1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Wire messages, traits representing wire message handlers, and a few error types live here.
12 //! For a normal node you probably don't need to use anything here, however, if you wish to split a
13 //! node into an internet-facing route/message socket handling daemon and a separate daemon (or
14 //! server entirely) which handles only channel-related messages you may wish to implement
15 //! [`ChannelMessageHandler`] yourself and use it to re-serialize messages and pass them across
18 //! Note that if you go with such an architecture (instead of passing raw socket events to a
19 //! non-internet-facing system) you trust the frontend internet-facing system to not lie about the
20 //! source `node_id` of the message, however this does allow you to significantly reduce bandwidth
21 //! between the systems as routing messages can represent a significant chunk of bandwidth usage
22 //! (especially for non-channel-publicly-announcing nodes). As an alternate design which avoids
23 //! this issue, if you have sufficient bidirectional bandwidth between your systems, you may send
24 //! raw socket events into your non-internet-facing system and then send routing events back to
25 //! track the network on the less-secure system.
27 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
28 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature;
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
30 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
33 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
34 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
35 use crate::onion_message;
37 use crate::prelude::*;
40 use crate::io::{self, Read};
41 use crate::io_extras::read_to_end;
43 use crate::events::{MessageSendEventsProvider, OnionMessageProvider};
44 use crate::util::logger;
45 use crate::util::ser::{LengthReadable, Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, FixedLengthReader, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize, Hostname};
47 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
49 use crate::routing::gossip::{NodeAlias, NodeId};
51 /// 21 million * 10^8 * 1000
52 pub(crate) const MAX_VALUE_MSAT: u64 = 21_000_000_0000_0000_000;
55 /// A partial signature that also contains the Musig2 nonce its signer used
56 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
57 pub struct PartialSignatureWithNonce(pub musig2::types::PartialSignature, pub musig2::types::PublicNonce);
59 /// An error in decoding a message or struct.
60 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
61 pub enum DecodeError {
62 /// A version byte specified something we don't know how to handle.
64 /// Includes unknown realm byte in an onion hop data packet.
66 /// Unknown feature mandating we fail to parse message (e.g., TLV with an even, unknown type)
67 UnknownRequiredFeature,
68 /// Value was invalid.
70 /// For example, a byte which was supposed to be a bool was something other than a 0
71 /// or 1, a public key/private key/signature was invalid, text wasn't UTF-8, TLV was
72 /// syntactically incorrect, etc.
74 /// The buffer to be read was too short.
76 /// A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly.
78 /// Error from [`std::io`].
80 /// The message included zlib-compressed values, which we don't support.
81 UnsupportedCompression,
84 /// An [`init`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
86 /// [`init`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-init-message
87 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
89 /// The relevant features which the sender supports.
90 pub features: InitFeatures,
91 /// The receipient's network address.
93 /// This adds the option to report a remote IP address back to a connecting peer using the init
94 /// message. A node can decide to use that information to discover a potential update to its
95 /// public IPv4 address (NAT) and use that for a [`NodeAnnouncement`] update message containing
97 pub remote_network_address: Option<NetAddress>,
100 /// An [`error`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
102 /// [`error`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-error-and-warning-messages
103 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
104 pub struct ErrorMessage {
105 /// The channel ID involved in the error.
107 /// All-0s indicates a general error unrelated to a specific channel, after which all channels
108 /// with the sending peer should be closed.
109 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
110 /// A possibly human-readable error description.
112 /// The string should be sanitized before it is used (e.g., emitted to logs or printed to
113 /// `stdout`). Otherwise, a well crafted error message may trigger a security vulnerability in
114 /// the terminal emulator or the logging subsystem.
118 /// A [`warning`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
120 /// [`warning`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-error-and-warning-messages
121 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
122 pub struct WarningMessage {
123 /// The channel ID involved in the warning.
125 /// All-0s indicates a warning unrelated to a specific channel.
126 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
127 /// A possibly human-readable warning description.
129 /// The string should be sanitized before it is used (e.g. emitted to logs or printed to
130 /// stdout). Otherwise, a well crafted error message may trigger a security vulnerability in
131 /// the terminal emulator or the logging subsystem.
135 /// A [`ping`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
137 /// [`ping`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-ping-and-pong-messages
138 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
140 /// The desired response length.
142 /// The ping packet size.
144 /// This field is not sent on the wire. byteslen zeros are sent.
148 /// A [`pong`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
150 /// [`pong`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-ping-and-pong-messages
151 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
153 /// The pong packet size.
155 /// This field is not sent on the wire. byteslen zeros are sent.
159 /// An [`open_channel`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
161 /// [`open_channel`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-open_channel-message
162 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
163 pub struct OpenChannel {
164 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
165 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
166 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
167 pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
168 /// The channel value
169 pub funding_satoshis: u64,
170 /// The amount to push to the counterparty as part of the open, in milli-satoshi
172 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by sender will be omitted
173 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
174 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards sender, in milli-satoshi
175 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
176 /// The minimum value unencumbered by HTLCs for the counterparty to keep in the channel
177 pub channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
178 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
179 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
180 /// The feerate per 1000-weight of sender generated transactions, until updated by
182 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
183 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if
184 /// they broadcast a commitment transaction
185 pub to_self_delay: u16,
186 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards sender
187 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
188 /// The sender's key controlling the funding transaction
189 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
190 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
191 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
192 /// A payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
193 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
194 /// Used to derive a payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by sender
195 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
196 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to sender
197 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
198 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-sender transaction's per commitment point
199 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
200 /// The channel flags to be used
201 pub channel_flags: u8,
202 /// Optionally, a request to pre-set the to-sender output's `scriptPubkey` for when we collaboratively close
203 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField<Script>,
204 /// The channel type that this channel will represent
206 /// If this is `None`, we derive the channel type from the intersection of our
207 /// feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from the [`Init`] message.
208 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
211 /// An [`accept_channel`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
213 /// [`accept_channel`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-accept_channel-message
214 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
215 pub struct AcceptChannel {
216 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
217 pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
218 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by sender will be omitted
219 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
220 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards sender, in milli-satoshi
221 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
222 /// The minimum value unencumbered by HTLCs for the counterparty to keep in the channel
223 pub channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
224 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
225 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
226 /// Minimum depth of the funding transaction before the channel is considered open
227 pub minimum_depth: u32,
228 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if they broadcast a commitment transaction
229 pub to_self_delay: u16,
230 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards sender
231 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
232 /// The sender's key controlling the funding transaction
233 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
234 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
235 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
236 /// A payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
237 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
238 /// Used to derive a payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by sender
239 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
240 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
241 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
242 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-sender transaction's per commitment point
243 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
244 /// Optionally, a request to pre-set the to-sender output's scriptPubkey for when we collaboratively close
245 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField<Script>,
246 /// The channel type that this channel will represent.
248 /// If this is `None`, we derive the channel type from the intersection of
249 /// our feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from the [`Init`] message.
250 /// This is required to match the equivalent field in [`OpenChannel::channel_type`].
251 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
253 /// Next nonce the channel initiator should use to create a funding output signature against
254 pub next_local_nonce: Option<musig2::types::PublicNonce>,
257 /// A [`funding_created`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
259 /// [`funding_created`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-funding_created-message
260 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
261 pub struct FundingCreated {
262 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding is established
263 pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
264 /// The funding transaction ID
265 pub funding_txid: Txid,
266 /// The specific output index funding this channel
267 pub funding_output_index: u16,
268 /// The signature of the channel initiator (funder) on the initial commitment transaction
269 pub signature: Signature,
271 /// The partial signature of the channel initiator (funder)
272 pub partial_signature_with_nonce: Option<PartialSignatureWithNonce>,
274 /// Next nonce the channel acceptor should use to finalize the funding output signature
275 pub next_local_nonce: Option<musig2::types::PublicNonce>
278 /// A [`funding_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
280 /// [`funding_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-funding_signed-message
281 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
282 pub struct FundingSigned {
284 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
285 /// The signature of the channel acceptor (fundee) on the initial commitment transaction
286 pub signature: Signature,
288 /// The partial signature of the channel acceptor (fundee)
289 pub partial_signature_with_nonce: Option<PartialSignatureWithNonce>,
292 /// A [`channel_ready`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
294 /// [`channel_ready`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-channel_ready-message
295 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
296 pub struct ChannelReady {
298 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
299 /// The per-commitment point of the second commitment transaction
300 pub next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
301 /// If set, provides a `short_channel_id` alias for this channel.
303 /// The sender will accept payments to be forwarded over this SCID and forward them to this
304 /// messages' recipient.
305 pub short_channel_id_alias: Option<u64>,
308 /// A [`shutdown`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
310 /// [`shutdown`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#closing-initiation-shutdown
311 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
312 pub struct Shutdown {
314 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
315 /// The destination of this peer's funds on closing.
317 /// Must be in one of these forms: P2PKH, P2SH, P2WPKH, P2WSH, P2TR.
318 pub scriptpubkey: Script,
321 /// The minimum and maximum fees which the sender is willing to place on the closing transaction.
323 /// This is provided in [`ClosingSigned`] by both sides to indicate the fee range they are willing
325 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
326 pub struct ClosingSignedFeeRange {
327 /// The minimum absolute fee, in satoshis, which the sender is willing to place on the closing
329 pub min_fee_satoshis: u64,
330 /// The maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, which the sender is willing to place on the closing
332 pub max_fee_satoshis: u64,
335 /// A [`closing_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
337 /// [`closing_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#closing-negotiation-closing_signed
338 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
339 pub struct ClosingSigned {
341 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
342 /// The proposed total fee for the closing transaction
343 pub fee_satoshis: u64,
344 /// A signature on the closing transaction
345 pub signature: Signature,
346 /// The minimum and maximum fees which the sender is willing to accept, provided only by new
348 pub fee_range: Option<ClosingSignedFeeRange>,
351 /// An [`update_add_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
353 /// [`update_add_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#adding-an-htlc-update_add_htlc
354 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
355 pub struct UpdateAddHTLC {
357 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
360 /// The HTLC value in milli-satoshi
361 pub amount_msat: u64,
362 /// The payment hash, the pre-image of which controls HTLC redemption
363 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
364 /// The expiry height of the HTLC
365 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
366 pub(crate) onion_routing_packet: OnionPacket,
369 /// An onion message to be sent to or received from a peer.
371 // TODO: update with link to OM when they are merged into the BOLTs
372 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
373 pub struct OnionMessage {
374 /// Used in decrypting the onion packet's payload.
375 pub blinding_point: PublicKey,
376 pub(crate) onion_routing_packet: onion_message::Packet,
379 /// An [`update_fulfill_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
381 /// [`update_fulfill_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
382 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
383 pub struct UpdateFulfillHTLC {
385 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
388 /// The pre-image of the payment hash, allowing HTLC redemption
389 pub payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
392 /// An [`update_fail_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
394 /// [`update_fail_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
395 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
396 pub struct UpdateFailHTLC {
398 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
401 pub(crate) reason: OnionErrorPacket,
404 /// An [`update_fail_malformed_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
406 /// [`update_fail_malformed_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
407 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
408 pub struct UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
410 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
413 pub(crate) sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
415 pub failure_code: u16,
418 /// A [`commitment_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
420 /// [`commitment_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#committing-updates-so-far-commitment_signed
421 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
422 pub struct CommitmentSigned {
424 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
425 /// A signature on the commitment transaction
426 pub signature: Signature,
427 /// Signatures on the HTLC transactions
428 pub htlc_signatures: Vec<Signature>,
430 /// The partial Taproot signature on the commitment transaction
431 pub partial_signature_with_nonce: Option<PartialSignatureWithNonce>,
434 /// A [`revoke_and_ack`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
436 /// [`revoke_and_ack`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#completing-the-transition-to-the-updated-state-revoke_and_ack
437 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
438 pub struct RevokeAndACK {
440 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
441 /// The secret corresponding to the per-commitment point
442 pub per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
443 /// The next sender-broadcast commitment transaction's per-commitment point
444 pub next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
446 /// Musig nonce the recipient should use in their next commitment signature message
447 pub next_local_nonce: Option<musig2::types::PublicNonce>
450 /// An [`update_fee`] message to be sent to or received from a peer
452 /// [`update_fee`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#updating-fees-update_fee
453 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
454 pub struct UpdateFee {
456 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
457 /// Fee rate per 1000-weight of the transaction
458 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
461 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
462 /// Proof that the sender knows the per-commitment secret of the previous commitment transaction.
464 /// This is used to convince the recipient that the channel is at a certain commitment
465 /// number even if they lost that data due to a local failure. Of course, the peer may lie
466 /// and even later commitments may have been revoked.
467 pub struct DataLossProtect {
468 /// Proof that the sender knows the per-commitment secret of a specific commitment transaction
469 /// belonging to the recipient
470 pub your_last_per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
471 /// The sender's per-commitment point for their current commitment transaction
472 pub my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
475 /// A [`channel_reestablish`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
477 /// [`channel_reestablish`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#message-retransmission
478 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
479 pub struct ChannelReestablish {
481 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
482 /// The next commitment number for the sender
483 pub next_local_commitment_number: u64,
484 /// The next commitment number for the recipient
485 pub next_remote_commitment_number: u64,
486 /// Optionally, a field proving that next_remote_commitment_number-1 has been revoked
487 pub data_loss_protect: OptionalField<DataLossProtect>,
490 /// An [`announcement_signatures`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
492 /// [`announcement_signatures`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-announcement_signatures-message
493 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
494 pub struct AnnouncementSignatures {
496 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
497 /// The short channel ID
498 pub short_channel_id: u64,
499 /// A signature by the node key
500 pub node_signature: Signature,
501 /// A signature by the funding key
502 pub bitcoin_signature: Signature,
505 /// An address which can be used to connect to a remote peer.
506 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
507 pub enum NetAddress {
508 /// An IPv4 address/port on which the peer is listening.
510 /// The 4-byte IPv4 address
512 /// The port on which the node is listening
515 /// An IPv6 address/port on which the peer is listening.
517 /// The 16-byte IPv6 address
519 /// The port on which the node is listening
522 /// An old-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening.
524 /// This field is deprecated and the Tor network generally no longer supports V2 Onion
525 /// addresses. Thus, the details are not parsed here.
527 /// A new-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening.
529 /// To create the human-readable "hostname", concatenate the ED25519 pubkey, checksum, and version,
530 /// wrap as base32 and append ".onion".
532 /// The ed25519 long-term public key of the peer
533 ed25519_pubkey: [u8; 32],
534 /// The checksum of the pubkey and version, as included in the onion address
536 /// The version byte, as defined by the Tor Onion v3 spec.
538 /// The port on which the node is listening
541 /// A hostname/port on which the peer is listening.
543 /// The hostname on which the node is listening.
545 /// The port on which the node is listening.
550 /// Gets the ID of this address type. Addresses in [`NodeAnnouncement`] messages should be sorted
552 pub(crate) fn get_id(&self) -> u8 {
554 &NetAddress::IPv4 {..} => { 1 },
555 &NetAddress::IPv6 {..} => { 2 },
556 &NetAddress::OnionV2(_) => { 3 },
557 &NetAddress::OnionV3 {..} => { 4 },
558 &NetAddress::Hostname {..} => { 5 },
562 /// Strict byte-length of address descriptor, 1-byte type not recorded
563 fn len(&self) -> u16 {
565 &NetAddress::IPv4 { .. } => { 6 },
566 &NetAddress::IPv6 { .. } => { 18 },
567 &NetAddress::OnionV2(_) => { 12 },
568 &NetAddress::OnionV3 { .. } => { 37 },
569 // Consists of 1-byte hostname length, hostname bytes, and 2-byte port.
570 &NetAddress::Hostname { ref hostname, .. } => { u16::from(hostname.len()) + 3 },
574 /// The maximum length of any address descriptor, not including the 1-byte type.
575 /// This maximum length is reached by a hostname address descriptor:
576 /// a hostname with a maximum length of 255, its 1-byte length and a 2-byte port.
577 pub(crate) const MAX_LEN: u16 = 258;
580 impl Writeable for NetAddress {
581 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
583 &NetAddress::IPv4 { ref addr, ref port } => {
588 &NetAddress::IPv6 { ref addr, ref port } => {
593 &NetAddress::OnionV2(bytes) => {
595 bytes.write(writer)?;
597 &NetAddress::OnionV3 { ref ed25519_pubkey, ref checksum, ref version, ref port } => {
599 ed25519_pubkey.write(writer)?;
600 checksum.write(writer)?;
601 version.write(writer)?;
604 &NetAddress::Hostname { ref hostname, ref port } => {
606 hostname.write(writer)?;
614 impl Readable for Result<NetAddress, u8> {
615 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Result<NetAddress, u8>, DecodeError> {
616 let byte = <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
619 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::IPv4 {
620 addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
621 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
625 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::IPv6 {
626 addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
627 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
630 3 => Ok(Ok(NetAddress::OnionV2(Readable::read(reader)?))),
632 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::OnionV3 {
633 ed25519_pubkey: Readable::read(reader)?,
634 checksum: Readable::read(reader)?,
635 version: Readable::read(reader)?,
636 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
640 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::Hostname {
641 hostname: Readable::read(reader)?,
642 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
645 _ => return Ok(Err(byte)),
650 impl Readable for NetAddress {
651 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NetAddress, DecodeError> {
652 match Readable::read(reader) {
653 Ok(Ok(res)) => Ok(res),
654 Ok(Err(_)) => Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion),
660 /// Represents the set of gossip messages that require a signature from a node's identity key.
661 pub enum UnsignedGossipMessage<'a> {
662 /// An unsigned channel announcement.
663 ChannelAnnouncement(&'a UnsignedChannelAnnouncement),
664 /// An unsigned channel update.
665 ChannelUpdate(&'a UnsignedChannelUpdate),
666 /// An unsigned node announcement.
667 NodeAnnouncement(&'a UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)
670 impl<'a> Writeable for UnsignedGossipMessage<'a> {
671 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
673 UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
674 UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
675 UnsignedGossipMessage::NodeAnnouncement(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
680 /// The unsigned part of a [`node_announcement`] message.
682 /// [`node_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-node_announcement-message
683 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
684 pub struct UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
685 /// The advertised features
686 pub features: NodeFeatures,
687 /// A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed
689 /// The `node_id` this announcement originated from (don't rebroadcast the `node_announcement` back
692 /// An RGB color for UI purposes
694 /// An alias, for UI purposes.
696 /// This should be sanitized before use. There is no guarantee of uniqueness.
697 pub alias: NodeAlias,
698 /// List of addresses on which this node is reachable
699 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
700 pub(crate) excess_address_data: Vec<u8>,
701 pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
703 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
704 /// A [`node_announcement`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
706 /// [`node_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-node_announcement-message
707 pub struct NodeAnnouncement {
708 /// The signature by the node key
709 pub signature: Signature,
710 /// The actual content of the announcement
711 pub contents: UnsignedNodeAnnouncement,
714 /// The unsigned part of a [`channel_announcement`] message.
716 /// [`channel_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_announcement-message
717 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
718 pub struct UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
719 /// The advertised channel features
720 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
721 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
722 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
723 /// The short channel ID
724 pub short_channel_id: u64,
725 /// One of the two `node_id`s which are endpoints of this channel
726 pub node_id_1: NodeId,
727 /// The other of the two `node_id`s which are endpoints of this channel
728 pub node_id_2: NodeId,
729 /// The funding key for the first node
730 pub bitcoin_key_1: NodeId,
731 /// The funding key for the second node
732 pub bitcoin_key_2: NodeId,
733 pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
735 /// A [`channel_announcement`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
737 /// [`channel_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_announcement-message
738 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
739 pub struct ChannelAnnouncement {
740 /// Authentication of the announcement by the first public node
741 pub node_signature_1: Signature,
742 /// Authentication of the announcement by the second public node
743 pub node_signature_2: Signature,
744 /// Proof of funding UTXO ownership by the first public node
745 pub bitcoin_signature_1: Signature,
746 /// Proof of funding UTXO ownership by the second public node
747 pub bitcoin_signature_2: Signature,
748 /// The actual announcement
749 pub contents: UnsignedChannelAnnouncement,
752 /// The unsigned part of a [`channel_update`] message.
754 /// [`channel_update`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_update-message
755 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
756 pub struct UnsignedChannelUpdate {
757 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
758 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
759 /// The short channel ID
760 pub short_channel_id: u64,
761 /// A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed, specific to this channel
765 /// The number of blocks such that if:
766 /// `incoming_htlc.cltv_expiry < outgoing_htlc.cltv_expiry + cltv_expiry_delta`
767 /// then we need to fail the HTLC backwards. When forwarding an HTLC, `cltv_expiry_delta` determines
768 /// the outgoing HTLC's minimum `cltv_expiry` value -- so, if an incoming HTLC comes in with a
769 /// `cltv_expiry` of 100000, and the node we're forwarding to has a `cltv_expiry_delta` value of 10,
770 /// then we'll check that the outgoing HTLC's `cltv_expiry` value is at least 100010 before
771 /// forwarding. Note that the HTLC sender is the one who originally sets this value when
772 /// constructing the route.
773 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
774 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
775 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
776 /// The maximum HTLC value incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi.
778 /// This used to be optional.
779 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
780 /// The base HTLC fee charged by sender, in milli-satoshi
781 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
782 /// The amount to fee multiplier, in micro-satoshi
783 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
784 /// Excess data which was signed as a part of the message which we do not (yet) understand how
787 /// This is stored to ensure forward-compatibility as new fields are added to the lightning gossip protocol.
788 pub excess_data: Vec<u8>,
790 /// A [`channel_update`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
792 /// [`channel_update`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_update-message
793 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
794 pub struct ChannelUpdate {
795 /// A signature of the channel update
796 pub signature: Signature,
797 /// The actual channel update
798 pub contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate,
801 /// A [`query_channel_range`] message is used to query a peer for channel
802 /// UTXOs in a range of blocks. The recipient of a query makes a best
803 /// effort to reply to the query using one or more [`ReplyChannelRange`]
806 /// [`query_channel_range`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_channel_range-and-reply_channel_range-messages
807 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
808 pub struct QueryChannelRange {
809 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
810 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
811 /// The height of the first block for the channel UTXOs being queried
812 pub first_blocknum: u32,
813 /// The number of blocks to include in the query results
814 pub number_of_blocks: u32,
817 /// A [`reply_channel_range`] message is a reply to a [`QueryChannelRange`]
820 /// Multiple `reply_channel_range` messages can be sent in reply
821 /// to a single [`QueryChannelRange`] message. The query recipient makes a
822 /// best effort to respond based on their local network view which may
823 /// not be a perfect view of the network. The `short_channel_id`s in the
824 /// reply are encoded. We only support `encoding_type=0` uncompressed
825 /// serialization and do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization.
827 /// [`reply_channel_range`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_channel_range-and-reply_channel_range-messages
828 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
829 pub struct ReplyChannelRange {
830 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
831 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
832 /// The height of the first block in the range of the reply
833 pub first_blocknum: u32,
834 /// The number of blocks included in the range of the reply
835 pub number_of_blocks: u32,
836 /// True when this is the final reply for a query
837 pub sync_complete: bool,
838 /// The `short_channel_id`s in the channel range
839 pub short_channel_ids: Vec<u64>,
842 /// A [`query_short_channel_ids`] message is used to query a peer for
843 /// routing gossip messages related to one or more `short_channel_id`s.
845 /// The query recipient will reply with the latest, if available,
846 /// [`ChannelAnnouncement`], [`ChannelUpdate`] and [`NodeAnnouncement`] messages
847 /// it maintains for the requested `short_channel_id`s followed by a
848 /// [`ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd`] message. The `short_channel_id`s sent in
849 /// this query are encoded. We only support `encoding_type=0` uncompressed
850 /// serialization and do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization.
852 /// [`query_short_channel_ids`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_short_channel_idsreply_short_channel_ids_end-messages
853 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
854 pub struct QueryShortChannelIds {
855 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
856 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
857 /// The short_channel_ids that are being queried
858 pub short_channel_ids: Vec<u64>,
861 /// A [`reply_short_channel_ids_end`] message is sent as a reply to a
862 /// message. The query recipient makes a best
863 /// effort to respond based on their local network view which may not be
864 /// a perfect view of the network.
866 /// [`reply_short_channel_ids_end`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_short_channel_idsreply_short_channel_ids_end-messages
867 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
868 pub struct ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
869 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain that was queried
870 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
871 /// Indicates if the query recipient maintains up-to-date channel
872 /// information for the `chain_hash`
873 pub full_information: bool,
876 /// A [`gossip_timestamp_filter`] message is used by a node to request
877 /// gossip relay for messages in the requested time range when the
878 /// `gossip_queries` feature has been negotiated.
880 /// [`gossip_timestamp_filter`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-gossip_timestamp_filter-message
881 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
882 pub struct GossipTimestampFilter {
883 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain for channel and node information
884 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
885 /// The starting unix timestamp
886 pub first_timestamp: u32,
887 /// The range of information in seconds
888 pub timestamp_range: u32,
891 /// Encoding type for data compression of collections in gossip queries.
893 /// We do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization [defined in BOLT
894 /// #7](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#query-messages).
899 /// Used to put an error message in a [`LightningError`].
900 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
901 pub enum ErrorAction {
902 /// The peer took some action which made us think they were useless. Disconnect them.
904 /// An error message which we should make an effort to send before we disconnect.
905 msg: Option<ErrorMessage>
907 /// The peer did something harmless that we weren't able to process, just log and ignore
908 // New code should *not* use this. New code must use IgnoreAndLog, below!
910 /// The peer did something harmless that we weren't able to meaningfully process.
911 /// If the error is logged, log it at the given level.
912 IgnoreAndLog(logger::Level),
913 /// The peer provided us with a gossip message which we'd already seen. In most cases this
914 /// should be ignored, but it may result in the message being forwarded if it is a duplicate of
915 /// our own channel announcements.
916 IgnoreDuplicateGossip,
917 /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them.
919 /// The message to send.
922 /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them without closing any channels.
924 /// The message to send.
926 /// The peer may have done something harmless that we weren't able to meaningfully process,
927 /// though we should still tell them about it.
928 /// If this event is logged, log it at the given level.
929 log_level: logger::Level,
933 /// An Err type for failure to process messages.
934 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
935 pub struct LightningError {
936 /// A human-readable message describing the error
938 /// The action which should be taken against the offending peer.
939 pub action: ErrorAction,
942 /// Struct used to return values from [`RevokeAndACK`] messages, containing a bunch of commitment
943 /// transaction updates if they were pending.
944 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
945 pub struct CommitmentUpdate {
946 /// `update_add_htlc` messages which should be sent
947 pub update_add_htlcs: Vec<UpdateAddHTLC>,
948 /// `update_fulfill_htlc` messages which should be sent
949 pub update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
950 /// `update_fail_htlc` messages which should be sent
951 pub update_fail_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFailHTLC>,
952 /// `update_fail_malformed_htlc` messages which should be sent
953 pub update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFailMalformedHTLC>,
954 /// An `update_fee` message which should be sent
955 pub update_fee: Option<UpdateFee>,
956 /// A `commitment_signed` message which should be sent
957 pub commitment_signed: CommitmentSigned,
960 /// Messages could have optional fields to use with extended features
961 /// As we wish to serialize these differently from `Option<T>`s (`Options` get a tag byte, but
962 /// [`OptionalField`] simply gets `Present` if there are enough bytes to read into it), we have a
963 /// separate enum type for them.
965 /// This is not exported to bindings users due to a free generic in `T`
966 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
967 pub enum OptionalField<T> {
968 /// Optional field is included in message
970 /// Optional field is absent in message
974 /// A trait to describe an object which can receive channel messages.
976 /// Messages MAY be called in parallel when they originate from different `their_node_ids`, however
977 /// they MUST NOT be called in parallel when the two calls have the same `their_node_id`.
978 pub trait ChannelMessageHandler : MessageSendEventsProvider {
980 /// Handle an incoming `open_channel` message from the given peer.
981 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OpenChannel);
982 /// Handle an incoming `accept_channel` message from the given peer.
983 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AcceptChannel);
984 /// Handle an incoming `funding_created` message from the given peer.
985 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingCreated);
986 /// Handle an incoming `funding_signed` message from the given peer.
987 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingSigned);
988 /// Handle an incoming `channel_ready` message from the given peer.
989 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelReady);
992 /// Handle an incoming `shutdown` message from the given peer.
993 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Shutdown);
994 /// Handle an incoming `closing_signed` message from the given peer.
995 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ClosingSigned);
998 /// Handle an incoming `update_add_htlc` message from the given peer.
999 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateAddHTLC);
1000 /// Handle an incoming `update_fulfill_htlc` message from the given peer.
1001 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFulfillHTLC);
1002 /// Handle an incoming `update_fail_htlc` message from the given peer.
1003 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFailHTLC);
1004 /// Handle an incoming `update_fail_malformed_htlc` message from the given peer.
1005 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFailMalformedHTLC);
1006 /// Handle an incoming `commitment_signed` message from the given peer.
1007 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &CommitmentSigned);
1008 /// Handle an incoming `revoke_and_ack` message from the given peer.
1009 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &RevokeAndACK);
1011 /// Handle an incoming `update_fee` message from the given peer.
1012 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFee);
1014 // Channel-to-announce:
1015 /// Handle an incoming `announcement_signatures` message from the given peer.
1016 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AnnouncementSignatures);
1018 // Connection loss/reestablish:
1019 /// Indicates a connection to the peer failed/an existing connection was lost.
1020 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey);
1022 /// Handle a peer reconnecting, possibly generating `channel_reestablish` message(s).
1024 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1025 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1026 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1027 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1028 /// Handle an incoming `channel_reestablish` message from the given peer.
1029 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelReestablish);
1031 /// Handle an incoming `channel_update` message from the given peer.
1032 fn handle_channel_update(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelUpdate);
1035 /// Handle an incoming `error` message from the given peer.
1036 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ErrorMessage);
1038 // Handler information:
1039 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1040 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1041 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1042 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1044 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1045 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1046 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1048 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1049 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1052 /// A trait to describe an object which can receive routing messages.
1054 /// # Implementor DoS Warnings
1056 /// For messages enabled with the `gossip_queries` feature there are potential DoS vectors when
1057 /// handling inbound queries. Implementors using an on-disk network graph should be aware of
1058 /// repeated disk I/O for queries accessing different parts of the network graph.
1059 pub trait RoutingMessageHandler : MessageSendEventsProvider {
1060 /// Handle an incoming `node_announcement` message, returning `true` if it should be forwarded on,
1061 /// `false` or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1062 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1063 /// Handle a `channel_announcement` message, returning `true` if it should be forwarded on, `false`
1064 /// or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1065 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1066 /// Handle an incoming `channel_update` message, returning true if it should be forwarded on,
1067 /// `false` or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1068 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1069 /// Gets channel announcements and updates required to dump our routing table to a remote node,
1070 /// starting at the `short_channel_id` indicated by `starting_point` and including announcements
1071 /// for a single channel.
1072 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)>;
1073 /// Gets a node announcement required to dump our routing table to a remote node, starting at
1074 /// the node *after* the provided pubkey and including up to one announcement immediately
1075 /// higher (as defined by `<PublicKey as Ord>::cmp`) than `starting_point`.
1076 /// If `None` is provided for `starting_point`, we start at the first node.
1077 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&NodeId>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement>;
1078 /// Called when a connection is established with a peer. This can be used to
1079 /// perform routing table synchronization using a strategy defined by the
1082 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1083 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1084 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1085 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1086 /// Handles the reply of a query we initiated to learn about channels
1087 /// for a given range of blocks. We can expect to receive one or more
1088 /// replies to a single query.
1089 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1090 /// Handles the reply of a query we initiated asking for routing gossip
1091 /// messages for a list of channels. We should receive this message when
1092 /// a node has completed its best effort to send us the pertaining routing
1093 /// gossip messages.
1094 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1095 /// Handles when a peer asks us to send a list of `short_channel_id`s
1096 /// for the requested range of blocks.
1097 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1098 /// Handles when a peer asks us to send routing gossip messages for a
1099 /// list of `short_channel_id`s.
1100 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1102 // Handler queueing status:
1103 /// Indicates that there are a large number of [`ChannelAnnouncement`] (or other) messages
1104 /// pending some async action. While there is no guarantee of the rate of future messages, the
1105 /// caller should seek to reduce the rate of new gossip messages handled, especially
1106 /// [`ChannelAnnouncement`]s.
1107 fn processing_queue_high(&self) -> bool;
1109 // Handler information:
1110 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1111 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1112 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1113 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1114 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1115 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1116 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1118 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1119 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1122 /// A trait to describe an object that can receive onion messages.
1123 pub trait OnionMessageHandler : OnionMessageProvider {
1124 /// Handle an incoming `onion_message` message from the given peer.
1125 fn handle_onion_message(&self, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OnionMessage);
1126 /// Called when a connection is established with a peer. Can be used to track which peers
1127 /// advertise onion message support and are online.
1129 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1130 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1131 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1132 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1133 /// Indicates a connection to the peer failed/an existing connection was lost. Allows handlers to
1134 /// drop and refuse to forward onion messages to this peer.
1135 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey);
1137 // Handler information:
1138 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1139 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1140 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1141 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1143 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1144 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1145 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1147 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1148 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1151 mod fuzzy_internal_msgs {
1152 use crate::prelude::*;
1153 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
1155 // These types aren't intended to be pub, but are exposed for direct fuzzing (as we deserialize
1156 // them from untrusted input):
1158 pub(crate) struct FinalOnionHopData {
1159 pub(crate) payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
1160 /// The total value, in msat, of the payment as received by the ultimate recipient.
1161 /// Message serialization may panic if this value is more than 21 million Bitcoin.
1162 pub(crate) total_msat: u64,
1165 pub(crate) enum OnionHopDataFormat {
1167 short_channel_id: u64,
1170 payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData>,
1171 keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
1175 pub struct OnionHopData {
1176 pub(crate) format: OnionHopDataFormat,
1177 /// The value, in msat, of the payment after this hop's fee is deducted.
1178 /// Message serialization may panic if this value is more than 21 million Bitcoin.
1179 pub(crate) amt_to_forward: u64,
1180 pub(crate) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
1183 pub struct DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
1184 pub(crate) hmac: [u8; 32],
1185 pub(crate) failuremsg: Vec<u8>,
1186 pub(crate) pad: Vec<u8>,
1190 pub use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*;
1191 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
1192 pub(crate) use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*;
1195 pub(crate) struct OnionPacket {
1196 pub(crate) version: u8,
1197 /// In order to ensure we always return an error on onion decode in compliance with [BOLT
1198 /// #4](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md), we have to
1199 /// deserialize `OnionPacket`s contained in [`UpdateAddHTLC`] messages even if the ephemeral
1200 /// public key (here) is bogus, so we hold a [`Result`] instead of a [`PublicKey`] as we'd
1202 pub(crate) public_key: Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>,
1203 pub(crate) hop_data: [u8; 20*65],
1204 pub(crate) hmac: [u8; 32],
1207 impl onion_utils::Packet for OnionPacket {
1208 type Data = onion_utils::FixedSizeOnionPacket;
1209 fn new(pubkey: PublicKey, hop_data: onion_utils::FixedSizeOnionPacket, hmac: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
1212 public_key: Ok(pubkey),
1213 hop_data: hop_data.0,
1219 impl Eq for OnionPacket { }
1220 impl PartialEq for OnionPacket {
1221 fn eq(&self, other: &OnionPacket) -> bool {
1222 for (i, j) in self.hop_data.iter().zip(other.hop_data.iter()) {
1223 if i != j { return false; }
1225 self.version == other.version &&
1226 self.public_key == other.public_key &&
1227 self.hmac == other.hmac
1231 impl fmt::Debug for OnionPacket {
1232 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
1233 f.write_fmt(format_args!("OnionPacket version {} with hmac {:?}", self.version, &self.hmac[..]))
1237 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1238 pub(crate) struct OnionErrorPacket {
1239 // This really should be a constant size slice, but the spec lets these things be up to 128KB?
1240 // (TODO) We limit it in decode to much lower...
1241 pub(crate) data: Vec<u8>,
1244 impl fmt::Display for DecodeError {
1245 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
1247 DecodeError::UnknownVersion => f.write_str("Unknown realm byte in Onion packet"),
1248 DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature => f.write_str("Unknown required feature preventing decode"),
1249 DecodeError::InvalidValue => f.write_str("Nonsense bytes didn't map to the type they were interpreted as"),
1250 DecodeError::ShortRead => f.write_str("Packet extended beyond the provided bytes"),
1251 DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor => f.write_str("A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly"),
1252 DecodeError::Io(ref e) => fmt::Debug::fmt(e, f),
1253 DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression => f.write_str("We don't support receiving messages with zlib-compressed fields"),
1258 impl From<io::Error> for DecodeError {
1259 fn from(e: io::Error) -> Self {
1260 if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof {
1261 DecodeError::ShortRead
1263 DecodeError::Io(e.kind())
1268 impl Writeable for OptionalField<Script> {
1269 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1271 OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1272 // Note that Writeable for script includes the 16-bit length tag for us
1275 OptionalField::Absent => {}
1281 impl Readable for OptionalField<Script> {
1282 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1283 match <u16 as Readable>::read(r) {
1285 let mut buf = vec![0; len as usize];
1286 r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
1287 Ok(OptionalField::Present(Script::from(buf)))
1289 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(OptionalField::Absent),
1295 impl Writeable for OptionalField<u64> {
1296 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1298 OptionalField::Present(ref value) => {
1301 OptionalField::Absent => {}
1307 impl Readable for OptionalField<u64> {
1308 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1309 let value: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
1310 Ok(OptionalField::Present(value))
1314 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
1315 impl_writeable_msg!(AcceptChannel, {
1316 temporary_channel_id,
1317 dust_limit_satoshis,
1318 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1319 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1325 revocation_basepoint,
1327 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1329 first_per_commitment_point,
1330 shutdown_scriptpubkey
1332 (1, channel_type, option),
1336 impl_writeable_msg!(AcceptChannel, {
1337 temporary_channel_id,
1338 dust_limit_satoshis,
1339 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1340 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1346 revocation_basepoint,
1348 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1350 first_per_commitment_point,
1351 shutdown_scriptpubkey
1353 (1, channel_type, option),
1354 (4, next_local_nonce, option),
1357 impl_writeable_msg!(AnnouncementSignatures, {
1364 impl Writeable for ChannelReestablish {
1365 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1366 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
1367 self.next_local_commitment_number.write(w)?;
1368 self.next_remote_commitment_number.write(w)?;
1369 match self.data_loss_protect {
1370 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss_protect) => {
1371 (*data_loss_protect).your_last_per_commitment_secret.write(w)?;
1372 (*data_loss_protect).my_current_per_commitment_point.write(w)?;
1374 OptionalField::Absent => {}
1380 impl Readable for ChannelReestablish{
1381 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1383 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1384 next_local_commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
1385 next_remote_commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
1386 data_loss_protect: {
1387 match <[u8; 32] as Readable>::read(r) {
1388 Ok(your_last_per_commitment_secret) =>
1389 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
1390 your_last_per_commitment_secret,
1391 my_current_per_commitment_point: Readable::read(r)?,
1393 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => OptionalField::Absent,
1394 Err(e) => return Err(e)
1401 impl_writeable_msg!(ClosingSigned,
1402 { channel_id, fee_satoshis, signature },
1403 { (1, fee_range, option) }
1406 impl_writeable!(ClosingSignedFeeRange, {
1411 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
1412 impl_writeable_msg!(CommitmentSigned, {
1419 impl_writeable_msg!(CommitmentSigned, {
1424 (2, partial_signature_with_nonce, option)
1427 impl_writeable!(DecodedOnionErrorPacket, {
1433 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
1434 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingCreated, {
1435 temporary_channel_id,
1437 funding_output_index,
1441 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingCreated, {
1442 temporary_channel_id,
1444 funding_output_index,
1447 (2, partial_signature_with_nonce, option),
1448 (4, next_local_nonce, option)
1451 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
1452 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingSigned, {
1458 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingSigned, {
1462 (2, partial_signature_with_nonce, option)
1465 impl_writeable_msg!(ChannelReady, {
1467 next_per_commitment_point,
1469 (1, short_channel_id_alias, option),
1472 impl Writeable for Init {
1473 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1474 // global_features gets the bottom 13 bits of our features, and local_features gets all of
1475 // our relevant feature bits. This keeps us compatible with old nodes.
1476 self.features.write_up_to_13(w)?;
1477 self.features.write(w)?;
1478 encode_tlv_stream!(w, {
1479 (3, self.remote_network_address, option)
1485 impl Readable for Init {
1486 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1487 let global_features: InitFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
1488 let features: InitFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
1489 let mut remote_network_address: Option<NetAddress> = None;
1490 decode_tlv_stream!(r, {
1491 (3, remote_network_address, option)
1494 features: features.or(global_features),
1495 remote_network_address,
1500 impl_writeable_msg!(OpenChannel, {
1502 temporary_channel_id,
1505 dust_limit_satoshis,
1506 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1507 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1513 revocation_basepoint,
1515 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1517 first_per_commitment_point,
1519 shutdown_scriptpubkey
1521 (1, channel_type, option),
1524 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
1525 impl_writeable_msg!(RevokeAndACK, {
1527 per_commitment_secret,
1528 next_per_commitment_point
1532 impl_writeable_msg!(RevokeAndACK, {
1534 per_commitment_secret,
1535 next_per_commitment_point
1537 (4, next_local_nonce, option)
1540 impl_writeable_msg!(Shutdown, {
1545 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFailHTLC, {
1551 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, {
1558 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFee, {
1563 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFulfillHTLC, {
1569 // Note that this is written as a part of ChannelManager objects, and thus cannot change its
1570 // serialization format in a way which assumes we know the total serialized length/message end
1572 impl_writeable!(OnionErrorPacket, {
1576 // Note that this is written as a part of ChannelManager objects, and thus cannot change its
1577 // serialization format in a way which assumes we know the total serialized length/message end
1579 impl Writeable for OnionPacket {
1580 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1581 self.version.write(w)?;
1582 match self.public_key {
1583 Ok(pubkey) => pubkey.write(w)?,
1584 Err(_) => [0u8;33].write(w)?,
1586 w.write_all(&self.hop_data)?;
1587 self.hmac.write(w)?;
1592 impl Readable for OnionPacket {
1593 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1595 version: Readable::read(r)?,
1597 let mut buf = [0u8;33];
1598 r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
1599 PublicKey::from_slice(&buf)
1601 hop_data: Readable::read(r)?,
1602 hmac: Readable::read(r)?,
1607 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateAddHTLC, {
1613 onion_routing_packet
1616 impl Readable for OnionMessage {
1617 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1618 let blinding_point: PublicKey = Readable::read(r)?;
1619 let len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1620 let mut packet_reader = FixedLengthReader::new(r, len as u64);
1621 let onion_routing_packet: onion_message::Packet = <onion_message::Packet as LengthReadable>::read(&mut packet_reader)?;
1624 onion_routing_packet,
1629 impl Writeable for OnionMessage {
1630 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1631 self.blinding_point.write(w)?;
1632 let onion_packet_len = self.onion_routing_packet.serialized_length();
1633 (onion_packet_len as u16).write(w)?;
1634 self.onion_routing_packet.write(w)?;
1639 impl Writeable for FinalOnionHopData {
1640 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1641 self.payment_secret.0.write(w)?;
1642 HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.total_msat).write(w)
1646 impl Readable for FinalOnionHopData {
1647 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1648 let secret: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
1649 let amt: HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize<u64> = Readable::read(r)?;
1650 Ok(Self { payment_secret: PaymentSecret(secret), total_msat: amt.0 })
1654 impl Writeable for OnionHopData {
1655 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1657 OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => {
1658 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
1659 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.amt_to_forward), required),
1660 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
1661 (6, short_channel_id, required)
1664 OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { ref payment_data, ref keysend_preimage } => {
1665 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
1666 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.amt_to_forward), required),
1667 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
1668 (8, payment_data, option),
1669 (5482373484, keysend_preimage, option)
1677 impl Readable for OnionHopData {
1678 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1679 let mut amt = HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(0u64);
1680 let mut cltv_value = HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(0u32);
1681 let mut short_id: Option<u64> = None;
1682 let mut payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData> = None;
1683 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
1684 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
1686 (4, cltv_value, required),
1687 (6, short_id, option),
1688 (8, payment_data, option),
1689 // See https://github.com/lightning/blips/blob/master/blip-0003.md
1690 (5482373484, keysend_preimage, option)
1693 let format = if let Some(short_channel_id) = short_id {
1694 if payment_data.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
1695 OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
1699 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1700 if data.total_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1701 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1704 OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
1710 if amt.0 > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1711 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1715 amt_to_forward: amt.0,
1716 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv_value.0,
1721 // ReadableArgs because we need onion_utils::decode_next_hop to accommodate payment packets and
1722 // onion message packets.
1723 impl ReadableArgs<()> for OnionHopData {
1724 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R, _arg: ()) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1725 <Self as Readable>::read(r)
1729 impl Writeable for Ping {
1730 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1731 self.ponglen.write(w)?;
1732 vec![0u8; self.byteslen as usize].write(w)?; // size-unchecked write
1737 impl Readable for Ping {
1738 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1740 ponglen: Readable::read(r)?,
1742 let byteslen = Readable::read(r)?;
1743 r.read_exact(&mut vec![0u8; byteslen as usize][..])?;
1750 impl Writeable for Pong {
1751 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1752 vec![0u8; self.byteslen as usize].write(w)?; // size-unchecked write
1757 impl Readable for Pong {
1758 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1761 let byteslen = Readable::read(r)?;
1762 r.read_exact(&mut vec![0u8; byteslen as usize][..])?;
1769 impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1770 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1771 self.features.write(w)?;
1772 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
1773 self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
1774 self.node_id_1.write(w)?;
1775 self.node_id_2.write(w)?;
1776 self.bitcoin_key_1.write(w)?;
1777 self.bitcoin_key_2.write(w)?;
1778 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
1783 impl Readable for UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1784 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1786 features: Readable::read(r)?,
1787 chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
1788 short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1789 node_id_1: Readable::read(r)?,
1790 node_id_2: Readable::read(r)?,
1791 bitcoin_key_1: Readable::read(r)?,
1792 bitcoin_key_2: Readable::read(r)?,
1793 excess_data: read_to_end(r)?,
1798 impl_writeable!(ChannelAnnouncement, {
1801 bitcoin_signature_1,
1802 bitcoin_signature_2,
1806 impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1807 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1808 // `message_flags` used to indicate presence of `htlc_maximum_msat`, but was deprecated in the spec.
1809 const MESSAGE_FLAGS: u8 = 1;
1810 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
1811 self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
1812 self.timestamp.write(w)?;
1813 let all_flags = self.flags as u16 | ((MESSAGE_FLAGS as u16) << 8);
1814 all_flags.write(w)?;
1815 self.cltv_expiry_delta.write(w)?;
1816 self.htlc_minimum_msat.write(w)?;
1817 self.fee_base_msat.write(w)?;
1818 self.fee_proportional_millionths.write(w)?;
1819 self.htlc_maximum_msat.write(w)?;
1820 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
1825 impl Readable for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1826 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1828 chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
1829 short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1830 timestamp: Readable::read(r)?,
1832 let flags: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1833 // Note: we ignore the `message_flags` for now, since it was deprecated by the spec.
1836 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(r)?,
1837 htlc_minimum_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
1838 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
1839 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(r)?,
1840 htlc_maximum_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
1841 excess_data: read_to_end(r)?,
1846 impl_writeable!(ChannelUpdate, {
1851 impl Writeable for ErrorMessage {
1852 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1853 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
1854 (self.data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
1855 w.write_all(self.data.as_bytes())?;
1860 impl Readable for ErrorMessage {
1861 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1863 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1865 let sz: usize = <u16 as Readable>::read(r)? as usize;
1866 let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(sz);
1868 r.read_exact(&mut data)?;
1869 match String::from_utf8(data) {
1871 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1878 impl Writeable for WarningMessage {
1879 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1880 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
1881 (self.data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
1882 w.write_all(self.data.as_bytes())?;
1887 impl Readable for WarningMessage {
1888 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1890 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1892 let sz: usize = <u16 as Readable>::read(r)? as usize;
1893 let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(sz);
1895 r.read_exact(&mut data)?;
1896 match String::from_utf8(data) {
1898 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1905 impl Writeable for UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1906 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1907 self.features.write(w)?;
1908 self.timestamp.write(w)?;
1909 self.node_id.write(w)?;
1910 w.write_all(&self.rgb)?;
1911 self.alias.write(w)?;
1913 let mut addr_len = 0;
1914 for addr in self.addresses.iter() {
1915 addr_len += 1 + addr.len();
1917 (addr_len + self.excess_address_data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
1918 for addr in self.addresses.iter() {
1921 w.write_all(&self.excess_address_data[..])?;
1922 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
1927 impl Readable for UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1928 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1929 let features: NodeFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
1930 let timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
1931 let node_id: NodeId = Readable::read(r)?;
1932 let mut rgb = [0; 3];
1933 r.read_exact(&mut rgb)?;
1934 let alias: NodeAlias = Readable::read(r)?;
1936 let addr_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1937 let mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress> = Vec::new();
1938 let mut addr_readpos = 0;
1939 let mut excess = false;
1940 let mut excess_byte = 0;
1942 if addr_len <= addr_readpos { break; }
1943 match Readable::read(r) {
1945 if addr_len < addr_readpos + 1 + addr.len() {
1946 return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor);
1948 addr_readpos += (1 + addr.len()) as u16;
1949 addresses.push(addr);
1951 Ok(Err(unknown_descriptor)) => {
1953 excess_byte = unknown_descriptor;
1956 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor),
1957 Err(e) => return Err(e),
1961 let mut excess_data = vec![];
1962 let excess_address_data = if addr_readpos < addr_len {
1963 let mut excess_address_data = vec![0; (addr_len - addr_readpos) as usize];
1964 r.read_exact(&mut excess_address_data[if excess { 1 } else { 0 }..])?;
1966 excess_address_data[0] = excess_byte;
1971 excess_data.push(excess_byte);
1975 excess_data.extend(read_to_end(r)?.iter());
1976 Ok(UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1983 excess_address_data,
1989 impl_writeable!(NodeAnnouncement, {
1994 impl Readable for QueryShortChannelIds {
1995 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1996 let chain_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(r)?;
1998 let encoding_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1999 let encoding_type: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
2001 // Must be encoding_type=0 uncompressed serialization. We do not
2002 // support encoding_type=1 zlib serialization.
2003 if encoding_type != EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8 {
2004 return Err(DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression);
2007 // We expect the encoding_len to always includes the 1-byte
2008 // encoding_type and that short_channel_ids are 8-bytes each
2009 if encoding_len == 0 || (encoding_len - 1) % 8 != 0 {
2010 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2013 // Read short_channel_ids (8-bytes each), for the u16 encoding_len
2014 // less the 1-byte encoding_type
2015 let short_channel_id_count: u16 = (encoding_len - 1)/8;
2016 let mut short_channel_ids = Vec::with_capacity(short_channel_id_count as usize);
2017 for _ in 0..short_channel_id_count {
2018 short_channel_ids.push(Readable::read(r)?);
2021 Ok(QueryShortChannelIds {
2028 impl Writeable for QueryShortChannelIds {
2029 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2030 // Calculated from 1-byte encoding_type plus 8-bytes per short_channel_id
2031 let encoding_len: u16 = 1 + self.short_channel_ids.len() as u16 * 8;
2033 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
2034 encoding_len.write(w)?;
2036 // We only support type=0 uncompressed serialization
2037 (EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8).write(w)?;
2039 for scid in self.short_channel_ids.iter() {
2047 impl_writeable_msg!(ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd, {
2052 impl QueryChannelRange {
2053 /// Calculates the overflow safe ending block height for the query.
2055 /// Overflow returns `0xffffffff`, otherwise returns `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`.
2056 pub fn end_blocknum(&self) -> u32 {
2057 match self.first_blocknum.checked_add(self.number_of_blocks) {
2058 Some(block) => block,
2059 None => u32::max_value(),
2064 impl_writeable_msg!(QueryChannelRange, {
2070 impl Readable for ReplyChannelRange {
2071 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2072 let chain_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(r)?;
2073 let first_blocknum: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
2074 let number_of_blocks: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
2075 let sync_complete: bool = Readable::read(r)?;
2077 let encoding_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
2078 let encoding_type: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
2080 // Must be encoding_type=0 uncompressed serialization. We do not
2081 // support encoding_type=1 zlib serialization.
2082 if encoding_type != EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8 {
2083 return Err(DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression);
2086 // We expect the encoding_len to always includes the 1-byte
2087 // encoding_type and that short_channel_ids are 8-bytes each
2088 if encoding_len == 0 || (encoding_len - 1) % 8 != 0 {
2089 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2092 // Read short_channel_ids (8-bytes each), for the u16 encoding_len
2093 // less the 1-byte encoding_type
2094 let short_channel_id_count: u16 = (encoding_len - 1)/8;
2095 let mut short_channel_ids = Vec::with_capacity(short_channel_id_count as usize);
2096 for _ in 0..short_channel_id_count {
2097 short_channel_ids.push(Readable::read(r)?);
2100 Ok(ReplyChannelRange {
2110 impl Writeable for ReplyChannelRange {
2111 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2112 let encoding_len: u16 = 1 + self.short_channel_ids.len() as u16 * 8;
2113 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
2114 self.first_blocknum.write(w)?;
2115 self.number_of_blocks.write(w)?;
2116 self.sync_complete.write(w)?;
2118 encoding_len.write(w)?;
2119 (EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8).write(w)?;
2120 for scid in self.short_channel_ids.iter() {
2128 impl_writeable_msg!(GossipTimestampFilter, {
2137 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
2138 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
2139 use crate::ln::msgs;
2140 use crate::ln::msgs::{FinalOnionHopData, OptionalField, OnionErrorPacket, OnionHopDataFormat};
2141 use crate::routing::gossip::{NodeAlias, NodeId};
2142 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Hostname};
2144 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2145 use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
2146 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2147 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
2148 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2149 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
2151 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2152 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2154 use crate::io::{self, Cursor};
2155 use crate::prelude::*;
2156 use core::convert::TryFrom;
2159 fn encoding_channel_reestablish_no_secret() {
2160 let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
2161 channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
2162 next_local_commitment_number: 3,
2163 next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
2164 data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Absent,
2167 let encoded_value = cr.encode();
2170 vec![4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4]
2175 fn encoding_channel_reestablish_with_secret() {
2177 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2178 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
2181 let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
2182 channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
2183 next_local_commitment_number: 3,
2184 next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
2185 data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Present(msgs::DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret: [9;32], my_current_per_commitment_point: public_key}),
2188 let encoded_value = cr.encode();
2191 vec![4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 3, 27, 132, 197, 86, 123, 18, 100, 64, 153, 93, 62, 213, 170, 186, 5, 101, 215, 30, 24, 52, 96, 72, 25, 255, 156, 23, 245, 233, 213, 221, 7, 143]
2195 macro_rules! get_keys_from {
2196 ($slice: expr, $secp_ctx: expr) => {
2198 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode($slice).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2199 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &privkey);
2205 macro_rules! get_sig_on {
2206 ($privkey: expr, $ctx: expr, $string: expr) => {
2208 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&$string.into_bytes()[..]).unwrap();
2209 $ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &$privkey)
2215 fn encoding_announcement_signatures() {
2216 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2217 let (privkey, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2218 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2219 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("02020202020202020202020202020202"));
2220 let announcement_signatures = msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2221 channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
2222 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2223 node_signature: sig_1,
2224 bitcoin_signature: sig_2,
2227 let encoded_value = announcement_signatures.encode();
2228 assert_eq!(encoded_value, hex::decode("040000000000000005000000000000000600000000000000070000000000000000083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073acf9953cef4700860f5967838eba2bae89288ad188ebf8b20bf995c3ea53a26df1876d0a3a0e13172ba286a673140190c02ba9da60a2e43a745188c8a83c7f3ef").unwrap());
2231 fn do_encoding_channel_announcement(unknown_features_bits: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2232 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2233 let (privkey_1, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2234 let (privkey_2, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2235 let (privkey_3, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2236 let (privkey_4, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2237 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2238 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey_2, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2239 let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2240 let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2241 let mut features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
2242 if unknown_features_bits {
2243 features = ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF]);
2245 let unsigned_channel_announcement = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2247 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
2248 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2249 node_id_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_1),
2250 node_id_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_2),
2251 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_3),
2252 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_4),
2253 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![10, 0, 0, 20, 0, 0, 30, 0, 0, 40] } else { Vec::new() },
2255 let channel_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2256 node_signature_1: sig_1,
2257 node_signature_2: sig_2,
2258 bitcoin_signature_1: sig_3,
2259 bitcoin_signature_2: sig_4,
2260 contents: unsigned_channel_announcement,
2262 let encoded_value = channel_announcement.encode();
2263 let mut target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
2264 if unknown_features_bits {
2265 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0002ffff").unwrap());
2267 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000").unwrap());
2269 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
2270 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00083a840000034d031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f024d4b6cd1361032ca9bd2aeb9d900aa4d45d9ead80ac9423374c451a7254d076602531fe6068134503d2723133227c867ac8fa6c83c537e9a44c3c5bdbdcb1fe33703462779ad4aad39514614751a71085f2f10e1c7a593e4e030efb5b8721ce55b0b").unwrap());
2272 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0a00001400001e000028").unwrap());
2274 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2278 fn encoding_channel_announcement() {
2279 do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, false);
2280 do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, true);
2281 do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, false);
2282 do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, true);
2285 fn do_encoding_node_announcement(unknown_features_bits: bool, ipv4: bool, ipv6: bool, onionv2: bool, onionv3: bool, hostname: bool, excess_address_data: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2286 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2287 let (privkey_1, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2288 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2289 let features = if unknown_features_bits {
2290 NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF])
2292 // Set to some features we may support
2293 NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![2 | 1 << 5])
2295 let mut addresses = Vec::new();
2297 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::IPv4 {
2298 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252],
2303 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::IPv6 {
2304 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240],
2309 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::OnionV2(
2310 [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 38, 7]
2314 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::OnionV3 {
2315 ed25519_pubkey: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240, 239, 238, 237, 236, 235, 234, 233, 232, 231, 230, 229, 228, 227, 226, 225, 224],
2322 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::Hostname {
2323 hostname: Hostname::try_from(String::from("host")).unwrap(),
2327 let mut addr_len = 0;
2328 for addr in &addresses {
2329 addr_len += addr.len() + 1;
2331 let unsigned_node_announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2333 timestamp: 20190119,
2334 node_id: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_1),
2336 alias: NodeAlias([16;32]),
2338 excess_address_data: if excess_address_data { vec![33, 108, 40, 11, 83, 149, 162, 84, 110, 126, 75, 38, 99, 224, 79, 129, 22, 34, 241, 90, 79, 146, 232, 58, 162, 233, 43, 162, 165, 115, 193, 57, 20, 44, 84, 174, 99, 7, 42, 30, 193, 238, 125, 192, 192, 75, 222, 92, 132, 120, 6, 23, 42, 160, 92, 146, 194, 42, 232, 227, 8, 209, 210, 105] } else { Vec::new() },
2339 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![59, 18, 204, 25, 92, 224, 162, 209, 189, 166, 168, 139, 239, 161, 159, 160, 127, 81, 202, 167, 92, 232, 56, 55, 242, 137, 101, 96, 11, 138, 172, 171, 8, 85, 255, 176, 231, 65, 236, 95, 124, 65, 66, 30, 152, 41, 169, 212, 134, 17, 200, 200, 49, 247, 27, 229, 234, 115, 230, 101, 148, 151, 127, 253] } else { Vec::new() },
2341 addr_len += unsigned_node_announcement.excess_address_data.len() as u16;
2342 let node_announcement = msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2344 contents: unsigned_node_announcement,
2346 let encoded_value = node_announcement.encode();
2347 let mut target_value = hex::decode("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2348 if unknown_features_bits {
2349 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0002ffff").unwrap());
2351 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000122").unwrap());
2353 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("013413a7031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f2020201010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010").unwrap());
2354 target_value.append(&mut vec![(addr_len >> 8) as u8, addr_len as u8]);
2356 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("01fffefdfc2607").unwrap());
2359 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("02fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f02607").unwrap());
2362 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("03fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f62607").unwrap());
2365 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("04fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0efeeedecebeae9e8e7e6e5e4e3e2e1e00020102607").unwrap());
2368 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0504686f73742607").unwrap());
2370 if excess_address_data {
2371 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f92e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d269").unwrap());
2374 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("3b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
2376 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2380 fn encoding_node_announcement() {
2381 do_encoding_node_announcement(true, true, true, true, true, true, true, true);
2382 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false);
2383 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, true, false, false, false, false, false, false);
2384 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, true, false, false, false, false, false);
2385 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, true, false, false, false, false);
2386 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, true, false, false, false);
2387 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, true, false, false);
2388 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, false, true, false);
2389 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, true, false, true, false, false, true, false);
2390 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, true, false, true, false, false, false);
2393 fn do_encoding_channel_update(direction: bool, disable: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2394 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2395 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2396 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2397 let unsigned_channel_update = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2398 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
2399 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2400 timestamp: 20190119,
2401 flags: if direction { 1 } else { 0 } | if disable { 1 << 1 } else { 0 },
2402 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2403 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
2404 htlc_maximum_msat: 131355275467161,
2405 fee_base_msat: 10000,
2406 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2407 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![0, 0, 0, 0, 59, 154, 202, 0] } else { Vec::new() }
2409 let channel_update = msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2411 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2413 let encoded_value = channel_update.encode();
2414 let mut target_value = hex::decode("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2415 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
2416 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00083a840000034d013413a7").unwrap());
2417 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("01").unwrap());
2418 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00").unwrap());
2420 let flag = target_value.last_mut().unwrap();
2424 let flag = target_value.last_mut().unwrap();
2425 *flag = *flag | 1 << 1;
2427 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap());
2428 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000777788889999").unwrap());
2430 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000003b9aca00").unwrap());
2432 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2436 fn encoding_channel_update() {
2437 do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, false);
2438 do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, true);
2439 do_encoding_channel_update(true, false, false);
2440 do_encoding_channel_update(true, false, true);
2441 do_encoding_channel_update(false, true, false);
2442 do_encoding_channel_update(false, true, true);
2443 do_encoding_channel_update(true, true, false);
2444 do_encoding_channel_update(true, true, true);
2447 fn do_encoding_open_channel(random_bit: bool, shutdown: bool, incl_chan_type: bool) {
2448 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2449 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2450 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2451 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2452 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2453 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
2454 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
2455 let open_channel = msgs::OpenChannel {
2456 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
2457 temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
2458 funding_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
2459 push_msat: 2536655962884945560,
2460 dust_limit_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
2461 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 8517154655701053848,
2462 channel_reserve_satoshis: 8665828695742877976,
2463 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
2464 feerate_per_kw: 821716,
2465 to_self_delay: 49340,
2466 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
2467 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
2468 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
2469 payment_point: pubkey_3,
2470 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
2471 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
2472 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
2473 channel_flags: if random_bit { 1 << 5 } else { 0 },
2474 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { OptionalField::Present(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { OptionalField::Absent },
2475 channel_type: if incl_chan_type { Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::empty()) } else { None },
2477 let encoded_value = open_channel.encode();
2478 let mut target_value = Vec::new();
2479 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
2480 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2482 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("20").unwrap());
2484 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00").unwrap());
2487 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
2490 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0100").unwrap());
2492 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2496 fn encoding_open_channel() {
2497 do_encoding_open_channel(false, false, false);
2498 do_encoding_open_channel(false, false, true);
2499 do_encoding_open_channel(false, true, false);
2500 do_encoding_open_channel(false, true, true);
2501 do_encoding_open_channel(true, false, false);
2502 do_encoding_open_channel(true, false, true);
2503 do_encoding_open_channel(true, true, false);
2504 do_encoding_open_channel(true, true, true);
2507 fn do_encoding_accept_channel(shutdown: bool) {
2508 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2509 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2510 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2511 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2512 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2513 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
2514 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
2515 let accept_channel = msgs::AcceptChannel {
2516 temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
2517 dust_limit_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
2518 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 2536655962884945560,
2519 channel_reserve_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
2520 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
2521 minimum_depth: 821716,
2522 to_self_delay: 49340,
2523 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
2524 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
2525 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
2526 payment_point: pubkey_3,
2527 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
2528 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
2529 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
2530 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { OptionalField::Present(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { OptionalField::Absent },
2533 next_local_nonce: None,
2535 let encoded_value = accept_channel.encode();
2536 let mut target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
2538 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
2540 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2544 fn encoding_accept_channel() {
2545 do_encoding_accept_channel(false);
2546 do_encoding_accept_channel(true);
2550 fn encoding_funding_created() {
2551 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2552 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2553 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2554 let funding_created = msgs::FundingCreated {
2555 temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
2556 funding_txid: Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap(),
2557 funding_output_index: 255,
2560 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2562 next_local_nonce: None,
2564 let encoded_value = funding_created.encode();
2565 let target_value = hex::decode("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202026e96fe9f8b0ddcd729ba03cfafa5a27b050b39d354dd980814268dfa9a44d4c200ffd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2566 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2570 fn encoding_funding_signed() {
2571 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2572 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2573 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2574 let funding_signed = msgs::FundingSigned {
2575 channel_id: [2; 32],
2578 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2580 let encoded_value = funding_signed.encode();
2581 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2582 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2586 fn encoding_channel_ready() {
2587 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2588 let (_, pubkey_1,) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2589 let channel_ready = msgs::ChannelReady {
2590 channel_id: [2; 32],
2591 next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
2592 short_channel_id_alias: None,
2594 let encoded_value = channel_ready.encode();
2595 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap();
2596 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2599 fn do_encoding_shutdown(script_type: u8) {
2600 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2601 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2602 let script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::OP_TRUE).into_script();
2603 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
2604 channel_id: [2; 32],
2606 if script_type == 1 { Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() }
2607 else if script_type == 2 { Address::p2sh(&script, Network::Testnet).unwrap().script_pubkey() }
2608 else if script_type == 3 { Address::p2wpkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).unwrap().script_pubkey() }
2609 else { Address::p2wsh(&script, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() },
2611 let encoded_value = shutdown.encode();
2612 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap();
2613 if script_type == 1 {
2614 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
2615 } else if script_type == 2 {
2616 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0017a914da1745e9b549bd0bfa1a569971c77eba30cd5a4b87").unwrap());
2617 } else if script_type == 3 {
2618 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0016001479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b235983").unwrap());
2619 } else if script_type == 4 {
2620 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("002200204ae81572f06e1b88fd5ced7a1a000945432e83e1551e6f721ee9c00b8cc33260").unwrap());
2622 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2626 fn encoding_shutdown() {
2627 do_encoding_shutdown(1);
2628 do_encoding_shutdown(2);
2629 do_encoding_shutdown(3);
2630 do_encoding_shutdown(4);
2634 fn encoding_closing_signed() {
2635 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2636 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2637 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2638 let closing_signed = msgs::ClosingSigned {
2639 channel_id: [2; 32],
2640 fee_satoshis: 2316138423780173,
2644 let encoded_value = closing_signed.encode();
2645 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2646 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2647 assert_eq!(msgs::ClosingSigned::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value)).unwrap(), closing_signed);
2649 let closing_signed_with_range = msgs::ClosingSigned {
2650 channel_id: [2; 32],
2651 fee_satoshis: 2316138423780173,
2653 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
2654 min_fee_satoshis: 0xdeadbeef,
2655 max_fee_satoshis: 0x1badcafe01234567,
2658 let encoded_value_with_range = closing_signed_with_range.encode();
2659 let target_value_with_range = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a011000000000deadbeef1badcafe01234567").unwrap();
2660 assert_eq!(encoded_value_with_range, target_value_with_range);
2661 assert_eq!(msgs::ClosingSigned::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value_with_range)).unwrap(),
2662 closing_signed_with_range);
2666 fn encoding_update_add_htlc() {
2667 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2668 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2669 let onion_routing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2671 public_key: Ok(pubkey_1),
2672 hop_data: [1; 20*65],
2675 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2676 channel_id: [2; 32],
2677 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2678 amount_msat: 3608586615801332854,
2679 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
2680 cltv_expiry: 821716,
2681 onion_routing_packet
2683 let encoded_value = update_add_htlc.encode();
2684 let target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
2685 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2689 fn encoding_update_fulfill_htlc() {
2690 let update_fulfill_htlc = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2691 channel_id: [2; 32],
2692 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2693 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([1; 32]),
2695 let encoded_value = update_fulfill_htlc.encode();
2696 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap();
2697 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2701 fn encoding_update_fail_htlc() {
2702 let reason = OnionErrorPacket {
2703 data: [1; 32].to_vec(),
2705 let update_fail_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2706 channel_id: [2; 32],
2707 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2710 let encoded_value = update_fail_htlc.encode();
2711 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d00200101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap();
2712 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2716 fn encoding_update_fail_malformed_htlc() {
2717 let update_fail_malformed_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2718 channel_id: [2; 32],
2719 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2720 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
2723 let encoded_value = update_fail_malformed_htlc.encode();
2724 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010100ff").unwrap();
2725 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2728 fn do_encoding_commitment_signed(htlcs: bool) {
2729 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2730 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2731 let (privkey_2, _) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2732 let (privkey_3, _) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2733 let (privkey_4, _) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2734 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2735 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey_2, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2736 let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2737 let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2738 let commitment_signed = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
2739 channel_id: [2; 32],
2741 htlc_signatures: if htlcs { vec![sig_2, sig_3, sig_4] } else { Vec::new() },
2743 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2745 let encoded_value = commitment_signed.encode();
2746 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2748 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00031735b6a427e80d5fe7cd90a2f4ee08dc9c27cda7c35a4172e5d85b12c49d4232537e98f9b1f3c5e6989a8b9644e90e8918127680dbd0d4043510840fc0f1e11a216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f91e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d2692b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
2750 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000").unwrap());
2752 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2756 fn encoding_commitment_signed() {
2757 do_encoding_commitment_signed(true);
2758 do_encoding_commitment_signed(false);
2762 fn encoding_revoke_and_ack() {
2763 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2764 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2765 let raa = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2766 channel_id: [2; 32],
2767 per_commitment_secret: [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1],
2768 next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
2770 next_local_nonce: None,
2772 let encoded_value = raa.encode();
2773 let target_value = hex::decode("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap();
2774 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2778 fn encoding_update_fee() {
2779 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
2780 channel_id: [2; 32],
2781 feerate_per_kw: 20190119,
2783 let encoded_value = update_fee.encode();
2784 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202013413a7").unwrap();
2785 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2789 fn encoding_init() {
2790 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
2791 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF]),
2792 remote_network_address: None,
2793 }.encode(), hex::decode("00023fff0003ffffff").unwrap());
2794 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
2795 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF]),
2796 remote_network_address: None,
2797 }.encode(), hex::decode("0001ff0001ff").unwrap());
2798 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
2799 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
2800 remote_network_address: None,
2801 }.encode(), hex::decode("00000000").unwrap());
2803 let init_msg = msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
2804 remote_network_address: Some(msgs::NetAddress::IPv4 {
2805 addr: [127, 0, 0, 1],
2809 let encoded_value = init_msg.encode();
2810 let target_value = hex::decode("000000000307017f00000103e8").unwrap();
2811 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2812 assert_eq!(msgs::Init::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value)).unwrap(), init_msg);
2816 fn encoding_error() {
2817 let error = msgs::ErrorMessage {
2818 channel_id: [2; 32],
2819 data: String::from("rust-lightning"),
2821 let encoded_value = error.encode();
2822 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000e727573742d6c696768746e696e67").unwrap();
2823 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2827 fn encoding_warning() {
2828 let error = msgs::WarningMessage {
2829 channel_id: [2; 32],
2830 data: String::from("rust-lightning"),
2832 let encoded_value = error.encode();
2833 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000e727573742d6c696768746e696e67").unwrap();
2834 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2838 fn encoding_ping() {
2839 let ping = msgs::Ping {
2843 let encoded_value = ping.encode();
2844 let target_value = hex::decode("0040004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap();
2845 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2849 fn encoding_pong() {
2850 let pong = msgs::Pong {
2853 let encoded_value = pong.encode();
2854 let target_value = hex::decode("004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap();
2855 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2859 fn encoding_nonfinal_onion_hop_data() {
2860 let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
2861 format: OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
2862 short_channel_id: 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea,
2864 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
2865 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2867 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
2868 let target_value = hex::decode("1a02080badf00d010203040404ffffffff0608deadbeef1bad1dea").unwrap();
2869 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2870 msg = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2871 if let OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } = msg.format {
2872 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea);
2873 } else { panic!(); }
2874 assert_eq!(msg.amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
2875 assert_eq!(msg.outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
2879 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data() {
2880 let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
2881 format: OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
2883 keysend_preimage: None,
2885 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
2886 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2888 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
2889 let target_value = hex::decode("1002080badf00d010203040404ffffffff").unwrap();
2890 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2891 msg = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2892 if let OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data: None, .. } = msg.format { } else { panic!(); }
2893 assert_eq!(msg.amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
2894 assert_eq!(msg.outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
2898 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data_with_secret() {
2899 let expected_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([0x42u8; 32]);
2900 let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
2901 format: OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
2902 payment_data: Some(FinalOnionHopData {
2903 payment_secret: expected_payment_secret,
2904 total_msat: 0x1badca1f
2906 keysend_preimage: None,
2908 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
2909 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2911 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
2912 let target_value = hex::decode("3602080badf00d010203040404ffffffff082442424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242421badca1f").unwrap();
2913 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2914 msg = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2915 if let OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
2916 payment_data: Some(FinalOnionHopData {
2918 total_msat: 0x1badca1f
2920 keysend_preimage: None,
2922 assert_eq!(payment_secret, expected_payment_secret);
2923 } else { panic!(); }
2924 assert_eq!(msg.amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
2925 assert_eq!(msg.outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
2929 fn query_channel_range_end_blocknum() {
2930 let tests: Vec<(u32, u32, u32)> = vec![
2931 (10000, 1500, 11500),
2932 (0, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
2933 (1, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
2936 for (first_blocknum, number_of_blocks, expected) in tests.into_iter() {
2937 let sut = msgs::QueryChannelRange {
2938 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap(),
2942 assert_eq!(sut.end_blocknum(), expected);
2947 fn encoding_query_channel_range() {
2948 let mut query_channel_range = msgs::QueryChannelRange {
2949 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap(),
2950 first_blocknum: 100000,
2951 number_of_blocks: 1500,
2953 let encoded_value = query_channel_range.encode();
2954 let target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206000186a0000005dc").unwrap();
2955 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2957 query_channel_range = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2958 assert_eq!(query_channel_range.first_blocknum, 100000);
2959 assert_eq!(query_channel_range.number_of_blocks, 1500);
2963 fn encoding_reply_channel_range() {
2964 do_encoding_reply_channel_range(0);
2965 do_encoding_reply_channel_range(1);
2968 fn do_encoding_reply_channel_range(encoding_type: u8) {
2969 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206000b8a06000005dc01").unwrap();
2970 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2971 let mut reply_channel_range = msgs::ReplyChannelRange {
2972 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2973 first_blocknum: 756230,
2974 number_of_blocks: 1500,
2975 sync_complete: true,
2976 short_channel_ids: vec![0x000000000000008e, 0x0000000000003c69, 0x000000000045a6c4],
2979 if encoding_type == 0 {
2980 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001900000000000000008e0000000000003c69000000000045a6c4").unwrap());
2981 let encoded_value = reply_channel_range.encode();
2982 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2984 reply_channel_range = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2985 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2986 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.first_blocknum, 756230);
2987 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.number_of_blocks, 1500);
2988 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.sync_complete, true);
2989 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[0], 0x000000000000008e);
2990 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[1], 0x0000000000003c69);
2991 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[2], 0x000000000045a6c4);
2993 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001601789c636000833e08659309a65878be010010a9023a").unwrap());
2994 let result: Result<msgs::ReplyChannelRange, msgs::DecodeError> = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]));
2995 assert!(result.is_err(), "Expected decode failure with unsupported zlib encoding");
3000 fn encoding_query_short_channel_ids() {
3001 do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(0);
3002 do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(1);
3005 fn do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(encoding_type: u8) {
3006 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206").unwrap();
3007 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
3008 let mut query_short_channel_ids = msgs::QueryShortChannelIds {
3009 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
3010 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0000000000008e, 0x0000000000003c69, 0x000000000045a6c4],
3013 if encoding_type == 0 {
3014 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001900000000000000008e0000000000003c69000000000045a6c4").unwrap());
3015 let encoded_value = query_short_channel_ids.encode();
3016 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3018 query_short_channel_ids = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
3019 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
3020 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[0], 0x000000000000008e);
3021 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[1], 0x0000000000003c69);
3022 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[2], 0x000000000045a6c4);
3024 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001601789c636000833e08659309a65878be010010a9023a").unwrap());
3025 let result: Result<msgs::QueryShortChannelIds, msgs::DecodeError> = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]));
3026 assert!(result.is_err(), "Expected decode failure with unsupported zlib encoding");
3031 fn encoding_reply_short_channel_ids_end() {
3032 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
3033 let mut reply_short_channel_ids_end = msgs::ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
3034 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
3035 full_information: true,
3037 let encoded_value = reply_short_channel_ids_end.encode();
3038 let target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e220601").unwrap();
3039 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3041 reply_short_channel_ids_end = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
3042 assert_eq!(reply_short_channel_ids_end.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
3043 assert_eq!(reply_short_channel_ids_end.full_information, true);
3047 fn encoding_gossip_timestamp_filter(){
3048 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
3049 let mut gossip_timestamp_filter = msgs::GossipTimestampFilter {
3050 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
3051 first_timestamp: 1590000000,
3052 timestamp_range: 0xffff_ffff,
3054 let encoded_value = gossip_timestamp_filter.encode();
3055 let target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e22065ec57980ffffffff").unwrap();
3056 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3058 gossip_timestamp_filter = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
3059 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
3060 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.first_timestamp, 1590000000);
3061 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.timestamp_range, 0xffff_ffff);
3065 fn decode_onion_hop_data_len_as_bigsize() {
3066 // Tests that we can decode an onion payload that is >253 bytes.
3067 // Previously, receiving a payload of this size could've caused us to fail to decode a valid
3068 // payload, because we were decoding the length (a BigSize, big-endian) as a VarInt
3071 // Encode a test onion payload with a big custom TLV such that it's >253 bytes, forcing the
3072 // payload length to be encoded over multiple bytes rather than a single u8.
3073 let big_payload = encode_big_payload().unwrap();
3074 let mut rd = Cursor::new(&big_payload[..]);
3075 <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut rd).unwrap();
3077 // see above test, needs to be a separate method for use of the serialization macros.
3078 fn encode_big_payload() -> Result<Vec<u8>, io::Error> {
3079 use crate::util::ser::HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize;
3080 let payload = msgs::OnionHopData {
3081 format: OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
3082 short_channel_id: 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea,
3084 amt_to_forward: 1000,
3085 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
3087 let mut encoded_payload = Vec::new();
3088 let test_bytes = vec![42u8; 1000];
3089 if let OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } = payload.format {
3090 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(&mut encoded_payload, {
3091 (1, test_bytes, vec_type),
3092 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(payload.amt_to_forward), required),
3093 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(payload.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
3094 (6, short_channel_id, required)