1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Wire messages, traits representing wire message handlers, and a few error types live here.
12 //! For a normal node you probably don't need to use anything here, however, if you wish to split a
13 //! node into an internet-facing route/message socket handling daemon and a separate daemon (or
14 //! server entirely) which handles only channel-related messages you may wish to implement
15 //! [`ChannelMessageHandler`] yourself and use it to re-serialize messages and pass them across
18 //! Note that if you go with such an architecture (instead of passing raw socket events to a
19 //! non-internet-facing system) you trust the frontend internet-facing system to not lie about the
20 //! source `node_id` of the message, however this does allow you to significantly reduce bandwidth
21 //! between the systems as routing messages can represent a significant chunk of bandwidth usage
22 //! (especially for non-channel-publicly-announcing nodes). As an alternate design which avoids
23 //! this issue, if you have sufficient bidirectional bandwidth between your systems, you may send
24 //! raw socket events into your non-internet-facing system and then send routing events back to
25 //! track the network on the less-secure system.
27 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
28 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature;
30 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Witness};
31 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::ScriptBuf;
32 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
34 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{BlindedPaymentTlvs, ForwardTlvs, ReceiveTlvs};
35 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
36 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
37 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
38 use crate::onion_message;
39 use crate::sign::{NodeSigner, Recipient};
41 use crate::prelude::*;
42 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
43 use core::convert::TryFrom;
47 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
48 use core::str::FromStr;
49 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
50 use std::net::SocketAddr;
51 use core::fmt::Display;
52 use crate::io::{self, Cursor, Read};
53 use crate::io_extras::read_to_end;
55 use crate::events::{EventsProvider, MessageSendEventsProvider};
56 use crate::util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaChaPolyReadAdapter;
57 use crate::util::logger;
58 use crate::util::ser::{LengthReadable, LengthReadableArgs, Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, WithoutLength, FixedLengthReader, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize, Hostname, TransactionU16LenLimited, BigSize};
59 use crate::util::base32;
61 use crate::routing::gossip::{NodeAlias, NodeId};
63 /// 21 million * 10^8 * 1000
64 pub(crate) const MAX_VALUE_MSAT: u64 = 21_000_000_0000_0000_000;
67 /// A partial signature that also contains the Musig2 nonce its signer used
68 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
69 pub struct PartialSignatureWithNonce(pub musig2::types::PartialSignature, pub musig2::types::PublicNonce);
71 /// An error in decoding a message or struct.
72 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
73 pub enum DecodeError {
74 /// A version byte specified something we don't know how to handle.
76 /// Includes unknown realm byte in an onion hop data packet.
78 /// Unknown feature mandating we fail to parse message (e.g., TLV with an even, unknown type)
79 UnknownRequiredFeature,
80 /// Value was invalid.
82 /// For example, a byte which was supposed to be a bool was something other than a 0
83 /// or 1, a public key/private key/signature was invalid, text wasn't UTF-8, TLV was
84 /// syntactically incorrect, etc.
86 /// The buffer to be read was too short.
88 /// A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly.
90 /// Error from [`std::io`].
92 /// The message included zlib-compressed values, which we don't support.
93 UnsupportedCompression,
96 /// An [`init`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
98 /// [`init`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-init-message
99 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
101 /// The relevant features which the sender supports.
102 pub features: InitFeatures,
103 /// Indicates chains the sender is interested in.
105 /// If there are no common chains, the connection will be closed.
106 pub networks: Option<Vec<ChainHash>>,
107 /// The receipient's network address.
109 /// This adds the option to report a remote IP address back to a connecting peer using the init
110 /// message. A node can decide to use that information to discover a potential update to its
111 /// public IPv4 address (NAT) and use that for a [`NodeAnnouncement`] update message containing
113 pub remote_network_address: Option<SocketAddress>,
116 /// An [`error`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
118 /// [`error`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-error-and-warning-messages
119 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
120 pub struct ErrorMessage {
121 /// The channel ID involved in the error.
123 /// All-0s indicates a general error unrelated to a specific channel, after which all channels
124 /// with the sending peer should be closed.
125 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
126 /// A possibly human-readable error description.
128 /// The string should be sanitized before it is used (e.g., emitted to logs or printed to
129 /// `stdout`). Otherwise, a well crafted error message may trigger a security vulnerability in
130 /// the terminal emulator or the logging subsystem.
134 /// A [`warning`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
136 /// [`warning`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-error-and-warning-messages
137 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
138 pub struct WarningMessage {
139 /// The channel ID involved in the warning.
141 /// All-0s indicates a warning unrelated to a specific channel.
142 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
143 /// A possibly human-readable warning description.
145 /// The string should be sanitized before it is used (e.g. emitted to logs or printed to
146 /// stdout). Otherwise, a well crafted error message may trigger a security vulnerability in
147 /// the terminal emulator or the logging subsystem.
151 /// A [`ping`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
153 /// [`ping`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-ping-and-pong-messages
154 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
156 /// The desired response length.
158 /// The ping packet size.
160 /// This field is not sent on the wire. byteslen zeros are sent.
164 /// A [`pong`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
166 /// [`pong`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-ping-and-pong-messages
167 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
169 /// The pong packet size.
171 /// This field is not sent on the wire. byteslen zeros are sent.
175 /// An [`open_channel`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
177 /// Used in V1 channel establishment
179 /// [`open_channel`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-open_channel-message
180 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub struct OpenChannel {
182 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
183 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
184 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
185 pub temporary_channel_id: ChannelId,
186 /// The channel value
187 pub funding_satoshis: u64,
188 /// The amount to push to the counterparty as part of the open, in milli-satoshi
190 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by sender will be omitted
191 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
192 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards sender, in milli-satoshi
193 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
194 /// The minimum value unencumbered by HTLCs for the counterparty to keep in the channel
195 pub channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
196 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
197 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
198 /// The feerate per 1000-weight of sender generated transactions, until updated by
200 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
201 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if
202 /// they broadcast a commitment transaction
203 pub to_self_delay: u16,
204 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards sender
205 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
206 /// The sender's key controlling the funding transaction
207 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
208 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
209 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
210 /// A payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
211 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
212 /// Used to derive a payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by sender
213 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
214 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to sender
215 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
216 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-sender transaction's per commitment point
217 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
218 /// The channel flags to be used
219 pub channel_flags: u8,
220 /// A request to pre-set the to-sender output's `scriptPubkey` for when we collaboratively close
221 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
222 /// The channel type that this channel will represent
224 /// If this is `None`, we derive the channel type from the intersection of our
225 /// feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from the [`Init`] message.
226 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
229 /// An open_channel2 message to be sent by or received from the channel initiator.
231 /// Used in V2 channel establishment
233 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `open_channel2`.
234 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
235 pub struct OpenChannelV2 {
236 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
237 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
238 /// A temporary channel ID derived using a zeroed out value for the channel acceptor's revocation basepoint
239 pub temporary_channel_id: ChannelId,
240 /// The feerate for the funding transaction set by the channel initiator
241 pub funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
242 /// The feerate for the commitment transaction set by the channel initiator
243 pub commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
244 /// Part of the channel value contributed by the channel initiator
245 pub funding_satoshis: u64,
246 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by the channel initiator will be
248 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
249 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards channel initiator, in milli-satoshi
250 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
251 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to channel initiator, in milli-satoshi
252 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
253 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if they
254 /// broadcast a commitment transaction
255 pub to_self_delay: u16,
256 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards channel initiator
257 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
258 /// The locktime for the funding transaction
260 /// The channel initiator's key controlling the funding transaction
261 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
262 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
263 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
264 /// A payment key to channel initiator for transactions broadcast by counterparty
265 pub payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
266 /// Used to derive a payment key to channel initiator for transactions broadcast by channel
268 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
269 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to channel initiator
270 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
271 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-channel-initiator transaction's per commitment point
272 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
273 /// The second to-be-broadcast-by-channel-initiator transaction's per commitment point
274 pub second_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
276 pub channel_flags: u8,
277 /// Optionally, a request to pre-set the to-channel-initiator output's scriptPubkey for when we
278 /// collaboratively close
279 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
280 /// The channel type that this channel will represent. If none is set, we derive the channel
281 /// type from the intersection of our feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from
282 /// the Init message.
283 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
284 /// Optionally, a requirement that only confirmed inputs can be added
285 pub require_confirmed_inputs: Option<()>,
288 /// An [`accept_channel`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
290 /// Used in V1 channel establishment
292 /// [`accept_channel`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-accept_channel-message
293 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
294 pub struct AcceptChannel {
295 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
296 pub temporary_channel_id: ChannelId,
297 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by sender will be omitted
298 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
299 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards sender, in milli-satoshi
300 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
301 /// The minimum value unencumbered by HTLCs for the counterparty to keep in the channel
302 pub channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
303 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
304 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
305 /// Minimum depth of the funding transaction before the channel is considered open
306 pub minimum_depth: u32,
307 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if they broadcast a commitment transaction
308 pub to_self_delay: u16,
309 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards sender
310 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
311 /// The sender's key controlling the funding transaction
312 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
313 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
314 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
315 /// A payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
316 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
317 /// Used to derive a payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by sender
318 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
319 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
320 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
321 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-sender transaction's per commitment point
322 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
323 /// A request to pre-set the to-sender output's scriptPubkey for when we collaboratively close
324 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
325 /// The channel type that this channel will represent.
327 /// If this is `None`, we derive the channel type from the intersection of
328 /// our feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from the [`Init`] message.
329 /// This is required to match the equivalent field in [`OpenChannel::channel_type`].
330 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
332 /// Next nonce the channel initiator should use to create a funding output signature against
333 pub next_local_nonce: Option<musig2::types::PublicNonce>,
336 /// An accept_channel2 message to be sent by or received from the channel accepter.
338 /// Used in V2 channel establishment
340 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `accept_channel2`.
341 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
342 pub struct AcceptChannelV2 {
343 /// The same `temporary_channel_id` received from the initiator's `open_channel2` message.
344 pub temporary_channel_id: ChannelId,
345 /// Part of the channel value contributed by the channel acceptor
346 pub funding_satoshis: u64,
347 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by the channel acceptor will be
349 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
350 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards channel acceptor, in milli-satoshi
351 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
352 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to channel acceptor, in milli-satoshi
353 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
354 /// Minimum depth of the funding transaction before the channel is considered open
355 pub minimum_depth: u32,
356 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if they
357 /// broadcast a commitment transaction
358 pub to_self_delay: u16,
359 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards channel acceptor
360 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
361 /// The channel acceptor's key controlling the funding transaction
362 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
363 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
364 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
365 /// A payment key to channel acceptor for transactions broadcast by counterparty
366 pub payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
367 /// Used to derive a payment key to channel acceptor for transactions broadcast by channel
369 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
370 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to channel acceptor for transactions broadcast by counterparty
371 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
372 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-channel-acceptor transaction's per commitment point
373 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
374 /// The second to-be-broadcast-by-channel-acceptor transaction's per commitment point
375 pub second_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
376 /// Optionally, a request to pre-set the to-channel-acceptor output's scriptPubkey for when we
377 /// collaboratively close
378 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
379 /// The channel type that this channel will represent. If none is set, we derive the channel
380 /// type from the intersection of our feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from
381 /// the Init message.
383 /// This is required to match the equivalent field in [`OpenChannelV2::channel_type`].
384 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
385 /// Optionally, a requirement that only confirmed inputs can be added
386 pub require_confirmed_inputs: Option<()>,
389 /// A [`funding_created`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
391 /// Used in V1 channel establishment
393 /// [`funding_created`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-funding_created-message
394 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
395 pub struct FundingCreated {
396 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding is established
397 pub temporary_channel_id: ChannelId,
398 /// The funding transaction ID
399 pub funding_txid: Txid,
400 /// The specific output index funding this channel
401 pub funding_output_index: u16,
402 /// The signature of the channel initiator (funder) on the initial commitment transaction
403 pub signature: Signature,
405 /// The partial signature of the channel initiator (funder)
406 pub partial_signature_with_nonce: Option<PartialSignatureWithNonce>,
408 /// Next nonce the channel acceptor should use to finalize the funding output signature
409 pub next_local_nonce: Option<musig2::types::PublicNonce>
412 /// A [`funding_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
414 /// Used in V1 channel establishment
416 /// [`funding_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-funding_signed-message
417 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
418 pub struct FundingSigned {
420 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
421 /// The signature of the channel acceptor (fundee) on the initial commitment transaction
422 pub signature: Signature,
424 /// The partial signature of the channel acceptor (fundee)
425 pub partial_signature_with_nonce: Option<PartialSignatureWithNonce>,
428 /// A [`channel_ready`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
430 /// [`channel_ready`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-channel_ready-message
431 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
432 pub struct ChannelReady {
434 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
435 /// The per-commitment point of the second commitment transaction
436 pub next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
437 /// If set, provides a `short_channel_id` alias for this channel.
439 /// The sender will accept payments to be forwarded over this SCID and forward them to this
440 /// messages' recipient.
441 pub short_channel_id_alias: Option<u64>,
444 /// An stfu (quiescence) message to be sent by or received from the stfu initiator.
445 // TODO(splicing): Add spec link for `stfu`; still in draft, using from https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/863
446 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
448 /// The channel ID where quiescence is intended
449 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
450 /// Initiator flag, 1 if initiating, 0 if replying to an stfu.
454 /// A splice message to be sent by or received from the stfu initiator (splice initiator).
455 // TODO(splicing): Add spec link for `splice`; still in draft, using from https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/863
456 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
458 /// The channel ID where splicing is intended
459 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
460 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is intended to be spliced
461 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
462 /// The intended change in channel capacity: the amount to be added (positive value)
463 /// or removed (negative value) by the sender (splice initiator) by splicing into/from the channel.
464 pub relative_satoshis: i64,
465 /// The feerate for the new funding transaction, set by the splice initiator
466 pub funding_feerate_perkw: u32,
467 /// The locktime for the new funding transaction
469 /// The key of the sender (splice initiator) controlling the new funding transaction
470 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
473 /// A splice_ack message to be received by or sent to the splice initiator.
475 // TODO(splicing): Add spec link for `splice_ack`; still in draft, using from https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/863
476 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
477 pub struct SpliceAck {
478 /// The channel ID where splicing is intended
479 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
480 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is intended to be spliced
481 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
482 /// The intended change in channel capacity: the amount to be added (positive value)
483 /// or removed (negative value) by the sender (splice acceptor) by splicing into/from the channel.
484 pub relative_satoshis: i64,
485 /// The key of the sender (splice acceptor) controlling the new funding transaction
486 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
489 /// A splice_locked message to be sent to or received from a peer.
491 // TODO(splicing): Add spec link for `splice_locked`; still in draft, using from https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/863
492 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
493 pub struct SpliceLocked {
495 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
498 /// A tx_add_input message for adding an input during interactive transaction construction
500 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `tx_add_input`.
501 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
502 pub struct TxAddInput {
504 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
505 /// A randomly chosen unique identifier for this input, which is even for initiators and odd for
508 /// Serialized transaction that contains the output this input spends to verify that it is non
510 pub prevtx: TransactionU16LenLimited,
511 /// The index of the output being spent
513 /// The sequence number of this input
517 /// A tx_add_output message for adding an output during interactive transaction construction.
519 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `tx_add_output`.
520 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
521 pub struct TxAddOutput {
523 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
524 /// A randomly chosen unique identifier for this output, which is even for initiators and odd for
527 /// The satoshi value of the output
529 /// The scriptPubKey for the output
530 pub script: ScriptBuf,
533 /// A tx_remove_input message for removing an input during interactive transaction construction.
535 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `tx_remove_input`.
536 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
537 pub struct TxRemoveInput {
539 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
540 /// The serial ID of the input to be removed
544 /// A tx_remove_output message for removing an output during interactive transaction construction.
546 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `tx_remove_output`.
547 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
548 pub struct TxRemoveOutput {
550 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
551 /// The serial ID of the output to be removed
555 /// A tx_complete message signalling the conclusion of a peer's transaction contributions during
556 /// interactive transaction construction.
558 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `tx_complete`.
559 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
560 pub struct TxComplete {
562 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
565 /// A tx_signatures message containing the sender's signatures for a transaction constructed with
566 /// interactive transaction construction.
568 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `tx_signatures`.
569 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
570 pub struct TxSignatures {
572 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
575 /// The list of witnesses
576 pub witnesses: Vec<Witness>,
579 /// A tx_init_rbf message which initiates a replacement of the transaction after it's been
582 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `tx_init_rbf`.
583 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
584 pub struct TxInitRbf {
586 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
587 /// The locktime of the transaction
589 /// The feerate of the transaction
590 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
591 /// The number of satoshis the sender will contribute to or, if negative, remove from
592 /// (e.g. splice-out) the funding output of the transaction
593 pub funding_output_contribution: Option<i64>,
596 /// A tx_ack_rbf message which acknowledges replacement of the transaction after it's been
599 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `tx_ack_rbf`.
600 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
601 pub struct TxAckRbf {
603 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
604 /// The number of satoshis the sender will contribute to or, if negative, remove from
605 /// (e.g. splice-out) the funding output of the transaction
606 pub funding_output_contribution: Option<i64>,
609 /// A tx_abort message which signals the cancellation of an in-progress transaction negotiation.
611 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `tx_abort`.
612 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
615 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
620 /// A [`shutdown`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
622 /// [`shutdown`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#closing-initiation-shutdown
623 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
624 pub struct Shutdown {
626 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
627 /// The destination of this peer's funds on closing.
629 /// Must be in one of these forms: P2PKH, P2SH, P2WPKH, P2WSH, P2TR.
630 pub scriptpubkey: ScriptBuf,
633 /// The minimum and maximum fees which the sender is willing to place on the closing transaction.
635 /// This is provided in [`ClosingSigned`] by both sides to indicate the fee range they are willing
637 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
638 pub struct ClosingSignedFeeRange {
639 /// The minimum absolute fee, in satoshis, which the sender is willing to place on the closing
641 pub min_fee_satoshis: u64,
642 /// The maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, which the sender is willing to place on the closing
644 pub max_fee_satoshis: u64,
647 /// A [`closing_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
649 /// [`closing_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#closing-negotiation-closing_signed
650 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
651 pub struct ClosingSigned {
653 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
654 /// The proposed total fee for the closing transaction
655 pub fee_satoshis: u64,
656 /// A signature on the closing transaction
657 pub signature: Signature,
658 /// The minimum and maximum fees which the sender is willing to accept, provided only by new
660 pub fee_range: Option<ClosingSignedFeeRange>,
663 /// An [`update_add_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
665 /// [`update_add_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#adding-an-htlc-update_add_htlc
666 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
667 pub struct UpdateAddHTLC {
669 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
672 /// The HTLC value in milli-satoshi
673 pub amount_msat: u64,
674 /// The payment hash, the pre-image of which controls HTLC redemption
675 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
676 /// The expiry height of the HTLC
677 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
678 /// The extra fee skimmed by the sender of this message. See
679 /// [`ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs`].
681 /// [`ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs
682 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
683 /// The onion routing packet with encrypted data for the next hop.
684 pub onion_routing_packet: OnionPacket,
685 /// Provided if we are relaying or receiving a payment within a blinded path, to decrypt the onion
686 /// routing packet and the recipient-provided encrypted payload within.
687 pub blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
690 /// An onion message to be sent to or received from a peer.
692 // TODO: update with link to OM when they are merged into the BOLTs
693 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
694 pub struct OnionMessage {
695 /// Used in decrypting the onion packet's payload.
696 pub blinding_point: PublicKey,
697 /// The full onion packet including hop data, pubkey, and hmac
698 pub onion_routing_packet: onion_message::Packet,
701 /// An [`update_fulfill_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
703 /// [`update_fulfill_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
704 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
705 pub struct UpdateFulfillHTLC {
707 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
710 /// The pre-image of the payment hash, allowing HTLC redemption
711 pub payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
714 /// An [`update_fail_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
716 /// [`update_fail_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
717 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
718 pub struct UpdateFailHTLC {
720 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
723 pub(crate) reason: OnionErrorPacket,
726 /// An [`update_fail_malformed_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
728 /// [`update_fail_malformed_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
729 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
730 pub struct UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
732 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
735 pub(crate) sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
737 pub failure_code: u16,
740 /// A [`commitment_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
742 /// [`commitment_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#committing-updates-so-far-commitment_signed
743 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
744 pub struct CommitmentSigned {
746 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
747 /// A signature on the commitment transaction
748 pub signature: Signature,
749 /// Signatures on the HTLC transactions
750 pub htlc_signatures: Vec<Signature>,
752 /// The partial Taproot signature on the commitment transaction
753 pub partial_signature_with_nonce: Option<PartialSignatureWithNonce>,
756 /// A [`revoke_and_ack`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
758 /// [`revoke_and_ack`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#completing-the-transition-to-the-updated-state-revoke_and_ack
759 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
760 pub struct RevokeAndACK {
762 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
763 /// The secret corresponding to the per-commitment point
764 pub per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
765 /// The next sender-broadcast commitment transaction's per-commitment point
766 pub next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
768 /// Musig nonce the recipient should use in their next commitment signature message
769 pub next_local_nonce: Option<musig2::types::PublicNonce>
772 /// An [`update_fee`] message to be sent to or received from a peer
774 /// [`update_fee`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#updating-fees-update_fee
775 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
776 pub struct UpdateFee {
778 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
779 /// Fee rate per 1000-weight of the transaction
780 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
783 /// A [`channel_reestablish`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
785 /// [`channel_reestablish`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#message-retransmission
786 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
787 pub struct ChannelReestablish {
789 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
790 /// The next commitment number for the sender
791 pub next_local_commitment_number: u64,
792 /// The next commitment number for the recipient
793 pub next_remote_commitment_number: u64,
794 /// Proof that the sender knows the per-commitment secret of a specific commitment transaction
795 /// belonging to the recipient
796 pub your_last_per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
797 /// The sender's per-commitment point for their current commitment transaction
798 pub my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
799 /// The next funding transaction ID
800 pub next_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
803 /// An [`announcement_signatures`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
805 /// [`announcement_signatures`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-announcement_signatures-message
806 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
807 pub struct AnnouncementSignatures {
809 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
810 /// The short channel ID
811 pub short_channel_id: u64,
812 /// A signature by the node key
813 pub node_signature: Signature,
814 /// A signature by the funding key
815 pub bitcoin_signature: Signature,
818 /// An address which can be used to connect to a remote peer.
819 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
820 pub enum SocketAddress {
821 /// An IPv4 address and port on which the peer is listening.
823 /// The 4-byte IPv4 address
825 /// The port on which the node is listening
828 /// An IPv6 address and port on which the peer is listening.
830 /// The 16-byte IPv6 address
832 /// The port on which the node is listening
835 /// An old-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening.
837 /// This field is deprecated and the Tor network generally no longer supports V2 Onion
838 /// addresses. Thus, the details are not parsed here.
840 /// A new-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening.
842 /// To create the human-readable "hostname", concatenate the ED25519 pubkey, checksum, and version,
843 /// wrap as base32 and append ".onion".
845 /// The ed25519 long-term public key of the peer
846 ed25519_pubkey: [u8; 32],
847 /// The checksum of the pubkey and version, as included in the onion address
849 /// The version byte, as defined by the Tor Onion v3 spec.
851 /// The port on which the node is listening
854 /// A hostname/port on which the peer is listening.
856 /// The hostname on which the node is listening.
858 /// The port on which the node is listening.
863 /// Gets the ID of this address type. Addresses in [`NodeAnnouncement`] messages should be sorted
865 pub(crate) fn get_id(&self) -> u8 {
867 &SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 {..} => { 1 },
868 &SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 {..} => { 2 },
869 &SocketAddress::OnionV2(_) => { 3 },
870 &SocketAddress::OnionV3 {..} => { 4 },
871 &SocketAddress::Hostname {..} => { 5 },
875 /// Strict byte-length of address descriptor, 1-byte type not recorded
876 fn len(&self) -> u16 {
878 &SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 { .. } => { 6 },
879 &SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 { .. } => { 18 },
880 &SocketAddress::OnionV2(_) => { 12 },
881 &SocketAddress::OnionV3 { .. } => { 37 },
882 // Consists of 1-byte hostname length, hostname bytes, and 2-byte port.
883 &SocketAddress::Hostname { ref hostname, .. } => { u16::from(hostname.len()) + 3 },
887 /// The maximum length of any address descriptor, not including the 1-byte type.
888 /// This maximum length is reached by a hostname address descriptor:
889 /// a hostname with a maximum length of 255, its 1-byte length and a 2-byte port.
890 pub(crate) const MAX_LEN: u16 = 258;
893 impl Writeable for SocketAddress {
894 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
896 &SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 { ref addr, ref port } => {
901 &SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 { ref addr, ref port } => {
906 &SocketAddress::OnionV2(bytes) => {
908 bytes.write(writer)?;
910 &SocketAddress::OnionV3 { ref ed25519_pubkey, ref checksum, ref version, ref port } => {
912 ed25519_pubkey.write(writer)?;
913 checksum.write(writer)?;
914 version.write(writer)?;
917 &SocketAddress::Hostname { ref hostname, ref port } => {
919 hostname.write(writer)?;
927 impl Readable for Result<SocketAddress, u8> {
928 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Result<SocketAddress, u8>, DecodeError> {
929 let byte = <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
932 Ok(Ok(SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 {
933 addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
934 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
938 Ok(Ok(SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 {
939 addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
940 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
943 3 => Ok(Ok(SocketAddress::OnionV2(Readable::read(reader)?))),
945 Ok(Ok(SocketAddress::OnionV3 {
946 ed25519_pubkey: Readable::read(reader)?,
947 checksum: Readable::read(reader)?,
948 version: Readable::read(reader)?,
949 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
953 Ok(Ok(SocketAddress::Hostname {
954 hostname: Readable::read(reader)?,
955 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
958 _ => return Ok(Err(byte)),
963 impl Readable for SocketAddress {
964 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<SocketAddress, DecodeError> {
965 match Readable::read(reader) {
966 Ok(Ok(res)) => Ok(res),
967 Ok(Err(_)) => Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion),
973 /// [`SocketAddress`] error variants
974 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
975 pub enum SocketAddressParseError {
976 /// Socket address (IPv4/IPv6) parsing error
978 /// Invalid input format
982 /// Invalid onion v3 address
986 impl fmt::Display for SocketAddressParseError {
987 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
989 SocketAddressParseError::SocketAddrParse => write!(f, "Socket address (IPv4/IPv6) parsing error"),
990 SocketAddressParseError::InvalidInput => write!(f, "Invalid input format. \
991 Expected: \"<ipv4>:<port>\", \"[<ipv6>]:<port>\", \"<onion address>.onion:<port>\" or \"<hostname>:<port>\""),
992 SocketAddressParseError::InvalidPort => write!(f, "Invalid port"),
993 SocketAddressParseError::InvalidOnionV3 => write!(f, "Invalid onion v3 address"),
998 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
999 impl From<std::net::SocketAddrV4> for SocketAddress {
1000 fn from(addr: std::net::SocketAddrV4) -> Self {
1001 SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 { addr: addr.ip().octets(), port: addr.port() }
1005 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1006 impl From<std::net::SocketAddrV6> for SocketAddress {
1007 fn from(addr: std::net::SocketAddrV6) -> Self {
1008 SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 { addr: addr.ip().octets(), port: addr.port() }
1012 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1013 impl From<std::net::SocketAddr> for SocketAddress {
1014 fn from(addr: std::net::SocketAddr) -> Self {
1016 std::net::SocketAddr::V4(addr) => addr.into(),
1017 std::net::SocketAddr::V6(addr) => addr.into(),
1022 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1023 impl std::net::ToSocketAddrs for SocketAddress {
1024 type Iter = std::vec::IntoIter<std::net::SocketAddr>;
1026 fn to_socket_addrs(&self) -> std::io::Result<Self::Iter> {
1028 SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 { addr, port } => {
1029 let ip_addr = std::net::Ipv4Addr::from(*addr);
1030 let socket_addr = SocketAddr::new(ip_addr.into(), *port);
1031 Ok(vec![socket_addr].into_iter())
1033 SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 { addr, port } => {
1034 let ip_addr = std::net::Ipv6Addr::from(*addr);
1035 let socket_addr = SocketAddr::new(ip_addr.into(), *port);
1036 Ok(vec![socket_addr].into_iter())
1038 SocketAddress::Hostname { ref hostname, port } => {
1039 (hostname.as_str(), *port).to_socket_addrs()
1041 SocketAddress::OnionV2(..) => {
1042 Err(std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::Other, "Resolution of OnionV2 \
1043 addresses is currently unsupported."))
1045 SocketAddress::OnionV3 { .. } => {
1046 Err(std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::Other, "Resolution of OnionV3 \
1047 addresses is currently unsupported."))
1053 /// Parses an OnionV3 host and port into a [`SocketAddress::OnionV3`].
1055 /// The host part must end with ".onion".
1056 pub fn parse_onion_address(host: &str, port: u16) -> Result<SocketAddress, SocketAddressParseError> {
1057 if host.ends_with(".onion") {
1058 let domain = &host[..host.len() - ".onion".len()];
1059 if domain.len() != 56 {
1060 return Err(SocketAddressParseError::InvalidOnionV3);
1062 let onion = base32::Alphabet::RFC4648 { padding: false }.decode(&domain).map_err(|_| SocketAddressParseError::InvalidOnionV3)?;
1063 if onion.len() != 35 {
1064 return Err(SocketAddressParseError::InvalidOnionV3);
1066 let version = onion[0];
1067 let first_checksum_flag = onion[1];
1068 let second_checksum_flag = onion[2];
1069 let mut ed25519_pubkey = [0; 32];
1070 ed25519_pubkey.copy_from_slice(&onion[3..35]);
1071 let checksum = u16::from_be_bytes([first_checksum_flag, second_checksum_flag]);
1072 return Ok(SocketAddress::OnionV3 { ed25519_pubkey, checksum, version, port });
1075 return Err(SocketAddressParseError::InvalidInput);
1079 impl Display for SocketAddress {
1080 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> core::fmt::Result {
1082 SocketAddress::TcpIpV4{addr, port} => write!(
1083 f, "{}.{}.{}.{}:{}", addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3], port)?,
1084 SocketAddress::TcpIpV6{addr, port} => write!(
1086 "[{:02x}{:02x}:{:02x}{:02x}:{:02x}{:02x}:{:02x}{:02x}:{:02x}{:02x}:{:02x}{:02x}:{:02x}{:02x}:{:02x}{:02x}]:{}",
1087 addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3], addr[4], addr[5], addr[6], addr[7], addr[8], addr[9], addr[10], addr[11], addr[12], addr[13], addr[14], addr[15], port
1089 SocketAddress::OnionV2(bytes) => write!(f, "OnionV2({:?})", bytes)?,
1090 SocketAddress::OnionV3 {
1096 let [first_checksum_flag, second_checksum_flag] = checksum.to_be_bytes();
1097 let mut addr = vec![*version, first_checksum_flag, second_checksum_flag];
1098 addr.extend_from_slice(ed25519_pubkey);
1099 let onion = base32::Alphabet::RFC4648 { padding: false }.encode(&addr);
1100 write!(f, "{}.onion:{}", onion, port)?
1102 SocketAddress::Hostname { hostname, port } => write!(f, "{}:{}", hostname, port)?,
1108 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1109 impl FromStr for SocketAddress {
1110 type Err = SocketAddressParseError;
1112 fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
1113 match std::net::SocketAddr::from_str(s) {
1114 Ok(addr) => Ok(addr.into()),
1116 let trimmed_input = match s.rfind(":") {
1118 None => return Err(SocketAddressParseError::InvalidInput),
1120 let host = &s[..trimmed_input];
1121 let port: u16 = s[trimmed_input + 1..].parse().map_err(|_| SocketAddressParseError::InvalidPort)?;
1122 if host.ends_with(".onion") {
1123 return parse_onion_address(host, port);
1125 if let Ok(hostname) = Hostname::try_from(s[..trimmed_input].to_string()) {
1126 return Ok(SocketAddress::Hostname { hostname, port });
1128 return Err(SocketAddressParseError::SocketAddrParse)
1134 /// Represents the set of gossip messages that require a signature from a node's identity key.
1135 pub enum UnsignedGossipMessage<'a> {
1136 /// An unsigned channel announcement.
1137 ChannelAnnouncement(&'a UnsignedChannelAnnouncement),
1138 /// An unsigned channel update.
1139 ChannelUpdate(&'a UnsignedChannelUpdate),
1140 /// An unsigned node announcement.
1141 NodeAnnouncement(&'a UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)
1144 impl<'a> Writeable for UnsignedGossipMessage<'a> {
1145 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1147 UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
1148 UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
1149 UnsignedGossipMessage::NodeAnnouncement(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
1154 /// The unsigned part of a [`node_announcement`] message.
1156 /// [`node_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-node_announcement-message
1157 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1158 pub struct UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1159 /// The advertised features
1160 pub features: NodeFeatures,
1161 /// A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed
1163 /// The `node_id` this announcement originated from (don't rebroadcast the `node_announcement` back
1165 pub node_id: NodeId,
1166 /// An RGB color for UI purposes
1168 /// An alias, for UI purposes.
1170 /// This should be sanitized before use. There is no guarantee of uniqueness.
1171 pub alias: NodeAlias,
1172 /// List of addresses on which this node is reachable
1173 pub addresses: Vec<SocketAddress>,
1174 pub(crate) excess_address_data: Vec<u8>,
1175 pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
1177 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1178 /// A [`node_announcement`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
1180 /// [`node_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-node_announcement-message
1181 pub struct NodeAnnouncement {
1182 /// The signature by the node key
1183 pub signature: Signature,
1184 /// The actual content of the announcement
1185 pub contents: UnsignedNodeAnnouncement,
1188 /// The unsigned part of a [`channel_announcement`] message.
1190 /// [`channel_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_announcement-message
1191 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1192 pub struct UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1193 /// The advertised channel features
1194 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
1195 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
1196 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
1197 /// The short channel ID
1198 pub short_channel_id: u64,
1199 /// One of the two `node_id`s which are endpoints of this channel
1200 pub node_id_1: NodeId,
1201 /// The other of the two `node_id`s which are endpoints of this channel
1202 pub node_id_2: NodeId,
1203 /// The funding key for the first node
1204 pub bitcoin_key_1: NodeId,
1205 /// The funding key for the second node
1206 pub bitcoin_key_2: NodeId,
1207 /// Excess data which was signed as a part of the message which we do not (yet) understand how
1210 /// This is stored to ensure forward-compatibility as new fields are added to the lightning gossip protocol.
1211 pub excess_data: Vec<u8>,
1213 /// A [`channel_announcement`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
1215 /// [`channel_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_announcement-message
1216 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1217 pub struct ChannelAnnouncement {
1218 /// Authentication of the announcement by the first public node
1219 pub node_signature_1: Signature,
1220 /// Authentication of the announcement by the second public node
1221 pub node_signature_2: Signature,
1222 /// Proof of funding UTXO ownership by the first public node
1223 pub bitcoin_signature_1: Signature,
1224 /// Proof of funding UTXO ownership by the second public node
1225 pub bitcoin_signature_2: Signature,
1226 /// The actual announcement
1227 pub contents: UnsignedChannelAnnouncement,
1230 /// The unsigned part of a [`channel_update`] message.
1232 /// [`channel_update`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_update-message
1233 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1234 pub struct UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1235 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
1236 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
1237 /// The short channel ID
1238 pub short_channel_id: u64,
1239 /// A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed, specific to this channel
1243 /// The number of blocks such that if:
1244 /// `incoming_htlc.cltv_expiry < outgoing_htlc.cltv_expiry + cltv_expiry_delta`
1245 /// then we need to fail the HTLC backwards. When forwarding an HTLC, `cltv_expiry_delta` determines
1246 /// the outgoing HTLC's minimum `cltv_expiry` value -- so, if an incoming HTLC comes in with a
1247 /// `cltv_expiry` of 100000, and the node we're forwarding to has a `cltv_expiry_delta` value of 10,
1248 /// then we'll check that the outgoing HTLC's `cltv_expiry` value is at least 100010 before
1249 /// forwarding. Note that the HTLC sender is the one who originally sets this value when
1250 /// constructing the route.
1251 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1252 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
1253 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1254 /// The maximum HTLC value incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi.
1256 /// This used to be optional.
1257 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
1258 /// The base HTLC fee charged by sender, in milli-satoshi
1259 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1260 /// The amount to fee multiplier, in micro-satoshi
1261 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1262 /// Excess data which was signed as a part of the message which we do not (yet) understand how
1265 /// This is stored to ensure forward-compatibility as new fields are added to the lightning gossip protocol.
1266 pub excess_data: Vec<u8>,
1268 /// A [`channel_update`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
1270 /// [`channel_update`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_update-message
1271 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1272 pub struct ChannelUpdate {
1273 /// A signature of the channel update
1274 pub signature: Signature,
1275 /// The actual channel update
1276 pub contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate,
1279 /// A [`query_channel_range`] message is used to query a peer for channel
1280 /// UTXOs in a range of blocks. The recipient of a query makes a best
1281 /// effort to reply to the query using one or more [`ReplyChannelRange`]
1284 /// [`query_channel_range`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_channel_range-and-reply_channel_range-messages
1285 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1286 pub struct QueryChannelRange {
1287 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
1288 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
1289 /// The height of the first block for the channel UTXOs being queried
1290 pub first_blocknum: u32,
1291 /// The number of blocks to include in the query results
1292 pub number_of_blocks: u32,
1295 /// A [`reply_channel_range`] message is a reply to a [`QueryChannelRange`]
1298 /// Multiple `reply_channel_range` messages can be sent in reply
1299 /// to a single [`QueryChannelRange`] message. The query recipient makes a
1300 /// best effort to respond based on their local network view which may
1301 /// not be a perfect view of the network. The `short_channel_id`s in the
1302 /// reply are encoded. We only support `encoding_type=0` uncompressed
1303 /// serialization and do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization.
1305 /// [`reply_channel_range`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_channel_range-and-reply_channel_range-messages
1306 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1307 pub struct ReplyChannelRange {
1308 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
1309 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
1310 /// The height of the first block in the range of the reply
1311 pub first_blocknum: u32,
1312 /// The number of blocks included in the range of the reply
1313 pub number_of_blocks: u32,
1314 /// True when this is the final reply for a query
1315 pub sync_complete: bool,
1316 /// The `short_channel_id`s in the channel range
1317 pub short_channel_ids: Vec<u64>,
1320 /// A [`query_short_channel_ids`] message is used to query a peer for
1321 /// routing gossip messages related to one or more `short_channel_id`s.
1323 /// The query recipient will reply with the latest, if available,
1324 /// [`ChannelAnnouncement`], [`ChannelUpdate`] and [`NodeAnnouncement`] messages
1325 /// it maintains for the requested `short_channel_id`s followed by a
1326 /// [`ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd`] message. The `short_channel_id`s sent in
1327 /// this query are encoded. We only support `encoding_type=0` uncompressed
1328 /// serialization and do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization.
1330 /// [`query_short_channel_ids`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_short_channel_idsreply_short_channel_ids_end-messages
1331 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1332 pub struct QueryShortChannelIds {
1333 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
1334 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
1335 /// The short_channel_ids that are being queried
1336 pub short_channel_ids: Vec<u64>,
1339 /// A [`reply_short_channel_ids_end`] message is sent as a reply to a
1340 /// message. The query recipient makes a best
1341 /// effort to respond based on their local network view which may not be
1342 /// a perfect view of the network.
1344 /// [`reply_short_channel_ids_end`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_short_channel_idsreply_short_channel_ids_end-messages
1345 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1346 pub struct ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
1347 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain that was queried
1348 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
1349 /// Indicates if the query recipient maintains up-to-date channel
1350 /// information for the `chain_hash`
1351 pub full_information: bool,
1354 /// A [`gossip_timestamp_filter`] message is used by a node to request
1355 /// gossip relay for messages in the requested time range when the
1356 /// `gossip_queries` feature has been negotiated.
1358 /// [`gossip_timestamp_filter`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-gossip_timestamp_filter-message
1359 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1360 pub struct GossipTimestampFilter {
1361 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain for channel and node information
1362 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
1363 /// The starting unix timestamp
1364 pub first_timestamp: u32,
1365 /// The range of information in seconds
1366 pub timestamp_range: u32,
1369 /// Encoding type for data compression of collections in gossip queries.
1371 /// We do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization [defined in BOLT
1372 /// #7](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#query-messages).
1374 Uncompressed = 0x00,
1377 /// Used to put an error message in a [`LightningError`].
1378 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq)]
1379 pub enum ErrorAction {
1380 /// The peer took some action which made us think they were useless. Disconnect them.
1382 /// An error message which we should make an effort to send before we disconnect.
1383 msg: Option<ErrorMessage>
1385 /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them without closing any channels and disconnect them.
1386 DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
1387 /// A warning message which we should make an effort to send before we disconnect.
1388 msg: WarningMessage,
1390 /// The peer did something harmless that we weren't able to process, just log and ignore
1391 // New code should *not* use this. New code must use IgnoreAndLog, below!
1393 /// The peer did something harmless that we weren't able to meaningfully process.
1394 /// If the error is logged, log it at the given level.
1395 IgnoreAndLog(logger::Level),
1396 /// The peer provided us with a gossip message which we'd already seen. In most cases this
1397 /// should be ignored, but it may result in the message being forwarded if it is a duplicate of
1398 /// our own channel announcements.
1399 IgnoreDuplicateGossip,
1400 /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them.
1402 /// The message to send.
1405 /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them without closing any channels.
1406 SendWarningMessage {
1407 /// The message to send.
1408 msg: WarningMessage,
1409 /// The peer may have done something harmless that we weren't able to meaningfully process,
1410 /// though we should still tell them about it.
1411 /// If this event is logged, log it at the given level.
1412 log_level: logger::Level,
1416 /// An Err type for failure to process messages.
1417 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1418 pub struct LightningError {
1419 /// A human-readable message describing the error
1421 /// The action which should be taken against the offending peer.
1422 pub action: ErrorAction,
1425 /// Struct used to return values from [`RevokeAndACK`] messages, containing a bunch of commitment
1426 /// transaction updates if they were pending.
1427 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1428 pub struct CommitmentUpdate {
1429 /// `update_add_htlc` messages which should be sent
1430 pub update_add_htlcs: Vec<UpdateAddHTLC>,
1431 /// `update_fulfill_htlc` messages which should be sent
1432 pub update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
1433 /// `update_fail_htlc` messages which should be sent
1434 pub update_fail_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFailHTLC>,
1435 /// `update_fail_malformed_htlc` messages which should be sent
1436 pub update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFailMalformedHTLC>,
1437 /// An `update_fee` message which should be sent
1438 pub update_fee: Option<UpdateFee>,
1439 /// A `commitment_signed` message which should be sent
1440 pub commitment_signed: CommitmentSigned,
1443 /// A trait to describe an object which can receive channel messages.
1445 /// Messages MAY be called in parallel when they originate from different `their_node_ids`, however
1446 /// they MUST NOT be called in parallel when the two calls have the same `their_node_id`.
1447 pub trait ChannelMessageHandler : MessageSendEventsProvider {
1449 /// Handle an incoming `open_channel` message from the given peer.
1450 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OpenChannel);
1451 /// Handle an incoming `open_channel2` message from the given peer.
1452 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OpenChannelV2);
1453 /// Handle an incoming `accept_channel` message from the given peer.
1454 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AcceptChannel);
1455 /// Handle an incoming `accept_channel2` message from the given peer.
1456 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AcceptChannelV2);
1457 /// Handle an incoming `funding_created` message from the given peer.
1458 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingCreated);
1459 /// Handle an incoming `funding_signed` message from the given peer.
1460 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingSigned);
1461 /// Handle an incoming `channel_ready` message from the given peer.
1462 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelReady);
1465 /// Handle an incoming `shutdown` message from the given peer.
1466 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Shutdown);
1467 /// Handle an incoming `closing_signed` message from the given peer.
1468 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ClosingSigned);
1471 /// Handle an incoming `stfu` message from the given peer.
1472 fn handle_stfu(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Stfu);
1475 /// Handle an incoming `splice` message from the given peer.
1476 fn handle_splice(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Splice);
1477 /// Handle an incoming `splice_ack` message from the given peer.
1478 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &SpliceAck);
1479 /// Handle an incoming `splice_locked` message from the given peer.
1480 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &SpliceLocked);
1482 // Interactive channel construction
1483 /// Handle an incoming `tx_add_input message` from the given peer.
1484 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &TxAddInput);
1485 /// Handle an incoming `tx_add_output` message from the given peer.
1486 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &TxAddOutput);
1487 /// Handle an incoming `tx_remove_input` message from the given peer.
1488 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &TxRemoveInput);
1489 /// Handle an incoming `tx_remove_output` message from the given peer.
1490 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &TxRemoveOutput);
1491 /// Handle an incoming `tx_complete message` from the given peer.
1492 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &TxComplete);
1493 /// Handle an incoming `tx_signatures` message from the given peer.
1494 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &TxSignatures);
1495 /// Handle an incoming `tx_init_rbf` message from the given peer.
1496 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &TxInitRbf);
1497 /// Handle an incoming `tx_ack_rbf` message from the given peer.
1498 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &TxAckRbf);
1499 /// Handle an incoming `tx_abort message` from the given peer.
1500 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &TxAbort);
1503 /// Handle an incoming `update_add_htlc` message from the given peer.
1504 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateAddHTLC);
1505 /// Handle an incoming `update_fulfill_htlc` message from the given peer.
1506 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFulfillHTLC);
1507 /// Handle an incoming `update_fail_htlc` message from the given peer.
1508 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFailHTLC);
1509 /// Handle an incoming `update_fail_malformed_htlc` message from the given peer.
1510 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFailMalformedHTLC);
1511 /// Handle an incoming `commitment_signed` message from the given peer.
1512 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &CommitmentSigned);
1513 /// Handle an incoming `revoke_and_ack` message from the given peer.
1514 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &RevokeAndACK);
1516 /// Handle an incoming `update_fee` message from the given peer.
1517 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFee);
1519 // Channel-to-announce:
1520 /// Handle an incoming `announcement_signatures` message from the given peer.
1521 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AnnouncementSignatures);
1523 // Connection loss/reestablish:
1524 /// Indicates a connection to the peer failed/an existing connection was lost.
1525 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey);
1527 /// Handle a peer reconnecting, possibly generating `channel_reestablish` message(s).
1529 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1530 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1531 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1532 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1533 /// Handle an incoming `channel_reestablish` message from the given peer.
1534 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelReestablish);
1536 /// Handle an incoming `channel_update` message from the given peer.
1537 fn handle_channel_update(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelUpdate);
1540 /// Handle an incoming `error` message from the given peer.
1541 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ErrorMessage);
1543 // Handler information:
1544 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1545 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1546 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1547 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1549 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1550 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1551 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1553 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1554 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1556 /// Gets the chain hashes for this `ChannelMessageHandler` indicating which chains it supports.
1558 /// If it's `None`, then no particular network chain hash compatibility will be enforced when
1559 /// connecting to peers.
1560 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>>;
1563 /// A trait to describe an object which can receive routing messages.
1565 /// # Implementor DoS Warnings
1567 /// For messages enabled with the `gossip_queries` feature there are potential DoS vectors when
1568 /// handling inbound queries. Implementors using an on-disk network graph should be aware of
1569 /// repeated disk I/O for queries accessing different parts of the network graph.
1570 pub trait RoutingMessageHandler : MessageSendEventsProvider {
1571 /// Handle an incoming `node_announcement` message, returning `true` if it should be forwarded on,
1572 /// `false` or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1573 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1574 /// Handle a `channel_announcement` message, returning `true` if it should be forwarded on, `false`
1575 /// or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1576 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1577 /// Handle an incoming `channel_update` message, returning true if it should be forwarded on,
1578 /// `false` or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1579 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1580 /// Gets channel announcements and updates required to dump our routing table to a remote node,
1581 /// starting at the `short_channel_id` indicated by `starting_point` and including announcements
1582 /// for a single channel.
1583 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)>;
1584 /// Gets a node announcement required to dump our routing table to a remote node, starting at
1585 /// the node *after* the provided pubkey and including up to one announcement immediately
1586 /// higher (as defined by `<PublicKey as Ord>::cmp`) than `starting_point`.
1587 /// If `None` is provided for `starting_point`, we start at the first node.
1588 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&NodeId>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement>;
1589 /// Called when a connection is established with a peer. This can be used to
1590 /// perform routing table synchronization using a strategy defined by the
1593 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1594 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1595 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1596 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1597 /// Handles the reply of a query we initiated to learn about channels
1598 /// for a given range of blocks. We can expect to receive one or more
1599 /// replies to a single query.
1600 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1601 /// Handles the reply of a query we initiated asking for routing gossip
1602 /// messages for a list of channels. We should receive this message when
1603 /// a node has completed its best effort to send us the pertaining routing
1604 /// gossip messages.
1605 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1606 /// Handles when a peer asks us to send a list of `short_channel_id`s
1607 /// for the requested range of blocks.
1608 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1609 /// Handles when a peer asks us to send routing gossip messages for a
1610 /// list of `short_channel_id`s.
1611 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1613 // Handler queueing status:
1614 /// Indicates that there are a large number of [`ChannelAnnouncement`] (or other) messages
1615 /// pending some async action. While there is no guarantee of the rate of future messages, the
1616 /// caller should seek to reduce the rate of new gossip messages handled, especially
1617 /// [`ChannelAnnouncement`]s.
1618 fn processing_queue_high(&self) -> bool;
1620 // Handler information:
1621 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1622 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1623 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1624 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1625 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1626 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1627 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1629 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1630 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1633 /// A handler for received [`OnionMessage`]s and for providing generated ones to send.
1634 pub trait OnionMessageHandler: EventsProvider {
1635 /// Handle an incoming `onion_message` message from the given peer.
1636 fn handle_onion_message(&self, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OnionMessage);
1638 /// Returns the next pending onion message for the peer with the given node id.
1639 fn next_onion_message_for_peer(&self, peer_node_id: PublicKey) -> Option<OnionMessage>;
1641 /// Called when a connection is established with a peer. Can be used to track which peers
1642 /// advertise onion message support and are online.
1644 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1645 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1646 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1647 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1649 /// Indicates a connection to the peer failed/an existing connection was lost. Allows handlers to
1650 /// drop and refuse to forward onion messages to this peer.
1651 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey);
1653 /// Performs actions that should happen roughly every ten seconds after startup. Allows handlers
1654 /// to drop any buffered onion messages intended for prospective peers.
1655 fn timer_tick_occurred(&self);
1657 // Handler information:
1658 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1659 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1660 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1661 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1663 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1664 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1665 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1667 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1668 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1671 mod fuzzy_internal_msgs {
1672 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1673 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, PaymentRelay};
1674 use crate::prelude::*;
1675 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
1676 use crate::ln::features::BlindedHopFeatures;
1678 // These types aren't intended to be pub, but are exposed for direct fuzzing (as we deserialize
1679 // them from untrusted input):
1681 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
1682 pub struct FinalOnionHopData {
1683 pub payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
1684 /// The total value, in msat, of the payment as received by the ultimate recipient.
1685 /// Message serialization may panic if this value is more than 21 million Bitcoin.
1686 pub total_msat: u64,
1689 pub enum InboundOnionPayload {
1691 short_channel_id: u64,
1692 /// The value, in msat, of the payment after this hop's fee is deducted.
1693 amt_to_forward: u64,
1694 outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
1697 payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData>,
1698 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
1699 keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
1700 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
1702 outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
1705 short_channel_id: u64,
1706 payment_relay: PaymentRelay,
1707 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints,
1708 features: BlindedHopFeatures,
1709 intro_node_blinding_point: PublicKey,
1714 outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
1715 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
1716 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints,
1717 intro_node_blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1721 pub(crate) enum OutboundOnionPayload {
1723 short_channel_id: u64,
1724 /// The value, in msat, of the payment after this hop's fee is deducted.
1725 amt_to_forward: u64,
1726 outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
1729 payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData>,
1730 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
1731 keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
1732 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
1734 outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
1737 encrypted_tlvs: Vec<u8>,
1738 intro_node_blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1743 outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
1744 encrypted_tlvs: Vec<u8>,
1745 intro_node_blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, // Set if the introduction node of the blinded path is the final node
1749 pub struct DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
1750 pub(crate) hmac: [u8; 32],
1751 pub(crate) failuremsg: Vec<u8>,
1752 pub(crate) pad: Vec<u8>,
1756 pub use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*;
1757 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
1758 pub(crate) use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*;
1760 /// BOLT 4 onion packet including hop data for the next peer.
1761 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1762 pub struct OnionPacket {
1763 /// BOLT 4 version number.
1765 /// In order to ensure we always return an error on onion decode in compliance with [BOLT
1766 /// #4](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md), we have to
1767 /// deserialize `OnionPacket`s contained in [`UpdateAddHTLC`] messages even if the ephemeral
1768 /// public key (here) is bogus, so we hold a [`Result`] instead of a [`PublicKey`] as we'd
1770 pub public_key: Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>,
1771 /// 1300 bytes encrypted payload for the next hop.
1772 pub hop_data: [u8; 20*65],
1773 /// HMAC to verify the integrity of hop_data.
1777 impl onion_utils::Packet for OnionPacket {
1778 type Data = onion_utils::FixedSizeOnionPacket;
1779 fn new(pubkey: PublicKey, hop_data: onion_utils::FixedSizeOnionPacket, hmac: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
1782 public_key: Ok(pubkey),
1783 hop_data: hop_data.0,
1789 impl fmt::Debug for OnionPacket {
1790 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
1791 f.write_fmt(format_args!("OnionPacket version {} with hmac {:?}", self.version, &self.hmac[..]))
1795 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1796 pub(crate) struct OnionErrorPacket {
1797 // This really should be a constant size slice, but the spec lets these things be up to 128KB?
1798 // (TODO) We limit it in decode to much lower...
1799 pub(crate) data: Vec<u8>,
1802 impl fmt::Display for DecodeError {
1803 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
1805 DecodeError::UnknownVersion => f.write_str("Unknown realm byte in Onion packet"),
1806 DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature => f.write_str("Unknown required feature preventing decode"),
1807 DecodeError::InvalidValue => f.write_str("Nonsense bytes didn't map to the type they were interpreted as"),
1808 DecodeError::ShortRead => f.write_str("Packet extended beyond the provided bytes"),
1809 DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor => f.write_str("A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly"),
1810 DecodeError::Io(ref e) => fmt::Debug::fmt(e, f),
1811 DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression => f.write_str("We don't support receiving messages with zlib-compressed fields"),
1816 impl From<io::Error> for DecodeError {
1817 fn from(e: io::Error) -> Self {
1818 if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof {
1819 DecodeError::ShortRead
1821 DecodeError::Io(e.kind())
1826 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
1827 impl_writeable_msg!(AcceptChannel, {
1828 temporary_channel_id,
1829 dust_limit_satoshis,
1830 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1831 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1837 revocation_basepoint,
1839 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1841 first_per_commitment_point,
1843 (0, shutdown_scriptpubkey, (option, encoding: (ScriptBuf, WithoutLength))), // Don't encode length twice.
1844 (1, channel_type, option),
1848 impl_writeable_msg!(AcceptChannel, {
1849 temporary_channel_id,
1850 dust_limit_satoshis,
1851 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1852 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1858 revocation_basepoint,
1860 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1862 first_per_commitment_point,
1864 (0, shutdown_scriptpubkey, (option, encoding: (ScriptBuf, WithoutLength))), // Don't encode length twice.
1865 (1, channel_type, option),
1866 (4, next_local_nonce, option),
1869 impl_writeable_msg!(AcceptChannelV2, {
1870 temporary_channel_id,
1872 dust_limit_satoshis,
1873 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1879 revocation_basepoint,
1881 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1883 first_per_commitment_point,
1884 second_per_commitment_point,
1886 (0, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
1887 (1, channel_type, option),
1888 (2, require_confirmed_inputs, option),
1891 impl_writeable_msg!(Stfu, {
1896 impl_writeable_msg!(Splice, {
1900 funding_feerate_perkw,
1905 impl_writeable_msg!(SpliceAck, {
1912 impl_writeable_msg!(SpliceLocked, {
1916 impl_writeable_msg!(TxAddInput, {
1924 impl_writeable_msg!(TxAddOutput, {
1931 impl_writeable_msg!(TxRemoveInput, {
1936 impl_writeable_msg!(TxRemoveOutput, {
1941 impl_writeable_msg!(TxComplete, {
1945 impl_writeable_msg!(TxSignatures, {
1951 impl_writeable_msg!(TxInitRbf, {
1954 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
1956 (0, funding_output_contribution, option),
1959 impl_writeable_msg!(TxAckRbf, {
1962 (0, funding_output_contribution, option),
1965 impl_writeable_msg!(TxAbort, {
1970 impl_writeable_msg!(AnnouncementSignatures, {
1977 impl_writeable_msg!(ChannelReestablish, {
1979 next_local_commitment_number,
1980 next_remote_commitment_number,
1981 your_last_per_commitment_secret,
1982 my_current_per_commitment_point,
1984 (0, next_funding_txid, option),
1987 impl_writeable_msg!(ClosingSigned,
1988 { channel_id, fee_satoshis, signature },
1989 { (1, fee_range, option) }
1992 impl_writeable!(ClosingSignedFeeRange, {
1997 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
1998 impl_writeable_msg!(CommitmentSigned, {
2005 impl_writeable_msg!(CommitmentSigned, {
2010 (2, partial_signature_with_nonce, option)
2013 impl_writeable!(DecodedOnionErrorPacket, {
2019 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
2020 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingCreated, {
2021 temporary_channel_id,
2023 funding_output_index,
2027 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingCreated, {
2028 temporary_channel_id,
2030 funding_output_index,
2033 (2, partial_signature_with_nonce, option),
2034 (4, next_local_nonce, option)
2037 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
2038 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingSigned, {
2044 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingSigned, {
2048 (2, partial_signature_with_nonce, option)
2051 impl_writeable_msg!(ChannelReady, {
2053 next_per_commitment_point,
2055 (1, short_channel_id_alias, option),
2058 impl Writeable for Init {
2059 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2060 // global_features gets the bottom 13 bits of our features, and local_features gets all of
2061 // our relevant feature bits. This keeps us compatible with old nodes.
2062 self.features.write_up_to_13(w)?;
2063 self.features.write(w)?;
2064 encode_tlv_stream!(w, {
2065 (1, self.networks.as_ref().map(|n| WithoutLength(n)), option),
2066 (3, self.remote_network_address, option),
2072 impl Readable for Init {
2073 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2074 let global_features: InitFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
2075 let features: InitFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
2076 let mut remote_network_address: Option<SocketAddress> = None;
2077 let mut networks: Option<WithoutLength<Vec<ChainHash>>> = None;
2078 decode_tlv_stream!(r, {
2079 (1, networks, option),
2080 (3, remote_network_address, option)
2083 features: features | global_features,
2084 networks: networks.map(|n| n.0),
2085 remote_network_address,
2090 impl_writeable_msg!(OpenChannel, {
2092 temporary_channel_id,
2095 dust_limit_satoshis,
2096 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
2097 channel_reserve_satoshis,
2103 revocation_basepoint,
2105 delayed_payment_basepoint,
2107 first_per_commitment_point,
2110 (0, shutdown_scriptpubkey, (option, encoding: (ScriptBuf, WithoutLength))), // Don't encode length twice.
2111 (1, channel_type, option),
2114 impl_writeable_msg!(OpenChannelV2, {
2116 temporary_channel_id,
2117 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
2118 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
2120 dust_limit_satoshis,
2121 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
2127 revocation_basepoint,
2129 delayed_payment_basepoint,
2131 first_per_commitment_point,
2132 second_per_commitment_point,
2135 (0, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
2136 (1, channel_type, option),
2137 (2, require_confirmed_inputs, option),
2140 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
2141 impl_writeable_msg!(RevokeAndACK, {
2143 per_commitment_secret,
2144 next_per_commitment_point
2148 impl_writeable_msg!(RevokeAndACK, {
2150 per_commitment_secret,
2151 next_per_commitment_point
2153 (4, next_local_nonce, option)
2156 impl_writeable_msg!(Shutdown, {
2161 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFailHTLC, {
2167 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, {
2174 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFee, {
2179 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFulfillHTLC, {
2185 // Note that this is written as a part of ChannelManager objects, and thus cannot change its
2186 // serialization format in a way which assumes we know the total serialized length/message end
2188 impl_writeable!(OnionErrorPacket, {
2192 // Note that this is written as a part of ChannelManager objects, and thus cannot change its
2193 // serialization format in a way which assumes we know the total serialized length/message end
2195 impl Writeable for OnionPacket {
2196 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2197 self.version.write(w)?;
2198 match self.public_key {
2199 Ok(pubkey) => pubkey.write(w)?,
2200 Err(_) => [0u8;33].write(w)?,
2202 w.write_all(&self.hop_data)?;
2203 self.hmac.write(w)?;
2208 impl Readable for OnionPacket {
2209 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2211 version: Readable::read(r)?,
2213 let mut buf = [0u8;33];
2214 r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
2215 PublicKey::from_slice(&buf)
2217 hop_data: Readable::read(r)?,
2218 hmac: Readable::read(r)?,
2223 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateAddHTLC, {
2229 onion_routing_packet,
2231 (0, blinding_point, option),
2232 (65537, skimmed_fee_msat, option)
2235 impl Readable for OnionMessage {
2236 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2237 let blinding_point: PublicKey = Readable::read(r)?;
2238 let len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
2239 let mut packet_reader = FixedLengthReader::new(r, len as u64);
2240 let onion_routing_packet: onion_message::Packet = <onion_message::Packet as LengthReadable>::read(&mut packet_reader)?;
2243 onion_routing_packet,
2248 impl Writeable for OnionMessage {
2249 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2250 self.blinding_point.write(w)?;
2251 let onion_packet_len = self.onion_routing_packet.serialized_length();
2252 (onion_packet_len as u16).write(w)?;
2253 self.onion_routing_packet.write(w)?;
2258 impl Writeable for FinalOnionHopData {
2259 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2260 self.payment_secret.0.write(w)?;
2261 HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.total_msat).write(w)
2265 impl Readable for FinalOnionHopData {
2266 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2267 let secret: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
2268 let amt: HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize<u64> = Readable::read(r)?;
2269 Ok(Self { payment_secret: PaymentSecret(secret), total_msat: amt.0 })
2273 impl Writeable for OutboundOnionPayload {
2274 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2276 Self::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } => {
2277 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
2278 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*amt_to_forward), required),
2279 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*outgoing_cltv_value), required),
2280 (6, short_channel_id, required)
2284 ref payment_data, ref payment_metadata, ref keysend_preimage, amt_msat,
2285 outgoing_cltv_value, ref custom_tlvs,
2287 // We need to update [`ln::outbound_payment::RecipientOnionFields::with_custom_tlvs`]
2288 // to reject any reserved types in the experimental range if new ones are ever
2290 let keysend_tlv = keysend_preimage.map(|preimage| (5482373484, preimage.encode()));
2291 let mut custom_tlvs: Vec<&(u64, Vec<u8>)> = custom_tlvs.iter().chain(keysend_tlv.iter()).collect();
2292 custom_tlvs.sort_unstable_by_key(|(typ, _)| *typ);
2293 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
2294 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*amt_msat), required),
2295 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*outgoing_cltv_value), required),
2296 (8, payment_data, option),
2297 (16, payment_metadata.as_ref().map(|m| WithoutLength(m)), option)
2298 }, custom_tlvs.iter());
2300 Self::BlindedForward { encrypted_tlvs, intro_node_blinding_point } => {
2301 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
2302 (10, *encrypted_tlvs, required_vec),
2303 (12, intro_node_blinding_point, option)
2306 Self::BlindedReceive {
2307 amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, encrypted_tlvs,
2308 intro_node_blinding_point,
2310 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
2311 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*amt_msat), required),
2312 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*outgoing_cltv_value), required),
2313 (10, *encrypted_tlvs, required_vec),
2314 (12, intro_node_blinding_point, option),
2315 (18, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*total_msat), required)
2323 impl<NS: Deref> ReadableArgs<(Option<PublicKey>, &NS)> for InboundOnionPayload where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
2324 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R, args: (Option<PublicKey>, &NS)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2325 let (update_add_blinding_point, node_signer) = args;
2328 let mut cltv_value = None;
2329 let mut short_id: Option<u64> = None;
2330 let mut payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData> = None;
2331 let mut encrypted_tlvs_opt: Option<WithoutLength<Vec<u8>>> = None;
2332 let mut intro_node_blinding_point = None;
2333 let mut payment_metadata: Option<WithoutLength<Vec<u8>>> = None;
2334 let mut total_msat = None;
2335 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
2336 let mut custom_tlvs = Vec::new();
2338 let tlv_len = BigSize::read(r)?;
2339 let rd = FixedLengthReader::new(r, tlv_len.0);
2340 decode_tlv_stream_with_custom_tlv_decode!(rd, {
2341 (2, amt, (option, encoding: (u64, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize))),
2342 (4, cltv_value, (option, encoding: (u32, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize))),
2343 (6, short_id, option),
2344 (8, payment_data, option),
2345 (10, encrypted_tlvs_opt, option),
2346 (12, intro_node_blinding_point, option),
2347 (16, payment_metadata, option),
2348 (18, total_msat, (option, encoding: (u64, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize))),
2349 // See https://github.com/lightning/blips/blob/master/blip-0003.md
2350 (5482373484, keysend_preimage, option)
2351 }, |msg_type: u64, msg_reader: &mut FixedLengthReader<_>| -> Result<bool, DecodeError> {
2352 if msg_type < 1 << 16 { return Ok(false) }
2353 let mut value = Vec::new();
2354 msg_reader.read_to_end(&mut value)?;
2355 custom_tlvs.push((msg_type, value));
2359 if amt.unwrap_or(0) > MAX_VALUE_MSAT { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
2360 if intro_node_blinding_point.is_some() && update_add_blinding_point.is_some() {
2361 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
2364 if let Some(blinding_point) = intro_node_blinding_point.or(update_add_blinding_point) {
2365 if short_id.is_some() || payment_data.is_some() || payment_metadata.is_some() ||
2366 keysend_preimage.is_some()
2368 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
2370 let enc_tlvs = encrypted_tlvs_opt.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?.0;
2371 let enc_tlvs_ss = node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::Node, &blinding_point, None)
2372 .map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
2373 let rho = onion_utils::gen_rho_from_shared_secret(&enc_tlvs_ss.secret_bytes());
2374 let mut s = Cursor::new(&enc_tlvs);
2375 let mut reader = FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, enc_tlvs.len() as u64);
2376 match ChaChaPolyReadAdapter::read(&mut reader, rho)? {
2377 ChaChaPolyReadAdapter { readable: BlindedPaymentTlvs::Forward(ForwardTlvs {
2378 short_channel_id, payment_relay, payment_constraints, features
2380 if amt.is_some() || cltv_value.is_some() || total_msat.is_some() {
2381 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
2383 Ok(Self::BlindedForward {
2386 payment_constraints,
2388 intro_node_blinding_point: intro_node_blinding_point.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
2391 ChaChaPolyReadAdapter { readable: BlindedPaymentTlvs::Receive(ReceiveTlvs {
2392 payment_secret, payment_constraints
2394 if total_msat.unwrap_or(0) > MAX_VALUE_MSAT { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
2395 Ok(Self::BlindedReceive {
2396 amt_msat: amt.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
2397 total_msat: total_msat.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
2398 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv_value.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
2400 payment_constraints,
2401 intro_node_blinding_point,
2405 } else if let Some(short_channel_id) = short_id {
2406 if payment_data.is_some() || payment_metadata.is_some() || encrypted_tlvs_opt.is_some() ||
2407 total_msat.is_some()
2408 { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
2411 amt_to_forward: amt.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
2412 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv_value.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
2415 if encrypted_tlvs_opt.is_some() || total_msat.is_some() {
2416 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
2418 if let Some(data) = &payment_data {
2419 if data.total_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
2420 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2425 payment_metadata: payment_metadata.map(|w| w.0),
2427 amt_msat: amt.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
2428 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv_value.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
2435 impl Writeable for Ping {
2436 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2437 self.ponglen.write(w)?;
2438 vec![0u8; self.byteslen as usize].write(w)?; // size-unchecked write
2443 impl Readable for Ping {
2444 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2446 ponglen: Readable::read(r)?,
2448 let byteslen = Readable::read(r)?;
2449 r.read_exact(&mut vec![0u8; byteslen as usize][..])?;
2456 impl Writeable for Pong {
2457 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2458 vec![0u8; self.byteslen as usize].write(w)?; // size-unchecked write
2463 impl Readable for Pong {
2464 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2467 let byteslen = Readable::read(r)?;
2468 r.read_exact(&mut vec![0u8; byteslen as usize][..])?;
2475 impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2476 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2477 self.features.write(w)?;
2478 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
2479 self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
2480 self.node_id_1.write(w)?;
2481 self.node_id_2.write(w)?;
2482 self.bitcoin_key_1.write(w)?;
2483 self.bitcoin_key_2.write(w)?;
2484 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
2489 impl Readable for UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2490 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2492 features: Readable::read(r)?,
2493 chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
2494 short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
2495 node_id_1: Readable::read(r)?,
2496 node_id_2: Readable::read(r)?,
2497 bitcoin_key_1: Readable::read(r)?,
2498 bitcoin_key_2: Readable::read(r)?,
2499 excess_data: read_to_end(r)?,
2504 impl_writeable!(ChannelAnnouncement, {
2507 bitcoin_signature_1,
2508 bitcoin_signature_2,
2512 impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2513 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2514 // `message_flags` used to indicate presence of `htlc_maximum_msat`, but was deprecated in the spec.
2515 const MESSAGE_FLAGS: u8 = 1;
2516 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
2517 self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
2518 self.timestamp.write(w)?;
2519 let all_flags = self.flags as u16 | ((MESSAGE_FLAGS as u16) << 8);
2520 all_flags.write(w)?;
2521 self.cltv_expiry_delta.write(w)?;
2522 self.htlc_minimum_msat.write(w)?;
2523 self.fee_base_msat.write(w)?;
2524 self.fee_proportional_millionths.write(w)?;
2525 self.htlc_maximum_msat.write(w)?;
2526 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
2531 impl Readable for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2532 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2534 chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
2535 short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
2536 timestamp: Readable::read(r)?,
2538 let flags: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
2539 // Note: we ignore the `message_flags` for now, since it was deprecated by the spec.
2542 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(r)?,
2543 htlc_minimum_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
2544 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
2545 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(r)?,
2546 htlc_maximum_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
2547 excess_data: read_to_end(r)?,
2552 impl_writeable!(ChannelUpdate, {
2557 impl Writeable for ErrorMessage {
2558 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2559 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
2560 (self.data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
2561 w.write_all(self.data.as_bytes())?;
2566 impl Readable for ErrorMessage {
2567 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2569 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
2571 let sz: usize = <u16 as Readable>::read(r)? as usize;
2572 let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(sz);
2574 r.read_exact(&mut data)?;
2575 match String::from_utf8(data) {
2577 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2584 impl Writeable for WarningMessage {
2585 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2586 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
2587 (self.data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
2588 w.write_all(self.data.as_bytes())?;
2593 impl Readable for WarningMessage {
2594 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2596 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
2598 let sz: usize = <u16 as Readable>::read(r)? as usize;
2599 let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(sz);
2601 r.read_exact(&mut data)?;
2602 match String::from_utf8(data) {
2604 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2611 impl Writeable for UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2612 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2613 self.features.write(w)?;
2614 self.timestamp.write(w)?;
2615 self.node_id.write(w)?;
2616 w.write_all(&self.rgb)?;
2617 self.alias.write(w)?;
2619 let mut addr_len = 0;
2620 for addr in self.addresses.iter() {
2621 addr_len += 1 + addr.len();
2623 (addr_len + self.excess_address_data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
2624 for addr in self.addresses.iter() {
2627 w.write_all(&self.excess_address_data[..])?;
2628 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
2633 impl Readable for UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2634 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2635 let features: NodeFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
2636 let timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
2637 let node_id: NodeId = Readable::read(r)?;
2638 let mut rgb = [0; 3];
2639 r.read_exact(&mut rgb)?;
2640 let alias: NodeAlias = Readable::read(r)?;
2642 let addr_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
2643 let mut addresses: Vec<SocketAddress> = Vec::new();
2644 let mut addr_readpos = 0;
2645 let mut excess = false;
2646 let mut excess_byte = 0;
2648 if addr_len <= addr_readpos { break; }
2649 match Readable::read(r) {
2651 if addr_len < addr_readpos + 1 + addr.len() {
2652 return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor);
2654 addr_readpos += (1 + addr.len()) as u16;
2655 addresses.push(addr);
2657 Ok(Err(unknown_descriptor)) => {
2659 excess_byte = unknown_descriptor;
2662 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor),
2663 Err(e) => return Err(e),
2667 let mut excess_data = vec![];
2668 let excess_address_data = if addr_readpos < addr_len {
2669 let mut excess_address_data = vec![0; (addr_len - addr_readpos) as usize];
2670 r.read_exact(&mut excess_address_data[if excess { 1 } else { 0 }..])?;
2672 excess_address_data[0] = excess_byte;
2677 excess_data.push(excess_byte);
2681 excess_data.extend(read_to_end(r)?.iter());
2682 Ok(UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2689 excess_address_data,
2695 impl_writeable!(NodeAnnouncement, {
2700 impl Readable for QueryShortChannelIds {
2701 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2702 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(r)?;
2704 let encoding_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
2705 let encoding_type: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
2707 // Must be encoding_type=0 uncompressed serialization. We do not
2708 // support encoding_type=1 zlib serialization.
2709 if encoding_type != EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8 {
2710 return Err(DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression);
2713 // We expect the encoding_len to always includes the 1-byte
2714 // encoding_type and that short_channel_ids are 8-bytes each
2715 if encoding_len == 0 || (encoding_len - 1) % 8 != 0 {
2716 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2719 // Read short_channel_ids (8-bytes each), for the u16 encoding_len
2720 // less the 1-byte encoding_type
2721 let short_channel_id_count: u16 = (encoding_len - 1)/8;
2722 let mut short_channel_ids = Vec::with_capacity(short_channel_id_count as usize);
2723 for _ in 0..short_channel_id_count {
2724 short_channel_ids.push(Readable::read(r)?);
2727 Ok(QueryShortChannelIds {
2734 impl Writeable for QueryShortChannelIds {
2735 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2736 // Calculated from 1-byte encoding_type plus 8-bytes per short_channel_id
2737 let encoding_len: u16 = 1 + self.short_channel_ids.len() as u16 * 8;
2739 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
2740 encoding_len.write(w)?;
2742 // We only support type=0 uncompressed serialization
2743 (EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8).write(w)?;
2745 for scid in self.short_channel_ids.iter() {
2753 impl_writeable_msg!(ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd, {
2758 impl QueryChannelRange {
2759 /// Calculates the overflow safe ending block height for the query.
2761 /// Overflow returns `0xffffffff`, otherwise returns `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`.
2762 pub fn end_blocknum(&self) -> u32 {
2763 match self.first_blocknum.checked_add(self.number_of_blocks) {
2764 Some(block) => block,
2765 None => u32::max_value(),
2770 impl_writeable_msg!(QueryChannelRange, {
2776 impl Readable for ReplyChannelRange {
2777 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2778 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(r)?;
2779 let first_blocknum: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
2780 let number_of_blocks: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
2781 let sync_complete: bool = Readable::read(r)?;
2783 let encoding_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
2784 let encoding_type: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
2786 // Must be encoding_type=0 uncompressed serialization. We do not
2787 // support encoding_type=1 zlib serialization.
2788 if encoding_type != EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8 {
2789 return Err(DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression);
2792 // We expect the encoding_len to always includes the 1-byte
2793 // encoding_type and that short_channel_ids are 8-bytes each
2794 if encoding_len == 0 || (encoding_len - 1) % 8 != 0 {
2795 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2798 // Read short_channel_ids (8-bytes each), for the u16 encoding_len
2799 // less the 1-byte encoding_type
2800 let short_channel_id_count: u16 = (encoding_len - 1)/8;
2801 let mut short_channel_ids = Vec::with_capacity(short_channel_id_count as usize);
2802 for _ in 0..short_channel_id_count {
2803 short_channel_ids.push(Readable::read(r)?);
2806 Ok(ReplyChannelRange {
2816 impl Writeable for ReplyChannelRange {
2817 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2818 let encoding_len: u16 = 1 + self.short_channel_ids.len() as u16 * 8;
2819 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
2820 self.first_blocknum.write(w)?;
2821 self.number_of_blocks.write(w)?;
2822 self.sync_complete.write(w)?;
2824 encoding_len.write(w)?;
2825 (EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8).write(w)?;
2826 for scid in self.short_channel_ids.iter() {
2834 impl_writeable_msg!(GossipTimestampFilter, {
2842 use std::convert::TryFrom;
2843 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxIn, ScriptBuf, Sequence, Witness, TxOut};
2844 use hex::DisplayHex;
2845 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
2846 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
2847 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
2848 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, FinalOnionHopData, OnionErrorPacket};
2849 use crate::ln::msgs::SocketAddress;
2850 use crate::routing::gossip::{NodeAlias, NodeId};
2851 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, ReadableArgs, Hostname, TransactionU16LenLimited};
2852 use crate::util::test_utils;
2854 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2855 use bitcoin::address::Address;
2856 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2857 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
2858 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
2859 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2860 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
2861 use bitcoin::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
2863 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2864 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2866 use crate::io::{self, Cursor};
2867 use crate::prelude::*;
2868 use core::str::FromStr;
2869 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2871 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2872 use std::net::{Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr, SocketAddr, SocketAddrV4, SocketAddrV6, ToSocketAddrs};
2873 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2874 use crate::ln::msgs::SocketAddressParseError;
2877 fn encoding_channel_reestablish() {
2879 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2880 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
2883 let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
2884 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]),
2885 next_local_commitment_number: 3,
2886 next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
2887 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [9;32],
2888 my_current_per_commitment_point: public_key,
2889 next_funding_txid: None,
2892 let encoded_value = cr.encode();
2896 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, // channel_id
2897 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, // next_local_commitment_number
2898 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, // next_remote_commitment_number
2899 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, // your_last_per_commitment_secret
2900 3, 27, 132, 197, 86, 123, 18, 100, 64, 153, 93, 62, 213, 170, 186, 5, 101, 215, 30, 24, 52, 96, 72, 25, 255, 156, 23, 245, 233, 213, 221, 7, 143, // my_current_per_commitment_point
2906 fn encoding_channel_reestablish_with_next_funding_txid() {
2908 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2909 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
2912 let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
2913 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]),
2914 next_local_commitment_number: 3,
2915 next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
2916 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [9;32],
2917 my_current_per_commitment_point: public_key,
2918 next_funding_txid: Some(Txid::from_raw_hash(bitcoin::hashes::Hash::from_slice(&[
2919 48, 167, 250, 69, 152, 48, 103, 172, 164, 99, 59, 19, 23, 11, 92, 84, 15, 80, 4, 12, 98, 82, 75, 31, 201, 11, 91, 23, 98, 23, 53, 124,
2923 let encoded_value = cr.encode();
2927 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, // channel_id
2928 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, // next_local_commitment_number
2929 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, // next_remote_commitment_number
2930 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, // your_last_per_commitment_secret
2931 3, 27, 132, 197, 86, 123, 18, 100, 64, 153, 93, 62, 213, 170, 186, 5, 101, 215, 30, 24, 52, 96, 72, 25, 255, 156, 23, 245, 233, 213, 221, 7, 143, // my_current_per_commitment_point
2932 0, // Type (next_funding_txid)
2934 48, 167, 250, 69, 152, 48, 103, 172, 164, 99, 59, 19, 23, 11, 92, 84, 15, 80, 4, 12, 98, 82, 75, 31, 201, 11, 91, 23, 98, 23, 53, 124, // Value
2939 macro_rules! get_keys_from {
2940 ($slice: expr, $secp_ctx: expr) => {
2942 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($slice).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2943 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &privkey);
2949 macro_rules! get_sig_on {
2950 ($privkey: expr, $ctx: expr, $string: expr) => {
2952 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&$string.into_bytes()[..]).unwrap();
2953 $ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &$privkey)
2959 fn encoding_announcement_signatures() {
2960 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2961 let (privkey, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2962 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2963 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("02020202020202020202020202020202"));
2964 let announcement_signatures = msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2965 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]),
2966 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2967 node_signature: sig_1,
2968 bitcoin_signature: sig_2,
2971 let encoded_value = announcement_signatures.encode();
2972 assert_eq!(encoded_value, <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("040000000000000005000000000000000600000000000000070000000000000000083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073acf9953cef4700860f5967838eba2bae89288ad188ebf8b20bf995c3ea53a26df1876d0a3a0e13172ba286a673140190c02ba9da60a2e43a745188c8a83c7f3ef").unwrap());
2975 fn do_encoding_channel_announcement(unknown_features_bits: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2976 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2977 let (privkey_1, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2978 let (privkey_2, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2979 let (privkey_3, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2980 let (privkey_4, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2981 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2982 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey_2, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2983 let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2984 let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2985 let mut features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
2986 if unknown_features_bits {
2987 features = ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF]);
2989 let unsigned_channel_announcement = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2991 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
2992 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2993 node_id_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_1),
2994 node_id_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_2),
2995 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_3),
2996 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_4),
2997 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![10, 0, 0, 20, 0, 0, 30, 0, 0, 40] } else { Vec::new() },
2999 let channel_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
3000 node_signature_1: sig_1,
3001 node_signature_2: sig_2,
3002 bitcoin_signature_1: sig_3,
3003 bitcoin_signature_2: sig_4,
3004 contents: unsigned_channel_announcement,
3006 let encoded_value = channel_announcement.encode();
3007 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("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").unwrap();
3008 if unknown_features_bits {
3009 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0002ffff").unwrap());
3011 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000").unwrap());
3013 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap());
3014 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00083a840000034d031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f024d4b6cd1361032ca9bd2aeb9d900aa4d45d9ead80ac9423374c451a7254d076602531fe6068134503d2723133227c867ac8fa6c83c537e9a44c3c5bdbdcb1fe33703462779ad4aad39514614751a71085f2f10e1c7a593e4e030efb5b8721ce55b0b").unwrap());
3016 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0a00001400001e000028").unwrap());
3018 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3022 fn encoding_channel_announcement() {
3023 do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, false);
3024 do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, true);
3025 do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, false);
3026 do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, true);
3029 fn do_encoding_node_announcement(unknown_features_bits: bool, ipv4: bool, ipv6: bool, onionv2: bool, onionv3: bool, hostname: bool, excess_address_data: bool, excess_data: bool) {
3030 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3031 let (privkey_1, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3032 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
3033 let features = if unknown_features_bits {
3034 NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF])
3036 // Set to some features we may support
3037 NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![2 | 1 << 5])
3039 let mut addresses = Vec::new();
3041 addresses.push(SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 {
3042 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252],
3047 addresses.push(SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 {
3048 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240],
3053 addresses.push(msgs::SocketAddress::OnionV2(
3054 [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 38, 7]
3058 addresses.push(msgs::SocketAddress::OnionV3 {
3059 ed25519_pubkey: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240, 239, 238, 237, 236, 235, 234, 233, 232, 231, 230, 229, 228, 227, 226, 225, 224],
3066 addresses.push(SocketAddress::Hostname {
3067 hostname: Hostname::try_from(String::from("host")).unwrap(),
3071 let mut addr_len = 0;
3072 for addr in &addresses {
3073 addr_len += addr.len() + 1;
3075 let unsigned_node_announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
3077 timestamp: 20190119,
3078 node_id: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_1),
3080 alias: NodeAlias([16;32]),
3082 excess_address_data: if excess_address_data { vec![33, 108, 40, 11, 83, 149, 162, 84, 110, 126, 75, 38, 99, 224, 79, 129, 22, 34, 241, 90, 79, 146, 232, 58, 162, 233, 43, 162, 165, 115, 193, 57, 20, 44, 84, 174, 99, 7, 42, 30, 193, 238, 125, 192, 192, 75, 222, 92, 132, 120, 6, 23, 42, 160, 92, 146, 194, 42, 232, 227, 8, 209, 210, 105] } else { Vec::new() },
3083 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![59, 18, 204, 25, 92, 224, 162, 209, 189, 166, 168, 139, 239, 161, 159, 160, 127, 81, 202, 167, 92, 232, 56, 55, 242, 137, 101, 96, 11, 138, 172, 171, 8, 85, 255, 176, 231, 65, 236, 95, 124, 65, 66, 30, 152, 41, 169, 212, 134, 17, 200, 200, 49, 247, 27, 229, 234, 115, 230, 101, 148, 151, 127, 253] } else { Vec::new() },
3085 addr_len += unsigned_node_announcement.excess_address_data.len() as u16;
3086 let node_announcement = msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
3088 contents: unsigned_node_announcement,
3090 let encoded_value = node_announcement.encode();
3091 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
3092 if unknown_features_bits {
3093 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0002ffff").unwrap());
3095 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000122").unwrap());
3097 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("013413a7031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f2020201010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010").unwrap());
3098 target_value.append(&mut vec![(addr_len >> 8) as u8, addr_len as u8]);
3100 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("01fffefdfc2607").unwrap());
3103 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f02607").unwrap());
3106 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("03fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f62607").unwrap());
3109 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("04fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0efeeedecebeae9e8e7e6e5e4e3e2e1e00020102607").unwrap());
3112 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0504686f73742607").unwrap());
3114 if excess_address_data {
3115 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f92e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d269").unwrap());
3118 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
3120 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3124 fn encoding_node_announcement() {
3125 do_encoding_node_announcement(true, true, true, true, true, true, true, true);
3126 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false);
3127 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, true, false, false, false, false, false, false);
3128 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, true, false, false, false, false, false);
3129 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, true, false, false, false, false);
3130 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, true, false, false, false);
3131 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, true, false, false);
3132 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, false, true, false);
3133 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, true, false, true, false, false, true, false);
3134 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, true, false, true, false, false, false);
3137 fn do_encoding_channel_update(direction: bool, disable: bool, excess_data: bool) {
3138 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3139 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3140 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
3141 let unsigned_channel_update = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3142 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
3143 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
3144 timestamp: 20190119,
3145 flags: if direction { 1 } else { 0 } | if disable { 1 << 1 } else { 0 },
3146 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
3147 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
3148 htlc_maximum_msat: 131355275467161,
3149 fee_base_msat: 10000,
3150 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
3151 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![0, 0, 0, 0, 59, 154, 202, 0] } else { Vec::new() }
3153 let channel_update = msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3155 contents: unsigned_channel_update
3157 let encoded_value = channel_update.encode();
3158 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
3159 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap());
3160 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00083a840000034d013413a7").unwrap());
3161 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("01").unwrap());
3162 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00").unwrap());
3164 let flag = target_value.last_mut().unwrap();
3168 let flag = target_value.last_mut().unwrap();
3169 *flag = *flag | 1 << 1;
3171 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap());
3172 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000777788889999").unwrap());
3174 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000000003b9aca00").unwrap());
3176 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3180 fn encoding_channel_update() {
3181 do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, false);
3182 do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, true);
3183 do_encoding_channel_update(true, false, false);
3184 do_encoding_channel_update(true, false, true);
3185 do_encoding_channel_update(false, true, false);
3186 do_encoding_channel_update(false, true, true);
3187 do_encoding_channel_update(true, true, false);
3188 do_encoding_channel_update(true, true, true);
3191 fn do_encoding_open_channel(random_bit: bool, shutdown: bool, incl_chan_type: bool) {
3192 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3193 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3194 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
3195 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
3196 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
3197 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
3198 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
3199 let open_channel = msgs::OpenChannel {
3200 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
3201 temporary_channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3202 funding_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
3203 push_msat: 2536655962884945560,
3204 dust_limit_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
3205 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 8517154655701053848,
3206 channel_reserve_satoshis: 8665828695742877976,
3207 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
3208 feerate_per_kw: 821716,
3209 to_self_delay: 49340,
3210 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
3211 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
3212 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
3213 payment_point: pubkey_3,
3214 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
3215 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
3216 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
3217 channel_flags: if random_bit { 1 << 5 } else { 0 },
3218 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { Some(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { None },
3219 channel_type: if incl_chan_type { Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::empty()) } else { None },
3221 let encoded_value = open_channel.encode();
3222 let mut target_value = Vec::new();
3223 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap());
3224 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("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").unwrap());
3226 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("20").unwrap());
3228 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00").unwrap());
3231 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
3234 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0100").unwrap());
3236 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3240 fn encoding_open_channel() {
3241 do_encoding_open_channel(false, false, false);
3242 do_encoding_open_channel(false, false, true);
3243 do_encoding_open_channel(false, true, false);
3244 do_encoding_open_channel(false, true, true);
3245 do_encoding_open_channel(true, false, false);
3246 do_encoding_open_channel(true, false, true);
3247 do_encoding_open_channel(true, true, false);
3248 do_encoding_open_channel(true, true, true);
3251 fn do_encoding_open_channelv2(random_bit: bool, shutdown: bool, incl_chan_type: bool, require_confirmed_inputs: bool) {
3252 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3253 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3254 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
3255 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
3256 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
3257 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
3258 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
3259 let (_, pubkey_7) = get_keys_from!("0707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707", secp_ctx);
3260 let open_channelv2 = msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
3261 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
3262 temporary_channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3263 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: 821716,
3264 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: 821716,
3265 funding_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
3266 dust_limit_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
3267 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 8517154655701053848,
3268 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
3269 to_self_delay: 49340,
3270 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
3271 locktime: 305419896,
3272 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
3273 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
3274 payment_basepoint: pubkey_3,
3275 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
3276 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
3277 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
3278 second_per_commitment_point: pubkey_7,
3279 channel_flags: if random_bit { 1 << 5 } else { 0 },
3280 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { Some(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { None },
3281 channel_type: if incl_chan_type { Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::empty()) } else { None },
3282 require_confirmed_inputs: if require_confirmed_inputs { Some(()) } else { None },
3284 let encoded_value = open_channelv2.encode();
3285 let mut target_value = Vec::new();
3286 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap());
3287 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap());
3288 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000c89d4").unwrap());
3289 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000c89d4").unwrap());
3290 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1234567890123456").unwrap());
3291 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3214466870114476").unwrap());
3292 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7633030896203198").unwrap());
3293 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00083a840000034d").unwrap());
3294 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c0bc").unwrap());
3295 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c0bc").unwrap());
3296 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("12345678").unwrap());
3297 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap());
3298 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("024d4b6cd1361032ca9bd2aeb9d900aa4d45d9ead80ac9423374c451a7254d0766").unwrap());
3299 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02531fe6068134503d2723133227c867ac8fa6c83c537e9a44c3c5bdbdcb1fe337").unwrap());
3300 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("03462779ad4aad39514614751a71085f2f10e1c7a593e4e030efb5b8721ce55b0b").unwrap());
3301 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0362c0a046dacce86ddd0343c6d3c7c79c2208ba0d9c9cf24a6d046d21d21f90f7").unwrap());
3302 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("03f006a18d5653c4edf5391ff23a61f03ff83d237e880ee61187fa9f379a028e0a").unwrap());
3303 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02989c0b76cb563971fdc9bef31ec06c3560f3249d6ee9e5d83c57625596e05f6f").unwrap());
3306 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("20").unwrap());
3308 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00").unwrap());
3311 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001b").unwrap()); // Type 0 + Length 27
3312 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
3315 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0100").unwrap());
3317 if require_confirmed_inputs {
3318 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0200").unwrap());
3320 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3324 fn encoding_open_channelv2() {
3325 do_encoding_open_channelv2(false, false, false, false);
3326 do_encoding_open_channelv2(false, false, false, true);
3327 do_encoding_open_channelv2(false, false, true, false);
3328 do_encoding_open_channelv2(false, false, true, true);
3329 do_encoding_open_channelv2(false, true, false, false);
3330 do_encoding_open_channelv2(false, true, false, true);
3331 do_encoding_open_channelv2(false, true, true, false);
3332 do_encoding_open_channelv2(false, true, true, true);
3333 do_encoding_open_channelv2(true, false, false, false);
3334 do_encoding_open_channelv2(true, false, false, true);
3335 do_encoding_open_channelv2(true, false, true, false);
3336 do_encoding_open_channelv2(true, false, true, true);
3337 do_encoding_open_channelv2(true, true, false, false);
3338 do_encoding_open_channelv2(true, true, false, true);
3339 do_encoding_open_channelv2(true, true, true, false);
3340 do_encoding_open_channelv2(true, true, true, true);
3343 fn do_encoding_accept_channel(shutdown: bool) {
3344 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3345 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3346 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
3347 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
3348 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
3349 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
3350 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
3351 let accept_channel = msgs::AcceptChannel {
3352 temporary_channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3353 dust_limit_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
3354 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 2536655962884945560,
3355 channel_reserve_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
3356 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
3357 minimum_depth: 821716,
3358 to_self_delay: 49340,
3359 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
3360 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
3361 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
3362 payment_point: pubkey_3,
3363 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
3364 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
3365 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
3366 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { Some(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { None },
3369 next_local_nonce: None,
3371 let encoded_value = accept_channel.encode();
3372 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("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").unwrap();
3374 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
3376 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3380 fn encoding_accept_channel() {
3381 do_encoding_accept_channel(false);
3382 do_encoding_accept_channel(true);
3385 fn do_encoding_accept_channelv2(shutdown: bool) {
3386 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3387 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3388 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
3389 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
3390 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
3391 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
3392 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
3393 let (_, pubkey_7) = get_keys_from!("0707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707", secp_ctx);
3394 let accept_channelv2 = msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
3395 temporary_channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3396 funding_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
3397 dust_limit_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
3398 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 2536655962884945560,
3399 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
3400 minimum_depth: 821716,
3401 to_self_delay: 49340,
3402 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
3403 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
3404 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
3405 payment_basepoint: pubkey_3,
3406 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
3407 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
3408 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
3409 second_per_commitment_point: pubkey_7,
3410 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { Some(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { None },
3412 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
3414 let encoded_value = accept_channelv2.encode();
3415 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap(); // temporary_channel_id
3416 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1234567890123456").unwrap()); // funding_satoshis
3417 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1234567890123456").unwrap()); // dust_limit_satoshis
3418 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2334032891223698").unwrap()); // max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3419 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00083a840000034d").unwrap()); // htlc_minimum_msat
3420 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000c89d4").unwrap()); // minimum_depth
3421 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c0bc").unwrap()); // to_self_delay
3422 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c0bc").unwrap()); // max_accepted_htlcs
3423 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap()); // funding_pubkey
3424 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("024d4b6cd1361032ca9bd2aeb9d900aa4d45d9ead80ac9423374c451a7254d0766").unwrap()); // revocation_basepoint
3425 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02531fe6068134503d2723133227c867ac8fa6c83c537e9a44c3c5bdbdcb1fe337").unwrap()); // payment_basepoint
3426 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("03462779ad4aad39514614751a71085f2f10e1c7a593e4e030efb5b8721ce55b0b").unwrap()); // delayed_payment_basepoint
3427 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0362c0a046dacce86ddd0343c6d3c7c79c2208ba0d9c9cf24a6d046d21d21f90f7").unwrap()); // htlc_basepoint
3428 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("03f006a18d5653c4edf5391ff23a61f03ff83d237e880ee61187fa9f379a028e0a").unwrap()); // first_per_commitment_point
3429 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02989c0b76cb563971fdc9bef31ec06c3560f3249d6ee9e5d83c57625596e05f6f").unwrap()); // second_per_commitment_point
3431 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001b").unwrap()); // Type 0 + Length 27
3432 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
3434 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3438 fn encoding_accept_channelv2() {
3439 do_encoding_accept_channelv2(false);
3440 do_encoding_accept_channelv2(true);
3444 fn encoding_funding_created() {
3445 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3446 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3447 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
3448 let funding_created = msgs::FundingCreated {
3449 temporary_channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3450 funding_txid: Txid::from_str("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap(),
3451 funding_output_index: 255,
3454 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
3456 next_local_nonce: None,
3458 let encoded_value = funding_created.encode();
3459 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202026e96fe9f8b0ddcd729ba03cfafa5a27b050b39d354dd980814268dfa9a44d4c200ffd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
3460 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3464 fn encoding_funding_signed() {
3465 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3466 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3467 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
3468 let funding_signed = msgs::FundingSigned {
3469 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3472 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
3474 let encoded_value = funding_signed.encode();
3475 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
3476 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3480 fn encoding_channel_ready() {
3481 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3482 let (_, pubkey_1,) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3483 let channel_ready = msgs::ChannelReady {
3484 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3485 next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
3486 short_channel_id_alias: None,
3488 let encoded_value = channel_ready.encode();
3489 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap();
3490 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3494 fn encoding_splice() {
3495 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3496 let (_, pubkey_1,) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3497 let splice = msgs::Splice {
3498 chain_hash: ChainHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
3499 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3500 relative_satoshis: 123456,
3501 funding_feerate_perkw: 2000,
3503 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
3505 let encoded_value = splice.encode();
3506 assert_eq!(encoded_value.as_hex().to_string(), "02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202026fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000000000000001e240000007d000000000031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f");
3510 fn encoding_stfu() {
3511 let stfu = msgs::Stfu {
3512 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3515 let encoded_value = stfu.encode();
3516 assert_eq!(encoded_value.as_hex().to_string(), "020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020201");
3520 fn encoding_splice_ack() {
3521 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3522 let (_, pubkey_1,) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3523 let splice = msgs::SpliceAck {
3524 chain_hash: ChainHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
3525 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3526 relative_satoshis: 123456,
3527 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
3529 let encoded_value = splice.encode();
3530 assert_eq!(encoded_value.as_hex().to_string(), "02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202026fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000000000000001e240031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f");
3534 fn encoding_splice_locked() {
3535 let splice = msgs::SpliceLocked {
3536 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3538 let encoded_value = splice.encode();
3539 assert_eq!(encoded_value.as_hex().to_string(), "0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202");
3543 fn encoding_tx_add_input() {
3544 let tx_add_input = msgs::TxAddInput {
3545 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3546 serial_id: 4886718345,
3547 prevtx: TransactionU16LenLimited::new(Transaction {
3549 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
3551 previous_output: OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_str("305bab643ee297b8b6b76b320792c8223d55082122cb606bf89382146ced9c77").unwrap(), index: 2 }.into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
3552 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
3553 sequence: Sequence(0xfffffffd),
3554 witness: Witness::from_slice(&vec![
3555 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("304402206af85b7dd67450ad12c979302fac49dfacbc6a8620f49c5da2b5721cf9565ca502207002b32fed9ce1bf095f57aeb10c36928ac60b12e723d97d2964a54640ceefa701").unwrap(),
3556 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0301ab7dc16488303549bfcdd80f6ae5ee4c20bf97ab5410bbd6b1bfa85dcd6944").unwrap()]),
3561 script_pubkey: Address::from_str("bc1qzlffunw52jav8vwdu5x3jfk6sr8u22rmq3xzw2").unwrap().payload.script_pubkey(),
3565 script_pubkey: Address::from_str("bc1qxmk834g5marzm227dgqvynd23y2nvt2ztwcw2z").unwrap().payload.script_pubkey(),
3569 prevtx_out: 305419896,
3570 sequence: 305419896,
3572 let encoded_value = tx_add_input.encode();
3573 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("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").unwrap();
3574 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3578 fn encoding_tx_add_output() {
3579 let tx_add_output = msgs::TxAddOutput {
3580 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3581 serial_id: 4886718345,
3583 script: Address::from_str("bc1qxmk834g5marzm227dgqvynd23y2nvt2ztwcw2z").unwrap().payload.script_pubkey(),
3585 let encoded_value = tx_add_output.encode();
3586 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000000012345678900000001234567890016001436ec78d514df462da95e6a00c24daa8915362d42").unwrap();
3587 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3591 fn encoding_tx_remove_input() {
3592 let tx_remove_input = msgs::TxRemoveInput {
3593 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3594 serial_id: 4886718345,
3596 let encoded_value = tx_remove_input.encode();
3597 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020000000123456789").unwrap();
3598 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3602 fn encoding_tx_remove_output() {
3603 let tx_remove_output = msgs::TxRemoveOutput {
3604 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3605 serial_id: 4886718345,
3607 let encoded_value = tx_remove_output.encode();
3608 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020000000123456789").unwrap();
3609 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3613 fn encoding_tx_complete() {
3614 let tx_complete = msgs::TxComplete {
3615 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3617 let encoded_value = tx_complete.encode();
3618 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap();
3619 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3623 fn encoding_tx_signatures() {
3624 let tx_signatures = msgs::TxSignatures {
3625 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3626 tx_hash: Txid::from_str("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap(),
3628 Witness::from_slice(&vec![
3629 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("304402206af85b7dd67450ad12c979302fac49dfacbc6a8620f49c5da2b5721cf9565ca502207002b32fed9ce1bf095f57aeb10c36928ac60b12e723d97d2964a54640ceefa701").unwrap(),
3630 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0301ab7dc16488303549bfcdd80f6ae5ee4c20bf97ab5410bbd6b1bfa85dcd6944").unwrap()]),
3631 Witness::from_slice(&vec![
3632 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3045022100ee00dbf4a862463e837d7c08509de814d620e4d9830fa84818713e0fa358f145022021c3c7060c4d53fe84fd165d60208451108a778c13b92ca4c6bad439236126cc01").unwrap(),
3633 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("028fbbf0b16f5ba5bcb5dd37cd4047ce6f726a21c06682f9ec2f52b057de1dbdb5").unwrap()]),
3636 let encoded_value = tx_signatures.encode();
3637 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap(); // channel_id
3638 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("6e96fe9f8b0ddcd729ba03cfafa5a27b050b39d354dd980814268dfa9a44d4c2").unwrap()); // tx_hash (sha256) (big endian byte order)
3639 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0002").unwrap()); // num_witnesses (u16)
3641 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("006b").unwrap()); // len of witness_data
3642 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02").unwrap()); // num_witness_elements (VarInt)
3643 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("47").unwrap()); // len of witness element data (VarInt)
3644 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("304402206af85b7dd67450ad12c979302fac49dfacbc6a8620f49c5da2b5721cf9565ca502207002b32fed9ce1bf095f57aeb10c36928ac60b12e723d97d2964a54640ceefa701").unwrap());
3645 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("21").unwrap()); // len of witness element data (VarInt)
3646 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0301ab7dc16488303549bfcdd80f6ae5ee4c20bf97ab5410bbd6b1bfa85dcd6944").unwrap());
3648 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("006c").unwrap()); // len of witness_data
3649 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02").unwrap()); // num_witness_elements (VarInt)
3650 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("48").unwrap()); // len of witness element data (VarInt)
3651 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3045022100ee00dbf4a862463e837d7c08509de814d620e4d9830fa84818713e0fa358f145022021c3c7060c4d53fe84fd165d60208451108a778c13b92ca4c6bad439236126cc01").unwrap());
3652 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("21").unwrap()); // len of witness element data (VarInt)
3653 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("028fbbf0b16f5ba5bcb5dd37cd4047ce6f726a21c06682f9ec2f52b057de1dbdb5").unwrap());
3654 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3657 fn do_encoding_tx_init_rbf(funding_value_with_hex_target: Option<(i64, &str)>) {
3658 let tx_init_rbf = msgs::TxInitRbf {
3659 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3660 locktime: 305419896,
3661 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: 20190119,
3662 funding_output_contribution: if let Some((value, _)) = funding_value_with_hex_target { Some(value) } else { None },
3664 let encoded_value = tx_init_rbf.encode();
3665 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap(); // channel_id
3666 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("12345678").unwrap()); // locktime
3667 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("013413a7").unwrap()); // feerate_sat_per_1000_weight
3668 if let Some((_, target)) = funding_value_with_hex_target {
3669 target_value.push(0x00); // Type
3670 target_value.push(target.len() as u8 / 2); // Length
3671 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(target).unwrap()); // Value (i64)
3673 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3677 fn encoding_tx_init_rbf() {
3678 do_encoding_tx_init_rbf(Some((1311768467284833366, "1234567890123456")));
3679 do_encoding_tx_init_rbf(Some((13117684672, "000000030DDFFBC0")));
3680 do_encoding_tx_init_rbf(None);
3683 fn do_encoding_tx_ack_rbf(funding_value_with_hex_target: Option<(i64, &str)>) {
3684 let tx_ack_rbf = msgs::TxAckRbf {
3685 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3686 funding_output_contribution: if let Some((value, _)) = funding_value_with_hex_target { Some(value) } else { None },
3688 let encoded_value = tx_ack_rbf.encode();
3689 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap();
3690 if let Some((_, target)) = funding_value_with_hex_target {
3691 target_value.push(0x00); // Type
3692 target_value.push(target.len() as u8 / 2); // Length
3693 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(target).unwrap()); // Value (i64)
3695 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3699 fn encoding_tx_ack_rbf() {
3700 do_encoding_tx_ack_rbf(Some((1311768467284833366, "1234567890123456")));
3701 do_encoding_tx_ack_rbf(Some((13117684672, "000000030DDFFBC0")));
3702 do_encoding_tx_ack_rbf(None);
3706 fn encoding_tx_abort() {
3707 let tx_abort = msgs::TxAbort {
3708 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3709 data: <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("54686520717569636B2062726F776E20666F78206A756D7073206F76657220746865206C617A7920646F672E").unwrap(),
3711 let encoded_value = tx_abort.encode();
3712 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202002C54686520717569636B2062726F776E20666F78206A756D7073206F76657220746865206C617A7920646F672E").unwrap();
3713 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3716 fn do_encoding_shutdown(script_type: u8) {
3717 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3718 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3719 let script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::OP_TRUE).into_script();
3720 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
3721 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3723 if script_type == 1 { Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() }
3724 else if script_type == 2 { Address::p2sh(&script, Network::Testnet).unwrap().script_pubkey() }
3725 else if script_type == 3 { Address::p2wpkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).unwrap().script_pubkey() }
3726 else { Address::p2wsh(&script, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() },
3728 let encoded_value = shutdown.encode();
3729 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap();
3730 if script_type == 1 {
3731 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
3732 } else if script_type == 2 {
3733 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0017a914da1745e9b549bd0bfa1a569971c77eba30cd5a4b87").unwrap());
3734 } else if script_type == 3 {
3735 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0016001479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b235983").unwrap());
3736 } else if script_type == 4 {
3737 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("002200204ae81572f06e1b88fd5ced7a1a000945432e83e1551e6f721ee9c00b8cc33260").unwrap());
3739 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3743 fn encoding_shutdown() {
3744 do_encoding_shutdown(1);
3745 do_encoding_shutdown(2);
3746 do_encoding_shutdown(3);
3747 do_encoding_shutdown(4);
3751 fn encoding_closing_signed() {
3752 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3753 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3754 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
3755 let closing_signed = msgs::ClosingSigned {
3756 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3757 fee_satoshis: 2316138423780173,
3761 let encoded_value = closing_signed.encode();
3762 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
3763 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3764 assert_eq!(msgs::ClosingSigned::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value)).unwrap(), closing_signed);
3766 let closing_signed_with_range = msgs::ClosingSigned {
3767 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3768 fee_satoshis: 2316138423780173,
3770 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
3771 min_fee_satoshis: 0xdeadbeef,
3772 max_fee_satoshis: 0x1badcafe01234567,
3775 let encoded_value_with_range = closing_signed_with_range.encode();
3776 let target_value_with_range = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a011000000000deadbeef1badcafe01234567").unwrap();
3777 assert_eq!(encoded_value_with_range, target_value_with_range);
3778 assert_eq!(msgs::ClosingSigned::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value_with_range)).unwrap(),
3779 closing_signed_with_range);
3783 fn encoding_update_add_htlc() {
3784 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3785 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3786 let onion_routing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
3788 public_key: Ok(pubkey_1),
3789 hop_data: [1; 20*65],
3792 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3793 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3794 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
3795 amount_msat: 3608586615801332854,
3796 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3797 cltv_expiry: 821716,
3798 onion_routing_packet,
3799 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
3800 blinding_point: None,
3802 let encoded_value = update_add_htlc.encode();
3803 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d32144668701144760101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101000c89d4ff031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap();
3804 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3808 fn encoding_update_fulfill_htlc() {
3809 let update_fulfill_htlc = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3810 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3811 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
3812 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([1; 32]),
3814 let encoded_value = update_fulfill_htlc.encode();
3815 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap();
3816 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3820 fn encoding_update_fail_htlc() {
3821 let reason = OnionErrorPacket {
3822 data: [1; 32].to_vec(),
3824 let update_fail_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3825 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3826 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
3829 let encoded_value = update_fail_htlc.encode();
3830 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d00200101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap();
3831 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3835 fn encoding_update_fail_malformed_htlc() {
3836 let update_fail_malformed_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3837 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3838 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
3839 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
3842 let encoded_value = update_fail_malformed_htlc.encode();
3843 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010100ff").unwrap();
3844 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3847 fn do_encoding_commitment_signed(htlcs: bool) {
3848 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3849 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3850 let (privkey_2, _) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
3851 let (privkey_3, _) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
3852 let (privkey_4, _) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
3853 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
3854 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey_2, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
3855 let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
3856 let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
3857 let commitment_signed = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
3858 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3860 htlc_signatures: if htlcs { vec![sig_2, sig_3, sig_4] } else { Vec::new() },
3862 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
3864 let encoded_value = commitment_signed.encode();
3865 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
3867 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00031735b6a427e80d5fe7cd90a2f4ee08dc9c27cda7c35a4172e5d85b12c49d4232537e98f9b1f3c5e6989a8b9644e90e8918127680dbd0d4043510840fc0f1e11a216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f91e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d2692b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
3869 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000").unwrap());
3871 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3875 fn encoding_commitment_signed() {
3876 do_encoding_commitment_signed(true);
3877 do_encoding_commitment_signed(false);
3881 fn encoding_revoke_and_ack() {
3882 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3883 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3884 let raa = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3885 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3886 per_commitment_secret: [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1],
3887 next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
3889 next_local_nonce: None,
3891 let encoded_value = raa.encode();
3892 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap();
3893 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3897 fn encoding_update_fee() {
3898 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
3899 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3900 feerate_per_kw: 20190119,
3902 let encoded_value = update_fee.encode();
3903 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202013413a7").unwrap();
3904 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3908 fn encoding_init() {
3909 let mainnet_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin);
3910 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
3911 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF]),
3912 networks: Some(vec![mainnet_hash]),
3913 remote_network_address: None,
3914 }.encode(), <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00023fff0003ffffff01206fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap());
3915 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
3916 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF]),
3918 remote_network_address: None,
3919 }.encode(), <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0001ff0001ff").unwrap());
3920 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
3921 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
3922 networks: Some(vec![mainnet_hash]),
3923 remote_network_address: None,
3924 }.encode(), <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000001206fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap());
3925 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
3926 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
3927 networks: Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&[1; 32]), ChainHash::from(&[2; 32])]),
3928 remote_network_address: None,
3929 }.encode(), <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00000000014001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap());
3930 let init_msg = msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
3931 networks: Some(vec![mainnet_hash]),
3932 remote_network_address: Some(SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 {
3933 addr: [127, 0, 0, 1],
3937 let encoded_value = init_msg.encode();
3938 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000001206fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d61900000000000307017f00000103e8").unwrap();
3939 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3940 assert_eq!(msgs::Init::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value)).unwrap(), init_msg);
3944 fn encoding_error() {
3945 let error = msgs::ErrorMessage {
3946 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3947 data: String::from("rust-lightning"),
3949 let encoded_value = error.encode();
3950 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000e727573742d6c696768746e696e67").unwrap();
3951 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3955 fn encoding_warning() {
3956 let error = msgs::WarningMessage {
3957 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3958 data: String::from("rust-lightning"),
3960 let encoded_value = error.encode();
3961 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000e727573742d6c696768746e696e67").unwrap();
3962 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3966 fn encoding_ping() {
3967 let ping = msgs::Ping {
3971 let encoded_value = ping.encode();
3972 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0040004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap();
3973 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3977 fn encoding_pong() {
3978 let pong = msgs::Pong {
3981 let encoded_value = pong.encode();
3982 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap();
3983 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3987 fn encoding_nonfinal_onion_hop_data() {
3988 let outbound_msg = msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Forward {
3989 short_channel_id: 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea,
3990 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
3991 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
3993 let encoded_value = outbound_msg.encode();
3994 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1a02080badf00d010203040404ffffffff0608deadbeef1bad1dea").unwrap();
3995 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3997 let node_signer = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], Network::Testnet);
3998 let inbound_msg = ReadableArgs::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]), (None, &&node_signer)).unwrap();
3999 if let msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
4000 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
4002 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea);
4003 assert_eq!(amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
4004 assert_eq!(outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
4005 } else { panic!(); }
4009 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data() {
4010 let outbound_msg = msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive {
4012 payment_metadata: None,
4013 keysend_preimage: None,
4014 amt_msat: 0x0badf00d01020304,
4015 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
4016 custom_tlvs: vec![],
4018 let encoded_value = outbound_msg.encode();
4019 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1002080badf00d010203040404ffffffff").unwrap();
4020 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
4022 let node_signer = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], Network::Testnet);
4023 let inbound_msg = ReadableArgs::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]), (None, &&node_signer)).unwrap();
4024 if let msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
4025 payment_data: None, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4027 assert_eq!(amt_msat, 0x0badf00d01020304);
4028 assert_eq!(outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
4029 } else { panic!(); }
4033 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data_with_secret() {
4034 let expected_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([0x42u8; 32]);
4035 let outbound_msg = msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive {
4036 payment_data: Some(FinalOnionHopData {
4037 payment_secret: expected_payment_secret,
4038 total_msat: 0x1badca1f
4040 payment_metadata: None,
4041 keysend_preimage: None,
4042 amt_msat: 0x0badf00d01020304,
4043 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
4044 custom_tlvs: vec![],
4046 let encoded_value = outbound_msg.encode();
4047 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3602080badf00d010203040404ffffffff082442424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242421badca1f").unwrap();
4048 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
4050 let node_signer = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], Network::Testnet);
4051 let inbound_msg = ReadableArgs::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]), (None, &&node_signer)).unwrap();
4052 if let msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
4053 payment_data: Some(FinalOnionHopData {
4055 total_msat: 0x1badca1f
4057 amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4058 payment_metadata: None,
4059 keysend_preimage: None,
4062 assert_eq!(payment_secret, expected_payment_secret);
4063 assert_eq!(amt_msat, 0x0badf00d01020304);
4064 assert_eq!(outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
4065 assert_eq!(custom_tlvs, vec![]);
4066 } else { panic!(); }
4070 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data_with_bad_custom_tlvs() {
4071 // If custom TLVs have type number within the range reserved for protocol, treat them as if
4073 let bad_type_range_tlvs = vec![
4074 ((1 << 16) - 4, vec![42]),
4075 ((1 << 16) - 2, vec![42; 32]),
4077 let mut msg = msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive {
4079 payment_metadata: None,
4080 keysend_preimage: None,
4081 custom_tlvs: bad_type_range_tlvs,
4082 amt_msat: 0x0badf00d01020304,
4083 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
4085 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
4086 let node_signer = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], Network::Testnet);
4087 assert!(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::read(&mut Cursor::new(&encoded_value[..]), (None, &&node_signer)).is_err());
4088 let good_type_range_tlvs = vec![
4089 ((1 << 16) - 3, vec![42]),
4090 ((1 << 16) - 1, vec![42; 32]),
4092 if let msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive { ref mut custom_tlvs, .. } = msg {
4093 *custom_tlvs = good_type_range_tlvs.clone();
4095 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
4096 let inbound_msg = ReadableArgs::read(&mut Cursor::new(&encoded_value[..]), (None, &&node_signer)).unwrap();
4098 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { custom_tlvs, .. } => assert!(custom_tlvs.is_empty()),
4104 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data_with_custom_tlvs() {
4105 let expected_custom_tlvs = vec![
4106 (5482373483, vec![0x12, 0x34]),
4107 (5482373487, vec![0x42u8; 8]),
4109 let msg = msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive {
4111 payment_metadata: None,
4112 keysend_preimage: None,
4113 custom_tlvs: expected_custom_tlvs.clone(),
4114 amt_msat: 0x0badf00d01020304,
4115 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
4117 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
4118 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2e02080badf00d010203040404ffffffffff0000000146c6616b021234ff0000000146c6616f084242424242424242").unwrap();
4119 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
4120 let node_signer = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], Network::Testnet);
4121 let inbound_msg: msgs::InboundOnionPayload = ReadableArgs::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]), (None, &&node_signer)).unwrap();
4122 if let msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
4124 payment_metadata: None,
4125 keysend_preimage: None,
4128 outgoing_cltv_value,
4131 assert_eq!(custom_tlvs, expected_custom_tlvs);
4132 assert_eq!(amt_msat, 0x0badf00d01020304);
4133 assert_eq!(outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
4134 } else { panic!(); }
4138 fn query_channel_range_end_blocknum() {
4139 let tests: Vec<(u32, u32, u32)> = vec![
4140 (10000, 1500, 11500),
4141 (0, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
4142 (1, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
4145 for (first_blocknum, number_of_blocks, expected) in tests.into_iter() {
4146 let sut = msgs::QueryChannelRange {
4147 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Regtest),
4151 assert_eq!(sut.end_blocknum(), expected);
4156 fn encoding_query_channel_range() {
4157 let mut query_channel_range = msgs::QueryChannelRange {
4158 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Regtest),
4159 first_blocknum: 100000,
4160 number_of_blocks: 1500,
4162 let encoded_value = query_channel_range.encode();
4163 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f000186a0000005dc").unwrap();
4164 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
4166 query_channel_range = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
4167 assert_eq!(query_channel_range.first_blocknum, 100000);
4168 assert_eq!(query_channel_range.number_of_blocks, 1500);
4172 fn encoding_reply_channel_range() {
4173 do_encoding_reply_channel_range(0);
4174 do_encoding_reply_channel_range(1);
4177 fn do_encoding_reply_channel_range(encoding_type: u8) {
4178 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f000b8a06000005dc01").unwrap();
4179 let expected_chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Regtest);
4180 let mut reply_channel_range = msgs::ReplyChannelRange {
4181 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
4182 first_blocknum: 756230,
4183 number_of_blocks: 1500,
4184 sync_complete: true,
4185 short_channel_ids: vec![0x000000000000008e, 0x0000000000003c69, 0x000000000045a6c4],
4188 if encoding_type == 0 {
4189 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001900000000000000008e0000000000003c69000000000045a6c4").unwrap());
4190 let encoded_value = reply_channel_range.encode();
4191 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
4193 reply_channel_range = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
4194 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
4195 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.first_blocknum, 756230);
4196 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.number_of_blocks, 1500);
4197 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.sync_complete, true);
4198 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[0], 0x000000000000008e);
4199 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[1], 0x0000000000003c69);
4200 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[2], 0x000000000045a6c4);
4202 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001601789c636000833e08659309a65878be010010a9023a").unwrap());
4203 let result: Result<msgs::ReplyChannelRange, msgs::DecodeError> = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]));
4204 assert!(result.is_err(), "Expected decode failure with unsupported zlib encoding");
4209 fn encoding_query_short_channel_ids() {
4210 do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(0);
4211 do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(1);
4214 fn do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(encoding_type: u8) {
4215 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
4216 let expected_chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Regtest);
4217 let mut query_short_channel_ids = msgs::QueryShortChannelIds {
4218 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
4219 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0000000000008e, 0x0000000000003c69, 0x000000000045a6c4],
4222 if encoding_type == 0 {
4223 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001900000000000000008e0000000000003c69000000000045a6c4").unwrap());
4224 let encoded_value = query_short_channel_ids.encode();
4225 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
4227 query_short_channel_ids = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
4228 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
4229 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[0], 0x000000000000008e);
4230 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[1], 0x0000000000003c69);
4231 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[2], 0x000000000045a6c4);
4233 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001601789c636000833e08659309a65878be010010a9023a").unwrap());
4234 let result: Result<msgs::QueryShortChannelIds, msgs::DecodeError> = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]));
4235 assert!(result.is_err(), "Expected decode failure with unsupported zlib encoding");
4240 fn encoding_reply_short_channel_ids_end() {
4241 let expected_chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Regtest);
4242 let mut reply_short_channel_ids_end = msgs::ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
4243 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
4244 full_information: true,
4246 let encoded_value = reply_short_channel_ids_end.encode();
4247 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f01").unwrap();
4248 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
4250 reply_short_channel_ids_end = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
4251 assert_eq!(reply_short_channel_ids_end.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
4252 assert_eq!(reply_short_channel_ids_end.full_information, true);
4256 fn encoding_gossip_timestamp_filter(){
4257 let expected_chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Regtest);
4258 let mut gossip_timestamp_filter = msgs::GossipTimestampFilter {
4259 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
4260 first_timestamp: 1590000000,
4261 timestamp_range: 0xffff_ffff,
4263 let encoded_value = gossip_timestamp_filter.encode();
4264 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f5ec57980ffffffff").unwrap();
4265 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
4267 gossip_timestamp_filter = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
4268 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
4269 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.first_timestamp, 1590000000);
4270 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.timestamp_range, 0xffff_ffff);
4274 fn decode_onion_hop_data_len_as_bigsize() {
4275 // Tests that we can decode an onion payload that is >253 bytes.
4276 // Previously, receiving a payload of this size could've caused us to fail to decode a valid
4277 // payload, because we were decoding the length (a BigSize, big-endian) as a VarInt
4280 // Encode a test onion payload with a big custom TLV such that it's >253 bytes, forcing the
4281 // payload length to be encoded over multiple bytes rather than a single u8.
4282 let big_payload = encode_big_payload().unwrap();
4283 let mut rd = Cursor::new(&big_payload[..]);
4285 let node_signer = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], Network::Testnet);
4286 <msgs::InboundOnionPayload as ReadableArgs<(Option<PublicKey>, &&test_utils::TestKeysInterface)>>
4287 ::read(&mut rd, (None, &&node_signer)).unwrap();
4289 // see above test, needs to be a separate method for use of the serialization macros.
4290 fn encode_big_payload() -> Result<Vec<u8>, io::Error> {
4291 use crate::util::ser::HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize;
4292 let payload = msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Forward {
4293 short_channel_id: 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea,
4294 amt_to_forward: 1000,
4295 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
4297 let mut encoded_payload = Vec::new();
4298 let test_bytes = vec![42u8; 1000];
4299 if let msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } = payload {
4300 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(&mut encoded_payload, {
4301 (1, test_bytes, required_vec),
4302 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(amt_to_forward), required),
4303 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(outgoing_cltv_value), required),
4304 (6, short_channel_id, required)
4311 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
4312 fn test_socket_address_from_str() {
4313 let tcpip_v4 = SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 {
4314 addr: Ipv4Addr::new(127, 0, 0, 1).octets(),
4317 assert_eq!(tcpip_v4, SocketAddress::from_str("127.0.0.1:1234").unwrap());
4318 assert_eq!(tcpip_v4, SocketAddress::from_str(&tcpip_v4.to_string()).unwrap());
4320 let tcpip_v6 = SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 {
4321 addr: Ipv6Addr::new(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1).octets(),
4324 assert_eq!(tcpip_v6, SocketAddress::from_str("[0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1]:1234").unwrap());
4325 assert_eq!(tcpip_v6, SocketAddress::from_str(&tcpip_v6.to_string()).unwrap());
4327 let hostname = SocketAddress::Hostname {
4328 hostname: Hostname::try_from("lightning-node.mydomain.com".to_string()).unwrap(),
4331 assert_eq!(hostname, SocketAddress::from_str("lightning-node.mydomain.com:1234").unwrap());
4332 assert_eq!(hostname, SocketAddress::from_str(&hostname.to_string()).unwrap());
4334 let onion_v2 = SocketAddress::OnionV2 ([40, 4, 64, 185, 202, 19, 162, 75, 90, 200, 38, 7],);
4335 assert_eq!("OnionV2([40, 4, 64, 185, 202, 19, 162, 75, 90, 200, 38, 7])", &onion_v2.to_string());
4336 assert_eq!(Err(SocketAddressParseError::InvalidOnionV3), SocketAddress::from_str("FACEBOOKCOREWWWI.onion:9735"));
4338 let onion_v3 = SocketAddress::OnionV3 {
4339 ed25519_pubkey: [37, 24, 75, 5, 25, 73, 117, 194, 139, 102, 182, 107, 4, 105, 247, 246, 85,
4340 111, 177, 172, 49, 137, 167, 155, 64, 221, 163, 47, 31, 33, 71, 3],
4345 assert_eq!(onion_v3, SocketAddress::from_str("pg6mmjiyjmcrsslvykfwnntlaru7p5svn6y2ymmju6nubxndf4pscryd.onion:1234").unwrap());
4346 assert_eq!(onion_v3, SocketAddress::from_str(&onion_v3.to_string()).unwrap());
4348 assert_eq!(Err(SocketAddressParseError::InvalidOnionV3), SocketAddress::from_str("pg6mmjiyjmcrsslvykfwnntlaru7p5svn6.onion:1234"));
4349 assert_eq!(Err(SocketAddressParseError::InvalidInput), SocketAddress::from_str("127.0.0.1@1234"));
4350 assert_eq!(Err(SocketAddressParseError::InvalidInput), "".parse::<SocketAddress>());
4351 assert!(SocketAddress::from_str("pg6mmjiyjmcrsslvykfwnntlaru7p5svn6y2ymmju6nubxndf4pscryd.onion.onion:9735:94").is_err());
4352 assert!(SocketAddress::from_str("wrong$%#.com:1234").is_err());
4353 assert_eq!(Err(SocketAddressParseError::InvalidPort), SocketAddress::from_str("example.com:wrong"));
4354 assert!("localhost".parse::<SocketAddress>().is_err());
4355 assert!("localhost:invalid-port".parse::<SocketAddress>().is_err());
4356 assert!( "invalid-onion-v3-hostname.onion:8080".parse::<SocketAddress>().is_err());
4357 assert!("b32.example.onion:invalid-port".parse::<SocketAddress>().is_err());
4358 assert!("invalid-address".parse::<SocketAddress>().is_err());
4359 assert!(SocketAddress::from_str("pg6mmjiyjmcrsslvykfwnntlaru7p5svn6y2ymmju6nubxndf4pscryd.onion.onion:1234").is_err());
4363 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
4364 fn test_socket_address_to_socket_addrs() {
4365 assert_eq!(SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 {addr:[0u8; 4], port: 1337,}.to_socket_addrs().unwrap().next().unwrap(),
4366 SocketAddr::V4(SocketAddrV4::new(Ipv4Addr::new(0,0,0,0), 1337)));
4367 assert_eq!(SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 {addr:[0u8; 16], port: 1337,}.to_socket_addrs().unwrap().next().unwrap(),
4368 SocketAddr::V6(SocketAddrV6::new(Ipv6Addr::from([0u8; 16]), 1337, 0, 0)));
4369 assert_eq!(SocketAddress::Hostname { hostname: Hostname::try_from("0.0.0.0".to_string()).unwrap(), port: 0 }
4370 .to_socket_addrs().unwrap().next().unwrap(), SocketAddr::V4(SocketAddrV4::new(Ipv4Addr::from([0u8; 4]),0)));
4371 assert!(SocketAddress::OnionV2([0u8; 12]).to_socket_addrs().is_err());
4372 assert!(SocketAddress::OnionV3{ ed25519_pubkey: [37, 24, 75, 5, 25, 73, 117, 194, 139, 102,
4373 182, 107, 4, 105, 247, 246, 85, 111, 177, 172, 49, 137, 167, 155, 64, 221, 163, 47, 31,
4377 port: 1234 }.to_socket_addrs().is_err());