid
2970 // payload, because we were decoding the length (a BigSize, big-endian) as a VarInt
2973 // Encode a test onion payload with a big custom TLV such that it's >253 bytes, forcing the
2974 // payload length to be encoded over multiple bytes rather than a single u8.
2975 let big_payload = encode_big_payload().unwrap();
2976 let mut rd = Cursor::new(&big_payload[..]);
2977 <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut rd).unwrap();
2979 // see above test, needs to be a separate method for use of the serialization macros.
2980 fn encode_big_payload() -> Result<Vec<u8>, io::Error> {
2981 use crate::util::ser::HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize;
2982 let payload = msgs::OnionHopData {
2983 format: OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
2984 short_channel_id: 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea,
2986 amt_to_forward: 1000,
2987 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2989 let mut encoded_payload = Vec::new();
2990 let test_bytes = vec![42u8; 1000];
2991 if let OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } = payload.format {
2992 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(&mut encoded_payload, {
2993 (1, test_bytes, vec_type),
2994 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(payload.amt_to_forward), required),
2995 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(payload.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
2996 (6, short_channel_id, required)