1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Wire messages, traits representing wire message handlers, and a few error types live here.
12 //! For a normal node you probably don't need to use anything here, however, if you wish to split a
13 //! node into an internet-facing route/message socket handling daemon and a separate daemon (or
14 //! server entirely) which handles only channel-related messages you may wish to implement
15 //! [`ChannelMessageHandler`] yourself and use it to re-serialize messages and pass them across
18 //! Note that if you go with such an architecture (instead of passing raw socket events to a
19 //! non-internet-facing system) you trust the frontend internet-facing system to not lie about the
20 //! source `node_id` of the message, however this does allow you to significantly reduce bandwidth
21 //! between the systems as routing messages can represent a significant chunk of bandwidth usage
22 //! (especially for non-channel-publicly-announcing nodes). As an alternate design which avoids
23 //! this issue, if you have sufficient bidirectional bandwidth between your systems, you may send
24 //! raw socket events into your non-internet-facing system and then send routing events back to
25 //! track the network on the less-secure system.
27 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
28 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature;
30 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Witness};
31 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::ScriptBuf;
32 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
34 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{BlindedPaymentTlvs, ForwardTlvs, ReceiveTlvs};
35 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
36 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
37 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
38 use crate::onion_message;
39 use crate::sign::{NodeSigner, Recipient};
41 use crate::prelude::*;
42 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
43 use core::convert::TryFrom;
47 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
48 use core::str::FromStr;
49 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
50 use std::net::SocketAddr;
51 use core::fmt::Display;
52 use crate::io::{self, Cursor, Read};
53 use crate::io_extras::read_to_end;
55 use crate::events::{EventsProvider, MessageSendEventsProvider};
56 use crate::util::chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaChaPolyReadAdapter;
57 use crate::util::logger;
58 use crate::util::ser::{LengthReadable, LengthReadableArgs, Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, WithoutLength, FixedLengthReader, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize, Hostname, TransactionU16LenLimited, BigSize};
59 use crate::util::base32;
61 use crate::routing::gossip::{NodeAlias, NodeId};
63 /// 21 million * 10^8 * 1000
64 pub(crate) const MAX_VALUE_MSAT: u64 = 21_000_000_0000_0000_000;
67 /// A partial signature that also contains the Musig2 nonce its signer used
68 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
69 pub struct PartialSignatureWithNonce(pub musig2::types::PartialSignature, pub musig2::types::PublicNonce);
71 /// An error in decoding a message or struct.
72 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
73 pub enum DecodeError {
74 /// A version byte specified something we don't know how to handle.
76 /// Includes unknown realm byte in an onion hop data packet.
78 /// Unknown feature mandating we fail to parse message (e.g., TLV with an even, unknown type)
79 UnknownRequiredFeature,
80 /// Value was invalid.
82 /// For example, a byte which was supposed to be a bool was something other than a 0
83 /// or 1, a public key/private key/signature was invalid, text wasn't UTF-8, TLV was
84 /// syntactically incorrect, etc.
86 /// The buffer to be read was too short.
88 /// A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly.
90 /// Error from [`std::io`].
92 /// The message included zlib-compressed values, which we don't support.
93 UnsupportedCompression,
96 /// An [`init`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
98 /// [`init`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-init-message
99 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
101 /// The relevant features which the sender supports.
102 pub features: InitFeatures,
103 /// Indicates chains the sender is interested in.
105 /// If there are no common chains, the connection will be closed.
106 pub networks: Option<Vec<ChainHash>>,
107 /// The receipient's network address.
109 /// This adds the option to report a remote IP address back to a connecting peer using the init
110 /// message. A node can decide to use that information to discover a potential update to its
111 /// public IPv4 address (NAT) and use that for a [`NodeAnnouncement`] update message containing
113 pub remote_network_address: Option<SocketAddress>,
116 /// An [`error`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
118 /// [`error`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-error-and-warning-messages
119 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
120 pub struct ErrorMessage {
121 /// The channel ID involved in the error.
123 /// All-0s indicates a general error unrelated to a specific channel, after which all channels
124 /// with the sending peer should be closed.
125 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
126 /// A possibly human-readable error description.
128 /// The string should be sanitized before it is used (e.g., emitted to logs or printed to
129 /// `stdout`). Otherwise, a well crafted error message may trigger a security vulnerability in
130 /// the terminal emulator or the logging subsystem.
134 /// A [`warning`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
136 /// [`warning`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-error-and-warning-messages
137 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
138 pub struct WarningMessage {
139 /// The channel ID involved in the warning.
141 /// All-0s indicates a warning unrelated to a specific channel.
142 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
143 /// A possibly human-readable warning description.
145 /// The string should be sanitized before it is used (e.g. emitted to logs or printed to
146 /// stdout). Otherwise, a well crafted error message may trigger a security vulnerability in
147 /// the terminal emulator or the logging subsystem.
151 /// A [`ping`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
153 /// [`ping`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-ping-and-pong-messages
154 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
156 /// The desired response length.
158 /// The ping packet size.
160 /// This field is not sent on the wire. byteslen zeros are sent.
164 /// A [`pong`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
166 /// [`pong`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-ping-and-pong-messages
167 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
169 /// The pong packet size.
171 /// This field is not sent on the wire. byteslen zeros are sent.
175 /// An [`open_channel`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
177 /// Used in V1 channel establishment
179 /// [`open_channel`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-open_channel-message
180 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub struct OpenChannel {
182 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
183 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
184 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
185 pub temporary_channel_id: ChannelId,
186 /// The channel value
187 pub funding_satoshis: u64,
188 /// The amount to push to the counterparty as part of the open, in milli-satoshi
190 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by sender will be omitted
191 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
192 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards sender, in milli-satoshi
193 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
194 /// The minimum value unencumbered by HTLCs for the counterparty to keep in the channel
195 pub channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
196 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
197 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
198 /// The feerate per 1000-weight of sender generated transactions, until updated by
200 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
201 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if
202 /// they broadcast a commitment transaction
203 pub to_self_delay: u16,
204 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards sender
205 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
206 /// The sender's key controlling the funding transaction
207 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
208 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
209 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
210 /// A payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
211 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
212 /// Used to derive a payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by sender
213 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
214 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to sender
215 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
216 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-sender transaction's per commitment point
217 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
218 /// The channel flags to be used
219 pub channel_flags: u8,
220 /// A request to pre-set the to-sender output's `scriptPubkey` for when we collaboratively close
221 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
222 /// The channel type that this channel will represent
224 /// If this is `None`, we derive the channel type from the intersection of our
225 /// feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from the [`Init`] message.
226 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
229 /// An open_channel2 message to be sent by or received from the channel initiator.
231 /// Used in V2 channel establishment
233 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `open_channel2`.
234 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
235 pub struct OpenChannelV2 {
236 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
237 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
238 /// A temporary channel ID derived using a zeroed out value for the channel acceptor's revocation basepoint
239 pub temporary_channel_id: ChannelId,
240 /// The feerate for the funding transaction set by the channel initiator
241 pub funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
242 /// The feerate for the commitment transaction set by the channel initiator
243 pub commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
244 /// Part of the channel value contributed by the channel initiator
245 pub funding_satoshis: u64,
246 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by the channel initiator will be
248 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
249 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards channel initiator, in milli-satoshi
250 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
251 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to channel initiator, in milli-satoshi
252 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
253 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if they
254 /// broadcast a commitment transaction
255 pub to_self_delay: u16,
256 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards channel initiator
257 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
258 /// The locktime for the funding transaction
260 /// The channel initiator's key controlling the funding transaction
261 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
262 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
263 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
264 /// A payment key to channel initiator for transactions broadcast by counterparty
265 pub payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
266 /// Used to derive a payment key to channel initiator for transactions broadcast by channel
268 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
269 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to channel initiator
270 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
271 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-channel-initiator transaction's per commitment point
272 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
273 /// The second to-be-broadcast-by-channel-initiator transaction's per commitment point
274 pub second_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
276 pub channel_flags: u8,
277 /// Optionally, a request to pre-set the to-channel-initiator output's scriptPubkey for when we
278 /// collaboratively close
279 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
280 /// The channel type that this channel will represent. If none is set, we derive the channel
281 /// type from the intersection of our feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from
282 /// the Init message.
283 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
284 /// Optionally, a requirement that only confirmed inputs can be added
285 pub require_confirmed_inputs: Option<()>,
288 /// An [`accept_channel`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
290 /// Used in V1 channel establishment
292 /// [`accept_channel`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-accept_channel-message
293 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
294 pub struct AcceptChannel {
295 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
296 pub temporary_channel_id: ChannelId,
297 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by sender will be omitted
298 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
299 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards sender, in milli-satoshi
300 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
301 /// The minimum value unencumbered by HTLCs for the counterparty to keep in the channel
302 pub channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
303 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
304 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
305 /// Minimum depth of the funding transaction before the channel is considered open
306 pub minimum_depth: u32,
307 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if they broadcast a commitment transaction
308 pub to_self_delay: u16,
309 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards sender
310 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
311 /// The sender's key controlling the funding transaction
312 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
313 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
314 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
315 /// A payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
316 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
317 /// Used to derive a payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by sender
318 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
319 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
320 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
321 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-sender transaction's per commitment point
322 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
323 /// A request to pre-set the to-sender output's scriptPubkey for when we collaboratively close
324 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
325 /// The channel type that this channel will represent.
327 /// If this is `None`, we derive the channel type from the intersection of
328 /// our feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from the [`Init`] message.
329 /// This is required to match the equivalent field in [`OpenChannel::channel_type`].
330 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
332 /// Next nonce the channel initiator should use to create a funding output signature against
333 pub next_local_nonce: Option<musig2::types::PublicNonce>,
336 /// An accept_channel2 message to be sent by or received from the channel accepter.
338 /// Used in V2 channel establishment
340 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `accept_channel2`.
341 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
342 pub struct AcceptChannelV2 {
343 /// The same `temporary_channel_id` received from the initiator's `open_channel2` message.
344 pub temporary_channel_id: ChannelId,
345 /// Part of the channel value contributed by the channel acceptor
346 pub funding_satoshis: u64,
347 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by the channel acceptor will be
349 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
350 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards channel acceptor, in milli-satoshi
351 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
352 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to channel acceptor, in milli-satoshi
353 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
354 /// Minimum depth of the funding transaction before the channel is considered open
355 pub minimum_depth: u32,
356 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if they
357 /// broadcast a commitment transaction
358 pub to_self_delay: u16,
359 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards channel acceptor
360 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
361 /// The channel acceptor's key controlling the funding transaction
362 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
363 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
364 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
365 /// A payment key to channel acceptor for transactions broadcast by counterparty
366 pub payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
367 /// Used to derive a payment key to channel acceptor for transactions broadcast by channel
369 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
370 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to channel acceptor for transactions broadcast by counterparty
371 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
372 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-channel-acceptor transaction's per commitment point
373 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
374 /// The second to-be-broadcast-by-channel-acceptor transaction's per commitment point
375 pub second_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
376 /// Optionally, a request to pre-set the to-channel-acceptor output's scriptPubkey for when we
377 /// collaboratively close
378 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
379 /// The channel type that this channel will represent. If none is set, we derive the channel
380 /// type from the intersection of our feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from
381 /// the Init message.
383 /// This is required to match the equivalent field in [`OpenChannelV2::channel_type`].
384 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
385 /// Optionally, a requirement that only confirmed inputs can be added
386 pub require_confirmed_inputs: Option<()>,
389 /// A [`funding_created`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
391 /// Used in V1 channel establishment
393 /// [`funding_created`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-funding_created-message
394 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
395 pub struct FundingCreated {
396 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding is established
397 pub temporary_channel_id: ChannelId,
398 /// The funding transaction ID
399 pub funding_txid: Txid,
400 /// The specific output index funding this channel
401 pub funding_output_index: u16,
402 /// The signature of the channel initiator (funder) on the initial commitment transaction
403 pub signature: Signature,
405 /// The partial signature of the channel initiator (funder)
406 pub partial_signature_with_nonce: Option<PartialSignatureWithNonce>,
408 /// Next nonce the channel acceptor should use to finalize the funding output signature
409 pub next_local_nonce: Option<musig2::types::PublicNonce>
412 /// A [`funding_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
414 /// Used in V1 channel establishment
416 /// [`funding_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-funding_signed-message
417 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
418 pub struct FundingSigned {
420 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
421 /// The signature of the channel acceptor (fundee) on the initial commitment transaction
422 pub signature: Signature,
424 /// The partial signature of the channel acceptor (fundee)
425 pub partial_signature_with_nonce: Option<PartialSignatureWithNonce>,
428 /// A [`channel_ready`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
430 /// [`channel_ready`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-channel_ready-message
431 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
432 pub struct ChannelReady {
434 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
435 /// The per-commitment point of the second commitment transaction
436 pub next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
437 /// If set, provides a `short_channel_id` alias for this channel.
439 /// The sender will accept payments to be forwarded over this SCID and forward them to this
440 /// messages' recipient.
441 pub short_channel_id_alias: Option<u64>,
444 /// An stfu (quiescence) message to be sent by or received from the stfu initiator.
445 // TODO(splicing): Add spec link for `stfu`; still in draft, using from https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/863
446 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
448 /// The channel ID where quiescence is intended
449 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
450 /// Initiator flag, 1 if initiating, 0 if replying to an stfu.
454 /// A splice message to be sent by or received from the stfu initiator (splice initiator).
455 // TODO(splicing): Add spec link for `splice`; still in draft, using from https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/863
456 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
458 /// The channel ID where splicing is intended
459 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
460 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is intended to be spliced
461 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
462 /// The intended change in channel capacity: the amount to be added (positive value)
463 /// or removed (negative value) by the sender (splice initiator) by splicing into/from the channel.
464 pub relative_satoshis: i64,
465 /// The feerate for the new funding transaction, set by the splice initiator
466 pub funding_feerate_perkw: u32,
467 /// The locktime for the new funding transaction
469 /// The key of the sender (splice initiator) controlling the new funding transaction
470 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
473 /// A splice_ack message to be received by or sent to the splice initiator.
475 // TODO(splicing): Add spec link for `splice_ack`; still in draft, using from https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/863
476 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
477 pub struct SpliceAck {
478 /// The channel ID where splicing is intended
479 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
480 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is intended to be spliced
481 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
482 /// The intended change in channel capacity: the amount to be added (positive value)
483 /// or removed (negative value) by the sender (splice acceptor) by splicing into/from the channel.
484 pub relative_satoshis: i64,
485 /// The key of the sender (splice acceptor) controlling the new funding transaction
486 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
489 /// A splice_locked message to be sent to or received from a peer.
491 // TODO(splicing): Add spec link for `splice_locked`; still in draft, using from https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/863
492 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
493 pub struct SpliceLocked {
495 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
498 /// A tx_add_input message for adding an input during interactive transaction construction
500 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `tx_add_input`.
501 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
502 pub struct TxAddInput {
504 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
505 /// A randomly chosen unique identifier for this input, which is even for initiators and odd for
508 /// Serialized transaction that contains the output this input spends to verify that it is non
510 pub prevtx: TransactionU16LenLimited,
511 /// The index of the output being spent
513 /// The sequence number of this input
517 /// A tx_add_output message for adding an output during interactive transaction construction.
519 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `tx_add_output`.
520 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
521 pub struct TxAddOutput {
523 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
524 /// A randomly chosen unique identifier for this output, which is even for initiators and odd for
527 /// The satoshi value of the output
529 /// The scriptPubKey for the output
530 pub script: ScriptBuf,
533 /// A tx_remove_input message for removing an input during interactive transaction construction.
535 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `tx_remove_input`.
536 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
537 pub struct TxRemoveInput {
539 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
540 /// The serial ID of the input to be removed
544 /// A tx_remove_output message for removing an output during interactive transaction construction.
546 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `tx_remove_output`.
547 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
548 pub struct TxRemoveOutput {
550 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
551 /// The serial ID of the output to be removed
555 /// A tx_complete message signalling the conclusion of a peer's transaction contributions during
556 /// interactive transaction construction.
558 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `tx_complete`.
559 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
560 pub struct TxComplete {
562 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
565 /// A tx_signatures message containing the sender's signatures for a transaction constructed with
566 /// interactive transaction construction.
568 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `tx_signatures`.
569 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
570 pub struct TxSignatures {
572 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
575 /// The list of witnesses
576 pub witnesses: Vec<Witness>,
579 /// A tx_init_rbf message which initiates a replacement of the transaction after it's been
582 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `tx_init_rbf`.
583 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
584 pub struct TxInitRbf {
586 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
587 /// The locktime of the transaction
589 /// The feerate of the transaction
590 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
591 /// The number of satoshis the sender will contribute to or, if negative, remove from
592 /// (e.g. splice-out) the funding output of the transaction
593 pub funding_output_contribution: Option<i64>,
596 /// A tx_ack_rbf message which acknowledges replacement of the transaction after it's been
599 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `tx_ack_rbf`.
600 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
601 pub struct TxAckRbf {
603 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
604 /// The number of satoshis the sender will contribute to or, if negative, remove from
605 /// (e.g. splice-out) the funding output of the transaction
606 pub funding_output_contribution: Option<i64>,
609 /// A tx_abort message which signals the cancellation of an in-progress transaction negotiation.
611 // TODO(dual_funding): Add spec link for `tx_abort`.
612 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
615 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
620 /// A [`shutdown`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
622 /// [`shutdown`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#closing-initiation-shutdown
623 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
624 pub struct Shutdown {
626 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
627 /// The destination of this peer's funds on closing.
629 /// Must be in one of these forms: P2PKH, P2SH, P2WPKH, P2WSH, P2TR.
630 pub scriptpubkey: ScriptBuf,
633 /// The minimum and maximum fees which the sender is willing to place on the closing transaction.
635 /// This is provided in [`ClosingSigned`] by both sides to indicate the fee range they are willing
637 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
638 pub struct ClosingSignedFeeRange {
639 /// The minimum absolute fee, in satoshis, which the sender is willing to place on the closing
641 pub min_fee_satoshis: u64,
642 /// The maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, which the sender is willing to place on the closing
644 pub max_fee_satoshis: u64,
647 /// A [`closing_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
649 /// [`closing_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#closing-negotiation-closing_signed
650 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
651 pub struct ClosingSigned {
653 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
654 /// The proposed total fee for the closing transaction
655 pub fee_satoshis: u64,
656 /// A signature on the closing transaction
657 pub signature: Signature,
658 /// The minimum and maximum fees which the sender is willing to accept, provided only by new
660 pub fee_range: Option<ClosingSignedFeeRange>,
663 /// An [`update_add_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
665 /// [`update_add_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#adding-an-htlc-update_add_htlc
666 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
667 pub struct UpdateAddHTLC {
669 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
672 /// The HTLC value in milli-satoshi
673 pub amount_msat: u64,
674 /// The payment hash, the pre-image of which controls HTLC redemption
675 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
676 /// The expiry height of the HTLC
677 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
678 /// The extra fee skimmed by the sender of this message. See
679 /// [`ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs`].
681 /// [`ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs
682 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
683 /// The onion routing packet with encrypted data for the next hop.
684 pub onion_routing_packet: OnionPacket,
685 /// Provided if we are relaying or receiving a payment within a blinded path, to decrypt the onion
686 /// routing packet and the recipient-provided encrypted payload within.
687 pub blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
690 /// An onion message to be sent to or received from a peer.
692 // TODO: update with link to OM when they are merged into the BOLTs
693 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
694 pub struct OnionMessage {
695 /// Used in decrypting the onion packet's payload.
696 pub blinding_point: PublicKey,
697 /// The full onion packet including hop data, pubkey, and hmac
698 pub onion_routing_packet: onion_message::Packet,
701 /// An [`update_fulfill_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
703 /// [`update_fulfill_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
704 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
705 pub struct UpdateFulfillHTLC {
707 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
710 /// The pre-image of the payment hash, allowing HTLC redemption
711 pub payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
714 /// An [`update_fail_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
716 /// [`update_fail_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
717 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
718 pub struct UpdateFailHTLC {
720 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
723 pub(crate) reason: OnionErrorPacket,
726 /// An [`update_fail_malformed_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
728 /// [`update_fail_malformed_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
729 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
730 pub struct UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
732 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
735 pub(crate) sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
737 pub failure_code: u16,
740 /// A [`commitment_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
742 /// [`commitment_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#committing-updates-so-far-commitment_signed
743 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
744 pub struct CommitmentSigned {
746 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
747 /// A signature on the commitment transaction
748 pub signature: Signature,
749 /// Signatures on the HTLC transactions
750 pub htlc_signatures: Vec<Signature>,
752 /// The partial Taproot signature on the commitment transaction
753 pub partial_signature_with_nonce: Option<PartialSignatureWithNonce>,
756 /// A [`revoke_and_ack`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
758 /// [`revoke_and_ack`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#completing-the-transition-to-the-updated-state-revoke_and_ack
759 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
760 pub struct RevokeAndACK {
762 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
763 /// The secret corresponding to the per-commitment point
764 pub per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
765 /// The next sender-broadcast commitment transaction's per-commitment point
766 pub next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
768 /// Musig nonce the recipient should use in their next commitment signature message
769 pub next_local_nonce: Option<musig2::types::PublicNonce>
772 /// An [`update_fee`] message to be sent to or received from a peer
774 /// [`update_fee`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#updating-fees-update_fee
775 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
776 pub struct UpdateFee {
778 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
779 /// Fee rate per 1000-weight of the transaction
780 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
783 /// A [`channel_reestablish`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
785 /// [`channel_reestablish`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#message-retransmission
786 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
787 pub struct ChannelReestablish {
789 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
790 /// The next commitment number for the sender
791 pub next_local_commitment_number: u64,
792 /// The next commitment number for the recipient
793 pub next_remote_commitment_number: u64,
794 /// Proof that the sender knows the per-commitment secret of a specific commitment transaction
795 /// belonging to the recipient
796 pub your_last_per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
797 /// The sender's per-commitment point for their current commitment transaction
798 pub my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
799 /// The next funding transaction ID
800 pub next_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
803 /// An [`announcement_signatures`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
805 /// [`announcement_signatures`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-announcement_signatures-message
806 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
807 pub struct AnnouncementSignatures {
809 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
810 /// The short channel ID
811 pub short_channel_id: u64,
812 /// A signature by the node key
813 pub node_signature: Signature,
814 /// A signature by the funding key
815 pub bitcoin_signature: Signature,
818 /// An address which can be used to connect to a remote peer.
819 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
820 pub enum SocketAddress {
821 /// An IPv4 address and port on which the peer is listening.
823 /// The 4-byte IPv4 address
825 /// The port on which the node is listening
828 /// An IPv6 address and port on which the peer is listening.
830 /// The 16-byte IPv6 address
832 /// The port on which the node is listening
835 /// An old-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening.
837 /// This field is deprecated and the Tor network generally no longer supports V2 Onion
838 /// addresses. Thus, the details are not parsed here.
840 /// A new-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening.
842 /// To create the human-readable "hostname", concatenate the ED25519 pubkey, checksum, and version,
843 /// wrap as base32 and append ".onion".
845 /// The ed25519 long-term public key of the peer
846 ed25519_pubkey: [u8; 32],
847 /// The checksum of the pubkey and version, as included in the onion address
849 /// The version byte, as defined by the Tor Onion v3 spec.
851 /// The port on which the node is listening
854 /// A hostname/port on which the peer is listening.
856 /// The hostname on which the node is listening.
858 /// The port on which the node is listening.
863 /// Gets the ID of this address type. Addresses in [`NodeAnnouncement`] messages should be sorted
865 pub(crate) fn get_id(&self) -> u8 {
867 &SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 {..} => { 1 },
868 &SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 {..} => { 2 },
869 &SocketAddress::OnionV2(_) => { 3 },
870 &SocketAddress::OnionV3 {..} => { 4 },
871 &SocketAddress::Hostname {..} => { 5 },
875 /// Strict byte-length of address descriptor, 1-byte type not recorded
876 fn len(&self) -> u16 {
878 &SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 { .. } => { 6 },
879 &SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 { .. } => { 18 },
880 &SocketAddress::OnionV2(_) => { 12 },
881 &SocketAddress::OnionV3 { .. } => { 37 },
882 // Consists of 1-byte hostname length, hostname bytes, and 2-byte port.
883 &SocketAddress::Hostname { ref hostname, .. } => { u16::from(hostname.len()) + 3 },
887 /// The maximum length of any address descriptor, not including the 1-byte type.
888 /// This maximum length is reached by a hostname address descriptor:
889 /// a hostname with a maximum length of 255, its 1-byte length and a 2-byte port.
890 pub(crate) const MAX_LEN: u16 = 258;
893 impl Writeable for SocketAddress {
894 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
896 &SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 { ref addr, ref port } => {
901 &SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 { ref addr, ref port } => {
906 &SocketAddress::OnionV2(bytes) => {
908 bytes.write(writer)?;
910 &SocketAddress::OnionV3 { ref ed25519_pubkey, ref checksum, ref version, ref port } => {
912 ed25519_pubkey.write(writer)?;
913 checksum.write(writer)?;
914 version.write(writer)?;
917 &SocketAddress::Hostname { ref hostname, ref port } => {
919 hostname.write(writer)?;
927 impl Readable for Result<SocketAddress, u8> {
928 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Result<SocketAddress, u8>, DecodeError> {
929 let byte = <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
932 Ok(Ok(SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 {
933 addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
934 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
938 Ok(Ok(SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 {
939 addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
940 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
943 3 => Ok(Ok(SocketAddress::OnionV2(Readable::read(reader)?))),
945 Ok(Ok(SocketAddress::OnionV3 {
946 ed25519_pubkey: Readable::read(reader)?,
947 checksum: Readable::read(reader)?,
948 version: Readable::read(reader)?,
949 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
953 Ok(Ok(SocketAddress::Hostname {
954 hostname: Readable::read(reader)?,
955 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
958 _ => return Ok(Err(byte)),
963 impl Readable for SocketAddress {
964 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<SocketAddress, DecodeError> {
965 match Readable::read(reader) {
966 Ok(Ok(res)) => Ok(res),
967 Ok(Err(_)) => Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion),
973 /// [`SocketAddress`] error variants
974 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
975 pub enum SocketAddressParseError {
976 /// Socket address (IPv4/IPv6) parsing error
978 /// Invalid input format
982 /// Invalid onion v3 address
986 impl fmt::Display for SocketAddressParseError {
987 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
989 SocketAddressParseError::SocketAddrParse => write!(f, "Socket address (IPv4/IPv6) parsing error"),
990 SocketAddressParseError::InvalidInput => write!(f, "Invalid input format. \
991 Expected: \"<ipv4>:<port>\", \"[<ipv6>]:<port>\", \"<onion address>.onion:<port>\" or \"<hostname>:<port>\""),
992 SocketAddressParseError::InvalidPort => write!(f, "Invalid port"),
993 SocketAddressParseError::InvalidOnionV3 => write!(f, "Invalid onion v3 address"),
998 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
999 impl From<std::net::SocketAddrV4> for SocketAddress {
1000 fn from(addr: std::net::SocketAddrV4) -> Self {
1001 SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 { addr: addr.ip().octets(), port: addr.port() }
1005 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1006 impl From<std::net::SocketAddrV6> for SocketAddress {
1007 fn from(addr: std::net::SocketAddrV6) -> Self {
1008 SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 { addr: addr.ip().octets(), port: addr.port() }
1012 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1013 impl From<std::net::SocketAddr> for SocketAddress {
1014 fn from(addr: std::net::SocketAddr) -> Self {
1016 std::net::SocketAddr::V4(addr) => addr.into(),
1017 std::net::SocketAddr::V6(addr) => addr.into(),
1022 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1023 impl std::net::ToSocketAddrs for SocketAddress {
1024 type Iter = std::vec::IntoIter<std::net::SocketAddr>;
1026 fn to_socket_addrs(&self) -> std::io::Result<Self::Iter> {
1028 SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 { addr, port } => {
1029 let ip_addr = std::net::Ipv4Addr::from(*addr);
1030 let socket_addr = SocketAddr::new(ip_addr.into(), *port);
1031 Ok(vec![socket_addr].into_iter())
1033 SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 { addr, port } => {
1034 let ip_addr = std::net::Ipv6Addr::from(*addr);
1035 let socket_addr = SocketAddr::new(ip_addr.into(), *port);
1036 Ok(vec![socket_addr].into_iter())
1038 SocketAddress::Hostname { ref hostname, port } => {
1039 (hostname.as_str(), *port).to_socket_addrs()
1041 SocketAddress::OnionV2(..) => {
1042 Err(std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::Other, "Resolution of OnionV2 \
1043 addresses is currently unsupported."))
1045 SocketAddress::OnionV3 { .. } => {
1046 Err(std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::Other, "Resolution of OnionV3 \
1047 addresses is currently unsupported."))
1053 /// Parses an OnionV3 host and port into a [`SocketAddress::OnionV3`].
1055 /// The host part must end with ".onion".
1056 pub fn parse_onion_address(host: &str, port: u16) -> Result<SocketAddress, SocketAddressParseError> {
1057 if host.ends_with(".onion") {
1058 let domain = &host[..host.len() - ".onion".len()];
1059 if domain.len() != 56 {
1060 return Err(SocketAddressParseError::InvalidOnionV3);
1062 let onion = base32::Alphabet::RFC4648 { padding: false }.decode(&domain).map_err(|_| SocketAddressParseError::InvalidOnionV3)?;
1063 if onion.len() != 35 {
1064 return Err(SocketAddressParseError::InvalidOnionV3);
1066 let version = onion[0];
1067 let first_checksum_flag = onion[1];
1068 let second_checksum_flag = onion[2];
1069 let mut ed25519_pubkey = [0; 32];
1070 ed25519_pubkey.copy_from_slice(&onion[3..35]);
1071 let checksum = u16::from_be_bytes([first_checksum_flag, second_checksum_flag]);
1072 return Ok(SocketAddress::OnionV3 { ed25519_pubkey, checksum, version, port });
1075 return Err(SocketAddressParseError::InvalidInput);
1079 impl Display for SocketAddress {
1080 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> core::fmt::Result {
1082 SocketAddress::TcpIpV4{addr, port} => write!(
1083 f, "{}.{}.{}.{}:{}", addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3], port)?,
1084 SocketAddress::TcpIpV6{addr, port} => write!(
1086 "[{:02x}{:02x}:{:02x}{:02x}:{:02x}{:02x}:{:02x}{:02x}:{:02x}{:02x}:{:02x}{:02x}:{:02x}{:02x}:{:02x}{:02x}]:{}",
1087 addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3], addr[4], addr[5], addr[6], addr[7], addr[8], addr[9], addr[10], addr[11], addr[12], addr[13], addr[14], addr[15], port
1089 SocketAddress::OnionV2(bytes) => write!(f, "OnionV2({:?})", bytes)?,
1090 SocketAddress::OnionV3 {
1096 let [first_checksum_flag, second_checksum_flag] = checksum.to_be_bytes();
1097 let mut addr = vec![*version, first_checksum_flag, second_checksum_flag];
1098 addr.extend_from_slice(ed25519_pubkey);
1099 let onion = base32::Alphabet::RFC4648 { padding: false }.encode(&addr);
1100 write!(f, "{}.onion:{}", onion, port)?
1102 SocketAddress::Hostname { hostname, port } => write!(f, "{}:{}", hostname, port)?,
1108 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
1109 impl FromStr for SocketAddress {
1110 type Err = SocketAddressParseError;
1112 fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
1113 match std::net::SocketAddr::from_str(s) {
1114 Ok(addr) => Ok(addr.into()),
1116 let trimmed_input = match s.rfind(":") {
1118 None => return Err(SocketAddressParseError::InvalidInput),
1120 let host = &s[..trimmed_input];
1121 let port: u16 = s[trimmed_input + 1..].parse().map_err(|_| SocketAddressParseError::InvalidPort)?;
1122 if host.ends_with(".onion") {
1123 return parse_onion_address(host, port);
1125 if let Ok(hostname) = Hostname::try_from(s[..trimmed_input].to_string()) {
1126 return Ok(SocketAddress::Hostname { hostname, port });
1128 return Err(SocketAddressParseError::SocketAddrParse)
1134 /// Represents the set of gossip messages that require a signature from a node's identity key.
1135 pub enum UnsignedGossipMessage<'a> {
1136 /// An unsigned channel announcement.
1137 ChannelAnnouncement(&'a UnsignedChannelAnnouncement),
1138 /// An unsigned channel update.
1139 ChannelUpdate(&'a UnsignedChannelUpdate),
1140 /// An unsigned node announcement.
1141 NodeAnnouncement(&'a UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)
1144 impl<'a> Writeable for UnsignedGossipMessage<'a> {
1145 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1147 UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
1148 UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
1149 UnsignedGossipMessage::NodeAnnouncement(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
1154 /// The unsigned part of a [`node_announcement`] message.
1156 /// [`node_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-node_announcement-message
1157 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1158 pub struct UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1159 /// The advertised features
1160 pub features: NodeFeatures,
1161 /// A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed
1163 /// The `node_id` this announcement originated from (don't rebroadcast the `node_announcement` back
1165 pub node_id: NodeId,
1166 /// An RGB color for UI purposes
1168 /// An alias, for UI purposes.
1170 /// This should be sanitized before use. There is no guarantee of uniqueness.
1171 pub alias: NodeAlias,
1172 /// List of addresses on which this node is reachable
1173 pub addresses: Vec<SocketAddress>,
1174 pub(crate) excess_address_data: Vec<u8>,
1175 pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
1177 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1178 /// A [`node_announcement`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
1180 /// [`node_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-node_announcement-message
1181 pub struct NodeAnnouncement {
1182 /// The signature by the node key
1183 pub signature: Signature,
1184 /// The actual content of the announcement
1185 pub contents: UnsignedNodeAnnouncement,
1188 /// The unsigned part of a [`channel_announcement`] message.
1190 /// [`channel_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_announcement-message
1191 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1192 pub struct UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1193 /// The advertised channel features
1194 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
1195 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
1196 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
1197 /// The short channel ID
1198 pub short_channel_id: u64,
1199 /// One of the two `node_id`s which are endpoints of this channel
1200 pub node_id_1: NodeId,
1201 /// The other of the two `node_id`s which are endpoints of this channel
1202 pub node_id_2: NodeId,
1203 /// The funding key for the first node
1204 pub bitcoin_key_1: NodeId,
1205 /// The funding key for the second node
1206 pub bitcoin_key_2: NodeId,
1207 /// Excess data which was signed as a part of the message which we do not (yet) understand how
1210 /// This is stored to ensure forward-compatibility as new fields are added to the lightning gossip protocol.
1211 pub excess_data: Vec<u8>,
1213 /// A [`channel_announcement`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
1215 /// [`channel_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_announcement-message
1216 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1217 pub struct ChannelAnnouncement {
1218 /// Authentication of the announcement by the first public node
1219 pub node_signature_1: Signature,
1220 /// Authentication of the announcement by the second public node
1221 pub node_signature_2: Signature,
1222 /// Proof of funding UTXO ownership by the first public node
1223 pub bitcoin_signature_1: Signature,
1224 /// Proof of funding UTXO ownership by the second public node
1225 pub bitcoin_signature_2: Signature,
1226 /// The actual announcement
1227 pub contents: UnsignedChannelAnnouncement,
1230 /// The unsigned part of a [`channel_update`] message.
1232 /// [`channel_update`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_update-message
1233 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1234 pub struct UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1235 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
1236 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
1237 /// The short channel ID
1238 pub short_channel_id: u64,
1239 /// A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed, specific to this channel
1243 /// The number of blocks such that if:
1244 /// `incoming_htlc.cltv_expiry < outgoing_htlc.cltv_expiry + cltv_expiry_delta`
1245 /// then we need to fail the HTLC backwards. When forwarding an HTLC, `cltv_expiry_delta` determines
1246 /// the outgoing HTLC's minimum `cltv_expiry` value -- so, if an incoming HTLC comes in with a
1247 /// `cltv_expiry` of 100000, and the node we're forwarding to has a `cltv_expiry_delta` value of 10,
1248 /// then we'll check that the outgoing HTLC's `cltv_expiry` value is at least 100010 before
1249 /// forwarding. Note that the HTLC sender is the one who originally sets this value when
1250 /// constructing the route.
1251 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1252 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
1253 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1254 /// The maximum HTLC value incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi.
1256 /// This used to be optional.
1257 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
1258 /// The base HTLC fee charged by sender, in milli-satoshi
1259 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1260 /// The amount to fee multiplier, in micro-satoshi
1261 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1262 /// Excess data which was signed as a part of the message which we do not (yet) understand how
1265 /// This is stored to ensure forward-compatibility as new fields are added to the lightning gossip protocol.
1266 pub excess_data: Vec<u8>,
1268 /// A [`channel_update`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
1270 /// [`channel_update`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_update-message
1271 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1272 pub struct ChannelUpdate {
1273 /// A signature of the channel update
1274 pub signature: Signature,
1275 /// The actual channel update
1276 pub contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate,
1279 /// A [`query_channel_range`] message is used to query a peer for channel
1280 /// UTXOs in a range of blocks. The recipient of a query makes a best
1281 /// effort to reply to the query using one or more [`ReplyChannelRange`]
1284 /// [`query_channel_range`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_channel_range-and-reply_channel_range-messages
1285 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1286 pub struct QueryChannelRange {
1287 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
1288 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
1289 /// The height of the first block for the channel UTXOs being queried
1290 pub first_blocknum: u32,
1291 /// The number of blocks to include in the query results
1292 pub number_of_blocks: u32,
1295 /// A [`reply_channel_range`] message is a reply to a [`QueryChannelRange`]
1298 /// Multiple `reply_channel_range` messages can be sent in reply
1299 /// to a single [`QueryChannelRange`] message. The query recipient makes a
1300 /// best effort to respond based on their local network view which may
1301 /// not be a perfect view of the network. The `short_channel_id`s in the
1302 /// reply are encoded. We only support `encoding_type=0` uncompressed
1303 /// serialization and do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization.
1305 /// [`reply_channel_range`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_channel_range-and-reply_channel_range-messages
1306 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1307 pub struct ReplyChannelRange {
1308 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
1309 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
1310 /// The height of the first block in the range of the reply
1311 pub first_blocknum: u32,
1312 /// The number of blocks included in the range of the reply
1313 pub number_of_blocks: u32,
1314 /// True when this is the final reply for a query
1315 pub sync_complete: bool,
1316 /// The `short_channel_id`s in the channel range
1317 pub short_channel_ids: Vec<u64>,
1320 /// A [`query_short_channel_ids`] message is used to query a peer for
1321 /// routing gossip messages related to one or more `short_channel_id`s.
1323 /// The query recipient will reply with the latest, if available,
1324 /// [`ChannelAnnouncement`], [`ChannelUpdate`] and [`NodeAnnouncement`] messages
1325 /// it maintains for the requested `short_channel_id`s followed by a
1326 /// [`ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd`] message. The `short_channel_id`s sent in
1327 /// this query are encoded. We only support `encoding_type=0` uncompressed
1328 /// serialization and do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization.
1330 /// [`query_short_channel_ids`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_short_channel_idsreply_short_channel_ids_end-messages
1331 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1332 pub struct QueryShortChannelIds {
1333 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
1334 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
1335 /// The short_channel_ids that are being queried
1336 pub short_channel_ids: Vec<u64>,
1339 /// A [`reply_short_channel_ids_end`] message is sent as a reply to a
1340 /// message. The query recipient makes a best
1341 /// effort to respond based on their local network view which may not be
1342 /// a perfect view of the network.
1344 /// [`reply_short_channel_ids_end`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_short_channel_idsreply_short_channel_ids_end-messages
1345 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1346 pub struct ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
1347 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain that was queried
1348 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
1349 /// Indicates if the query recipient maintains up-to-date channel
1350 /// information for the `chain_hash`
1351 pub full_information: bool,
1354 /// A [`gossip_timestamp_filter`] message is used by a node to request
1355 /// gossip relay for messages in the requested time range when the
1356 /// `gossip_queries` feature has been negotiated.
1358 /// [`gossip_timestamp_filter`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-gossip_timestamp_filter-message
1359 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1360 pub struct GossipTimestampFilter {
1361 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain for channel and node information
1362 pub chain_hash: ChainHash,
1363 /// The starting unix timestamp
1364 pub first_timestamp: u32,
1365 /// The range of information in seconds
1366 pub timestamp_range: u32,
1369 /// Encoding type for data compression of collections in gossip queries.
1371 /// We do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization [defined in BOLT
1372 /// #7](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#query-messages).
1374 Uncompressed = 0x00,
1377 /// Used to put an error message in a [`LightningError`].
1378 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq)]
1379 pub enum ErrorAction {
1380 /// The peer took some action which made us think they were useless. Disconnect them.
1382 /// An error message which we should make an effort to send before we disconnect.
1383 msg: Option<ErrorMessage>
1385 /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them without closing any channels and disconnect them.
1386 DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
1387 /// A warning message which we should make an effort to send before we disconnect.
1388 msg: WarningMessage,
1390 /// The peer did something harmless that we weren't able to process, just log and ignore
1391 // New code should *not* use this. New code must use IgnoreAndLog, below!
1393 /// The peer did something harmless that we weren't able to meaningfully process.
1394 /// If the error is logged, log it at the given level.
1395 IgnoreAndLog(logger::Level),
1396 /// The peer provided us with a gossip message which we'd already seen. In most cases this
1397 /// should be ignored, but it may result in the message being forwarded if it is a duplicate of
1398 /// our own channel announcements.
1399 IgnoreDuplicateGossip,
1400 /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them.
1402 /// The message to send.
1405 /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them without closing any channels.
1406 SendWarningMessage {
1407 /// The message to send.
1408 msg: WarningMessage,
1409 /// The peer may have done something harmless that we weren't able to meaningfully process,
1410 /// though we should still tell them about it.
1411 /// If this event is logged, log it at the given level.
1412 log_level: logger::Level,
1416 /// An Err type for failure to process messages.
1417 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1418 pub struct LightningError {
1419 /// A human-readable message describing the error
1421 /// The action which should be taken against the offending peer.
1422 pub action: ErrorAction,
1425 /// Struct used to return values from [`RevokeAndACK`] messages, containing a bunch of commitment
1426 /// transaction updates if they were pending.
1427 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1428 pub struct CommitmentUpdate {
1429 /// `update_add_htlc` messages which should be sent
1430 pub update_add_htlcs: Vec<UpdateAddHTLC>,
1431 /// `update_fulfill_htlc` messages which should be sent
1432 pub update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
1433 /// `update_fail_htlc` messages which should be sent
1434 pub update_fail_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFailHTLC>,
1435 /// `update_fail_malformed_htlc` messages which should be sent
1436 pub update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFailMalformedHTLC>,
1437 /// An `update_fee` message which should be sent
1438 pub update_fee: Option<UpdateFee>,
1439 /// A `commitment_signed` message which should be sent
1440 pub commitment_signed: CommitmentSigned,
1443 /// A trait to describe an object which can receive channel messages.
1445 /// Messages MAY be called in parallel when they originate from different `their_node_ids`, however
1446 /// they MUST NOT be called in parallel when the two calls have the same `their_node_id`.
1447 pub trait ChannelMessageHandler : MessageSendEventsProvider {
1449 /// Handle an incoming `open_channel` message from the given peer.
1450 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OpenChannel);
1451 /// Handle an incoming `open_channel2` message from the given peer.
1452 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OpenChannelV2);
1453 /// Handle an incoming `accept_channel` message from the given peer.
1454 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AcceptChannel);
1455 /// Handle an incoming `accept_channel2` message from the given peer.
1456 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AcceptChannelV2);
1457 /// Handle an incoming `funding_created` message from the given peer.
1458 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingCreated);
1459 /// Handle an incoming `funding_signed` message from the given peer.
1460 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingSigned);
1461 /// Handle an incoming `channel_ready` message from the given peer.
1462 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelReady);
1465 /// Handle an incoming `shutdown` message from the given peer.
1466 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Shutdown);
1467 /// Handle an incoming `closing_signed` message from the given peer.
1468 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ClosingSigned);
1471 /// Handle an incoming `stfu` message from the given peer.
1472 fn handle_stfu(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Stfu);
1475 /// Handle an incoming `splice` message from the given peer.
1476 fn handle_splice(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Splice);
1477 /// Handle an incoming `splice_ack` message from the given peer.
1478 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &SpliceAck);
1479 /// Handle an incoming `splice_locked` message from the given peer.
1480 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &SpliceLocked);
1482 // Interactive channel construction
1483 /// Handle an incoming `tx_add_input message` from the given peer.
1484 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &TxAddInput);
1485 /// Handle an incoming `tx_add_output` message from the given peer.
1486 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &TxAddOutput);
1487 /// Handle an incoming `tx_remove_input` message from the given peer.
1488 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &TxRemoveInput);
1489 /// Handle an incoming `tx_remove_output` message from the given peer.
1490 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &TxRemoveOutput);
1491 /// Handle an incoming `tx_complete message` from the given peer.
1492 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &TxComplete);
1493 /// Handle an incoming `tx_signatures` message from the given peer.
1494 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &TxSignatures);
1495 /// Handle an incoming `tx_init_rbf` message from the given peer.
1496 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &TxInitRbf);
1497 /// Handle an incoming `tx_ack_rbf` message from the given peer.
1498 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &TxAckRbf);
1499 /// Handle an incoming `tx_abort message` from the given peer.
1500 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &TxAbort);
1503 /// Handle an incoming `update_add_htlc` message from the given peer.
1504 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateAddHTLC);
1505 /// Handle an incoming `update_fulfill_htlc` message from the given peer.
1506 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFulfillHTLC);
1507 /// Handle an incoming `update_fail_htlc` message from the given peer.
1508 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFailHTLC);
1509 /// Handle an incoming `update_fail_malformed_htlc` message from the given peer.
1510 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFailMalformedHTLC);
1511 /// Handle an incoming `commitment_signed` message from the given peer.
1512 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &CommitmentSigned);
1513 /// Handle an incoming `revoke_and_ack` message from the given peer.
1514 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &RevokeAndACK);
1516 /// Handle an incoming `update_fee` message from the given peer.
1517 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFee);
1519 // Channel-to-announce:
1520 /// Handle an incoming `announcement_signatures` message from the given peer.
1521 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AnnouncementSignatures);
1523 // Connection loss/reestablish:
1524 /// Indicates a connection to the peer failed/an existing connection was lost.
1525 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey);
1527 /// Handle a peer reconnecting, possibly generating `channel_reestablish` message(s).
1529 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1530 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1531 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1532 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1533 /// Handle an incoming `channel_reestablish` message from the given peer.
1534 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelReestablish);
1536 /// Handle an incoming `channel_update` message from the given peer.
1537 fn handle_channel_update(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelUpdate);
1540 /// Handle an incoming `error` message from the given peer.
1541 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ErrorMessage);
1543 // Handler information:
1544 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1545 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1546 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1547 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1549 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1550 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1551 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1553 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1554 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1556 /// Gets the chain hashes for this `ChannelMessageHandler` indicating which chains it supports.
1558 /// If it's `None`, then no particular network chain hash compatibility will be enforced when
1559 /// connecting to peers.
1560 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>>;
1563 /// A trait to describe an object which can receive routing messages.
1565 /// # Implementor DoS Warnings
1567 /// For messages enabled with the `gossip_queries` feature there are potential DoS vectors when
1568 /// handling inbound queries. Implementors using an on-disk network graph should be aware of
1569 /// repeated disk I/O for queries accessing different parts of the network graph.
1570 pub trait RoutingMessageHandler : MessageSendEventsProvider {
1571 /// Handle an incoming `node_announcement` message, returning `true` if it should be forwarded on,
1572 /// `false` or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1573 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1574 /// Handle a `channel_announcement` message, returning `true` if it should be forwarded on, `false`
1575 /// or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1576 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1577 /// Handle an incoming `channel_update` message, returning true if it should be forwarded on,
1578 /// `false` or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1579 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1580 /// Gets channel announcements and updates required to dump our routing table to a remote node,
1581 /// starting at the `short_channel_id` indicated by `starting_point` and including announcements
1582 /// for a single channel.
1583 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)>;
1584 /// Gets a node announcement required to dump our routing table to a remote node, starting at
1585 /// the node *after* the provided pubkey and including up to one announcement immediately
1586 /// higher (as defined by `<PublicKey as Ord>::cmp`) than `starting_point`.
1587 /// If `None` is provided for `starting_point`, we start at the first node.
1588 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&NodeId>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement>;
1589 /// Called when a connection is established with a peer. This can be used to
1590 /// perform routing table synchronization using a strategy defined by the
1593 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1594 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1595 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1596 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1597 /// Handles the reply of a query we initiated to learn about channels
1598 /// for a given range of blocks. We can expect to receive one or more
1599 /// replies to a single query.
1600 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1601 /// Handles the reply of a query we initiated asking for routing gossip
1602 /// messages for a list of channels. We should receive this message when
1603 /// a node has completed its best effort to send us the pertaining routing
1604 /// gossip messages.
1605 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1606 /// Handles when a peer asks us to send a list of `short_channel_id`s
1607 /// for the requested range of blocks.
1608 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1609 /// Handles when a peer asks us to send routing gossip messages for a
1610 /// list of `short_channel_id`s.
1611 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1613 // Handler queueing status:
1614 /// Indicates that there are a large number of [`ChannelAnnouncement`] (or other) messages
1615 /// pending some async action. While there is no guarantee of the rate of future messages, the
1616 /// caller should seek to reduce the rate of new gossip messages handled, especially
1617 /// [`ChannelAnnouncement`]s.
1618 fn processing_queue_high(&self) -> bool;
1620 // Handler information:
1621 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1622 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1623 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1624 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1625 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1626 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1627 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1629 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1630 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1633 /// A handler for received [`OnionMessage`]s and for providing generated ones to send.
1634 pub trait OnionMessageHandler: EventsProvider {
1635 /// Handle an incoming `onion_message` message from the given peer.
1636 fn handle_onion_message(&self, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OnionMessage);
1638 /// Returns the next pending onion message for the peer with the given node id.
1639 fn next_onion_message_for_peer(&self, peer_node_id: PublicKey) -> Option<OnionMessage>;
1641 /// Called when a connection is established with a peer. Can be used to track which peers
1642 /// advertise onion message support and are online.
1644 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1645 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1646 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1647 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1649 /// Indicates a connection to the peer failed/an existing connection was lost. Allows handlers to
1650 /// drop and refuse to forward onion messages to this peer.
1651 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey);
1653 /// Performs actions that should happen roughly every ten seconds after startup. Allows handlers
1654 /// to drop any buffered onion messages intended for prospective peers.
1655 fn timer_tick_occurred(&self);
1657 // Handler information:
1658 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1659 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1660 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1661 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1663 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1664 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1665 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1667 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1668 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1671 mod fuzzy_internal_msgs {
1672 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1673 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, PaymentRelay};
1674 use crate::prelude::*;
1675 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
1676 use crate::ln::features::BlindedHopFeatures;
1678 // These types aren't intended to be pub, but are exposed for direct fuzzing (as we deserialize
1679 // them from untrusted input):
1681 pub struct FinalOnionHopData {
1682 pub payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
1683 /// The total value, in msat, of the payment as received by the ultimate recipient.
1684 /// Message serialization may panic if this value is more than 21 million Bitcoin.
1685 pub total_msat: u64,
1688 pub enum InboundOnionPayload {
1690 short_channel_id: u64,
1691 /// The value, in msat, of the payment after this hop's fee is deducted.
1692 amt_to_forward: u64,
1693 outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
1696 payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData>,
1697 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
1698 keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
1699 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
1701 outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
1704 short_channel_id: u64,
1705 payment_relay: PaymentRelay,
1706 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints,
1707 features: BlindedHopFeatures,
1708 intro_node_blinding_point: PublicKey,
1713 outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
1714 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
1715 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints,
1716 intro_node_blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1720 pub(crate) enum OutboundOnionPayload {
1722 short_channel_id: u64,
1723 /// The value, in msat, of the payment after this hop's fee is deducted.
1724 amt_to_forward: u64,
1725 outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
1728 payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData>,
1729 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
1730 keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
1731 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
1733 outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
1736 encrypted_tlvs: Vec<u8>,
1737 intro_node_blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1742 outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
1743 encrypted_tlvs: Vec<u8>,
1744 intro_node_blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, // Set if the introduction node of the blinded path is the final node
1748 pub struct DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
1749 pub(crate) hmac: [u8; 32],
1750 pub(crate) failuremsg: Vec<u8>,
1751 pub(crate) pad: Vec<u8>,
1755 pub use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*;
1756 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
1757 pub(crate) use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*;
1759 /// BOLT 4 onion packet including hop data for the next peer.
1760 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1761 pub struct OnionPacket {
1762 /// BOLT 4 version number.
1764 /// In order to ensure we always return an error on onion decode in compliance with [BOLT
1765 /// #4](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md), we have to
1766 /// deserialize `OnionPacket`s contained in [`UpdateAddHTLC`] messages even if the ephemeral
1767 /// public key (here) is bogus, so we hold a [`Result`] instead of a [`PublicKey`] as we'd
1769 pub public_key: Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>,
1770 /// 1300 bytes encrypted payload for the next hop.
1771 pub hop_data: [u8; 20*65],
1772 /// HMAC to verify the integrity of hop_data.
1776 impl onion_utils::Packet for OnionPacket {
1777 type Data = onion_utils::FixedSizeOnionPacket;
1778 fn new(pubkey: PublicKey, hop_data: onion_utils::FixedSizeOnionPacket, hmac: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
1781 public_key: Ok(pubkey),
1782 hop_data: hop_data.0,
1788 impl fmt::Debug for OnionPacket {
1789 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
1790 f.write_fmt(format_args!("OnionPacket version {} with hmac {:?}", self.version, &self.hmac[..]))
1794 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
1795 pub(crate) struct OnionErrorPacket {
1796 // This really should be a constant size slice, but the spec lets these things be up to 128KB?
1797 // (TODO) We limit it in decode to much lower...
1798 pub(crate) data: Vec<u8>,
1801 impl fmt::Display for DecodeError {
1802 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
1804 DecodeError::UnknownVersion => f.write_str("Unknown realm byte in Onion packet"),
1805 DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature => f.write_str("Unknown required feature preventing decode"),
1806 DecodeError::InvalidValue => f.write_str("Nonsense bytes didn't map to the type they were interpreted as"),
1807 DecodeError::ShortRead => f.write_str("Packet extended beyond the provided bytes"),
1808 DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor => f.write_str("A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly"),
1809 DecodeError::Io(ref e) => fmt::Debug::fmt(e, f),
1810 DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression => f.write_str("We don't support receiving messages with zlib-compressed fields"),
1815 impl From<io::Error> for DecodeError {
1816 fn from(e: io::Error) -> Self {
1817 if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof {
1818 DecodeError::ShortRead
1820 DecodeError::Io(e.kind())
1825 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
1826 impl_writeable_msg!(AcceptChannel, {
1827 temporary_channel_id,
1828 dust_limit_satoshis,
1829 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1830 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1836 revocation_basepoint,
1838 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1840 first_per_commitment_point,
1842 (0, shutdown_scriptpubkey, (option, encoding: (ScriptBuf, WithoutLength))), // Don't encode length twice.
1843 (1, channel_type, option),
1847 impl_writeable_msg!(AcceptChannel, {
1848 temporary_channel_id,
1849 dust_limit_satoshis,
1850 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1851 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1857 revocation_basepoint,
1859 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1861 first_per_commitment_point,
1863 (0, shutdown_scriptpubkey, (option, encoding: (ScriptBuf, WithoutLength))), // Don't encode length twice.
1864 (1, channel_type, option),
1865 (4, next_local_nonce, option),
1868 impl_writeable_msg!(AcceptChannelV2, {
1869 temporary_channel_id,
1871 dust_limit_satoshis,
1872 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1878 revocation_basepoint,
1880 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1882 first_per_commitment_point,
1883 second_per_commitment_point,
1885 (0, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
1886 (1, channel_type, option),
1887 (2, require_confirmed_inputs, option),
1890 impl_writeable_msg!(Stfu, {
1895 impl_writeable_msg!(Splice, {
1899 funding_feerate_perkw,
1904 impl_writeable_msg!(SpliceAck, {
1911 impl_writeable_msg!(SpliceLocked, {
1915 impl_writeable_msg!(TxAddInput, {
1923 impl_writeable_msg!(TxAddOutput, {
1930 impl_writeable_msg!(TxRemoveInput, {
1935 impl_writeable_msg!(TxRemoveOutput, {
1940 impl_writeable_msg!(TxComplete, {
1944 impl_writeable_msg!(TxSignatures, {
1950 impl_writeable_msg!(TxInitRbf, {
1953 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
1955 (0, funding_output_contribution, option),
1958 impl_writeable_msg!(TxAckRbf, {
1961 (0, funding_output_contribution, option),
1964 impl_writeable_msg!(TxAbort, {
1969 impl_writeable_msg!(AnnouncementSignatures, {
1976 impl_writeable_msg!(ChannelReestablish, {
1978 next_local_commitment_number,
1979 next_remote_commitment_number,
1980 your_last_per_commitment_secret,
1981 my_current_per_commitment_point,
1983 (0, next_funding_txid, option),
1986 impl_writeable_msg!(ClosingSigned,
1987 { channel_id, fee_satoshis, signature },
1988 { (1, fee_range, option) }
1991 impl_writeable!(ClosingSignedFeeRange, {
1996 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
1997 impl_writeable_msg!(CommitmentSigned, {
2004 impl_writeable_msg!(CommitmentSigned, {
2009 (2, partial_signature_with_nonce, option)
2012 impl_writeable!(DecodedOnionErrorPacket, {
2018 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
2019 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingCreated, {
2020 temporary_channel_id,
2022 funding_output_index,
2026 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingCreated, {
2027 temporary_channel_id,
2029 funding_output_index,
2032 (2, partial_signature_with_nonce, option),
2033 (4, next_local_nonce, option)
2036 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
2037 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingSigned, {
2043 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingSigned, {
2047 (2, partial_signature_with_nonce, option)
2050 impl_writeable_msg!(ChannelReady, {
2052 next_per_commitment_point,
2054 (1, short_channel_id_alias, option),
2057 impl Writeable for Init {
2058 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2059 // global_features gets the bottom 13 bits of our features, and local_features gets all of
2060 // our relevant feature bits. This keeps us compatible with old nodes.
2061 self.features.write_up_to_13(w)?;
2062 self.features.write(w)?;
2063 encode_tlv_stream!(w, {
2064 (1, self.networks.as_ref().map(|n| WithoutLength(n)), option),
2065 (3, self.remote_network_address, option),
2071 impl Readable for Init {
2072 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2073 let global_features: InitFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
2074 let features: InitFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
2075 let mut remote_network_address: Option<SocketAddress> = None;
2076 let mut networks: Option<WithoutLength<Vec<ChainHash>>> = None;
2077 decode_tlv_stream!(r, {
2078 (1, networks, option),
2079 (3, remote_network_address, option)
2082 features: features | global_features,
2083 networks: networks.map(|n| n.0),
2084 remote_network_address,
2089 impl_writeable_msg!(OpenChannel, {
2091 temporary_channel_id,
2094 dust_limit_satoshis,
2095 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
2096 channel_reserve_satoshis,
2102 revocation_basepoint,
2104 delayed_payment_basepoint,
2106 first_per_commitment_point,
2109 (0, shutdown_scriptpubkey, (option, encoding: (ScriptBuf, WithoutLength))), // Don't encode length twice.
2110 (1, channel_type, option),
2113 impl_writeable_msg!(OpenChannelV2, {
2115 temporary_channel_id,
2116 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
2117 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
2119 dust_limit_satoshis,
2120 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
2126 revocation_basepoint,
2128 delayed_payment_basepoint,
2130 first_per_commitment_point,
2131 second_per_commitment_point,
2134 (0, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
2135 (1, channel_type, option),
2136 (2, require_confirmed_inputs, option),
2139 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
2140 impl_writeable_msg!(RevokeAndACK, {
2142 per_commitment_secret,
2143 next_per_commitment_point
2147 impl_writeable_msg!(RevokeAndACK, {
2149 per_commitment_secret,
2150 next_per_commitment_point
2152 (4, next_local_nonce, option)
2155 impl_writeable_msg!(Shutdown, {
2160 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFailHTLC, {
2166 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, {
2173 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFee, {
2178 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFulfillHTLC, {
2184 // Note that this is written as a part of ChannelManager objects, and thus cannot change its
2185 // serialization format in a way which assumes we know the total serialized length/message end
2187 impl_writeable!(OnionErrorPacket, {
2191 // Note that this is written as a part of ChannelManager objects, and thus cannot change its
2192 // serialization format in a way which assumes we know the total serialized length/message end
2194 impl Writeable for OnionPacket {
2195 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2196 self.version.write(w)?;
2197 match self.public_key {
2198 Ok(pubkey) => pubkey.write(w)?,
2199 Err(_) => [0u8;33].write(w)?,
2201 w.write_all(&self.hop_data)?;
2202 self.hmac.write(w)?;
2207 impl Readable for OnionPacket {
2208 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2210 version: Readable::read(r)?,
2212 let mut buf = [0u8;33];
2213 r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
2214 PublicKey::from_slice(&buf)
2216 hop_data: Readable::read(r)?,
2217 hmac: Readable::read(r)?,
2222 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateAddHTLC, {
2228 onion_routing_packet,
2230 (0, blinding_point, option),
2231 (65537, skimmed_fee_msat, option)
2234 impl Readable for OnionMessage {
2235 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2236 let blinding_point: PublicKey = Readable::read(r)?;
2237 let len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
2238 let mut packet_reader = FixedLengthReader::new(r, len as u64);
2239 let onion_routing_packet: onion_message::Packet = <onion_message::Packet as LengthReadable>::read(&mut packet_reader)?;
2242 onion_routing_packet,
2247 impl Writeable for OnionMessage {
2248 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2249 self.blinding_point.write(w)?;
2250 let onion_packet_len = self.onion_routing_packet.serialized_length();
2251 (onion_packet_len as u16).write(w)?;
2252 self.onion_routing_packet.write(w)?;
2257 impl Writeable for FinalOnionHopData {
2258 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2259 self.payment_secret.0.write(w)?;
2260 HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.total_msat).write(w)
2264 impl Readable for FinalOnionHopData {
2265 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2266 let secret: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
2267 let amt: HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize<u64> = Readable::read(r)?;
2268 Ok(Self { payment_secret: PaymentSecret(secret), total_msat: amt.0 })
2272 impl Writeable for OutboundOnionPayload {
2273 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2275 Self::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } => {
2276 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
2277 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*amt_to_forward), required),
2278 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*outgoing_cltv_value), required),
2279 (6, short_channel_id, required)
2283 ref payment_data, ref payment_metadata, ref keysend_preimage, amt_msat,
2284 outgoing_cltv_value, ref custom_tlvs,
2286 // We need to update [`ln::outbound_payment::RecipientOnionFields::with_custom_tlvs`]
2287 // to reject any reserved types in the experimental range if new ones are ever
2289 let keysend_tlv = keysend_preimage.map(|preimage| (5482373484, preimage.encode()));
2290 let mut custom_tlvs: Vec<&(u64, Vec<u8>)> = custom_tlvs.iter().chain(keysend_tlv.iter()).collect();
2291 custom_tlvs.sort_unstable_by_key(|(typ, _)| *typ);
2292 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
2293 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*amt_msat), required),
2294 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*outgoing_cltv_value), required),
2295 (8, payment_data, option),
2296 (16, payment_metadata.as_ref().map(|m| WithoutLength(m)), option)
2297 }, custom_tlvs.iter());
2299 Self::BlindedForward { encrypted_tlvs, intro_node_blinding_point } => {
2300 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
2301 (10, *encrypted_tlvs, required_vec),
2302 (12, intro_node_blinding_point, option)
2305 Self::BlindedReceive {
2306 amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, encrypted_tlvs,
2307 intro_node_blinding_point,
2309 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
2310 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*amt_msat), required),
2311 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*outgoing_cltv_value), required),
2312 (10, *encrypted_tlvs, required_vec),
2313 (12, intro_node_blinding_point, option),
2314 (18, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*total_msat), required)
2322 impl<NS: Deref> ReadableArgs<(Option<PublicKey>, &NS)> for InboundOnionPayload where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
2323 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R, args: (Option<PublicKey>, &NS)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2324 let (update_add_blinding_point, node_signer) = args;
2327 let mut cltv_value = None;
2328 let mut short_id: Option<u64> = None;
2329 let mut payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData> = None;
2330 let mut encrypted_tlvs_opt: Option<WithoutLength<Vec<u8>>> = None;
2331 let mut intro_node_blinding_point = None;
2332 let mut payment_metadata: Option<WithoutLength<Vec<u8>>> = None;
2333 let mut total_msat = None;
2334 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
2335 let mut custom_tlvs = Vec::new();
2337 let tlv_len = BigSize::read(r)?;
2338 let rd = FixedLengthReader::new(r, tlv_len.0);
2339 decode_tlv_stream_with_custom_tlv_decode!(rd, {
2340 (2, amt, (option, encoding: (u64, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize))),
2341 (4, cltv_value, (option, encoding: (u32, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize))),
2342 (6, short_id, option),
2343 (8, payment_data, option),
2344 (10, encrypted_tlvs_opt, option),
2345 (12, intro_node_blinding_point, option),
2346 (16, payment_metadata, option),
2347 (18, total_msat, (option, encoding: (u64, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize))),
2348 // See https://github.com/lightning/blips/blob/master/blip-0003.md
2349 (5482373484, keysend_preimage, option)
2350 }, |msg_type: u64, msg_reader: &mut FixedLengthReader<_>| -> Result<bool, DecodeError> {
2351 if msg_type < 1 << 16 { return Ok(false) }
2352 let mut value = Vec::new();
2353 msg_reader.read_to_end(&mut value)?;
2354 custom_tlvs.push((msg_type, value));
2358 if amt.unwrap_or(0) > MAX_VALUE_MSAT { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
2359 if intro_node_blinding_point.is_some() && update_add_blinding_point.is_some() {
2360 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
2363 if let Some(blinding_point) = intro_node_blinding_point.or(update_add_blinding_point) {
2364 if short_id.is_some() || payment_data.is_some() || payment_metadata.is_some() {
2365 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
2367 let enc_tlvs = encrypted_tlvs_opt.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?.0;
2368 let enc_tlvs_ss = node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::Node, &blinding_point, None)
2369 .map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
2370 let rho = onion_utils::gen_rho_from_shared_secret(&enc_tlvs_ss.secret_bytes());
2371 let mut s = Cursor::new(&enc_tlvs);
2372 let mut reader = FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, enc_tlvs.len() as u64);
2373 match ChaChaPolyReadAdapter::read(&mut reader, rho)? {
2374 ChaChaPolyReadAdapter { readable: BlindedPaymentTlvs::Forward(ForwardTlvs {
2375 short_channel_id, payment_relay, payment_constraints, features
2377 if amt.is_some() || cltv_value.is_some() || total_msat.is_some() {
2378 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
2380 Ok(Self::BlindedForward {
2383 payment_constraints,
2385 intro_node_blinding_point: intro_node_blinding_point.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
2388 ChaChaPolyReadAdapter { readable: BlindedPaymentTlvs::Receive(ReceiveTlvs {
2389 payment_secret, payment_constraints
2391 if total_msat.unwrap_or(0) > MAX_VALUE_MSAT { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
2392 Ok(Self::BlindedReceive {
2393 amt_msat: amt.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
2394 total_msat: total_msat.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
2395 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv_value.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
2397 payment_constraints,
2398 intro_node_blinding_point,
2402 } else if let Some(short_channel_id) = short_id {
2403 if payment_data.is_some() || payment_metadata.is_some() || encrypted_tlvs_opt.is_some() ||
2404 total_msat.is_some()
2405 { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
2408 amt_to_forward: amt.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
2409 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv_value.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
2412 if encrypted_tlvs_opt.is_some() || total_msat.is_some() {
2413 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
2415 if let Some(data) = &payment_data {
2416 if data.total_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
2417 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2422 payment_metadata: payment_metadata.map(|w| w.0),
2424 amt_msat: amt.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
2425 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv_value.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
2432 impl Writeable for Ping {
2433 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2434 self.ponglen.write(w)?;
2435 vec![0u8; self.byteslen as usize].write(w)?; // size-unchecked write
2440 impl Readable for Ping {
2441 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2443 ponglen: Readable::read(r)?,
2445 let byteslen = Readable::read(r)?;
2446 r.read_exact(&mut vec![0u8; byteslen as usize][..])?;
2453 impl Writeable for Pong {
2454 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2455 vec![0u8; self.byteslen as usize].write(w)?; // size-unchecked write
2460 impl Readable for Pong {
2461 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2464 let byteslen = Readable::read(r)?;
2465 r.read_exact(&mut vec![0u8; byteslen as usize][..])?;
2472 impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2473 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2474 self.features.write(w)?;
2475 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
2476 self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
2477 self.node_id_1.write(w)?;
2478 self.node_id_2.write(w)?;
2479 self.bitcoin_key_1.write(w)?;
2480 self.bitcoin_key_2.write(w)?;
2481 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
2486 impl Readable for UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2487 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2489 features: Readable::read(r)?,
2490 chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
2491 short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
2492 node_id_1: Readable::read(r)?,
2493 node_id_2: Readable::read(r)?,
2494 bitcoin_key_1: Readable::read(r)?,
2495 bitcoin_key_2: Readable::read(r)?,
2496 excess_data: read_to_end(r)?,
2501 impl_writeable!(ChannelAnnouncement, {
2504 bitcoin_signature_1,
2505 bitcoin_signature_2,
2509 impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2510 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2511 // `message_flags` used to indicate presence of `htlc_maximum_msat`, but was deprecated in the spec.
2512 const MESSAGE_FLAGS: u8 = 1;
2513 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
2514 self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
2515 self.timestamp.write(w)?;
2516 let all_flags = self.flags as u16 | ((MESSAGE_FLAGS as u16) << 8);
2517 all_flags.write(w)?;
2518 self.cltv_expiry_delta.write(w)?;
2519 self.htlc_minimum_msat.write(w)?;
2520 self.fee_base_msat.write(w)?;
2521 self.fee_proportional_millionths.write(w)?;
2522 self.htlc_maximum_msat.write(w)?;
2523 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
2528 impl Readable for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2529 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2531 chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
2532 short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
2533 timestamp: Readable::read(r)?,
2535 let flags: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
2536 // Note: we ignore the `message_flags` for now, since it was deprecated by the spec.
2539 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(r)?,
2540 htlc_minimum_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
2541 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
2542 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(r)?,
2543 htlc_maximum_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
2544 excess_data: read_to_end(r)?,
2549 impl_writeable!(ChannelUpdate, {
2554 impl Writeable for ErrorMessage {
2555 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2556 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
2557 (self.data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
2558 w.write_all(self.data.as_bytes())?;
2563 impl Readable for ErrorMessage {
2564 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2566 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
2568 let sz: usize = <u16 as Readable>::read(r)? as usize;
2569 let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(sz);
2571 r.read_exact(&mut data)?;
2572 match String::from_utf8(data) {
2574 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2581 impl Writeable for WarningMessage {
2582 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2583 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
2584 (self.data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
2585 w.write_all(self.data.as_bytes())?;
2590 impl Readable for WarningMessage {
2591 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2593 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
2595 let sz: usize = <u16 as Readable>::read(r)? as usize;
2596 let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(sz);
2598 r.read_exact(&mut data)?;
2599 match String::from_utf8(data) {
2601 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2608 impl Writeable for UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2609 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2610 self.features.write(w)?;
2611 self.timestamp.write(w)?;
2612 self.node_id.write(w)?;
2613 w.write_all(&self.rgb)?;
2614 self.alias.write(w)?;
2616 let mut addr_len = 0;
2617 for addr in self.addresses.iter() {
2618 addr_len += 1 + addr.len();
2620 (addr_len + self.excess_address_data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
2621 for addr in self.addresses.iter() {
2624 w.write_all(&self.excess_address_data[..])?;
2625 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
2630 impl Readable for UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2631 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2632 let features: NodeFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
2633 let timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
2634 let node_id: NodeId = Readable::read(r)?;
2635 let mut rgb = [0; 3];
2636 r.read_exact(&mut rgb)?;
2637 let alias: NodeAlias = Readable::read(r)?;
2639 let addr_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
2640 let mut addresses: Vec<SocketAddress> = Vec::new();
2641 let mut addr_readpos = 0;
2642 let mut excess = false;
2643 let mut excess_byte = 0;
2645 if addr_len <= addr_readpos { break; }
2646 match Readable::read(r) {
2648 if addr_len < addr_readpos + 1 + addr.len() {
2649 return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor);
2651 addr_readpos += (1 + addr.len()) as u16;
2652 addresses.push(addr);
2654 Ok(Err(unknown_descriptor)) => {
2656 excess_byte = unknown_descriptor;
2659 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor),
2660 Err(e) => return Err(e),
2664 let mut excess_data = vec![];
2665 let excess_address_data = if addr_readpos < addr_len {
2666 let mut excess_address_data = vec![0; (addr_len - addr_readpos) as usize];
2667 r.read_exact(&mut excess_address_data[if excess { 1 } else { 0 }..])?;
2669 excess_address_data[0] = excess_byte;
2674 excess_data.push(excess_byte);
2678 excess_data.extend(read_to_end(r)?.iter());
2679 Ok(UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2686 excess_address_data,
2692 impl_writeable!(NodeAnnouncement, {
2697 impl Readable for QueryShortChannelIds {
2698 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2699 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(r)?;
2701 let encoding_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
2702 let encoding_type: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
2704 // Must be encoding_type=0 uncompressed serialization. We do not
2705 // support encoding_type=1 zlib serialization.
2706 if encoding_type != EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8 {
2707 return Err(DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression);
2710 // We expect the encoding_len to always includes the 1-byte
2711 // encoding_type and that short_channel_ids are 8-bytes each
2712 if encoding_len == 0 || (encoding_len - 1) % 8 != 0 {
2713 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2716 // Read short_channel_ids (8-bytes each), for the u16 encoding_len
2717 // less the 1-byte encoding_type
2718 let short_channel_id_count: u16 = (encoding_len - 1)/8;
2719 let mut short_channel_ids = Vec::with_capacity(short_channel_id_count as usize);
2720 for _ in 0..short_channel_id_count {
2721 short_channel_ids.push(Readable::read(r)?);
2724 Ok(QueryShortChannelIds {
2731 impl Writeable for QueryShortChannelIds {
2732 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2733 // Calculated from 1-byte encoding_type plus 8-bytes per short_channel_id
2734 let encoding_len: u16 = 1 + self.short_channel_ids.len() as u16 * 8;
2736 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
2737 encoding_len.write(w)?;
2739 // We only support type=0 uncompressed serialization
2740 (EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8).write(w)?;
2742 for scid in self.short_channel_ids.iter() {
2750 impl_writeable_msg!(ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd, {
2755 impl QueryChannelRange {
2756 /// Calculates the overflow safe ending block height for the query.
2758 /// Overflow returns `0xffffffff`, otherwise returns `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`.
2759 pub fn end_blocknum(&self) -> u32 {
2760 match self.first_blocknum.checked_add(self.number_of_blocks) {
2761 Some(block) => block,
2762 None => u32::max_value(),
2767 impl_writeable_msg!(QueryChannelRange, {
2773 impl Readable for ReplyChannelRange {
2774 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2775 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(r)?;
2776 let first_blocknum: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
2777 let number_of_blocks: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
2778 let sync_complete: bool = Readable::read(r)?;
2780 let encoding_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
2781 let encoding_type: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
2783 // Must be encoding_type=0 uncompressed serialization. We do not
2784 // support encoding_type=1 zlib serialization.
2785 if encoding_type != EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8 {
2786 return Err(DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression);
2789 // We expect the encoding_len to always includes the 1-byte
2790 // encoding_type and that short_channel_ids are 8-bytes each
2791 if encoding_len == 0 || (encoding_len - 1) % 8 != 0 {
2792 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2795 // Read short_channel_ids (8-bytes each), for the u16 encoding_len
2796 // less the 1-byte encoding_type
2797 let short_channel_id_count: u16 = (encoding_len - 1)/8;
2798 let mut short_channel_ids = Vec::with_capacity(short_channel_id_count as usize);
2799 for _ in 0..short_channel_id_count {
2800 short_channel_ids.push(Readable::read(r)?);
2803 Ok(ReplyChannelRange {
2813 impl Writeable for ReplyChannelRange {
2814 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2815 let encoding_len: u16 = 1 + self.short_channel_ids.len() as u16 * 8;
2816 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
2817 self.first_blocknum.write(w)?;
2818 self.number_of_blocks.write(w)?;
2819 self.sync_complete.write(w)?;
2821 encoding_len.write(w)?;
2822 (EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8).write(w)?;
2823 for scid in self.short_channel_ids.iter() {
2831 impl_writeable_msg!(GossipTimestampFilter, {
2839 use std::convert::TryFrom;
2840 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxIn, ScriptBuf, Sequence, Witness, TxOut};
2841 use hex::DisplayHex;
2842 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
2843 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
2844 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
2845 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, FinalOnionHopData, OnionErrorPacket};
2846 use crate::ln::msgs::SocketAddress;
2847 use crate::routing::gossip::{NodeAlias, NodeId};
2848 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, ReadableArgs, Hostname, TransactionU16LenLimited};
2849 use crate::util::test_utils;
2851 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2852 use bitcoin::address::Address;
2853 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2854 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
2855 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
2856 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2857 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
2858 use bitcoin::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
2860 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2861 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2863 use crate::io::{self, Cursor};
2864 use crate::prelude::*;
2865 use core::str::FromStr;
2866 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2868 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2869 use std::net::{Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr, SocketAddr, SocketAddrV4, SocketAddrV6, ToSocketAddrs};
2870 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
2871 use crate::ln::msgs::SocketAddressParseError;
2874 fn encoding_channel_reestablish() {
2876 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2877 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
2880 let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
2881 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]),
2882 next_local_commitment_number: 3,
2883 next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
2884 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [9;32],
2885 my_current_per_commitment_point: public_key,
2886 next_funding_txid: None,
2889 let encoded_value = cr.encode();
2893 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, // channel_id
2894 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, // next_local_commitment_number
2895 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, // next_remote_commitment_number
2896 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, // your_last_per_commitment_secret
2897 3, 27, 132, 197, 86, 123, 18, 100, 64, 153, 93, 62, 213, 170, 186, 5, 101, 215, 30, 24, 52, 96, 72, 25, 255, 156, 23, 245, 233, 213, 221, 7, 143, // my_current_per_commitment_point
2903 fn encoding_channel_reestablish_with_next_funding_txid() {
2905 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2906 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
2909 let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
2910 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]),
2911 next_local_commitment_number: 3,
2912 next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
2913 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [9;32],
2914 my_current_per_commitment_point: public_key,
2915 next_funding_txid: Some(Txid::from_raw_hash(bitcoin::hashes::Hash::from_slice(&[
2916 48, 167, 250, 69, 152, 48, 103, 172, 164, 99, 59, 19, 23, 11, 92, 84, 15, 80, 4, 12, 98, 82, 75, 31, 201, 11, 91, 23, 98, 23, 53, 124,
2920 let encoded_value = cr.encode();
2924 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, // channel_id
2925 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, // next_local_commitment_number
2926 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, // next_remote_commitment_number
2927 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, // your_last_per_commitment_secret
2928 3, 27, 132, 197, 86, 123, 18, 100, 64, 153, 93, 62, 213, 170, 186, 5, 101, 215, 30, 24, 52, 96, 72, 25, 255, 156, 23, 245, 233, 213, 221, 7, 143, // my_current_per_commitment_point
2929 0, // Type (next_funding_txid)
2931 48, 167, 250, 69, 152, 48, 103, 172, 164, 99, 59, 19, 23, 11, 92, 84, 15, 80, 4, 12, 98, 82, 75, 31, 201, 11, 91, 23, 98, 23, 53, 124, // Value
2936 macro_rules! get_keys_from {
2937 ($slice: expr, $secp_ctx: expr) => {
2939 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($slice).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2940 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &privkey);
2946 macro_rules! get_sig_on {
2947 ($privkey: expr, $ctx: expr, $string: expr) => {
2949 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&$string.into_bytes()[..]).unwrap();
2950 $ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &$privkey)
2956 fn encoding_announcement_signatures() {
2957 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2958 let (privkey, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2959 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2960 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("02020202020202020202020202020202"));
2961 let announcement_signatures = msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2962 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]),
2963 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2964 node_signature: sig_1,
2965 bitcoin_signature: sig_2,
2968 let encoded_value = announcement_signatures.encode();
2969 assert_eq!(encoded_value, <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("040000000000000005000000000000000600000000000000070000000000000000083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073acf9953cef4700860f5967838eba2bae89288ad188ebf8b20bf995c3ea53a26df1876d0a3a0e13172ba286a673140190c02ba9da60a2e43a745188c8a83c7f3ef").unwrap());
2972 fn do_encoding_channel_announcement(unknown_features_bits: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2973 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2974 let (privkey_1, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2975 let (privkey_2, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2976 let (privkey_3, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2977 let (privkey_4, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2978 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2979 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey_2, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2980 let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2981 let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2982 let mut features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
2983 if unknown_features_bits {
2984 features = ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF]);
2986 let unsigned_channel_announcement = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2988 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
2989 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2990 node_id_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_1),
2991 node_id_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_2),
2992 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_3),
2993 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_4),
2994 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![10, 0, 0, 20, 0, 0, 30, 0, 0, 40] } else { Vec::new() },
2996 let channel_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2997 node_signature_1: sig_1,
2998 node_signature_2: sig_2,
2999 bitcoin_signature_1: sig_3,
3000 bitcoin_signature_2: sig_4,
3001 contents: unsigned_channel_announcement,
3003 let encoded_value = channel_announcement.encode();
3004 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("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").unwrap();
3005 if unknown_features_bits {
3006 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0002ffff").unwrap());
3008 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000").unwrap());
3010 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap());
3011 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00083a840000034d031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f024d4b6cd1361032ca9bd2aeb9d900aa4d45d9ead80ac9423374c451a7254d076602531fe6068134503d2723133227c867ac8fa6c83c537e9a44c3c5bdbdcb1fe33703462779ad4aad39514614751a71085f2f10e1c7a593e4e030efb5b8721ce55b0b").unwrap());
3013 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0a00001400001e000028").unwrap());
3015 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3019 fn encoding_channel_announcement() {
3020 do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, false);
3021 do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, true);
3022 do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, false);
3023 do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, true);
3026 fn do_encoding_node_announcement(unknown_features_bits: bool, ipv4: bool, ipv6: bool, onionv2: bool, onionv3: bool, hostname: bool, excess_address_data: bool, excess_data: bool) {
3027 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3028 let (privkey_1, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3029 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
3030 let features = if unknown_features_bits {
3031 NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF])
3033 // Set to some features we may support
3034 NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![2 | 1 << 5])
3036 let mut addresses = Vec::new();
3038 addresses.push(SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 {
3039 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252],
3044 addresses.push(SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 {
3045 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240],
3050 addresses.push(msgs::SocketAddress::OnionV2(
3051 [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 38, 7]
3055 addresses.push(msgs::SocketAddress::OnionV3 {
3056 ed25519_pubkey: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240, 239, 238, 237, 236, 235, 234, 233, 232, 231, 230, 229, 228, 227, 226, 225, 224],
3063 addresses.push(SocketAddress::Hostname {
3064 hostname: Hostname::try_from(String::from("host")).unwrap(),
3068 let mut addr_len = 0;
3069 for addr in &addresses {
3070 addr_len += addr.len() + 1;
3072 let unsigned_node_announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
3074 timestamp: 20190119,
3075 node_id: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_1),
3077 alias: NodeAlias([16;32]),
3079 excess_address_data: if excess_address_data { vec![33, 108, 40, 11, 83, 149, 162, 84, 110, 126, 75, 38, 99, 224, 79, 129, 22, 34, 241, 90, 79, 146, 232, 58, 162, 233, 43, 162, 165, 115, 193, 57, 20, 44, 84, 174, 99, 7, 42, 30, 193, 238, 125, 192, 192, 75, 222, 92, 132, 120, 6, 23, 42, 160, 92, 146, 194, 42, 232, 227, 8, 209, 210, 105] } else { Vec::new() },
3080 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![59, 18, 204, 25, 92, 224, 162, 209, 189, 166, 168, 139, 239, 161, 159, 160, 127, 81, 202, 167, 92, 232, 56, 55, 242, 137, 101, 96, 11, 138, 172, 171, 8, 85, 255, 176, 231, 65, 236, 95, 124, 65, 66, 30, 152, 41, 169, 212, 134, 17, 200, 200, 49, 247, 27, 229, 234, 115, 230, 101, 148, 151, 127, 253] } else { Vec::new() },
3082 addr_len += unsigned_node_announcement.excess_address_data.len() as u16;
3083 let node_announcement = msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
3085 contents: unsigned_node_announcement,
3087 let encoded_value = node_announcement.encode();
3088 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
3089 if unknown_features_bits {
3090 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0002ffff").unwrap());
3092 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000122").unwrap());
3094 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("013413a7031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f2020201010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010").unwrap());
3095 target_value.append(&mut vec![(addr_len >> 8) as u8, addr_len as u8]);
3097 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("01fffefdfc2607").unwrap());
3100 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f02607").unwrap());
3103 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("03fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f62607").unwrap());
3106 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("04fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0efeeedecebeae9e8e7e6e5e4e3e2e1e00020102607").unwrap());
3109 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0504686f73742607").unwrap());
3111 if excess_address_data {
3112 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f92e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d269").unwrap());
3115 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
3117 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3121 fn encoding_node_announcement() {
3122 do_encoding_node_announcement(true, true, true, true, true, true, true, true);
3123 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false);
3124 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, true, false, false, false, false, false, false);
3125 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, true, false, false, false, false, false);
3126 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, true, false, false, false, false);
3127 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, true, false, false, false);
3128 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, true, false, false);
3129 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, false, true, false);
3130 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, true, false, true, false, false, true, false);
3131 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, true, false, true, false, false, false);
3134 fn do_encoding_channel_update(direction: bool, disable: bool, excess_data: bool) {
3135 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3136 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3137 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
3138 let unsigned_channel_update = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3139 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
3140 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
3141 timestamp: 20190119,
3142 flags: if direction { 1 } else { 0 } | if disable { 1 << 1 } else { 0 },
3143 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
3144 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
3145 htlc_maximum_msat: 131355275467161,
3146 fee_base_msat: 10000,
3147 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
3148 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![0, 0, 0, 0, 59, 154, 202, 0] } else { Vec::new() }
3150 let channel_update = msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3152 contents: unsigned_channel_update
3154 let encoded_value = channel_update.encode();
3155 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
3156 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap());
3157 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00083a840000034d013413a7").unwrap());
3158 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("01").unwrap());
3159 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00").unwrap());
3161 let flag = target_value.last_mut().unwrap();
3165 let flag = target_value.last_mut().unwrap();
3166 *flag = *flag | 1 << 1;
3168 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap());
3169 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000777788889999").unwrap());
3171 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000000003b9aca00").unwrap());
3173 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3177 fn encoding_channel_update() {
3178 do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, false);
3179 do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, true);
3180 do_encoding_channel_update(true, false, false);
3181 do_encoding_channel_update(true, false, true);
3182 do_encoding_channel_update(false, true, false);
3183 do_encoding_channel_update(false, true, true);
3184 do_encoding_channel_update(true, true, false);
3185 do_encoding_channel_update(true, true, true);
3188 fn do_encoding_open_channel(random_bit: bool, shutdown: bool, incl_chan_type: bool) {
3189 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3190 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3191 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
3192 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
3193 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
3194 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
3195 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
3196 let open_channel = msgs::OpenChannel {
3197 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
3198 temporary_channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3199 funding_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
3200 push_msat: 2536655962884945560,
3201 dust_limit_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
3202 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 8517154655701053848,
3203 channel_reserve_satoshis: 8665828695742877976,
3204 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
3205 feerate_per_kw: 821716,
3206 to_self_delay: 49340,
3207 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
3208 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
3209 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
3210 payment_point: pubkey_3,
3211 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
3212 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
3213 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
3214 channel_flags: if random_bit { 1 << 5 } else { 0 },
3215 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { Some(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { None },
3216 channel_type: if incl_chan_type { Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::empty()) } else { None },
3218 let encoded_value = open_channel.encode();
3219 let mut target_value = Vec::new();
3220 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap());
3221 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("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").unwrap());
3223 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("20").unwrap());
3225 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00").unwrap());
3228 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
3231 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0100").unwrap());
3233 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3237 fn encoding_open_channel() {
3238 do_encoding_open_channel(false, false, false);
3239 do_encoding_open_channel(false, false, true);
3240 do_encoding_open_channel(false, true, false);
3241 do_encoding_open_channel(false, true, true);
3242 do_encoding_open_channel(true, false, false);
3243 do_encoding_open_channel(true, false, true);
3244 do_encoding_open_channel(true, true, false);
3245 do_encoding_open_channel(true, true, true);
3248 fn do_encoding_open_channelv2(random_bit: bool, shutdown: bool, incl_chan_type: bool, require_confirmed_inputs: bool) {
3249 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3250 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3251 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
3252 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
3253 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
3254 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
3255 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
3256 let (_, pubkey_7) = get_keys_from!("0707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707", secp_ctx);
3257 let open_channelv2 = msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
3258 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
3259 temporary_channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3260 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: 821716,
3261 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: 821716,
3262 funding_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
3263 dust_limit_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
3264 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 8517154655701053848,
3265 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
3266 to_self_delay: 49340,
3267 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
3268 locktime: 305419896,
3269 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
3270 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
3271 payment_basepoint: pubkey_3,
3272 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
3273 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
3274 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
3275 second_per_commitment_point: pubkey_7,
3276 channel_flags: if random_bit { 1 << 5 } else { 0 },
3277 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { Some(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { None },
3278 channel_type: if incl_chan_type { Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::empty()) } else { None },
3279 require_confirmed_inputs: if require_confirmed_inputs { Some(()) } else { None },
3281 let encoded_value = open_channelv2.encode();
3282 let mut target_value = Vec::new();
3283 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap());
3284 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap());
3285 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000c89d4").unwrap());
3286 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000c89d4").unwrap());
3287 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1234567890123456").unwrap());
3288 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3214466870114476").unwrap());
3289 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7633030896203198").unwrap());
3290 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00083a840000034d").unwrap());
3291 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c0bc").unwrap());
3292 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c0bc").unwrap());
3293 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("12345678").unwrap());
3294 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap());
3295 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("024d4b6cd1361032ca9bd2aeb9d900aa4d45d9ead80ac9423374c451a7254d0766").unwrap());
3296 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02531fe6068134503d2723133227c867ac8fa6c83c537e9a44c3c5bdbdcb1fe337").unwrap());
3297 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("03462779ad4aad39514614751a71085f2f10e1c7a593e4e030efb5b8721ce55b0b").unwrap());
3298 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0362c0a046dacce86ddd0343c6d3c7c79c2208ba0d9c9cf24a6d046d21d21f90f7").unwrap());
3299 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("03f006a18d5653c4edf5391ff23a61f03ff83d237e880ee61187fa9f379a028e0a").unwrap());
3300 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02989c0b76cb563971fdc9bef31ec06c3560f3249d6ee9e5d83c57625596e05f6f").unwrap());
3303 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("20").unwrap());
3305 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00").unwrap());
3308 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001b").unwrap()); // Type 0 + Length 27
3309 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
3312 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0100").unwrap());
3314 if require_confirmed_inputs {
3315 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0200").unwrap());
3317 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3321 fn encoding_open_channelv2() {
3322 do_encoding_open_channelv2(false, false, false, false);
3323 do_encoding_open_channelv2(false, false, false, true);
3324 do_encoding_open_channelv2(false, false, true, false);
3325 do_encoding_open_channelv2(false, false, true, true);
3326 do_encoding_open_channelv2(false, true, false, false);
3327 do_encoding_open_channelv2(false, true, false, true);
3328 do_encoding_open_channelv2(false, true, true, false);
3329 do_encoding_open_channelv2(false, true, true, true);
3330 do_encoding_open_channelv2(true, false, false, false);
3331 do_encoding_open_channelv2(true, false, false, true);
3332 do_encoding_open_channelv2(true, false, true, false);
3333 do_encoding_open_channelv2(true, false, true, true);
3334 do_encoding_open_channelv2(true, true, false, false);
3335 do_encoding_open_channelv2(true, true, false, true);
3336 do_encoding_open_channelv2(true, true, true, false);
3337 do_encoding_open_channelv2(true, true, true, true);
3340 fn do_encoding_accept_channel(shutdown: bool) {
3341 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3342 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3343 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
3344 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
3345 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
3346 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
3347 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
3348 let accept_channel = msgs::AcceptChannel {
3349 temporary_channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3350 dust_limit_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
3351 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 2536655962884945560,
3352 channel_reserve_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
3353 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
3354 minimum_depth: 821716,
3355 to_self_delay: 49340,
3356 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
3357 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
3358 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
3359 payment_point: pubkey_3,
3360 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
3361 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
3362 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
3363 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { Some(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { None },
3366 next_local_nonce: None,
3368 let encoded_value = accept_channel.encode();
3369 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("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").unwrap();
3371 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
3373 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3377 fn encoding_accept_channel() {
3378 do_encoding_accept_channel(false);
3379 do_encoding_accept_channel(true);
3382 fn do_encoding_accept_channelv2(shutdown: bool) {
3383 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3384 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3385 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
3386 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
3387 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
3388 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
3389 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
3390 let (_, pubkey_7) = get_keys_from!("0707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707070707", secp_ctx);
3391 let accept_channelv2 = msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
3392 temporary_channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3393 funding_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
3394 dust_limit_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
3395 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 2536655962884945560,
3396 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
3397 minimum_depth: 821716,
3398 to_self_delay: 49340,
3399 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
3400 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
3401 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
3402 payment_basepoint: pubkey_3,
3403 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
3404 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
3405 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
3406 second_per_commitment_point: pubkey_7,
3407 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { Some(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { None },
3409 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
3411 let encoded_value = accept_channelv2.encode();
3412 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap(); // temporary_channel_id
3413 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1234567890123456").unwrap()); // funding_satoshis
3414 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1234567890123456").unwrap()); // dust_limit_satoshis
3415 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2334032891223698").unwrap()); // max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3416 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00083a840000034d").unwrap()); // htlc_minimum_msat
3417 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000c89d4").unwrap()); // minimum_depth
3418 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c0bc").unwrap()); // to_self_delay
3419 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c0bc").unwrap()); // max_accepted_htlcs
3420 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap()); // funding_pubkey
3421 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("024d4b6cd1361032ca9bd2aeb9d900aa4d45d9ead80ac9423374c451a7254d0766").unwrap()); // revocation_basepoint
3422 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02531fe6068134503d2723133227c867ac8fa6c83c537e9a44c3c5bdbdcb1fe337").unwrap()); // payment_basepoint
3423 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("03462779ad4aad39514614751a71085f2f10e1c7a593e4e030efb5b8721ce55b0b").unwrap()); // delayed_payment_basepoint
3424 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0362c0a046dacce86ddd0343c6d3c7c79c2208ba0d9c9cf24a6d046d21d21f90f7").unwrap()); // htlc_basepoint
3425 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("03f006a18d5653c4edf5391ff23a61f03ff83d237e880ee61187fa9f379a028e0a").unwrap()); // first_per_commitment_point
3426 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02989c0b76cb563971fdc9bef31ec06c3560f3249d6ee9e5d83c57625596e05f6f").unwrap()); // second_per_commitment_point
3428 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001b").unwrap()); // Type 0 + Length 27
3429 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
3431 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3435 fn encoding_accept_channelv2() {
3436 do_encoding_accept_channelv2(false);
3437 do_encoding_accept_channelv2(true);
3441 fn encoding_funding_created() {
3442 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3443 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3444 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
3445 let funding_created = msgs::FundingCreated {
3446 temporary_channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3447 funding_txid: Txid::from_str("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap(),
3448 funding_output_index: 255,
3451 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
3453 next_local_nonce: None,
3455 let encoded_value = funding_created.encode();
3456 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202026e96fe9f8b0ddcd729ba03cfafa5a27b050b39d354dd980814268dfa9a44d4c200ffd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
3457 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3461 fn encoding_funding_signed() {
3462 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3463 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3464 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
3465 let funding_signed = msgs::FundingSigned {
3466 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3469 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
3471 let encoded_value = funding_signed.encode();
3472 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
3473 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3477 fn encoding_channel_ready() {
3478 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3479 let (_, pubkey_1,) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3480 let channel_ready = msgs::ChannelReady {
3481 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3482 next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
3483 short_channel_id_alias: None,
3485 let encoded_value = channel_ready.encode();
3486 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap();
3487 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3491 fn encoding_splice() {
3492 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3493 let (_, pubkey_1,) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3494 let splice = msgs::Splice {
3495 chain_hash: ChainHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
3496 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3497 relative_satoshis: 123456,
3498 funding_feerate_perkw: 2000,
3500 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
3502 let encoded_value = splice.encode();
3503 assert_eq!(encoded_value.as_hex().to_string(), "02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202026fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000000000000001e240000007d000000000031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f");
3507 fn encoding_stfu() {
3508 let stfu = msgs::Stfu {
3509 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3512 let encoded_value = stfu.encode();
3513 assert_eq!(encoded_value.as_hex().to_string(), "020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020201");
3517 fn encoding_splice_ack() {
3518 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3519 let (_, pubkey_1,) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3520 let splice = msgs::SpliceAck {
3521 chain_hash: ChainHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
3522 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3523 relative_satoshis: 123456,
3524 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
3526 let encoded_value = splice.encode();
3527 assert_eq!(encoded_value.as_hex().to_string(), "02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202026fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000000000000001e240031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f");
3531 fn encoding_splice_locked() {
3532 let splice = msgs::SpliceLocked {
3533 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3535 let encoded_value = splice.encode();
3536 assert_eq!(encoded_value.as_hex().to_string(), "0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202");
3540 fn encoding_tx_add_input() {
3541 let tx_add_input = msgs::TxAddInput {
3542 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3543 serial_id: 4886718345,
3544 prevtx: TransactionU16LenLimited::new(Transaction {
3546 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
3548 previous_output: OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_str("305bab643ee297b8b6b76b320792c8223d55082122cb606bf89382146ced9c77").unwrap(), index: 2 }.into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
3549 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
3550 sequence: Sequence(0xfffffffd),
3551 witness: Witness::from_slice(&vec![
3552 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("304402206af85b7dd67450ad12c979302fac49dfacbc6a8620f49c5da2b5721cf9565ca502207002b32fed9ce1bf095f57aeb10c36928ac60b12e723d97d2964a54640ceefa701").unwrap(),
3553 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0301ab7dc16488303549bfcdd80f6ae5ee4c20bf97ab5410bbd6b1bfa85dcd6944").unwrap()]),
3558 script_pubkey: Address::from_str("bc1qzlffunw52jav8vwdu5x3jfk6sr8u22rmq3xzw2").unwrap().payload.script_pubkey(),
3562 script_pubkey: Address::from_str("bc1qxmk834g5marzm227dgqvynd23y2nvt2ztwcw2z").unwrap().payload.script_pubkey(),
3566 prevtx_out: 305419896,
3567 sequence: 305419896,
3569 let encoded_value = tx_add_input.encode();
3570 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("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").unwrap();
3571 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3575 fn encoding_tx_add_output() {
3576 let tx_add_output = msgs::TxAddOutput {
3577 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3578 serial_id: 4886718345,
3580 script: Address::from_str("bc1qxmk834g5marzm227dgqvynd23y2nvt2ztwcw2z").unwrap().payload.script_pubkey(),
3582 let encoded_value = tx_add_output.encode();
3583 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000000012345678900000001234567890016001436ec78d514df462da95e6a00c24daa8915362d42").unwrap();
3584 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3588 fn encoding_tx_remove_input() {
3589 let tx_remove_input = msgs::TxRemoveInput {
3590 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3591 serial_id: 4886718345,
3593 let encoded_value = tx_remove_input.encode();
3594 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020000000123456789").unwrap();
3595 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3599 fn encoding_tx_remove_output() {
3600 let tx_remove_output = msgs::TxRemoveOutput {
3601 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3602 serial_id: 4886718345,
3604 let encoded_value = tx_remove_output.encode();
3605 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020000000123456789").unwrap();
3606 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3610 fn encoding_tx_complete() {
3611 let tx_complete = msgs::TxComplete {
3612 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3614 let encoded_value = tx_complete.encode();
3615 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap();
3616 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3620 fn encoding_tx_signatures() {
3621 let tx_signatures = msgs::TxSignatures {
3622 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3623 tx_hash: Txid::from_str("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap(),
3625 Witness::from_slice(&vec![
3626 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("304402206af85b7dd67450ad12c979302fac49dfacbc6a8620f49c5da2b5721cf9565ca502207002b32fed9ce1bf095f57aeb10c36928ac60b12e723d97d2964a54640ceefa701").unwrap(),
3627 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0301ab7dc16488303549bfcdd80f6ae5ee4c20bf97ab5410bbd6b1bfa85dcd6944").unwrap()]),
3628 Witness::from_slice(&vec![
3629 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3045022100ee00dbf4a862463e837d7c08509de814d620e4d9830fa84818713e0fa358f145022021c3c7060c4d53fe84fd165d60208451108a778c13b92ca4c6bad439236126cc01").unwrap(),
3630 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("028fbbf0b16f5ba5bcb5dd37cd4047ce6f726a21c06682f9ec2f52b057de1dbdb5").unwrap()]),
3633 let encoded_value = tx_signatures.encode();
3634 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap(); // channel_id
3635 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("6e96fe9f8b0ddcd729ba03cfafa5a27b050b39d354dd980814268dfa9a44d4c2").unwrap()); // tx_hash (sha256) (big endian byte order)
3636 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0002").unwrap()); // num_witnesses (u16)
3638 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("006b").unwrap()); // len of witness_data
3639 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02").unwrap()); // num_witness_elements (VarInt)
3640 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("47").unwrap()); // len of witness element data (VarInt)
3641 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("304402206af85b7dd67450ad12c979302fac49dfacbc6a8620f49c5da2b5721cf9565ca502207002b32fed9ce1bf095f57aeb10c36928ac60b12e723d97d2964a54640ceefa701").unwrap());
3642 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("21").unwrap()); // len of witness element data (VarInt)
3643 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0301ab7dc16488303549bfcdd80f6ae5ee4c20bf97ab5410bbd6b1bfa85dcd6944").unwrap());
3645 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("006c").unwrap()); // len of witness_data
3646 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02").unwrap()); // num_witness_elements (VarInt)
3647 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("48").unwrap()); // len of witness element data (VarInt)
3648 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3045022100ee00dbf4a862463e837d7c08509de814d620e4d9830fa84818713e0fa358f145022021c3c7060c4d53fe84fd165d60208451108a778c13b92ca4c6bad439236126cc01").unwrap());
3649 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("21").unwrap()); // len of witness element data (VarInt)
3650 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("028fbbf0b16f5ba5bcb5dd37cd4047ce6f726a21c06682f9ec2f52b057de1dbdb5").unwrap());
3651 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3654 fn do_encoding_tx_init_rbf(funding_value_with_hex_target: Option<(i64, &str)>) {
3655 let tx_init_rbf = msgs::TxInitRbf {
3656 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3657 locktime: 305419896,
3658 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: 20190119,
3659 funding_output_contribution: if let Some((value, _)) = funding_value_with_hex_target { Some(value) } else { None },
3661 let encoded_value = tx_init_rbf.encode();
3662 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap(); // channel_id
3663 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("12345678").unwrap()); // locktime
3664 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("013413a7").unwrap()); // feerate_sat_per_1000_weight
3665 if let Some((_, target)) = funding_value_with_hex_target {
3666 target_value.push(0x00); // Type
3667 target_value.push(target.len() as u8 / 2); // Length
3668 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(target).unwrap()); // Value (i64)
3670 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3674 fn encoding_tx_init_rbf() {
3675 do_encoding_tx_init_rbf(Some((1311768467284833366, "1234567890123456")));
3676 do_encoding_tx_init_rbf(Some((13117684672, "000000030DDFFBC0")));
3677 do_encoding_tx_init_rbf(None);
3680 fn do_encoding_tx_ack_rbf(funding_value_with_hex_target: Option<(i64, &str)>) {
3681 let tx_ack_rbf = msgs::TxAckRbf {
3682 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3683 funding_output_contribution: if let Some((value, _)) = funding_value_with_hex_target { Some(value) } else { None },
3685 let encoded_value = tx_ack_rbf.encode();
3686 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap();
3687 if let Some((_, target)) = funding_value_with_hex_target {
3688 target_value.push(0x00); // Type
3689 target_value.push(target.len() as u8 / 2); // Length
3690 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(target).unwrap()); // Value (i64)
3692 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3696 fn encoding_tx_ack_rbf() {
3697 do_encoding_tx_ack_rbf(Some((1311768467284833366, "1234567890123456")));
3698 do_encoding_tx_ack_rbf(Some((13117684672, "000000030DDFFBC0")));
3699 do_encoding_tx_ack_rbf(None);
3703 fn encoding_tx_abort() {
3704 let tx_abort = msgs::TxAbort {
3705 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3706 data: <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("54686520717569636B2062726F776E20666F78206A756D7073206F76657220746865206C617A7920646F672E").unwrap(),
3708 let encoded_value = tx_abort.encode();
3709 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202002C54686520717569636B2062726F776E20666F78206A756D7073206F76657220746865206C617A7920646F672E").unwrap();
3710 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3713 fn do_encoding_shutdown(script_type: u8) {
3714 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3715 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3716 let script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::OP_TRUE).into_script();
3717 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
3718 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3720 if script_type == 1 { Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() }
3721 else if script_type == 2 { Address::p2sh(&script, Network::Testnet).unwrap().script_pubkey() }
3722 else if script_type == 3 { Address::p2wpkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).unwrap().script_pubkey() }
3723 else { Address::p2wsh(&script, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() },
3725 let encoded_value = shutdown.encode();
3726 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap();
3727 if script_type == 1 {
3728 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
3729 } else if script_type == 2 {
3730 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0017a914da1745e9b549bd0bfa1a569971c77eba30cd5a4b87").unwrap());
3731 } else if script_type == 3 {
3732 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0016001479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b235983").unwrap());
3733 } else if script_type == 4 {
3734 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("002200204ae81572f06e1b88fd5ced7a1a000945432e83e1551e6f721ee9c00b8cc33260").unwrap());
3736 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3740 fn encoding_shutdown() {
3741 do_encoding_shutdown(1);
3742 do_encoding_shutdown(2);
3743 do_encoding_shutdown(3);
3744 do_encoding_shutdown(4);
3748 fn encoding_closing_signed() {
3749 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3750 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3751 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
3752 let closing_signed = msgs::ClosingSigned {
3753 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3754 fee_satoshis: 2316138423780173,
3758 let encoded_value = closing_signed.encode();
3759 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
3760 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3761 assert_eq!(msgs::ClosingSigned::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value)).unwrap(), closing_signed);
3763 let closing_signed_with_range = msgs::ClosingSigned {
3764 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3765 fee_satoshis: 2316138423780173,
3767 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
3768 min_fee_satoshis: 0xdeadbeef,
3769 max_fee_satoshis: 0x1badcafe01234567,
3772 let encoded_value_with_range = closing_signed_with_range.encode();
3773 let target_value_with_range = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a011000000000deadbeef1badcafe01234567").unwrap();
3774 assert_eq!(encoded_value_with_range, target_value_with_range);
3775 assert_eq!(msgs::ClosingSigned::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value_with_range)).unwrap(),
3776 closing_signed_with_range);
3780 fn encoding_update_add_htlc() {
3781 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3782 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3783 let onion_routing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
3785 public_key: Ok(pubkey_1),
3786 hop_data: [1; 20*65],
3789 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3790 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3791 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
3792 amount_msat: 3608586615801332854,
3793 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3794 cltv_expiry: 821716,
3795 onion_routing_packet,
3796 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
3797 blinding_point: None,
3799 let encoded_value = update_add_htlc.encode();
3800 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("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").unwrap();
3801 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3805 fn encoding_update_fulfill_htlc() {
3806 let update_fulfill_htlc = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3807 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3808 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
3809 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([1; 32]),
3811 let encoded_value = update_fulfill_htlc.encode();
3812 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap();
3813 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3817 fn encoding_update_fail_htlc() {
3818 let reason = OnionErrorPacket {
3819 data: [1; 32].to_vec(),
3821 let update_fail_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3822 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3823 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
3826 let encoded_value = update_fail_htlc.encode();
3827 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d00200101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap();
3828 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3832 fn encoding_update_fail_malformed_htlc() {
3833 let update_fail_malformed_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3834 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3835 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
3836 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
3839 let encoded_value = update_fail_malformed_htlc.encode();
3840 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010100ff").unwrap();
3841 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3844 fn do_encoding_commitment_signed(htlcs: bool) {
3845 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3846 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3847 let (privkey_2, _) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
3848 let (privkey_3, _) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
3849 let (privkey_4, _) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
3850 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
3851 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey_2, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
3852 let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
3853 let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
3854 let commitment_signed = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
3855 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3857 htlc_signatures: if htlcs { vec![sig_2, sig_3, sig_4] } else { Vec::new() },
3859 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
3861 let encoded_value = commitment_signed.encode();
3862 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
3864 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00031735b6a427e80d5fe7cd90a2f4ee08dc9c27cda7c35a4172e5d85b12c49d4232537e98f9b1f3c5e6989a8b9644e90e8918127680dbd0d4043510840fc0f1e11a216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f91e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d2692b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
3866 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000").unwrap());
3868 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3872 fn encoding_commitment_signed() {
3873 do_encoding_commitment_signed(true);
3874 do_encoding_commitment_signed(false);
3878 fn encoding_revoke_and_ack() {
3879 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3880 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
3881 let raa = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3882 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3883 per_commitment_secret: [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1],
3884 next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
3886 next_local_nonce: None,
3888 let encoded_value = raa.encode();
3889 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap();
3890 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3894 fn encoding_update_fee() {
3895 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
3896 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3897 feerate_per_kw: 20190119,
3899 let encoded_value = update_fee.encode();
3900 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202013413a7").unwrap();
3901 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3905 fn encoding_init() {
3906 let mainnet_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin);
3907 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
3908 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF]),
3909 networks: Some(vec![mainnet_hash]),
3910 remote_network_address: None,
3911 }.encode(), <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00023fff0003ffffff01206fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap());
3912 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
3913 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF]),
3915 remote_network_address: None,
3916 }.encode(), <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0001ff0001ff").unwrap());
3917 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
3918 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
3919 networks: Some(vec![mainnet_hash]),
3920 remote_network_address: None,
3921 }.encode(), <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000001206fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap());
3922 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
3923 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
3924 networks: Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&[1; 32]), ChainHash::from(&[2; 32])]),
3925 remote_network_address: None,
3926 }.encode(), <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("00000000014001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap());
3927 let init_msg = msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
3928 networks: Some(vec![mainnet_hash]),
3929 remote_network_address: Some(SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 {
3930 addr: [127, 0, 0, 1],
3934 let encoded_value = init_msg.encode();
3935 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000001206fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d61900000000000307017f00000103e8").unwrap();
3936 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3937 assert_eq!(msgs::Init::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value)).unwrap(), init_msg);
3941 fn encoding_error() {
3942 let error = msgs::ErrorMessage {
3943 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3944 data: String::from("rust-lightning"),
3946 let encoded_value = error.encode();
3947 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000e727573742d6c696768746e696e67").unwrap();
3948 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3952 fn encoding_warning() {
3953 let error = msgs::WarningMessage {
3954 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([2; 32]),
3955 data: String::from("rust-lightning"),
3957 let encoded_value = error.encode();
3958 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000e727573742d6c696768746e696e67").unwrap();
3959 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3963 fn encoding_ping() {
3964 let ping = msgs::Ping {
3968 let encoded_value = ping.encode();
3969 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0040004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap();
3970 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3974 fn encoding_pong() {
3975 let pong = msgs::Pong {
3978 let encoded_value = pong.encode();
3979 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap();
3980 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3984 fn encoding_nonfinal_onion_hop_data() {
3985 let outbound_msg = msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Forward {
3986 short_channel_id: 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea,
3987 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
3988 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
3990 let encoded_value = outbound_msg.encode();
3991 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1a02080badf00d010203040404ffffffff0608deadbeef1bad1dea").unwrap();
3992 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3994 let node_signer = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], Network::Testnet);
3995 let inbound_msg = ReadableArgs::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]), (None, &&node_signer)).unwrap();
3996 if let msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
3997 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
3999 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea);
4000 assert_eq!(amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
4001 assert_eq!(outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
4002 } else { panic!(); }
4006 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data() {
4007 let outbound_msg = msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive {
4009 payment_metadata: None,
4010 keysend_preimage: None,
4011 amt_msat: 0x0badf00d01020304,
4012 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
4013 custom_tlvs: vec![],
4015 let encoded_value = outbound_msg.encode();
4016 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1002080badf00d010203040404ffffffff").unwrap();
4017 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
4019 let node_signer = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], Network::Testnet);
4020 let inbound_msg = ReadableArgs::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]), (None, &&node_signer)).unwrap();
4021 if let msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
4022 payment_data: None, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4024 assert_eq!(amt_msat, 0x0badf00d01020304);
4025 assert_eq!(outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
4026 } else { panic!(); }
4030 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data_with_secret() {
4031 let expected_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([0x42u8; 32]);
4032 let outbound_msg = msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive {
4033 payment_data: Some(FinalOnionHopData {
4034 payment_secret: expected_payment_secret,
4035 total_msat: 0x1badca1f
4037 payment_metadata: None,
4038 keysend_preimage: None,
4039 amt_msat: 0x0badf00d01020304,
4040 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
4041 custom_tlvs: vec![],
4043 let encoded_value = outbound_msg.encode();
4044 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3602080badf00d010203040404ffffffff082442424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242421badca1f").unwrap();
4045 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
4047 let node_signer = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], Network::Testnet);
4048 let inbound_msg = ReadableArgs::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]), (None, &&node_signer)).unwrap();
4049 if let msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
4050 payment_data: Some(FinalOnionHopData {
4052 total_msat: 0x1badca1f
4054 amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4055 payment_metadata: None,
4056 keysend_preimage: None,
4059 assert_eq!(payment_secret, expected_payment_secret);
4060 assert_eq!(amt_msat, 0x0badf00d01020304);
4061 assert_eq!(outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
4062 assert_eq!(custom_tlvs, vec![]);
4063 } else { panic!(); }
4067 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data_with_bad_custom_tlvs() {
4068 // If custom TLVs have type number within the range reserved for protocol, treat them as if
4070 let bad_type_range_tlvs = vec![
4071 ((1 << 16) - 4, vec![42]),
4072 ((1 << 16) - 2, vec![42; 32]),
4074 let mut msg = msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive {
4076 payment_metadata: None,
4077 keysend_preimage: None,
4078 custom_tlvs: bad_type_range_tlvs,
4079 amt_msat: 0x0badf00d01020304,
4080 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
4082 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
4083 let node_signer = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], Network::Testnet);
4084 assert!(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::read(&mut Cursor::new(&encoded_value[..]), (None, &&node_signer)).is_err());
4085 let good_type_range_tlvs = vec![
4086 ((1 << 16) - 3, vec![42]),
4087 ((1 << 16) - 1, vec![42; 32]),
4089 if let msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive { ref mut custom_tlvs, .. } = msg {
4090 *custom_tlvs = good_type_range_tlvs.clone();
4092 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
4093 let inbound_msg = ReadableArgs::read(&mut Cursor::new(&encoded_value[..]), (None, &&node_signer)).unwrap();
4095 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { custom_tlvs, .. } => assert!(custom_tlvs.is_empty()),
4101 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data_with_custom_tlvs() {
4102 let expected_custom_tlvs = vec![
4103 (5482373483, vec![0x12, 0x34]),
4104 (5482373487, vec![0x42u8; 8]),
4106 let msg = msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive {
4108 payment_metadata: None,
4109 keysend_preimage: None,
4110 custom_tlvs: expected_custom_tlvs.clone(),
4111 amt_msat: 0x0badf00d01020304,
4112 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
4114 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
4115 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2e02080badf00d010203040404ffffffffff0000000146c6616b021234ff0000000146c6616f084242424242424242").unwrap();
4116 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
4117 let node_signer = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], Network::Testnet);
4118 let inbound_msg: msgs::InboundOnionPayload = ReadableArgs::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]), (None, &&node_signer)).unwrap();
4119 if let msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
4121 payment_metadata: None,
4122 keysend_preimage: None,
4125 outgoing_cltv_value,
4128 assert_eq!(custom_tlvs, expected_custom_tlvs);
4129 assert_eq!(amt_msat, 0x0badf00d01020304);
4130 assert_eq!(outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
4131 } else { panic!(); }
4135 fn query_channel_range_end_blocknum() {
4136 let tests: Vec<(u32, u32, u32)> = vec![
4137 (10000, 1500, 11500),
4138 (0, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
4139 (1, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
4142 for (first_blocknum, number_of_blocks, expected) in tests.into_iter() {
4143 let sut = msgs::QueryChannelRange {
4144 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Regtest),
4148 assert_eq!(sut.end_blocknum(), expected);
4153 fn encoding_query_channel_range() {
4154 let mut query_channel_range = msgs::QueryChannelRange {
4155 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Regtest),
4156 first_blocknum: 100000,
4157 number_of_blocks: 1500,
4159 let encoded_value = query_channel_range.encode();
4160 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f000186a0000005dc").unwrap();
4161 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
4163 query_channel_range = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
4164 assert_eq!(query_channel_range.first_blocknum, 100000);
4165 assert_eq!(query_channel_range.number_of_blocks, 1500);
4169 fn encoding_reply_channel_range() {
4170 do_encoding_reply_channel_range(0);
4171 do_encoding_reply_channel_range(1);
4174 fn do_encoding_reply_channel_range(encoding_type: u8) {
4175 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f000b8a06000005dc01").unwrap();
4176 let expected_chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Regtest);
4177 let mut reply_channel_range = msgs::ReplyChannelRange {
4178 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
4179 first_blocknum: 756230,
4180 number_of_blocks: 1500,
4181 sync_complete: true,
4182 short_channel_ids: vec![0x000000000000008e, 0x0000000000003c69, 0x000000000045a6c4],
4185 if encoding_type == 0 {
4186 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001900000000000000008e0000000000003c69000000000045a6c4").unwrap());
4187 let encoded_value = reply_channel_range.encode();
4188 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
4190 reply_channel_range = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
4191 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
4192 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.first_blocknum, 756230);
4193 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.number_of_blocks, 1500);
4194 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.sync_complete, true);
4195 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[0], 0x000000000000008e);
4196 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[1], 0x0000000000003c69);
4197 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[2], 0x000000000045a6c4);
4199 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001601789c636000833e08659309a65878be010010a9023a").unwrap());
4200 let result: Result<msgs::ReplyChannelRange, msgs::DecodeError> = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]));
4201 assert!(result.is_err(), "Expected decode failure with unsupported zlib encoding");
4206 fn encoding_query_short_channel_ids() {
4207 do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(0);
4208 do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(1);
4211 fn do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(encoding_type: u8) {
4212 let mut target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
4213 let expected_chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Regtest);
4214 let mut query_short_channel_ids = msgs::QueryShortChannelIds {
4215 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
4216 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0000000000008e, 0x0000000000003c69, 0x000000000045a6c4],
4219 if encoding_type == 0 {
4220 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001900000000000000008e0000000000003c69000000000045a6c4").unwrap());
4221 let encoded_value = query_short_channel_ids.encode();
4222 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
4224 query_short_channel_ids = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
4225 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
4226 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[0], 0x000000000000008e);
4227 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[1], 0x0000000000003c69);
4228 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[2], 0x000000000045a6c4);
4230 target_value.append(&mut <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("001601789c636000833e08659309a65878be010010a9023a").unwrap());
4231 let result: Result<msgs::QueryShortChannelIds, msgs::DecodeError> = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]));
4232 assert!(result.is_err(), "Expected decode failure with unsupported zlib encoding");
4237 fn encoding_reply_short_channel_ids_end() {
4238 let expected_chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Regtest);
4239 let mut reply_short_channel_ids_end = msgs::ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
4240 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
4241 full_information: true,
4243 let encoded_value = reply_short_channel_ids_end.encode();
4244 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f01").unwrap();
4245 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
4247 reply_short_channel_ids_end = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
4248 assert_eq!(reply_short_channel_ids_end.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
4249 assert_eq!(reply_short_channel_ids_end.full_information, true);
4253 fn encoding_gossip_timestamp_filter(){
4254 let expected_chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Regtest);
4255 let mut gossip_timestamp_filter = msgs::GossipTimestampFilter {
4256 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
4257 first_timestamp: 1590000000,
4258 timestamp_range: 0xffff_ffff,
4260 let encoded_value = gossip_timestamp_filter.encode();
4261 let target_value = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f5ec57980ffffffff").unwrap();
4262 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
4264 gossip_timestamp_filter = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
4265 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
4266 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.first_timestamp, 1590000000);
4267 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.timestamp_range, 0xffff_ffff);
4271 fn decode_onion_hop_data_len_as_bigsize() {
4272 // Tests that we can decode an onion payload that is >253 bytes.
4273 // Previously, receiving a payload of this size could've caused us to fail to decode a valid
4274 // payload, because we were decoding the length (a BigSize, big-endian) as a VarInt
4277 // Encode a test onion payload with a big custom TLV such that it's >253 bytes, forcing the
4278 // payload length to be encoded over multiple bytes rather than a single u8.
4279 let big_payload = encode_big_payload().unwrap();
4280 let mut rd = Cursor::new(&big_payload[..]);
4282 let node_signer = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], Network::Testnet);
4283 <msgs::InboundOnionPayload as ReadableArgs<(Option<PublicKey>, &&test_utils::TestKeysInterface)>>
4284 ::read(&mut rd, (None, &&node_signer)).unwrap();
4286 // see above test, needs to be a separate method for use of the serialization macros.
4287 fn encode_big_payload() -> Result<Vec<u8>, io::Error> {
4288 use crate::util::ser::HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize;
4289 let payload = msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Forward {
4290 short_channel_id: 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea,
4291 amt_to_forward: 1000,
4292 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
4294 let mut encoded_payload = Vec::new();
4295 let test_bytes = vec![42u8; 1000];
4296 if let msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } = payload {
4297 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(&mut encoded_payload, {
4298 (1, test_bytes, required_vec),
4299 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(amt_to_forward), required),
4300 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(outgoing_cltv_value), required),
4301 (6, short_channel_id, required)
4308 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
4309 fn test_socket_address_from_str() {
4310 let tcpip_v4 = SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 {
4311 addr: Ipv4Addr::new(127, 0, 0, 1).octets(),
4314 assert_eq!(tcpip_v4, SocketAddress::from_str("127.0.0.1:1234").unwrap());
4315 assert_eq!(tcpip_v4, SocketAddress::from_str(&tcpip_v4.to_string()).unwrap());
4317 let tcpip_v6 = SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 {
4318 addr: Ipv6Addr::new(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1).octets(),
4321 assert_eq!(tcpip_v6, SocketAddress::from_str("[0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1]:1234").unwrap());
4322 assert_eq!(tcpip_v6, SocketAddress::from_str(&tcpip_v6.to_string()).unwrap());
4324 let hostname = SocketAddress::Hostname {
4325 hostname: Hostname::try_from("lightning-node.mydomain.com".to_string()).unwrap(),
4328 assert_eq!(hostname, SocketAddress::from_str("lightning-node.mydomain.com:1234").unwrap());
4329 assert_eq!(hostname, SocketAddress::from_str(&hostname.to_string()).unwrap());
4331 let onion_v2 = SocketAddress::OnionV2 ([40, 4, 64, 185, 202, 19, 162, 75, 90, 200, 38, 7],);
4332 assert_eq!("OnionV2([40, 4, 64, 185, 202, 19, 162, 75, 90, 200, 38, 7])", &onion_v2.to_string());
4333 assert_eq!(Err(SocketAddressParseError::InvalidOnionV3), SocketAddress::from_str("FACEBOOKCOREWWWI.onion:9735"));
4335 let onion_v3 = SocketAddress::OnionV3 {
4336 ed25519_pubkey: [37, 24, 75, 5, 25, 73, 117, 194, 139, 102, 182, 107, 4, 105, 247, 246, 85,
4337 111, 177, 172, 49, 137, 167, 155, 64, 221, 163, 47, 31, 33, 71, 3],
4342 assert_eq!(onion_v3, SocketAddress::from_str("pg6mmjiyjmcrsslvykfwnntlaru7p5svn6y2ymmju6nubxndf4pscryd.onion:1234").unwrap());
4343 assert_eq!(onion_v3, SocketAddress::from_str(&onion_v3.to_string()).unwrap());
4345 assert_eq!(Err(SocketAddressParseError::InvalidOnionV3), SocketAddress::from_str("pg6mmjiyjmcrsslvykfwnntlaru7p5svn6.onion:1234"));
4346 assert_eq!(Err(SocketAddressParseError::InvalidInput), SocketAddress::from_str("127.0.0.1@1234"));
4347 assert_eq!(Err(SocketAddressParseError::InvalidInput), "".parse::<SocketAddress>());
4348 assert!(SocketAddress::from_str("pg6mmjiyjmcrsslvykfwnntlaru7p5svn6y2ymmju6nubxndf4pscryd.onion.onion:9735:94").is_err());
4349 assert!(SocketAddress::from_str("wrong$%#.com:1234").is_err());
4350 assert_eq!(Err(SocketAddressParseError::InvalidPort), SocketAddress::from_str("example.com:wrong"));
4351 assert!("localhost".parse::<SocketAddress>().is_err());
4352 assert!("localhost:invalid-port".parse::<SocketAddress>().is_err());
4353 assert!( "invalid-onion-v3-hostname.onion:8080".parse::<SocketAddress>().is_err());
4354 assert!("b32.example.onion:invalid-port".parse::<SocketAddress>().is_err());
4355 assert!("invalid-address".parse::<SocketAddress>().is_err());
4356 assert!(SocketAddress::from_str("pg6mmjiyjmcrsslvykfwnntlaru7p5svn6y2ymmju6nubxndf4pscryd.onion.onion:1234").is_err());
4360 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
4361 fn test_socket_address_to_socket_addrs() {
4362 assert_eq!(SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 {addr:[0u8; 4], port: 1337,}.to_socket_addrs().unwrap().next().unwrap(),
4363 SocketAddr::V4(SocketAddrV4::new(Ipv4Addr::new(0,0,0,0), 1337)));
4364 assert_eq!(SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 {addr:[0u8; 16], port: 1337,}.to_socket_addrs().unwrap().next().unwrap(),
4365 SocketAddr::V6(SocketAddrV6::new(Ipv6Addr::from([0u8; 16]), 1337, 0, 0)));
4366 assert_eq!(SocketAddress::Hostname { hostname: Hostname::try_from("0.0.0.0".to_string()).unwrap(), port: 0 }
4367 .to_socket_addrs().unwrap().next().unwrap(), SocketAddr::V4(SocketAddrV4::new(Ipv4Addr::from([0u8; 4]),0)));
4368 assert!(SocketAddress::OnionV2([0u8; 12]).to_socket_addrs().is_err());
4369 assert!(SocketAddress::OnionV3{ ed25519_pubkey: [37, 24, 75, 5, 25, 73, 117, 194, 139, 102,
4370 182, 107, 4, 105, 247, 246, 85, 111, 177, 172, 49, 137, 167, 155, 64, 221, 163, 47, 31,
4374 port: 1234 }.to_socket_addrs().is_err());