1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Wire messages, traits representing wire message handlers, and a few error types live here.
12 //! For a normal node you probably don't need to use anything here, however, if you wish to split a
13 //! node into an internet-facing route/message socket handling daemon and a separate daemon (or
14 //! server entirely) which handles only channel-related messages you may wish to implement
15 //! [`ChannelMessageHandler`] yourself and use it to re-serialize messages and pass them across
18 //! Note that if you go with such an architecture (instead of passing raw socket events to a
19 //! non-internet-facing system) you trust the frontend internet-facing system to not lie about the
20 //! source `node_id` of the message, however this does allow you to significantly reduce bandwidth
21 //! between the systems as routing messages can represent a significant chunk of bandwidth usage
22 //! (especially for non-channel-publicly-announcing nodes). As an alternate design which avoids
23 //! this issue, if you have sufficient bidirectional bandwidth between your systems, you may send
24 //! raw socket events into your non-internet-facing system and then send routing events back to
25 //! track the network on the less-secure system.
27 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
28 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature;
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
30 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
33 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
34 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
35 use crate::onion_message;
37 use crate::prelude::*;
40 use crate::io::{self, Read};
41 use crate::io_extras::read_to_end;
43 use crate::events::{MessageSendEventsProvider, OnionMessageProvider};
44 use crate::util::logger;
45 use crate::util::ser::{LengthReadable, Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, FixedLengthReader, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize, Hostname};
47 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
49 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
51 /// 21 million * 10^8 * 1000
52 pub(crate) const MAX_VALUE_MSAT: u64 = 21_000_000_0000_0000_000;
54 /// An error in decoding a message or struct.
55 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
56 pub enum DecodeError {
57 /// A version byte specified something we don't know how to handle.
59 /// Includes unknown realm byte in an onion hop data packet.
61 /// Unknown feature mandating we fail to parse message (e.g., TLV with an even, unknown type)
62 UnknownRequiredFeature,
63 /// Value was invalid.
65 /// For example, a byte which was supposed to be a bool was something other than a 0
66 /// or 1, a public key/private key/signature was invalid, text wasn't UTF-8, TLV was
67 /// syntactically incorrect, etc.
69 /// The buffer to be read was too short.
71 /// A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly.
73 /// Error from [`std::io`].
75 /// The message included zlib-compressed values, which we don't support.
76 UnsupportedCompression,
79 /// An [`init`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
81 /// [`init`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-init-message
82 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
84 /// The relevant features which the sender supports.
85 pub features: InitFeatures,
86 /// The receipient's network address.
88 /// This adds the option to report a remote IP address back to a connecting peer using the init
89 /// message. A node can decide to use that information to discover a potential update to its
90 /// public IPv4 address (NAT) and use that for a [`NodeAnnouncement`] update message containing
92 pub remote_network_address: Option<NetAddress>,
95 /// An [`error`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
97 /// [`error`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-error-and-warning-messages
98 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
99 pub struct ErrorMessage {
100 /// The channel ID involved in the error.
102 /// All-0s indicates a general error unrelated to a specific channel, after which all channels
103 /// with the sending peer should be closed.
104 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
105 /// A possibly human-readable error description.
107 /// The string should be sanitized before it is used (e.g., emitted to logs or printed to
108 /// `stdout`). Otherwise, a well crafted error message may trigger a security vulnerability in
109 /// the terminal emulator or the logging subsystem.
113 /// A [`warning`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
115 /// [`warning`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-error-and-warning-messages
116 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
117 pub struct WarningMessage {
118 /// The channel ID involved in the warning.
120 /// All-0s indicates a warning unrelated to a specific channel.
121 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
122 /// A possibly human-readable warning description.
124 /// The string should be sanitized before it is used (e.g. emitted to logs or printed to
125 /// stdout). Otherwise, a well crafted error message may trigger a security vulnerability in
126 /// the terminal emulator or the logging subsystem.
130 /// A [`ping`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
132 /// [`ping`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-ping-and-pong-messages
133 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
135 /// The desired response length.
137 /// The ping packet size.
139 /// This field is not sent on the wire. byteslen zeros are sent.
143 /// A [`pong`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
145 /// [`pong`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-ping-and-pong-messages
146 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
148 /// The pong packet size.
150 /// This field is not sent on the wire. byteslen zeros are sent.
154 /// An [`open_channel`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
156 /// [`open_channel`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-open_channel-message
157 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
158 pub struct OpenChannel {
159 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
160 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
161 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
162 pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
163 /// The channel value
164 pub funding_satoshis: u64,
165 /// The amount to push to the counterparty as part of the open, in milli-satoshi
167 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by sender will be omitted
168 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
169 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards sender, in milli-satoshi
170 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
171 /// The minimum value unencumbered by HTLCs for the counterparty to keep in the channel
172 pub channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
173 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
174 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
175 /// The feerate per 1000-weight of sender generated transactions, until updated by
177 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
178 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if
179 /// they broadcast a commitment transaction
180 pub to_self_delay: u16,
181 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards sender
182 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
183 /// The sender's key controlling the funding transaction
184 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
185 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
186 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
187 /// A payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
188 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
189 /// Used to derive a payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by sender
190 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
191 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to sender
192 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
193 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-sender transaction's per commitment point
194 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
195 /// The channel flags to be used
196 pub channel_flags: u8,
197 /// Optionally, a request to pre-set the to-sender output's `scriptPubkey` for when we collaboratively close
198 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField<Script>,
199 /// The channel type that this channel will represent
201 /// If this is `None`, we derive the channel type from the intersection of our
202 /// feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from the [`Init`] message.
203 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
206 /// An [`accept_channel`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
208 /// [`accept_channel`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-accept_channel-message
209 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
210 pub struct AcceptChannel {
211 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
212 pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
213 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by sender will be omitted
214 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
215 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards sender, in milli-satoshi
216 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
217 /// The minimum value unencumbered by HTLCs for the counterparty to keep in the channel
218 pub channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
219 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
220 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
221 /// Minimum depth of the funding transaction before the channel is considered open
222 pub minimum_depth: u32,
223 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if they broadcast a commitment transaction
224 pub to_self_delay: u16,
225 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards sender
226 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
227 /// The sender's key controlling the funding transaction
228 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
229 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
230 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
231 /// A payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
232 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
233 /// Used to derive a payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by sender
234 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
235 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
236 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
237 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-sender transaction's per commitment point
238 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
239 /// Optionally, a request to pre-set the to-sender output's scriptPubkey for when we collaboratively close
240 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField<Script>,
241 /// The channel type that this channel will represent.
243 /// If this is `None`, we derive the channel type from the intersection of
244 /// our feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from the [`Init`] message.
245 /// This is required to match the equivalent field in [`OpenChannel::channel_type`].
246 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
249 /// A [`funding_created`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
251 /// [`funding_created`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-funding_created-message
252 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
253 pub struct FundingCreated {
254 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding is established
255 pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
256 /// The funding transaction ID
257 pub funding_txid: Txid,
258 /// The specific output index funding this channel
259 pub funding_output_index: u16,
260 /// The signature of the channel initiator (funder) on the initial commitment transaction
261 pub signature: Signature,
264 /// A [`funding_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
266 /// [`funding_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-funding_signed-message
267 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
268 pub struct FundingSigned {
270 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
271 /// The signature of the channel acceptor (fundee) on the initial commitment transaction
272 pub signature: Signature,
275 /// A [`channel_ready`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
277 /// [`channel_ready`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-channel_ready-message
278 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
279 pub struct ChannelReady {
281 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
282 /// The per-commitment point of the second commitment transaction
283 pub next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
284 /// If set, provides a `short_channel_id` alias for this channel.
286 /// The sender will accept payments to be forwarded over this SCID and forward them to this
287 /// messages' recipient.
288 pub short_channel_id_alias: Option<u64>,
291 /// A [`shutdown`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
293 /// [`shutdown`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#closing-initiation-shutdown
294 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
295 pub struct Shutdown {
297 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
298 /// The destination of this peer's funds on closing.
300 /// Must be in one of these forms: P2PKH, P2SH, P2WPKH, P2WSH, P2TR.
301 pub scriptpubkey: Script,
304 /// The minimum and maximum fees which the sender is willing to place on the closing transaction.
306 /// This is provided in [`ClosingSigned`] by both sides to indicate the fee range they are willing
308 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
309 pub struct ClosingSignedFeeRange {
310 /// The minimum absolute fee, in satoshis, which the sender is willing to place on the closing
312 pub min_fee_satoshis: u64,
313 /// The maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, which the sender is willing to place on the closing
315 pub max_fee_satoshis: u64,
318 /// A [`closing_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
320 /// [`closing_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#closing-negotiation-closing_signed
321 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
322 pub struct ClosingSigned {
324 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
325 /// The proposed total fee for the closing transaction
326 pub fee_satoshis: u64,
327 /// A signature on the closing transaction
328 pub signature: Signature,
329 /// The minimum and maximum fees which the sender is willing to accept, provided only by new
331 pub fee_range: Option<ClosingSignedFeeRange>,
334 /// An [`update_add_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
336 /// [`update_add_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#adding-an-htlc-update_add_htlc
337 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
338 pub struct UpdateAddHTLC {
340 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
343 /// The HTLC value in milli-satoshi
344 pub amount_msat: u64,
345 /// The payment hash, the pre-image of which controls HTLC redemption
346 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
347 /// The expiry height of the HTLC
348 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
349 pub(crate) onion_routing_packet: OnionPacket,
352 /// An onion message to be sent to or received from a peer.
354 // TODO: update with link to OM when they are merged into the BOLTs
355 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
356 pub struct OnionMessage {
357 /// Used in decrypting the onion packet's payload.
358 pub blinding_point: PublicKey,
359 pub(crate) onion_routing_packet: onion_message::Packet,
362 /// An [`update_fulfill_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
364 /// [`update_fulfill_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
365 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
366 pub struct UpdateFulfillHTLC {
368 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
371 /// The pre-image of the payment hash, allowing HTLC redemption
372 pub payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
375 /// An [`update_fail_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
377 /// [`update_fail_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
378 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
379 pub struct UpdateFailHTLC {
381 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
384 pub(crate) reason: OnionErrorPacket,
387 /// An [`update_fail_malformed_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
389 /// [`update_fail_malformed_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
390 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
391 pub struct UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
393 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
396 pub(crate) sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
398 pub failure_code: u16,
401 /// A [`commitment_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
403 /// [`commitment_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#committing-updates-so-far-commitment_signed
404 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
405 pub struct CommitmentSigned {
407 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
408 /// A signature on the commitment transaction
409 pub signature: Signature,
410 /// Signatures on the HTLC transactions
411 pub htlc_signatures: Vec<Signature>,
414 /// A [`revoke_and_ack`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
416 /// [`revoke_and_ack`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#completing-the-transition-to-the-updated-state-revoke_and_ack
417 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
418 pub struct RevokeAndACK {
420 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
421 /// The secret corresponding to the per-commitment point
422 pub per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
423 /// The next sender-broadcast commitment transaction's per-commitment point
424 pub next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
427 /// An [`update_fee`] message to be sent to or received from a peer
429 /// [`update_fee`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#updating-fees-update_fee
430 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
431 pub struct UpdateFee {
433 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
434 /// Fee rate per 1000-weight of the transaction
435 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
438 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
439 /// Proof that the sender knows the per-commitment secret of the previous commitment transaction.
441 /// This is used to convince the recipient that the channel is at a certain commitment
442 /// number even if they lost that data due to a local failure. Of course, the peer may lie
443 /// and even later commitments may have been revoked.
444 pub struct DataLossProtect {
445 /// Proof that the sender knows the per-commitment secret of a specific commitment transaction
446 /// belonging to the recipient
447 pub your_last_per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
448 /// The sender's per-commitment point for their current commitment transaction
449 pub my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
452 /// A [`channel_reestablish`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
454 /// [`channel_reestablish`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#message-retransmission
455 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
456 pub struct ChannelReestablish {
458 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
459 /// The next commitment number for the sender
460 pub next_local_commitment_number: u64,
461 /// The next commitment number for the recipient
462 pub next_remote_commitment_number: u64,
463 /// Optionally, a field proving that next_remote_commitment_number-1 has been revoked
464 pub data_loss_protect: OptionalField<DataLossProtect>,
467 /// An [`announcement_signatures`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
469 /// [`announcement_signatures`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-announcement_signatures-message
470 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
471 pub struct AnnouncementSignatures {
473 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
474 /// The short channel ID
475 pub short_channel_id: u64,
476 /// A signature by the node key
477 pub node_signature: Signature,
478 /// A signature by the funding key
479 pub bitcoin_signature: Signature,
482 /// An address which can be used to connect to a remote peer.
483 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
484 pub enum NetAddress {
485 /// An IPv4 address/port on which the peer is listening.
487 /// The 4-byte IPv4 address
489 /// The port on which the node is listening
492 /// An IPv6 address/port on which the peer is listening.
494 /// The 16-byte IPv6 address
496 /// The port on which the node is listening
499 /// An old-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening.
501 /// This field is deprecated and the Tor network generally no longer supports V2 Onion
502 /// addresses. Thus, the details are not parsed here.
504 /// A new-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening.
506 /// To create the human-readable "hostname", concatenate the ED25519 pubkey, checksum, and version,
507 /// wrap as base32 and append ".onion".
509 /// The ed25519 long-term public key of the peer
510 ed25519_pubkey: [u8; 32],
511 /// The checksum of the pubkey and version, as included in the onion address
513 /// The version byte, as defined by the Tor Onion v3 spec.
515 /// The port on which the node is listening
518 /// A hostname/port on which the peer is listening.
520 /// The hostname on which the node is listening.
522 /// The port on which the node is listening.
527 /// Gets the ID of this address type. Addresses in [`NodeAnnouncement`] messages should be sorted
529 pub(crate) fn get_id(&self) -> u8 {
531 &NetAddress::IPv4 {..} => { 1 },
532 &NetAddress::IPv6 {..} => { 2 },
533 &NetAddress::OnionV2(_) => { 3 },
534 &NetAddress::OnionV3 {..} => { 4 },
535 &NetAddress::Hostname {..} => { 5 },
539 /// Strict byte-length of address descriptor, 1-byte type not recorded
540 fn len(&self) -> u16 {
542 &NetAddress::IPv4 { .. } => { 6 },
543 &NetAddress::IPv6 { .. } => { 18 },
544 &NetAddress::OnionV2(_) => { 12 },
545 &NetAddress::OnionV3 { .. } => { 37 },
546 // Consists of 1-byte hostname length, hostname bytes, and 2-byte port.
547 &NetAddress::Hostname { ref hostname, .. } => { u16::from(hostname.len()) + 3 },
551 /// The maximum length of any address descriptor, not including the 1-byte type.
552 /// This maximum length is reached by a hostname address descriptor:
553 /// a hostname with a maximum length of 255, its 1-byte length and a 2-byte port.
554 pub(crate) const MAX_LEN: u16 = 258;
557 impl Writeable for NetAddress {
558 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
560 &NetAddress::IPv4 { ref addr, ref port } => {
565 &NetAddress::IPv6 { ref addr, ref port } => {
570 &NetAddress::OnionV2(bytes) => {
572 bytes.write(writer)?;
574 &NetAddress::OnionV3 { ref ed25519_pubkey, ref checksum, ref version, ref port } => {
576 ed25519_pubkey.write(writer)?;
577 checksum.write(writer)?;
578 version.write(writer)?;
581 &NetAddress::Hostname { ref hostname, ref port } => {
583 hostname.write(writer)?;
591 impl Readable for Result<NetAddress, u8> {
592 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Result<NetAddress, u8>, DecodeError> {
593 let byte = <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
596 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::IPv4 {
597 addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
598 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
602 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::IPv6 {
603 addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
604 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
607 3 => Ok(Ok(NetAddress::OnionV2(Readable::read(reader)?))),
609 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::OnionV3 {
610 ed25519_pubkey: Readable::read(reader)?,
611 checksum: Readable::read(reader)?,
612 version: Readable::read(reader)?,
613 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
617 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::Hostname {
618 hostname: Readable::read(reader)?,
619 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
622 _ => return Ok(Err(byte)),
627 impl Readable for NetAddress {
628 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NetAddress, DecodeError> {
629 match Readable::read(reader) {
630 Ok(Ok(res)) => Ok(res),
631 Ok(Err(_)) => Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion),
637 /// Represents the set of gossip messages that require a signature from a node's identity key.
638 pub enum UnsignedGossipMessage<'a> {
639 /// An unsigned channel announcement.
640 ChannelAnnouncement(&'a UnsignedChannelAnnouncement),
641 /// An unsigned channel update.
642 ChannelUpdate(&'a UnsignedChannelUpdate),
643 /// An unsigned node announcement.
644 NodeAnnouncement(&'a UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)
647 impl<'a> Writeable for UnsignedGossipMessage<'a> {
648 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
650 UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
651 UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
652 UnsignedGossipMessage::NodeAnnouncement(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
657 /// The unsigned part of a [`node_announcement`] message.
659 /// [`node_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-node_announcement-message
660 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
661 pub struct UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
662 /// The advertised features
663 pub features: NodeFeatures,
664 /// A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed
666 /// The `node_id` this announcement originated from (don't rebroadcast the `node_announcement` back
669 /// An RGB color for UI purposes
671 /// An alias, for UI purposes.
673 /// This should be sanitized before use. There is no guarantee of uniqueness.
675 /// List of addresses on which this node is reachable
676 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
677 pub(crate) excess_address_data: Vec<u8>,
678 pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
680 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
681 /// A [`node_announcement`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
683 /// [`node_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-node_announcement-message
684 pub struct NodeAnnouncement {
685 /// The signature by the node key
686 pub signature: Signature,
687 /// The actual content of the announcement
688 pub contents: UnsignedNodeAnnouncement,
691 /// The unsigned part of a [`channel_announcement`] message.
693 /// [`channel_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_announcement-message
694 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
695 pub struct UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
696 /// The advertised channel features
697 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
698 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
699 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
700 /// The short channel ID
701 pub short_channel_id: u64,
702 /// One of the two `node_id`s which are endpoints of this channel
703 pub node_id_1: NodeId,
704 /// The other of the two `node_id`s which are endpoints of this channel
705 pub node_id_2: NodeId,
706 /// The funding key for the first node
707 pub bitcoin_key_1: NodeId,
708 /// The funding key for the second node
709 pub bitcoin_key_2: NodeId,
710 pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
712 /// A [`channel_announcement`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
714 /// [`channel_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_announcement-message
715 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
716 pub struct ChannelAnnouncement {
717 /// Authentication of the announcement by the first public node
718 pub node_signature_1: Signature,
719 /// Authentication of the announcement by the second public node
720 pub node_signature_2: Signature,
721 /// Proof of funding UTXO ownership by the first public node
722 pub bitcoin_signature_1: Signature,
723 /// Proof of funding UTXO ownership by the second public node
724 pub bitcoin_signature_2: Signature,
725 /// The actual announcement
726 pub contents: UnsignedChannelAnnouncement,
729 /// The unsigned part of a [`channel_update`] message.
731 /// [`channel_update`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_update-message
732 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
733 pub struct UnsignedChannelUpdate {
734 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
735 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
736 /// The short channel ID
737 pub short_channel_id: u64,
738 /// A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed, specific to this channel
742 /// The number of blocks such that if:
743 /// `incoming_htlc.cltv_expiry < outgoing_htlc.cltv_expiry + cltv_expiry_delta`
744 /// then we need to fail the HTLC backwards. When forwarding an HTLC, `cltv_expiry_delta` determines
745 /// the outgoing HTLC's minimum `cltv_expiry` value -- so, if an incoming HTLC comes in with a
746 /// `cltv_expiry` of 100000, and the node we're forwarding to has a `cltv_expiry_delta` value of 10,
747 /// then we'll check that the outgoing HTLC's `cltv_expiry` value is at least 100010 before
748 /// forwarding. Note that the HTLC sender is the one who originally sets this value when
749 /// constructing the route.
750 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
751 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
752 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
753 /// The maximum HTLC value incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi.
755 /// This used to be optional.
756 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
757 /// The base HTLC fee charged by sender, in milli-satoshi
758 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
759 /// The amount to fee multiplier, in micro-satoshi
760 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
761 /// Excess data which was signed as a part of the message which we do not (yet) understand how
764 /// This is stored to ensure forward-compatibility as new fields are added to the lightning gossip protocol.
765 pub excess_data: Vec<u8>,
767 /// A [`channel_update`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
769 /// [`channel_update`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_update-message
770 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
771 pub struct ChannelUpdate {
772 /// A signature of the channel update
773 pub signature: Signature,
774 /// The actual channel update
775 pub contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate,
778 /// A [`query_channel_range`] message is used to query a peer for channel
779 /// UTXOs in a range of blocks. The recipient of a query makes a best
780 /// effort to reply to the query using one or more [`ReplyChannelRange`]
783 /// [`query_channel_range`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_channel_range-and-reply_channel_range-messages
784 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
785 pub struct QueryChannelRange {
786 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
787 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
788 /// The height of the first block for the channel UTXOs being queried
789 pub first_blocknum: u32,
790 /// The number of blocks to include in the query results
791 pub number_of_blocks: u32,
794 /// A [`reply_channel_range`] message is a reply to a [`QueryChannelRange`]
797 /// Multiple `reply_channel_range` messages can be sent in reply
798 /// to a single [`QueryChannelRange`] message. The query recipient makes a
799 /// best effort to respond based on their local network view which may
800 /// not be a perfect view of the network. The `short_channel_id`s in the
801 /// reply are encoded. We only support `encoding_type=0` uncompressed
802 /// serialization and do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization.
804 /// [`reply_channel_range`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_channel_range-and-reply_channel_range-messages
805 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
806 pub struct ReplyChannelRange {
807 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
808 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
809 /// The height of the first block in the range of the reply
810 pub first_blocknum: u32,
811 /// The number of blocks included in the range of the reply
812 pub number_of_blocks: u32,
813 /// True when this is the final reply for a query
814 pub sync_complete: bool,
815 /// The `short_channel_id`s in the channel range
816 pub short_channel_ids: Vec<u64>,
819 /// A [`query_short_channel_ids`] message is used to query a peer for
820 /// routing gossip messages related to one or more `short_channel_id`s.
822 /// The query recipient will reply with the latest, if available,
823 /// [`ChannelAnnouncement`], [`ChannelUpdate`] and [`NodeAnnouncement`] messages
824 /// it maintains for the requested `short_channel_id`s followed by a
825 /// [`ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd`] message. The `short_channel_id`s sent in
826 /// this query are encoded. We only support `encoding_type=0` uncompressed
827 /// serialization and do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization.
829 /// [`query_short_channel_ids`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_short_channel_idsreply_short_channel_ids_end-messages
830 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
831 pub struct QueryShortChannelIds {
832 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
833 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
834 /// The short_channel_ids that are being queried
835 pub short_channel_ids: Vec<u64>,
838 /// A [`reply_short_channel_ids_end`] message is sent as a reply to a
839 /// message. The query recipient makes a best
840 /// effort to respond based on their local network view which may not be
841 /// a perfect view of the network.
843 /// [`reply_short_channel_ids_end`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_short_channel_idsreply_short_channel_ids_end-messages
844 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
845 pub struct ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
846 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain that was queried
847 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
848 /// Indicates if the query recipient maintains up-to-date channel
849 /// information for the `chain_hash`
850 pub full_information: bool,
853 /// A [`gossip_timestamp_filter`] message is used by a node to request
854 /// gossip relay for messages in the requested time range when the
855 /// `gossip_queries` feature has been negotiated.
857 /// [`gossip_timestamp_filter`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-gossip_timestamp_filter-message
858 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
859 pub struct GossipTimestampFilter {
860 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain for channel and node information
861 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
862 /// The starting unix timestamp
863 pub first_timestamp: u32,
864 /// The range of information in seconds
865 pub timestamp_range: u32,
868 /// Encoding type for data compression of collections in gossip queries.
870 /// We do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization [defined in BOLT
871 /// #7](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#query-messages).
876 /// Used to put an error message in a [`LightningError`].
877 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
878 pub enum ErrorAction {
879 /// The peer took some action which made us think they were useless. Disconnect them.
881 /// An error message which we should make an effort to send before we disconnect.
882 msg: Option<ErrorMessage>
884 /// The peer did something harmless that we weren't able to process, just log and ignore
885 // New code should *not* use this. New code must use IgnoreAndLog, below!
887 /// The peer did something harmless that we weren't able to meaningfully process.
888 /// If the error is logged, log it at the given level.
889 IgnoreAndLog(logger::Level),
890 /// The peer provided us with a gossip message which we'd already seen. In most cases this
891 /// should be ignored, but it may result in the message being forwarded if it is a duplicate of
892 /// our own channel announcements.
893 IgnoreDuplicateGossip,
894 /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them.
896 /// The message to send.
899 /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them without closing any channels.
901 /// The message to send.
903 /// The peer may have done something harmless that we weren't able to meaningfully process,
904 /// though we should still tell them about it.
905 /// If this event is logged, log it at the given level.
906 log_level: logger::Level,
910 /// An Err type for failure to process messages.
911 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
912 pub struct LightningError {
913 /// A human-readable message describing the error
915 /// The action which should be taken against the offending peer.
916 pub action: ErrorAction,
919 /// Struct used to return values from [`RevokeAndACK`] messages, containing a bunch of commitment
920 /// transaction updates if they were pending.
921 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
922 pub struct CommitmentUpdate {
923 /// `update_add_htlc` messages which should be sent
924 pub update_add_htlcs: Vec<UpdateAddHTLC>,
925 /// `update_fulfill_htlc` messages which should be sent
926 pub update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
927 /// `update_fail_htlc` messages which should be sent
928 pub update_fail_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFailHTLC>,
929 /// `update_fail_malformed_htlc` messages which should be sent
930 pub update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFailMalformedHTLC>,
931 /// An `update_fee` message which should be sent
932 pub update_fee: Option<UpdateFee>,
933 /// A `commitment_signed` message which should be sent
934 pub commitment_signed: CommitmentSigned,
937 /// Messages could have optional fields to use with extended features
938 /// As we wish to serialize these differently from `Option<T>`s (`Options` get a tag byte, but
939 /// [`OptionalField`] simply gets `Present` if there are enough bytes to read into it), we have a
940 /// separate enum type for them.
942 /// This is not exported to bindings users due to a free generic in `T`
943 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
944 pub enum OptionalField<T> {
945 /// Optional field is included in message
947 /// Optional field is absent in message
951 /// A trait to describe an object which can receive channel messages.
953 /// Messages MAY be called in parallel when they originate from different `their_node_ids`, however
954 /// they MUST NOT be called in parallel when the two calls have the same `their_node_id`.
955 pub trait ChannelMessageHandler : MessageSendEventsProvider {
957 /// Handle an incoming `open_channel` message from the given peer.
958 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OpenChannel);
959 /// Handle an incoming `accept_channel` message from the given peer.
960 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AcceptChannel);
961 /// Handle an incoming `funding_created` message from the given peer.
962 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingCreated);
963 /// Handle an incoming `funding_signed` message from the given peer.
964 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingSigned);
965 /// Handle an incoming `channel_ready` message from the given peer.
966 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelReady);
969 /// Handle an incoming `shutdown` message from the given peer.
970 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Shutdown);
971 /// Handle an incoming `closing_signed` message from the given peer.
972 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ClosingSigned);
975 /// Handle an incoming `update_add_htlc` message from the given peer.
976 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateAddHTLC);
977 /// Handle an incoming `update_fulfill_htlc` message from the given peer.
978 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFulfillHTLC);
979 /// Handle an incoming `update_fail_htlc` message from the given peer.
980 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFailHTLC);
981 /// Handle an incoming `update_fail_malformed_htlc` message from the given peer.
982 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFailMalformedHTLC);
983 /// Handle an incoming `commitment_signed` message from the given peer.
984 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &CommitmentSigned);
985 /// Handle an incoming `revoke_and_ack` message from the given peer.
986 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &RevokeAndACK);
988 /// Handle an incoming `update_fee` message from the given peer.
989 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFee);
991 // Channel-to-announce:
992 /// Handle an incoming `announcement_signatures` message from the given peer.
993 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AnnouncementSignatures);
995 // Connection loss/reestablish:
996 /// Indicates a connection to the peer failed/an existing connection was lost.
997 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey);
999 /// Handle a peer reconnecting, possibly generating `channel_reestablish` message(s).
1001 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1002 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1003 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1004 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1005 /// Handle an incoming `channel_reestablish` message from the given peer.
1006 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelReestablish);
1008 /// Handle an incoming `channel_update` message from the given peer.
1009 fn handle_channel_update(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelUpdate);
1012 /// Handle an incoming `error` message from the given peer.
1013 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ErrorMessage);
1015 // Handler information:
1016 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1017 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1018 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1019 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1021 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1022 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1023 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1025 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1026 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1029 /// A trait to describe an object which can receive routing messages.
1031 /// # Implementor DoS Warnings
1033 /// For messages enabled with the `gossip_queries` feature there are potential DoS vectors when
1034 /// handling inbound queries. Implementors using an on-disk network graph should be aware of
1035 /// repeated disk I/O for queries accessing different parts of the network graph.
1036 pub trait RoutingMessageHandler : MessageSendEventsProvider {
1037 /// Handle an incoming `node_announcement` message, returning `true` if it should be forwarded on,
1038 /// `false` or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1039 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1040 /// Handle a `channel_announcement` message, returning `true` if it should be forwarded on, `false`
1041 /// or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1042 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1043 /// Handle an incoming `channel_update` message, returning true if it should be forwarded on,
1044 /// `false` or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1045 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1046 /// Gets channel announcements and updates required to dump our routing table to a remote node,
1047 /// starting at the `short_channel_id` indicated by `starting_point` and including announcements
1048 /// for a single channel.
1049 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)>;
1050 /// Gets a node announcement required to dump our routing table to a remote node, starting at
1051 /// the node *after* the provided pubkey and including up to one announcement immediately
1052 /// higher (as defined by `<PublicKey as Ord>::cmp`) than `starting_point`.
1053 /// If `None` is provided for `starting_point`, we start at the first node.
1054 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&NodeId>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement>;
1055 /// Called when a connection is established with a peer. This can be used to
1056 /// perform routing table synchronization using a strategy defined by the
1059 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1060 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1061 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1062 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1063 /// Handles the reply of a query we initiated to learn about channels
1064 /// for a given range of blocks. We can expect to receive one or more
1065 /// replies to a single query.
1066 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1067 /// Handles the reply of a query we initiated asking for routing gossip
1068 /// messages for a list of channels. We should receive this message when
1069 /// a node has completed its best effort to send us the pertaining routing
1070 /// gossip messages.
1071 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1072 /// Handles when a peer asks us to send a list of `short_channel_id`s
1073 /// for the requested range of blocks.
1074 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1075 /// Handles when a peer asks us to send routing gossip messages for a
1076 /// list of `short_channel_id`s.
1077 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1079 // Handler queueing status:
1080 /// Indicates that there are a large number of [`ChannelAnnouncement`] (or other) messages
1081 /// pending some async action. While there is no guarantee of the rate of future messages, the
1082 /// caller should seek to reduce the rate of new gossip messages handled, especially
1083 /// [`ChannelAnnouncement`]s.
1084 fn processing_queue_high(&self) -> bool;
1086 // Handler information:
1087 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1088 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1089 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1090 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1091 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1092 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1093 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1095 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1096 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1099 /// A trait to describe an object that can receive onion messages.
1100 pub trait OnionMessageHandler : OnionMessageProvider {
1101 /// Handle an incoming `onion_message` message from the given peer.
1102 fn handle_onion_message(&self, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OnionMessage);
1103 /// Called when a connection is established with a peer. Can be used to track which peers
1104 /// advertise onion message support and are online.
1106 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1107 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1108 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1109 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1110 /// Indicates a connection to the peer failed/an existing connection was lost. Allows handlers to
1111 /// drop and refuse to forward onion messages to this peer.
1112 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey);
1114 // Handler information:
1115 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1116 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1117 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1118 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1120 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1121 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1122 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1124 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1125 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1128 mod fuzzy_internal_msgs {
1129 use crate::prelude::*;
1130 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
1132 // These types aren't intended to be pub, but are exposed for direct fuzzing (as we deserialize
1133 // them from untrusted input):
1135 pub(crate) struct FinalOnionHopData {
1136 pub(crate) payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
1137 /// The total value, in msat, of the payment as received by the ultimate recipient.
1138 /// Message serialization may panic if this value is more than 21 million Bitcoin.
1139 pub(crate) total_msat: u64,
1142 pub(crate) enum OnionHopDataFormat {
1144 short_channel_id: u64,
1147 payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData>,
1148 keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
1152 pub struct OnionHopData {
1153 pub(crate) format: OnionHopDataFormat,
1154 /// The value, in msat, of the payment after this hop's fee is deducted.
1155 /// Message serialization may panic if this value is more than 21 million Bitcoin.
1156 pub(crate) amt_to_forward: u64,
1157 pub(crate) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
1160 pub struct DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
1161 pub(crate) hmac: [u8; 32],
1162 pub(crate) failuremsg: Vec<u8>,
1163 pub(crate) pad: Vec<u8>,
1167 pub use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*;
1168 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
1169 pub(crate) use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*;
1172 pub(crate) struct OnionPacket {
1173 pub(crate) version: u8,
1174 /// In order to ensure we always return an error on onion decode in compliance with [BOLT
1175 /// #4](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md), we have to
1176 /// deserialize `OnionPacket`s contained in [`UpdateAddHTLC`] messages even if the ephemeral
1177 /// public key (here) is bogus, so we hold a [`Result`] instead of a [`PublicKey`] as we'd
1179 pub(crate) public_key: Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>,
1180 pub(crate) hop_data: [u8; 20*65],
1181 pub(crate) hmac: [u8; 32],
1184 impl onion_utils::Packet for OnionPacket {
1185 type Data = onion_utils::FixedSizeOnionPacket;
1186 fn new(pubkey: PublicKey, hop_data: onion_utils::FixedSizeOnionPacket, hmac: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
1189 public_key: Ok(pubkey),
1190 hop_data: hop_data.0,
1196 impl Eq for OnionPacket { }
1197 impl PartialEq for OnionPacket {
1198 fn eq(&self, other: &OnionPacket) -> bool {
1199 for (i, j) in self.hop_data.iter().zip(other.hop_data.iter()) {
1200 if i != j { return false; }
1202 self.version == other.version &&
1203 self.public_key == other.public_key &&
1204 self.hmac == other.hmac
1208 impl fmt::Debug for OnionPacket {
1209 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
1210 f.write_fmt(format_args!("OnionPacket version {} with hmac {:?}", self.version, &self.hmac[..]))
1214 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1215 pub(crate) struct OnionErrorPacket {
1216 // This really should be a constant size slice, but the spec lets these things be up to 128KB?
1217 // (TODO) We limit it in decode to much lower...
1218 pub(crate) data: Vec<u8>,
1221 impl fmt::Display for DecodeError {
1222 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
1224 DecodeError::UnknownVersion => f.write_str("Unknown realm byte in Onion packet"),
1225 DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature => f.write_str("Unknown required feature preventing decode"),
1226 DecodeError::InvalidValue => f.write_str("Nonsense bytes didn't map to the type they were interpreted as"),
1227 DecodeError::ShortRead => f.write_str("Packet extended beyond the provided bytes"),
1228 DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor => f.write_str("A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly"),
1229 DecodeError::Io(ref e) => fmt::Debug::fmt(e, f),
1230 DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression => f.write_str("We don't support receiving messages with zlib-compressed fields"),
1235 impl From<io::Error> for DecodeError {
1236 fn from(e: io::Error) -> Self {
1237 if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof {
1238 DecodeError::ShortRead
1240 DecodeError::Io(e.kind())
1245 impl Writeable for OptionalField<Script> {
1246 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1248 OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1249 // Note that Writeable for script includes the 16-bit length tag for us
1252 OptionalField::Absent => {}
1258 impl Readable for OptionalField<Script> {
1259 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1260 match <u16 as Readable>::read(r) {
1262 let mut buf = vec![0; len as usize];
1263 r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
1264 Ok(OptionalField::Present(Script::from(buf)))
1266 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(OptionalField::Absent),
1272 impl Writeable for OptionalField<u64> {
1273 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1275 OptionalField::Present(ref value) => {
1278 OptionalField::Absent => {}
1284 impl Readable for OptionalField<u64> {
1285 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1286 let value: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
1287 Ok(OptionalField::Present(value))
1292 impl_writeable_msg!(AcceptChannel, {
1293 temporary_channel_id,
1294 dust_limit_satoshis,
1295 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1296 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1302 revocation_basepoint,
1304 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1306 first_per_commitment_point,
1307 shutdown_scriptpubkey
1309 (1, channel_type, option),
1312 impl_writeable_msg!(AnnouncementSignatures, {
1319 impl Writeable for ChannelReestablish {
1320 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1321 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
1322 self.next_local_commitment_number.write(w)?;
1323 self.next_remote_commitment_number.write(w)?;
1324 match self.data_loss_protect {
1325 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss_protect) => {
1326 (*data_loss_protect).your_last_per_commitment_secret.write(w)?;
1327 (*data_loss_protect).my_current_per_commitment_point.write(w)?;
1329 OptionalField::Absent => {}
1335 impl Readable for ChannelReestablish{
1336 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1338 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1339 next_local_commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
1340 next_remote_commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
1341 data_loss_protect: {
1342 match <[u8; 32] as Readable>::read(r) {
1343 Ok(your_last_per_commitment_secret) =>
1344 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
1345 your_last_per_commitment_secret,
1346 my_current_per_commitment_point: Readable::read(r)?,
1348 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => OptionalField::Absent,
1349 Err(e) => return Err(e)
1356 impl_writeable_msg!(ClosingSigned,
1357 { channel_id, fee_satoshis, signature },
1358 { (1, fee_range, option) }
1361 impl_writeable!(ClosingSignedFeeRange, {
1366 impl_writeable_msg!(CommitmentSigned, {
1372 impl_writeable!(DecodedOnionErrorPacket, {
1378 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingCreated, {
1379 temporary_channel_id,
1381 funding_output_index,
1385 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingSigned, {
1390 impl_writeable_msg!(ChannelReady, {
1392 next_per_commitment_point,
1394 (1, short_channel_id_alias, option),
1397 impl Writeable for Init {
1398 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1399 // global_features gets the bottom 13 bits of our features, and local_features gets all of
1400 // our relevant feature bits. This keeps us compatible with old nodes.
1401 self.features.write_up_to_13(w)?;
1402 self.features.write(w)?;
1403 encode_tlv_stream!(w, {
1404 (3, self.remote_network_address, option)
1410 impl Readable for Init {
1411 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1412 let global_features: InitFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
1413 let features: InitFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
1414 let mut remote_network_address: Option<NetAddress> = None;
1415 decode_tlv_stream!(r, {
1416 (3, remote_network_address, option)
1419 features: features.or(global_features),
1420 remote_network_address,
1425 impl_writeable_msg!(OpenChannel, {
1427 temporary_channel_id,
1430 dust_limit_satoshis,
1431 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1432 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1438 revocation_basepoint,
1440 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1442 first_per_commitment_point,
1444 shutdown_scriptpubkey
1446 (1, channel_type, option),
1449 impl_writeable_msg!(RevokeAndACK, {
1451 per_commitment_secret,
1452 next_per_commitment_point
1455 impl_writeable_msg!(Shutdown, {
1460 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFailHTLC, {
1466 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, {
1473 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFee, {
1478 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFulfillHTLC, {
1484 // Note that this is written as a part of ChannelManager objects, and thus cannot change its
1485 // serialization format in a way which assumes we know the total serialized length/message end
1487 impl_writeable!(OnionErrorPacket, {
1491 // Note that this is written as a part of ChannelManager objects, and thus cannot change its
1492 // serialization format in a way which assumes we know the total serialized length/message end
1494 impl Writeable for OnionPacket {
1495 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1496 self.version.write(w)?;
1497 match self.public_key {
1498 Ok(pubkey) => pubkey.write(w)?,
1499 Err(_) => [0u8;33].write(w)?,
1501 w.write_all(&self.hop_data)?;
1502 self.hmac.write(w)?;
1507 impl Readable for OnionPacket {
1508 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1510 version: Readable::read(r)?,
1512 let mut buf = [0u8;33];
1513 r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
1514 PublicKey::from_slice(&buf)
1516 hop_data: Readable::read(r)?,
1517 hmac: Readable::read(r)?,
1522 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateAddHTLC, {
1528 onion_routing_packet
1531 impl Readable for OnionMessage {
1532 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1533 let blinding_point: PublicKey = Readable::read(r)?;
1534 let len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1535 let mut packet_reader = FixedLengthReader::new(r, len as u64);
1536 let onion_routing_packet: onion_message::Packet = <onion_message::Packet as LengthReadable>::read(&mut packet_reader)?;
1539 onion_routing_packet,
1544 impl Writeable for OnionMessage {
1545 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1546 self.blinding_point.write(w)?;
1547 let onion_packet_len = self.onion_routing_packet.serialized_length();
1548 (onion_packet_len as u16).write(w)?;
1549 self.onion_routing_packet.write(w)?;
1554 impl Writeable for FinalOnionHopData {
1555 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1556 self.payment_secret.0.write(w)?;
1557 HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.total_msat).write(w)
1561 impl Readable for FinalOnionHopData {
1562 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1563 let secret: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
1564 let amt: HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize<u64> = Readable::read(r)?;
1565 Ok(Self { payment_secret: PaymentSecret(secret), total_msat: amt.0 })
1569 impl Writeable for OnionHopData {
1570 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1572 OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => {
1573 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
1574 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.amt_to_forward), required),
1575 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
1576 (6, short_channel_id, required)
1579 OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { ref payment_data, ref keysend_preimage } => {
1580 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
1581 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.amt_to_forward), required),
1582 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
1583 (8, payment_data, option),
1584 (5482373484, keysend_preimage, option)
1592 impl Readable for OnionHopData {
1593 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1594 let mut amt = HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(0u64);
1595 let mut cltv_value = HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(0u32);
1596 let mut short_id: Option<u64> = None;
1597 let mut payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData> = None;
1598 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
1599 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
1601 (4, cltv_value, required),
1602 (6, short_id, option),
1603 (8, payment_data, option),
1604 // See https://github.com/lightning/blips/blob/master/blip-0003.md
1605 (5482373484, keysend_preimage, option)
1608 let format = if let Some(short_channel_id) = short_id {
1609 if payment_data.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
1610 OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
1614 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1615 if data.total_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1616 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1619 OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
1625 if amt.0 > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1626 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1630 amt_to_forward: amt.0,
1631 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv_value.0,
1636 // ReadableArgs because we need onion_utils::decode_next_hop to accommodate payment packets and
1637 // onion message packets.
1638 impl ReadableArgs<()> for OnionHopData {
1639 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R, _arg: ()) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1640 <Self as Readable>::read(r)
1644 impl Writeable for Ping {
1645 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1646 self.ponglen.write(w)?;
1647 vec![0u8; self.byteslen as usize].write(w)?; // size-unchecked write
1652 impl Readable for Ping {
1653 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1655 ponglen: Readable::read(r)?,
1657 let byteslen = Readable::read(r)?;
1658 r.read_exact(&mut vec![0u8; byteslen as usize][..])?;
1665 impl Writeable for Pong {
1666 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1667 vec![0u8; self.byteslen as usize].write(w)?; // size-unchecked write
1672 impl Readable for Pong {
1673 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1676 let byteslen = Readable::read(r)?;
1677 r.read_exact(&mut vec![0u8; byteslen as usize][..])?;
1684 impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1685 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1686 self.features.write(w)?;
1687 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
1688 self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
1689 self.node_id_1.write(w)?;
1690 self.node_id_2.write(w)?;
1691 self.bitcoin_key_1.write(w)?;
1692 self.bitcoin_key_2.write(w)?;
1693 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
1698 impl Readable for UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1699 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1701 features: Readable::read(r)?,
1702 chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
1703 short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1704 node_id_1: Readable::read(r)?,
1705 node_id_2: Readable::read(r)?,
1706 bitcoin_key_1: Readable::read(r)?,
1707 bitcoin_key_2: Readable::read(r)?,
1708 excess_data: read_to_end(r)?,
1713 impl_writeable!(ChannelAnnouncement, {
1716 bitcoin_signature_1,
1717 bitcoin_signature_2,
1721 impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1722 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1723 // `message_flags` used to indicate presence of `htlc_maximum_msat`, but was deprecated in the spec.
1724 const MESSAGE_FLAGS: u8 = 1;
1725 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
1726 self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
1727 self.timestamp.write(w)?;
1728 let all_flags = self.flags as u16 | ((MESSAGE_FLAGS as u16) << 8);
1729 all_flags.write(w)?;
1730 self.cltv_expiry_delta.write(w)?;
1731 self.htlc_minimum_msat.write(w)?;
1732 self.fee_base_msat.write(w)?;
1733 self.fee_proportional_millionths.write(w)?;
1734 self.htlc_maximum_msat.write(w)?;
1735 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
1740 impl Readable for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1741 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1743 chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
1744 short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1745 timestamp: Readable::read(r)?,
1747 let flags: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1748 // Note: we ignore the `message_flags` for now, since it was deprecated by the spec.
1751 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(r)?,
1752 htlc_minimum_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
1753 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
1754 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(r)?,
1755 htlc_maximum_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
1756 excess_data: read_to_end(r)?,
1761 impl_writeable!(ChannelUpdate, {
1766 impl Writeable for ErrorMessage {
1767 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1768 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
1769 (self.data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
1770 w.write_all(self.data.as_bytes())?;
1775 impl Readable for ErrorMessage {
1776 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1778 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1780 let sz: usize = <u16 as Readable>::read(r)? as usize;
1781 let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(sz);
1783 r.read_exact(&mut data)?;
1784 match String::from_utf8(data) {
1786 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1793 impl Writeable for WarningMessage {
1794 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1795 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
1796 (self.data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
1797 w.write_all(self.data.as_bytes())?;
1802 impl Readable for WarningMessage {
1803 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1805 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1807 let sz: usize = <u16 as Readable>::read(r)? as usize;
1808 let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(sz);
1810 r.read_exact(&mut data)?;
1811 match String::from_utf8(data) {
1813 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1820 impl Writeable for UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1821 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1822 self.features.write(w)?;
1823 self.timestamp.write(w)?;
1824 self.node_id.write(w)?;
1825 w.write_all(&self.rgb)?;
1826 self.alias.write(w)?;
1828 let mut addr_len = 0;
1829 for addr in self.addresses.iter() {
1830 addr_len += 1 + addr.len();
1832 (addr_len + self.excess_address_data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
1833 for addr in self.addresses.iter() {
1836 w.write_all(&self.excess_address_data[..])?;
1837 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
1842 impl Readable for UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1843 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1844 let features: NodeFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
1845 let timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
1846 let node_id: NodeId = Readable::read(r)?;
1847 let mut rgb = [0; 3];
1848 r.read_exact(&mut rgb)?;
1849 let alias: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
1851 let addr_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1852 let mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress> = Vec::new();
1853 let mut addr_readpos = 0;
1854 let mut excess = false;
1855 let mut excess_byte = 0;
1857 if addr_len <= addr_readpos { break; }
1858 match Readable::read(r) {
1860 if addr_len < addr_readpos + 1 + addr.len() {
1861 return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor);
1863 addr_readpos += (1 + addr.len()) as u16;
1864 addresses.push(addr);
1866 Ok(Err(unknown_descriptor)) => {
1868 excess_byte = unknown_descriptor;
1871 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor),
1872 Err(e) => return Err(e),
1876 let mut excess_data = vec![];
1877 let excess_address_data = if addr_readpos < addr_len {
1878 let mut excess_address_data = vec![0; (addr_len - addr_readpos) as usize];
1879 r.read_exact(&mut excess_address_data[if excess { 1 } else { 0 }..])?;
1881 excess_address_data[0] = excess_byte;
1886 excess_data.push(excess_byte);
1890 excess_data.extend(read_to_end(r)?.iter());
1891 Ok(UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1898 excess_address_data,
1904 impl_writeable!(NodeAnnouncement, {
1909 impl Readable for QueryShortChannelIds {
1910 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1911 let chain_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(r)?;
1913 let encoding_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1914 let encoding_type: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
1916 // Must be encoding_type=0 uncompressed serialization. We do not
1917 // support encoding_type=1 zlib serialization.
1918 if encoding_type != EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8 {
1919 return Err(DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression);
1922 // We expect the encoding_len to always includes the 1-byte
1923 // encoding_type and that short_channel_ids are 8-bytes each
1924 if encoding_len == 0 || (encoding_len - 1) % 8 != 0 {
1925 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1928 // Read short_channel_ids (8-bytes each), for the u16 encoding_len
1929 // less the 1-byte encoding_type
1930 let short_channel_id_count: u16 = (encoding_len - 1)/8;
1931 let mut short_channel_ids = Vec::with_capacity(short_channel_id_count as usize);
1932 for _ in 0..short_channel_id_count {
1933 short_channel_ids.push(Readable::read(r)?);
1936 Ok(QueryShortChannelIds {
1943 impl Writeable for QueryShortChannelIds {
1944 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1945 // Calculated from 1-byte encoding_type plus 8-bytes per short_channel_id
1946 let encoding_len: u16 = 1 + self.short_channel_ids.len() as u16 * 8;
1948 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
1949 encoding_len.write(w)?;
1951 // We only support type=0 uncompressed serialization
1952 (EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8).write(w)?;
1954 for scid in self.short_channel_ids.iter() {
1962 impl_writeable_msg!(ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd, {
1967 impl QueryChannelRange {
1968 /// Calculates the overflow safe ending block height for the query.
1970 /// Overflow returns `0xffffffff`, otherwise returns `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`.
1971 pub fn end_blocknum(&self) -> u32 {
1972 match self.first_blocknum.checked_add(self.number_of_blocks) {
1973 Some(block) => block,
1974 None => u32::max_value(),
1979 impl_writeable_msg!(QueryChannelRange, {
1985 impl Readable for ReplyChannelRange {
1986 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1987 let chain_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(r)?;
1988 let first_blocknum: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
1989 let number_of_blocks: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
1990 let sync_complete: bool = Readable::read(r)?;
1992 let encoding_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1993 let encoding_type: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
1995 // Must be encoding_type=0 uncompressed serialization. We do not
1996 // support encoding_type=1 zlib serialization.
1997 if encoding_type != EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8 {
1998 return Err(DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression);
2001 // We expect the encoding_len to always includes the 1-byte
2002 // encoding_type and that short_channel_ids are 8-bytes each
2003 if encoding_len == 0 || (encoding_len - 1) % 8 != 0 {
2004 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2007 // Read short_channel_ids (8-bytes each), for the u16 encoding_len
2008 // less the 1-byte encoding_type
2009 let short_channel_id_count: u16 = (encoding_len - 1)/8;
2010 let mut short_channel_ids = Vec::with_capacity(short_channel_id_count as usize);
2011 for _ in 0..short_channel_id_count {
2012 short_channel_ids.push(Readable::read(r)?);
2015 Ok(ReplyChannelRange {
2025 impl Writeable for ReplyChannelRange {
2026 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2027 let encoding_len: u16 = 1 + self.short_channel_ids.len() as u16 * 8;
2028 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
2029 self.first_blocknum.write(w)?;
2030 self.number_of_blocks.write(w)?;
2031 self.sync_complete.write(w)?;
2033 encoding_len.write(w)?;
2034 (EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8).write(w)?;
2035 for scid in self.short_channel_ids.iter() {
2043 impl_writeable_msg!(GossipTimestampFilter, {
2052 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
2053 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
2054 use crate::ln::msgs;
2055 use crate::ln::msgs::{FinalOnionHopData, OptionalField, OnionErrorPacket, OnionHopDataFormat};
2056 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
2057 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Hostname};
2059 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2060 use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
2061 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2062 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
2063 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2064 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
2066 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2067 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2069 use crate::io::{self, Cursor};
2070 use crate::prelude::*;
2071 use core::convert::TryFrom;
2074 fn encoding_channel_reestablish_no_secret() {
2075 let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
2076 channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
2077 next_local_commitment_number: 3,
2078 next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
2079 data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Absent,
2082 let encoded_value = cr.encode();
2085 vec![4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4]
2090 fn encoding_channel_reestablish_with_secret() {
2092 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2093 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
2096 let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
2097 channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
2098 next_local_commitment_number: 3,
2099 next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
2100 data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Present(msgs::DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret: [9;32], my_current_per_commitment_point: public_key}),
2103 let encoded_value = cr.encode();
2106 vec![4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 3, 27, 132, 197, 86, 123, 18, 100, 64, 153, 93, 62, 213, 170, 186, 5, 101, 215, 30, 24, 52, 96, 72, 25, 255, 156, 23, 245, 233, 213, 221, 7, 143]
2110 macro_rules! get_keys_from {
2111 ($slice: expr, $secp_ctx: expr) => {
2113 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode($slice).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2114 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &privkey);
2120 macro_rules! get_sig_on {
2121 ($privkey: expr, $ctx: expr, $string: expr) => {
2123 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&$string.into_bytes()[..]).unwrap();
2124 $ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &$privkey)
2130 fn encoding_announcement_signatures() {
2131 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2132 let (privkey, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2133 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2134 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("02020202020202020202020202020202"));
2135 let announcement_signatures = msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2136 channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
2137 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2138 node_signature: sig_1,
2139 bitcoin_signature: sig_2,
2142 let encoded_value = announcement_signatures.encode();
2143 assert_eq!(encoded_value, hex::decode("040000000000000005000000000000000600000000000000070000000000000000083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073acf9953cef4700860f5967838eba2bae89288ad188ebf8b20bf995c3ea53a26df1876d0a3a0e13172ba286a673140190c02ba9da60a2e43a745188c8a83c7f3ef").unwrap());
2146 fn do_encoding_channel_announcement(unknown_features_bits: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2147 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2148 let (privkey_1, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2149 let (privkey_2, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2150 let (privkey_3, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2151 let (privkey_4, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2152 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2153 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey_2, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2154 let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2155 let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2156 let mut features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
2157 if unknown_features_bits {
2158 features = ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF]);
2160 let unsigned_channel_announcement = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2162 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
2163 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2164 node_id_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_1),
2165 node_id_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_2),
2166 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_3),
2167 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_4),
2168 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![10, 0, 0, 20, 0, 0, 30, 0, 0, 40] } else { Vec::new() },
2170 let channel_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2171 node_signature_1: sig_1,
2172 node_signature_2: sig_2,
2173 bitcoin_signature_1: sig_3,
2174 bitcoin_signature_2: sig_4,
2175 contents: unsigned_channel_announcement,
2177 let encoded_value = channel_announcement.encode();
2178 let mut target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
2179 if unknown_features_bits {
2180 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0002ffff").unwrap());
2182 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000").unwrap());
2184 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
2185 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00083a840000034d031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f024d4b6cd1361032ca9bd2aeb9d900aa4d45d9ead80ac9423374c451a7254d076602531fe6068134503d2723133227c867ac8fa6c83c537e9a44c3c5bdbdcb1fe33703462779ad4aad39514614751a71085f2f10e1c7a593e4e030efb5b8721ce55b0b").unwrap());
2187 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0a00001400001e000028").unwrap());
2189 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2193 fn encoding_channel_announcement() {
2194 do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, false);
2195 do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, true);
2196 do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, false);
2197 do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, true);
2200 fn do_encoding_node_announcement(unknown_features_bits: bool, ipv4: bool, ipv6: bool, onionv2: bool, onionv3: bool, hostname: bool, excess_address_data: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2201 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2202 let (privkey_1, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2203 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2204 let features = if unknown_features_bits {
2205 NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF])
2207 // Set to some features we may support
2208 NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![2 | 1 << 5])
2210 let mut addresses = Vec::new();
2212 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::IPv4 {
2213 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252],
2218 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::IPv6 {
2219 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240],
2224 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::OnionV2(
2225 [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 38, 7]
2229 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::OnionV3 {
2230 ed25519_pubkey: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240, 239, 238, 237, 236, 235, 234, 233, 232, 231, 230, 229, 228, 227, 226, 225, 224],
2237 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::Hostname {
2238 hostname: Hostname::try_from(String::from("host")).unwrap(),
2242 let mut addr_len = 0;
2243 for addr in &addresses {
2244 addr_len += addr.len() + 1;
2246 let unsigned_node_announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2248 timestamp: 20190119,
2249 node_id: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_1),
2253 excess_address_data: if excess_address_data { vec![33, 108, 40, 11, 83, 149, 162, 84, 110, 126, 75, 38, 99, 224, 79, 129, 22, 34, 241, 90, 79, 146, 232, 58, 162, 233, 43, 162, 165, 115, 193, 57, 20, 44, 84, 174, 99, 7, 42, 30, 193, 238, 125, 192, 192, 75, 222, 92, 132, 120, 6, 23, 42, 160, 92, 146, 194, 42, 232, 227, 8, 209, 210, 105] } else { Vec::new() },
2254 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![59, 18, 204, 25, 92, 224, 162, 209, 189, 166, 168, 139, 239, 161, 159, 160, 127, 81, 202, 167, 92, 232, 56, 55, 242, 137, 101, 96, 11, 138, 172, 171, 8, 85, 255, 176, 231, 65, 236, 95, 124, 65, 66, 30, 152, 41, 169, 212, 134, 17, 200, 200, 49, 247, 27, 229, 234, 115, 230, 101, 148, 151, 127, 253] } else { Vec::new() },
2256 addr_len += unsigned_node_announcement.excess_address_data.len() as u16;
2257 let node_announcement = msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2259 contents: unsigned_node_announcement,
2261 let encoded_value = node_announcement.encode();
2262 let mut target_value = hex::decode("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2263 if unknown_features_bits {
2264 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0002ffff").unwrap());
2266 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000122").unwrap());
2268 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("013413a7031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f2020201010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010").unwrap());
2269 target_value.append(&mut vec![(addr_len >> 8) as u8, addr_len as u8]);
2271 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("01fffefdfc2607").unwrap());
2274 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("02fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f02607").unwrap());
2277 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("03fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f62607").unwrap());
2280 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("04fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0efeeedecebeae9e8e7e6e5e4e3e2e1e00020102607").unwrap());
2283 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0504686f73742607").unwrap());
2285 if excess_address_data {
2286 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f92e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d269").unwrap());
2289 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("3b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
2291 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2295 fn encoding_node_announcement() {
2296 do_encoding_node_announcement(true, true, true, true, true, true, true, true);
2297 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false);
2298 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, true, false, false, false, false, false, false);
2299 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, true, false, false, false, false, false);
2300 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, true, false, false, false, false);
2301 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, true, false, false, false);
2302 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, true, false, false);
2303 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, false, true, false);
2304 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, true, false, true, false, false, true, false);
2305 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, true, false, true, false, false, false);
2308 fn do_encoding_channel_update(direction: bool, disable: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2309 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2310 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2311 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2312 let unsigned_channel_update = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2313 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
2314 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2315 timestamp: 20190119,
2316 flags: if direction { 1 } else { 0 } | if disable { 1 << 1 } else { 0 },
2317 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2318 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
2319 htlc_maximum_msat: 131355275467161,
2320 fee_base_msat: 10000,
2321 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2322 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![0, 0, 0, 0, 59, 154, 202, 0] } else { Vec::new() }
2324 let channel_update = msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2326 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2328 let encoded_value = channel_update.encode();
2329 let mut target_value = hex::decode("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2330 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
2331 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00083a840000034d013413a7").unwrap());
2332 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("01").unwrap());
2333 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00").unwrap());
2335 let flag = target_value.last_mut().unwrap();
2339 let flag = target_value.last_mut().unwrap();
2340 *flag = *flag | 1 << 1;
2342 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap());
2343 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000777788889999").unwrap());
2345 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000003b9aca00").unwrap());
2347 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2351 fn encoding_channel_update() {
2352 do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, false);
2353 do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, true);
2354 do_encoding_channel_update(true, false, false);
2355 do_encoding_channel_update(true, false, true);
2356 do_encoding_channel_update(false, true, false);
2357 do_encoding_channel_update(false, true, true);
2358 do_encoding_channel_update(true, true, false);
2359 do_encoding_channel_update(true, true, true);
2362 fn do_encoding_open_channel(random_bit: bool, shutdown: bool, incl_chan_type: bool) {
2363 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2364 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2365 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2366 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2367 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2368 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
2369 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
2370 let open_channel = msgs::OpenChannel {
2371 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
2372 temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
2373 funding_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
2374 push_msat: 2536655962884945560,
2375 dust_limit_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
2376 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 8517154655701053848,
2377 channel_reserve_satoshis: 8665828695742877976,
2378 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
2379 feerate_per_kw: 821716,
2380 to_self_delay: 49340,
2381 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
2382 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
2383 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
2384 payment_point: pubkey_3,
2385 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
2386 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
2387 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
2388 channel_flags: if random_bit { 1 << 5 } else { 0 },
2389 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { OptionalField::Present(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { OptionalField::Absent },
2390 channel_type: if incl_chan_type { Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::empty()) } else { None },
2392 let encoded_value = open_channel.encode();
2393 let mut target_value = Vec::new();
2394 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
2395 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2397 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("20").unwrap());
2399 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00").unwrap());
2402 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
2405 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0100").unwrap());
2407 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2411 fn encoding_open_channel() {
2412 do_encoding_open_channel(false, false, false);
2413 do_encoding_open_channel(false, false, true);
2414 do_encoding_open_channel(false, true, false);
2415 do_encoding_open_channel(false, true, true);
2416 do_encoding_open_channel(true, false, false);
2417 do_encoding_open_channel(true, false, true);
2418 do_encoding_open_channel(true, true, false);
2419 do_encoding_open_channel(true, true, true);
2422 fn do_encoding_accept_channel(shutdown: bool) {
2423 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2424 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2425 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2426 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2427 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2428 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
2429 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
2430 let accept_channel = msgs::AcceptChannel {
2431 temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
2432 dust_limit_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
2433 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 2536655962884945560,
2434 channel_reserve_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
2435 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
2436 minimum_depth: 821716,
2437 to_self_delay: 49340,
2438 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
2439 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
2440 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
2441 payment_point: pubkey_3,
2442 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
2443 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
2444 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
2445 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { OptionalField::Present(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { OptionalField::Absent },
2448 let encoded_value = accept_channel.encode();
2449 let mut target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
2451 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
2453 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2457 fn encoding_accept_channel() {
2458 do_encoding_accept_channel(false);
2459 do_encoding_accept_channel(true);
2463 fn encoding_funding_created() {
2464 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2465 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2466 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2467 let funding_created = msgs::FundingCreated {
2468 temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
2469 funding_txid: Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap(),
2470 funding_output_index: 255,
2473 let encoded_value = funding_created.encode();
2474 let target_value = hex::decode("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202026e96fe9f8b0ddcd729ba03cfafa5a27b050b39d354dd980814268dfa9a44d4c200ffd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2475 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2479 fn encoding_funding_signed() {
2480 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2481 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2482 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2483 let funding_signed = msgs::FundingSigned {
2484 channel_id: [2; 32],
2487 let encoded_value = funding_signed.encode();
2488 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2489 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2493 fn encoding_channel_ready() {
2494 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2495 let (_, pubkey_1,) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2496 let channel_ready = msgs::ChannelReady {
2497 channel_id: [2; 32],
2498 next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
2499 short_channel_id_alias: None,
2501 let encoded_value = channel_ready.encode();
2502 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap();
2503 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2506 fn do_encoding_shutdown(script_type: u8) {
2507 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2508 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2509 let script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::OP_TRUE).into_script();
2510 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
2511 channel_id: [2; 32],
2513 if script_type == 1 { Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() }
2514 else if script_type == 2 { Address::p2sh(&script, Network::Testnet).unwrap().script_pubkey() }
2515 else if script_type == 3 { Address::p2wpkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).unwrap().script_pubkey() }
2516 else { Address::p2wsh(&script, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() },
2518 let encoded_value = shutdown.encode();
2519 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap();
2520 if script_type == 1 {
2521 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
2522 } else if script_type == 2 {
2523 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0017a914da1745e9b549bd0bfa1a569971c77eba30cd5a4b87").unwrap());
2524 } else if script_type == 3 {
2525 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0016001479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b235983").unwrap());
2526 } else if script_type == 4 {
2527 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("002200204ae81572f06e1b88fd5ced7a1a000945432e83e1551e6f721ee9c00b8cc33260").unwrap());
2529 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2533 fn encoding_shutdown() {
2534 do_encoding_shutdown(1);
2535 do_encoding_shutdown(2);
2536 do_encoding_shutdown(3);
2537 do_encoding_shutdown(4);
2541 fn encoding_closing_signed() {
2542 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2543 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2544 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2545 let closing_signed = msgs::ClosingSigned {
2546 channel_id: [2; 32],
2547 fee_satoshis: 2316138423780173,
2551 let encoded_value = closing_signed.encode();
2552 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2553 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2554 assert_eq!(msgs::ClosingSigned::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value)).unwrap(), closing_signed);
2556 let closing_signed_with_range = msgs::ClosingSigned {
2557 channel_id: [2; 32],
2558 fee_satoshis: 2316138423780173,
2560 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
2561 min_fee_satoshis: 0xdeadbeef,
2562 max_fee_satoshis: 0x1badcafe01234567,
2565 let encoded_value_with_range = closing_signed_with_range.encode();
2566 let target_value_with_range = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a011000000000deadbeef1badcafe01234567").unwrap();
2567 assert_eq!(encoded_value_with_range, target_value_with_range);
2568 assert_eq!(msgs::ClosingSigned::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value_with_range)).unwrap(),
2569 closing_signed_with_range);
2573 fn encoding_update_add_htlc() {
2574 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2575 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2576 let onion_routing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2578 public_key: Ok(pubkey_1),
2579 hop_data: [1; 20*65],
2582 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2583 channel_id: [2; 32],
2584 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2585 amount_msat: 3608586615801332854,
2586 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
2587 cltv_expiry: 821716,
2588 onion_routing_packet
2590 let encoded_value = update_add_htlc.encode();
2591 let target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
2592 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2596 fn encoding_update_fulfill_htlc() {
2597 let update_fulfill_htlc = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2598 channel_id: [2; 32],
2599 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2600 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([1; 32]),
2602 let encoded_value = update_fulfill_htlc.encode();
2603 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap();
2604 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2608 fn encoding_update_fail_htlc() {
2609 let reason = OnionErrorPacket {
2610 data: [1; 32].to_vec(),
2612 let update_fail_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2613 channel_id: [2; 32],
2614 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2617 let encoded_value = update_fail_htlc.encode();
2618 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d00200101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap();
2619 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2623 fn encoding_update_fail_malformed_htlc() {
2624 let update_fail_malformed_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2625 channel_id: [2; 32],
2626 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2627 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
2630 let encoded_value = update_fail_malformed_htlc.encode();
2631 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010100ff").unwrap();
2632 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2635 fn do_encoding_commitment_signed(htlcs: bool) {
2636 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2637 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2638 let (privkey_2, _) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2639 let (privkey_3, _) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2640 let (privkey_4, _) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2641 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2642 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey_2, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2643 let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2644 let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2645 let commitment_signed = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
2646 channel_id: [2; 32],
2648 htlc_signatures: if htlcs { vec![sig_2, sig_3, sig_4] } else { Vec::new() },
2650 let encoded_value = commitment_signed.encode();
2651 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2653 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00031735b6a427e80d5fe7cd90a2f4ee08dc9c27cda7c35a4172e5d85b12c49d4232537e98f9b1f3c5e6989a8b9644e90e8918127680dbd0d4043510840fc0f1e11a216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f91e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d2692b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
2655 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000").unwrap());
2657 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2661 fn encoding_commitment_signed() {
2662 do_encoding_commitment_signed(true);
2663 do_encoding_commitment_signed(false);
2667 fn encoding_revoke_and_ack() {
2668 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2669 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2670 let raa = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2671 channel_id: [2; 32],
2672 per_commitment_secret: [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1],
2673 next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
2675 let encoded_value = raa.encode();
2676 let target_value = hex::decode("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap();
2677 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2681 fn encoding_update_fee() {
2682 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
2683 channel_id: [2; 32],
2684 feerate_per_kw: 20190119,
2686 let encoded_value = update_fee.encode();
2687 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202013413a7").unwrap();
2688 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2692 fn encoding_init() {
2693 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
2694 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF]),
2695 remote_network_address: None,
2696 }.encode(), hex::decode("00023fff0003ffffff").unwrap());
2697 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
2698 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF]),
2699 remote_network_address: None,
2700 }.encode(), hex::decode("0001ff0001ff").unwrap());
2701 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
2702 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
2703 remote_network_address: None,
2704 }.encode(), hex::decode("00000000").unwrap());
2706 let init_msg = msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
2707 remote_network_address: Some(msgs::NetAddress::IPv4 {
2708 addr: [127, 0, 0, 1],
2712 let encoded_value = init_msg.encode();
2713 let target_value = hex::decode("000000000307017f00000103e8").unwrap();
2714 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2715 assert_eq!(msgs::Init::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value)).unwrap(), init_msg);
2719 fn encoding_error() {
2720 let error = msgs::ErrorMessage {
2721 channel_id: [2; 32],
2722 data: String::from("rust-lightning"),
2724 let encoded_value = error.encode();
2725 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000e727573742d6c696768746e696e67").unwrap();
2726 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2730 fn encoding_warning() {
2731 let error = msgs::WarningMessage {
2732 channel_id: [2; 32],
2733 data: String::from("rust-lightning"),
2735 let encoded_value = error.encode();
2736 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000e727573742d6c696768746e696e67").unwrap();
2737 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2741 fn encoding_ping() {
2742 let ping = msgs::Ping {
2746 let encoded_value = ping.encode();
2747 let target_value = hex::decode("0040004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap();
2748 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2752 fn encoding_pong() {
2753 let pong = msgs::Pong {
2756 let encoded_value = pong.encode();
2757 let target_value = hex::decode("004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap();
2758 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2762 fn encoding_nonfinal_onion_hop_data() {
2763 let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
2764 format: OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
2765 short_channel_id: 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea,
2767 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
2768 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2770 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
2771 let target_value = hex::decode("1a02080badf00d010203040404ffffffff0608deadbeef1bad1dea").unwrap();
2772 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2773 msg = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2774 if let OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } = msg.format {
2775 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea);
2776 } else { panic!(); }
2777 assert_eq!(msg.amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
2778 assert_eq!(msg.outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
2782 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data() {
2783 let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
2784 format: OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
2786 keysend_preimage: None,
2788 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
2789 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2791 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
2792 let target_value = hex::decode("1002080badf00d010203040404ffffffff").unwrap();
2793 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2794 msg = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2795 if let OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data: None, .. } = msg.format { } else { panic!(); }
2796 assert_eq!(msg.amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
2797 assert_eq!(msg.outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
2801 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data_with_secret() {
2802 let expected_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([0x42u8; 32]);
2803 let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
2804 format: OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
2805 payment_data: Some(FinalOnionHopData {
2806 payment_secret: expected_payment_secret,
2807 total_msat: 0x1badca1f
2809 keysend_preimage: None,
2811 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
2812 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2814 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
2815 let target_value = hex::decode("3602080badf00d010203040404ffffffff082442424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242421badca1f").unwrap();
2816 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2817 msg = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2818 if let OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
2819 payment_data: Some(FinalOnionHopData {
2821 total_msat: 0x1badca1f
2823 keysend_preimage: None,
2825 assert_eq!(payment_secret, expected_payment_secret);
2826 } else { panic!(); }
2827 assert_eq!(msg.amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
2828 assert_eq!(msg.outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
2832 fn query_channel_range_end_blocknum() {
2833 let tests: Vec<(u32, u32, u32)> = vec![
2834 (10000, 1500, 11500),
2835 (0, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
2836 (1, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
2839 for (first_blocknum, number_of_blocks, expected) in tests.into_iter() {
2840 let sut = msgs::QueryChannelRange {
2841 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap(),
2845 assert_eq!(sut.end_blocknum(), expected);
2850 fn encoding_query_channel_range() {
2851 let mut query_channel_range = msgs::QueryChannelRange {
2852 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap(),
2853 first_blocknum: 100000,
2854 number_of_blocks: 1500,
2856 let encoded_value = query_channel_range.encode();
2857 let target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206000186a0000005dc").unwrap();
2858 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2860 query_channel_range = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2861 assert_eq!(query_channel_range.first_blocknum, 100000);
2862 assert_eq!(query_channel_range.number_of_blocks, 1500);
2866 fn encoding_reply_channel_range() {
2867 do_encoding_reply_channel_range(0);
2868 do_encoding_reply_channel_range(1);
2871 fn do_encoding_reply_channel_range(encoding_type: u8) {
2872 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206000b8a06000005dc01").unwrap();
2873 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2874 let mut reply_channel_range = msgs::ReplyChannelRange {
2875 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2876 first_blocknum: 756230,
2877 number_of_blocks: 1500,
2878 sync_complete: true,
2879 short_channel_ids: vec![0x000000000000008e, 0x0000000000003c69, 0x000000000045a6c4],
2882 if encoding_type == 0 {
2883 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001900000000000000008e0000000000003c69000000000045a6c4").unwrap());
2884 let encoded_value = reply_channel_range.encode();
2885 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2887 reply_channel_range = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2888 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2889 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.first_blocknum, 756230);
2890 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.number_of_blocks, 1500);
2891 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.sync_complete, true);
2892 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[0], 0x000000000000008e);
2893 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[1], 0x0000000000003c69);
2894 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[2], 0x000000000045a6c4);
2896 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001601789c636000833e08659309a65878be010010a9023a").unwrap());
2897 let result: Result<msgs::ReplyChannelRange, msgs::DecodeError> = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]));
2898 assert!(result.is_err(), "Expected decode failure with unsupported zlib encoding");
2903 fn encoding_query_short_channel_ids() {
2904 do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(0);
2905 do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(1);
2908 fn do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(encoding_type: u8) {
2909 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206").unwrap();
2910 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2911 let mut query_short_channel_ids = msgs::QueryShortChannelIds {
2912 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2913 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0000000000008e, 0x0000000000003c69, 0x000000000045a6c4],
2916 if encoding_type == 0 {
2917 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001900000000000000008e0000000000003c69000000000045a6c4").unwrap());
2918 let encoded_value = query_short_channel_ids.encode();
2919 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2921 query_short_channel_ids = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2922 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2923 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[0], 0x000000000000008e);
2924 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[1], 0x0000000000003c69);
2925 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[2], 0x000000000045a6c4);
2927 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001601789c636000833e08659309a65878be010010a9023a").unwrap());
2928 let result: Result<msgs::QueryShortChannelIds, msgs::DecodeError> = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]));
2929 assert!(result.is_err(), "Expected decode failure with unsupported zlib encoding");
2934 fn encoding_reply_short_channel_ids_end() {
2935 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2936 let mut reply_short_channel_ids_end = msgs::ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
2937 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2938 full_information: true,
2940 let encoded_value = reply_short_channel_ids_end.encode();
2941 let target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e220601").unwrap();
2942 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2944 reply_short_channel_ids_end = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2945 assert_eq!(reply_short_channel_ids_end.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2946 assert_eq!(reply_short_channel_ids_end.full_information, true);
2950 fn encoding_gossip_timestamp_filter(){
2951 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2952 let mut gossip_timestamp_filter = msgs::GossipTimestampFilter {
2953 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2954 first_timestamp: 1590000000,
2955 timestamp_range: 0xffff_ffff,
2957 let encoded_value = gossip_timestamp_filter.encode();
2958 let target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e22065ec57980ffffffff").unwrap();
2959 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2961 gossip_timestamp_filter = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2962 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2963 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.first_timestamp, 1590000000);
2964 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.timestamp_range, 0xffff_ffff);
2968 fn decode_onion_hop_data_len_as_bigsize() {
2969 // Tests that we can decode an onion payload that is >253 bytes.
2970 // Previously, receiving a payload of this size could've caused us to fail to decode a valid
2971 // payload, because we were decoding the length (a BigSize, big-endian) as a VarInt
2974 // Encode a test onion payload with a big custom TLV such that it's >253 bytes, forcing the
2975 // payload length to be encoded over multiple bytes rather than a single u8.
2976 let big_payload = encode_big_payload().unwrap();
2977 let mut rd = Cursor::new(&big_payload[..]);
2978 <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut rd).unwrap();
2980 // see above test, needs to be a separate method for use of the serialization macros.
2981 fn encode_big_payload() -> Result<Vec<u8>, io::Error> {
2982 use crate::util::ser::HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize;
2983 let payload = msgs::OnionHopData {
2984 format: OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
2985 short_channel_id: 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea,
2987 amt_to_forward: 1000,
2988 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2990 let mut encoded_payload = Vec::new();
2991 let test_bytes = vec![42u8; 1000];
2992 if let OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } = payload.format {
2993 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(&mut encoded_payload, {
2994 (1, test_bytes, vec_type),
2995 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(payload.amt_to_forward), required),
2996 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(payload.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
2997 (6, short_channel_id, required)