1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Wire messages, traits representing wire message handlers, and a few error types live here.
12 //! For a normal node you probably don't need to use anything here, however, if you wish to split a
13 //! node into an internet-facing route/message socket handling daemon and a separate daemon (or
14 //! server entirely) which handles only channel-related messages you may wish to implement
15 //! [`ChannelMessageHandler`] yourself and use it to re-serialize messages and pass them across
18 //! Note that if you go with such an architecture (instead of passing raw socket events to a
19 //! non-internet-facing system) you trust the frontend internet-facing system to not lie about the
20 //! source `node_id` of the message, however this does allow you to significantly reduce bandwidth
21 //! between the systems as routing messages can represent a significant chunk of bandwidth usage
22 //! (especially for non-channel-publicly-announcing nodes). As an alternate design which avoids
23 //! this issue, if you have sufficient bidirectional bandwidth between your systems, you may send
24 //! raw socket events into your non-internet-facing system and then send routing events back to
25 //! track the network on the less-secure system.
27 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
28 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature;
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
30 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
33 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
34 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
35 use crate::onion_message;
37 use crate::prelude::*;
40 use crate::io::{self, Read};
41 use crate::io_extras::read_to_end;
43 use crate::util::events::{MessageSendEventsProvider, OnionMessageProvider};
44 use crate::util::logger;
45 use crate::util::ser::{LengthReadable, Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, FixedLengthReader, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize, Hostname};
47 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
49 /// 21 million * 10^8 * 1000
50 pub(crate) const MAX_VALUE_MSAT: u64 = 21_000_000_0000_0000_000;
52 /// An error in decoding a message or struct.
53 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
54 pub enum DecodeError {
55 /// A version byte specified something we don't know how to handle.
57 /// Includes unknown realm byte in an onion hop data packet.
59 /// Unknown feature mandating we fail to parse message (e.g., TLV with an even, unknown type)
60 UnknownRequiredFeature,
61 /// Value was invalid.
63 /// For example, a byte which was supposed to be a bool was something other than a 0
64 /// or 1, a public key/private key/signature was invalid, text wasn't UTF-8, TLV was
65 /// syntactically incorrect, etc.
67 /// The buffer to be read was too short.
69 /// A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly.
71 /// Error from [`std::io`].
73 /// The message included zlib-compressed values, which we don't support.
74 UnsupportedCompression,
77 /// An [`init`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
79 /// [`init`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-init-message
80 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
82 /// The relevant features which the sender supports.
83 pub features: InitFeatures,
84 /// The receipient's network address.
86 /// This adds the option to report a remote IP address back to a connecting peer using the init
87 /// message. A node can decide to use that information to discover a potential update to its
88 /// public IPv4 address (NAT) and use that for a [`NodeAnnouncement`] update message containing
90 pub remote_network_address: Option<NetAddress>,
93 /// An [`error`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
95 /// [`error`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-error-and-warning-messages
96 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
97 pub struct ErrorMessage {
98 /// The channel ID involved in the error.
100 /// All-0s indicates a general error unrelated to a specific channel, after which all channels
101 /// with the sending peer should be closed.
102 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
103 /// A possibly human-readable error description.
105 /// The string should be sanitized before it is used (e.g., emitted to logs or printed to
106 /// `stdout`). Otherwise, a well crafted error message may trigger a security vulnerability in
107 /// the terminal emulator or the logging subsystem.
111 /// A [`warning`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
113 /// [`warning`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-error-and-warning-messages
114 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
115 pub struct WarningMessage {
116 /// The channel ID involved in the warning.
118 /// All-0s indicates a warning unrelated to a specific channel.
119 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
120 /// A possibly human-readable warning description.
122 /// The string should be sanitized before it is used (e.g. emitted to logs or printed to
123 /// stdout). Otherwise, a well crafted error message may trigger a security vulnerability in
124 /// the terminal emulator or the logging subsystem.
128 /// A [`ping`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
130 /// [`ping`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-ping-and-pong-messages
131 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
133 /// The desired response length.
135 /// The ping packet size.
137 /// This field is not sent on the wire. byteslen zeros are sent.
141 /// A [`pong`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
143 /// [`pong`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-ping-and-pong-messages
144 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
146 /// The pong packet size.
148 /// This field is not sent on the wire. byteslen zeros are sent.
152 /// An [`open_channel`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
154 /// [`open_channel`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-open_channel-message
155 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
156 pub struct OpenChannel {
157 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
158 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
159 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
160 pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
161 /// The channel value
162 pub funding_satoshis: u64,
163 /// The amount to push to the counterparty as part of the open, in milli-satoshi
165 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by sender will be omitted
166 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
167 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards sender, in milli-satoshi
168 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
169 /// The minimum value unencumbered by HTLCs for the counterparty to keep in the channel
170 pub channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
171 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
172 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
173 /// The feerate per 1000-weight of sender generated transactions, until updated by
175 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
176 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if
177 /// they broadcast a commitment transaction
178 pub to_self_delay: u16,
179 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards sender
180 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
181 /// The sender's key controlling the funding transaction
182 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
183 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
184 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
185 /// A payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
186 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
187 /// Used to derive a payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by sender
188 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
189 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to sender
190 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
191 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-sender transaction's per commitment point
192 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
193 /// The channel flags to be used
194 pub channel_flags: u8,
195 /// Optionally, a request to pre-set the to-sender output's `scriptPubkey` for when we collaboratively close
196 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField<Script>,
197 /// The channel type that this channel will represent
199 /// If this is `None`, we derive the channel type from the intersection of our
200 /// feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from the [`Init`] message.
201 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
204 /// An [`accept_channel`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
206 /// [`accept_channel`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-accept_channel-message
207 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
208 pub struct AcceptChannel {
209 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
210 pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
211 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by sender will be omitted
212 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
213 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards sender, in milli-satoshi
214 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
215 /// The minimum value unencumbered by HTLCs for the counterparty to keep in the channel
216 pub channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
217 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
218 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
219 /// Minimum depth of the funding transaction before the channel is considered open
220 pub minimum_depth: u32,
221 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if they broadcast a commitment transaction
222 pub to_self_delay: u16,
223 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards sender
224 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
225 /// The sender's key controlling the funding transaction
226 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
227 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
228 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
229 /// A payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
230 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
231 /// Used to derive a payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by sender
232 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
233 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
234 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
235 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-sender transaction's per commitment point
236 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
237 /// Optionally, a request to pre-set the to-sender output's scriptPubkey for when we collaboratively close
238 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField<Script>,
239 /// The channel type that this channel will represent.
241 /// If this is `None`, we derive the channel type from the intersection of
242 /// our feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from the [`Init`] message.
243 /// This is required to match the equivalent field in [`OpenChannel::channel_type`].
244 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
247 /// A [`funding_created`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
249 /// [`funding_created`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-funding_created-message
250 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
251 pub struct FundingCreated {
252 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding is established
253 pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
254 /// The funding transaction ID
255 pub funding_txid: Txid,
256 /// The specific output index funding this channel
257 pub funding_output_index: u16,
258 /// The signature of the channel initiator (funder) on the initial commitment transaction
259 pub signature: Signature,
262 /// A [`funding_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
264 /// [`funding_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-funding_signed-message
265 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
266 pub struct FundingSigned {
268 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
269 /// The signature of the channel acceptor (fundee) on the initial commitment transaction
270 pub signature: Signature,
273 /// A [`channel_ready`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
275 /// [`channel_ready`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-channel_ready-message
276 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
277 pub struct ChannelReady {
279 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
280 /// The per-commitment point of the second commitment transaction
281 pub next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
282 /// If set, provides a `short_channel_id` alias for this channel.
284 /// The sender will accept payments to be forwarded over this SCID and forward them to this
285 /// messages' recipient.
286 pub short_channel_id_alias: Option<u64>,
289 /// A [`shutdown`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
291 /// [`shutdown`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#closing-initiation-shutdown
292 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
293 pub struct Shutdown {
295 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
296 /// The destination of this peer's funds on closing.
298 /// Must be in one of these forms: P2PKH, P2SH, P2WPKH, P2WSH, P2TR.
299 pub scriptpubkey: Script,
302 /// The minimum and maximum fees which the sender is willing to place on the closing transaction.
304 /// This is provided in [`ClosingSigned`] by both sides to indicate the fee range they are willing
306 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
307 pub struct ClosingSignedFeeRange {
308 /// The minimum absolute fee, in satoshis, which the sender is willing to place on the closing
310 pub min_fee_satoshis: u64,
311 /// The maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, which the sender is willing to place on the closing
313 pub max_fee_satoshis: u64,
316 /// A [`closing_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
318 /// [`closing_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#closing-negotiation-closing_signed
319 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
320 pub struct ClosingSigned {
322 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
323 /// The proposed total fee for the closing transaction
324 pub fee_satoshis: u64,
325 /// A signature on the closing transaction
326 pub signature: Signature,
327 /// The minimum and maximum fees which the sender is willing to accept, provided only by new
329 pub fee_range: Option<ClosingSignedFeeRange>,
332 /// An [`update_add_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
334 /// [`update_add_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#adding-an-htlc-update_add_htlc
335 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
336 pub struct UpdateAddHTLC {
338 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
341 /// The HTLC value in milli-satoshi
342 pub amount_msat: u64,
343 /// The payment hash, the pre-image of which controls HTLC redemption
344 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
345 /// The expiry height of the HTLC
346 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
347 pub(crate) onion_routing_packet: OnionPacket,
350 /// An onion message to be sent to or received from a peer.
352 // TODO: update with link to OM when they are merged into the BOLTs
353 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
354 pub struct OnionMessage {
355 /// Used in decrypting the onion packet's payload.
356 pub blinding_point: PublicKey,
357 pub(crate) onion_routing_packet: onion_message::Packet,
360 /// An [`update_fulfill_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
362 /// [`update_fulfill_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
363 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
364 pub struct UpdateFulfillHTLC {
366 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
369 /// The pre-image of the payment hash, allowing HTLC redemption
370 pub payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
373 /// An [`update_fail_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
375 /// [`update_fail_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
376 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
377 pub struct UpdateFailHTLC {
379 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
382 pub(crate) reason: OnionErrorPacket,
385 /// An [`update_fail_malformed_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
387 /// [`update_fail_malformed_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
388 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
389 pub struct UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
391 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
394 pub(crate) sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
396 pub failure_code: u16,
399 /// A [`commitment_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
401 /// [`commitment_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#committing-updates-so-far-commitment_signed
402 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
403 pub struct CommitmentSigned {
405 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
406 /// A signature on the commitment transaction
407 pub signature: Signature,
408 /// Signatures on the HTLC transactions
409 pub htlc_signatures: Vec<Signature>,
412 /// A [`revoke_and_ack`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
414 /// [`revoke_and_ack`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#completing-the-transition-to-the-updated-state-revoke_and_ack
415 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
416 pub struct RevokeAndACK {
418 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
419 /// The secret corresponding to the per-commitment point
420 pub per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
421 /// The next sender-broadcast commitment transaction's per-commitment point
422 pub next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
425 /// An [`update_fee`] message to be sent to or received from a peer
427 /// [`update_fee`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#updating-fees-update_fee
428 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
429 pub struct UpdateFee {
431 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
432 /// Fee rate per 1000-weight of the transaction
433 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
436 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
437 /// Proof that the sender knows the per-commitment secret of the previous commitment transaction.
439 /// This is used to convince the recipient that the channel is at a certain commitment
440 /// number even if they lost that data due to a local failure. Of course, the peer may lie
441 /// and even later commitments may have been revoked.
442 pub struct DataLossProtect {
443 /// Proof that the sender knows the per-commitment secret of a specific commitment transaction
444 /// belonging to the recipient
445 pub your_last_per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
446 /// The sender's per-commitment point for their current commitment transaction
447 pub my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
450 /// A [`channel_reestablish`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
452 /// [`channel_reestablish`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#message-retransmission
453 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
454 pub struct ChannelReestablish {
456 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
457 /// The next commitment number for the sender
458 pub next_local_commitment_number: u64,
459 /// The next commitment number for the recipient
460 pub next_remote_commitment_number: u64,
461 /// Optionally, a field proving that next_remote_commitment_number-1 has been revoked
462 pub data_loss_protect: OptionalField<DataLossProtect>,
465 /// An [`announcement_signatures`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
467 /// [`announcement_signatures`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-announcement_signatures-message
468 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
469 pub struct AnnouncementSignatures {
471 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
472 /// The short channel ID
473 pub short_channel_id: u64,
474 /// A signature by the node key
475 pub node_signature: Signature,
476 /// A signature by the funding key
477 pub bitcoin_signature: Signature,
480 /// An address which can be used to connect to a remote peer.
481 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
482 pub enum NetAddress {
483 /// An IPv4 address/port on which the peer is listening.
485 /// The 4-byte IPv4 address
487 /// The port on which the node is listening
490 /// An IPv6 address/port on which the peer is listening.
492 /// The 16-byte IPv6 address
494 /// The port on which the node is listening
497 /// An old-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening.
499 /// This field is deprecated and the Tor network generally no longer supports V2 Onion
500 /// addresses. Thus, the details are not parsed here.
502 /// A new-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening.
504 /// To create the human-readable "hostname", concatenate the ED25519 pubkey, checksum, and version,
505 /// wrap as base32 and append ".onion".
507 /// The ed25519 long-term public key of the peer
508 ed25519_pubkey: [u8; 32],
509 /// The checksum of the pubkey and version, as included in the onion address
511 /// The version byte, as defined by the Tor Onion v3 spec.
513 /// The port on which the node is listening
516 /// A hostname/port on which the peer is listening.
518 /// The hostname on which the node is listening.
520 /// The port on which the node is listening.
525 /// Gets the ID of this address type. Addresses in [`NodeAnnouncement`] messages should be sorted
527 pub(crate) fn get_id(&self) -> u8 {
529 &NetAddress::IPv4 {..} => { 1 },
530 &NetAddress::IPv6 {..} => { 2 },
531 &NetAddress::OnionV2(_) => { 3 },
532 &NetAddress::OnionV3 {..} => { 4 },
533 &NetAddress::Hostname {..} => { 5 },
537 /// Strict byte-length of address descriptor, 1-byte type not recorded
538 fn len(&self) -> u16 {
540 &NetAddress::IPv4 { .. } => { 6 },
541 &NetAddress::IPv6 { .. } => { 18 },
542 &NetAddress::OnionV2(_) => { 12 },
543 &NetAddress::OnionV3 { .. } => { 37 },
544 // Consists of 1-byte hostname length, hostname bytes, and 2-byte port.
545 &NetAddress::Hostname { ref hostname, .. } => { u16::from(hostname.len()) + 3 },
549 /// The maximum length of any address descriptor, not including the 1-byte type.
550 /// This maximum length is reached by a hostname address descriptor:
551 /// a hostname with a maximum length of 255, its 1-byte length and a 2-byte port.
552 pub(crate) const MAX_LEN: u16 = 258;
555 impl Writeable for NetAddress {
556 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
558 &NetAddress::IPv4 { ref addr, ref port } => {
563 &NetAddress::IPv6 { ref addr, ref port } => {
568 &NetAddress::OnionV2(bytes) => {
570 bytes.write(writer)?;
572 &NetAddress::OnionV3 { ref ed25519_pubkey, ref checksum, ref version, ref port } => {
574 ed25519_pubkey.write(writer)?;
575 checksum.write(writer)?;
576 version.write(writer)?;
579 &NetAddress::Hostname { ref hostname, ref port } => {
581 hostname.write(writer)?;
589 impl Readable for Result<NetAddress, u8> {
590 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Result<NetAddress, u8>, DecodeError> {
591 let byte = <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
594 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::IPv4 {
595 addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
596 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
600 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::IPv6 {
601 addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
602 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
605 3 => Ok(Ok(NetAddress::OnionV2(Readable::read(reader)?))),
607 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::OnionV3 {
608 ed25519_pubkey: Readable::read(reader)?,
609 checksum: Readable::read(reader)?,
610 version: Readable::read(reader)?,
611 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
615 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::Hostname {
616 hostname: Readable::read(reader)?,
617 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
620 _ => return Ok(Err(byte)),
625 impl Readable for NetAddress {
626 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NetAddress, DecodeError> {
627 match Readable::read(reader) {
628 Ok(Ok(res)) => Ok(res),
629 Ok(Err(_)) => Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion),
636 /// The unsigned part of a [`node_announcement`] message.
638 /// [`node_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-node_announcement-message
639 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
640 pub struct UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
641 /// The advertised features
642 pub features: NodeFeatures,
643 /// A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed
645 /// The `node_id` this announcement originated from (don't rebroadcast the `node_announcement` back
647 pub node_id: PublicKey,
648 /// An RGB color for UI purposes
650 /// An alias, for UI purposes.
652 /// This should be sanitized before use. There is no guarantee of uniqueness.
654 /// List of addresses on which this node is reachable
655 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
656 pub(crate) excess_address_data: Vec<u8>,
657 pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
659 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
660 /// A [`node_announcement`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
662 /// [`node_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-node_announcement-message
663 pub struct NodeAnnouncement {
664 /// The signature by the node key
665 pub signature: Signature,
666 /// The actual content of the announcement
667 pub contents: UnsignedNodeAnnouncement,
670 /// The unsigned part of a [`channel_announcement`] message.
672 /// [`channel_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_announcement-message
673 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
674 pub struct UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
675 /// The advertised channel features
676 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
677 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
678 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
679 /// The short channel ID
680 pub short_channel_id: u64,
681 /// One of the two `node_id`s which are endpoints of this channel
682 pub node_id_1: PublicKey,
683 /// The other of the two `node_id`s which are endpoints of this channel
684 pub node_id_2: PublicKey,
685 /// The funding key for the first node
686 pub bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey,
687 /// The funding key for the second node
688 pub bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey,
689 pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
691 /// A [`channel_announcement`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
693 /// [`channel_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_announcement-message
694 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
695 pub struct ChannelAnnouncement {
696 /// Authentication of the announcement by the first public node
697 pub node_signature_1: Signature,
698 /// Authentication of the announcement by the second public node
699 pub node_signature_2: Signature,
700 /// Proof of funding UTXO ownership by the first public node
701 pub bitcoin_signature_1: Signature,
702 /// Proof of funding UTXO ownership by the second public node
703 pub bitcoin_signature_2: Signature,
704 /// The actual announcement
705 pub contents: UnsignedChannelAnnouncement,
708 /// The unsigned part of a [`channel_update`] message.
710 /// [`channel_update`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_update-message
711 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
712 pub struct UnsignedChannelUpdate {
713 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
714 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
715 /// The short channel ID
716 pub short_channel_id: u64,
717 /// A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed, specific to this channel
721 /// The number of blocks such that if:
722 /// `incoming_htlc.cltv_expiry < outgoing_htlc.cltv_expiry + cltv_expiry_delta`
723 /// then we need to fail the HTLC backwards. When forwarding an HTLC, `cltv_expiry_delta` determines
724 /// the outgoing HTLC's minimum `cltv_expiry` value -- so, if an incoming HTLC comes in with a
725 /// `cltv_expiry` of 100000, and the node we're forwarding to has a `cltv_expiry_delta` value of 10,
726 /// then we'll check that the outgoing HTLC's `cltv_expiry` value is at least 100010 before
727 /// forwarding. Note that the HTLC sender is the one who originally sets this value when
728 /// constructing the route.
729 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
730 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
731 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
732 /// The maximum HTLC value incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi.
734 /// This used to be optional.
735 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
736 /// The base HTLC fee charged by sender, in milli-satoshi
737 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
738 /// The amount to fee multiplier, in micro-satoshi
739 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
740 /// Excess data which was signed as a part of the message which we do not (yet) understand how
743 /// This is stored to ensure forward-compatibility as new fields are added to the lightning gossip protocol.
744 pub excess_data: Vec<u8>,
746 /// A [`channel_update`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
748 /// [`channel_update`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_update-message
749 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
750 pub struct ChannelUpdate {
751 /// A signature of the channel update
752 pub signature: Signature,
753 /// The actual channel update
754 pub contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate,
757 /// A [`query_channel_range`] message is used to query a peer for channel
758 /// UTXOs in a range of blocks. The recipient of a query makes a best
759 /// effort to reply to the query using one or more [`ReplyChannelRange`]
762 /// [`query_channel_range`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_channel_range-and-reply_channel_range-messages
763 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
764 pub struct QueryChannelRange {
765 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
766 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
767 /// The height of the first block for the channel UTXOs being queried
768 pub first_blocknum: u32,
769 /// The number of blocks to include in the query results
770 pub number_of_blocks: u32,
773 /// A [`reply_channel_range`] message is a reply to a [`QueryChannelRange`]
776 /// Multiple `reply_channel_range` messages can be sent in reply
777 /// to a single [`QueryChannelRange`] message. The query recipient makes a
778 /// best effort to respond based on their local network view which may
779 /// not be a perfect view of the network. The `short_channel_id`s in the
780 /// reply are encoded. We only support `encoding_type=0` uncompressed
781 /// serialization and do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization.
783 /// [`reply_channel_range`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_channel_range-and-reply_channel_range-messages
784 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
785 pub struct ReplyChannelRange {
786 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
787 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
788 /// The height of the first block in the range of the reply
789 pub first_blocknum: u32,
790 /// The number of blocks included in the range of the reply
791 pub number_of_blocks: u32,
792 /// True when this is the final reply for a query
793 pub sync_complete: bool,
794 /// The `short_channel_id`s in the channel range
795 pub short_channel_ids: Vec<u64>,
798 /// A [`query_short_channel_ids`] message is used to query a peer for
799 /// routing gossip messages related to one or more `short_channel_id`s.
801 /// The query recipient will reply with the latest, if available,
802 /// [`ChannelAnnouncement`], [`ChannelUpdate`] and [`NodeAnnouncement`] messages
803 /// it maintains for the requested `short_channel_id`s followed by a
804 /// [`ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd`] message. The `short_channel_id`s sent in
805 /// this query are encoded. We only support `encoding_type=0` uncompressed
806 /// serialization and do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization.
808 /// [`query_short_channel_ids`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_short_channel_idsreply_short_channel_ids_end-messages
809 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
810 pub struct QueryShortChannelIds {
811 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
812 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
813 /// The short_channel_ids that are being queried
814 pub short_channel_ids: Vec<u64>,
817 /// A [`reply_short_channel_ids_end`] message is sent as a reply to a
818 /// message. The query recipient makes a best
819 /// effort to respond based on their local network view which may not be
820 /// a perfect view of the network.
822 /// [`reply_short_channel_ids_end`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_short_channel_idsreply_short_channel_ids_end-messages
823 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
824 pub struct ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
825 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain that was queried
826 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
827 /// Indicates if the query recipient maintains up-to-date channel
828 /// information for the `chain_hash`
829 pub full_information: bool,
832 /// A [`gossip_timestamp_filter`] message is used by a node to request
833 /// gossip relay for messages in the requested time range when the
834 /// `gossip_queries` feature has been negotiated.
836 /// [`gossip_timestamp_filter`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-gossip_timestamp_filter-message
837 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
838 pub struct GossipTimestampFilter {
839 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain for channel and node information
840 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
841 /// The starting unix timestamp
842 pub first_timestamp: u32,
843 /// The range of information in seconds
844 pub timestamp_range: u32,
847 /// Encoding type for data compression of collections in gossip queries.
849 /// We do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization [defined in BOLT
850 /// #7](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#query-messages).
855 /// Used to put an error message in a [`LightningError`].
856 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
857 pub enum ErrorAction {
858 /// The peer took some action which made us think they were useless. Disconnect them.
860 /// An error message which we should make an effort to send before we disconnect.
861 msg: Option<ErrorMessage>
863 /// The peer did something harmless that we weren't able to process, just log and ignore
864 // New code should *not* use this. New code must use IgnoreAndLog, below!
866 /// The peer did something harmless that we weren't able to meaningfully process.
867 /// If the error is logged, log it at the given level.
868 IgnoreAndLog(logger::Level),
869 /// The peer provided us with a gossip message which we'd already seen. In most cases this
870 /// should be ignored, but it may result in the message being forwarded if it is a duplicate of
871 /// our own channel announcements.
872 IgnoreDuplicateGossip,
873 /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them.
875 /// The message to send.
878 /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them without closing any channels.
880 /// The message to send.
882 /// The peer may have done something harmless that we weren't able to meaningfully process,
883 /// though we should still tell them about it.
884 /// If this event is logged, log it at the given level.
885 log_level: logger::Level,
889 /// An Err type for failure to process messages.
890 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
891 pub struct LightningError {
892 /// A human-readable message describing the error
894 /// The action which should be taken against the offending peer.
895 pub action: ErrorAction,
898 /// Struct used to return values from [`RevokeAndACK`] messages, containing a bunch of commitment
899 /// transaction updates if they were pending.
900 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
901 pub struct CommitmentUpdate {
902 /// `update_add_htlc` messages which should be sent
903 pub update_add_htlcs: Vec<UpdateAddHTLC>,
904 /// `update_fulfill_htlc` messages which should be sent
905 pub update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
906 /// `update_fail_htlc` messages which should be sent
907 pub update_fail_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFailHTLC>,
908 /// `update_fail_malformed_htlc` messages which should be sent
909 pub update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFailMalformedHTLC>,
910 /// An `update_fee` message which should be sent
911 pub update_fee: Option<UpdateFee>,
912 /// A `commitment_signed` message which should be sent
913 pub commitment_signed: CommitmentSigned,
916 /// Messages could have optional fields to use with extended features
917 /// As we wish to serialize these differently from `Option<T>`s (`Options` get a tag byte, but
918 /// [`OptionalField`] simply gets `Present` if there are enough bytes to read into it), we have a
919 /// separate enum type for them.
921 /// (C-not exported) due to a free generic in `T`
922 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
923 pub enum OptionalField<T> {
924 /// Optional field is included in message
926 /// Optional field is absent in message
930 /// A trait to describe an object which can receive channel messages.
932 /// Messages MAY be called in parallel when they originate from different `their_node_ids`, however
933 /// they MUST NOT be called in parallel when the two calls have the same `their_node_id`.
934 pub trait ChannelMessageHandler : MessageSendEventsProvider {
936 /// Handle an incoming `open_channel` message from the given peer.
937 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OpenChannel);
938 /// Handle an incoming `accept_channel` message from the given peer.
939 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AcceptChannel);
940 /// Handle an incoming `funding_created` message from the given peer.
941 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingCreated);
942 /// Handle an incoming `funding_signed` message from the given peer.
943 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingSigned);
944 /// Handle an incoming `channel_ready` message from the given peer.
945 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelReady);
948 /// Handle an incoming `shutdown` message from the given peer.
949 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Shutdown);
950 /// Handle an incoming `closing_signed` message from the given peer.
951 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ClosingSigned);
954 /// Handle an incoming `update_add_htlc` message from the given peer.
955 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateAddHTLC);
956 /// Handle an incoming `update_fulfill_htlc` message from the given peer.
957 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFulfillHTLC);
958 /// Handle an incoming `update_fail_htlc` message from the given peer.
959 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFailHTLC);
960 /// Handle an incoming `update_fail_malformed_htlc` message from the given peer.
961 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFailMalformedHTLC);
962 /// Handle an incoming `commitment_signed` message from the given peer.
963 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &CommitmentSigned);
964 /// Handle an incoming `revoke_and_ack` message from the given peer.
965 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &RevokeAndACK);
967 /// Handle an incoming `update_fee` message from the given peer.
968 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFee);
970 // Channel-to-announce:
971 /// Handle an incoming `announcement_signatures` message from the given peer.
972 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AnnouncementSignatures);
974 // Connection loss/reestablish:
975 /// Indicates a connection to the peer failed/an existing connection was lost. If no connection
976 /// is believed to be possible in the future (eg they're sending us messages we don't
977 /// understand or indicate they require unknown feature bits), `no_connection_possible` is set
978 /// and any outstanding channels should be failed.
980 /// Note that in some rare cases this may be called without a corresponding
981 /// [`Self::peer_connected`].
982 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool);
984 /// Handle a peer reconnecting, possibly generating `channel_reestablish` message(s).
986 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
987 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
988 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
989 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Init) -> Result<(), ()>;
990 /// Handle an incoming `channel_reestablish` message from the given peer.
991 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelReestablish);
993 /// Handle an incoming `channel_update` message from the given peer.
994 fn handle_channel_update(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelUpdate);
997 /// Handle an incoming `error` message from the given peer.
998 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ErrorMessage);
1000 // Handler information:
1001 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1002 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1003 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1004 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1006 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1007 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1008 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1010 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1011 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1014 /// A trait to describe an object which can receive routing messages.
1016 /// # Implementor DoS Warnings
1018 /// For messages enabled with the `gossip_queries` feature there are potential DoS vectors when
1019 /// handling inbound queries. Implementors using an on-disk network graph should be aware of
1020 /// repeated disk I/O for queries accessing different parts of the network graph.
1021 pub trait RoutingMessageHandler : MessageSendEventsProvider {
1022 /// Handle an incoming `node_announcement` message, returning `true` if it should be forwarded on,
1023 /// `false` or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1024 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1025 /// Handle a `channel_announcement` message, returning `true` if it should be forwarded on, `false`
1026 /// or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1027 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1028 /// Handle an incoming `channel_update` message, returning true if it should be forwarded on,
1029 /// `false` or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1030 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1031 /// Gets channel announcements and updates required to dump our routing table to a remote node,
1032 /// starting at the `short_channel_id` indicated by `starting_point` and including announcements
1033 /// for a single channel.
1034 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)>;
1035 /// Gets a node announcement required to dump our routing table to a remote node, starting at
1036 /// the node *after* the provided pubkey and including up to one announcement immediately
1037 /// higher (as defined by `<PublicKey as Ord>::cmp`) than `starting_point`.
1038 /// If `None` is provided for `starting_point`, we start at the first node.
1039 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement>;
1040 /// Called when a connection is established with a peer. This can be used to
1041 /// perform routing table synchronization using a strategy defined by the
1044 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1045 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1046 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1047 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init: &Init) -> Result<(), ()>;
1048 /// Handles the reply of a query we initiated to learn about channels
1049 /// for a given range of blocks. We can expect to receive one or more
1050 /// replies to a single query.
1051 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1052 /// Handles the reply of a query we initiated asking for routing gossip
1053 /// messages for a list of channels. We should receive this message when
1054 /// a node has completed its best effort to send us the pertaining routing
1055 /// gossip messages.
1056 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1057 /// Handles when a peer asks us to send a list of `short_channel_id`s
1058 /// for the requested range of blocks.
1059 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1060 /// Handles when a peer asks us to send routing gossip messages for a
1061 /// list of `short_channel_id`s.
1062 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1064 // Handler information:
1065 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1066 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1067 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1068 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1069 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1070 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1071 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1073 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1074 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1077 /// A trait to describe an object that can receive onion messages.
1078 pub trait OnionMessageHandler : OnionMessageProvider {
1079 /// Handle an incoming `onion_message` message from the given peer.
1080 fn handle_onion_message(&self, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OnionMessage);
1081 /// Called when a connection is established with a peer. Can be used to track which peers
1082 /// advertise onion message support and are online.
1084 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1085 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1086 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1087 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init: &Init) -> Result<(), ()>;
1088 /// Indicates a connection to the peer failed/an existing connection was lost. Allows handlers to
1089 /// drop and refuse to forward onion messages to this peer.
1091 /// Note that in some rare cases this may be called without a corresponding
1092 /// [`Self::peer_connected`].
1093 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool);
1095 // Handler information:
1096 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1097 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1098 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1099 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1101 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1102 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1103 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1105 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1106 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1109 mod fuzzy_internal_msgs {
1110 use crate::prelude::*;
1111 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
1113 // These types aren't intended to be pub, but are exposed for direct fuzzing (as we deserialize
1114 // them from untrusted input):
1116 pub(crate) struct FinalOnionHopData {
1117 pub(crate) payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
1118 /// The total value, in msat, of the payment as received by the ultimate recipient.
1119 /// Message serialization may panic if this value is more than 21 million Bitcoin.
1120 pub(crate) total_msat: u64,
1123 pub(crate) enum OnionHopDataFormat {
1125 short_channel_id: u64,
1128 payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData>,
1129 keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
1133 pub struct OnionHopData {
1134 pub(crate) format: OnionHopDataFormat,
1135 /// The value, in msat, of the payment after this hop's fee is deducted.
1136 /// Message serialization may panic if this value is more than 21 million Bitcoin.
1137 pub(crate) amt_to_forward: u64,
1138 pub(crate) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
1141 pub struct DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
1142 pub(crate) hmac: [u8; 32],
1143 pub(crate) failuremsg: Vec<u8>,
1144 pub(crate) pad: Vec<u8>,
1148 pub use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*;
1149 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
1150 pub(crate) use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*;
1153 pub(crate) struct OnionPacket {
1154 pub(crate) version: u8,
1155 /// In order to ensure we always return an error on onion decode in compliance with [BOLT
1156 /// #4](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md), we have to
1157 /// deserialize `OnionPacket`s contained in [`UpdateAddHTLC`] messages even if the ephemeral
1158 /// public key (here) is bogus, so we hold a [`Result`] instead of a [`PublicKey`] as we'd
1160 pub(crate) public_key: Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>,
1161 pub(crate) hop_data: [u8; 20*65],
1162 pub(crate) hmac: [u8; 32],
1165 impl onion_utils::Packet for OnionPacket {
1166 type Data = onion_utils::FixedSizeOnionPacket;
1167 fn new(pubkey: PublicKey, hop_data: onion_utils::FixedSizeOnionPacket, hmac: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
1170 public_key: Ok(pubkey),
1171 hop_data: hop_data.0,
1177 impl Eq for OnionPacket { }
1178 impl PartialEq for OnionPacket {
1179 fn eq(&self, other: &OnionPacket) -> bool {
1180 for (i, j) in self.hop_data.iter().zip(other.hop_data.iter()) {
1181 if i != j { return false; }
1183 self.version == other.version &&
1184 self.public_key == other.public_key &&
1185 self.hmac == other.hmac
1189 impl fmt::Debug for OnionPacket {
1190 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
1191 f.write_fmt(format_args!("OnionPacket version {} with hmac {:?}", self.version, &self.hmac[..]))
1195 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1196 pub(crate) struct OnionErrorPacket {
1197 // This really should be a constant size slice, but the spec lets these things be up to 128KB?
1198 // (TODO) We limit it in decode to much lower...
1199 pub(crate) data: Vec<u8>,
1202 impl fmt::Display for DecodeError {
1203 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
1205 DecodeError::UnknownVersion => f.write_str("Unknown realm byte in Onion packet"),
1206 DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature => f.write_str("Unknown required feature preventing decode"),
1207 DecodeError::InvalidValue => f.write_str("Nonsense bytes didn't map to the type they were interpreted as"),
1208 DecodeError::ShortRead => f.write_str("Packet extended beyond the provided bytes"),
1209 DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor => f.write_str("A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly"),
1210 DecodeError::Io(ref e) => fmt::Debug::fmt(e, f),
1211 DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression => f.write_str("We don't support receiving messages with zlib-compressed fields"),
1216 impl From<io::Error> for DecodeError {
1217 fn from(e: io::Error) -> Self {
1218 if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof {
1219 DecodeError::ShortRead
1221 DecodeError::Io(e.kind())
1226 impl Writeable for OptionalField<Script> {
1227 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1229 OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1230 // Note that Writeable for script includes the 16-bit length tag for us
1233 OptionalField::Absent => {}
1239 impl Readable for OptionalField<Script> {
1240 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1241 match <u16 as Readable>::read(r) {
1243 let mut buf = vec![0; len as usize];
1244 r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
1245 Ok(OptionalField::Present(Script::from(buf)))
1247 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(OptionalField::Absent),
1253 impl Writeable for OptionalField<u64> {
1254 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1256 OptionalField::Present(ref value) => {
1259 OptionalField::Absent => {}
1265 impl Readable for OptionalField<u64> {
1266 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1267 let value: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
1268 Ok(OptionalField::Present(value))
1273 impl_writeable_msg!(AcceptChannel, {
1274 temporary_channel_id,
1275 dust_limit_satoshis,
1276 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1277 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1283 revocation_basepoint,
1285 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1287 first_per_commitment_point,
1288 shutdown_scriptpubkey
1290 (1, channel_type, option),
1293 impl_writeable_msg!(AnnouncementSignatures, {
1300 impl Writeable for ChannelReestablish {
1301 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1302 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
1303 self.next_local_commitment_number.write(w)?;
1304 self.next_remote_commitment_number.write(w)?;
1305 match self.data_loss_protect {
1306 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss_protect) => {
1307 (*data_loss_protect).your_last_per_commitment_secret.write(w)?;
1308 (*data_loss_protect).my_current_per_commitment_point.write(w)?;
1310 OptionalField::Absent => {}
1316 impl Readable for ChannelReestablish{
1317 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1319 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1320 next_local_commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
1321 next_remote_commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
1322 data_loss_protect: {
1323 match <[u8; 32] as Readable>::read(r) {
1324 Ok(your_last_per_commitment_secret) =>
1325 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
1326 your_last_per_commitment_secret,
1327 my_current_per_commitment_point: Readable::read(r)?,
1329 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => OptionalField::Absent,
1330 Err(e) => return Err(e)
1337 impl_writeable_msg!(ClosingSigned,
1338 { channel_id, fee_satoshis, signature },
1339 { (1, fee_range, option) }
1342 impl_writeable!(ClosingSignedFeeRange, {
1347 impl_writeable_msg!(CommitmentSigned, {
1353 impl_writeable!(DecodedOnionErrorPacket, {
1359 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingCreated, {
1360 temporary_channel_id,
1362 funding_output_index,
1366 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingSigned, {
1371 impl_writeable_msg!(ChannelReady, {
1373 next_per_commitment_point,
1375 (1, short_channel_id_alias, option),
1378 impl Writeable for Init {
1379 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1380 // global_features gets the bottom 13 bits of our features, and local_features gets all of
1381 // our relevant feature bits. This keeps us compatible with old nodes.
1382 self.features.write_up_to_13(w)?;
1383 self.features.write(w)?;
1384 encode_tlv_stream!(w, {
1385 (3, self.remote_network_address, option)
1391 impl Readable for Init {
1392 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1393 let global_features: InitFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
1394 let features: InitFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
1395 let mut remote_network_address: Option<NetAddress> = None;
1396 decode_tlv_stream!(r, {
1397 (3, remote_network_address, option)
1400 features: features.or(global_features),
1401 remote_network_address,
1406 impl_writeable_msg!(OpenChannel, {
1408 temporary_channel_id,
1411 dust_limit_satoshis,
1412 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1413 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1419 revocation_basepoint,
1421 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1423 first_per_commitment_point,
1425 shutdown_scriptpubkey
1427 (1, channel_type, option),
1430 impl_writeable_msg!(RevokeAndACK, {
1432 per_commitment_secret,
1433 next_per_commitment_point
1436 impl_writeable_msg!(Shutdown, {
1441 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFailHTLC, {
1447 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, {
1454 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFee, {
1459 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFulfillHTLC, {
1465 // Note that this is written as a part of ChannelManager objects, and thus cannot change its
1466 // serialization format in a way which assumes we know the total serialized length/message end
1468 impl_writeable!(OnionErrorPacket, {
1472 // Note that this is written as a part of ChannelManager objects, and thus cannot change its
1473 // serialization format in a way which assumes we know the total serialized length/message end
1475 impl Writeable for OnionPacket {
1476 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1477 self.version.write(w)?;
1478 match self.public_key {
1479 Ok(pubkey) => pubkey.write(w)?,
1480 Err(_) => [0u8;33].write(w)?,
1482 w.write_all(&self.hop_data)?;
1483 self.hmac.write(w)?;
1488 impl Readable for OnionPacket {
1489 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1491 version: Readable::read(r)?,
1493 let mut buf = [0u8;33];
1494 r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
1495 PublicKey::from_slice(&buf)
1497 hop_data: Readable::read(r)?,
1498 hmac: Readable::read(r)?,
1503 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateAddHTLC, {
1509 onion_routing_packet
1512 impl Readable for OnionMessage {
1513 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1514 let blinding_point: PublicKey = Readable::read(r)?;
1515 let len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1516 let mut packet_reader = FixedLengthReader::new(r, len as u64);
1517 let onion_routing_packet: onion_message::Packet = <onion_message::Packet as LengthReadable>::read(&mut packet_reader)?;
1520 onion_routing_packet,
1525 impl Writeable for OnionMessage {
1526 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1527 self.blinding_point.write(w)?;
1528 let onion_packet_len = self.onion_routing_packet.serialized_length();
1529 (onion_packet_len as u16).write(w)?;
1530 self.onion_routing_packet.write(w)?;
1535 impl Writeable for FinalOnionHopData {
1536 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1537 self.payment_secret.0.write(w)?;
1538 HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.total_msat).write(w)
1542 impl Readable for FinalOnionHopData {
1543 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1544 let secret: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
1545 let amt: HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize<u64> = Readable::read(r)?;
1546 Ok(Self { payment_secret: PaymentSecret(secret), total_msat: amt.0 })
1550 impl Writeable for OnionHopData {
1551 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1553 OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => {
1554 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
1555 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.amt_to_forward), required),
1556 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
1557 (6, short_channel_id, required)
1560 OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { ref payment_data, ref keysend_preimage } => {
1561 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
1562 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.amt_to_forward), required),
1563 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
1564 (8, payment_data, option),
1565 (5482373484, keysend_preimage, option)
1573 impl Readable for OnionHopData {
1574 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1575 let mut amt = HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(0u64);
1576 let mut cltv_value = HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(0u32);
1577 let mut short_id: Option<u64> = None;
1578 let mut payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData> = None;
1579 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
1580 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
1582 (4, cltv_value, required),
1583 (6, short_id, option),
1584 (8, payment_data, option),
1585 // See https://github.com/lightning/blips/blob/master/blip-0003.md
1586 (5482373484, keysend_preimage, option)
1589 let format = if let Some(short_channel_id) = short_id {
1590 if payment_data.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
1591 OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
1595 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1596 if data.total_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1597 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1600 OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
1606 if amt.0 > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1607 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1611 amt_to_forward: amt.0,
1612 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv_value.0,
1617 // ReadableArgs because we need onion_utils::decode_next_hop to accommodate payment packets and
1618 // onion message packets.
1619 impl ReadableArgs<()> for OnionHopData {
1620 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R, _arg: ()) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1621 <Self as Readable>::read(r)
1625 impl Writeable for Ping {
1626 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1627 self.ponglen.write(w)?;
1628 vec![0u8; self.byteslen as usize].write(w)?; // size-unchecked write
1633 impl Readable for Ping {
1634 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1636 ponglen: Readable::read(r)?,
1638 let byteslen = Readable::read(r)?;
1639 r.read_exact(&mut vec![0u8; byteslen as usize][..])?;
1646 impl Writeable for Pong {
1647 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1648 vec![0u8; self.byteslen as usize].write(w)?; // size-unchecked write
1653 impl Readable for Pong {
1654 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1657 let byteslen = Readable::read(r)?;
1658 r.read_exact(&mut vec![0u8; byteslen as usize][..])?;
1665 impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1666 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1667 self.features.write(w)?;
1668 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
1669 self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
1670 self.node_id_1.write(w)?;
1671 self.node_id_2.write(w)?;
1672 self.bitcoin_key_1.write(w)?;
1673 self.bitcoin_key_2.write(w)?;
1674 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
1679 impl Readable for UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1680 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1682 features: Readable::read(r)?,
1683 chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
1684 short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1685 node_id_1: Readable::read(r)?,
1686 node_id_2: Readable::read(r)?,
1687 bitcoin_key_1: Readable::read(r)?,
1688 bitcoin_key_2: Readable::read(r)?,
1689 excess_data: read_to_end(r)?,
1694 impl_writeable!(ChannelAnnouncement, {
1697 bitcoin_signature_1,
1698 bitcoin_signature_2,
1702 impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1703 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1704 // `message_flags` used to indicate presence of `htlc_maximum_msat`, but was deprecated in the spec.
1705 const MESSAGE_FLAGS: u8 = 1;
1706 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
1707 self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
1708 self.timestamp.write(w)?;
1709 let all_flags = self.flags as u16 | ((MESSAGE_FLAGS as u16) << 8);
1710 all_flags.write(w)?;
1711 self.cltv_expiry_delta.write(w)?;
1712 self.htlc_minimum_msat.write(w)?;
1713 self.fee_base_msat.write(w)?;
1714 self.fee_proportional_millionths.write(w)?;
1715 self.htlc_maximum_msat.write(w)?;
1716 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
1721 impl Readable for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1722 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1724 chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
1725 short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1726 timestamp: Readable::read(r)?,
1728 let flags: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1729 // Note: we ignore the `message_flags` for now, since it was deprecated by the spec.
1732 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(r)?,
1733 htlc_minimum_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
1734 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
1735 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(r)?,
1736 htlc_maximum_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
1737 excess_data: read_to_end(r)?,
1742 impl_writeable!(ChannelUpdate, {
1747 impl Writeable for ErrorMessage {
1748 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1749 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
1750 (self.data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
1751 w.write_all(self.data.as_bytes())?;
1756 impl Readable for ErrorMessage {
1757 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1759 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1761 let sz: usize = <u16 as Readable>::read(r)? as usize;
1762 let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(sz);
1764 r.read_exact(&mut data)?;
1765 match String::from_utf8(data) {
1767 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1774 impl Writeable for WarningMessage {
1775 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1776 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
1777 (self.data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
1778 w.write_all(self.data.as_bytes())?;
1783 impl Readable for WarningMessage {
1784 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1786 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1788 let sz: usize = <u16 as Readable>::read(r)? as usize;
1789 let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(sz);
1791 r.read_exact(&mut data)?;
1792 match String::from_utf8(data) {
1794 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1801 impl Writeable for UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1802 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1803 self.features.write(w)?;
1804 self.timestamp.write(w)?;
1805 self.node_id.write(w)?;
1806 w.write_all(&self.rgb)?;
1807 self.alias.write(w)?;
1809 let mut addr_len = 0;
1810 for addr in self.addresses.iter() {
1811 addr_len += 1 + addr.len();
1813 (addr_len + self.excess_address_data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
1814 for addr in self.addresses.iter() {
1817 w.write_all(&self.excess_address_data[..])?;
1818 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
1823 impl Readable for UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1824 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1825 let features: NodeFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
1826 let timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
1827 let node_id: PublicKey = Readable::read(r)?;
1828 let mut rgb = [0; 3];
1829 r.read_exact(&mut rgb)?;
1830 let alias: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
1832 let addr_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1833 let mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress> = Vec::new();
1834 let mut addr_readpos = 0;
1835 let mut excess = false;
1836 let mut excess_byte = 0;
1838 if addr_len <= addr_readpos { break; }
1839 match Readable::read(r) {
1841 if addr_len < addr_readpos + 1 + addr.len() {
1842 return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor);
1844 addr_readpos += (1 + addr.len()) as u16;
1845 addresses.push(addr);
1847 Ok(Err(unknown_descriptor)) => {
1849 excess_byte = unknown_descriptor;
1852 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor),
1853 Err(e) => return Err(e),
1857 let mut excess_data = vec![];
1858 let excess_address_data = if addr_readpos < addr_len {
1859 let mut excess_address_data = vec![0; (addr_len - addr_readpos) as usize];
1860 r.read_exact(&mut excess_address_data[if excess { 1 } else { 0 }..])?;
1862 excess_address_data[0] = excess_byte;
1867 excess_data.push(excess_byte);
1871 excess_data.extend(read_to_end(r)?.iter());
1872 Ok(UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1879 excess_address_data,
1885 impl_writeable!(NodeAnnouncement, {
1890 impl Readable for QueryShortChannelIds {
1891 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1892 let chain_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(r)?;
1894 let encoding_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1895 let encoding_type: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
1897 // Must be encoding_type=0 uncompressed serialization. We do not
1898 // support encoding_type=1 zlib serialization.
1899 if encoding_type != EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8 {
1900 return Err(DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression);
1903 // We expect the encoding_len to always includes the 1-byte
1904 // encoding_type and that short_channel_ids are 8-bytes each
1905 if encoding_len == 0 || (encoding_len - 1) % 8 != 0 {
1906 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1909 // Read short_channel_ids (8-bytes each), for the u16 encoding_len
1910 // less the 1-byte encoding_type
1911 let short_channel_id_count: u16 = (encoding_len - 1)/8;
1912 let mut short_channel_ids = Vec::with_capacity(short_channel_id_count as usize);
1913 for _ in 0..short_channel_id_count {
1914 short_channel_ids.push(Readable::read(r)?);
1917 Ok(QueryShortChannelIds {
1924 impl Writeable for QueryShortChannelIds {
1925 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1926 // Calculated from 1-byte encoding_type plus 8-bytes per short_channel_id
1927 let encoding_len: u16 = 1 + self.short_channel_ids.len() as u16 * 8;
1929 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
1930 encoding_len.write(w)?;
1932 // We only support type=0 uncompressed serialization
1933 (EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8).write(w)?;
1935 for scid in self.short_channel_ids.iter() {
1943 impl_writeable_msg!(ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd, {
1948 impl QueryChannelRange {
1949 /// Calculates the overflow safe ending block height for the query.
1951 /// Overflow returns `0xffffffff`, otherwise returns `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`.
1952 pub fn end_blocknum(&self) -> u32 {
1953 match self.first_blocknum.checked_add(self.number_of_blocks) {
1954 Some(block) => block,
1955 None => u32::max_value(),
1960 impl_writeable_msg!(QueryChannelRange, {
1966 impl Readable for ReplyChannelRange {
1967 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1968 let chain_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(r)?;
1969 let first_blocknum: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
1970 let number_of_blocks: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
1971 let sync_complete: bool = Readable::read(r)?;
1973 let encoding_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1974 let encoding_type: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
1976 // Must be encoding_type=0 uncompressed serialization. We do not
1977 // support encoding_type=1 zlib serialization.
1978 if encoding_type != EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8 {
1979 return Err(DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression);
1982 // We expect the encoding_len to always includes the 1-byte
1983 // encoding_type and that short_channel_ids are 8-bytes each
1984 if encoding_len == 0 || (encoding_len - 1) % 8 != 0 {
1985 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1988 // Read short_channel_ids (8-bytes each), for the u16 encoding_len
1989 // less the 1-byte encoding_type
1990 let short_channel_id_count: u16 = (encoding_len - 1)/8;
1991 let mut short_channel_ids = Vec::with_capacity(short_channel_id_count as usize);
1992 for _ in 0..short_channel_id_count {
1993 short_channel_ids.push(Readable::read(r)?);
1996 Ok(ReplyChannelRange {
2006 impl Writeable for ReplyChannelRange {
2007 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2008 let encoding_len: u16 = 1 + self.short_channel_ids.len() as u16 * 8;
2009 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
2010 self.first_blocknum.write(w)?;
2011 self.number_of_blocks.write(w)?;
2012 self.sync_complete.write(w)?;
2014 encoding_len.write(w)?;
2015 (EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8).write(w)?;
2016 for scid in self.short_channel_ids.iter() {
2024 impl_writeable_msg!(GossipTimestampFilter, {
2033 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
2034 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
2035 use crate::ln::msgs;
2036 use crate::ln::msgs::{FinalOnionHopData, OptionalField, OnionErrorPacket, OnionHopDataFormat};
2037 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Hostname};
2039 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2040 use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
2041 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2042 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
2043 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2044 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
2046 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2047 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2049 use crate::io::{self, Cursor};
2050 use crate::prelude::*;
2051 use core::convert::TryFrom;
2054 fn encoding_channel_reestablish_no_secret() {
2055 let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
2056 channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
2057 next_local_commitment_number: 3,
2058 next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
2059 data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Absent,
2062 let encoded_value = cr.encode();
2065 vec![4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4]
2070 fn encoding_channel_reestablish_with_secret() {
2072 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2073 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
2076 let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
2077 channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
2078 next_local_commitment_number: 3,
2079 next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
2080 data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Present(msgs::DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret: [9;32], my_current_per_commitment_point: public_key}),
2083 let encoded_value = cr.encode();
2086 vec![4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 3, 27, 132, 197, 86, 123, 18, 100, 64, 153, 93, 62, 213, 170, 186, 5, 101, 215, 30, 24, 52, 96, 72, 25, 255, 156, 23, 245, 233, 213, 221, 7, 143]
2090 macro_rules! get_keys_from {
2091 ($slice: expr, $secp_ctx: expr) => {
2093 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode($slice).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2094 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &privkey);
2100 macro_rules! get_sig_on {
2101 ($privkey: expr, $ctx: expr, $string: expr) => {
2103 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&$string.into_bytes()[..]).unwrap();
2104 $ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &$privkey)
2110 fn encoding_announcement_signatures() {
2111 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2112 let (privkey, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2113 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2114 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("02020202020202020202020202020202"));
2115 let announcement_signatures = msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2116 channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
2117 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2118 node_signature: sig_1,
2119 bitcoin_signature: sig_2,
2122 let encoded_value = announcement_signatures.encode();
2123 assert_eq!(encoded_value, hex::decode("040000000000000005000000000000000600000000000000070000000000000000083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073acf9953cef4700860f5967838eba2bae89288ad188ebf8b20bf995c3ea53a26df1876d0a3a0e13172ba286a673140190c02ba9da60a2e43a745188c8a83c7f3ef").unwrap());
2126 fn do_encoding_channel_announcement(unknown_features_bits: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2127 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2128 let (privkey_1, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2129 let (privkey_2, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2130 let (privkey_3, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2131 let (privkey_4, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2132 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2133 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey_2, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2134 let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2135 let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2136 let mut features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
2137 if unknown_features_bits {
2138 features = ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF]);
2140 let unsigned_channel_announcement = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2142 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
2143 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2144 node_id_1: pubkey_1,
2145 node_id_2: pubkey_2,
2146 bitcoin_key_1: pubkey_3,
2147 bitcoin_key_2: pubkey_4,
2148 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![10, 0, 0, 20, 0, 0, 30, 0, 0, 40] } else { Vec::new() },
2150 let channel_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2151 node_signature_1: sig_1,
2152 node_signature_2: sig_2,
2153 bitcoin_signature_1: sig_3,
2154 bitcoin_signature_2: sig_4,
2155 contents: unsigned_channel_announcement,
2157 let encoded_value = channel_announcement.encode();
2158 let mut target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
2159 if unknown_features_bits {
2160 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0002ffff").unwrap());
2162 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000").unwrap());
2164 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
2165 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00083a840000034d031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f024d4b6cd1361032ca9bd2aeb9d900aa4d45d9ead80ac9423374c451a7254d076602531fe6068134503d2723133227c867ac8fa6c83c537e9a44c3c5bdbdcb1fe33703462779ad4aad39514614751a71085f2f10e1c7a593e4e030efb5b8721ce55b0b").unwrap());
2167 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0a00001400001e000028").unwrap());
2169 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2173 fn encoding_channel_announcement() {
2174 do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, false);
2175 do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, true);
2176 do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, false);
2177 do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, true);
2180 fn do_encoding_node_announcement(unknown_features_bits: bool, ipv4: bool, ipv6: bool, onionv2: bool, onionv3: bool, hostname: bool, excess_address_data: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2181 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2182 let (privkey_1, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2183 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2184 let features = if unknown_features_bits {
2185 NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF])
2187 // Set to some features we may support
2188 NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![2 | 1 << 5])
2190 let mut addresses = Vec::new();
2192 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::IPv4 {
2193 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252],
2198 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::IPv6 {
2199 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240],
2204 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::OnionV2(
2205 [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 38, 7]
2209 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::OnionV3 {
2210 ed25519_pubkey: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240, 239, 238, 237, 236, 235, 234, 233, 232, 231, 230, 229, 228, 227, 226, 225, 224],
2217 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::Hostname {
2218 hostname: Hostname::try_from(String::from("host")).unwrap(),
2222 let mut addr_len = 0;
2223 for addr in &addresses {
2224 addr_len += addr.len() + 1;
2226 let unsigned_node_announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2228 timestamp: 20190119,
2233 excess_address_data: if excess_address_data { vec![33, 108, 40, 11, 83, 149, 162, 84, 110, 126, 75, 38, 99, 224, 79, 129, 22, 34, 241, 90, 79, 146, 232, 58, 162, 233, 43, 162, 165, 115, 193, 57, 20, 44, 84, 174, 99, 7, 42, 30, 193, 238, 125, 192, 192, 75, 222, 92, 132, 120, 6, 23, 42, 160, 92, 146, 194, 42, 232, 227, 8, 209, 210, 105] } else { Vec::new() },
2234 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![59, 18, 204, 25, 92, 224, 162, 209, 189, 166, 168, 139, 239, 161, 159, 160, 127, 81, 202, 167, 92, 232, 56, 55, 242, 137, 101, 96, 11, 138, 172, 171, 8, 85, 255, 176, 231, 65, 236, 95, 124, 65, 66, 30, 152, 41, 169, 212, 134, 17, 200, 200, 49, 247, 27, 229, 234, 115, 230, 101, 148, 151, 127, 253] } else { Vec::new() },
2236 addr_len += unsigned_node_announcement.excess_address_data.len() as u16;
2237 let node_announcement = msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2239 contents: unsigned_node_announcement,
2241 let encoded_value = node_announcement.encode();
2242 let mut target_value = hex::decode("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2243 if unknown_features_bits {
2244 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0002ffff").unwrap());
2246 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000122").unwrap());
2248 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("013413a7031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f2020201010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010").unwrap());
2249 target_value.append(&mut vec![(addr_len >> 8) as u8, addr_len as u8]);
2251 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("01fffefdfc2607").unwrap());
2254 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("02fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f02607").unwrap());
2257 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("03fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f62607").unwrap());
2260 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("04fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0efeeedecebeae9e8e7e6e5e4e3e2e1e00020102607").unwrap());
2263 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0504686f73742607").unwrap());
2265 if excess_address_data {
2266 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f92e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d269").unwrap());
2269 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("3b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
2271 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2275 fn encoding_node_announcement() {
2276 do_encoding_node_announcement(true, true, true, true, true, true, true, true);
2277 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false);
2278 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, true, false, false, false, false, false, false);
2279 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, true, false, false, false, false, false);
2280 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, true, false, false, false, false);
2281 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, true, false, false, false);
2282 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, true, false, false);
2283 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, false, true, false);
2284 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, true, false, true, false, false, true, false);
2285 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, true, false, true, false, false, false);
2288 fn do_encoding_channel_update(direction: bool, disable: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2289 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2290 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2291 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2292 let unsigned_channel_update = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2293 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
2294 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2295 timestamp: 20190119,
2296 flags: if direction { 1 } else { 0 } | if disable { 1 << 1 } else { 0 },
2297 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2298 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
2299 htlc_maximum_msat: 131355275467161,
2300 fee_base_msat: 10000,
2301 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2302 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![0, 0, 0, 0, 59, 154, 202, 0] } else { Vec::new() }
2304 let channel_update = msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2306 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2308 let encoded_value = channel_update.encode();
2309 let mut target_value = hex::decode("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2310 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
2311 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00083a840000034d013413a7").unwrap());
2312 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("01").unwrap());
2313 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00").unwrap());
2315 let flag = target_value.last_mut().unwrap();
2319 let flag = target_value.last_mut().unwrap();
2320 *flag = *flag | 1 << 1;
2322 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap());
2323 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000777788889999").unwrap());
2325 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000003b9aca00").unwrap());
2327 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2331 fn encoding_channel_update() {
2332 do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, false);
2333 do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, true);
2334 do_encoding_channel_update(true, false, false);
2335 do_encoding_channel_update(true, false, true);
2336 do_encoding_channel_update(false, true, false);
2337 do_encoding_channel_update(false, true, true);
2338 do_encoding_channel_update(true, true, false);
2339 do_encoding_channel_update(true, true, true);
2342 fn do_encoding_open_channel(random_bit: bool, shutdown: bool, incl_chan_type: bool) {
2343 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2344 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2345 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2346 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2347 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2348 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
2349 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
2350 let open_channel = msgs::OpenChannel {
2351 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
2352 temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
2353 funding_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
2354 push_msat: 2536655962884945560,
2355 dust_limit_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
2356 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 8517154655701053848,
2357 channel_reserve_satoshis: 8665828695742877976,
2358 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
2359 feerate_per_kw: 821716,
2360 to_self_delay: 49340,
2361 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
2362 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
2363 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
2364 payment_point: pubkey_3,
2365 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
2366 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
2367 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
2368 channel_flags: if random_bit { 1 << 5 } else { 0 },
2369 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { OptionalField::Present(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { OptionalField::Absent },
2370 channel_type: if incl_chan_type { Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::empty()) } else { None },
2372 let encoded_value = open_channel.encode();
2373 let mut target_value = Vec::new();
2374 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
2375 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2377 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("20").unwrap());
2379 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00").unwrap());
2382 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
2385 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0100").unwrap());
2387 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2391 fn encoding_open_channel() {
2392 do_encoding_open_channel(false, false, false);
2393 do_encoding_open_channel(false, false, true);
2394 do_encoding_open_channel(false, true, false);
2395 do_encoding_open_channel(false, true, true);
2396 do_encoding_open_channel(true, false, false);
2397 do_encoding_open_channel(true, false, true);
2398 do_encoding_open_channel(true, true, false);
2399 do_encoding_open_channel(true, true, true);
2402 fn do_encoding_accept_channel(shutdown: bool) {
2403 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2404 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2405 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2406 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2407 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2408 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
2409 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
2410 let accept_channel = msgs::AcceptChannel {
2411 temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
2412 dust_limit_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
2413 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 2536655962884945560,
2414 channel_reserve_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
2415 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
2416 minimum_depth: 821716,
2417 to_self_delay: 49340,
2418 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
2419 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
2420 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
2421 payment_point: pubkey_3,
2422 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
2423 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
2424 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
2425 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { OptionalField::Present(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { OptionalField::Absent },
2428 let encoded_value = accept_channel.encode();
2429 let mut target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
2431 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
2433 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2437 fn encoding_accept_channel() {
2438 do_encoding_accept_channel(false);
2439 do_encoding_accept_channel(true);
2443 fn encoding_funding_created() {
2444 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2445 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2446 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2447 let funding_created = msgs::FundingCreated {
2448 temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
2449 funding_txid: Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap(),
2450 funding_output_index: 255,
2453 let encoded_value = funding_created.encode();
2454 let target_value = hex::decode("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202026e96fe9f8b0ddcd729ba03cfafa5a27b050b39d354dd980814268dfa9a44d4c200ffd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2455 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2459 fn encoding_funding_signed() {
2460 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2461 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2462 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2463 let funding_signed = msgs::FundingSigned {
2464 channel_id: [2; 32],
2467 let encoded_value = funding_signed.encode();
2468 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2469 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2473 fn encoding_channel_ready() {
2474 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2475 let (_, pubkey_1,) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2476 let channel_ready = msgs::ChannelReady {
2477 channel_id: [2; 32],
2478 next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
2479 short_channel_id_alias: None,
2481 let encoded_value = channel_ready.encode();
2482 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap();
2483 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2486 fn do_encoding_shutdown(script_type: u8) {
2487 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2488 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2489 let script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::OP_TRUE).into_script();
2490 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
2491 channel_id: [2; 32],
2493 if script_type == 1 { Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() }
2494 else if script_type == 2 { Address::p2sh(&script, Network::Testnet).unwrap().script_pubkey() }
2495 else if script_type == 3 { Address::p2wpkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).unwrap().script_pubkey() }
2496 else { Address::p2wsh(&script, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() },
2498 let encoded_value = shutdown.encode();
2499 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap();
2500 if script_type == 1 {
2501 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
2502 } else if script_type == 2 {
2503 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0017a914da1745e9b549bd0bfa1a569971c77eba30cd5a4b87").unwrap());
2504 } else if script_type == 3 {
2505 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0016001479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b235983").unwrap());
2506 } else if script_type == 4 {
2507 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("002200204ae81572f06e1b88fd5ced7a1a000945432e83e1551e6f721ee9c00b8cc33260").unwrap());
2509 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2513 fn encoding_shutdown() {
2514 do_encoding_shutdown(1);
2515 do_encoding_shutdown(2);
2516 do_encoding_shutdown(3);
2517 do_encoding_shutdown(4);
2521 fn encoding_closing_signed() {
2522 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2523 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2524 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2525 let closing_signed = msgs::ClosingSigned {
2526 channel_id: [2; 32],
2527 fee_satoshis: 2316138423780173,
2531 let encoded_value = closing_signed.encode();
2532 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2533 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2534 assert_eq!(msgs::ClosingSigned::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value)).unwrap(), closing_signed);
2536 let closing_signed_with_range = msgs::ClosingSigned {
2537 channel_id: [2; 32],
2538 fee_satoshis: 2316138423780173,
2540 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
2541 min_fee_satoshis: 0xdeadbeef,
2542 max_fee_satoshis: 0x1badcafe01234567,
2545 let encoded_value_with_range = closing_signed_with_range.encode();
2546 let target_value_with_range = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a011000000000deadbeef1badcafe01234567").unwrap();
2547 assert_eq!(encoded_value_with_range, target_value_with_range);
2548 assert_eq!(msgs::ClosingSigned::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value_with_range)).unwrap(),
2549 closing_signed_with_range);
2553 fn encoding_update_add_htlc() {
2554 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2555 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2556 let onion_routing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2558 public_key: Ok(pubkey_1),
2559 hop_data: [1; 20*65],
2562 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2563 channel_id: [2; 32],
2564 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2565 amount_msat: 3608586615801332854,
2566 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
2567 cltv_expiry: 821716,
2568 onion_routing_packet
2570 let encoded_value = update_add_htlc.encode();
2571 let target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
2572 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2576 fn encoding_update_fulfill_htlc() {
2577 let update_fulfill_htlc = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2578 channel_id: [2; 32],
2579 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2580 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([1; 32]),
2582 let encoded_value = update_fulfill_htlc.encode();
2583 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap();
2584 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2588 fn encoding_update_fail_htlc() {
2589 let reason = OnionErrorPacket {
2590 data: [1; 32].to_vec(),
2592 let update_fail_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2593 channel_id: [2; 32],
2594 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2597 let encoded_value = update_fail_htlc.encode();
2598 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d00200101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap();
2599 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2603 fn encoding_update_fail_malformed_htlc() {
2604 let update_fail_malformed_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2605 channel_id: [2; 32],
2606 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2607 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
2610 let encoded_value = update_fail_malformed_htlc.encode();
2611 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010100ff").unwrap();
2612 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2615 fn do_encoding_commitment_signed(htlcs: bool) {
2616 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2617 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2618 let (privkey_2, _) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2619 let (privkey_3, _) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2620 let (privkey_4, _) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2621 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2622 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey_2, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2623 let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2624 let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2625 let commitment_signed = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
2626 channel_id: [2; 32],
2628 htlc_signatures: if htlcs { vec![sig_2, sig_3, sig_4] } else { Vec::new() },
2630 let encoded_value = commitment_signed.encode();
2631 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2633 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00031735b6a427e80d5fe7cd90a2f4ee08dc9c27cda7c35a4172e5d85b12c49d4232537e98f9b1f3c5e6989a8b9644e90e8918127680dbd0d4043510840fc0f1e11a216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f91e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d2692b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
2635 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000").unwrap());
2637 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2641 fn encoding_commitment_signed() {
2642 do_encoding_commitment_signed(true);
2643 do_encoding_commitment_signed(false);
2647 fn encoding_revoke_and_ack() {
2648 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2649 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2650 let raa = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2651 channel_id: [2; 32],
2652 per_commitment_secret: [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1],
2653 next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
2655 let encoded_value = raa.encode();
2656 let target_value = hex::decode("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap();
2657 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2661 fn encoding_update_fee() {
2662 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
2663 channel_id: [2; 32],
2664 feerate_per_kw: 20190119,
2666 let encoded_value = update_fee.encode();
2667 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202013413a7").unwrap();
2668 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2672 fn encoding_init() {
2673 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
2674 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF]),
2675 remote_network_address: None,
2676 }.encode(), hex::decode("00023fff0003ffffff").unwrap());
2677 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
2678 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF]),
2679 remote_network_address: None,
2680 }.encode(), hex::decode("0001ff0001ff").unwrap());
2681 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
2682 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
2683 remote_network_address: None,
2684 }.encode(), hex::decode("00000000").unwrap());
2686 let init_msg = msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
2687 remote_network_address: Some(msgs::NetAddress::IPv4 {
2688 addr: [127, 0, 0, 1],
2692 let encoded_value = init_msg.encode();
2693 let target_value = hex::decode("000000000307017f00000103e8").unwrap();
2694 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2695 assert_eq!(msgs::Init::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value)).unwrap(), init_msg);
2699 fn encoding_error() {
2700 let error = msgs::ErrorMessage {
2701 channel_id: [2; 32],
2702 data: String::from("rust-lightning"),
2704 let encoded_value = error.encode();
2705 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000e727573742d6c696768746e696e67").unwrap();
2706 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2710 fn encoding_warning() {
2711 let error = msgs::WarningMessage {
2712 channel_id: [2; 32],
2713 data: String::from("rust-lightning"),
2715 let encoded_value = error.encode();
2716 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000e727573742d6c696768746e696e67").unwrap();
2717 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2721 fn encoding_ping() {
2722 let ping = msgs::Ping {
2726 let encoded_value = ping.encode();
2727 let target_value = hex::decode("0040004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap();
2728 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2732 fn encoding_pong() {
2733 let pong = msgs::Pong {
2736 let encoded_value = pong.encode();
2737 let target_value = hex::decode("004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap();
2738 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2742 fn encoding_nonfinal_onion_hop_data() {
2743 let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
2744 format: OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
2745 short_channel_id: 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea,
2747 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
2748 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2750 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
2751 let target_value = hex::decode("1a02080badf00d010203040404ffffffff0608deadbeef1bad1dea").unwrap();
2752 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2753 msg = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2754 if let OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } = msg.format {
2755 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea);
2756 } else { panic!(); }
2757 assert_eq!(msg.amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
2758 assert_eq!(msg.outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
2762 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data() {
2763 let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
2764 format: OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
2766 keysend_preimage: None,
2768 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
2769 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2771 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
2772 let target_value = hex::decode("1002080badf00d010203040404ffffffff").unwrap();
2773 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2774 msg = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2775 if let OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data: None, .. } = msg.format { } else { panic!(); }
2776 assert_eq!(msg.amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
2777 assert_eq!(msg.outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
2781 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data_with_secret() {
2782 let expected_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([0x42u8; 32]);
2783 let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
2784 format: OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
2785 payment_data: Some(FinalOnionHopData {
2786 payment_secret: expected_payment_secret,
2787 total_msat: 0x1badca1f
2789 keysend_preimage: None,
2791 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
2792 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2794 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
2795 let target_value = hex::decode("3602080badf00d010203040404ffffffff082442424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242421badca1f").unwrap();
2796 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2797 msg = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2798 if let OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
2799 payment_data: Some(FinalOnionHopData {
2801 total_msat: 0x1badca1f
2803 keysend_preimage: None,
2805 assert_eq!(payment_secret, expected_payment_secret);
2806 } else { panic!(); }
2807 assert_eq!(msg.amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
2808 assert_eq!(msg.outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
2812 fn query_channel_range_end_blocknum() {
2813 let tests: Vec<(u32, u32, u32)> = vec![
2814 (10000, 1500, 11500),
2815 (0, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
2816 (1, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
2819 for (first_blocknum, number_of_blocks, expected) in tests.into_iter() {
2820 let sut = msgs::QueryChannelRange {
2821 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap(),
2825 assert_eq!(sut.end_blocknum(), expected);
2830 fn encoding_query_channel_range() {
2831 let mut query_channel_range = msgs::QueryChannelRange {
2832 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap(),
2833 first_blocknum: 100000,
2834 number_of_blocks: 1500,
2836 let encoded_value = query_channel_range.encode();
2837 let target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206000186a0000005dc").unwrap();
2838 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2840 query_channel_range = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2841 assert_eq!(query_channel_range.first_blocknum, 100000);
2842 assert_eq!(query_channel_range.number_of_blocks, 1500);
2846 fn encoding_reply_channel_range() {
2847 do_encoding_reply_channel_range(0);
2848 do_encoding_reply_channel_range(1);
2851 fn do_encoding_reply_channel_range(encoding_type: u8) {
2852 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206000b8a06000005dc01").unwrap();
2853 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2854 let mut reply_channel_range = msgs::ReplyChannelRange {
2855 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2856 first_blocknum: 756230,
2857 number_of_blocks: 1500,
2858 sync_complete: true,
2859 short_channel_ids: vec![0x000000000000008e, 0x0000000000003c69, 0x000000000045a6c4],
2862 if encoding_type == 0 {
2863 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001900000000000000008e0000000000003c69000000000045a6c4").unwrap());
2864 let encoded_value = reply_channel_range.encode();
2865 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2867 reply_channel_range = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2868 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2869 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.first_blocknum, 756230);
2870 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.number_of_blocks, 1500);
2871 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.sync_complete, true);
2872 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[0], 0x000000000000008e);
2873 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[1], 0x0000000000003c69);
2874 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[2], 0x000000000045a6c4);
2876 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001601789c636000833e08659309a65878be010010a9023a").unwrap());
2877 let result: Result<msgs::ReplyChannelRange, msgs::DecodeError> = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]));
2878 assert!(result.is_err(), "Expected decode failure with unsupported zlib encoding");
2883 fn encoding_query_short_channel_ids() {
2884 do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(0);
2885 do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(1);
2888 fn do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(encoding_type: u8) {
2889 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206").unwrap();
2890 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2891 let mut query_short_channel_ids = msgs::QueryShortChannelIds {
2892 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2893 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0000000000008e, 0x0000000000003c69, 0x000000000045a6c4],
2896 if encoding_type == 0 {
2897 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001900000000000000008e0000000000003c69000000000045a6c4").unwrap());
2898 let encoded_value = query_short_channel_ids.encode();
2899 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2901 query_short_channel_ids = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2902 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2903 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[0], 0x000000000000008e);
2904 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[1], 0x0000000000003c69);
2905 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[2], 0x000000000045a6c4);
2907 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001601789c636000833e08659309a65878be010010a9023a").unwrap());
2908 let result: Result<msgs::QueryShortChannelIds, msgs::DecodeError> = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]));
2909 assert!(result.is_err(), "Expected decode failure with unsupported zlib encoding");
2914 fn encoding_reply_short_channel_ids_end() {
2915 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2916 let mut reply_short_channel_ids_end = msgs::ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
2917 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2918 full_information: true,
2920 let encoded_value = reply_short_channel_ids_end.encode();
2921 let target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e220601").unwrap();
2922 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2924 reply_short_channel_ids_end = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2925 assert_eq!(reply_short_channel_ids_end.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2926 assert_eq!(reply_short_channel_ids_end.full_information, true);
2930 fn encoding_gossip_timestamp_filter(){
2931 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2932 let mut gossip_timestamp_filter = msgs::GossipTimestampFilter {
2933 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2934 first_timestamp: 1590000000,
2935 timestamp_range: 0xffff_ffff,
2937 let encoded_value = gossip_timestamp_filter.encode();
2938 let target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e22065ec57980ffffffff").unwrap();
2939 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2941 gossip_timestamp_filter = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2942 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2943 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.first_timestamp, 1590000000);
2944 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.timestamp_range, 0xffff_ffff);
2948 fn decode_onion_hop_data_len_as_bigsize() {
2949 // Tests that we can decode an onion payload that is >253 bytes.
2950 // Previously, receiving a payload of this size could've caused us to fail to decode a valid
2951 // payload, because we were decoding the length (a BigSize, big-endian) as a VarInt
2954 // Encode a test onion payload with a big custom TLV such that it's >253 bytes, forcing the
2955 // payload length to be encoded over multiple bytes rather than a single u8.
2956 let big_payload = encode_big_payload().unwrap();
2957 let mut rd = Cursor::new(&big_payload[..]);
2958 <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut rd).unwrap();
2960 // see above test, needs to be a separate method for use of the serialization macros.
2961 fn encode_big_payload() -> Result<Vec<u8>, io::Error> {
2962 use crate::util::ser::HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize;
2963 let payload = msgs::OnionHopData {
2964 format: OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
2965 short_channel_id: 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea,
2967 amt_to_forward: 1000,
2968 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2970 let mut encoded_payload = Vec::new();
2971 let test_bytes = vec![42u8; 1000];
2972 if let OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } = payload.format {
2973 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(&mut encoded_payload, {
2974 (1, test_bytes, vec_type),
2975 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(payload.amt_to_forward), required),
2976 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(payload.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
2977 (6, short_channel_id, required)