1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Wire messages, traits representing wire message handlers, and a few error types live here.
12 //! For a normal node you probably don't need to use anything here, however, if you wish to split a
13 //! node into an internet-facing route/message socket handling daemon and a separate daemon (or
14 //! server entirely) which handles only channel-related messages you may wish to implement
15 //! [`ChannelMessageHandler`] yourself and use it to re-serialize messages and pass them across
18 //! Note that if you go with such an architecture (instead of passing raw socket events to a
19 //! non-internet-facing system) you trust the frontend internet-facing system to not lie about the
20 //! source `node_id` of the message, however this does allow you to significantly reduce bandwidth
21 //! between the systems as routing messages can represent a significant chunk of bandwidth usage
22 //! (especially for non-channel-publicly-announcing nodes). As an alternate design which avoids
23 //! this issue, if you have sufficient bidirectional bandwidth between your systems, you may send
24 //! raw socket events into your non-internet-facing system and then send routing events back to
25 //! track the network on the less-secure system.
27 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
28 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature;
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
30 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
33 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
34 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
35 use crate::onion_message;
37 use crate::prelude::*;
40 use crate::io::{self, Read};
41 use crate::io_extras::read_to_end;
43 use crate::events::{MessageSendEventsProvider, OnionMessageProvider};
44 use crate::util::logger;
45 use crate::util::ser::{LengthReadable, Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, WithoutLength, FixedLengthReader, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize, Hostname};
47 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
49 use crate::routing::gossip::{NodeAlias, NodeId};
51 /// 21 million * 10^8 * 1000
52 pub(crate) const MAX_VALUE_MSAT: u64 = 21_000_000_0000_0000_000;
55 /// A partial signature that also contains the Musig2 nonce its signer used
56 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
57 pub struct PartialSignatureWithNonce(pub musig2::types::PartialSignature, pub musig2::types::PublicNonce);
59 /// An error in decoding a message or struct.
60 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
61 pub enum DecodeError {
62 /// A version byte specified something we don't know how to handle.
64 /// Includes unknown realm byte in an onion hop data packet.
66 /// Unknown feature mandating we fail to parse message (e.g., TLV with an even, unknown type)
67 UnknownRequiredFeature,
68 /// Value was invalid.
70 /// For example, a byte which was supposed to be a bool was something other than a 0
71 /// or 1, a public key/private key/signature was invalid, text wasn't UTF-8, TLV was
72 /// syntactically incorrect, etc.
74 /// The buffer to be read was too short.
76 /// A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly.
78 /// Error from [`std::io`].
80 /// The message included zlib-compressed values, which we don't support.
81 UnsupportedCompression,
84 /// An [`init`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
86 /// [`init`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-init-message
87 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
89 /// The relevant features which the sender supports.
90 pub features: InitFeatures,
91 /// The receipient's network address.
93 /// This adds the option to report a remote IP address back to a connecting peer using the init
94 /// message. A node can decide to use that information to discover a potential update to its
95 /// public IPv4 address (NAT) and use that for a [`NodeAnnouncement`] update message containing
97 pub remote_network_address: Option<NetAddress>,
100 /// An [`error`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
102 /// [`error`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-error-and-warning-messages
103 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
104 pub struct ErrorMessage {
105 /// The channel ID involved in the error.
107 /// All-0s indicates a general error unrelated to a specific channel, after which all channels
108 /// with the sending peer should be closed.
109 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
110 /// A possibly human-readable error description.
112 /// The string should be sanitized before it is used (e.g., emitted to logs or printed to
113 /// `stdout`). Otherwise, a well crafted error message may trigger a security vulnerability in
114 /// the terminal emulator or the logging subsystem.
118 /// A [`warning`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
120 /// [`warning`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-error-and-warning-messages
121 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
122 pub struct WarningMessage {
123 /// The channel ID involved in the warning.
125 /// All-0s indicates a warning unrelated to a specific channel.
126 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
127 /// A possibly human-readable warning description.
129 /// The string should be sanitized before it is used (e.g. emitted to logs or printed to
130 /// stdout). Otherwise, a well crafted error message may trigger a security vulnerability in
131 /// the terminal emulator or the logging subsystem.
135 /// A [`ping`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
137 /// [`ping`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-ping-and-pong-messages
138 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
140 /// The desired response length.
142 /// The ping packet size.
144 /// This field is not sent on the wire. byteslen zeros are sent.
148 /// A [`pong`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
150 /// [`pong`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-ping-and-pong-messages
151 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
153 /// The pong packet size.
155 /// This field is not sent on the wire. byteslen zeros are sent.
159 /// An [`open_channel`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
161 /// [`open_channel`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-open_channel-message
162 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
163 pub struct OpenChannel {
164 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
165 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
166 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
167 pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
168 /// The channel value
169 pub funding_satoshis: u64,
170 /// The amount to push to the counterparty as part of the open, in milli-satoshi
172 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by sender will be omitted
173 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
174 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards sender, in milli-satoshi
175 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
176 /// The minimum value unencumbered by HTLCs for the counterparty to keep in the channel
177 pub channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
178 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
179 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
180 /// The feerate per 1000-weight of sender generated transactions, until updated by
182 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
183 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if
184 /// they broadcast a commitment transaction
185 pub to_self_delay: u16,
186 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards sender
187 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
188 /// The sender's key controlling the funding transaction
189 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
190 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
191 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
192 /// A payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
193 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
194 /// Used to derive a payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by sender
195 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
196 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to sender
197 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
198 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-sender transaction's per commitment point
199 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
200 /// The channel flags to be used
201 pub channel_flags: u8,
202 /// A request to pre-set the to-sender output's `scriptPubkey` for when we collaboratively close
203 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
204 /// The channel type that this channel will represent
206 /// If this is `None`, we derive the channel type from the intersection of our
207 /// feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from the [`Init`] message.
208 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
211 /// An [`accept_channel`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
213 /// [`accept_channel`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-accept_channel-message
214 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
215 pub struct AcceptChannel {
216 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
217 pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
218 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by sender will be omitted
219 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
220 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards sender, in milli-satoshi
221 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
222 /// The minimum value unencumbered by HTLCs for the counterparty to keep in the channel
223 pub channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
224 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
225 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
226 /// Minimum depth of the funding transaction before the channel is considered open
227 pub minimum_depth: u32,
228 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if they broadcast a commitment transaction
229 pub to_self_delay: u16,
230 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards sender
231 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
232 /// The sender's key controlling the funding transaction
233 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
234 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
235 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
236 /// A payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
237 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
238 /// Used to derive a payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by sender
239 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
240 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
241 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
242 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-sender transaction's per commitment point
243 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
244 /// A request to pre-set the to-sender output's scriptPubkey for when we collaboratively close
245 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
246 /// The channel type that this channel will represent.
248 /// If this is `None`, we derive the channel type from the intersection of
249 /// our feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from the [`Init`] message.
250 /// This is required to match the equivalent field in [`OpenChannel::channel_type`].
251 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
253 /// Next nonce the channel initiator should use to create a funding output signature against
254 pub next_local_nonce: Option<musig2::types::PublicNonce>,
257 /// A [`funding_created`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
259 /// [`funding_created`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-funding_created-message
260 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
261 pub struct FundingCreated {
262 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding is established
263 pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
264 /// The funding transaction ID
265 pub funding_txid: Txid,
266 /// The specific output index funding this channel
267 pub funding_output_index: u16,
268 /// The signature of the channel initiator (funder) on the initial commitment transaction
269 pub signature: Signature,
271 /// The partial signature of the channel initiator (funder)
272 pub partial_signature_with_nonce: Option<PartialSignatureWithNonce>,
274 /// Next nonce the channel acceptor should use to finalize the funding output signature
275 pub next_local_nonce: Option<musig2::types::PublicNonce>
278 /// A [`funding_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
280 /// [`funding_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-funding_signed-message
281 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
282 pub struct FundingSigned {
284 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
285 /// The signature of the channel acceptor (fundee) on the initial commitment transaction
286 pub signature: Signature,
288 /// The partial signature of the channel acceptor (fundee)
289 pub partial_signature_with_nonce: Option<PartialSignatureWithNonce>,
292 /// A [`channel_ready`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
294 /// [`channel_ready`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-channel_ready-message
295 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
296 pub struct ChannelReady {
298 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
299 /// The per-commitment point of the second commitment transaction
300 pub next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
301 /// If set, provides a `short_channel_id` alias for this channel.
303 /// The sender will accept payments to be forwarded over this SCID and forward them to this
304 /// messages' recipient.
305 pub short_channel_id_alias: Option<u64>,
308 /// A [`shutdown`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
310 /// [`shutdown`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#closing-initiation-shutdown
311 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
312 pub struct Shutdown {
314 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
315 /// The destination of this peer's funds on closing.
317 /// Must be in one of these forms: P2PKH, P2SH, P2WPKH, P2WSH, P2TR.
318 pub scriptpubkey: Script,
321 /// The minimum and maximum fees which the sender is willing to place on the closing transaction.
323 /// This is provided in [`ClosingSigned`] by both sides to indicate the fee range they are willing
325 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
326 pub struct ClosingSignedFeeRange {
327 /// The minimum absolute fee, in satoshis, which the sender is willing to place on the closing
329 pub min_fee_satoshis: u64,
330 /// The maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, which the sender is willing to place on the closing
332 pub max_fee_satoshis: u64,
335 /// A [`closing_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
337 /// [`closing_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#closing-negotiation-closing_signed
338 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
339 pub struct ClosingSigned {
341 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
342 /// The proposed total fee for the closing transaction
343 pub fee_satoshis: u64,
344 /// A signature on the closing transaction
345 pub signature: Signature,
346 /// The minimum and maximum fees which the sender is willing to accept, provided only by new
348 pub fee_range: Option<ClosingSignedFeeRange>,
351 /// An [`update_add_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
353 /// [`update_add_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#adding-an-htlc-update_add_htlc
354 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
355 pub struct UpdateAddHTLC {
357 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
360 /// The HTLC value in milli-satoshi
361 pub amount_msat: u64,
362 /// The payment hash, the pre-image of which controls HTLC redemption
363 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
364 /// The expiry height of the HTLC
365 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
366 pub(crate) onion_routing_packet: OnionPacket,
369 /// An onion message to be sent to or received from a peer.
371 // TODO: update with link to OM when they are merged into the BOLTs
372 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
373 pub struct OnionMessage {
374 /// Used in decrypting the onion packet's payload.
375 pub blinding_point: PublicKey,
376 pub(crate) onion_routing_packet: onion_message::Packet,
379 /// An [`update_fulfill_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
381 /// [`update_fulfill_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
382 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
383 pub struct UpdateFulfillHTLC {
385 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
388 /// The pre-image of the payment hash, allowing HTLC redemption
389 pub payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
392 /// An [`update_fail_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
394 /// [`update_fail_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
395 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
396 pub struct UpdateFailHTLC {
398 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
401 pub(crate) reason: OnionErrorPacket,
404 /// An [`update_fail_malformed_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
406 /// [`update_fail_malformed_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
407 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
408 pub struct UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
410 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
413 pub(crate) sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
415 pub failure_code: u16,
418 /// A [`commitment_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
420 /// [`commitment_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#committing-updates-so-far-commitment_signed
421 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
422 pub struct CommitmentSigned {
424 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
425 /// A signature on the commitment transaction
426 pub signature: Signature,
427 /// Signatures on the HTLC transactions
428 pub htlc_signatures: Vec<Signature>,
430 /// The partial Taproot signature on the commitment transaction
431 pub partial_signature_with_nonce: Option<PartialSignatureWithNonce>,
434 /// A [`revoke_and_ack`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
436 /// [`revoke_and_ack`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#completing-the-transition-to-the-updated-state-revoke_and_ack
437 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
438 pub struct RevokeAndACK {
440 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
441 /// The secret corresponding to the per-commitment point
442 pub per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
443 /// The next sender-broadcast commitment transaction's per-commitment point
444 pub next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
446 /// Musig nonce the recipient should use in their next commitment signature message
447 pub next_local_nonce: Option<musig2::types::PublicNonce>
450 /// An [`update_fee`] message to be sent to or received from a peer
452 /// [`update_fee`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#updating-fees-update_fee
453 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
454 pub struct UpdateFee {
456 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
457 /// Fee rate per 1000-weight of the transaction
458 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
461 /// A [`channel_reestablish`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
463 /// [`channel_reestablish`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#message-retransmission
464 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
465 pub struct ChannelReestablish {
467 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
468 /// The next commitment number for the sender
469 pub next_local_commitment_number: u64,
470 /// The next commitment number for the recipient
471 pub next_remote_commitment_number: u64,
472 /// Proof that the sender knows the per-commitment secret of a specific commitment transaction
473 /// belonging to the recipient
474 pub your_last_per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
475 /// The sender's per-commitment point for their current commitment transaction
476 pub my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
479 /// An [`announcement_signatures`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
481 /// [`announcement_signatures`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-announcement_signatures-message
482 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
483 pub struct AnnouncementSignatures {
485 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
486 /// The short channel ID
487 pub short_channel_id: u64,
488 /// A signature by the node key
489 pub node_signature: Signature,
490 /// A signature by the funding key
491 pub bitcoin_signature: Signature,
494 /// An address which can be used to connect to a remote peer.
495 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
496 pub enum NetAddress {
497 /// An IPv4 address/port on which the peer is listening.
499 /// The 4-byte IPv4 address
501 /// The port on which the node is listening
504 /// An IPv6 address/port on which the peer is listening.
506 /// The 16-byte IPv6 address
508 /// The port on which the node is listening
511 /// An old-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening.
513 /// This field is deprecated and the Tor network generally no longer supports V2 Onion
514 /// addresses. Thus, the details are not parsed here.
516 /// A new-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening.
518 /// To create the human-readable "hostname", concatenate the ED25519 pubkey, checksum, and version,
519 /// wrap as base32 and append ".onion".
521 /// The ed25519 long-term public key of the peer
522 ed25519_pubkey: [u8; 32],
523 /// The checksum of the pubkey and version, as included in the onion address
525 /// The version byte, as defined by the Tor Onion v3 spec.
527 /// The port on which the node is listening
530 /// A hostname/port on which the peer is listening.
532 /// The hostname on which the node is listening.
534 /// The port on which the node is listening.
539 /// Gets the ID of this address type. Addresses in [`NodeAnnouncement`] messages should be sorted
541 pub(crate) fn get_id(&self) -> u8 {
543 &NetAddress::IPv4 {..} => { 1 },
544 &NetAddress::IPv6 {..} => { 2 },
545 &NetAddress::OnionV2(_) => { 3 },
546 &NetAddress::OnionV3 {..} => { 4 },
547 &NetAddress::Hostname {..} => { 5 },
551 /// Strict byte-length of address descriptor, 1-byte type not recorded
552 fn len(&self) -> u16 {
554 &NetAddress::IPv4 { .. } => { 6 },
555 &NetAddress::IPv6 { .. } => { 18 },
556 &NetAddress::OnionV2(_) => { 12 },
557 &NetAddress::OnionV3 { .. } => { 37 },
558 // Consists of 1-byte hostname length, hostname bytes, and 2-byte port.
559 &NetAddress::Hostname { ref hostname, .. } => { u16::from(hostname.len()) + 3 },
563 /// The maximum length of any address descriptor, not including the 1-byte type.
564 /// This maximum length is reached by a hostname address descriptor:
565 /// a hostname with a maximum length of 255, its 1-byte length and a 2-byte port.
566 pub(crate) const MAX_LEN: u16 = 258;
569 impl Writeable for NetAddress {
570 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
572 &NetAddress::IPv4 { ref addr, ref port } => {
577 &NetAddress::IPv6 { ref addr, ref port } => {
582 &NetAddress::OnionV2(bytes) => {
584 bytes.write(writer)?;
586 &NetAddress::OnionV3 { ref ed25519_pubkey, ref checksum, ref version, ref port } => {
588 ed25519_pubkey.write(writer)?;
589 checksum.write(writer)?;
590 version.write(writer)?;
593 &NetAddress::Hostname { ref hostname, ref port } => {
595 hostname.write(writer)?;
603 impl Readable for Result<NetAddress, u8> {
604 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Result<NetAddress, u8>, DecodeError> {
605 let byte = <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
608 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::IPv4 {
609 addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
610 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
614 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::IPv6 {
615 addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
616 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
619 3 => Ok(Ok(NetAddress::OnionV2(Readable::read(reader)?))),
621 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::OnionV3 {
622 ed25519_pubkey: Readable::read(reader)?,
623 checksum: Readable::read(reader)?,
624 version: Readable::read(reader)?,
625 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
629 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::Hostname {
630 hostname: Readable::read(reader)?,
631 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
634 _ => return Ok(Err(byte)),
639 impl Readable for NetAddress {
640 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NetAddress, DecodeError> {
641 match Readable::read(reader) {
642 Ok(Ok(res)) => Ok(res),
643 Ok(Err(_)) => Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion),
649 /// Represents the set of gossip messages that require a signature from a node's identity key.
650 pub enum UnsignedGossipMessage<'a> {
651 /// An unsigned channel announcement.
652 ChannelAnnouncement(&'a UnsignedChannelAnnouncement),
653 /// An unsigned channel update.
654 ChannelUpdate(&'a UnsignedChannelUpdate),
655 /// An unsigned node announcement.
656 NodeAnnouncement(&'a UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)
659 impl<'a> Writeable for UnsignedGossipMessage<'a> {
660 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
662 UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
663 UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
664 UnsignedGossipMessage::NodeAnnouncement(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
669 /// The unsigned part of a [`node_announcement`] message.
671 /// [`node_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-node_announcement-message
672 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
673 pub struct UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
674 /// The advertised features
675 pub features: NodeFeatures,
676 /// A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed
678 /// The `node_id` this announcement originated from (don't rebroadcast the `node_announcement` back
681 /// An RGB color for UI purposes
683 /// An alias, for UI purposes.
685 /// This should be sanitized before use. There is no guarantee of uniqueness.
686 pub alias: NodeAlias,
687 /// List of addresses on which this node is reachable
688 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
689 pub(crate) excess_address_data: Vec<u8>,
690 pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
692 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
693 /// A [`node_announcement`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
695 /// [`node_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-node_announcement-message
696 pub struct NodeAnnouncement {
697 /// The signature by the node key
698 pub signature: Signature,
699 /// The actual content of the announcement
700 pub contents: UnsignedNodeAnnouncement,
703 /// The unsigned part of a [`channel_announcement`] message.
705 /// [`channel_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_announcement-message
706 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
707 pub struct UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
708 /// The advertised channel features
709 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
710 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
711 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
712 /// The short channel ID
713 pub short_channel_id: u64,
714 /// One of the two `node_id`s which are endpoints of this channel
715 pub node_id_1: NodeId,
716 /// The other of the two `node_id`s which are endpoints of this channel
717 pub node_id_2: NodeId,
718 /// The funding key for the first node
719 pub bitcoin_key_1: NodeId,
720 /// The funding key for the second node
721 pub bitcoin_key_2: NodeId,
722 pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
724 /// A [`channel_announcement`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
726 /// [`channel_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_announcement-message
727 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
728 pub struct ChannelAnnouncement {
729 /// Authentication of the announcement by the first public node
730 pub node_signature_1: Signature,
731 /// Authentication of the announcement by the second public node
732 pub node_signature_2: Signature,
733 /// Proof of funding UTXO ownership by the first public node
734 pub bitcoin_signature_1: Signature,
735 /// Proof of funding UTXO ownership by the second public node
736 pub bitcoin_signature_2: Signature,
737 /// The actual announcement
738 pub contents: UnsignedChannelAnnouncement,
741 /// The unsigned part of a [`channel_update`] message.
743 /// [`channel_update`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_update-message
744 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
745 pub struct UnsignedChannelUpdate {
746 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
747 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
748 /// The short channel ID
749 pub short_channel_id: u64,
750 /// A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed, specific to this channel
754 /// The number of blocks such that if:
755 /// `incoming_htlc.cltv_expiry < outgoing_htlc.cltv_expiry + cltv_expiry_delta`
756 /// then we need to fail the HTLC backwards. When forwarding an HTLC, `cltv_expiry_delta` determines
757 /// the outgoing HTLC's minimum `cltv_expiry` value -- so, if an incoming HTLC comes in with a
758 /// `cltv_expiry` of 100000, and the node we're forwarding to has a `cltv_expiry_delta` value of 10,
759 /// then we'll check that the outgoing HTLC's `cltv_expiry` value is at least 100010 before
760 /// forwarding. Note that the HTLC sender is the one who originally sets this value when
761 /// constructing the route.
762 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
763 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
764 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
765 /// The maximum HTLC value incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi.
767 /// This used to be optional.
768 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
769 /// The base HTLC fee charged by sender, in milli-satoshi
770 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
771 /// The amount to fee multiplier, in micro-satoshi
772 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
773 /// Excess data which was signed as a part of the message which we do not (yet) understand how
776 /// This is stored to ensure forward-compatibility as new fields are added to the lightning gossip protocol.
777 pub excess_data: Vec<u8>,
779 /// A [`channel_update`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
781 /// [`channel_update`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_update-message
782 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
783 pub struct ChannelUpdate {
784 /// A signature of the channel update
785 pub signature: Signature,
786 /// The actual channel update
787 pub contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate,
790 /// A [`query_channel_range`] message is used to query a peer for channel
791 /// UTXOs in a range of blocks. The recipient of a query makes a best
792 /// effort to reply to the query using one or more [`ReplyChannelRange`]
795 /// [`query_channel_range`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_channel_range-and-reply_channel_range-messages
796 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
797 pub struct QueryChannelRange {
798 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
799 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
800 /// The height of the first block for the channel UTXOs being queried
801 pub first_blocknum: u32,
802 /// The number of blocks to include in the query results
803 pub number_of_blocks: u32,
806 /// A [`reply_channel_range`] message is a reply to a [`QueryChannelRange`]
809 /// Multiple `reply_channel_range` messages can be sent in reply
810 /// to a single [`QueryChannelRange`] message. The query recipient makes a
811 /// best effort to respond based on their local network view which may
812 /// not be a perfect view of the network. The `short_channel_id`s in the
813 /// reply are encoded. We only support `encoding_type=0` uncompressed
814 /// serialization and do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization.
816 /// [`reply_channel_range`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_channel_range-and-reply_channel_range-messages
817 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
818 pub struct ReplyChannelRange {
819 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
820 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
821 /// The height of the first block in the range of the reply
822 pub first_blocknum: u32,
823 /// The number of blocks included in the range of the reply
824 pub number_of_blocks: u32,
825 /// True when this is the final reply for a query
826 pub sync_complete: bool,
827 /// The `short_channel_id`s in the channel range
828 pub short_channel_ids: Vec<u64>,
831 /// A [`query_short_channel_ids`] message is used to query a peer for
832 /// routing gossip messages related to one or more `short_channel_id`s.
834 /// The query recipient will reply with the latest, if available,
835 /// [`ChannelAnnouncement`], [`ChannelUpdate`] and [`NodeAnnouncement`] messages
836 /// it maintains for the requested `short_channel_id`s followed by a
837 /// [`ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd`] message. The `short_channel_id`s sent in
838 /// this query are encoded. We only support `encoding_type=0` uncompressed
839 /// serialization and do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization.
841 /// [`query_short_channel_ids`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_short_channel_idsreply_short_channel_ids_end-messages
842 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
843 pub struct QueryShortChannelIds {
844 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
845 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
846 /// The short_channel_ids that are being queried
847 pub short_channel_ids: Vec<u64>,
850 /// A [`reply_short_channel_ids_end`] message is sent as a reply to a
851 /// message. The query recipient makes a best
852 /// effort to respond based on their local network view which may not be
853 /// a perfect view of the network.
855 /// [`reply_short_channel_ids_end`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_short_channel_idsreply_short_channel_ids_end-messages
856 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
857 pub struct ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
858 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain that was queried
859 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
860 /// Indicates if the query recipient maintains up-to-date channel
861 /// information for the `chain_hash`
862 pub full_information: bool,
865 /// A [`gossip_timestamp_filter`] message is used by a node to request
866 /// gossip relay for messages in the requested time range when the
867 /// `gossip_queries` feature has been negotiated.
869 /// [`gossip_timestamp_filter`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-gossip_timestamp_filter-message
870 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
871 pub struct GossipTimestampFilter {
872 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain for channel and node information
873 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
874 /// The starting unix timestamp
875 pub first_timestamp: u32,
876 /// The range of information in seconds
877 pub timestamp_range: u32,
880 /// Encoding type for data compression of collections in gossip queries.
882 /// We do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization [defined in BOLT
883 /// #7](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#query-messages).
888 /// Used to put an error message in a [`LightningError`].
889 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
890 pub enum ErrorAction {
891 /// The peer took some action which made us think they were useless. Disconnect them.
893 /// An error message which we should make an effort to send before we disconnect.
894 msg: Option<ErrorMessage>
896 /// The peer did something harmless that we weren't able to process, just log and ignore
897 // New code should *not* use this. New code must use IgnoreAndLog, below!
899 /// The peer did something harmless that we weren't able to meaningfully process.
900 /// If the error is logged, log it at the given level.
901 IgnoreAndLog(logger::Level),
902 /// The peer provided us with a gossip message which we'd already seen. In most cases this
903 /// should be ignored, but it may result in the message being forwarded if it is a duplicate of
904 /// our own channel announcements.
905 IgnoreDuplicateGossip,
906 /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them.
908 /// The message to send.
911 /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them without closing any channels.
913 /// The message to send.
915 /// The peer may have done something harmless that we weren't able to meaningfully process,
916 /// though we should still tell them about it.
917 /// If this event is logged, log it at the given level.
918 log_level: logger::Level,
922 /// An Err type for failure to process messages.
923 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
924 pub struct LightningError {
925 /// A human-readable message describing the error
927 /// The action which should be taken against the offending peer.
928 pub action: ErrorAction,
931 /// Struct used to return values from [`RevokeAndACK`] messages, containing a bunch of commitment
932 /// transaction updates if they were pending.
933 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
934 pub struct CommitmentUpdate {
935 /// `update_add_htlc` messages which should be sent
936 pub update_add_htlcs: Vec<UpdateAddHTLC>,
937 /// `update_fulfill_htlc` messages which should be sent
938 pub update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
939 /// `update_fail_htlc` messages which should be sent
940 pub update_fail_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFailHTLC>,
941 /// `update_fail_malformed_htlc` messages which should be sent
942 pub update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFailMalformedHTLC>,
943 /// An `update_fee` message which should be sent
944 pub update_fee: Option<UpdateFee>,
945 /// A `commitment_signed` message which should be sent
946 pub commitment_signed: CommitmentSigned,
949 /// A trait to describe an object which can receive channel messages.
951 /// Messages MAY be called in parallel when they originate from different `their_node_ids`, however
952 /// they MUST NOT be called in parallel when the two calls have the same `their_node_id`.
953 pub trait ChannelMessageHandler : MessageSendEventsProvider {
955 /// Handle an incoming `open_channel` message from the given peer.
956 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OpenChannel);
957 /// Handle an incoming `accept_channel` message from the given peer.
958 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AcceptChannel);
959 /// Handle an incoming `funding_created` message from the given peer.
960 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingCreated);
961 /// Handle an incoming `funding_signed` message from the given peer.
962 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingSigned);
963 /// Handle an incoming `channel_ready` message from the given peer.
964 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelReady);
967 /// Handle an incoming `shutdown` message from the given peer.
968 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Shutdown);
969 /// Handle an incoming `closing_signed` message from the given peer.
970 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ClosingSigned);
973 /// Handle an incoming `update_add_htlc` message from the given peer.
974 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateAddHTLC);
975 /// Handle an incoming `update_fulfill_htlc` message from the given peer.
976 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFulfillHTLC);
977 /// Handle an incoming `update_fail_htlc` message from the given peer.
978 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFailHTLC);
979 /// Handle an incoming `update_fail_malformed_htlc` message from the given peer.
980 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFailMalformedHTLC);
981 /// Handle an incoming `commitment_signed` message from the given peer.
982 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &CommitmentSigned);
983 /// Handle an incoming `revoke_and_ack` message from the given peer.
984 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &RevokeAndACK);
986 /// Handle an incoming `update_fee` message from the given peer.
987 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFee);
989 // Channel-to-announce:
990 /// Handle an incoming `announcement_signatures` message from the given peer.
991 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AnnouncementSignatures);
993 // Connection loss/reestablish:
994 /// Indicates a connection to the peer failed/an existing connection was lost.
995 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey);
997 /// Handle a peer reconnecting, possibly generating `channel_reestablish` message(s).
999 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1000 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1001 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1002 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1003 /// Handle an incoming `channel_reestablish` message from the given peer.
1004 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelReestablish);
1006 /// Handle an incoming `channel_update` message from the given peer.
1007 fn handle_channel_update(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelUpdate);
1010 /// Handle an incoming `error` message from the given peer.
1011 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ErrorMessage);
1013 // Handler information:
1014 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1015 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1016 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1017 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1019 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1020 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1021 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1023 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1024 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1027 /// A trait to describe an object which can receive routing messages.
1029 /// # Implementor DoS Warnings
1031 /// For messages enabled with the `gossip_queries` feature there are potential DoS vectors when
1032 /// handling inbound queries. Implementors using an on-disk network graph should be aware of
1033 /// repeated disk I/O for queries accessing different parts of the network graph.
1034 pub trait RoutingMessageHandler : MessageSendEventsProvider {
1035 /// Handle an incoming `node_announcement` message, returning `true` if it should be forwarded on,
1036 /// `false` or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1037 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1038 /// Handle a `channel_announcement` message, returning `true` if it should be forwarded on, `false`
1039 /// or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1040 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1041 /// Handle an incoming `channel_update` message, returning true if it should be forwarded on,
1042 /// `false` or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1043 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1044 /// Gets channel announcements and updates required to dump our routing table to a remote node,
1045 /// starting at the `short_channel_id` indicated by `starting_point` and including announcements
1046 /// for a single channel.
1047 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)>;
1048 /// Gets a node announcement required to dump our routing table to a remote node, starting at
1049 /// the node *after* the provided pubkey and including up to one announcement immediately
1050 /// higher (as defined by `<PublicKey as Ord>::cmp`) than `starting_point`.
1051 /// If `None` is provided for `starting_point`, we start at the first node.
1052 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&NodeId>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement>;
1053 /// Called when a connection is established with a peer. This can be used to
1054 /// perform routing table synchronization using a strategy defined by the
1057 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1058 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1059 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1060 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1061 /// Handles the reply of a query we initiated to learn about channels
1062 /// for a given range of blocks. We can expect to receive one or more
1063 /// replies to a single query.
1064 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1065 /// Handles the reply of a query we initiated asking for routing gossip
1066 /// messages for a list of channels. We should receive this message when
1067 /// a node has completed its best effort to send us the pertaining routing
1068 /// gossip messages.
1069 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1070 /// Handles when a peer asks us to send a list of `short_channel_id`s
1071 /// for the requested range of blocks.
1072 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1073 /// Handles when a peer asks us to send routing gossip messages for a
1074 /// list of `short_channel_id`s.
1075 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1077 // Handler queueing status:
1078 /// Indicates that there are a large number of [`ChannelAnnouncement`] (or other) messages
1079 /// pending some async action. While there is no guarantee of the rate of future messages, the
1080 /// caller should seek to reduce the rate of new gossip messages handled, especially
1081 /// [`ChannelAnnouncement`]s.
1082 fn processing_queue_high(&self) -> bool;
1084 // Handler information:
1085 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1086 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1087 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1088 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1089 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1090 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1091 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1093 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1094 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1097 /// A trait to describe an object that can receive onion messages.
1098 pub trait OnionMessageHandler : OnionMessageProvider {
1099 /// Handle an incoming `onion_message` message from the given peer.
1100 fn handle_onion_message(&self, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OnionMessage);
1101 /// Called when a connection is established with a peer. Can be used to track which peers
1102 /// advertise onion message support and are online.
1104 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1105 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1106 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1107 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1108 /// Indicates a connection to the peer failed/an existing connection was lost. Allows handlers to
1109 /// drop and refuse to forward onion messages to this peer.
1110 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey);
1112 // Handler information:
1113 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1114 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1115 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1116 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1118 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1119 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1120 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1122 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1123 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1126 mod fuzzy_internal_msgs {
1127 use crate::prelude::*;
1128 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
1130 // These types aren't intended to be pub, but are exposed for direct fuzzing (as we deserialize
1131 // them from untrusted input):
1133 pub(crate) struct FinalOnionHopData {
1134 pub(crate) payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
1135 /// The total value, in msat, of the payment as received by the ultimate recipient.
1136 /// Message serialization may panic if this value is more than 21 million Bitcoin.
1137 pub(crate) total_msat: u64,
1140 pub(crate) enum OnionHopDataFormat {
1142 short_channel_id: u64,
1145 payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData>,
1146 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
1147 keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
1151 pub struct OnionHopData {
1152 pub(crate) format: OnionHopDataFormat,
1153 /// The value, in msat, of the payment after this hop's fee is deducted.
1154 /// Message serialization may panic if this value is more than 21 million Bitcoin.
1155 pub(crate) amt_to_forward: u64,
1156 pub(crate) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
1159 pub struct DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
1160 pub(crate) hmac: [u8; 32],
1161 pub(crate) failuremsg: Vec<u8>,
1162 pub(crate) pad: Vec<u8>,
1166 pub use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*;
1167 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
1168 pub(crate) use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*;
1171 pub(crate) struct OnionPacket {
1172 pub(crate) version: u8,
1173 /// In order to ensure we always return an error on onion decode in compliance with [BOLT
1174 /// #4](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md), we have to
1175 /// deserialize `OnionPacket`s contained in [`UpdateAddHTLC`] messages even if the ephemeral
1176 /// public key (here) is bogus, so we hold a [`Result`] instead of a [`PublicKey`] as we'd
1178 pub(crate) public_key: Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>,
1179 pub(crate) hop_data: [u8; 20*65],
1180 pub(crate) hmac: [u8; 32],
1183 impl onion_utils::Packet for OnionPacket {
1184 type Data = onion_utils::FixedSizeOnionPacket;
1185 fn new(pubkey: PublicKey, hop_data: onion_utils::FixedSizeOnionPacket, hmac: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
1188 public_key: Ok(pubkey),
1189 hop_data: hop_data.0,
1195 impl Eq for OnionPacket { }
1196 impl PartialEq for OnionPacket {
1197 fn eq(&self, other: &OnionPacket) -> bool {
1198 for (i, j) in self.hop_data.iter().zip(other.hop_data.iter()) {
1199 if i != j { return false; }
1201 self.version == other.version &&
1202 self.public_key == other.public_key &&
1203 self.hmac == other.hmac
1207 impl fmt::Debug for OnionPacket {
1208 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
1209 f.write_fmt(format_args!("OnionPacket version {} with hmac {:?}", self.version, &self.hmac[..]))
1213 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1214 pub(crate) struct OnionErrorPacket {
1215 // This really should be a constant size slice, but the spec lets these things be up to 128KB?
1216 // (TODO) We limit it in decode to much lower...
1217 pub(crate) data: Vec<u8>,
1220 impl fmt::Display for DecodeError {
1221 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
1223 DecodeError::UnknownVersion => f.write_str("Unknown realm byte in Onion packet"),
1224 DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature => f.write_str("Unknown required feature preventing decode"),
1225 DecodeError::InvalidValue => f.write_str("Nonsense bytes didn't map to the type they were interpreted as"),
1226 DecodeError::ShortRead => f.write_str("Packet extended beyond the provided bytes"),
1227 DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor => f.write_str("A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly"),
1228 DecodeError::Io(ref e) => fmt::Debug::fmt(e, f),
1229 DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression => f.write_str("We don't support receiving messages with zlib-compressed fields"),
1234 impl From<io::Error> for DecodeError {
1235 fn from(e: io::Error) -> Self {
1236 if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof {
1237 DecodeError::ShortRead
1239 DecodeError::Io(e.kind())
1244 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
1245 impl_writeable_msg!(AcceptChannel, {
1246 temporary_channel_id,
1247 dust_limit_satoshis,
1248 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1249 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1255 revocation_basepoint,
1257 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1259 first_per_commitment_point,
1261 (0, shutdown_scriptpubkey, (option, encoding: (Script, WithoutLength))), // Don't encode length twice.
1262 (1, channel_type, option),
1266 impl_writeable_msg!(AcceptChannel, {
1267 temporary_channel_id,
1268 dust_limit_satoshis,
1269 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1270 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1276 revocation_basepoint,
1278 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1280 first_per_commitment_point,
1282 (0, shutdown_scriptpubkey, (option, encoding: (Script, WithoutLength))), // Don't encode length twice.
1283 (1, channel_type, option),
1284 (4, next_local_nonce, option),
1287 impl_writeable_msg!(AnnouncementSignatures, {
1294 impl_writeable_msg!(ChannelReestablish, {
1296 next_local_commitment_number,
1297 next_remote_commitment_number,
1298 your_last_per_commitment_secret,
1299 my_current_per_commitment_point,
1302 impl_writeable_msg!(ClosingSigned,
1303 { channel_id, fee_satoshis, signature },
1304 { (1, fee_range, option) }
1307 impl_writeable!(ClosingSignedFeeRange, {
1312 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
1313 impl_writeable_msg!(CommitmentSigned, {
1320 impl_writeable_msg!(CommitmentSigned, {
1325 (2, partial_signature_with_nonce, option)
1328 impl_writeable!(DecodedOnionErrorPacket, {
1334 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
1335 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingCreated, {
1336 temporary_channel_id,
1338 funding_output_index,
1342 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingCreated, {
1343 temporary_channel_id,
1345 funding_output_index,
1348 (2, partial_signature_with_nonce, option),
1349 (4, next_local_nonce, option)
1352 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
1353 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingSigned, {
1359 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingSigned, {
1363 (2, partial_signature_with_nonce, option)
1366 impl_writeable_msg!(ChannelReady, {
1368 next_per_commitment_point,
1370 (1, short_channel_id_alias, option),
1373 impl Writeable for Init {
1374 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1375 // global_features gets the bottom 13 bits of our features, and local_features gets all of
1376 // our relevant feature bits. This keeps us compatible with old nodes.
1377 self.features.write_up_to_13(w)?;
1378 self.features.write(w)?;
1379 encode_tlv_stream!(w, {
1380 (3, self.remote_network_address, option)
1386 impl Readable for Init {
1387 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1388 let global_features: InitFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
1389 let features: InitFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
1390 let mut remote_network_address: Option<NetAddress> = None;
1391 decode_tlv_stream!(r, {
1392 (3, remote_network_address, option)
1395 features: features.or(global_features),
1396 remote_network_address,
1401 impl_writeable_msg!(OpenChannel, {
1403 temporary_channel_id,
1406 dust_limit_satoshis,
1407 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1408 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1414 revocation_basepoint,
1416 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1418 first_per_commitment_point,
1421 (0, shutdown_scriptpubkey, (option, encoding: (Script, WithoutLength))), // Don't encode length twice.
1422 (1, channel_type, option),
1425 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
1426 impl_writeable_msg!(RevokeAndACK, {
1428 per_commitment_secret,
1429 next_per_commitment_point
1433 impl_writeable_msg!(RevokeAndACK, {
1435 per_commitment_secret,
1436 next_per_commitment_point
1438 (4, next_local_nonce, option)
1441 impl_writeable_msg!(Shutdown, {
1446 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFailHTLC, {
1452 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, {
1459 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFee, {
1464 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFulfillHTLC, {
1470 // Note that this is written as a part of ChannelManager objects, and thus cannot change its
1471 // serialization format in a way which assumes we know the total serialized length/message end
1473 impl_writeable!(OnionErrorPacket, {
1477 // Note that this is written as a part of ChannelManager objects, and thus cannot change its
1478 // serialization format in a way which assumes we know the total serialized length/message end
1480 impl Writeable for OnionPacket {
1481 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1482 self.version.write(w)?;
1483 match self.public_key {
1484 Ok(pubkey) => pubkey.write(w)?,
1485 Err(_) => [0u8;33].write(w)?,
1487 w.write_all(&self.hop_data)?;
1488 self.hmac.write(w)?;
1493 impl Readable for OnionPacket {
1494 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1496 version: Readable::read(r)?,
1498 let mut buf = [0u8;33];
1499 r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
1500 PublicKey::from_slice(&buf)
1502 hop_data: Readable::read(r)?,
1503 hmac: Readable::read(r)?,
1508 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateAddHTLC, {
1514 onion_routing_packet
1517 impl Readable for OnionMessage {
1518 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1519 let blinding_point: PublicKey = Readable::read(r)?;
1520 let len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1521 let mut packet_reader = FixedLengthReader::new(r, len as u64);
1522 let onion_routing_packet: onion_message::Packet = <onion_message::Packet as LengthReadable>::read(&mut packet_reader)?;
1525 onion_routing_packet,
1530 impl Writeable for OnionMessage {
1531 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1532 self.blinding_point.write(w)?;
1533 let onion_packet_len = self.onion_routing_packet.serialized_length();
1534 (onion_packet_len as u16).write(w)?;
1535 self.onion_routing_packet.write(w)?;
1540 impl Writeable for FinalOnionHopData {
1541 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1542 self.payment_secret.0.write(w)?;
1543 HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.total_msat).write(w)
1547 impl Readable for FinalOnionHopData {
1548 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1549 let secret: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
1550 let amt: HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize<u64> = Readable::read(r)?;
1551 Ok(Self { payment_secret: PaymentSecret(secret), total_msat: amt.0 })
1555 impl Writeable for OnionHopData {
1556 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1558 OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => {
1559 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
1560 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.amt_to_forward), required),
1561 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
1562 (6, short_channel_id, required)
1565 OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { ref payment_data, ref payment_metadata, ref keysend_preimage } => {
1566 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
1567 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.amt_to_forward), required),
1568 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
1569 (8, payment_data, option),
1570 (16, payment_metadata.as_ref().map(|m| WithoutLength(m)), option),
1571 (5482373484, keysend_preimage, option)
1579 impl Readable for OnionHopData {
1580 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1581 let mut amt = HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(0u64);
1582 let mut cltv_value = HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(0u32);
1583 let mut short_id: Option<u64> = None;
1584 let mut payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData> = None;
1585 let mut payment_metadata: Option<WithoutLength<Vec<u8>>> = None;
1586 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
1587 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
1589 (4, cltv_value, required),
1590 (6, short_id, option),
1591 (8, payment_data, option),
1592 (16, payment_metadata, option),
1593 // See https://github.com/lightning/blips/blob/master/blip-0003.md
1594 (5482373484, keysend_preimage, option)
1597 let format = if let Some(short_channel_id) = short_id {
1598 if payment_data.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
1599 if payment_metadata.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
1600 OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
1604 if let Some(data) = &payment_data {
1605 if data.total_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1606 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1609 OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
1611 payment_metadata: payment_metadata.map(|w| w.0),
1616 if amt.0 > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1617 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1621 amt_to_forward: amt.0,
1622 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv_value.0,
1627 // ReadableArgs because we need onion_utils::decode_next_hop to accommodate payment packets and
1628 // onion message packets.
1629 impl ReadableArgs<()> for OnionHopData {
1630 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R, _arg: ()) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1631 <Self as Readable>::read(r)
1635 impl Writeable for Ping {
1636 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1637 self.ponglen.write(w)?;
1638 vec![0u8; self.byteslen as usize].write(w)?; // size-unchecked write
1643 impl Readable for Ping {
1644 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1646 ponglen: Readable::read(r)?,
1648 let byteslen = Readable::read(r)?;
1649 r.read_exact(&mut vec![0u8; byteslen as usize][..])?;
1656 impl Writeable for Pong {
1657 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1658 vec![0u8; self.byteslen as usize].write(w)?; // size-unchecked write
1663 impl Readable for Pong {
1664 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1667 let byteslen = Readable::read(r)?;
1668 r.read_exact(&mut vec![0u8; byteslen as usize][..])?;
1675 impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1676 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1677 self.features.write(w)?;
1678 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
1679 self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
1680 self.node_id_1.write(w)?;
1681 self.node_id_2.write(w)?;
1682 self.bitcoin_key_1.write(w)?;
1683 self.bitcoin_key_2.write(w)?;
1684 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
1689 impl Readable for UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1690 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1692 features: Readable::read(r)?,
1693 chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
1694 short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1695 node_id_1: Readable::read(r)?,
1696 node_id_2: Readable::read(r)?,
1697 bitcoin_key_1: Readable::read(r)?,
1698 bitcoin_key_2: Readable::read(r)?,
1699 excess_data: read_to_end(r)?,
1704 impl_writeable!(ChannelAnnouncement, {
1707 bitcoin_signature_1,
1708 bitcoin_signature_2,
1712 impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1713 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1714 // `message_flags` used to indicate presence of `htlc_maximum_msat`, but was deprecated in the spec.
1715 const MESSAGE_FLAGS: u8 = 1;
1716 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
1717 self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
1718 self.timestamp.write(w)?;
1719 let all_flags = self.flags as u16 | ((MESSAGE_FLAGS as u16) << 8);
1720 all_flags.write(w)?;
1721 self.cltv_expiry_delta.write(w)?;
1722 self.htlc_minimum_msat.write(w)?;
1723 self.fee_base_msat.write(w)?;
1724 self.fee_proportional_millionths.write(w)?;
1725 self.htlc_maximum_msat.write(w)?;
1726 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
1731 impl Readable for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1732 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1734 chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
1735 short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1736 timestamp: Readable::read(r)?,
1738 let flags: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1739 // Note: we ignore the `message_flags` for now, since it was deprecated by the spec.
1742 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(r)?,
1743 htlc_minimum_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
1744 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
1745 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(r)?,
1746 htlc_maximum_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
1747 excess_data: read_to_end(r)?,
1752 impl_writeable!(ChannelUpdate, {
1757 impl Writeable for ErrorMessage {
1758 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1759 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
1760 (self.data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
1761 w.write_all(self.data.as_bytes())?;
1766 impl Readable for ErrorMessage {
1767 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1769 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1771 let sz: usize = <u16 as Readable>::read(r)? as usize;
1772 let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(sz);
1774 r.read_exact(&mut data)?;
1775 match String::from_utf8(data) {
1777 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1784 impl Writeable for WarningMessage {
1785 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1786 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
1787 (self.data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
1788 w.write_all(self.data.as_bytes())?;
1793 impl Readable for WarningMessage {
1794 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1796 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1798 let sz: usize = <u16 as Readable>::read(r)? as usize;
1799 let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(sz);
1801 r.read_exact(&mut data)?;
1802 match String::from_utf8(data) {
1804 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1811 impl Writeable for UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1812 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1813 self.features.write(w)?;
1814 self.timestamp.write(w)?;
1815 self.node_id.write(w)?;
1816 w.write_all(&self.rgb)?;
1817 self.alias.write(w)?;
1819 let mut addr_len = 0;
1820 for addr in self.addresses.iter() {
1821 addr_len += 1 + addr.len();
1823 (addr_len + self.excess_address_data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
1824 for addr in self.addresses.iter() {
1827 w.write_all(&self.excess_address_data[..])?;
1828 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
1833 impl Readable for UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1834 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1835 let features: NodeFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
1836 let timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
1837 let node_id: NodeId = Readable::read(r)?;
1838 let mut rgb = [0; 3];
1839 r.read_exact(&mut rgb)?;
1840 let alias: NodeAlias = Readable::read(r)?;
1842 let addr_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1843 let mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress> = Vec::new();
1844 let mut addr_readpos = 0;
1845 let mut excess = false;
1846 let mut excess_byte = 0;
1848 if addr_len <= addr_readpos { break; }
1849 match Readable::read(r) {
1851 if addr_len < addr_readpos + 1 + addr.len() {
1852 return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor);
1854 addr_readpos += (1 + addr.len()) as u16;
1855 addresses.push(addr);
1857 Ok(Err(unknown_descriptor)) => {
1859 excess_byte = unknown_descriptor;
1862 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor),
1863 Err(e) => return Err(e),
1867 let mut excess_data = vec![];
1868 let excess_address_data = if addr_readpos < addr_len {
1869 let mut excess_address_data = vec![0; (addr_len - addr_readpos) as usize];
1870 r.read_exact(&mut excess_address_data[if excess { 1 } else { 0 }..])?;
1872 excess_address_data[0] = excess_byte;
1877 excess_data.push(excess_byte);
1881 excess_data.extend(read_to_end(r)?.iter());
1882 Ok(UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1889 excess_address_data,
1895 impl_writeable!(NodeAnnouncement, {
1900 impl Readable for QueryShortChannelIds {
1901 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1902 let chain_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(r)?;
1904 let encoding_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1905 let encoding_type: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
1907 // Must be encoding_type=0 uncompressed serialization. We do not
1908 // support encoding_type=1 zlib serialization.
1909 if encoding_type != EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8 {
1910 return Err(DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression);
1913 // We expect the encoding_len to always includes the 1-byte
1914 // encoding_type and that short_channel_ids are 8-bytes each
1915 if encoding_len == 0 || (encoding_len - 1) % 8 != 0 {
1916 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1919 // Read short_channel_ids (8-bytes each), for the u16 encoding_len
1920 // less the 1-byte encoding_type
1921 let short_channel_id_count: u16 = (encoding_len - 1)/8;
1922 let mut short_channel_ids = Vec::with_capacity(short_channel_id_count as usize);
1923 for _ in 0..short_channel_id_count {
1924 short_channel_ids.push(Readable::read(r)?);
1927 Ok(QueryShortChannelIds {
1934 impl Writeable for QueryShortChannelIds {
1935 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1936 // Calculated from 1-byte encoding_type plus 8-bytes per short_channel_id
1937 let encoding_len: u16 = 1 + self.short_channel_ids.len() as u16 * 8;
1939 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
1940 encoding_len.write(w)?;
1942 // We only support type=0 uncompressed serialization
1943 (EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8).write(w)?;
1945 for scid in self.short_channel_ids.iter() {
1953 impl_writeable_msg!(ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd, {
1958 impl QueryChannelRange {
1959 /// Calculates the overflow safe ending block height for the query.
1961 /// Overflow returns `0xffffffff`, otherwise returns `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`.
1962 pub fn end_blocknum(&self) -> u32 {
1963 match self.first_blocknum.checked_add(self.number_of_blocks) {
1964 Some(block) => block,
1965 None => u32::max_value(),
1970 impl_writeable_msg!(QueryChannelRange, {
1976 impl Readable for ReplyChannelRange {
1977 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1978 let chain_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(r)?;
1979 let first_blocknum: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
1980 let number_of_blocks: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
1981 let sync_complete: bool = Readable::read(r)?;
1983 let encoding_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1984 let encoding_type: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
1986 // Must be encoding_type=0 uncompressed serialization. We do not
1987 // support encoding_type=1 zlib serialization.
1988 if encoding_type != EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8 {
1989 return Err(DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression);
1992 // We expect the encoding_len to always includes the 1-byte
1993 // encoding_type and that short_channel_ids are 8-bytes each
1994 if encoding_len == 0 || (encoding_len - 1) % 8 != 0 {
1995 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1998 // Read short_channel_ids (8-bytes each), for the u16 encoding_len
1999 // less the 1-byte encoding_type
2000 let short_channel_id_count: u16 = (encoding_len - 1)/8;
2001 let mut short_channel_ids = Vec::with_capacity(short_channel_id_count as usize);
2002 for _ in 0..short_channel_id_count {
2003 short_channel_ids.push(Readable::read(r)?);
2006 Ok(ReplyChannelRange {
2016 impl Writeable for ReplyChannelRange {
2017 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2018 let encoding_len: u16 = 1 + self.short_channel_ids.len() as u16 * 8;
2019 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
2020 self.first_blocknum.write(w)?;
2021 self.number_of_blocks.write(w)?;
2022 self.sync_complete.write(w)?;
2024 encoding_len.write(w)?;
2025 (EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8).write(w)?;
2026 for scid in self.short_channel_ids.iter() {
2034 impl_writeable_msg!(GossipTimestampFilter, {
2043 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
2044 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
2045 use crate::ln::msgs;
2046 use crate::ln::msgs::{FinalOnionHopData, OnionErrorPacket, OnionHopDataFormat};
2047 use crate::routing::gossip::{NodeAlias, NodeId};
2048 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Hostname};
2050 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2051 use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
2052 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2053 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
2054 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2055 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
2057 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2058 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2060 use crate::io::{self, Cursor};
2061 use crate::prelude::*;
2062 use core::convert::TryFrom;
2065 fn encoding_channel_reestablish() {
2067 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2068 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
2071 let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
2072 channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
2073 next_local_commitment_number: 3,
2074 next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
2075 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [9;32],
2076 my_current_per_commitment_point: public_key,
2079 let encoded_value = cr.encode();
2082 vec![4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 3, 27, 132, 197, 86, 123, 18, 100, 64, 153, 93, 62, 213, 170, 186, 5, 101, 215, 30, 24, 52, 96, 72, 25, 255, 156, 23, 245, 233, 213, 221, 7, 143]
2086 macro_rules! get_keys_from {
2087 ($slice: expr, $secp_ctx: expr) => {
2089 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode($slice).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2090 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &privkey);
2096 macro_rules! get_sig_on {
2097 ($privkey: expr, $ctx: expr, $string: expr) => {
2099 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&$string.into_bytes()[..]).unwrap();
2100 $ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &$privkey)
2106 fn encoding_announcement_signatures() {
2107 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2108 let (privkey, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2109 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2110 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("02020202020202020202020202020202"));
2111 let announcement_signatures = msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2112 channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
2113 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2114 node_signature: sig_1,
2115 bitcoin_signature: sig_2,
2118 let encoded_value = announcement_signatures.encode();
2119 assert_eq!(encoded_value, hex::decode("040000000000000005000000000000000600000000000000070000000000000000083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073acf9953cef4700860f5967838eba2bae89288ad188ebf8b20bf995c3ea53a26df1876d0a3a0e13172ba286a673140190c02ba9da60a2e43a745188c8a83c7f3ef").unwrap());
2122 fn do_encoding_channel_announcement(unknown_features_bits: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2123 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2124 let (privkey_1, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2125 let (privkey_2, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2126 let (privkey_3, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2127 let (privkey_4, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2128 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2129 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey_2, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2130 let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2131 let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2132 let mut features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
2133 if unknown_features_bits {
2134 features = ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF]);
2136 let unsigned_channel_announcement = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2138 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
2139 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2140 node_id_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_1),
2141 node_id_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_2),
2142 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_3),
2143 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_4),
2144 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![10, 0, 0, 20, 0, 0, 30, 0, 0, 40] } else { Vec::new() },
2146 let channel_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2147 node_signature_1: sig_1,
2148 node_signature_2: sig_2,
2149 bitcoin_signature_1: sig_3,
2150 bitcoin_signature_2: sig_4,
2151 contents: unsigned_channel_announcement,
2153 let encoded_value = channel_announcement.encode();
2154 let mut target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
2155 if unknown_features_bits {
2156 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0002ffff").unwrap());
2158 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000").unwrap());
2160 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
2161 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00083a840000034d031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f024d4b6cd1361032ca9bd2aeb9d900aa4d45d9ead80ac9423374c451a7254d076602531fe6068134503d2723133227c867ac8fa6c83c537e9a44c3c5bdbdcb1fe33703462779ad4aad39514614751a71085f2f10e1c7a593e4e030efb5b8721ce55b0b").unwrap());
2163 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0a00001400001e000028").unwrap());
2165 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2169 fn encoding_channel_announcement() {
2170 do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, false);
2171 do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, true);
2172 do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, false);
2173 do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, true);
2176 fn do_encoding_node_announcement(unknown_features_bits: bool, ipv4: bool, ipv6: bool, onionv2: bool, onionv3: bool, hostname: bool, excess_address_data: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2177 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2178 let (privkey_1, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2179 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2180 let features = if unknown_features_bits {
2181 NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF])
2183 // Set to some features we may support
2184 NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![2 | 1 << 5])
2186 let mut addresses = Vec::new();
2188 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::IPv4 {
2189 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252],
2194 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::IPv6 {
2195 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240],
2200 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::OnionV2(
2201 [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 38, 7]
2205 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::OnionV3 {
2206 ed25519_pubkey: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240, 239, 238, 237, 236, 235, 234, 233, 232, 231, 230, 229, 228, 227, 226, 225, 224],
2213 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::Hostname {
2214 hostname: Hostname::try_from(String::from("host")).unwrap(),
2218 let mut addr_len = 0;
2219 for addr in &addresses {
2220 addr_len += addr.len() + 1;
2222 let unsigned_node_announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2224 timestamp: 20190119,
2225 node_id: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_1),
2227 alias: NodeAlias([16;32]),
2229 excess_address_data: if excess_address_data { vec![33, 108, 40, 11, 83, 149, 162, 84, 110, 126, 75, 38, 99, 224, 79, 129, 22, 34, 241, 90, 79, 146, 232, 58, 162, 233, 43, 162, 165, 115, 193, 57, 20, 44, 84, 174, 99, 7, 42, 30, 193, 238, 125, 192, 192, 75, 222, 92, 132, 120, 6, 23, 42, 160, 92, 146, 194, 42, 232, 227, 8, 209, 210, 105] } else { Vec::new() },
2230 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![59, 18, 204, 25, 92, 224, 162, 209, 189, 166, 168, 139, 239, 161, 159, 160, 127, 81, 202, 167, 92, 232, 56, 55, 242, 137, 101, 96, 11, 138, 172, 171, 8, 85, 255, 176, 231, 65, 236, 95, 124, 65, 66, 30, 152, 41, 169, 212, 134, 17, 200, 200, 49, 247, 27, 229, 234, 115, 230, 101, 148, 151, 127, 253] } else { Vec::new() },
2232 addr_len += unsigned_node_announcement.excess_address_data.len() as u16;
2233 let node_announcement = msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2235 contents: unsigned_node_announcement,
2237 let encoded_value = node_announcement.encode();
2238 let mut target_value = hex::decode("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2239 if unknown_features_bits {
2240 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0002ffff").unwrap());
2242 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000122").unwrap());
2244 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("013413a7031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f2020201010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010").unwrap());
2245 target_value.append(&mut vec![(addr_len >> 8) as u8, addr_len as u8]);
2247 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("01fffefdfc2607").unwrap());
2250 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("02fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f02607").unwrap());
2253 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("03fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f62607").unwrap());
2256 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("04fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0efeeedecebeae9e8e7e6e5e4e3e2e1e00020102607").unwrap());
2259 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0504686f73742607").unwrap());
2261 if excess_address_data {
2262 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f92e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d269").unwrap());
2265 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("3b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
2267 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2271 fn encoding_node_announcement() {
2272 do_encoding_node_announcement(true, true, true, true, true, true, true, true);
2273 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false);
2274 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, true, false, false, false, false, false, false);
2275 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, true, false, false, false, false, false);
2276 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, true, false, false, false, false);
2277 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, true, false, false, false);
2278 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, true, false, false);
2279 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, false, true, false);
2280 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, true, false, true, false, false, true, false);
2281 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, true, false, true, false, false, false);
2284 fn do_encoding_channel_update(direction: bool, disable: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2285 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2286 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2287 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2288 let unsigned_channel_update = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2289 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
2290 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2291 timestamp: 20190119,
2292 flags: if direction { 1 } else { 0 } | if disable { 1 << 1 } else { 0 },
2293 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2294 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
2295 htlc_maximum_msat: 131355275467161,
2296 fee_base_msat: 10000,
2297 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2298 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![0, 0, 0, 0, 59, 154, 202, 0] } else { Vec::new() }
2300 let channel_update = msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2302 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2304 let encoded_value = channel_update.encode();
2305 let mut target_value = hex::decode("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2306 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
2307 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00083a840000034d013413a7").unwrap());
2308 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("01").unwrap());
2309 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00").unwrap());
2311 let flag = target_value.last_mut().unwrap();
2315 let flag = target_value.last_mut().unwrap();
2316 *flag = *flag | 1 << 1;
2318 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap());
2319 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000777788889999").unwrap());
2321 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000003b9aca00").unwrap());
2323 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2327 fn encoding_channel_update() {
2328 do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, false);
2329 do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, true);
2330 do_encoding_channel_update(true, false, false);
2331 do_encoding_channel_update(true, false, true);
2332 do_encoding_channel_update(false, true, false);
2333 do_encoding_channel_update(false, true, true);
2334 do_encoding_channel_update(true, true, false);
2335 do_encoding_channel_update(true, true, true);
2338 fn do_encoding_open_channel(random_bit: bool, shutdown: bool, incl_chan_type: bool) {
2339 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2340 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2341 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2342 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2343 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2344 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
2345 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
2346 let open_channel = msgs::OpenChannel {
2347 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
2348 temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
2349 funding_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
2350 push_msat: 2536655962884945560,
2351 dust_limit_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
2352 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 8517154655701053848,
2353 channel_reserve_satoshis: 8665828695742877976,
2354 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
2355 feerate_per_kw: 821716,
2356 to_self_delay: 49340,
2357 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
2358 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
2359 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
2360 payment_point: pubkey_3,
2361 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
2362 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
2363 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
2364 channel_flags: if random_bit { 1 << 5 } else { 0 },
2365 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { Some(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { None },
2366 channel_type: if incl_chan_type { Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::empty()) } else { None },
2368 let encoded_value = open_channel.encode();
2369 let mut target_value = Vec::new();
2370 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
2371 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2373 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("20").unwrap());
2375 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00").unwrap());
2378 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
2381 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0100").unwrap());
2383 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2387 fn encoding_open_channel() {
2388 do_encoding_open_channel(false, false, false);
2389 do_encoding_open_channel(false, false, true);
2390 do_encoding_open_channel(false, true, false);
2391 do_encoding_open_channel(false, true, true);
2392 do_encoding_open_channel(true, false, false);
2393 do_encoding_open_channel(true, false, true);
2394 do_encoding_open_channel(true, true, false);
2395 do_encoding_open_channel(true, true, true);
2398 fn do_encoding_accept_channel(shutdown: bool) {
2399 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2400 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2401 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2402 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2403 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2404 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
2405 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
2406 let accept_channel = msgs::AcceptChannel {
2407 temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
2408 dust_limit_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
2409 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 2536655962884945560,
2410 channel_reserve_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
2411 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
2412 minimum_depth: 821716,
2413 to_self_delay: 49340,
2414 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
2415 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
2416 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
2417 payment_point: pubkey_3,
2418 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
2419 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
2420 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
2421 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { Some(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { None },
2424 next_local_nonce: None,
2426 let encoded_value = accept_channel.encode();
2427 let mut target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
2429 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
2431 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2435 fn encoding_accept_channel() {
2436 do_encoding_accept_channel(false);
2437 do_encoding_accept_channel(true);
2441 fn encoding_funding_created() {
2442 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2443 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2444 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2445 let funding_created = msgs::FundingCreated {
2446 temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
2447 funding_txid: Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap(),
2448 funding_output_index: 255,
2451 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2453 next_local_nonce: None,
2455 let encoded_value = funding_created.encode();
2456 let target_value = hex::decode("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202026e96fe9f8b0ddcd729ba03cfafa5a27b050b39d354dd980814268dfa9a44d4c200ffd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2457 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2461 fn encoding_funding_signed() {
2462 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2463 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2464 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2465 let funding_signed = msgs::FundingSigned {
2466 channel_id: [2; 32],
2469 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2471 let encoded_value = funding_signed.encode();
2472 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2473 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2477 fn encoding_channel_ready() {
2478 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2479 let (_, pubkey_1,) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2480 let channel_ready = msgs::ChannelReady {
2481 channel_id: [2; 32],
2482 next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
2483 short_channel_id_alias: None,
2485 let encoded_value = channel_ready.encode();
2486 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap();
2487 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2490 fn do_encoding_shutdown(script_type: u8) {
2491 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2492 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2493 let script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::OP_TRUE).into_script();
2494 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
2495 channel_id: [2; 32],
2497 if script_type == 1 { Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() }
2498 else if script_type == 2 { Address::p2sh(&script, Network::Testnet).unwrap().script_pubkey() }
2499 else if script_type == 3 { Address::p2wpkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).unwrap().script_pubkey() }
2500 else { Address::p2wsh(&script, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() },
2502 let encoded_value = shutdown.encode();
2503 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap();
2504 if script_type == 1 {
2505 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
2506 } else if script_type == 2 {
2507 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0017a914da1745e9b549bd0bfa1a569971c77eba30cd5a4b87").unwrap());
2508 } else if script_type == 3 {
2509 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0016001479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b235983").unwrap());
2510 } else if script_type == 4 {
2511 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("002200204ae81572f06e1b88fd5ced7a1a000945432e83e1551e6f721ee9c00b8cc33260").unwrap());
2513 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2517 fn encoding_shutdown() {
2518 do_encoding_shutdown(1);
2519 do_encoding_shutdown(2);
2520 do_encoding_shutdown(3);
2521 do_encoding_shutdown(4);
2525 fn encoding_closing_signed() {
2526 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2527 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2528 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2529 let closing_signed = msgs::ClosingSigned {
2530 channel_id: [2; 32],
2531 fee_satoshis: 2316138423780173,
2535 let encoded_value = closing_signed.encode();
2536 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2537 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2538 assert_eq!(msgs::ClosingSigned::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value)).unwrap(), closing_signed);
2540 let closing_signed_with_range = msgs::ClosingSigned {
2541 channel_id: [2; 32],
2542 fee_satoshis: 2316138423780173,
2544 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
2545 min_fee_satoshis: 0xdeadbeef,
2546 max_fee_satoshis: 0x1badcafe01234567,
2549 let encoded_value_with_range = closing_signed_with_range.encode();
2550 let target_value_with_range = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a011000000000deadbeef1badcafe01234567").unwrap();
2551 assert_eq!(encoded_value_with_range, target_value_with_range);
2552 assert_eq!(msgs::ClosingSigned::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value_with_range)).unwrap(),
2553 closing_signed_with_range);
2557 fn encoding_update_add_htlc() {
2558 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2559 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2560 let onion_routing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2562 public_key: Ok(pubkey_1),
2563 hop_data: [1; 20*65],
2566 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2567 channel_id: [2; 32],
2568 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2569 amount_msat: 3608586615801332854,
2570 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
2571 cltv_expiry: 821716,
2572 onion_routing_packet
2574 let encoded_value = update_add_htlc.encode();
2575 let target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
2576 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2580 fn encoding_update_fulfill_htlc() {
2581 let update_fulfill_htlc = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2582 channel_id: [2; 32],
2583 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2584 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([1; 32]),
2586 let encoded_value = update_fulfill_htlc.encode();
2587 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap();
2588 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2592 fn encoding_update_fail_htlc() {
2593 let reason = OnionErrorPacket {
2594 data: [1; 32].to_vec(),
2596 let update_fail_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2597 channel_id: [2; 32],
2598 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2601 let encoded_value = update_fail_htlc.encode();
2602 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d00200101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap();
2603 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2607 fn encoding_update_fail_malformed_htlc() {
2608 let update_fail_malformed_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2609 channel_id: [2; 32],
2610 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2611 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
2614 let encoded_value = update_fail_malformed_htlc.encode();
2615 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010100ff").unwrap();
2616 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2619 fn do_encoding_commitment_signed(htlcs: bool) {
2620 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2621 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2622 let (privkey_2, _) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2623 let (privkey_3, _) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2624 let (privkey_4, _) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2625 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2626 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey_2, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2627 let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2628 let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2629 let commitment_signed = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
2630 channel_id: [2; 32],
2632 htlc_signatures: if htlcs { vec![sig_2, sig_3, sig_4] } else { Vec::new() },
2634 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2636 let encoded_value = commitment_signed.encode();
2637 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2639 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00031735b6a427e80d5fe7cd90a2f4ee08dc9c27cda7c35a4172e5d85b12c49d4232537e98f9b1f3c5e6989a8b9644e90e8918127680dbd0d4043510840fc0f1e11a216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f91e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d2692b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
2641 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000").unwrap());
2643 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2647 fn encoding_commitment_signed() {
2648 do_encoding_commitment_signed(true);
2649 do_encoding_commitment_signed(false);
2653 fn encoding_revoke_and_ack() {
2654 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2655 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2656 let raa = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2657 channel_id: [2; 32],
2658 per_commitment_secret: [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1],
2659 next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
2661 next_local_nonce: None,
2663 let encoded_value = raa.encode();
2664 let target_value = hex::decode("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap();
2665 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2669 fn encoding_update_fee() {
2670 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
2671 channel_id: [2; 32],
2672 feerate_per_kw: 20190119,
2674 let encoded_value = update_fee.encode();
2675 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202013413a7").unwrap();
2676 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2680 fn encoding_init() {
2681 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
2682 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF]),
2683 remote_network_address: None,
2684 }.encode(), hex::decode("00023fff0003ffffff").unwrap());
2685 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
2686 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF]),
2687 remote_network_address: None,
2688 }.encode(), hex::decode("0001ff0001ff").unwrap());
2689 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
2690 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
2691 remote_network_address: None,
2692 }.encode(), hex::decode("00000000").unwrap());
2694 let init_msg = msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
2695 remote_network_address: Some(msgs::NetAddress::IPv4 {
2696 addr: [127, 0, 0, 1],
2700 let encoded_value = init_msg.encode();
2701 let target_value = hex::decode("000000000307017f00000103e8").unwrap();
2702 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2703 assert_eq!(msgs::Init::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value)).unwrap(), init_msg);
2707 fn encoding_error() {
2708 let error = msgs::ErrorMessage {
2709 channel_id: [2; 32],
2710 data: String::from("rust-lightning"),
2712 let encoded_value = error.encode();
2713 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000e727573742d6c696768746e696e67").unwrap();
2714 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2718 fn encoding_warning() {
2719 let error = msgs::WarningMessage {
2720 channel_id: [2; 32],
2721 data: String::from("rust-lightning"),
2723 let encoded_value = error.encode();
2724 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000e727573742d6c696768746e696e67").unwrap();
2725 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2729 fn encoding_ping() {
2730 let ping = msgs::Ping {
2734 let encoded_value = ping.encode();
2735 let target_value = hex::decode("0040004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap();
2736 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2740 fn encoding_pong() {
2741 let pong = msgs::Pong {
2744 let encoded_value = pong.encode();
2745 let target_value = hex::decode("004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap();
2746 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2750 fn encoding_nonfinal_onion_hop_data() {
2751 let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
2752 format: OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
2753 short_channel_id: 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea,
2755 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
2756 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2758 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
2759 let target_value = hex::decode("1a02080badf00d010203040404ffffffff0608deadbeef1bad1dea").unwrap();
2760 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2761 msg = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2762 if let OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } = msg.format {
2763 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea);
2764 } else { panic!(); }
2765 assert_eq!(msg.amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
2766 assert_eq!(msg.outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
2770 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data() {
2771 let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
2772 format: OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
2774 payment_metadata: None,
2775 keysend_preimage: None,
2777 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
2778 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2780 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
2781 let target_value = hex::decode("1002080badf00d010203040404ffffffff").unwrap();
2782 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2783 msg = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2784 if let OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data: None, .. } = msg.format { } else { panic!(); }
2785 assert_eq!(msg.amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
2786 assert_eq!(msg.outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
2790 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data_with_secret() {
2791 let expected_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([0x42u8; 32]);
2792 let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
2793 format: OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
2794 payment_data: Some(FinalOnionHopData {
2795 payment_secret: expected_payment_secret,
2796 total_msat: 0x1badca1f
2798 payment_metadata: None,
2799 keysend_preimage: None,
2801 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
2802 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2804 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
2805 let target_value = hex::decode("3602080badf00d010203040404ffffffff082442424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242421badca1f").unwrap();
2806 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2807 msg = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2808 if let OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
2809 payment_data: Some(FinalOnionHopData {
2811 total_msat: 0x1badca1f
2813 payment_metadata: None,
2814 keysend_preimage: None,
2816 assert_eq!(payment_secret, expected_payment_secret);
2817 } else { panic!(); }
2818 assert_eq!(msg.amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
2819 assert_eq!(msg.outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
2823 fn query_channel_range_end_blocknum() {
2824 let tests: Vec<(u32, u32, u32)> = vec![
2825 (10000, 1500, 11500),
2826 (0, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
2827 (1, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
2830 for (first_blocknum, number_of_blocks, expected) in tests.into_iter() {
2831 let sut = msgs::QueryChannelRange {
2832 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap(),
2836 assert_eq!(sut.end_blocknum(), expected);
2841 fn encoding_query_channel_range() {
2842 let mut query_channel_range = msgs::QueryChannelRange {
2843 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap(),
2844 first_blocknum: 100000,
2845 number_of_blocks: 1500,
2847 let encoded_value = query_channel_range.encode();
2848 let target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206000186a0000005dc").unwrap();
2849 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2851 query_channel_range = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2852 assert_eq!(query_channel_range.first_blocknum, 100000);
2853 assert_eq!(query_channel_range.number_of_blocks, 1500);
2857 fn encoding_reply_channel_range() {
2858 do_encoding_reply_channel_range(0);
2859 do_encoding_reply_channel_range(1);
2862 fn do_encoding_reply_channel_range(encoding_type: u8) {
2863 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206000b8a06000005dc01").unwrap();
2864 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2865 let mut reply_channel_range = msgs::ReplyChannelRange {
2866 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2867 first_blocknum: 756230,
2868 number_of_blocks: 1500,
2869 sync_complete: true,
2870 short_channel_ids: vec![0x000000000000008e, 0x0000000000003c69, 0x000000000045a6c4],
2873 if encoding_type == 0 {
2874 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001900000000000000008e0000000000003c69000000000045a6c4").unwrap());
2875 let encoded_value = reply_channel_range.encode();
2876 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2878 reply_channel_range = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2879 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2880 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.first_blocknum, 756230);
2881 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.number_of_blocks, 1500);
2882 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.sync_complete, true);
2883 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[0], 0x000000000000008e);
2884 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[1], 0x0000000000003c69);
2885 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[2], 0x000000000045a6c4);
2887 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001601789c636000833e08659309a65878be010010a9023a").unwrap());
2888 let result: Result<msgs::ReplyChannelRange, msgs::DecodeError> = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]));
2889 assert!(result.is_err(), "Expected decode failure with unsupported zlib encoding");
2894 fn encoding_query_short_channel_ids() {
2895 do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(0);
2896 do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(1);
2899 fn do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(encoding_type: u8) {
2900 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206").unwrap();
2901 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2902 let mut query_short_channel_ids = msgs::QueryShortChannelIds {
2903 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2904 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0000000000008e, 0x0000000000003c69, 0x000000000045a6c4],
2907 if encoding_type == 0 {
2908 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001900000000000000008e0000000000003c69000000000045a6c4").unwrap());
2909 let encoded_value = query_short_channel_ids.encode();
2910 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2912 query_short_channel_ids = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2913 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2914 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[0], 0x000000000000008e);
2915 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[1], 0x0000000000003c69);
2916 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[2], 0x000000000045a6c4);
2918 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001601789c636000833e08659309a65878be010010a9023a").unwrap());
2919 let result: Result<msgs::QueryShortChannelIds, msgs::DecodeError> = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]));
2920 assert!(result.is_err(), "Expected decode failure with unsupported zlib encoding");
2925 fn encoding_reply_short_channel_ids_end() {
2926 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2927 let mut reply_short_channel_ids_end = msgs::ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
2928 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2929 full_information: true,
2931 let encoded_value = reply_short_channel_ids_end.encode();
2932 let target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e220601").unwrap();
2933 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2935 reply_short_channel_ids_end = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2936 assert_eq!(reply_short_channel_ids_end.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2937 assert_eq!(reply_short_channel_ids_end.full_information, true);
2941 fn encoding_gossip_timestamp_filter(){
2942 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2943 let mut gossip_timestamp_filter = msgs::GossipTimestampFilter {
2944 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2945 first_timestamp: 1590000000,
2946 timestamp_range: 0xffff_ffff,
2948 let encoded_value = gossip_timestamp_filter.encode();
2949 let target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e22065ec57980ffffffff").unwrap();
2950 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2952 gossip_timestamp_filter = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2953 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2954 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.first_timestamp, 1590000000);
2955 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.timestamp_range, 0xffff_ffff);
2959 fn decode_onion_hop_data_len_as_bigsize() {
2960 // Tests that we can decode an onion payload that is >253 bytes.
2961 // Previously, receiving a payload of this size could've caused us to fail to decode a valid
2962 // payload, because we were decoding the length (a BigSize, big-endian) as a VarInt
2965 // Encode a test onion payload with a big custom TLV such that it's >253 bytes, forcing the
2966 // payload length to be encoded over multiple bytes rather than a single u8.
2967 let big_payload = encode_big_payload().unwrap();
2968 let mut rd = Cursor::new(&big_payload[..]);
2969 <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut rd).unwrap();
2971 // see above test, needs to be a separate method for use of the serialization macros.
2972 fn encode_big_payload() -> Result<Vec<u8>, io::Error> {
2973 use crate::util::ser::HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize;
2974 let payload = msgs::OnionHopData {
2975 format: OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
2976 short_channel_id: 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea,
2978 amt_to_forward: 1000,
2979 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2981 let mut encoded_payload = Vec::new();
2982 let test_bytes = vec![42u8; 1000];
2983 if let OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } = payload.format {
2984 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(&mut encoded_payload, {
2985 (1, test_bytes, vec_type),
2986 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(payload.amt_to_forward), required),
2987 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(payload.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
2988 (6, short_channel_id, required)