1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Wire messages, traits representing wire message handlers, and a few error types live here.
12 //! For a normal node you probably don't need to use anything here, however, if you wish to split a
13 //! node into an internet-facing route/message socket handling daemon and a separate daemon (or
14 //! server entirely) which handles only channel-related messages you may wish to implement
15 //! [`ChannelMessageHandler`] yourself and use it to re-serialize messages and pass them across
18 //! Note that if you go with such an architecture (instead of passing raw socket events to a
19 //! non-internet-facing system) you trust the frontend internet-facing system to not lie about the
20 //! source `node_id` of the message, however this does allow you to significantly reduce bandwidth
21 //! between the systems as routing messages can represent a significant chunk of bandwidth usage
22 //! (especially for non-channel-publicly-announcing nodes). As an alternate design which avoids
23 //! this issue, if you have sufficient bidirectional bandwidth between your systems, you may send
24 //! raw socket events into your non-internet-facing system and then send routing events back to
25 //! track the network on the less-secure system.
27 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
28 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature;
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
30 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
33 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
34 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
35 use crate::onion_message;
37 use crate::prelude::*;
40 use crate::io::{self, Read};
41 use crate::io_extras::read_to_end;
43 use crate::events::{MessageSendEventsProvider, OnionMessageProvider};
44 use crate::util::logger;
45 use crate::util::ser::{LengthReadable, Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, FixedLengthReader, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize, Hostname};
47 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
49 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
51 /// 21 million * 10^8 * 1000
52 pub(crate) const MAX_VALUE_MSAT: u64 = 21_000_000_0000_0000_000;
55 /// A partial signature that also contains the Musig2 nonce its signer used
56 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
57 pub struct PartialSignatureWithNonce(pub musig2::types::PartialSignature, pub musig2::types::PublicNonce);
59 /// An error in decoding a message or struct.
60 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
61 pub enum DecodeError {
62 /// A version byte specified something we don't know how to handle.
64 /// Includes unknown realm byte in an onion hop data packet.
66 /// Unknown feature mandating we fail to parse message (e.g., TLV with an even, unknown type)
67 UnknownRequiredFeature,
68 /// Value was invalid.
70 /// For example, a byte which was supposed to be a bool was something other than a 0
71 /// or 1, a public key/private key/signature was invalid, text wasn't UTF-8, TLV was
72 /// syntactically incorrect, etc.
74 /// The buffer to be read was too short.
76 /// A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly.
78 /// Error from [`std::io`].
80 /// The message included zlib-compressed values, which we don't support.
81 UnsupportedCompression,
84 /// An [`init`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
86 /// [`init`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-init-message
87 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
89 /// The relevant features which the sender supports.
90 pub features: InitFeatures,
91 /// The receipient's network address.
93 /// This adds the option to report a remote IP address back to a connecting peer using the init
94 /// message. A node can decide to use that information to discover a potential update to its
95 /// public IPv4 address (NAT) and use that for a [`NodeAnnouncement`] update message containing
97 pub remote_network_address: Option<NetAddress>,
100 /// An [`error`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
102 /// [`error`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-error-and-warning-messages
103 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
104 pub struct ErrorMessage {
105 /// The channel ID involved in the error.
107 /// All-0s indicates a general error unrelated to a specific channel, after which all channels
108 /// with the sending peer should be closed.
109 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
110 /// A possibly human-readable error description.
112 /// The string should be sanitized before it is used (e.g., emitted to logs or printed to
113 /// `stdout`). Otherwise, a well crafted error message may trigger a security vulnerability in
114 /// the terminal emulator or the logging subsystem.
118 /// A [`warning`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
120 /// [`warning`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-error-and-warning-messages
121 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
122 pub struct WarningMessage {
123 /// The channel ID involved in the warning.
125 /// All-0s indicates a warning unrelated to a specific channel.
126 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
127 /// A possibly human-readable warning description.
129 /// The string should be sanitized before it is used (e.g. emitted to logs or printed to
130 /// stdout). Otherwise, a well crafted error message may trigger a security vulnerability in
131 /// the terminal emulator or the logging subsystem.
135 /// A [`ping`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
137 /// [`ping`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-ping-and-pong-messages
138 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
140 /// The desired response length.
142 /// The ping packet size.
144 /// This field is not sent on the wire. byteslen zeros are sent.
148 /// A [`pong`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
150 /// [`pong`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-ping-and-pong-messages
151 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
153 /// The pong packet size.
155 /// This field is not sent on the wire. byteslen zeros are sent.
159 /// An [`open_channel`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
161 /// [`open_channel`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-open_channel-message
162 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
163 pub struct OpenChannel {
164 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
165 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
166 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
167 pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
168 /// The channel value
169 pub funding_satoshis: u64,
170 /// The amount to push to the counterparty as part of the open, in milli-satoshi
172 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by sender will be omitted
173 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
174 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards sender, in milli-satoshi
175 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
176 /// The minimum value unencumbered by HTLCs for the counterparty to keep in the channel
177 pub channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
178 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
179 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
180 /// The feerate per 1000-weight of sender generated transactions, until updated by
182 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
183 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if
184 /// they broadcast a commitment transaction
185 pub to_self_delay: u16,
186 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards sender
187 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
188 /// The sender's key controlling the funding transaction
189 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
190 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
191 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
192 /// A payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
193 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
194 /// Used to derive a payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by sender
195 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
196 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to sender
197 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
198 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-sender transaction's per commitment point
199 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
200 /// The channel flags to be used
201 pub channel_flags: u8,
202 /// Optionally, a request to pre-set the to-sender output's `scriptPubkey` for when we collaboratively close
203 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField<Script>,
204 /// The channel type that this channel will represent
206 /// If this is `None`, we derive the channel type from the intersection of our
207 /// feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from the [`Init`] message.
208 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
211 /// An [`accept_channel`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
213 /// [`accept_channel`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-accept_channel-message
214 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
215 pub struct AcceptChannel {
216 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
217 pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
218 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by sender will be omitted
219 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
220 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards sender, in milli-satoshi
221 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
222 /// The minimum value unencumbered by HTLCs for the counterparty to keep in the channel
223 pub channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
224 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
225 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
226 /// Minimum depth of the funding transaction before the channel is considered open
227 pub minimum_depth: u32,
228 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if they broadcast a commitment transaction
229 pub to_self_delay: u16,
230 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards sender
231 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
232 /// The sender's key controlling the funding transaction
233 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
234 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
235 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
236 /// A payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
237 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
238 /// Used to derive a payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by sender
239 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
240 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
241 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
242 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-sender transaction's per commitment point
243 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
244 /// Optionally, a request to pre-set the to-sender output's scriptPubkey for when we collaboratively close
245 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField<Script>,
246 /// The channel type that this channel will represent.
248 /// If this is `None`, we derive the channel type from the intersection of
249 /// our feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from the [`Init`] message.
250 /// This is required to match the equivalent field in [`OpenChannel::channel_type`].
251 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
253 /// Next nonce the channel initiator should use to create a funding output signature against
254 pub next_local_nonce: Option<musig2::types::PublicNonce>,
257 /// A [`funding_created`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
259 /// [`funding_created`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-funding_created-message
260 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
261 pub struct FundingCreated {
262 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding is established
263 pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
264 /// The funding transaction ID
265 pub funding_txid: Txid,
266 /// The specific output index funding this channel
267 pub funding_output_index: u16,
268 /// The signature of the channel initiator (funder) on the initial commitment transaction
269 pub signature: Signature,
271 /// The partial signature of the channel initiator (funder)
272 pub partial_signature_with_nonce: Option<PartialSignatureWithNonce>,
274 /// Next nonce the channel acceptor should use to finalize the funding output signature
275 pub next_local_nonce: Option<musig2::types::PublicNonce>
278 /// A [`funding_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
280 /// [`funding_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-funding_signed-message
281 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
282 pub struct FundingSigned {
284 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
285 /// The signature of the channel acceptor (fundee) on the initial commitment transaction
286 pub signature: Signature,
288 /// The partial signature of the channel acceptor (fundee)
289 pub partial_signature_with_nonce: Option<PartialSignatureWithNonce>,
292 /// A [`channel_ready`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
294 /// [`channel_ready`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-channel_ready-message
295 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
296 pub struct ChannelReady {
298 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
299 /// The per-commitment point of the second commitment transaction
300 pub next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
301 /// If set, provides a `short_channel_id` alias for this channel.
303 /// The sender will accept payments to be forwarded over this SCID and forward them to this
304 /// messages' recipient.
305 pub short_channel_id_alias: Option<u64>,
308 /// A [`shutdown`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
310 /// [`shutdown`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#closing-initiation-shutdown
311 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
312 pub struct Shutdown {
314 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
315 /// The destination of this peer's funds on closing.
317 /// Must be in one of these forms: P2PKH, P2SH, P2WPKH, P2WSH, P2TR.
318 pub scriptpubkey: Script,
321 /// The minimum and maximum fees which the sender is willing to place on the closing transaction.
323 /// This is provided in [`ClosingSigned`] by both sides to indicate the fee range they are willing
325 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
326 pub struct ClosingSignedFeeRange {
327 /// The minimum absolute fee, in satoshis, which the sender is willing to place on the closing
329 pub min_fee_satoshis: u64,
330 /// The maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, which the sender is willing to place on the closing
332 pub max_fee_satoshis: u64,
335 /// A [`closing_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
337 /// [`closing_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#closing-negotiation-closing_signed
338 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
339 pub struct ClosingSigned {
341 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
342 /// The proposed total fee for the closing transaction
343 pub fee_satoshis: u64,
344 /// A signature on the closing transaction
345 pub signature: Signature,
346 /// The minimum and maximum fees which the sender is willing to accept, provided only by new
348 pub fee_range: Option<ClosingSignedFeeRange>,
351 /// An [`update_add_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
353 /// [`update_add_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#adding-an-htlc-update_add_htlc
354 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
355 pub struct UpdateAddHTLC {
357 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
360 /// The HTLC value in milli-satoshi
361 pub amount_msat: u64,
362 /// The payment hash, the pre-image of which controls HTLC redemption
363 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
364 /// The expiry height of the HTLC
365 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
366 pub(crate) onion_routing_packet: OnionPacket,
369 /// An onion message to be sent to or received from a peer.
371 // TODO: update with link to OM when they are merged into the BOLTs
372 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
373 pub struct OnionMessage {
374 /// Used in decrypting the onion packet's payload.
375 pub blinding_point: PublicKey,
376 pub(crate) onion_routing_packet: onion_message::Packet,
379 /// An [`update_fulfill_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
381 /// [`update_fulfill_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
382 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
383 pub struct UpdateFulfillHTLC {
385 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
388 /// The pre-image of the payment hash, allowing HTLC redemption
389 pub payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
392 /// An [`update_fail_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
394 /// [`update_fail_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
395 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
396 pub struct UpdateFailHTLC {
398 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
401 pub(crate) reason: OnionErrorPacket,
404 /// An [`update_fail_malformed_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
406 /// [`update_fail_malformed_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
407 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
408 pub struct UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
410 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
413 pub(crate) sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
415 pub failure_code: u16,
418 /// A [`commitment_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
420 /// [`commitment_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#committing-updates-so-far-commitment_signed
421 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
422 pub struct CommitmentSigned {
424 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
425 /// A signature on the commitment transaction
426 pub signature: Signature,
427 /// Signatures on the HTLC transactions
428 pub htlc_signatures: Vec<Signature>,
431 /// A [`revoke_and_ack`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
433 /// [`revoke_and_ack`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#completing-the-transition-to-the-updated-state-revoke_and_ack
434 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
435 pub struct RevokeAndACK {
437 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
438 /// The secret corresponding to the per-commitment point
439 pub per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
440 /// The next sender-broadcast commitment transaction's per-commitment point
441 pub next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
444 /// An [`update_fee`] message to be sent to or received from a peer
446 /// [`update_fee`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#updating-fees-update_fee
447 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
448 pub struct UpdateFee {
450 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
451 /// Fee rate per 1000-weight of the transaction
452 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
455 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
456 /// Proof that the sender knows the per-commitment secret of the previous commitment transaction.
458 /// This is used to convince the recipient that the channel is at a certain commitment
459 /// number even if they lost that data due to a local failure. Of course, the peer may lie
460 /// and even later commitments may have been revoked.
461 pub struct DataLossProtect {
462 /// Proof that the sender knows the per-commitment secret of a specific commitment transaction
463 /// belonging to the recipient
464 pub your_last_per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
465 /// The sender's per-commitment point for their current commitment transaction
466 pub my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
469 /// A [`channel_reestablish`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
471 /// [`channel_reestablish`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#message-retransmission
472 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
473 pub struct ChannelReestablish {
475 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
476 /// The next commitment number for the sender
477 pub next_local_commitment_number: u64,
478 /// The next commitment number for the recipient
479 pub next_remote_commitment_number: u64,
480 /// Optionally, a field proving that next_remote_commitment_number-1 has been revoked
481 pub data_loss_protect: OptionalField<DataLossProtect>,
484 /// An [`announcement_signatures`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
486 /// [`announcement_signatures`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-announcement_signatures-message
487 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
488 pub struct AnnouncementSignatures {
490 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
491 /// The short channel ID
492 pub short_channel_id: u64,
493 /// A signature by the node key
494 pub node_signature: Signature,
495 /// A signature by the funding key
496 pub bitcoin_signature: Signature,
499 /// An address which can be used to connect to a remote peer.
500 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
501 pub enum NetAddress {
502 /// An IPv4 address/port on which the peer is listening.
504 /// The 4-byte IPv4 address
506 /// The port on which the node is listening
509 /// An IPv6 address/port on which the peer is listening.
511 /// The 16-byte IPv6 address
513 /// The port on which the node is listening
516 /// An old-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening.
518 /// This field is deprecated and the Tor network generally no longer supports V2 Onion
519 /// addresses. Thus, the details are not parsed here.
521 /// A new-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening.
523 /// To create the human-readable "hostname", concatenate the ED25519 pubkey, checksum, and version,
524 /// wrap as base32 and append ".onion".
526 /// The ed25519 long-term public key of the peer
527 ed25519_pubkey: [u8; 32],
528 /// The checksum of the pubkey and version, as included in the onion address
530 /// The version byte, as defined by the Tor Onion v3 spec.
532 /// The port on which the node is listening
535 /// A hostname/port on which the peer is listening.
537 /// The hostname on which the node is listening.
539 /// The port on which the node is listening.
544 /// Gets the ID of this address type. Addresses in [`NodeAnnouncement`] messages should be sorted
546 pub(crate) fn get_id(&self) -> u8 {
548 &NetAddress::IPv4 {..} => { 1 },
549 &NetAddress::IPv6 {..} => { 2 },
550 &NetAddress::OnionV2(_) => { 3 },
551 &NetAddress::OnionV3 {..} => { 4 },
552 &NetAddress::Hostname {..} => { 5 },
556 /// Strict byte-length of address descriptor, 1-byte type not recorded
557 fn len(&self) -> u16 {
559 &NetAddress::IPv4 { .. } => { 6 },
560 &NetAddress::IPv6 { .. } => { 18 },
561 &NetAddress::OnionV2(_) => { 12 },
562 &NetAddress::OnionV3 { .. } => { 37 },
563 // Consists of 1-byte hostname length, hostname bytes, and 2-byte port.
564 &NetAddress::Hostname { ref hostname, .. } => { u16::from(hostname.len()) + 3 },
568 /// The maximum length of any address descriptor, not including the 1-byte type.
569 /// This maximum length is reached by a hostname address descriptor:
570 /// a hostname with a maximum length of 255, its 1-byte length and a 2-byte port.
571 pub(crate) const MAX_LEN: u16 = 258;
574 impl Writeable for NetAddress {
575 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
577 &NetAddress::IPv4 { ref addr, ref port } => {
582 &NetAddress::IPv6 { ref addr, ref port } => {
587 &NetAddress::OnionV2(bytes) => {
589 bytes.write(writer)?;
591 &NetAddress::OnionV3 { ref ed25519_pubkey, ref checksum, ref version, ref port } => {
593 ed25519_pubkey.write(writer)?;
594 checksum.write(writer)?;
595 version.write(writer)?;
598 &NetAddress::Hostname { ref hostname, ref port } => {
600 hostname.write(writer)?;
608 impl Readable for Result<NetAddress, u8> {
609 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Result<NetAddress, u8>, DecodeError> {
610 let byte = <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
613 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::IPv4 {
614 addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
615 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
619 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::IPv6 {
620 addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
621 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
624 3 => Ok(Ok(NetAddress::OnionV2(Readable::read(reader)?))),
626 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::OnionV3 {
627 ed25519_pubkey: Readable::read(reader)?,
628 checksum: Readable::read(reader)?,
629 version: Readable::read(reader)?,
630 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
634 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::Hostname {
635 hostname: Readable::read(reader)?,
636 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
639 _ => return Ok(Err(byte)),
644 impl Readable for NetAddress {
645 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NetAddress, DecodeError> {
646 match Readable::read(reader) {
647 Ok(Ok(res)) => Ok(res),
648 Ok(Err(_)) => Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion),
654 /// Represents the set of gossip messages that require a signature from a node's identity key.
655 pub enum UnsignedGossipMessage<'a> {
656 /// An unsigned channel announcement.
657 ChannelAnnouncement(&'a UnsignedChannelAnnouncement),
658 /// An unsigned channel update.
659 ChannelUpdate(&'a UnsignedChannelUpdate),
660 /// An unsigned node announcement.
661 NodeAnnouncement(&'a UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)
664 impl<'a> Writeable for UnsignedGossipMessage<'a> {
665 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
667 UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
668 UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
669 UnsignedGossipMessage::NodeAnnouncement(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
674 /// The unsigned part of a [`node_announcement`] message.
676 /// [`node_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-node_announcement-message
677 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
678 pub struct UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
679 /// The advertised features
680 pub features: NodeFeatures,
681 /// A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed
683 /// The `node_id` this announcement originated from (don't rebroadcast the `node_announcement` back
686 /// An RGB color for UI purposes
688 /// An alias, for UI purposes.
690 /// This should be sanitized before use. There is no guarantee of uniqueness.
692 /// List of addresses on which this node is reachable
693 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
694 pub(crate) excess_address_data: Vec<u8>,
695 pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
697 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
698 /// A [`node_announcement`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
700 /// [`node_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-node_announcement-message
701 pub struct NodeAnnouncement {
702 /// The signature by the node key
703 pub signature: Signature,
704 /// The actual content of the announcement
705 pub contents: UnsignedNodeAnnouncement,
708 /// The unsigned part of a [`channel_announcement`] message.
710 /// [`channel_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_announcement-message
711 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
712 pub struct UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
713 /// The advertised channel features
714 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
715 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
716 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
717 /// The short channel ID
718 pub short_channel_id: u64,
719 /// One of the two `node_id`s which are endpoints of this channel
720 pub node_id_1: NodeId,
721 /// The other of the two `node_id`s which are endpoints of this channel
722 pub node_id_2: NodeId,
723 /// The funding key for the first node
724 pub bitcoin_key_1: NodeId,
725 /// The funding key for the second node
726 pub bitcoin_key_2: NodeId,
727 pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
729 /// A [`channel_announcement`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
731 /// [`channel_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_announcement-message
732 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
733 pub struct ChannelAnnouncement {
734 /// Authentication of the announcement by the first public node
735 pub node_signature_1: Signature,
736 /// Authentication of the announcement by the second public node
737 pub node_signature_2: Signature,
738 /// Proof of funding UTXO ownership by the first public node
739 pub bitcoin_signature_1: Signature,
740 /// Proof of funding UTXO ownership by the second public node
741 pub bitcoin_signature_2: Signature,
742 /// The actual announcement
743 pub contents: UnsignedChannelAnnouncement,
746 /// The unsigned part of a [`channel_update`] message.
748 /// [`channel_update`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_update-message
749 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
750 pub struct UnsignedChannelUpdate {
751 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
752 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
753 /// The short channel ID
754 pub short_channel_id: u64,
755 /// A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed, specific to this channel
759 /// The number of blocks such that if:
760 /// `incoming_htlc.cltv_expiry < outgoing_htlc.cltv_expiry + cltv_expiry_delta`
761 /// then we need to fail the HTLC backwards. When forwarding an HTLC, `cltv_expiry_delta` determines
762 /// the outgoing HTLC's minimum `cltv_expiry` value -- so, if an incoming HTLC comes in with a
763 /// `cltv_expiry` of 100000, and the node we're forwarding to has a `cltv_expiry_delta` value of 10,
764 /// then we'll check that the outgoing HTLC's `cltv_expiry` value is at least 100010 before
765 /// forwarding. Note that the HTLC sender is the one who originally sets this value when
766 /// constructing the route.
767 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
768 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
769 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
770 /// The maximum HTLC value incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi.
772 /// This used to be optional.
773 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
774 /// The base HTLC fee charged by sender, in milli-satoshi
775 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
776 /// The amount to fee multiplier, in micro-satoshi
777 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
778 /// Excess data which was signed as a part of the message which we do not (yet) understand how
781 /// This is stored to ensure forward-compatibility as new fields are added to the lightning gossip protocol.
782 pub excess_data: Vec<u8>,
784 /// A [`channel_update`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
786 /// [`channel_update`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_update-message
787 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
788 pub struct ChannelUpdate {
789 /// A signature of the channel update
790 pub signature: Signature,
791 /// The actual channel update
792 pub contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate,
795 /// A [`query_channel_range`] message is used to query a peer for channel
796 /// UTXOs in a range of blocks. The recipient of a query makes a best
797 /// effort to reply to the query using one or more [`ReplyChannelRange`]
800 /// [`query_channel_range`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_channel_range-and-reply_channel_range-messages
801 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
802 pub struct QueryChannelRange {
803 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
804 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
805 /// The height of the first block for the channel UTXOs being queried
806 pub first_blocknum: u32,
807 /// The number of blocks to include in the query results
808 pub number_of_blocks: u32,
811 /// A [`reply_channel_range`] message is a reply to a [`QueryChannelRange`]
814 /// Multiple `reply_channel_range` messages can be sent in reply
815 /// to a single [`QueryChannelRange`] message. The query recipient makes a
816 /// best effort to respond based on their local network view which may
817 /// not be a perfect view of the network. The `short_channel_id`s in the
818 /// reply are encoded. We only support `encoding_type=0` uncompressed
819 /// serialization and do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization.
821 /// [`reply_channel_range`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_channel_range-and-reply_channel_range-messages
822 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
823 pub struct ReplyChannelRange {
824 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
825 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
826 /// The height of the first block in the range of the reply
827 pub first_blocknum: u32,
828 /// The number of blocks included in the range of the reply
829 pub number_of_blocks: u32,
830 /// True when this is the final reply for a query
831 pub sync_complete: bool,
832 /// The `short_channel_id`s in the channel range
833 pub short_channel_ids: Vec<u64>,
836 /// A [`query_short_channel_ids`] message is used to query a peer for
837 /// routing gossip messages related to one or more `short_channel_id`s.
839 /// The query recipient will reply with the latest, if available,
840 /// [`ChannelAnnouncement`], [`ChannelUpdate`] and [`NodeAnnouncement`] messages
841 /// it maintains for the requested `short_channel_id`s followed by a
842 /// [`ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd`] message. The `short_channel_id`s sent in
843 /// this query are encoded. We only support `encoding_type=0` uncompressed
844 /// serialization and do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization.
846 /// [`query_short_channel_ids`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_short_channel_idsreply_short_channel_ids_end-messages
847 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
848 pub struct QueryShortChannelIds {
849 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
850 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
851 /// The short_channel_ids that are being queried
852 pub short_channel_ids: Vec<u64>,
855 /// A [`reply_short_channel_ids_end`] message is sent as a reply to a
856 /// message. The query recipient makes a best
857 /// effort to respond based on their local network view which may not be
858 /// a perfect view of the network.
860 /// [`reply_short_channel_ids_end`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_short_channel_idsreply_short_channel_ids_end-messages
861 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
862 pub struct ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
863 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain that was queried
864 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
865 /// Indicates if the query recipient maintains up-to-date channel
866 /// information for the `chain_hash`
867 pub full_information: bool,
870 /// A [`gossip_timestamp_filter`] message is used by a node to request
871 /// gossip relay for messages in the requested time range when the
872 /// `gossip_queries` feature has been negotiated.
874 /// [`gossip_timestamp_filter`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-gossip_timestamp_filter-message
875 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
876 pub struct GossipTimestampFilter {
877 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain for channel and node information
878 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
879 /// The starting unix timestamp
880 pub first_timestamp: u32,
881 /// The range of information in seconds
882 pub timestamp_range: u32,
885 /// Encoding type for data compression of collections in gossip queries.
887 /// We do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization [defined in BOLT
888 /// #7](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#query-messages).
893 /// Used to put an error message in a [`LightningError`].
894 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
895 pub enum ErrorAction {
896 /// The peer took some action which made us think they were useless. Disconnect them.
898 /// An error message which we should make an effort to send before we disconnect.
899 msg: Option<ErrorMessage>
901 /// The peer did something harmless that we weren't able to process, just log and ignore
902 // New code should *not* use this. New code must use IgnoreAndLog, below!
904 /// The peer did something harmless that we weren't able to meaningfully process.
905 /// If the error is logged, log it at the given level.
906 IgnoreAndLog(logger::Level),
907 /// The peer provided us with a gossip message which we'd already seen. In most cases this
908 /// should be ignored, but it may result in the message being forwarded if it is a duplicate of
909 /// our own channel announcements.
910 IgnoreDuplicateGossip,
911 /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them.
913 /// The message to send.
916 /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them without closing any channels.
918 /// The message to send.
920 /// The peer may have done something harmless that we weren't able to meaningfully process,
921 /// though we should still tell them about it.
922 /// If this event is logged, log it at the given level.
923 log_level: logger::Level,
927 /// An Err type for failure to process messages.
928 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
929 pub struct LightningError {
930 /// A human-readable message describing the error
932 /// The action which should be taken against the offending peer.
933 pub action: ErrorAction,
936 /// Struct used to return values from [`RevokeAndACK`] messages, containing a bunch of commitment
937 /// transaction updates if they were pending.
938 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
939 pub struct CommitmentUpdate {
940 /// `update_add_htlc` messages which should be sent
941 pub update_add_htlcs: Vec<UpdateAddHTLC>,
942 /// `update_fulfill_htlc` messages which should be sent
943 pub update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
944 /// `update_fail_htlc` messages which should be sent
945 pub update_fail_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFailHTLC>,
946 /// `update_fail_malformed_htlc` messages which should be sent
947 pub update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFailMalformedHTLC>,
948 /// An `update_fee` message which should be sent
949 pub update_fee: Option<UpdateFee>,
950 /// A `commitment_signed` message which should be sent
951 pub commitment_signed: CommitmentSigned,
954 /// Messages could have optional fields to use with extended features
955 /// As we wish to serialize these differently from `Option<T>`s (`Options` get a tag byte, but
956 /// [`OptionalField`] simply gets `Present` if there are enough bytes to read into it), we have a
957 /// separate enum type for them.
959 /// This is not exported to bindings users due to a free generic in `T`
960 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
961 pub enum OptionalField<T> {
962 /// Optional field is included in message
964 /// Optional field is absent in message
968 /// A trait to describe an object which can receive channel messages.
970 /// Messages MAY be called in parallel when they originate from different `their_node_ids`, however
971 /// they MUST NOT be called in parallel when the two calls have the same `their_node_id`.
972 pub trait ChannelMessageHandler : MessageSendEventsProvider {
974 /// Handle an incoming `open_channel` message from the given peer.
975 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OpenChannel);
976 /// Handle an incoming `accept_channel` message from the given peer.
977 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AcceptChannel);
978 /// Handle an incoming `funding_created` message from the given peer.
979 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingCreated);
980 /// Handle an incoming `funding_signed` message from the given peer.
981 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingSigned);
982 /// Handle an incoming `channel_ready` message from the given peer.
983 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelReady);
986 /// Handle an incoming `shutdown` message from the given peer.
987 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Shutdown);
988 /// Handle an incoming `closing_signed` message from the given peer.
989 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ClosingSigned);
992 /// Handle an incoming `update_add_htlc` message from the given peer.
993 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateAddHTLC);
994 /// Handle an incoming `update_fulfill_htlc` message from the given peer.
995 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFulfillHTLC);
996 /// Handle an incoming `update_fail_htlc` message from the given peer.
997 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFailHTLC);
998 /// Handle an incoming `update_fail_malformed_htlc` message from the given peer.
999 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFailMalformedHTLC);
1000 /// Handle an incoming `commitment_signed` message from the given peer.
1001 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &CommitmentSigned);
1002 /// Handle an incoming `revoke_and_ack` message from the given peer.
1003 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &RevokeAndACK);
1005 /// Handle an incoming `update_fee` message from the given peer.
1006 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFee);
1008 // Channel-to-announce:
1009 /// Handle an incoming `announcement_signatures` message from the given peer.
1010 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AnnouncementSignatures);
1012 // Connection loss/reestablish:
1013 /// Indicates a connection to the peer failed/an existing connection was lost.
1014 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey);
1016 /// Handle a peer reconnecting, possibly generating `channel_reestablish` message(s).
1018 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1019 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1020 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1021 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1022 /// Handle an incoming `channel_reestablish` message from the given peer.
1023 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelReestablish);
1025 /// Handle an incoming `channel_update` message from the given peer.
1026 fn handle_channel_update(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelUpdate);
1029 /// Handle an incoming `error` message from the given peer.
1030 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ErrorMessage);
1032 // Handler information:
1033 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1034 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1035 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1036 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1038 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1039 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1040 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1042 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1043 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1046 /// A trait to describe an object which can receive routing messages.
1048 /// # Implementor DoS Warnings
1050 /// For messages enabled with the `gossip_queries` feature there are potential DoS vectors when
1051 /// handling inbound queries. Implementors using an on-disk network graph should be aware of
1052 /// repeated disk I/O for queries accessing different parts of the network graph.
1053 pub trait RoutingMessageHandler : MessageSendEventsProvider {
1054 /// Handle an incoming `node_announcement` message, returning `true` if it should be forwarded on,
1055 /// `false` or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1056 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1057 /// Handle a `channel_announcement` message, returning `true` if it should be forwarded on, `false`
1058 /// or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1059 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1060 /// Handle an incoming `channel_update` message, returning true if it should be forwarded on,
1061 /// `false` or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1062 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1063 /// Gets channel announcements and updates required to dump our routing table to a remote node,
1064 /// starting at the `short_channel_id` indicated by `starting_point` and including announcements
1065 /// for a single channel.
1066 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)>;
1067 /// Gets a node announcement required to dump our routing table to a remote node, starting at
1068 /// the node *after* the provided pubkey and including up to one announcement immediately
1069 /// higher (as defined by `<PublicKey as Ord>::cmp`) than `starting_point`.
1070 /// If `None` is provided for `starting_point`, we start at the first node.
1071 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&NodeId>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement>;
1072 /// Called when a connection is established with a peer. This can be used to
1073 /// perform routing table synchronization using a strategy defined by the
1076 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1077 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1078 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1079 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1080 /// Handles the reply of a query we initiated to learn about channels
1081 /// for a given range of blocks. We can expect to receive one or more
1082 /// replies to a single query.
1083 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1084 /// Handles the reply of a query we initiated asking for routing gossip
1085 /// messages for a list of channels. We should receive this message when
1086 /// a node has completed its best effort to send us the pertaining routing
1087 /// gossip messages.
1088 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1089 /// Handles when a peer asks us to send a list of `short_channel_id`s
1090 /// for the requested range of blocks.
1091 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1092 /// Handles when a peer asks us to send routing gossip messages for a
1093 /// list of `short_channel_id`s.
1094 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1096 // Handler queueing status:
1097 /// Indicates that there are a large number of [`ChannelAnnouncement`] (or other) messages
1098 /// pending some async action. While there is no guarantee of the rate of future messages, the
1099 /// caller should seek to reduce the rate of new gossip messages handled, especially
1100 /// [`ChannelAnnouncement`]s.
1101 fn processing_queue_high(&self) -> bool;
1103 // Handler information:
1104 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1105 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1106 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1107 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1108 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1109 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1110 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1112 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1113 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1116 /// A trait to describe an object that can receive onion messages.
1117 pub trait OnionMessageHandler : OnionMessageProvider {
1118 /// Handle an incoming `onion_message` message from the given peer.
1119 fn handle_onion_message(&self, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OnionMessage);
1120 /// Called when a connection is established with a peer. Can be used to track which peers
1121 /// advertise onion message support and are online.
1123 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1124 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1125 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1126 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1127 /// Indicates a connection to the peer failed/an existing connection was lost. Allows handlers to
1128 /// drop and refuse to forward onion messages to this peer.
1129 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey);
1131 // Handler information:
1132 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1133 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1134 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1135 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1137 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1138 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1139 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1141 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1142 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1145 mod fuzzy_internal_msgs {
1146 use crate::prelude::*;
1147 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
1149 // These types aren't intended to be pub, but are exposed for direct fuzzing (as we deserialize
1150 // them from untrusted input):
1152 pub(crate) struct FinalOnionHopData {
1153 pub(crate) payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
1154 /// The total value, in msat, of the payment as received by the ultimate recipient.
1155 /// Message serialization may panic if this value is more than 21 million Bitcoin.
1156 pub(crate) total_msat: u64,
1159 pub(crate) enum OnionHopDataFormat {
1161 short_channel_id: u64,
1164 payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData>,
1165 keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
1169 pub struct OnionHopData {
1170 pub(crate) format: OnionHopDataFormat,
1171 /// The value, in msat, of the payment after this hop's fee is deducted.
1172 /// Message serialization may panic if this value is more than 21 million Bitcoin.
1173 pub(crate) amt_to_forward: u64,
1174 pub(crate) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
1177 pub struct DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
1178 pub(crate) hmac: [u8; 32],
1179 pub(crate) failuremsg: Vec<u8>,
1180 pub(crate) pad: Vec<u8>,
1184 pub use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*;
1185 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
1186 pub(crate) use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*;
1189 pub(crate) struct OnionPacket {
1190 pub(crate) version: u8,
1191 /// In order to ensure we always return an error on onion decode in compliance with [BOLT
1192 /// #4](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md), we have to
1193 /// deserialize `OnionPacket`s contained in [`UpdateAddHTLC`] messages even if the ephemeral
1194 /// public key (here) is bogus, so we hold a [`Result`] instead of a [`PublicKey`] as we'd
1196 pub(crate) public_key: Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>,
1197 pub(crate) hop_data: [u8; 20*65],
1198 pub(crate) hmac: [u8; 32],
1201 impl onion_utils::Packet for OnionPacket {
1202 type Data = onion_utils::FixedSizeOnionPacket;
1203 fn new(pubkey: PublicKey, hop_data: onion_utils::FixedSizeOnionPacket, hmac: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
1206 public_key: Ok(pubkey),
1207 hop_data: hop_data.0,
1213 impl Eq for OnionPacket { }
1214 impl PartialEq for OnionPacket {
1215 fn eq(&self, other: &OnionPacket) -> bool {
1216 for (i, j) in self.hop_data.iter().zip(other.hop_data.iter()) {
1217 if i != j { return false; }
1219 self.version == other.version &&
1220 self.public_key == other.public_key &&
1221 self.hmac == other.hmac
1225 impl fmt::Debug for OnionPacket {
1226 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
1227 f.write_fmt(format_args!("OnionPacket version {} with hmac {:?}", self.version, &self.hmac[..]))
1231 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1232 pub(crate) struct OnionErrorPacket {
1233 // This really should be a constant size slice, but the spec lets these things be up to 128KB?
1234 // (TODO) We limit it in decode to much lower...
1235 pub(crate) data: Vec<u8>,
1238 impl fmt::Display for DecodeError {
1239 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
1241 DecodeError::UnknownVersion => f.write_str("Unknown realm byte in Onion packet"),
1242 DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature => f.write_str("Unknown required feature preventing decode"),
1243 DecodeError::InvalidValue => f.write_str("Nonsense bytes didn't map to the type they were interpreted as"),
1244 DecodeError::ShortRead => f.write_str("Packet extended beyond the provided bytes"),
1245 DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor => f.write_str("A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly"),
1246 DecodeError::Io(ref e) => fmt::Debug::fmt(e, f),
1247 DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression => f.write_str("We don't support receiving messages with zlib-compressed fields"),
1252 impl From<io::Error> for DecodeError {
1253 fn from(e: io::Error) -> Self {
1254 if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof {
1255 DecodeError::ShortRead
1257 DecodeError::Io(e.kind())
1262 impl Writeable for OptionalField<Script> {
1263 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1265 OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1266 // Note that Writeable for script includes the 16-bit length tag for us
1269 OptionalField::Absent => {}
1275 impl Readable for OptionalField<Script> {
1276 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1277 match <u16 as Readable>::read(r) {
1279 let mut buf = vec![0; len as usize];
1280 r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
1281 Ok(OptionalField::Present(Script::from(buf)))
1283 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(OptionalField::Absent),
1289 impl Writeable for OptionalField<u64> {
1290 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1292 OptionalField::Present(ref value) => {
1295 OptionalField::Absent => {}
1301 impl Readable for OptionalField<u64> {
1302 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1303 let value: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
1304 Ok(OptionalField::Present(value))
1308 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
1309 impl_writeable_msg!(AcceptChannel, {
1310 temporary_channel_id,
1311 dust_limit_satoshis,
1312 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1313 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1319 revocation_basepoint,
1321 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1323 first_per_commitment_point,
1324 shutdown_scriptpubkey
1326 (1, channel_type, option),
1330 impl_writeable_msg!(AcceptChannel, {
1331 temporary_channel_id,
1332 dust_limit_satoshis,
1333 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1334 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1340 revocation_basepoint,
1342 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1344 first_per_commitment_point,
1345 shutdown_scriptpubkey
1347 (1, channel_type, option),
1348 (4, next_local_nonce, option),
1351 impl_writeable_msg!(AnnouncementSignatures, {
1358 impl Writeable for ChannelReestablish {
1359 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1360 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
1361 self.next_local_commitment_number.write(w)?;
1362 self.next_remote_commitment_number.write(w)?;
1363 match self.data_loss_protect {
1364 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss_protect) => {
1365 (*data_loss_protect).your_last_per_commitment_secret.write(w)?;
1366 (*data_loss_protect).my_current_per_commitment_point.write(w)?;
1368 OptionalField::Absent => {}
1374 impl Readable for ChannelReestablish{
1375 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1377 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1378 next_local_commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
1379 next_remote_commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
1380 data_loss_protect: {
1381 match <[u8; 32] as Readable>::read(r) {
1382 Ok(your_last_per_commitment_secret) =>
1383 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
1384 your_last_per_commitment_secret,
1385 my_current_per_commitment_point: Readable::read(r)?,
1387 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => OptionalField::Absent,
1388 Err(e) => return Err(e)
1395 impl_writeable_msg!(ClosingSigned,
1396 { channel_id, fee_satoshis, signature },
1397 { (1, fee_range, option) }
1400 impl_writeable!(ClosingSignedFeeRange, {
1405 impl_writeable_msg!(CommitmentSigned, {
1411 impl_writeable!(DecodedOnionErrorPacket, {
1417 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
1418 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingCreated, {
1419 temporary_channel_id,
1421 funding_output_index,
1425 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingCreated, {
1426 temporary_channel_id,
1428 funding_output_index,
1431 (2, partial_signature_with_nonce, option),
1432 (4, next_local_nonce, option)
1435 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
1436 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingSigned, {
1442 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingSigned, {
1446 (2, partial_signature_with_nonce, option)
1449 impl_writeable_msg!(ChannelReady, {
1451 next_per_commitment_point,
1453 (1, short_channel_id_alias, option),
1456 impl Writeable for Init {
1457 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1458 // global_features gets the bottom 13 bits of our features, and local_features gets all of
1459 // our relevant feature bits. This keeps us compatible with old nodes.
1460 self.features.write_up_to_13(w)?;
1461 self.features.write(w)?;
1462 encode_tlv_stream!(w, {
1463 (3, self.remote_network_address, option)
1469 impl Readable for Init {
1470 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1471 let global_features: InitFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
1472 let features: InitFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
1473 let mut remote_network_address: Option<NetAddress> = None;
1474 decode_tlv_stream!(r, {
1475 (3, remote_network_address, option)
1478 features: features.or(global_features),
1479 remote_network_address,
1484 impl_writeable_msg!(OpenChannel, {
1486 temporary_channel_id,
1489 dust_limit_satoshis,
1490 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1491 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1497 revocation_basepoint,
1499 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1501 first_per_commitment_point,
1503 shutdown_scriptpubkey
1505 (1, channel_type, option),
1508 impl_writeable_msg!(RevokeAndACK, {
1510 per_commitment_secret,
1511 next_per_commitment_point
1514 impl_writeable_msg!(Shutdown, {
1519 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFailHTLC, {
1525 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, {
1532 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFee, {
1537 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFulfillHTLC, {
1543 // Note that this is written as a part of ChannelManager objects, and thus cannot change its
1544 // serialization format in a way which assumes we know the total serialized length/message end
1546 impl_writeable!(OnionErrorPacket, {
1550 // Note that this is written as a part of ChannelManager objects, and thus cannot change its
1551 // serialization format in a way which assumes we know the total serialized length/message end
1553 impl Writeable for OnionPacket {
1554 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1555 self.version.write(w)?;
1556 match self.public_key {
1557 Ok(pubkey) => pubkey.write(w)?,
1558 Err(_) => [0u8;33].write(w)?,
1560 w.write_all(&self.hop_data)?;
1561 self.hmac.write(w)?;
1566 impl Readable for OnionPacket {
1567 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1569 version: Readable::read(r)?,
1571 let mut buf = [0u8;33];
1572 r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
1573 PublicKey::from_slice(&buf)
1575 hop_data: Readable::read(r)?,
1576 hmac: Readable::read(r)?,
1581 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateAddHTLC, {
1587 onion_routing_packet
1590 impl Readable for OnionMessage {
1591 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1592 let blinding_point: PublicKey = Readable::read(r)?;
1593 let len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1594 let mut packet_reader = FixedLengthReader::new(r, len as u64);
1595 let onion_routing_packet: onion_message::Packet = <onion_message::Packet as LengthReadable>::read(&mut packet_reader)?;
1598 onion_routing_packet,
1603 impl Writeable for OnionMessage {
1604 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1605 self.blinding_point.write(w)?;
1606 let onion_packet_len = self.onion_routing_packet.serialized_length();
1607 (onion_packet_len as u16).write(w)?;
1608 self.onion_routing_packet.write(w)?;
1613 impl Writeable for FinalOnionHopData {
1614 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1615 self.payment_secret.0.write(w)?;
1616 HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.total_msat).write(w)
1620 impl Readable for FinalOnionHopData {
1621 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1622 let secret: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
1623 let amt: HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize<u64> = Readable::read(r)?;
1624 Ok(Self { payment_secret: PaymentSecret(secret), total_msat: amt.0 })
1628 impl Writeable for OnionHopData {
1629 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1631 OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => {
1632 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
1633 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.amt_to_forward), required),
1634 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
1635 (6, short_channel_id, required)
1638 OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { ref payment_data, ref keysend_preimage } => {
1639 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
1640 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.amt_to_forward), required),
1641 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
1642 (8, payment_data, option),
1643 (5482373484, keysend_preimage, option)
1651 impl Readable for OnionHopData {
1652 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1653 let mut amt = HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(0u64);
1654 let mut cltv_value = HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(0u32);
1655 let mut short_id: Option<u64> = None;
1656 let mut payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData> = None;
1657 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
1658 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
1660 (4, cltv_value, required),
1661 (6, short_id, option),
1662 (8, payment_data, option),
1663 // See https://github.com/lightning/blips/blob/master/blip-0003.md
1664 (5482373484, keysend_preimage, option)
1667 let format = if let Some(short_channel_id) = short_id {
1668 if payment_data.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
1669 OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
1673 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1674 if data.total_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1675 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1678 OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
1684 if amt.0 > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1685 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1689 amt_to_forward: amt.0,
1690 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv_value.0,
1695 // ReadableArgs because we need onion_utils::decode_next_hop to accommodate payment packets and
1696 // onion message packets.
1697 impl ReadableArgs<()> for OnionHopData {
1698 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R, _arg: ()) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1699 <Self as Readable>::read(r)
1703 impl Writeable for Ping {
1704 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1705 self.ponglen.write(w)?;
1706 vec![0u8; self.byteslen as usize].write(w)?; // size-unchecked write
1711 impl Readable for Ping {
1712 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1714 ponglen: Readable::read(r)?,
1716 let byteslen = Readable::read(r)?;
1717 r.read_exact(&mut vec![0u8; byteslen as usize][..])?;
1724 impl Writeable for Pong {
1725 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1726 vec![0u8; self.byteslen as usize].write(w)?; // size-unchecked write
1731 impl Readable for Pong {
1732 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1735 let byteslen = Readable::read(r)?;
1736 r.read_exact(&mut vec![0u8; byteslen as usize][..])?;
1743 impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1744 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1745 self.features.write(w)?;
1746 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
1747 self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
1748 self.node_id_1.write(w)?;
1749 self.node_id_2.write(w)?;
1750 self.bitcoin_key_1.write(w)?;
1751 self.bitcoin_key_2.write(w)?;
1752 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
1757 impl Readable for UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1758 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1760 features: Readable::read(r)?,
1761 chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
1762 short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1763 node_id_1: Readable::read(r)?,
1764 node_id_2: Readable::read(r)?,
1765 bitcoin_key_1: Readable::read(r)?,
1766 bitcoin_key_2: Readable::read(r)?,
1767 excess_data: read_to_end(r)?,
1772 impl_writeable!(ChannelAnnouncement, {
1775 bitcoin_signature_1,
1776 bitcoin_signature_2,
1780 impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1781 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1782 // `message_flags` used to indicate presence of `htlc_maximum_msat`, but was deprecated in the spec.
1783 const MESSAGE_FLAGS: u8 = 1;
1784 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
1785 self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
1786 self.timestamp.write(w)?;
1787 let all_flags = self.flags as u16 | ((MESSAGE_FLAGS as u16) << 8);
1788 all_flags.write(w)?;
1789 self.cltv_expiry_delta.write(w)?;
1790 self.htlc_minimum_msat.write(w)?;
1791 self.fee_base_msat.write(w)?;
1792 self.fee_proportional_millionths.write(w)?;
1793 self.htlc_maximum_msat.write(w)?;
1794 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
1799 impl Readable for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1800 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1802 chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
1803 short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1804 timestamp: Readable::read(r)?,
1806 let flags: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1807 // Note: we ignore the `message_flags` for now, since it was deprecated by the spec.
1810 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(r)?,
1811 htlc_minimum_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
1812 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
1813 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(r)?,
1814 htlc_maximum_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
1815 excess_data: read_to_end(r)?,
1820 impl_writeable!(ChannelUpdate, {
1825 impl Writeable for ErrorMessage {
1826 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1827 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
1828 (self.data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
1829 w.write_all(self.data.as_bytes())?;
1834 impl Readable for ErrorMessage {
1835 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1837 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1839 let sz: usize = <u16 as Readable>::read(r)? as usize;
1840 let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(sz);
1842 r.read_exact(&mut data)?;
1843 match String::from_utf8(data) {
1845 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1852 impl Writeable for WarningMessage {
1853 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1854 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
1855 (self.data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
1856 w.write_all(self.data.as_bytes())?;
1861 impl Readable for WarningMessage {
1862 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1864 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1866 let sz: usize = <u16 as Readable>::read(r)? as usize;
1867 let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(sz);
1869 r.read_exact(&mut data)?;
1870 match String::from_utf8(data) {
1872 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1879 impl Writeable for UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1880 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1881 self.features.write(w)?;
1882 self.timestamp.write(w)?;
1883 self.node_id.write(w)?;
1884 w.write_all(&self.rgb)?;
1885 self.alias.write(w)?;
1887 let mut addr_len = 0;
1888 for addr in self.addresses.iter() {
1889 addr_len += 1 + addr.len();
1891 (addr_len + self.excess_address_data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
1892 for addr in self.addresses.iter() {
1895 w.write_all(&self.excess_address_data[..])?;
1896 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
1901 impl Readable for UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1902 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1903 let features: NodeFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
1904 let timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
1905 let node_id: NodeId = Readable::read(r)?;
1906 let mut rgb = [0; 3];
1907 r.read_exact(&mut rgb)?;
1908 let alias: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
1910 let addr_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1911 let mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress> = Vec::new();
1912 let mut addr_readpos = 0;
1913 let mut excess = false;
1914 let mut excess_byte = 0;
1916 if addr_len <= addr_readpos { break; }
1917 match Readable::read(r) {
1919 if addr_len < addr_readpos + 1 + addr.len() {
1920 return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor);
1922 addr_readpos += (1 + addr.len()) as u16;
1923 addresses.push(addr);
1925 Ok(Err(unknown_descriptor)) => {
1927 excess_byte = unknown_descriptor;
1930 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor),
1931 Err(e) => return Err(e),
1935 let mut excess_data = vec![];
1936 let excess_address_data = if addr_readpos < addr_len {
1937 let mut excess_address_data = vec![0; (addr_len - addr_readpos) as usize];
1938 r.read_exact(&mut excess_address_data[if excess { 1 } else { 0 }..])?;
1940 excess_address_data[0] = excess_byte;
1945 excess_data.push(excess_byte);
1949 excess_data.extend(read_to_end(r)?.iter());
1950 Ok(UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1957 excess_address_data,
1963 impl_writeable!(NodeAnnouncement, {
1968 impl Readable for QueryShortChannelIds {
1969 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1970 let chain_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(r)?;
1972 let encoding_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1973 let encoding_type: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
1975 // Must be encoding_type=0 uncompressed serialization. We do not
1976 // support encoding_type=1 zlib serialization.
1977 if encoding_type != EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8 {
1978 return Err(DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression);
1981 // We expect the encoding_len to always includes the 1-byte
1982 // encoding_type and that short_channel_ids are 8-bytes each
1983 if encoding_len == 0 || (encoding_len - 1) % 8 != 0 {
1984 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1987 // Read short_channel_ids (8-bytes each), for the u16 encoding_len
1988 // less the 1-byte encoding_type
1989 let short_channel_id_count: u16 = (encoding_len - 1)/8;
1990 let mut short_channel_ids = Vec::with_capacity(short_channel_id_count as usize);
1991 for _ in 0..short_channel_id_count {
1992 short_channel_ids.push(Readable::read(r)?);
1995 Ok(QueryShortChannelIds {
2002 impl Writeable for QueryShortChannelIds {
2003 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2004 // Calculated from 1-byte encoding_type plus 8-bytes per short_channel_id
2005 let encoding_len: u16 = 1 + self.short_channel_ids.len() as u16 * 8;
2007 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
2008 encoding_len.write(w)?;
2010 // We only support type=0 uncompressed serialization
2011 (EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8).write(w)?;
2013 for scid in self.short_channel_ids.iter() {
2021 impl_writeable_msg!(ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd, {
2026 impl QueryChannelRange {
2027 /// Calculates the overflow safe ending block height for the query.
2029 /// Overflow returns `0xffffffff`, otherwise returns `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`.
2030 pub fn end_blocknum(&self) -> u32 {
2031 match self.first_blocknum.checked_add(self.number_of_blocks) {
2032 Some(block) => block,
2033 None => u32::max_value(),
2038 impl_writeable_msg!(QueryChannelRange, {
2044 impl Readable for ReplyChannelRange {
2045 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2046 let chain_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(r)?;
2047 let first_blocknum: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
2048 let number_of_blocks: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
2049 let sync_complete: bool = Readable::read(r)?;
2051 let encoding_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
2052 let encoding_type: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
2054 // Must be encoding_type=0 uncompressed serialization. We do not
2055 // support encoding_type=1 zlib serialization.
2056 if encoding_type != EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8 {
2057 return Err(DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression);
2060 // We expect the encoding_len to always includes the 1-byte
2061 // encoding_type and that short_channel_ids are 8-bytes each
2062 if encoding_len == 0 || (encoding_len - 1) % 8 != 0 {
2063 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2066 // Read short_channel_ids (8-bytes each), for the u16 encoding_len
2067 // less the 1-byte encoding_type
2068 let short_channel_id_count: u16 = (encoding_len - 1)/8;
2069 let mut short_channel_ids = Vec::with_capacity(short_channel_id_count as usize);
2070 for _ in 0..short_channel_id_count {
2071 short_channel_ids.push(Readable::read(r)?);
2074 Ok(ReplyChannelRange {
2084 impl Writeable for ReplyChannelRange {
2085 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2086 let encoding_len: u16 = 1 + self.short_channel_ids.len() as u16 * 8;
2087 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
2088 self.first_blocknum.write(w)?;
2089 self.number_of_blocks.write(w)?;
2090 self.sync_complete.write(w)?;
2092 encoding_len.write(w)?;
2093 (EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8).write(w)?;
2094 for scid in self.short_channel_ids.iter() {
2102 impl_writeable_msg!(GossipTimestampFilter, {
2111 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
2112 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
2113 use crate::ln::msgs;
2114 use crate::ln::msgs::{FinalOnionHopData, OptionalField, OnionErrorPacket, OnionHopDataFormat};
2115 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
2116 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Hostname};
2118 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2119 use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
2120 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2121 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
2122 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2123 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
2125 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2126 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2128 use crate::io::{self, Cursor};
2129 use crate::prelude::*;
2130 use core::convert::TryFrom;
2133 fn encoding_channel_reestablish_no_secret() {
2134 let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
2135 channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
2136 next_local_commitment_number: 3,
2137 next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
2138 data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Absent,
2141 let encoded_value = cr.encode();
2144 vec![4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4]
2149 fn encoding_channel_reestablish_with_secret() {
2151 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2152 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
2155 let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
2156 channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
2157 next_local_commitment_number: 3,
2158 next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
2159 data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Present(msgs::DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret: [9;32], my_current_per_commitment_point: public_key}),
2162 let encoded_value = cr.encode();
2165 vec![4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 3, 27, 132, 197, 86, 123, 18, 100, 64, 153, 93, 62, 213, 170, 186, 5, 101, 215, 30, 24, 52, 96, 72, 25, 255, 156, 23, 245, 233, 213, 221, 7, 143]
2169 macro_rules! get_keys_from {
2170 ($slice: expr, $secp_ctx: expr) => {
2172 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode($slice).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2173 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &privkey);
2179 macro_rules! get_sig_on {
2180 ($privkey: expr, $ctx: expr, $string: expr) => {
2182 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&$string.into_bytes()[..]).unwrap();
2183 $ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &$privkey)
2189 fn encoding_announcement_signatures() {
2190 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2191 let (privkey, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2192 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2193 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("02020202020202020202020202020202"));
2194 let announcement_signatures = msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2195 channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
2196 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2197 node_signature: sig_1,
2198 bitcoin_signature: sig_2,
2201 let encoded_value = announcement_signatures.encode();
2202 assert_eq!(encoded_value, hex::decode("040000000000000005000000000000000600000000000000070000000000000000083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073acf9953cef4700860f5967838eba2bae89288ad188ebf8b20bf995c3ea53a26df1876d0a3a0e13172ba286a673140190c02ba9da60a2e43a745188c8a83c7f3ef").unwrap());
2205 fn do_encoding_channel_announcement(unknown_features_bits: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2206 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2207 let (privkey_1, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2208 let (privkey_2, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2209 let (privkey_3, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2210 let (privkey_4, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2211 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2212 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey_2, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2213 let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2214 let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2215 let mut features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
2216 if unknown_features_bits {
2217 features = ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF]);
2219 let unsigned_channel_announcement = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2221 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
2222 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2223 node_id_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_1),
2224 node_id_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_2),
2225 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_3),
2226 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_4),
2227 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![10, 0, 0, 20, 0, 0, 30, 0, 0, 40] } else { Vec::new() },
2229 let channel_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2230 node_signature_1: sig_1,
2231 node_signature_2: sig_2,
2232 bitcoin_signature_1: sig_3,
2233 bitcoin_signature_2: sig_4,
2234 contents: unsigned_channel_announcement,
2236 let encoded_value = channel_announcement.encode();
2237 let mut target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
2238 if unknown_features_bits {
2239 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0002ffff").unwrap());
2241 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000").unwrap());
2243 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
2244 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00083a840000034d031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f024d4b6cd1361032ca9bd2aeb9d900aa4d45d9ead80ac9423374c451a7254d076602531fe6068134503d2723133227c867ac8fa6c83c537e9a44c3c5bdbdcb1fe33703462779ad4aad39514614751a71085f2f10e1c7a593e4e030efb5b8721ce55b0b").unwrap());
2246 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0a00001400001e000028").unwrap());
2248 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2252 fn encoding_channel_announcement() {
2253 do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, false);
2254 do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, true);
2255 do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, false);
2256 do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, true);
2259 fn do_encoding_node_announcement(unknown_features_bits: bool, ipv4: bool, ipv6: bool, onionv2: bool, onionv3: bool, hostname: bool, excess_address_data: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2260 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2261 let (privkey_1, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2262 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2263 let features = if unknown_features_bits {
2264 NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF])
2266 // Set to some features we may support
2267 NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![2 | 1 << 5])
2269 let mut addresses = Vec::new();
2271 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::IPv4 {
2272 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252],
2277 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::IPv6 {
2278 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240],
2283 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::OnionV2(
2284 [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 38, 7]
2288 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::OnionV3 {
2289 ed25519_pubkey: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240, 239, 238, 237, 236, 235, 234, 233, 232, 231, 230, 229, 228, 227, 226, 225, 224],
2296 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::Hostname {
2297 hostname: Hostname::try_from(String::from("host")).unwrap(),
2301 let mut addr_len = 0;
2302 for addr in &addresses {
2303 addr_len += addr.len() + 1;
2305 let unsigned_node_announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2307 timestamp: 20190119,
2308 node_id: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_1),
2312 excess_address_data: if excess_address_data { vec![33, 108, 40, 11, 83, 149, 162, 84, 110, 126, 75, 38, 99, 224, 79, 129, 22, 34, 241, 90, 79, 146, 232, 58, 162, 233, 43, 162, 165, 115, 193, 57, 20, 44, 84, 174, 99, 7, 42, 30, 193, 238, 125, 192, 192, 75, 222, 92, 132, 120, 6, 23, 42, 160, 92, 146, 194, 42, 232, 227, 8, 209, 210, 105] } else { Vec::new() },
2313 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![59, 18, 204, 25, 92, 224, 162, 209, 189, 166, 168, 139, 239, 161, 159, 160, 127, 81, 202, 167, 92, 232, 56, 55, 242, 137, 101, 96, 11, 138, 172, 171, 8, 85, 255, 176, 231, 65, 236, 95, 124, 65, 66, 30, 152, 41, 169, 212, 134, 17, 200, 200, 49, 247, 27, 229, 234, 115, 230, 101, 148, 151, 127, 253] } else { Vec::new() },
2315 addr_len += unsigned_node_announcement.excess_address_data.len() as u16;
2316 let node_announcement = msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2318 contents: unsigned_node_announcement,
2320 let encoded_value = node_announcement.encode();
2321 let mut target_value = hex::decode("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2322 if unknown_features_bits {
2323 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0002ffff").unwrap());
2325 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000122").unwrap());
2327 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("013413a7031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f2020201010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010").unwrap());
2328 target_value.append(&mut vec![(addr_len >> 8) as u8, addr_len as u8]);
2330 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("01fffefdfc2607").unwrap());
2333 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("02fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f02607").unwrap());
2336 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("03fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f62607").unwrap());
2339 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("04fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0efeeedecebeae9e8e7e6e5e4e3e2e1e00020102607").unwrap());
2342 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0504686f73742607").unwrap());
2344 if excess_address_data {
2345 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f92e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d269").unwrap());
2348 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("3b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
2350 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2354 fn encoding_node_announcement() {
2355 do_encoding_node_announcement(true, true, true, true, true, true, true, true);
2356 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false);
2357 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, true, false, false, false, false, false, false);
2358 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, true, false, false, false, false, false);
2359 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, true, false, false, false, false);
2360 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, true, false, false, false);
2361 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, true, false, false);
2362 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, false, true, false);
2363 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, true, false, true, false, false, true, false);
2364 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, true, false, true, false, false, false);
2367 fn do_encoding_channel_update(direction: bool, disable: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2368 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2369 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2370 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2371 let unsigned_channel_update = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2372 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
2373 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2374 timestamp: 20190119,
2375 flags: if direction { 1 } else { 0 } | if disable { 1 << 1 } else { 0 },
2376 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2377 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
2378 htlc_maximum_msat: 131355275467161,
2379 fee_base_msat: 10000,
2380 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2381 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![0, 0, 0, 0, 59, 154, 202, 0] } else { Vec::new() }
2383 let channel_update = msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2385 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2387 let encoded_value = channel_update.encode();
2388 let mut target_value = hex::decode("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2389 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
2390 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00083a840000034d013413a7").unwrap());
2391 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("01").unwrap());
2392 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00").unwrap());
2394 let flag = target_value.last_mut().unwrap();
2398 let flag = target_value.last_mut().unwrap();
2399 *flag = *flag | 1 << 1;
2401 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap());
2402 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000777788889999").unwrap());
2404 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000003b9aca00").unwrap());
2406 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2410 fn encoding_channel_update() {
2411 do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, false);
2412 do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, true);
2413 do_encoding_channel_update(true, false, false);
2414 do_encoding_channel_update(true, false, true);
2415 do_encoding_channel_update(false, true, false);
2416 do_encoding_channel_update(false, true, true);
2417 do_encoding_channel_update(true, true, false);
2418 do_encoding_channel_update(true, true, true);
2421 fn do_encoding_open_channel(random_bit: bool, shutdown: bool, incl_chan_type: bool) {
2422 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2423 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2424 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2425 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2426 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2427 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
2428 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
2429 let open_channel = msgs::OpenChannel {
2430 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
2431 temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
2432 funding_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
2433 push_msat: 2536655962884945560,
2434 dust_limit_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
2435 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 8517154655701053848,
2436 channel_reserve_satoshis: 8665828695742877976,
2437 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
2438 feerate_per_kw: 821716,
2439 to_self_delay: 49340,
2440 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
2441 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
2442 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
2443 payment_point: pubkey_3,
2444 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
2445 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
2446 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
2447 channel_flags: if random_bit { 1 << 5 } else { 0 },
2448 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { OptionalField::Present(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { OptionalField::Absent },
2449 channel_type: if incl_chan_type { Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::empty()) } else { None },
2451 let encoded_value = open_channel.encode();
2452 let mut target_value = Vec::new();
2453 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
2454 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2456 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("20").unwrap());
2458 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00").unwrap());
2461 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
2464 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0100").unwrap());
2466 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2470 fn encoding_open_channel() {
2471 do_encoding_open_channel(false, false, false);
2472 do_encoding_open_channel(false, false, true);
2473 do_encoding_open_channel(false, true, false);
2474 do_encoding_open_channel(false, true, true);
2475 do_encoding_open_channel(true, false, false);
2476 do_encoding_open_channel(true, false, true);
2477 do_encoding_open_channel(true, true, false);
2478 do_encoding_open_channel(true, true, true);
2481 fn do_encoding_accept_channel(shutdown: bool) {
2482 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2483 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2484 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2485 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2486 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2487 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
2488 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
2489 let accept_channel = msgs::AcceptChannel {
2490 temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
2491 dust_limit_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
2492 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 2536655962884945560,
2493 channel_reserve_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
2494 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
2495 minimum_depth: 821716,
2496 to_self_delay: 49340,
2497 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
2498 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
2499 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
2500 payment_point: pubkey_3,
2501 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
2502 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
2503 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
2504 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { OptionalField::Present(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { OptionalField::Absent },
2507 next_local_nonce: None,
2509 let encoded_value = accept_channel.encode();
2510 let mut target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
2512 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
2514 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2518 fn encoding_accept_channel() {
2519 do_encoding_accept_channel(false);
2520 do_encoding_accept_channel(true);
2524 fn encoding_funding_created() {
2525 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2526 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2527 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2528 let funding_created = msgs::FundingCreated {
2529 temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
2530 funding_txid: Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap(),
2531 funding_output_index: 255,
2534 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2536 next_local_nonce: None,
2538 let encoded_value = funding_created.encode();
2539 let target_value = hex::decode("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202026e96fe9f8b0ddcd729ba03cfafa5a27b050b39d354dd980814268dfa9a44d4c200ffd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2540 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2544 fn encoding_funding_signed() {
2545 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2546 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2547 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2548 let funding_signed = msgs::FundingSigned {
2549 channel_id: [2; 32],
2552 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2554 let encoded_value = funding_signed.encode();
2555 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2556 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2560 fn encoding_channel_ready() {
2561 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2562 let (_, pubkey_1,) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2563 let channel_ready = msgs::ChannelReady {
2564 channel_id: [2; 32],
2565 next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
2566 short_channel_id_alias: None,
2568 let encoded_value = channel_ready.encode();
2569 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap();
2570 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2573 fn do_encoding_shutdown(script_type: u8) {
2574 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2575 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2576 let script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::OP_TRUE).into_script();
2577 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
2578 channel_id: [2; 32],
2580 if script_type == 1 { Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() }
2581 else if script_type == 2 { Address::p2sh(&script, Network::Testnet).unwrap().script_pubkey() }
2582 else if script_type == 3 { Address::p2wpkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).unwrap().script_pubkey() }
2583 else { Address::p2wsh(&script, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() },
2585 let encoded_value = shutdown.encode();
2586 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap();
2587 if script_type == 1 {
2588 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
2589 } else if script_type == 2 {
2590 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0017a914da1745e9b549bd0bfa1a569971c77eba30cd5a4b87").unwrap());
2591 } else if script_type == 3 {
2592 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0016001479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b235983").unwrap());
2593 } else if script_type == 4 {
2594 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("002200204ae81572f06e1b88fd5ced7a1a000945432e83e1551e6f721ee9c00b8cc33260").unwrap());
2596 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2600 fn encoding_shutdown() {
2601 do_encoding_shutdown(1);
2602 do_encoding_shutdown(2);
2603 do_encoding_shutdown(3);
2604 do_encoding_shutdown(4);
2608 fn encoding_closing_signed() {
2609 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2610 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2611 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2612 let closing_signed = msgs::ClosingSigned {
2613 channel_id: [2; 32],
2614 fee_satoshis: 2316138423780173,
2618 let encoded_value = closing_signed.encode();
2619 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2620 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2621 assert_eq!(msgs::ClosingSigned::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value)).unwrap(), closing_signed);
2623 let closing_signed_with_range = msgs::ClosingSigned {
2624 channel_id: [2; 32],
2625 fee_satoshis: 2316138423780173,
2627 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
2628 min_fee_satoshis: 0xdeadbeef,
2629 max_fee_satoshis: 0x1badcafe01234567,
2632 let encoded_value_with_range = closing_signed_with_range.encode();
2633 let target_value_with_range = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a011000000000deadbeef1badcafe01234567").unwrap();
2634 assert_eq!(encoded_value_with_range, target_value_with_range);
2635 assert_eq!(msgs::ClosingSigned::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value_with_range)).unwrap(),
2636 closing_signed_with_range);
2640 fn encoding_update_add_htlc() {
2641 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2642 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2643 let onion_routing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2645 public_key: Ok(pubkey_1),
2646 hop_data: [1; 20*65],
2649 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2650 channel_id: [2; 32],
2651 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2652 amount_msat: 3608586615801332854,
2653 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
2654 cltv_expiry: 821716,
2655 onion_routing_packet
2657 let encoded_value = update_add_htlc.encode();
2658 let target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
2659 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2663 fn encoding_update_fulfill_htlc() {
2664 let update_fulfill_htlc = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2665 channel_id: [2; 32],
2666 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2667 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([1; 32]),
2669 let encoded_value = update_fulfill_htlc.encode();
2670 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap();
2671 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2675 fn encoding_update_fail_htlc() {
2676 let reason = OnionErrorPacket {
2677 data: [1; 32].to_vec(),
2679 let update_fail_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2680 channel_id: [2; 32],
2681 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2684 let encoded_value = update_fail_htlc.encode();
2685 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d00200101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap();
2686 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2690 fn encoding_update_fail_malformed_htlc() {
2691 let update_fail_malformed_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2692 channel_id: [2; 32],
2693 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2694 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
2697 let encoded_value = update_fail_malformed_htlc.encode();
2698 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010100ff").unwrap();
2699 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2702 fn do_encoding_commitment_signed(htlcs: bool) {
2703 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2704 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2705 let (privkey_2, _) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2706 let (privkey_3, _) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2707 let (privkey_4, _) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2708 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2709 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey_2, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2710 let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2711 let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2712 let commitment_signed = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
2713 channel_id: [2; 32],
2715 htlc_signatures: if htlcs { vec![sig_2, sig_3, sig_4] } else { Vec::new() },
2717 let encoded_value = commitment_signed.encode();
2718 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2720 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00031735b6a427e80d5fe7cd90a2f4ee08dc9c27cda7c35a4172e5d85b12c49d4232537e98f9b1f3c5e6989a8b9644e90e8918127680dbd0d4043510840fc0f1e11a216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f91e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d2692b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
2722 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000").unwrap());
2724 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2728 fn encoding_commitment_signed() {
2729 do_encoding_commitment_signed(true);
2730 do_encoding_commitment_signed(false);
2734 fn encoding_revoke_and_ack() {
2735 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2736 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2737 let raa = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2738 channel_id: [2; 32],
2739 per_commitment_secret: [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1],
2740 next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
2742 let encoded_value = raa.encode();
2743 let target_value = hex::decode("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap();
2744 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2748 fn encoding_update_fee() {
2749 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
2750 channel_id: [2; 32],
2751 feerate_per_kw: 20190119,
2753 let encoded_value = update_fee.encode();
2754 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202013413a7").unwrap();
2755 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2759 fn encoding_init() {
2760 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
2761 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF]),
2762 remote_network_address: None,
2763 }.encode(), hex::decode("00023fff0003ffffff").unwrap());
2764 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
2765 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF]),
2766 remote_network_address: None,
2767 }.encode(), hex::decode("0001ff0001ff").unwrap());
2768 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
2769 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
2770 remote_network_address: None,
2771 }.encode(), hex::decode("00000000").unwrap());
2773 let init_msg = msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
2774 remote_network_address: Some(msgs::NetAddress::IPv4 {
2775 addr: [127, 0, 0, 1],
2779 let encoded_value = init_msg.encode();
2780 let target_value = hex::decode("000000000307017f00000103e8").unwrap();
2781 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2782 assert_eq!(msgs::Init::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value)).unwrap(), init_msg);
2786 fn encoding_error() {
2787 let error = msgs::ErrorMessage {
2788 channel_id: [2; 32],
2789 data: String::from("rust-lightning"),
2791 let encoded_value = error.encode();
2792 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000e727573742d6c696768746e696e67").unwrap();
2793 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2797 fn encoding_warning() {
2798 let error = msgs::WarningMessage {
2799 channel_id: [2; 32],
2800 data: String::from("rust-lightning"),
2802 let encoded_value = error.encode();
2803 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000e727573742d6c696768746e696e67").unwrap();
2804 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2808 fn encoding_ping() {
2809 let ping = msgs::Ping {
2813 let encoded_value = ping.encode();
2814 let target_value = hex::decode("0040004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap();
2815 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2819 fn encoding_pong() {
2820 let pong = msgs::Pong {
2823 let encoded_value = pong.encode();
2824 let target_value = hex::decode("004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap();
2825 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2829 fn encoding_nonfinal_onion_hop_data() {
2830 let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
2831 format: OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
2832 short_channel_id: 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea,
2834 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
2835 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2837 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
2838 let target_value = hex::decode("1a02080badf00d010203040404ffffffff0608deadbeef1bad1dea").unwrap();
2839 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2840 msg = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2841 if let OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } = msg.format {
2842 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea);
2843 } else { panic!(); }
2844 assert_eq!(msg.amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
2845 assert_eq!(msg.outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
2849 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data() {
2850 let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
2851 format: OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
2853 keysend_preimage: None,
2855 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
2856 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2858 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
2859 let target_value = hex::decode("1002080badf00d010203040404ffffffff").unwrap();
2860 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2861 msg = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2862 if let OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data: None, .. } = msg.format { } else { panic!(); }
2863 assert_eq!(msg.amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
2864 assert_eq!(msg.outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
2868 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data_with_secret() {
2869 let expected_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([0x42u8; 32]);
2870 let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
2871 format: OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
2872 payment_data: Some(FinalOnionHopData {
2873 payment_secret: expected_payment_secret,
2874 total_msat: 0x1badca1f
2876 keysend_preimage: None,
2878 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
2879 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2881 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
2882 let target_value = hex::decode("3602080badf00d010203040404ffffffff082442424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242421badca1f").unwrap();
2883 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2884 msg = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2885 if let OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
2886 payment_data: Some(FinalOnionHopData {
2888 total_msat: 0x1badca1f
2890 keysend_preimage: None,
2892 assert_eq!(payment_secret, expected_payment_secret);
2893 } else { panic!(); }
2894 assert_eq!(msg.amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
2895 assert_eq!(msg.outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
2899 fn query_channel_range_end_blocknum() {
2900 let tests: Vec<(u32, u32, u32)> = vec![
2901 (10000, 1500, 11500),
2902 (0, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
2903 (1, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
2906 for (first_blocknum, number_of_blocks, expected) in tests.into_iter() {
2907 let sut = msgs::QueryChannelRange {
2908 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap(),
2912 assert_eq!(sut.end_blocknum(), expected);
2917 fn encoding_query_channel_range() {
2918 let mut query_channel_range = msgs::QueryChannelRange {
2919 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap(),
2920 first_blocknum: 100000,
2921 number_of_blocks: 1500,
2923 let encoded_value = query_channel_range.encode();
2924 let target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206000186a0000005dc").unwrap();
2925 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2927 query_channel_range = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2928 assert_eq!(query_channel_range.first_blocknum, 100000);
2929 assert_eq!(query_channel_range.number_of_blocks, 1500);
2933 fn encoding_reply_channel_range() {
2934 do_encoding_reply_channel_range(0);
2935 do_encoding_reply_channel_range(1);
2938 fn do_encoding_reply_channel_range(encoding_type: u8) {
2939 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206000b8a06000005dc01").unwrap();
2940 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2941 let mut reply_channel_range = msgs::ReplyChannelRange {
2942 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2943 first_blocknum: 756230,
2944 number_of_blocks: 1500,
2945 sync_complete: true,
2946 short_channel_ids: vec![0x000000000000008e, 0x0000000000003c69, 0x000000000045a6c4],
2949 if encoding_type == 0 {
2950 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001900000000000000008e0000000000003c69000000000045a6c4").unwrap());
2951 let encoded_value = reply_channel_range.encode();
2952 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2954 reply_channel_range = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2955 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2956 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.first_blocknum, 756230);
2957 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.number_of_blocks, 1500);
2958 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.sync_complete, true);
2959 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[0], 0x000000000000008e);
2960 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[1], 0x0000000000003c69);
2961 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[2], 0x000000000045a6c4);
2963 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001601789c636000833e08659309a65878be010010a9023a").unwrap());
2964 let result: Result<msgs::ReplyChannelRange, msgs::DecodeError> = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]));
2965 assert!(result.is_err(), "Expected decode failure with unsupported zlib encoding");
2970 fn encoding_query_short_channel_ids() {
2971 do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(0);
2972 do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(1);
2975 fn do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(encoding_type: u8) {
2976 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206").unwrap();
2977 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2978 let mut query_short_channel_ids = msgs::QueryShortChannelIds {
2979 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2980 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0000000000008e, 0x0000000000003c69, 0x000000000045a6c4],
2983 if encoding_type == 0 {
2984 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001900000000000000008e0000000000003c69000000000045a6c4").unwrap());
2985 let encoded_value = query_short_channel_ids.encode();
2986 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2988 query_short_channel_ids = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2989 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2990 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[0], 0x000000000000008e);
2991 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[1], 0x0000000000003c69);
2992 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[2], 0x000000000045a6c4);
2994 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001601789c636000833e08659309a65878be010010a9023a").unwrap());
2995 let result: Result<msgs::QueryShortChannelIds, msgs::DecodeError> = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]));
2996 assert!(result.is_err(), "Expected decode failure with unsupported zlib encoding");
3001 fn encoding_reply_short_channel_ids_end() {
3002 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
3003 let mut reply_short_channel_ids_end = msgs::ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
3004 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
3005 full_information: true,
3007 let encoded_value = reply_short_channel_ids_end.encode();
3008 let target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e220601").unwrap();
3009 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3011 reply_short_channel_ids_end = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
3012 assert_eq!(reply_short_channel_ids_end.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
3013 assert_eq!(reply_short_channel_ids_end.full_information, true);
3017 fn encoding_gossip_timestamp_filter(){
3018 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
3019 let mut gossip_timestamp_filter = msgs::GossipTimestampFilter {
3020 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
3021 first_timestamp: 1590000000,
3022 timestamp_range: 0xffff_ffff,
3024 let encoded_value = gossip_timestamp_filter.encode();
3025 let target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e22065ec57980ffffffff").unwrap();
3026 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3028 gossip_timestamp_filter = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
3029 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
3030 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.first_timestamp, 1590000000);
3031 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.timestamp_range, 0xffff_ffff);
3035 fn decode_onion_hop_data_len_as_bigsize() {
3036 // Tests that we can decode an onion payload that is >253 bytes.
3037 // Previously, receiving a payload of this size could've caused us to fail to decode a valid
3038 // payload, because we were decoding the length (a BigSize, big-endian) as a VarInt
3041 // Encode a test onion payload with a big custom TLV such that it's >253 bytes, forcing the
3042 // payload length to be encoded over multiple bytes rather than a single u8.
3043 let big_payload = encode_big_payload().unwrap();
3044 let mut rd = Cursor::new(&big_payload[..]);
3045 <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut rd).unwrap();
3047 // see above test, needs to be a separate method for use of the serialization macros.
3048 fn encode_big_payload() -> Result<Vec<u8>, io::Error> {
3049 use crate::util::ser::HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize;
3050 let payload = msgs::OnionHopData {
3051 format: OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
3052 short_channel_id: 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea,
3054 amt_to_forward: 1000,
3055 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
3057 let mut encoded_payload = Vec::new();
3058 let test_bytes = vec![42u8; 1000];
3059 if let OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } = payload.format {
3060 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(&mut encoded_payload, {
3061 (1, test_bytes, vec_type),
3062 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(payload.amt_to_forward), required),
3063 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(payload.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
3064 (6, short_channel_id, required)