1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Wire messages, traits representing wire message handlers, and a few error types live here.
12 //! For a normal node you probably don't need to use anything here, however, if you wish to split a
13 //! node into an internet-facing route/message socket handling daemon and a separate daemon (or
14 //! server entirely) which handles only channel-related messages you may wish to implement
15 //! [`ChannelMessageHandler`] yourself and use it to re-serialize messages and pass them across
18 //! Note that if you go with such an architecture (instead of passing raw socket events to a
19 //! non-internet-facing system) you trust the frontend internet-facing system to not lie about the
20 //! source `node_id` of the message, however this does allow you to significantly reduce bandwidth
21 //! between the systems as routing messages can represent a significant chunk of bandwidth usage
22 //! (especially for non-channel-publicly-announcing nodes). As an alternate design which avoids
23 //! this issue, if you have sufficient bidirectional bandwidth between your systems, you may send
24 //! raw socket events into your non-internet-facing system and then send routing events back to
25 //! track the network on the less-secure system.
27 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
28 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature;
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
30 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
33 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
34 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
35 use crate::onion_message;
37 use crate::prelude::*;
40 use crate::io::{self, Read};
41 use crate::io_extras::read_to_end;
43 use crate::util::events::{MessageSendEventsProvider, OnionMessageProvider};
44 use crate::util::logger;
45 use crate::util::ser::{LengthReadable, Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, FixedLengthReader, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize, Hostname};
47 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
49 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
51 /// 21 million * 10^8 * 1000
52 pub(crate) const MAX_VALUE_MSAT: u64 = 21_000_000_0000_0000_000;
54 /// An error in decoding a message or struct.
55 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
56 pub enum DecodeError {
57 /// A version byte specified something we don't know how to handle.
59 /// Includes unknown realm byte in an onion hop data packet.
61 /// Unknown feature mandating we fail to parse message (e.g., TLV with an even, unknown type)
62 UnknownRequiredFeature,
63 /// Value was invalid.
65 /// For example, a byte which was supposed to be a bool was something other than a 0
66 /// or 1, a public key/private key/signature was invalid, text wasn't UTF-8, TLV was
67 /// syntactically incorrect, etc.
69 /// The buffer to be read was too short.
71 /// A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly.
73 /// Error from [`std::io`].
75 /// The message included zlib-compressed values, which we don't support.
76 UnsupportedCompression,
79 /// An [`init`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
81 /// [`init`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-init-message
82 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
84 /// The relevant features which the sender supports.
85 pub features: InitFeatures,
86 /// The receipient's network address.
88 /// This adds the option to report a remote IP address back to a connecting peer using the init
89 /// message. A node can decide to use that information to discover a potential update to its
90 /// public IPv4 address (NAT) and use that for a [`NodeAnnouncement`] update message containing
92 pub remote_network_address: Option<NetAddress>,
95 /// An [`error`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
97 /// [`error`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-error-and-warning-messages
98 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
99 pub struct ErrorMessage {
100 /// The channel ID involved in the error.
102 /// All-0s indicates a general error unrelated to a specific channel, after which all channels
103 /// with the sending peer should be closed.
104 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
105 /// A possibly human-readable error description.
107 /// The string should be sanitized before it is used (e.g., emitted to logs or printed to
108 /// `stdout`). Otherwise, a well crafted error message may trigger a security vulnerability in
109 /// the terminal emulator or the logging subsystem.
113 /// A [`warning`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
115 /// [`warning`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-error-and-warning-messages
116 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
117 pub struct WarningMessage {
118 /// The channel ID involved in the warning.
120 /// All-0s indicates a warning unrelated to a specific channel.
121 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
122 /// A possibly human-readable warning description.
124 /// The string should be sanitized before it is used (e.g. emitted to logs or printed to
125 /// stdout). Otherwise, a well crafted error message may trigger a security vulnerability in
126 /// the terminal emulator or the logging subsystem.
130 /// A [`ping`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
132 /// [`ping`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-ping-and-pong-messages
133 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
135 /// The desired response length.
137 /// The ping packet size.
139 /// This field is not sent on the wire. byteslen zeros are sent.
143 /// A [`pong`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
145 /// [`pong`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-ping-and-pong-messages
146 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
148 /// The pong packet size.
150 /// This field is not sent on the wire. byteslen zeros are sent.
154 /// An [`open_channel`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
156 /// [`open_channel`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-open_channel-message
157 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
158 pub struct OpenChannel {
159 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
160 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
161 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
162 pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
163 /// The channel value
164 pub funding_satoshis: u64,
165 /// The amount to push to the counterparty as part of the open, in milli-satoshi
167 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by sender will be omitted
168 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
169 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards sender, in milli-satoshi
170 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
171 /// The minimum value unencumbered by HTLCs for the counterparty to keep in the channel
172 pub channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
173 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
174 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
175 /// The feerate per 1000-weight of sender generated transactions, until updated by
177 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
178 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if
179 /// they broadcast a commitment transaction
180 pub to_self_delay: u16,
181 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards sender
182 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
183 /// The sender's key controlling the funding transaction
184 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
185 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
186 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
187 /// A payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
188 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
189 /// Used to derive a payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by sender
190 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
191 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to sender
192 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
193 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-sender transaction's per commitment point
194 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
195 /// The channel flags to be used
196 pub channel_flags: u8,
197 /// Optionally, a request to pre-set the to-sender output's `scriptPubkey` for when we collaboratively close
198 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField<Script>,
199 /// The channel type that this channel will represent
201 /// If this is `None`, we derive the channel type from the intersection of our
202 /// feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from the [`Init`] message.
203 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
206 /// An [`accept_channel`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
208 /// [`accept_channel`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-accept_channel-message
209 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
210 pub struct AcceptChannel {
211 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
212 pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
213 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by sender will be omitted
214 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
215 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards sender, in milli-satoshi
216 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
217 /// The minimum value unencumbered by HTLCs for the counterparty to keep in the channel
218 pub channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
219 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
220 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
221 /// Minimum depth of the funding transaction before the channel is considered open
222 pub minimum_depth: u32,
223 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if they broadcast a commitment transaction
224 pub to_self_delay: u16,
225 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards sender
226 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
227 /// The sender's key controlling the funding transaction
228 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
229 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
230 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
231 /// A payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
232 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
233 /// Used to derive a payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by sender
234 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
235 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
236 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
237 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-sender transaction's per commitment point
238 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
239 /// Optionally, a request to pre-set the to-sender output's scriptPubkey for when we collaboratively close
240 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField<Script>,
241 /// The channel type that this channel will represent.
243 /// If this is `None`, we derive the channel type from the intersection of
244 /// our feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from the [`Init`] message.
245 /// This is required to match the equivalent field in [`OpenChannel::channel_type`].
246 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
249 /// A [`funding_created`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
251 /// [`funding_created`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-funding_created-message
252 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
253 pub struct FundingCreated {
254 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding is established
255 pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
256 /// The funding transaction ID
257 pub funding_txid: Txid,
258 /// The specific output index funding this channel
259 pub funding_output_index: u16,
260 /// The signature of the channel initiator (funder) on the initial commitment transaction
261 pub signature: Signature,
264 /// A [`funding_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
266 /// [`funding_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-funding_signed-message
267 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
268 pub struct FundingSigned {
270 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
271 /// The signature of the channel acceptor (fundee) on the initial commitment transaction
272 pub signature: Signature,
275 /// A [`channel_ready`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
277 /// [`channel_ready`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-channel_ready-message
278 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
279 pub struct ChannelReady {
281 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
282 /// The per-commitment point of the second commitment transaction
283 pub next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
284 /// If set, provides a `short_channel_id` alias for this channel.
286 /// The sender will accept payments to be forwarded over this SCID and forward them to this
287 /// messages' recipient.
288 pub short_channel_id_alias: Option<u64>,
291 /// A [`shutdown`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
293 /// [`shutdown`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#closing-initiation-shutdown
294 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
295 pub struct Shutdown {
297 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
298 /// The destination of this peer's funds on closing.
300 /// Must be in one of these forms: P2PKH, P2SH, P2WPKH, P2WSH, P2TR.
301 pub scriptpubkey: Script,
304 /// The minimum and maximum fees which the sender is willing to place on the closing transaction.
306 /// This is provided in [`ClosingSigned`] by both sides to indicate the fee range they are willing
308 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
309 pub struct ClosingSignedFeeRange {
310 /// The minimum absolute fee, in satoshis, which the sender is willing to place on the closing
312 pub min_fee_satoshis: u64,
313 /// The maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, which the sender is willing to place on the closing
315 pub max_fee_satoshis: u64,
318 /// A [`closing_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
320 /// [`closing_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#closing-negotiation-closing_signed
321 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
322 pub struct ClosingSigned {
324 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
325 /// The proposed total fee for the closing transaction
326 pub fee_satoshis: u64,
327 /// A signature on the closing transaction
328 pub signature: Signature,
329 /// The minimum and maximum fees which the sender is willing to accept, provided only by new
331 pub fee_range: Option<ClosingSignedFeeRange>,
334 /// An [`update_add_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
336 /// [`update_add_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#adding-an-htlc-update_add_htlc
337 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
338 pub struct UpdateAddHTLC {
340 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
343 /// The HTLC value in milli-satoshi
344 pub amount_msat: u64,
345 /// The payment hash, the pre-image of which controls HTLC redemption
346 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
347 /// The expiry height of the HTLC
348 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
349 pub(crate) onion_routing_packet: OnionPacket,
352 /// An onion message to be sent to or received from a peer.
354 // TODO: update with link to OM when they are merged into the BOLTs
355 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
356 pub struct OnionMessage {
357 /// Used in decrypting the onion packet's payload.
358 pub blinding_point: PublicKey,
359 pub(crate) onion_routing_packet: onion_message::Packet,
362 /// An [`update_fulfill_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
364 /// [`update_fulfill_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
365 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
366 pub struct UpdateFulfillHTLC {
368 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
371 /// The pre-image of the payment hash, allowing HTLC redemption
372 pub payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
375 /// An [`update_fail_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
377 /// [`update_fail_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
378 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
379 pub struct UpdateFailHTLC {
381 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
384 pub(crate) reason: OnionErrorPacket,
387 /// An [`update_fail_malformed_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
389 /// [`update_fail_malformed_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
390 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
391 pub struct UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
393 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
396 pub(crate) sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
398 pub failure_code: u16,
401 /// A [`commitment_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
403 /// [`commitment_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#committing-updates-so-far-commitment_signed
404 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
405 pub struct CommitmentSigned {
407 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
408 /// A signature on the commitment transaction
409 pub signature: Signature,
410 /// Signatures on the HTLC transactions
411 pub htlc_signatures: Vec<Signature>,
414 /// A [`revoke_and_ack`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
416 /// [`revoke_and_ack`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#completing-the-transition-to-the-updated-state-revoke_and_ack
417 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
418 pub struct RevokeAndACK {
420 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
421 /// The secret corresponding to the per-commitment point
422 pub per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
423 /// The next sender-broadcast commitment transaction's per-commitment point
424 pub next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
427 /// An [`update_fee`] message to be sent to or received from a peer
429 /// [`update_fee`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#updating-fees-update_fee
430 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
431 pub struct UpdateFee {
433 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
434 /// Fee rate per 1000-weight of the transaction
435 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
438 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
439 /// Proof that the sender knows the per-commitment secret of the previous commitment transaction.
441 /// This is used to convince the recipient that the channel is at a certain commitment
442 /// number even if they lost that data due to a local failure. Of course, the peer may lie
443 /// and even later commitments may have been revoked.
444 pub struct DataLossProtect {
445 /// Proof that the sender knows the per-commitment secret of a specific commitment transaction
446 /// belonging to the recipient
447 pub your_last_per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
448 /// The sender's per-commitment point for their current commitment transaction
449 pub my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
452 /// A [`channel_reestablish`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
454 /// [`channel_reestablish`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#message-retransmission
455 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
456 pub struct ChannelReestablish {
458 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
459 /// The next commitment number for the sender
460 pub next_local_commitment_number: u64,
461 /// The next commitment number for the recipient
462 pub next_remote_commitment_number: u64,
463 /// Optionally, a field proving that next_remote_commitment_number-1 has been revoked
464 pub data_loss_protect: OptionalField<DataLossProtect>,
467 /// An [`announcement_signatures`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
469 /// [`announcement_signatures`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-announcement_signatures-message
470 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
471 pub struct AnnouncementSignatures {
473 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
474 /// The short channel ID
475 pub short_channel_id: u64,
476 /// A signature by the node key
477 pub node_signature: Signature,
478 /// A signature by the funding key
479 pub bitcoin_signature: Signature,
482 /// An address which can be used to connect to a remote peer.
483 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
484 pub enum NetAddress {
485 /// An IPv4 address/port on which the peer is listening.
487 /// The 4-byte IPv4 address
489 /// The port on which the node is listening
492 /// An IPv6 address/port on which the peer is listening.
494 /// The 16-byte IPv6 address
496 /// The port on which the node is listening
499 /// An old-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening.
501 /// This field is deprecated and the Tor network generally no longer supports V2 Onion
502 /// addresses. Thus, the details are not parsed here.
504 /// A new-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening.
506 /// To create the human-readable "hostname", concatenate the ED25519 pubkey, checksum, and version,
507 /// wrap as base32 and append ".onion".
509 /// The ed25519 long-term public key of the peer
510 ed25519_pubkey: [u8; 32],
511 /// The checksum of the pubkey and version, as included in the onion address
513 /// The version byte, as defined by the Tor Onion v3 spec.
515 /// The port on which the node is listening
518 /// A hostname/port on which the peer is listening.
520 /// The hostname on which the node is listening.
522 /// The port on which the node is listening.
527 /// Gets the ID of this address type. Addresses in [`NodeAnnouncement`] messages should be sorted
529 pub(crate) fn get_id(&self) -> u8 {
531 &NetAddress::IPv4 {..} => { 1 },
532 &NetAddress::IPv6 {..} => { 2 },
533 &NetAddress::OnionV2(_) => { 3 },
534 &NetAddress::OnionV3 {..} => { 4 },
535 &NetAddress::Hostname {..} => { 5 },
539 /// Strict byte-length of address descriptor, 1-byte type not recorded
540 fn len(&self) -> u16 {
542 &NetAddress::IPv4 { .. } => { 6 },
543 &NetAddress::IPv6 { .. } => { 18 },
544 &NetAddress::OnionV2(_) => { 12 },
545 &NetAddress::OnionV3 { .. } => { 37 },
546 // Consists of 1-byte hostname length, hostname bytes, and 2-byte port.
547 &NetAddress::Hostname { ref hostname, .. } => { u16::from(hostname.len()) + 3 },
551 /// The maximum length of any address descriptor, not including the 1-byte type.
552 /// This maximum length is reached by a hostname address descriptor:
553 /// a hostname with a maximum length of 255, its 1-byte length and a 2-byte port.
554 pub(crate) const MAX_LEN: u16 = 258;
557 impl Writeable for NetAddress {
558 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
560 &NetAddress::IPv4 { ref addr, ref port } => {
565 &NetAddress::IPv6 { ref addr, ref port } => {
570 &NetAddress::OnionV2(bytes) => {
572 bytes.write(writer)?;
574 &NetAddress::OnionV3 { ref ed25519_pubkey, ref checksum, ref version, ref port } => {
576 ed25519_pubkey.write(writer)?;
577 checksum.write(writer)?;
578 version.write(writer)?;
581 &NetAddress::Hostname { ref hostname, ref port } => {
583 hostname.write(writer)?;
591 impl Readable for Result<NetAddress, u8> {
592 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Result<NetAddress, u8>, DecodeError> {
593 let byte = <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
596 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::IPv4 {
597 addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
598 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
602 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::IPv6 {
603 addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
604 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
607 3 => Ok(Ok(NetAddress::OnionV2(Readable::read(reader)?))),
609 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::OnionV3 {
610 ed25519_pubkey: Readable::read(reader)?,
611 checksum: Readable::read(reader)?,
612 version: Readable::read(reader)?,
613 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
617 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::Hostname {
618 hostname: Readable::read(reader)?,
619 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
622 _ => return Ok(Err(byte)),
627 impl Readable for NetAddress {
628 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NetAddress, DecodeError> {
629 match Readable::read(reader) {
630 Ok(Ok(res)) => Ok(res),
631 Ok(Err(_)) => Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion),
637 /// Represents the set of gossip messages that require a signature from a node's identity key.
639 pub enum UnsignedGossipMessage {
640 /// An unsigned channel announcement.
641 ChannelAnnouncement(UnsignedChannelAnnouncement),
642 /// An unsigned channel update.
643 ChannelUpdate(UnsignedChannelUpdate),
644 /// An unsigned node announcement.
645 NodeAnnouncement(UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)
648 impl Writeable for UnsignedGossipMessage {
649 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
651 UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
652 UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
653 UnsignedGossipMessage::NodeAnnouncement(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
658 /// The unsigned part of a [`node_announcement`] message.
660 /// [`node_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-node_announcement-message
661 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
662 pub struct UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
663 /// The advertised features
664 pub features: NodeFeatures,
665 /// A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed
667 /// The `node_id` this announcement originated from (don't rebroadcast the `node_announcement` back
670 /// An RGB color for UI purposes
672 /// An alias, for UI purposes.
674 /// This should be sanitized before use. There is no guarantee of uniqueness.
676 /// List of addresses on which this node is reachable
677 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
678 pub(crate) excess_address_data: Vec<u8>,
679 pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
681 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
682 /// A [`node_announcement`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
684 /// [`node_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-node_announcement-message
685 pub struct NodeAnnouncement {
686 /// The signature by the node key
687 pub signature: Signature,
688 /// The actual content of the announcement
689 pub contents: UnsignedNodeAnnouncement,
692 /// The unsigned part of a [`channel_announcement`] message.
694 /// [`channel_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_announcement-message
695 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
696 pub struct UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
697 /// The advertised channel features
698 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
699 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
700 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
701 /// The short channel ID
702 pub short_channel_id: u64,
703 /// One of the two `node_id`s which are endpoints of this channel
704 pub node_id_1: NodeId,
705 /// The other of the two `node_id`s which are endpoints of this channel
706 pub node_id_2: NodeId,
707 /// The funding key for the first node
708 pub bitcoin_key_1: NodeId,
709 /// The funding key for the second node
710 pub bitcoin_key_2: NodeId,
711 pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
713 /// A [`channel_announcement`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
715 /// [`channel_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_announcement-message
716 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
717 pub struct ChannelAnnouncement {
718 /// Authentication of the announcement by the first public node
719 pub node_signature_1: Signature,
720 /// Authentication of the announcement by the second public node
721 pub node_signature_2: Signature,
722 /// Proof of funding UTXO ownership by the first public node
723 pub bitcoin_signature_1: Signature,
724 /// Proof of funding UTXO ownership by the second public node
725 pub bitcoin_signature_2: Signature,
726 /// The actual announcement
727 pub contents: UnsignedChannelAnnouncement,
730 /// The unsigned part of a [`channel_update`] message.
732 /// [`channel_update`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_update-message
733 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
734 pub struct UnsignedChannelUpdate {
735 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
736 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
737 /// The short channel ID
738 pub short_channel_id: u64,
739 /// A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed, specific to this channel
743 /// The number of blocks such that if:
744 /// `incoming_htlc.cltv_expiry < outgoing_htlc.cltv_expiry + cltv_expiry_delta`
745 /// then we need to fail the HTLC backwards. When forwarding an HTLC, `cltv_expiry_delta` determines
746 /// the outgoing HTLC's minimum `cltv_expiry` value -- so, if an incoming HTLC comes in with a
747 /// `cltv_expiry` of 100000, and the node we're forwarding to has a `cltv_expiry_delta` value of 10,
748 /// then we'll check that the outgoing HTLC's `cltv_expiry` value is at least 100010 before
749 /// forwarding. Note that the HTLC sender is the one who originally sets this value when
750 /// constructing the route.
751 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
752 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
753 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
754 /// The maximum HTLC value incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi.
756 /// This used to be optional.
757 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
758 /// The base HTLC fee charged by sender, in milli-satoshi
759 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
760 /// The amount to fee multiplier, in micro-satoshi
761 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
762 /// Excess data which was signed as a part of the message which we do not (yet) understand how
765 /// This is stored to ensure forward-compatibility as new fields are added to the lightning gossip protocol.
766 pub excess_data: Vec<u8>,
768 /// A [`channel_update`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
770 /// [`channel_update`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_update-message
771 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
772 pub struct ChannelUpdate {
773 /// A signature of the channel update
774 pub signature: Signature,
775 /// The actual channel update
776 pub contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate,
779 /// A [`query_channel_range`] message is used to query a peer for channel
780 /// UTXOs in a range of blocks. The recipient of a query makes a best
781 /// effort to reply to the query using one or more [`ReplyChannelRange`]
784 /// [`query_channel_range`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_channel_range-and-reply_channel_range-messages
785 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
786 pub struct QueryChannelRange {
787 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
788 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
789 /// The height of the first block for the channel UTXOs being queried
790 pub first_blocknum: u32,
791 /// The number of blocks to include in the query results
792 pub number_of_blocks: u32,
795 /// A [`reply_channel_range`] message is a reply to a [`QueryChannelRange`]
798 /// Multiple `reply_channel_range` messages can be sent in reply
799 /// to a single [`QueryChannelRange`] message. The query recipient makes a
800 /// best effort to respond based on their local network view which may
801 /// not be a perfect view of the network. The `short_channel_id`s in the
802 /// reply are encoded. We only support `encoding_type=0` uncompressed
803 /// serialization and do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization.
805 /// [`reply_channel_range`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_channel_range-and-reply_channel_range-messages
806 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
807 pub struct ReplyChannelRange {
808 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
809 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
810 /// The height of the first block in the range of the reply
811 pub first_blocknum: u32,
812 /// The number of blocks included in the range of the reply
813 pub number_of_blocks: u32,
814 /// True when this is the final reply for a query
815 pub sync_complete: bool,
816 /// The `short_channel_id`s in the channel range
817 pub short_channel_ids: Vec<u64>,
820 /// A [`query_short_channel_ids`] message is used to query a peer for
821 /// routing gossip messages related to one or more `short_channel_id`s.
823 /// The query recipient will reply with the latest, if available,
824 /// [`ChannelAnnouncement`], [`ChannelUpdate`] and [`NodeAnnouncement`] messages
825 /// it maintains for the requested `short_channel_id`s followed by a
826 /// [`ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd`] message. The `short_channel_id`s sent in
827 /// this query are encoded. We only support `encoding_type=0` uncompressed
828 /// serialization and do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization.
830 /// [`query_short_channel_ids`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_short_channel_idsreply_short_channel_ids_end-messages
831 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
832 pub struct QueryShortChannelIds {
833 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
834 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
835 /// The short_channel_ids that are being queried
836 pub short_channel_ids: Vec<u64>,
839 /// A [`reply_short_channel_ids_end`] message is sent as a reply to a
840 /// message. The query recipient makes a best
841 /// effort to respond based on their local network view which may not be
842 /// a perfect view of the network.
844 /// [`reply_short_channel_ids_end`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_short_channel_idsreply_short_channel_ids_end-messages
845 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
846 pub struct ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
847 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain that was queried
848 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
849 /// Indicates if the query recipient maintains up-to-date channel
850 /// information for the `chain_hash`
851 pub full_information: bool,
854 /// A [`gossip_timestamp_filter`] message is used by a node to request
855 /// gossip relay for messages in the requested time range when the
856 /// `gossip_queries` feature has been negotiated.
858 /// [`gossip_timestamp_filter`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-gossip_timestamp_filter-message
859 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
860 pub struct GossipTimestampFilter {
861 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain for channel and node information
862 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
863 /// The starting unix timestamp
864 pub first_timestamp: u32,
865 /// The range of information in seconds
866 pub timestamp_range: u32,
869 /// Encoding type for data compression of collections in gossip queries.
871 /// We do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization [defined in BOLT
872 /// #7](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#query-messages).
877 /// Used to put an error message in a [`LightningError`].
878 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
879 pub enum ErrorAction {
880 /// The peer took some action which made us think they were useless. Disconnect them.
882 /// An error message which we should make an effort to send before we disconnect.
883 msg: Option<ErrorMessage>
885 /// The peer did something harmless that we weren't able to process, just log and ignore
886 // New code should *not* use this. New code must use IgnoreAndLog, below!
888 /// The peer did something harmless that we weren't able to meaningfully process.
889 /// If the error is logged, log it at the given level.
890 IgnoreAndLog(logger::Level),
891 /// The peer provided us with a gossip message which we'd already seen. In most cases this
892 /// should be ignored, but it may result in the message being forwarded if it is a duplicate of
893 /// our own channel announcements.
894 IgnoreDuplicateGossip,
895 /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them.
897 /// The message to send.
900 /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them without closing any channels.
902 /// The message to send.
904 /// The peer may have done something harmless that we weren't able to meaningfully process,
905 /// though we should still tell them about it.
906 /// If this event is logged, log it at the given level.
907 log_level: logger::Level,
911 /// An Err type for failure to process messages.
912 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
913 pub struct LightningError {
914 /// A human-readable message describing the error
916 /// The action which should be taken against the offending peer.
917 pub action: ErrorAction,
920 /// Struct used to return values from [`RevokeAndACK`] messages, containing a bunch of commitment
921 /// transaction updates if they were pending.
922 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
923 pub struct CommitmentUpdate {
924 /// `update_add_htlc` messages which should be sent
925 pub update_add_htlcs: Vec<UpdateAddHTLC>,
926 /// `update_fulfill_htlc` messages which should be sent
927 pub update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
928 /// `update_fail_htlc` messages which should be sent
929 pub update_fail_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFailHTLC>,
930 /// `update_fail_malformed_htlc` messages which should be sent
931 pub update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFailMalformedHTLC>,
932 /// An `update_fee` message which should be sent
933 pub update_fee: Option<UpdateFee>,
934 /// A `commitment_signed` message which should be sent
935 pub commitment_signed: CommitmentSigned,
938 /// Messages could have optional fields to use with extended features
939 /// As we wish to serialize these differently from `Option<T>`s (`Options` get a tag byte, but
940 /// [`OptionalField`] simply gets `Present` if there are enough bytes to read into it), we have a
941 /// separate enum type for them.
943 /// (C-not exported) due to a free generic in `T`
944 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
945 pub enum OptionalField<T> {
946 /// Optional field is included in message
948 /// Optional field is absent in message
952 /// A trait to describe an object which can receive channel messages.
954 /// Messages MAY be called in parallel when they originate from different `their_node_ids`, however
955 /// they MUST NOT be called in parallel when the two calls have the same `their_node_id`.
956 pub trait ChannelMessageHandler : MessageSendEventsProvider {
958 /// Handle an incoming `open_channel` message from the given peer.
959 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OpenChannel);
960 /// Handle an incoming `accept_channel` message from the given peer.
961 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AcceptChannel);
962 /// Handle an incoming `funding_created` message from the given peer.
963 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingCreated);
964 /// Handle an incoming `funding_signed` message from the given peer.
965 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingSigned);
966 /// Handle an incoming `channel_ready` message from the given peer.
967 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelReady);
970 /// Handle an incoming `shutdown` message from the given peer.
971 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Shutdown);
972 /// Handle an incoming `closing_signed` message from the given peer.
973 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ClosingSigned);
976 /// Handle an incoming `update_add_htlc` message from the given peer.
977 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateAddHTLC);
978 /// Handle an incoming `update_fulfill_htlc` message from the given peer.
979 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFulfillHTLC);
980 /// Handle an incoming `update_fail_htlc` message from the given peer.
981 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFailHTLC);
982 /// Handle an incoming `update_fail_malformed_htlc` message from the given peer.
983 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFailMalformedHTLC);
984 /// Handle an incoming `commitment_signed` message from the given peer.
985 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &CommitmentSigned);
986 /// Handle an incoming `revoke_and_ack` message from the given peer.
987 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &RevokeAndACK);
989 /// Handle an incoming `update_fee` message from the given peer.
990 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFee);
992 // Channel-to-announce:
993 /// Handle an incoming `announcement_signatures` message from the given peer.
994 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AnnouncementSignatures);
996 // Connection loss/reestablish:
997 /// Indicates a connection to the peer failed/an existing connection was lost.
998 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey);
1000 /// Handle a peer reconnecting, possibly generating `channel_reestablish` message(s).
1002 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1003 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1004 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1005 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1006 /// Handle an incoming `channel_reestablish` message from the given peer.
1007 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelReestablish);
1009 /// Handle an incoming `channel_update` message from the given peer.
1010 fn handle_channel_update(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelUpdate);
1013 /// Handle an incoming `error` message from the given peer.
1014 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ErrorMessage);
1016 // Handler information:
1017 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1018 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1019 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1020 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1022 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1023 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1024 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1026 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1027 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1030 /// A trait to describe an object which can receive routing messages.
1032 /// # Implementor DoS Warnings
1034 /// For messages enabled with the `gossip_queries` feature there are potential DoS vectors when
1035 /// handling inbound queries. Implementors using an on-disk network graph should be aware of
1036 /// repeated disk I/O for queries accessing different parts of the network graph.
1037 pub trait RoutingMessageHandler : MessageSendEventsProvider {
1038 /// Handle an incoming `node_announcement` message, returning `true` if it should be forwarded on,
1039 /// `false` or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1040 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1041 /// Handle a `channel_announcement` message, returning `true` if it should be forwarded on, `false`
1042 /// or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1043 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1044 /// Handle an incoming `channel_update` message, returning true if it should be forwarded on,
1045 /// `false` or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1046 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1047 /// Gets channel announcements and updates required to dump our routing table to a remote node,
1048 /// starting at the `short_channel_id` indicated by `starting_point` and including announcements
1049 /// for a single channel.
1050 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)>;
1051 /// Gets a node announcement required to dump our routing table to a remote node, starting at
1052 /// the node *after* the provided pubkey and including up to one announcement immediately
1053 /// higher (as defined by `<PublicKey as Ord>::cmp`) than `starting_point`.
1054 /// If `None` is provided for `starting_point`, we start at the first node.
1055 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&NodeId>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement>;
1056 /// Called when a connection is established with a peer. This can be used to
1057 /// perform routing table synchronization using a strategy defined by the
1060 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1061 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1062 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1063 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1064 /// Handles the reply of a query we initiated to learn about channels
1065 /// for a given range of blocks. We can expect to receive one or more
1066 /// replies to a single query.
1067 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1068 /// Handles the reply of a query we initiated asking for routing gossip
1069 /// messages for a list of channels. We should receive this message when
1070 /// a node has completed its best effort to send us the pertaining routing
1071 /// gossip messages.
1072 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1073 /// Handles when a peer asks us to send a list of `short_channel_id`s
1074 /// for the requested range of blocks.
1075 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1076 /// Handles when a peer asks us to send routing gossip messages for a
1077 /// list of `short_channel_id`s.
1078 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1080 // Handler queueing status:
1081 /// Indicates that there are a large number of [`ChannelAnnouncement`] (or other) messages
1082 /// pending some async action. While there is no guarantee of the rate of future messages, the
1083 /// caller should seek to reduce the rate of new gossip messages handled, especially
1084 /// [`ChannelAnnouncement`]s.
1085 fn processing_queue_high(&self) -> bool;
1087 // Handler information:
1088 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1089 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1090 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1091 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1092 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1093 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1094 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1096 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1097 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1100 /// A trait to describe an object that can receive onion messages.
1101 pub trait OnionMessageHandler : OnionMessageProvider {
1102 /// Handle an incoming `onion_message` message from the given peer.
1103 fn handle_onion_message(&self, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OnionMessage);
1104 /// Called when a connection is established with a peer. Can be used to track which peers
1105 /// advertise onion message support and are online.
1107 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1108 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1109 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1110 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1111 /// Indicates a connection to the peer failed/an existing connection was lost. Allows handlers to
1112 /// drop and refuse to forward onion messages to this peer.
1113 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey);
1115 // Handler information:
1116 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1117 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1118 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1119 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1121 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1122 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1123 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1125 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1126 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1129 mod fuzzy_internal_msgs {
1130 use crate::prelude::*;
1131 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
1133 // These types aren't intended to be pub, but are exposed for direct fuzzing (as we deserialize
1134 // them from untrusted input):
1136 pub(crate) struct FinalOnionHopData {
1137 pub(crate) payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
1138 /// The total value, in msat, of the payment as received by the ultimate recipient.
1139 /// Message serialization may panic if this value is more than 21 million Bitcoin.
1140 pub(crate) total_msat: u64,
1143 pub(crate) enum OnionHopDataFormat {
1145 short_channel_id: u64,
1148 payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData>,
1149 keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
1153 pub struct OnionHopData {
1154 pub(crate) format: OnionHopDataFormat,
1155 /// The value, in msat, of the payment after this hop's fee is deducted.
1156 /// Message serialization may panic if this value is more than 21 million Bitcoin.
1157 pub(crate) amt_to_forward: u64,
1158 pub(crate) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
1161 pub struct DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
1162 pub(crate) hmac: [u8; 32],
1163 pub(crate) failuremsg: Vec<u8>,
1164 pub(crate) pad: Vec<u8>,
1168 pub use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*;
1169 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
1170 pub(crate) use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*;
1173 pub(crate) struct OnionPacket {
1174 pub(crate) version: u8,
1175 /// In order to ensure we always return an error on onion decode in compliance with [BOLT
1176 /// #4](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md), we have to
1177 /// deserialize `OnionPacket`s contained in [`UpdateAddHTLC`] messages even if the ephemeral
1178 /// public key (here) is bogus, so we hold a [`Result`] instead of a [`PublicKey`] as we'd
1180 pub(crate) public_key: Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>,
1181 pub(crate) hop_data: [u8; 20*65],
1182 pub(crate) hmac: [u8; 32],
1185 impl onion_utils::Packet for OnionPacket {
1186 type Data = onion_utils::FixedSizeOnionPacket;
1187 fn new(pubkey: PublicKey, hop_data: onion_utils::FixedSizeOnionPacket, hmac: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
1190 public_key: Ok(pubkey),
1191 hop_data: hop_data.0,
1197 impl Eq for OnionPacket { }
1198 impl PartialEq for OnionPacket {
1199 fn eq(&self, other: &OnionPacket) -> bool {
1200 for (i, j) in self.hop_data.iter().zip(other.hop_data.iter()) {
1201 if i != j { return false; }
1203 self.version == other.version &&
1204 self.public_key == other.public_key &&
1205 self.hmac == other.hmac
1209 impl fmt::Debug for OnionPacket {
1210 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
1211 f.write_fmt(format_args!("OnionPacket version {} with hmac {:?}", self.version, &self.hmac[..]))
1215 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1216 pub(crate) struct OnionErrorPacket {
1217 // This really should be a constant size slice, but the spec lets these things be up to 128KB?
1218 // (TODO) We limit it in decode to much lower...
1219 pub(crate) data: Vec<u8>,
1222 impl fmt::Display for DecodeError {
1223 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
1225 DecodeError::UnknownVersion => f.write_str("Unknown realm byte in Onion packet"),
1226 DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature => f.write_str("Unknown required feature preventing decode"),
1227 DecodeError::InvalidValue => f.write_str("Nonsense bytes didn't map to the type they were interpreted as"),
1228 DecodeError::ShortRead => f.write_str("Packet extended beyond the provided bytes"),
1229 DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor => f.write_str("A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly"),
1230 DecodeError::Io(ref e) => fmt::Debug::fmt(e, f),
1231 DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression => f.write_str("We don't support receiving messages with zlib-compressed fields"),
1236 impl From<io::Error> for DecodeError {
1237 fn from(e: io::Error) -> Self {
1238 if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof {
1239 DecodeError::ShortRead
1241 DecodeError::Io(e.kind())
1246 impl Writeable for OptionalField<Script> {
1247 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1249 OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1250 // Note that Writeable for script includes the 16-bit length tag for us
1253 OptionalField::Absent => {}
1259 impl Readable for OptionalField<Script> {
1260 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1261 match <u16 as Readable>::read(r) {
1263 let mut buf = vec![0; len as usize];
1264 r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
1265 Ok(OptionalField::Present(Script::from(buf)))
1267 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(OptionalField::Absent),
1273 impl Writeable for OptionalField<u64> {
1274 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1276 OptionalField::Present(ref value) => {
1279 OptionalField::Absent => {}
1285 impl Readable for OptionalField<u64> {
1286 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1287 let value: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
1288 Ok(OptionalField::Present(value))
1293 impl_writeable_msg!(AcceptChannel, {
1294 temporary_channel_id,
1295 dust_limit_satoshis,
1296 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1297 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1303 revocation_basepoint,
1305 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1307 first_per_commitment_point,
1308 shutdown_scriptpubkey
1310 (1, channel_type, option),
1313 impl_writeable_msg!(AnnouncementSignatures, {
1320 impl Writeable for ChannelReestablish {
1321 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1322 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
1323 self.next_local_commitment_number.write(w)?;
1324 self.next_remote_commitment_number.write(w)?;
1325 match self.data_loss_protect {
1326 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss_protect) => {
1327 (*data_loss_protect).your_last_per_commitment_secret.write(w)?;
1328 (*data_loss_protect).my_current_per_commitment_point.write(w)?;
1330 OptionalField::Absent => {}
1336 impl Readable for ChannelReestablish{
1337 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1339 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1340 next_local_commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
1341 next_remote_commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
1342 data_loss_protect: {
1343 match <[u8; 32] as Readable>::read(r) {
1344 Ok(your_last_per_commitment_secret) =>
1345 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
1346 your_last_per_commitment_secret,
1347 my_current_per_commitment_point: Readable::read(r)?,
1349 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => OptionalField::Absent,
1350 Err(e) => return Err(e)
1357 impl_writeable_msg!(ClosingSigned,
1358 { channel_id, fee_satoshis, signature },
1359 { (1, fee_range, option) }
1362 impl_writeable!(ClosingSignedFeeRange, {
1367 impl_writeable_msg!(CommitmentSigned, {
1373 impl_writeable!(DecodedOnionErrorPacket, {
1379 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingCreated, {
1380 temporary_channel_id,
1382 funding_output_index,
1386 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingSigned, {
1391 impl_writeable_msg!(ChannelReady, {
1393 next_per_commitment_point,
1395 (1, short_channel_id_alias, option),
1398 impl Writeable for Init {
1399 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1400 // global_features gets the bottom 13 bits of our features, and local_features gets all of
1401 // our relevant feature bits. This keeps us compatible with old nodes.
1402 self.features.write_up_to_13(w)?;
1403 self.features.write(w)?;
1404 encode_tlv_stream!(w, {
1405 (3, self.remote_network_address, option)
1411 impl Readable for Init {
1412 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1413 let global_features: InitFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
1414 let features: InitFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
1415 let mut remote_network_address: Option<NetAddress> = None;
1416 decode_tlv_stream!(r, {
1417 (3, remote_network_address, option)
1420 features: features.or(global_features),
1421 remote_network_address,
1426 impl_writeable_msg!(OpenChannel, {
1428 temporary_channel_id,
1431 dust_limit_satoshis,
1432 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1433 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1439 revocation_basepoint,
1441 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1443 first_per_commitment_point,
1445 shutdown_scriptpubkey
1447 (1, channel_type, option),
1450 impl_writeable_msg!(RevokeAndACK, {
1452 per_commitment_secret,
1453 next_per_commitment_point
1456 impl_writeable_msg!(Shutdown, {
1461 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFailHTLC, {
1467 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, {
1474 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFee, {
1479 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFulfillHTLC, {
1485 // Note that this is written as a part of ChannelManager objects, and thus cannot change its
1486 // serialization format in a way which assumes we know the total serialized length/message end
1488 impl_writeable!(OnionErrorPacket, {
1492 // Note that this is written as a part of ChannelManager objects, and thus cannot change its
1493 // serialization format in a way which assumes we know the total serialized length/message end
1495 impl Writeable for OnionPacket {
1496 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1497 self.version.write(w)?;
1498 match self.public_key {
1499 Ok(pubkey) => pubkey.write(w)?,
1500 Err(_) => [0u8;33].write(w)?,
1502 w.write_all(&self.hop_data)?;
1503 self.hmac.write(w)?;
1508 impl Readable for OnionPacket {
1509 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1511 version: Readable::read(r)?,
1513 let mut buf = [0u8;33];
1514 r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
1515 PublicKey::from_slice(&buf)
1517 hop_data: Readable::read(r)?,
1518 hmac: Readable::read(r)?,
1523 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateAddHTLC, {
1529 onion_routing_packet
1532 impl Readable for OnionMessage {
1533 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1534 let blinding_point: PublicKey = Readable::read(r)?;
1535 let len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1536 let mut packet_reader = FixedLengthReader::new(r, len as u64);
1537 let onion_routing_packet: onion_message::Packet = <onion_message::Packet as LengthReadable>::read(&mut packet_reader)?;
1540 onion_routing_packet,
1545 impl Writeable for OnionMessage {
1546 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1547 self.blinding_point.write(w)?;
1548 let onion_packet_len = self.onion_routing_packet.serialized_length();
1549 (onion_packet_len as u16).write(w)?;
1550 self.onion_routing_packet.write(w)?;
1555 impl Writeable for FinalOnionHopData {
1556 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1557 self.payment_secret.0.write(w)?;
1558 HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.total_msat).write(w)
1562 impl Readable for FinalOnionHopData {
1563 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1564 let secret: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
1565 let amt: HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize<u64> = Readable::read(r)?;
1566 Ok(Self { payment_secret: PaymentSecret(secret), total_msat: amt.0 })
1570 impl Writeable for OnionHopData {
1571 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1573 OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => {
1574 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
1575 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.amt_to_forward), required),
1576 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
1577 (6, short_channel_id, required)
1580 OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { ref payment_data, ref keysend_preimage } => {
1581 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
1582 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.amt_to_forward), required),
1583 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
1584 (8, payment_data, option),
1585 (5482373484, keysend_preimage, option)
1593 impl Readable for OnionHopData {
1594 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1595 let mut amt = HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(0u64);
1596 let mut cltv_value = HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(0u32);
1597 let mut short_id: Option<u64> = None;
1598 let mut payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData> = None;
1599 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
1600 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
1602 (4, cltv_value, required),
1603 (6, short_id, option),
1604 (8, payment_data, option),
1605 // See https://github.com/lightning/blips/blob/master/blip-0003.md
1606 (5482373484, keysend_preimage, option)
1609 let format = if let Some(short_channel_id) = short_id {
1610 if payment_data.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
1611 OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
1615 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1616 if data.total_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1617 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1620 OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
1626 if amt.0 > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1627 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1631 amt_to_forward: amt.0,
1632 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv_value.0,
1637 // ReadableArgs because we need onion_utils::decode_next_hop to accommodate payment packets and
1638 // onion message packets.
1639 impl ReadableArgs<()> for OnionHopData {
1640 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R, _arg: ()) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1641 <Self as Readable>::read(r)
1645 impl Writeable for Ping {
1646 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1647 self.ponglen.write(w)?;
1648 vec![0u8; self.byteslen as usize].write(w)?; // size-unchecked write
1653 impl Readable for Ping {
1654 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1656 ponglen: Readable::read(r)?,
1658 let byteslen = Readable::read(r)?;
1659 r.read_exact(&mut vec![0u8; byteslen as usize][..])?;
1666 impl Writeable for Pong {
1667 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1668 vec![0u8; self.byteslen as usize].write(w)?; // size-unchecked write
1673 impl Readable for Pong {
1674 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1677 let byteslen = Readable::read(r)?;
1678 r.read_exact(&mut vec![0u8; byteslen as usize][..])?;
1685 impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1686 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1687 self.features.write(w)?;
1688 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
1689 self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
1690 self.node_id_1.write(w)?;
1691 self.node_id_2.write(w)?;
1692 self.bitcoin_key_1.write(w)?;
1693 self.bitcoin_key_2.write(w)?;
1694 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
1699 impl Readable for UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1700 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1702 features: Readable::read(r)?,
1703 chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
1704 short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1705 node_id_1: Readable::read(r)?,
1706 node_id_2: Readable::read(r)?,
1707 bitcoin_key_1: Readable::read(r)?,
1708 bitcoin_key_2: Readable::read(r)?,
1709 excess_data: read_to_end(r)?,
1714 impl_writeable!(ChannelAnnouncement, {
1717 bitcoin_signature_1,
1718 bitcoin_signature_2,
1722 impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1723 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1724 // `message_flags` used to indicate presence of `htlc_maximum_msat`, but was deprecated in the spec.
1725 const MESSAGE_FLAGS: u8 = 1;
1726 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
1727 self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
1728 self.timestamp.write(w)?;
1729 let all_flags = self.flags as u16 | ((MESSAGE_FLAGS as u16) << 8);
1730 all_flags.write(w)?;
1731 self.cltv_expiry_delta.write(w)?;
1732 self.htlc_minimum_msat.write(w)?;
1733 self.fee_base_msat.write(w)?;
1734 self.fee_proportional_millionths.write(w)?;
1735 self.htlc_maximum_msat.write(w)?;
1736 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
1741 impl Readable for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1742 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1744 chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
1745 short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1746 timestamp: Readable::read(r)?,
1748 let flags: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1749 // Note: we ignore the `message_flags` for now, since it was deprecated by the spec.
1752 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(r)?,
1753 htlc_minimum_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
1754 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
1755 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(r)?,
1756 htlc_maximum_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
1757 excess_data: read_to_end(r)?,
1762 impl_writeable!(ChannelUpdate, {
1767 impl Writeable for ErrorMessage {
1768 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1769 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
1770 (self.data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
1771 w.write_all(self.data.as_bytes())?;
1776 impl Readable for ErrorMessage {
1777 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1779 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1781 let sz: usize = <u16 as Readable>::read(r)? as usize;
1782 let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(sz);
1784 r.read_exact(&mut data)?;
1785 match String::from_utf8(data) {
1787 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1794 impl Writeable for WarningMessage {
1795 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1796 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
1797 (self.data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
1798 w.write_all(self.data.as_bytes())?;
1803 impl Readable for WarningMessage {
1804 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1806 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1808 let sz: usize = <u16 as Readable>::read(r)? as usize;
1809 let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(sz);
1811 r.read_exact(&mut data)?;
1812 match String::from_utf8(data) {
1814 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1821 impl Writeable for UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1822 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1823 self.features.write(w)?;
1824 self.timestamp.write(w)?;
1825 self.node_id.write(w)?;
1826 w.write_all(&self.rgb)?;
1827 self.alias.write(w)?;
1829 let mut addr_len = 0;
1830 for addr in self.addresses.iter() {
1831 addr_len += 1 + addr.len();
1833 (addr_len + self.excess_address_data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
1834 for addr in self.addresses.iter() {
1837 w.write_all(&self.excess_address_data[..])?;
1838 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
1843 impl Readable for UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1844 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1845 let features: NodeFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
1846 let timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
1847 let node_id: NodeId = Readable::read(r)?;
1848 let mut rgb = [0; 3];
1849 r.read_exact(&mut rgb)?;
1850 let alias: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
1852 let addr_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1853 let mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress> = Vec::new();
1854 let mut addr_readpos = 0;
1855 let mut excess = false;
1856 let mut excess_byte = 0;
1858 if addr_len <= addr_readpos { break; }
1859 match Readable::read(r) {
1861 if addr_len < addr_readpos + 1 + addr.len() {
1862 return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor);
1864 addr_readpos += (1 + addr.len()) as u16;
1865 addresses.push(addr);
1867 Ok(Err(unknown_descriptor)) => {
1869 excess_byte = unknown_descriptor;
1872 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor),
1873 Err(e) => return Err(e),
1877 let mut excess_data = vec![];
1878 let excess_address_data = if addr_readpos < addr_len {
1879 let mut excess_address_data = vec![0; (addr_len - addr_readpos) as usize];
1880 r.read_exact(&mut excess_address_data[if excess { 1 } else { 0 }..])?;
1882 excess_address_data[0] = excess_byte;
1887 excess_data.push(excess_byte);
1891 excess_data.extend(read_to_end(r)?.iter());
1892 Ok(UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1899 excess_address_data,
1905 impl_writeable!(NodeAnnouncement, {
1910 impl Readable for QueryShortChannelIds {
1911 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1912 let chain_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(r)?;
1914 let encoding_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1915 let encoding_type: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
1917 // Must be encoding_type=0 uncompressed serialization. We do not
1918 // support encoding_type=1 zlib serialization.
1919 if encoding_type != EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8 {
1920 return Err(DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression);
1923 // We expect the encoding_len to always includes the 1-byte
1924 // encoding_type and that short_channel_ids are 8-bytes each
1925 if encoding_len == 0 || (encoding_len - 1) % 8 != 0 {
1926 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1929 // Read short_channel_ids (8-bytes each), for the u16 encoding_len
1930 // less the 1-byte encoding_type
1931 let short_channel_id_count: u16 = (encoding_len - 1)/8;
1932 let mut short_channel_ids = Vec::with_capacity(short_channel_id_count as usize);
1933 for _ in 0..short_channel_id_count {
1934 short_channel_ids.push(Readable::read(r)?);
1937 Ok(QueryShortChannelIds {
1944 impl Writeable for QueryShortChannelIds {
1945 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1946 // Calculated from 1-byte encoding_type plus 8-bytes per short_channel_id
1947 let encoding_len: u16 = 1 + self.short_channel_ids.len() as u16 * 8;
1949 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
1950 encoding_len.write(w)?;
1952 // We only support type=0 uncompressed serialization
1953 (EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8).write(w)?;
1955 for scid in self.short_channel_ids.iter() {
1963 impl_writeable_msg!(ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd, {
1968 impl QueryChannelRange {
1969 /// Calculates the overflow safe ending block height for the query.
1971 /// Overflow returns `0xffffffff`, otherwise returns `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`.
1972 pub fn end_blocknum(&self) -> u32 {
1973 match self.first_blocknum.checked_add(self.number_of_blocks) {
1974 Some(block) => block,
1975 None => u32::max_value(),
1980 impl_writeable_msg!(QueryChannelRange, {
1986 impl Readable for ReplyChannelRange {
1987 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1988 let chain_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(r)?;
1989 let first_blocknum: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
1990 let number_of_blocks: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
1991 let sync_complete: bool = Readable::read(r)?;
1993 let encoding_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1994 let encoding_type: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
1996 // Must be encoding_type=0 uncompressed serialization. We do not
1997 // support encoding_type=1 zlib serialization.
1998 if encoding_type != EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8 {
1999 return Err(DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression);
2002 // We expect the encoding_len to always includes the 1-byte
2003 // encoding_type and that short_channel_ids are 8-bytes each
2004 if encoding_len == 0 || (encoding_len - 1) % 8 != 0 {
2005 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2008 // Read short_channel_ids (8-bytes each), for the u16 encoding_len
2009 // less the 1-byte encoding_type
2010 let short_channel_id_count: u16 = (encoding_len - 1)/8;
2011 let mut short_channel_ids = Vec::with_capacity(short_channel_id_count as usize);
2012 for _ in 0..short_channel_id_count {
2013 short_channel_ids.push(Readable::read(r)?);
2016 Ok(ReplyChannelRange {
2026 impl Writeable for ReplyChannelRange {
2027 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2028 let encoding_len: u16 = 1 + self.short_channel_ids.len() as u16 * 8;
2029 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
2030 self.first_blocknum.write(w)?;
2031 self.number_of_blocks.write(w)?;
2032 self.sync_complete.write(w)?;
2034 encoding_len.write(w)?;
2035 (EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8).write(w)?;
2036 for scid in self.short_channel_ids.iter() {
2044 impl_writeable_msg!(GossipTimestampFilter, {
2053 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
2054 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
2055 use crate::ln::msgs;
2056 use crate::ln::msgs::{FinalOnionHopData, OptionalField, OnionErrorPacket, OnionHopDataFormat};
2057 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
2058 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Hostname};
2060 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2061 use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
2062 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2063 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
2064 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2065 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
2067 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2068 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2070 use crate::io::{self, Cursor};
2071 use crate::prelude::*;
2072 use core::convert::TryFrom;
2075 fn encoding_channel_reestablish_no_secret() {
2076 let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
2077 channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
2078 next_local_commitment_number: 3,
2079 next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
2080 data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Absent,
2083 let encoded_value = cr.encode();
2086 vec![4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4]
2091 fn encoding_channel_reestablish_with_secret() {
2093 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2094 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
2097 let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
2098 channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
2099 next_local_commitment_number: 3,
2100 next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
2101 data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Present(msgs::DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret: [9;32], my_current_per_commitment_point: public_key}),
2104 let encoded_value = cr.encode();
2107 vec![4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 3, 27, 132, 197, 86, 123, 18, 100, 64, 153, 93, 62, 213, 170, 186, 5, 101, 215, 30, 24, 52, 96, 72, 25, 255, 156, 23, 245, 233, 213, 221, 7, 143]
2111 macro_rules! get_keys_from {
2112 ($slice: expr, $secp_ctx: expr) => {
2114 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode($slice).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2115 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &privkey);
2121 macro_rules! get_sig_on {
2122 ($privkey: expr, $ctx: expr, $string: expr) => {
2124 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&$string.into_bytes()[..]).unwrap();
2125 $ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &$privkey)
2131 fn encoding_announcement_signatures() {
2132 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2133 let (privkey, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2134 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2135 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("02020202020202020202020202020202"));
2136 let announcement_signatures = msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2137 channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
2138 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2139 node_signature: sig_1,
2140 bitcoin_signature: sig_2,
2143 let encoded_value = announcement_signatures.encode();
2144 assert_eq!(encoded_value, hex::decode("040000000000000005000000000000000600000000000000070000000000000000083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073acf9953cef4700860f5967838eba2bae89288ad188ebf8b20bf995c3ea53a26df1876d0a3a0e13172ba286a673140190c02ba9da60a2e43a745188c8a83c7f3ef").unwrap());
2147 fn do_encoding_channel_announcement(unknown_features_bits: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2148 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2149 let (privkey_1, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2150 let (privkey_2, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2151 let (privkey_3, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2152 let (privkey_4, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2153 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2154 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey_2, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2155 let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2156 let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2157 let mut features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
2158 if unknown_features_bits {
2159 features = ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF]);
2161 let unsigned_channel_announcement = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2163 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
2164 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2165 node_id_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_1),
2166 node_id_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_2),
2167 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_3),
2168 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_4),
2169 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![10, 0, 0, 20, 0, 0, 30, 0, 0, 40] } else { Vec::new() },
2171 let channel_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2172 node_signature_1: sig_1,
2173 node_signature_2: sig_2,
2174 bitcoin_signature_1: sig_3,
2175 bitcoin_signature_2: sig_4,
2176 contents: unsigned_channel_announcement,
2178 let encoded_value = channel_announcement.encode();
2179 let mut target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
2180 if unknown_features_bits {
2181 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0002ffff").unwrap());
2183 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000").unwrap());
2185 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
2186 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00083a840000034d031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f024d4b6cd1361032ca9bd2aeb9d900aa4d45d9ead80ac9423374c451a7254d076602531fe6068134503d2723133227c867ac8fa6c83c537e9a44c3c5bdbdcb1fe33703462779ad4aad39514614751a71085f2f10e1c7a593e4e030efb5b8721ce55b0b").unwrap());
2188 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0a00001400001e000028").unwrap());
2190 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2194 fn encoding_channel_announcement() {
2195 do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, false);
2196 do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, true);
2197 do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, false);
2198 do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, true);
2201 fn do_encoding_node_announcement(unknown_features_bits: bool, ipv4: bool, ipv6: bool, onionv2: bool, onionv3: bool, hostname: bool, excess_address_data: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2202 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2203 let (privkey_1, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2204 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2205 let features = if unknown_features_bits {
2206 NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF])
2208 // Set to some features we may support
2209 NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![2 | 1 << 5])
2211 let mut addresses = Vec::new();
2213 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::IPv4 {
2214 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252],
2219 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::IPv6 {
2220 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240],
2225 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::OnionV2(
2226 [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 38, 7]
2230 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::OnionV3 {
2231 ed25519_pubkey: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240, 239, 238, 237, 236, 235, 234, 233, 232, 231, 230, 229, 228, 227, 226, 225, 224],
2238 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::Hostname {
2239 hostname: Hostname::try_from(String::from("host")).unwrap(),
2243 let mut addr_len = 0;
2244 for addr in &addresses {
2245 addr_len += addr.len() + 1;
2247 let unsigned_node_announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2249 timestamp: 20190119,
2250 node_id: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_1),
2254 excess_address_data: if excess_address_data { vec![33, 108, 40, 11, 83, 149, 162, 84, 110, 126, 75, 38, 99, 224, 79, 129, 22, 34, 241, 90, 79, 146, 232, 58, 162, 233, 43, 162, 165, 115, 193, 57, 20, 44, 84, 174, 99, 7, 42, 30, 193, 238, 125, 192, 192, 75, 222, 92, 132, 120, 6, 23, 42, 160, 92, 146, 194, 42, 232, 227, 8, 209, 210, 105] } else { Vec::new() },
2255 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![59, 18, 204, 25, 92, 224, 162, 209, 189, 166, 168, 139, 239, 161, 159, 160, 127, 81, 202, 167, 92, 232, 56, 55, 242, 137, 101, 96, 11, 138, 172, 171, 8, 85, 255, 176, 231, 65, 236, 95, 124, 65, 66, 30, 152, 41, 169, 212, 134, 17, 200, 200, 49, 247, 27, 229, 234, 115, 230, 101, 148, 151, 127, 253] } else { Vec::new() },
2257 addr_len += unsigned_node_announcement.excess_address_data.len() as u16;
2258 let node_announcement = msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2260 contents: unsigned_node_announcement,
2262 let encoded_value = node_announcement.encode();
2263 let mut target_value = hex::decode("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2264 if unknown_features_bits {
2265 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0002ffff").unwrap());
2267 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000122").unwrap());
2269 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("013413a7031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f2020201010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010").unwrap());
2270 target_value.append(&mut vec![(addr_len >> 8) as u8, addr_len as u8]);
2272 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("01fffefdfc2607").unwrap());
2275 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("02fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f02607").unwrap());
2278 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("03fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f62607").unwrap());
2281 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("04fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0efeeedecebeae9e8e7e6e5e4e3e2e1e00020102607").unwrap());
2284 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0504686f73742607").unwrap());
2286 if excess_address_data {
2287 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f92e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d269").unwrap());
2290 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("3b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
2292 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2296 fn encoding_node_announcement() {
2297 do_encoding_node_announcement(true, true, true, true, true, true, true, true);
2298 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false);
2299 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, true, false, false, false, false, false, false);
2300 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, true, false, false, false, false, false);
2301 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, true, false, false, false, false);
2302 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, true, false, false, false);
2303 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, true, false, false);
2304 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, false, true, false);
2305 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, true, false, true, false, false, true, false);
2306 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, true, false, true, false, false, false);
2309 fn do_encoding_channel_update(direction: bool, disable: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2310 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2311 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2312 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2313 let unsigned_channel_update = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2314 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
2315 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2316 timestamp: 20190119,
2317 flags: if direction { 1 } else { 0 } | if disable { 1 << 1 } else { 0 },
2318 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2319 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
2320 htlc_maximum_msat: 131355275467161,
2321 fee_base_msat: 10000,
2322 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2323 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![0, 0, 0, 0, 59, 154, 202, 0] } else { Vec::new() }
2325 let channel_update = msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2327 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2329 let encoded_value = channel_update.encode();
2330 let mut target_value = hex::decode("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2331 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
2332 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00083a840000034d013413a7").unwrap());
2333 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("01").unwrap());
2334 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00").unwrap());
2336 let flag = target_value.last_mut().unwrap();
2340 let flag = target_value.last_mut().unwrap();
2341 *flag = *flag | 1 << 1;
2343 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap());
2344 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000777788889999").unwrap());
2346 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000003b9aca00").unwrap());
2348 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2352 fn encoding_channel_update() {
2353 do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, false);
2354 do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, true);
2355 do_encoding_channel_update(true, false, false);
2356 do_encoding_channel_update(true, false, true);
2357 do_encoding_channel_update(false, true, false);
2358 do_encoding_channel_update(false, true, true);
2359 do_encoding_channel_update(true, true, false);
2360 do_encoding_channel_update(true, true, true);
2363 fn do_encoding_open_channel(random_bit: bool, shutdown: bool, incl_chan_type: bool) {
2364 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2365 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2366 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2367 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2368 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2369 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
2370 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
2371 let open_channel = msgs::OpenChannel {
2372 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
2373 temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
2374 funding_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
2375 push_msat: 2536655962884945560,
2376 dust_limit_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
2377 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 8517154655701053848,
2378 channel_reserve_satoshis: 8665828695742877976,
2379 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
2380 feerate_per_kw: 821716,
2381 to_self_delay: 49340,
2382 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
2383 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
2384 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
2385 payment_point: pubkey_3,
2386 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
2387 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
2388 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
2389 channel_flags: if random_bit { 1 << 5 } else { 0 },
2390 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { OptionalField::Present(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { OptionalField::Absent },
2391 channel_type: if incl_chan_type { Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::empty()) } else { None },
2393 let encoded_value = open_channel.encode();
2394 let mut target_value = Vec::new();
2395 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
2396 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202021234567890123456233403289122369832144668701144767633030896203198784335490624111800083a840000034d000c89d4c0bcc0bc031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f024d4b6cd1361032ca9bd2aeb9d900aa4d45d9ead80ac9423374c451a7254d076602531fe6068134503d2723133227c867ac8fa6c83c537e9a44c3c5bdbdcb1fe33703462779ad4aad39514614751a71085f2f10e1c7a593e4e030efb5b8721ce55b0b0362c0a046dacce86ddd0343c6d3c7c79c2208ba0d9c9cf24a6d046d21d21f90f703f006a18d5653c4edf5391ff23a61f03ff83d237e880ee61187fa9f379a028e0a").unwrap());
2398 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("20").unwrap());
2400 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00").unwrap());
2403 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
2406 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0100").unwrap());
2408 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2412 fn encoding_open_channel() {
2413 do_encoding_open_channel(false, false, false);
2414 do_encoding_open_channel(false, false, true);
2415 do_encoding_open_channel(false, true, false);
2416 do_encoding_open_channel(false, true, true);
2417 do_encoding_open_channel(true, false, false);
2418 do_encoding_open_channel(true, false, true);
2419 do_encoding_open_channel(true, true, false);
2420 do_encoding_open_channel(true, true, true);
2423 fn do_encoding_accept_channel(shutdown: bool) {
2424 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2425 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2426 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2427 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2428 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2429 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
2430 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
2431 let accept_channel = msgs::AcceptChannel {
2432 temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
2433 dust_limit_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
2434 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 2536655962884945560,
2435 channel_reserve_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
2436 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
2437 minimum_depth: 821716,
2438 to_self_delay: 49340,
2439 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
2440 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
2441 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
2442 payment_point: pubkey_3,
2443 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
2444 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
2445 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
2446 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { OptionalField::Present(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { OptionalField::Absent },
2449 let encoded_value = accept_channel.encode();
2450 let mut target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
2452 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
2454 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2458 fn encoding_accept_channel() {
2459 do_encoding_accept_channel(false);
2460 do_encoding_accept_channel(true);
2464 fn encoding_funding_created() {
2465 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2466 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2467 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2468 let funding_created = msgs::FundingCreated {
2469 temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
2470 funding_txid: Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap(),
2471 funding_output_index: 255,
2474 let encoded_value = funding_created.encode();
2475 let target_value = hex::decode("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202026e96fe9f8b0ddcd729ba03cfafa5a27b050b39d354dd980814268dfa9a44d4c200ffd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2476 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2480 fn encoding_funding_signed() {
2481 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2482 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2483 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2484 let funding_signed = msgs::FundingSigned {
2485 channel_id: [2; 32],
2488 let encoded_value = funding_signed.encode();
2489 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2490 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2494 fn encoding_channel_ready() {
2495 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2496 let (_, pubkey_1,) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2497 let channel_ready = msgs::ChannelReady {
2498 channel_id: [2; 32],
2499 next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
2500 short_channel_id_alias: None,
2502 let encoded_value = channel_ready.encode();
2503 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap();
2504 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2507 fn do_encoding_shutdown(script_type: u8) {
2508 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2509 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2510 let script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::OP_TRUE).into_script();
2511 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
2512 channel_id: [2; 32],
2514 if script_type == 1 { Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() }
2515 else if script_type == 2 { Address::p2sh(&script, Network::Testnet).unwrap().script_pubkey() }
2516 else if script_type == 3 { Address::p2wpkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).unwrap().script_pubkey() }
2517 else { Address::p2wsh(&script, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() },
2519 let encoded_value = shutdown.encode();
2520 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap();
2521 if script_type == 1 {
2522 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
2523 } else if script_type == 2 {
2524 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0017a914da1745e9b549bd0bfa1a569971c77eba30cd5a4b87").unwrap());
2525 } else if script_type == 3 {
2526 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0016001479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b235983").unwrap());
2527 } else if script_type == 4 {
2528 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("002200204ae81572f06e1b88fd5ced7a1a000945432e83e1551e6f721ee9c00b8cc33260").unwrap());
2530 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2534 fn encoding_shutdown() {
2535 do_encoding_shutdown(1);
2536 do_encoding_shutdown(2);
2537 do_encoding_shutdown(3);
2538 do_encoding_shutdown(4);
2542 fn encoding_closing_signed() {
2543 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2544 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2545 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2546 let closing_signed = msgs::ClosingSigned {
2547 channel_id: [2; 32],
2548 fee_satoshis: 2316138423780173,
2552 let encoded_value = closing_signed.encode();
2553 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2554 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2555 assert_eq!(msgs::ClosingSigned::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value)).unwrap(), closing_signed);
2557 let closing_signed_with_range = msgs::ClosingSigned {
2558 channel_id: [2; 32],
2559 fee_satoshis: 2316138423780173,
2561 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
2562 min_fee_satoshis: 0xdeadbeef,
2563 max_fee_satoshis: 0x1badcafe01234567,
2566 let encoded_value_with_range = closing_signed_with_range.encode();
2567 let target_value_with_range = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a011000000000deadbeef1badcafe01234567").unwrap();
2568 assert_eq!(encoded_value_with_range, target_value_with_range);
2569 assert_eq!(msgs::ClosingSigned::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value_with_range)).unwrap(),
2570 closing_signed_with_range);
2574 fn encoding_update_add_htlc() {
2575 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2576 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2577 let onion_routing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2579 public_key: Ok(pubkey_1),
2580 hop_data: [1; 20*65],
2583 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2584 channel_id: [2; 32],
2585 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2586 amount_msat: 3608586615801332854,
2587 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
2588 cltv_expiry: 821716,
2589 onion_routing_packet
2591 let encoded_value = update_add_htlc.encode();
2592 let target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
2593 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2597 fn encoding_update_fulfill_htlc() {
2598 let update_fulfill_htlc = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2599 channel_id: [2; 32],
2600 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2601 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([1; 32]),
2603 let encoded_value = update_fulfill_htlc.encode();
2604 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap();
2605 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2609 fn encoding_update_fail_htlc() {
2610 let reason = OnionErrorPacket {
2611 data: [1; 32].to_vec(),
2613 let update_fail_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2614 channel_id: [2; 32],
2615 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2618 let encoded_value = update_fail_htlc.encode();
2619 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d00200101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap();
2620 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2624 fn encoding_update_fail_malformed_htlc() {
2625 let update_fail_malformed_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2626 channel_id: [2; 32],
2627 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2628 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
2631 let encoded_value = update_fail_malformed_htlc.encode();
2632 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010100ff").unwrap();
2633 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2636 fn do_encoding_commitment_signed(htlcs: bool) {
2637 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2638 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2639 let (privkey_2, _) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2640 let (privkey_3, _) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2641 let (privkey_4, _) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2642 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2643 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey_2, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2644 let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2645 let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2646 let commitment_signed = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
2647 channel_id: [2; 32],
2649 htlc_signatures: if htlcs { vec![sig_2, sig_3, sig_4] } else { Vec::new() },
2651 let encoded_value = commitment_signed.encode();
2652 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2654 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00031735b6a427e80d5fe7cd90a2f4ee08dc9c27cda7c35a4172e5d85b12c49d4232537e98f9b1f3c5e6989a8b9644e90e8918127680dbd0d4043510840fc0f1e11a216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f91e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d2692b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
2656 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000").unwrap());
2658 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2662 fn encoding_commitment_signed() {
2663 do_encoding_commitment_signed(true);
2664 do_encoding_commitment_signed(false);
2668 fn encoding_revoke_and_ack() {
2669 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2670 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2671 let raa = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2672 channel_id: [2; 32],
2673 per_commitment_secret: [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1],
2674 next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
2676 let encoded_value = raa.encode();
2677 let target_value = hex::decode("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap();
2678 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2682 fn encoding_update_fee() {
2683 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
2684 channel_id: [2; 32],
2685 feerate_per_kw: 20190119,
2687 let encoded_value = update_fee.encode();
2688 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202013413a7").unwrap();
2689 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2693 fn encoding_init() {
2694 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
2695 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF]),
2696 remote_network_address: None,
2697 }.encode(), hex::decode("00023fff0003ffffff").unwrap());
2698 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
2699 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF]),
2700 remote_network_address: None,
2701 }.encode(), hex::decode("0001ff0001ff").unwrap());
2702 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
2703 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
2704 remote_network_address: None,
2705 }.encode(), hex::decode("00000000").unwrap());
2707 let init_msg = msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
2708 remote_network_address: Some(msgs::NetAddress::IPv4 {
2709 addr: [127, 0, 0, 1],
2713 let encoded_value = init_msg.encode();
2714 let target_value = hex::decode("000000000307017f00000103e8").unwrap();
2715 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2716 assert_eq!(msgs::Init::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value)).unwrap(), init_msg);
2720 fn encoding_error() {
2721 let error = msgs::ErrorMessage {
2722 channel_id: [2; 32],
2723 data: String::from("rust-lightning"),
2725 let encoded_value = error.encode();
2726 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000e727573742d6c696768746e696e67").unwrap();
2727 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2731 fn encoding_warning() {
2732 let error = msgs::WarningMessage {
2733 channel_id: [2; 32],
2734 data: String::from("rust-lightning"),
2736 let encoded_value = error.encode();
2737 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000e727573742d6c696768746e696e67").unwrap();
2738 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2742 fn encoding_ping() {
2743 let ping = msgs::Ping {
2747 let encoded_value = ping.encode();
2748 let target_value = hex::decode("0040004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap();
2749 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2753 fn encoding_pong() {
2754 let pong = msgs::Pong {
2757 let encoded_value = pong.encode();
2758 let target_value = hex::decode("004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap();
2759 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2763 fn encoding_nonfinal_onion_hop_data() {
2764 let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
2765 format: OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
2766 short_channel_id: 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea,
2768 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
2769 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2771 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
2772 let target_value = hex::decode("1a02080badf00d010203040404ffffffff0608deadbeef1bad1dea").unwrap();
2773 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2774 msg = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2775 if let OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } = msg.format {
2776 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea);
2777 } else { panic!(); }
2778 assert_eq!(msg.amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
2779 assert_eq!(msg.outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
2783 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data() {
2784 let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
2785 format: OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
2787 keysend_preimage: None,
2789 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
2790 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2792 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
2793 let target_value = hex::decode("1002080badf00d010203040404ffffffff").unwrap();
2794 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2795 msg = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2796 if let OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data: None, .. } = msg.format { } else { panic!(); }
2797 assert_eq!(msg.amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
2798 assert_eq!(msg.outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
2802 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data_with_secret() {
2803 let expected_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([0x42u8; 32]);
2804 let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
2805 format: OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
2806 payment_data: Some(FinalOnionHopData {
2807 payment_secret: expected_payment_secret,
2808 total_msat: 0x1badca1f
2810 keysend_preimage: None,
2812 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
2813 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2815 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
2816 let target_value = hex::decode("3602080badf00d010203040404ffffffff082442424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242421badca1f").unwrap();
2817 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2818 msg = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2819 if let OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
2820 payment_data: Some(FinalOnionHopData {
2822 total_msat: 0x1badca1f
2824 keysend_preimage: None,
2826 assert_eq!(payment_secret, expected_payment_secret);
2827 } else { panic!(); }
2828 assert_eq!(msg.amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
2829 assert_eq!(msg.outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
2833 fn query_channel_range_end_blocknum() {
2834 let tests: Vec<(u32, u32, u32)> = vec![
2835 (10000, 1500, 11500),
2836 (0, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
2837 (1, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
2840 for (first_blocknum, number_of_blocks, expected) in tests.into_iter() {
2841 let sut = msgs::QueryChannelRange {
2842 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap(),
2846 assert_eq!(sut.end_blocknum(), expected);
2851 fn encoding_query_channel_range() {
2852 let mut query_channel_range = msgs::QueryChannelRange {
2853 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap(),
2854 first_blocknum: 100000,
2855 number_of_blocks: 1500,
2857 let encoded_value = query_channel_range.encode();
2858 let target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206000186a0000005dc").unwrap();
2859 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2861 query_channel_range = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2862 assert_eq!(query_channel_range.first_blocknum, 100000);
2863 assert_eq!(query_channel_range.number_of_blocks, 1500);
2867 fn encoding_reply_channel_range() {
2868 do_encoding_reply_channel_range(0);
2869 do_encoding_reply_channel_range(1);
2872 fn do_encoding_reply_channel_range(encoding_type: u8) {
2873 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206000b8a06000005dc01").unwrap();
2874 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2875 let mut reply_channel_range = msgs::ReplyChannelRange {
2876 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2877 first_blocknum: 756230,
2878 number_of_blocks: 1500,
2879 sync_complete: true,
2880 short_channel_ids: vec![0x000000000000008e, 0x0000000000003c69, 0x000000000045a6c4],
2883 if encoding_type == 0 {
2884 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001900000000000000008e0000000000003c69000000000045a6c4").unwrap());
2885 let encoded_value = reply_channel_range.encode();
2886 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2888 reply_channel_range = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2889 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2890 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.first_blocknum, 756230);
2891 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.number_of_blocks, 1500);
2892 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.sync_complete, true);
2893 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[0], 0x000000000000008e);
2894 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[1], 0x0000000000003c69);
2895 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[2], 0x000000000045a6c4);
2897 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001601789c636000833e08659309a65878be010010a9023a").unwrap());
2898 let result: Result<msgs::ReplyChannelRange, msgs::DecodeError> = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]));
2899 assert!(result.is_err(), "Expected decode failure with unsupported zlib encoding");
2904 fn encoding_query_short_channel_ids() {
2905 do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(0);
2906 do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(1);
2909 fn do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(encoding_type: u8) {
2910 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206").unwrap();
2911 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2912 let mut query_short_channel_ids = msgs::QueryShortChannelIds {
2913 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2914 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0000000000008e, 0x0000000000003c69, 0x000000000045a6c4],
2917 if encoding_type == 0 {
2918 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001900000000000000008e0000000000003c69000000000045a6c4").unwrap());
2919 let encoded_value = query_short_channel_ids.encode();
2920 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2922 query_short_channel_ids = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2923 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2924 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[0], 0x000000000000008e);
2925 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[1], 0x0000000000003c69);
2926 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[2], 0x000000000045a6c4);
2928 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001601789c636000833e08659309a65878be010010a9023a").unwrap());
2929 let result: Result<msgs::QueryShortChannelIds, msgs::DecodeError> = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]));
2930 assert!(result.is_err(), "Expected decode failure with unsupported zlib encoding");
2935 fn encoding_reply_short_channel_ids_end() {
2936 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2937 let mut reply_short_channel_ids_end = msgs::ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
2938 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2939 full_information: true,
2941 let encoded_value = reply_short_channel_ids_end.encode();
2942 let target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e220601").unwrap();
2943 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2945 reply_short_channel_ids_end = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2946 assert_eq!(reply_short_channel_ids_end.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2947 assert_eq!(reply_short_channel_ids_end.full_information, true);
2951 fn encoding_gossip_timestamp_filter(){
2952 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2953 let mut gossip_timestamp_filter = msgs::GossipTimestampFilter {
2954 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2955 first_timestamp: 1590000000,
2956 timestamp_range: 0xffff_ffff,
2958 let encoded_value = gossip_timestamp_filter.encode();
2959 let target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e22065ec57980ffffffff").unwrap();
2960 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2962 gossip_timestamp_filter = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2963 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2964 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.first_timestamp, 1590000000);
2965 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.timestamp_range, 0xffff_ffff);
2969 fn decode_onion_hop_data_len_as_bigsize() {
2970 // Tests that we can decode an onion payload that is >253 bytes.
2971 // Previously, receiving a payload of this size could've caused us to fail to decode a valid
2972 // payload, because we were decoding the length (a BigSize, big-endian) as a VarInt
2975 // Encode a test onion payload with a big custom TLV such that it's >253 bytes, forcing the
2976 // payload length to be encoded over multiple bytes rather than a single u8.
2977 let big_payload = encode_big_payload().unwrap();
2978 let mut rd = Cursor::new(&big_payload[..]);
2979 <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut rd).unwrap();
2981 // see above test, needs to be a separate method for use of the serialization macros.
2982 fn encode_big_payload() -> Result<Vec<u8>, io::Error> {
2983 use crate::util::ser::HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize;
2984 let payload = msgs::OnionHopData {
2985 format: OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
2986 short_channel_id: 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea,
2988 amt_to_forward: 1000,
2989 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2991 let mut encoded_payload = Vec::new();
2992 let test_bytes = vec![42u8; 1000];
2993 if let OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } = payload.format {
2994 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(&mut encoded_payload, {
2995 (1, test_bytes, vec_type),
2996 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(payload.amt_to_forward), required),
2997 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(payload.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
2998 (6, short_channel_id, required)