1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Wire messages, traits representing wire message handlers, and a few error types live here.
12 //! For a normal node you probably don't need to use anything here, however, if you wish to split a
13 //! node into an internet-facing route/message socket handling daemon and a separate daemon (or
14 //! server entirely) which handles only channel-related messages you may wish to implement
15 //! [`ChannelMessageHandler`] yourself and use it to re-serialize messages and pass them across
18 //! Note that if you go with such an architecture (instead of passing raw socket events to a
19 //! non-internet-facing system) you trust the frontend internet-facing system to not lie about the
20 //! source `node_id` of the message, however this does allow you to significantly reduce bandwidth
21 //! between the systems as routing messages can represent a significant chunk of bandwidth usage
22 //! (especially for non-channel-publicly-announcing nodes). As an alternate design which avoids
23 //! this issue, if you have sufficient bidirectional bandwidth between your systems, you may send
24 //! raw socket events into your non-internet-facing system and then send routing events back to
25 //! track the network on the less-secure system.
27 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
28 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature;
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
30 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
33 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
34 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
35 use crate::onion_message;
37 use crate::prelude::*;
40 use crate::io::{self, Read};
41 use crate::io_extras::read_to_end;
43 use crate::events::{MessageSendEventsProvider, OnionMessageProvider};
44 use crate::util::logger;
45 use crate::util::ser::{LengthReadable, Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, FixedLengthReader, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize, Hostname};
47 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
49 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
51 /// 21 million * 10^8 * 1000
52 pub(crate) const MAX_VALUE_MSAT: u64 = 21_000_000_0000_0000_000;
55 /// A partial signature that also contains the Musig2 nonce its signer used
56 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
57 pub struct PartialSignatureWithNonce(pub musig2::types::PartialSignature, pub musig2::types::PublicNonce);
59 /// An error in decoding a message or struct.
60 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
61 pub enum DecodeError {
62 /// A version byte specified something we don't know how to handle.
64 /// Includes unknown realm byte in an onion hop data packet.
66 /// Unknown feature mandating we fail to parse message (e.g., TLV with an even, unknown type)
67 UnknownRequiredFeature,
68 /// Value was invalid.
70 /// For example, a byte which was supposed to be a bool was something other than a 0
71 /// or 1, a public key/private key/signature was invalid, text wasn't UTF-8, TLV was
72 /// syntactically incorrect, etc.
74 /// The buffer to be read was too short.
76 /// A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly.
78 /// Error from [`std::io`].
80 /// The message included zlib-compressed values, which we don't support.
81 UnsupportedCompression,
84 /// An [`init`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
86 /// [`init`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-init-message
87 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
89 /// The relevant features which the sender supports.
90 pub features: InitFeatures,
91 /// The receipient's network address.
93 /// This adds the option to report a remote IP address back to a connecting peer using the init
94 /// message. A node can decide to use that information to discover a potential update to its
95 /// public IPv4 address (NAT) and use that for a [`NodeAnnouncement`] update message containing
97 pub remote_network_address: Option<NetAddress>,
100 /// An [`error`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
102 /// [`error`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-error-and-warning-messages
103 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
104 pub struct ErrorMessage {
105 /// The channel ID involved in the error.
107 /// All-0s indicates a general error unrelated to a specific channel, after which all channels
108 /// with the sending peer should be closed.
109 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
110 /// A possibly human-readable error description.
112 /// The string should be sanitized before it is used (e.g., emitted to logs or printed to
113 /// `stdout`). Otherwise, a well crafted error message may trigger a security vulnerability in
114 /// the terminal emulator or the logging subsystem.
118 /// A [`warning`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
120 /// [`warning`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-error-and-warning-messages
121 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
122 pub struct WarningMessage {
123 /// The channel ID involved in the warning.
125 /// All-0s indicates a warning unrelated to a specific channel.
126 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
127 /// A possibly human-readable warning description.
129 /// The string should be sanitized before it is used (e.g. emitted to logs or printed to
130 /// stdout). Otherwise, a well crafted error message may trigger a security vulnerability in
131 /// the terminal emulator or the logging subsystem.
135 /// A [`ping`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
137 /// [`ping`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-ping-and-pong-messages
138 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
140 /// The desired response length.
142 /// The ping packet size.
144 /// This field is not sent on the wire. byteslen zeros are sent.
148 /// A [`pong`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
150 /// [`pong`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-ping-and-pong-messages
151 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
153 /// The pong packet size.
155 /// This field is not sent on the wire. byteslen zeros are sent.
159 /// An [`open_channel`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
161 /// [`open_channel`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-open_channel-message
162 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
163 pub struct OpenChannel {
164 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
165 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
166 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
167 pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
168 /// The channel value
169 pub funding_satoshis: u64,
170 /// The amount to push to the counterparty as part of the open, in milli-satoshi
172 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by sender will be omitted
173 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
174 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards sender, in milli-satoshi
175 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
176 /// The minimum value unencumbered by HTLCs for the counterparty to keep in the channel
177 pub channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
178 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
179 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
180 /// The feerate per 1000-weight of sender generated transactions, until updated by
182 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
183 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if
184 /// they broadcast a commitment transaction
185 pub to_self_delay: u16,
186 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards sender
187 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
188 /// The sender's key controlling the funding transaction
189 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
190 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
191 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
192 /// A payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
193 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
194 /// Used to derive a payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by sender
195 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
196 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to sender
197 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
198 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-sender transaction's per commitment point
199 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
200 /// The channel flags to be used
201 pub channel_flags: u8,
202 /// Optionally, a request to pre-set the to-sender output's `scriptPubkey` for when we collaboratively close
203 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField<Script>,
204 /// The channel type that this channel will represent
206 /// If this is `None`, we derive the channel type from the intersection of our
207 /// feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from the [`Init`] message.
208 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
211 /// An [`accept_channel`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
213 /// [`accept_channel`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-accept_channel-message
214 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
215 pub struct AcceptChannel {
216 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
217 pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
218 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by sender will be omitted
219 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
220 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards sender, in milli-satoshi
221 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
222 /// The minimum value unencumbered by HTLCs for the counterparty to keep in the channel
223 pub channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
224 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
225 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
226 /// Minimum depth of the funding transaction before the channel is considered open
227 pub minimum_depth: u32,
228 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if they broadcast a commitment transaction
229 pub to_self_delay: u16,
230 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards sender
231 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
232 /// The sender's key controlling the funding transaction
233 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
234 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
235 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
236 /// A payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
237 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
238 /// Used to derive a payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by sender
239 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
240 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
241 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
242 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-sender transaction's per commitment point
243 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
244 /// Optionally, a request to pre-set the to-sender output's scriptPubkey for when we collaboratively close
245 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField<Script>,
246 /// The channel type that this channel will represent.
248 /// If this is `None`, we derive the channel type from the intersection of
249 /// our feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from the [`Init`] message.
250 /// This is required to match the equivalent field in [`OpenChannel::channel_type`].
251 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
253 /// Next nonce the channel initiator should use to create a funding output signature against
254 pub next_local_nonce: Option<musig2::types::PublicNonce>,
257 /// A [`funding_created`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
259 /// [`funding_created`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-funding_created-message
260 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
261 pub struct FundingCreated {
262 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding is established
263 pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
264 /// The funding transaction ID
265 pub funding_txid: Txid,
266 /// The specific output index funding this channel
267 pub funding_output_index: u16,
268 /// The signature of the channel initiator (funder) on the initial commitment transaction
269 pub signature: Signature,
271 /// The partial signature of the channel initiator (funder)
272 pub partial_signature_with_nonce: Option<PartialSignatureWithNonce>,
274 /// Next nonce the channel acceptor should use to finalize the funding output signature
275 pub next_local_nonce: Option<musig2::types::PublicNonce>
278 /// A [`funding_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
280 /// [`funding_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-funding_signed-message
281 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
282 pub struct FundingSigned {
284 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
285 /// The signature of the channel acceptor (fundee) on the initial commitment transaction
286 pub signature: Signature,
289 /// A [`channel_ready`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
291 /// [`channel_ready`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-channel_ready-message
292 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
293 pub struct ChannelReady {
295 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
296 /// The per-commitment point of the second commitment transaction
297 pub next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
298 /// If set, provides a `short_channel_id` alias for this channel.
300 /// The sender will accept payments to be forwarded over this SCID and forward them to this
301 /// messages' recipient.
302 pub short_channel_id_alias: Option<u64>,
305 /// A [`shutdown`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
307 /// [`shutdown`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#closing-initiation-shutdown
308 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
309 pub struct Shutdown {
311 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
312 /// The destination of this peer's funds on closing.
314 /// Must be in one of these forms: P2PKH, P2SH, P2WPKH, P2WSH, P2TR.
315 pub scriptpubkey: Script,
318 /// The minimum and maximum fees which the sender is willing to place on the closing transaction.
320 /// This is provided in [`ClosingSigned`] by both sides to indicate the fee range they are willing
322 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
323 pub struct ClosingSignedFeeRange {
324 /// The minimum absolute fee, in satoshis, which the sender is willing to place on the closing
326 pub min_fee_satoshis: u64,
327 /// The maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, which the sender is willing to place on the closing
329 pub max_fee_satoshis: u64,
332 /// A [`closing_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
334 /// [`closing_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#closing-negotiation-closing_signed
335 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
336 pub struct ClosingSigned {
338 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
339 /// The proposed total fee for the closing transaction
340 pub fee_satoshis: u64,
341 /// A signature on the closing transaction
342 pub signature: Signature,
343 /// The minimum and maximum fees which the sender is willing to accept, provided only by new
345 pub fee_range: Option<ClosingSignedFeeRange>,
348 /// An [`update_add_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
350 /// [`update_add_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#adding-an-htlc-update_add_htlc
351 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
352 pub struct UpdateAddHTLC {
354 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
357 /// The HTLC value in milli-satoshi
358 pub amount_msat: u64,
359 /// The payment hash, the pre-image of which controls HTLC redemption
360 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
361 /// The expiry height of the HTLC
362 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
363 pub(crate) onion_routing_packet: OnionPacket,
366 /// An onion message to be sent to or received from a peer.
368 // TODO: update with link to OM when they are merged into the BOLTs
369 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
370 pub struct OnionMessage {
371 /// Used in decrypting the onion packet's payload.
372 pub blinding_point: PublicKey,
373 pub(crate) onion_routing_packet: onion_message::Packet,
376 /// An [`update_fulfill_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
378 /// [`update_fulfill_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
379 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
380 pub struct UpdateFulfillHTLC {
382 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
385 /// The pre-image of the payment hash, allowing HTLC redemption
386 pub payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
389 /// An [`update_fail_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
391 /// [`update_fail_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
392 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
393 pub struct UpdateFailHTLC {
395 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
398 pub(crate) reason: OnionErrorPacket,
401 /// An [`update_fail_malformed_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
403 /// [`update_fail_malformed_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
404 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
405 pub struct UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
407 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
410 pub(crate) sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
412 pub failure_code: u16,
415 /// A [`commitment_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
417 /// [`commitment_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#committing-updates-so-far-commitment_signed
418 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
419 pub struct CommitmentSigned {
421 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
422 /// A signature on the commitment transaction
423 pub signature: Signature,
424 /// Signatures on the HTLC transactions
425 pub htlc_signatures: Vec<Signature>,
428 /// A [`revoke_and_ack`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
430 /// [`revoke_and_ack`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#completing-the-transition-to-the-updated-state-revoke_and_ack
431 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
432 pub struct RevokeAndACK {
434 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
435 /// The secret corresponding to the per-commitment point
436 pub per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
437 /// The next sender-broadcast commitment transaction's per-commitment point
438 pub next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
441 /// An [`update_fee`] message to be sent to or received from a peer
443 /// [`update_fee`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#updating-fees-update_fee
444 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
445 pub struct UpdateFee {
447 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
448 /// Fee rate per 1000-weight of the transaction
449 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
452 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
453 /// Proof that the sender knows the per-commitment secret of the previous commitment transaction.
455 /// This is used to convince the recipient that the channel is at a certain commitment
456 /// number even if they lost that data due to a local failure. Of course, the peer may lie
457 /// and even later commitments may have been revoked.
458 pub struct DataLossProtect {
459 /// Proof that the sender knows the per-commitment secret of a specific commitment transaction
460 /// belonging to the recipient
461 pub your_last_per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
462 /// The sender's per-commitment point for their current commitment transaction
463 pub my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
466 /// A [`channel_reestablish`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
468 /// [`channel_reestablish`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#message-retransmission
469 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
470 pub struct ChannelReestablish {
472 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
473 /// The next commitment number for the sender
474 pub next_local_commitment_number: u64,
475 /// The next commitment number for the recipient
476 pub next_remote_commitment_number: u64,
477 /// Optionally, a field proving that next_remote_commitment_number-1 has been revoked
478 pub data_loss_protect: OptionalField<DataLossProtect>,
481 /// An [`announcement_signatures`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
483 /// [`announcement_signatures`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-announcement_signatures-message
484 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
485 pub struct AnnouncementSignatures {
487 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
488 /// The short channel ID
489 pub short_channel_id: u64,
490 /// A signature by the node key
491 pub node_signature: Signature,
492 /// A signature by the funding key
493 pub bitcoin_signature: Signature,
496 /// An address which can be used to connect to a remote peer.
497 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
498 pub enum NetAddress {
499 /// An IPv4 address/port on which the peer is listening.
501 /// The 4-byte IPv4 address
503 /// The port on which the node is listening
506 /// An IPv6 address/port on which the peer is listening.
508 /// The 16-byte IPv6 address
510 /// The port on which the node is listening
513 /// An old-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening.
515 /// This field is deprecated and the Tor network generally no longer supports V2 Onion
516 /// addresses. Thus, the details are not parsed here.
518 /// A new-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening.
520 /// To create the human-readable "hostname", concatenate the ED25519 pubkey, checksum, and version,
521 /// wrap as base32 and append ".onion".
523 /// The ed25519 long-term public key of the peer
524 ed25519_pubkey: [u8; 32],
525 /// The checksum of the pubkey and version, as included in the onion address
527 /// The version byte, as defined by the Tor Onion v3 spec.
529 /// The port on which the node is listening
532 /// A hostname/port on which the peer is listening.
534 /// The hostname on which the node is listening.
536 /// The port on which the node is listening.
541 /// Gets the ID of this address type. Addresses in [`NodeAnnouncement`] messages should be sorted
543 pub(crate) fn get_id(&self) -> u8 {
545 &NetAddress::IPv4 {..} => { 1 },
546 &NetAddress::IPv6 {..} => { 2 },
547 &NetAddress::OnionV2(_) => { 3 },
548 &NetAddress::OnionV3 {..} => { 4 },
549 &NetAddress::Hostname {..} => { 5 },
553 /// Strict byte-length of address descriptor, 1-byte type not recorded
554 fn len(&self) -> u16 {
556 &NetAddress::IPv4 { .. } => { 6 },
557 &NetAddress::IPv6 { .. } => { 18 },
558 &NetAddress::OnionV2(_) => { 12 },
559 &NetAddress::OnionV3 { .. } => { 37 },
560 // Consists of 1-byte hostname length, hostname bytes, and 2-byte port.
561 &NetAddress::Hostname { ref hostname, .. } => { u16::from(hostname.len()) + 3 },
565 /// The maximum length of any address descriptor, not including the 1-byte type.
566 /// This maximum length is reached by a hostname address descriptor:
567 /// a hostname with a maximum length of 255, its 1-byte length and a 2-byte port.
568 pub(crate) const MAX_LEN: u16 = 258;
571 impl Writeable for NetAddress {
572 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
574 &NetAddress::IPv4 { ref addr, ref port } => {
579 &NetAddress::IPv6 { ref addr, ref port } => {
584 &NetAddress::OnionV2(bytes) => {
586 bytes.write(writer)?;
588 &NetAddress::OnionV3 { ref ed25519_pubkey, ref checksum, ref version, ref port } => {
590 ed25519_pubkey.write(writer)?;
591 checksum.write(writer)?;
592 version.write(writer)?;
595 &NetAddress::Hostname { ref hostname, ref port } => {
597 hostname.write(writer)?;
605 impl Readable for Result<NetAddress, u8> {
606 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Result<NetAddress, u8>, DecodeError> {
607 let byte = <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
610 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::IPv4 {
611 addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
612 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
616 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::IPv6 {
617 addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
618 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
621 3 => Ok(Ok(NetAddress::OnionV2(Readable::read(reader)?))),
623 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::OnionV3 {
624 ed25519_pubkey: Readable::read(reader)?,
625 checksum: Readable::read(reader)?,
626 version: Readable::read(reader)?,
627 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
631 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::Hostname {
632 hostname: Readable::read(reader)?,
633 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
636 _ => return Ok(Err(byte)),
641 impl Readable for NetAddress {
642 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NetAddress, DecodeError> {
643 match Readable::read(reader) {
644 Ok(Ok(res)) => Ok(res),
645 Ok(Err(_)) => Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion),
651 /// Represents the set of gossip messages that require a signature from a node's identity key.
652 pub enum UnsignedGossipMessage<'a> {
653 /// An unsigned channel announcement.
654 ChannelAnnouncement(&'a UnsignedChannelAnnouncement),
655 /// An unsigned channel update.
656 ChannelUpdate(&'a UnsignedChannelUpdate),
657 /// An unsigned node announcement.
658 NodeAnnouncement(&'a UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)
661 impl<'a> Writeable for UnsignedGossipMessage<'a> {
662 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
664 UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
665 UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
666 UnsignedGossipMessage::NodeAnnouncement(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
671 /// The unsigned part of a [`node_announcement`] message.
673 /// [`node_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-node_announcement-message
674 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
675 pub struct UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
676 /// The advertised features
677 pub features: NodeFeatures,
678 /// A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed
680 /// The `node_id` this announcement originated from (don't rebroadcast the `node_announcement` back
683 /// An RGB color for UI purposes
685 /// An alias, for UI purposes.
687 /// This should be sanitized before use. There is no guarantee of uniqueness.
689 /// List of addresses on which this node is reachable
690 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
691 pub(crate) excess_address_data: Vec<u8>,
692 pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
694 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
695 /// A [`node_announcement`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
697 /// [`node_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-node_announcement-message
698 pub struct NodeAnnouncement {
699 /// The signature by the node key
700 pub signature: Signature,
701 /// The actual content of the announcement
702 pub contents: UnsignedNodeAnnouncement,
705 /// The unsigned part of a [`channel_announcement`] message.
707 /// [`channel_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_announcement-message
708 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
709 pub struct UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
710 /// The advertised channel features
711 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
712 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
713 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
714 /// The short channel ID
715 pub short_channel_id: u64,
716 /// One of the two `node_id`s which are endpoints of this channel
717 pub node_id_1: NodeId,
718 /// The other of the two `node_id`s which are endpoints of this channel
719 pub node_id_2: NodeId,
720 /// The funding key for the first node
721 pub bitcoin_key_1: NodeId,
722 /// The funding key for the second node
723 pub bitcoin_key_2: NodeId,
724 pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
726 /// A [`channel_announcement`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
728 /// [`channel_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_announcement-message
729 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
730 pub struct ChannelAnnouncement {
731 /// Authentication of the announcement by the first public node
732 pub node_signature_1: Signature,
733 /// Authentication of the announcement by the second public node
734 pub node_signature_2: Signature,
735 /// Proof of funding UTXO ownership by the first public node
736 pub bitcoin_signature_1: Signature,
737 /// Proof of funding UTXO ownership by the second public node
738 pub bitcoin_signature_2: Signature,
739 /// The actual announcement
740 pub contents: UnsignedChannelAnnouncement,
743 /// The unsigned part of a [`channel_update`] message.
745 /// [`channel_update`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_update-message
746 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
747 pub struct UnsignedChannelUpdate {
748 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
749 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
750 /// The short channel ID
751 pub short_channel_id: u64,
752 /// A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed, specific to this channel
756 /// The number of blocks such that if:
757 /// `incoming_htlc.cltv_expiry < outgoing_htlc.cltv_expiry + cltv_expiry_delta`
758 /// then we need to fail the HTLC backwards. When forwarding an HTLC, `cltv_expiry_delta` determines
759 /// the outgoing HTLC's minimum `cltv_expiry` value -- so, if an incoming HTLC comes in with a
760 /// `cltv_expiry` of 100000, and the node we're forwarding to has a `cltv_expiry_delta` value of 10,
761 /// then we'll check that the outgoing HTLC's `cltv_expiry` value is at least 100010 before
762 /// forwarding. Note that the HTLC sender is the one who originally sets this value when
763 /// constructing the route.
764 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
765 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
766 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
767 /// The maximum HTLC value incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi.
769 /// This used to be optional.
770 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
771 /// The base HTLC fee charged by sender, in milli-satoshi
772 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
773 /// The amount to fee multiplier, in micro-satoshi
774 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
775 /// Excess data which was signed as a part of the message which we do not (yet) understand how
778 /// This is stored to ensure forward-compatibility as new fields are added to the lightning gossip protocol.
779 pub excess_data: Vec<u8>,
781 /// A [`channel_update`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
783 /// [`channel_update`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_update-message
784 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
785 pub struct ChannelUpdate {
786 /// A signature of the channel update
787 pub signature: Signature,
788 /// The actual channel update
789 pub contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate,
792 /// A [`query_channel_range`] message is used to query a peer for channel
793 /// UTXOs in a range of blocks. The recipient of a query makes a best
794 /// effort to reply to the query using one or more [`ReplyChannelRange`]
797 /// [`query_channel_range`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_channel_range-and-reply_channel_range-messages
798 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
799 pub struct QueryChannelRange {
800 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
801 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
802 /// The height of the first block for the channel UTXOs being queried
803 pub first_blocknum: u32,
804 /// The number of blocks to include in the query results
805 pub number_of_blocks: u32,
808 /// A [`reply_channel_range`] message is a reply to a [`QueryChannelRange`]
811 /// Multiple `reply_channel_range` messages can be sent in reply
812 /// to a single [`QueryChannelRange`] message. The query recipient makes a
813 /// best effort to respond based on their local network view which may
814 /// not be a perfect view of the network. The `short_channel_id`s in the
815 /// reply are encoded. We only support `encoding_type=0` uncompressed
816 /// serialization and do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization.
818 /// [`reply_channel_range`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_channel_range-and-reply_channel_range-messages
819 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
820 pub struct ReplyChannelRange {
821 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
822 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
823 /// The height of the first block in the range of the reply
824 pub first_blocknum: u32,
825 /// The number of blocks included in the range of the reply
826 pub number_of_blocks: u32,
827 /// True when this is the final reply for a query
828 pub sync_complete: bool,
829 /// The `short_channel_id`s in the channel range
830 pub short_channel_ids: Vec<u64>,
833 /// A [`query_short_channel_ids`] message is used to query a peer for
834 /// routing gossip messages related to one or more `short_channel_id`s.
836 /// The query recipient will reply with the latest, if available,
837 /// [`ChannelAnnouncement`], [`ChannelUpdate`] and [`NodeAnnouncement`] messages
838 /// it maintains for the requested `short_channel_id`s followed by a
839 /// [`ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd`] message. The `short_channel_id`s sent in
840 /// this query are encoded. We only support `encoding_type=0` uncompressed
841 /// serialization and do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization.
843 /// [`query_short_channel_ids`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_short_channel_idsreply_short_channel_ids_end-messages
844 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
845 pub struct QueryShortChannelIds {
846 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
847 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
848 /// The short_channel_ids that are being queried
849 pub short_channel_ids: Vec<u64>,
852 /// A [`reply_short_channel_ids_end`] message is sent as a reply to a
853 /// message. The query recipient makes a best
854 /// effort to respond based on their local network view which may not be
855 /// a perfect view of the network.
857 /// [`reply_short_channel_ids_end`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_short_channel_idsreply_short_channel_ids_end-messages
858 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
859 pub struct ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
860 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain that was queried
861 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
862 /// Indicates if the query recipient maintains up-to-date channel
863 /// information for the `chain_hash`
864 pub full_information: bool,
867 /// A [`gossip_timestamp_filter`] message is used by a node to request
868 /// gossip relay for messages in the requested time range when the
869 /// `gossip_queries` feature has been negotiated.
871 /// [`gossip_timestamp_filter`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-gossip_timestamp_filter-message
872 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
873 pub struct GossipTimestampFilter {
874 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain for channel and node information
875 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
876 /// The starting unix timestamp
877 pub first_timestamp: u32,
878 /// The range of information in seconds
879 pub timestamp_range: u32,
882 /// Encoding type for data compression of collections in gossip queries.
884 /// We do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization [defined in BOLT
885 /// #7](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#query-messages).
890 /// Used to put an error message in a [`LightningError`].
891 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
892 pub enum ErrorAction {
893 /// The peer took some action which made us think they were useless. Disconnect them.
895 /// An error message which we should make an effort to send before we disconnect.
896 msg: Option<ErrorMessage>
898 /// The peer did something harmless that we weren't able to process, just log and ignore
899 // New code should *not* use this. New code must use IgnoreAndLog, below!
901 /// The peer did something harmless that we weren't able to meaningfully process.
902 /// If the error is logged, log it at the given level.
903 IgnoreAndLog(logger::Level),
904 /// The peer provided us with a gossip message which we'd already seen. In most cases this
905 /// should be ignored, but it may result in the message being forwarded if it is a duplicate of
906 /// our own channel announcements.
907 IgnoreDuplicateGossip,
908 /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them.
910 /// The message to send.
913 /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them without closing any channels.
915 /// The message to send.
917 /// The peer may have done something harmless that we weren't able to meaningfully process,
918 /// though we should still tell them about it.
919 /// If this event is logged, log it at the given level.
920 log_level: logger::Level,
924 /// An Err type for failure to process messages.
925 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
926 pub struct LightningError {
927 /// A human-readable message describing the error
929 /// The action which should be taken against the offending peer.
930 pub action: ErrorAction,
933 /// Struct used to return values from [`RevokeAndACK`] messages, containing a bunch of commitment
934 /// transaction updates if they were pending.
935 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
936 pub struct CommitmentUpdate {
937 /// `update_add_htlc` messages which should be sent
938 pub update_add_htlcs: Vec<UpdateAddHTLC>,
939 /// `update_fulfill_htlc` messages which should be sent
940 pub update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
941 /// `update_fail_htlc` messages which should be sent
942 pub update_fail_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFailHTLC>,
943 /// `update_fail_malformed_htlc` messages which should be sent
944 pub update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFailMalformedHTLC>,
945 /// An `update_fee` message which should be sent
946 pub update_fee: Option<UpdateFee>,
947 /// A `commitment_signed` message which should be sent
948 pub commitment_signed: CommitmentSigned,
951 /// Messages could have optional fields to use with extended features
952 /// As we wish to serialize these differently from `Option<T>`s (`Options` get a tag byte, but
953 /// [`OptionalField`] simply gets `Present` if there are enough bytes to read into it), we have a
954 /// separate enum type for them.
956 /// This is not exported to bindings users due to a free generic in `T`
957 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
958 pub enum OptionalField<T> {
959 /// Optional field is included in message
961 /// Optional field is absent in message
965 /// A trait to describe an object which can receive channel messages.
967 /// Messages MAY be called in parallel when they originate from different `their_node_ids`, however
968 /// they MUST NOT be called in parallel when the two calls have the same `their_node_id`.
969 pub trait ChannelMessageHandler : MessageSendEventsProvider {
971 /// Handle an incoming `open_channel` message from the given peer.
972 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OpenChannel);
973 /// Handle an incoming `accept_channel` message from the given peer.
974 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AcceptChannel);
975 /// Handle an incoming `funding_created` message from the given peer.
976 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingCreated);
977 /// Handle an incoming `funding_signed` message from the given peer.
978 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingSigned);
979 /// Handle an incoming `channel_ready` message from the given peer.
980 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelReady);
983 /// Handle an incoming `shutdown` message from the given peer.
984 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Shutdown);
985 /// Handle an incoming `closing_signed` message from the given peer.
986 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ClosingSigned);
989 /// Handle an incoming `update_add_htlc` message from the given peer.
990 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateAddHTLC);
991 /// Handle an incoming `update_fulfill_htlc` message from the given peer.
992 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFulfillHTLC);
993 /// Handle an incoming `update_fail_htlc` message from the given peer.
994 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFailHTLC);
995 /// Handle an incoming `update_fail_malformed_htlc` message from the given peer.
996 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFailMalformedHTLC);
997 /// Handle an incoming `commitment_signed` message from the given peer.
998 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &CommitmentSigned);
999 /// Handle an incoming `revoke_and_ack` message from the given peer.
1000 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &RevokeAndACK);
1002 /// Handle an incoming `update_fee` message from the given peer.
1003 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFee);
1005 // Channel-to-announce:
1006 /// Handle an incoming `announcement_signatures` message from the given peer.
1007 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AnnouncementSignatures);
1009 // Connection loss/reestablish:
1010 /// Indicates a connection to the peer failed/an existing connection was lost.
1011 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey);
1013 /// Handle a peer reconnecting, possibly generating `channel_reestablish` message(s).
1015 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1016 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1017 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1018 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1019 /// Handle an incoming `channel_reestablish` message from the given peer.
1020 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelReestablish);
1022 /// Handle an incoming `channel_update` message from the given peer.
1023 fn handle_channel_update(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelUpdate);
1026 /// Handle an incoming `error` message from the given peer.
1027 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ErrorMessage);
1029 // Handler information:
1030 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1031 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1032 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1033 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1035 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1036 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1037 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1039 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1040 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1043 /// A trait to describe an object which can receive routing messages.
1045 /// # Implementor DoS Warnings
1047 /// For messages enabled with the `gossip_queries` feature there are potential DoS vectors when
1048 /// handling inbound queries. Implementors using an on-disk network graph should be aware of
1049 /// repeated disk I/O for queries accessing different parts of the network graph.
1050 pub trait RoutingMessageHandler : MessageSendEventsProvider {
1051 /// Handle an incoming `node_announcement` message, returning `true` if it should be forwarded on,
1052 /// `false` or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1053 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1054 /// Handle a `channel_announcement` message, returning `true` if it should be forwarded on, `false`
1055 /// or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1056 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1057 /// Handle an incoming `channel_update` message, returning true if it should be forwarded on,
1058 /// `false` or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1059 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1060 /// Gets channel announcements and updates required to dump our routing table to a remote node,
1061 /// starting at the `short_channel_id` indicated by `starting_point` and including announcements
1062 /// for a single channel.
1063 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)>;
1064 /// Gets a node announcement required to dump our routing table to a remote node, starting at
1065 /// the node *after* the provided pubkey and including up to one announcement immediately
1066 /// higher (as defined by `<PublicKey as Ord>::cmp`) than `starting_point`.
1067 /// If `None` is provided for `starting_point`, we start at the first node.
1068 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&NodeId>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement>;
1069 /// Called when a connection is established with a peer. This can be used to
1070 /// perform routing table synchronization using a strategy defined by the
1073 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1074 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1075 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1076 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1077 /// Handles the reply of a query we initiated to learn about channels
1078 /// for a given range of blocks. We can expect to receive one or more
1079 /// replies to a single query.
1080 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1081 /// Handles the reply of a query we initiated asking for routing gossip
1082 /// messages for a list of channels. We should receive this message when
1083 /// a node has completed its best effort to send us the pertaining routing
1084 /// gossip messages.
1085 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1086 /// Handles when a peer asks us to send a list of `short_channel_id`s
1087 /// for the requested range of blocks.
1088 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1089 /// Handles when a peer asks us to send routing gossip messages for a
1090 /// list of `short_channel_id`s.
1091 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1093 // Handler queueing status:
1094 /// Indicates that there are a large number of [`ChannelAnnouncement`] (or other) messages
1095 /// pending some async action. While there is no guarantee of the rate of future messages, the
1096 /// caller should seek to reduce the rate of new gossip messages handled, especially
1097 /// [`ChannelAnnouncement`]s.
1098 fn processing_queue_high(&self) -> bool;
1100 // Handler information:
1101 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1102 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1103 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1104 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1105 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1106 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1107 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1109 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1110 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1113 /// A trait to describe an object that can receive onion messages.
1114 pub trait OnionMessageHandler : OnionMessageProvider {
1115 /// Handle an incoming `onion_message` message from the given peer.
1116 fn handle_onion_message(&self, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OnionMessage);
1117 /// Called when a connection is established with a peer. Can be used to track which peers
1118 /// advertise onion message support and are online.
1120 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1121 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1122 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1123 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1124 /// Indicates a connection to the peer failed/an existing connection was lost. Allows handlers to
1125 /// drop and refuse to forward onion messages to this peer.
1126 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey);
1128 // Handler information:
1129 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1130 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1131 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1132 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1134 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1135 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1136 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1138 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1139 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1142 mod fuzzy_internal_msgs {
1143 use crate::prelude::*;
1144 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
1146 // These types aren't intended to be pub, but are exposed for direct fuzzing (as we deserialize
1147 // them from untrusted input):
1149 pub(crate) struct FinalOnionHopData {
1150 pub(crate) payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
1151 /// The total value, in msat, of the payment as received by the ultimate recipient.
1152 /// Message serialization may panic if this value is more than 21 million Bitcoin.
1153 pub(crate) total_msat: u64,
1156 pub(crate) enum OnionHopDataFormat {
1158 short_channel_id: u64,
1161 payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData>,
1162 keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
1166 pub struct OnionHopData {
1167 pub(crate) format: OnionHopDataFormat,
1168 /// The value, in msat, of the payment after this hop's fee is deducted.
1169 /// Message serialization may panic if this value is more than 21 million Bitcoin.
1170 pub(crate) amt_to_forward: u64,
1171 pub(crate) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
1174 pub struct DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
1175 pub(crate) hmac: [u8; 32],
1176 pub(crate) failuremsg: Vec<u8>,
1177 pub(crate) pad: Vec<u8>,
1181 pub use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*;
1182 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
1183 pub(crate) use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*;
1186 pub(crate) struct OnionPacket {
1187 pub(crate) version: u8,
1188 /// In order to ensure we always return an error on onion decode in compliance with [BOLT
1189 /// #4](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md), we have to
1190 /// deserialize `OnionPacket`s contained in [`UpdateAddHTLC`] messages even if the ephemeral
1191 /// public key (here) is bogus, so we hold a [`Result`] instead of a [`PublicKey`] as we'd
1193 pub(crate) public_key: Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>,
1194 pub(crate) hop_data: [u8; 20*65],
1195 pub(crate) hmac: [u8; 32],
1198 impl onion_utils::Packet for OnionPacket {
1199 type Data = onion_utils::FixedSizeOnionPacket;
1200 fn new(pubkey: PublicKey, hop_data: onion_utils::FixedSizeOnionPacket, hmac: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
1203 public_key: Ok(pubkey),
1204 hop_data: hop_data.0,
1210 impl Eq for OnionPacket { }
1211 impl PartialEq for OnionPacket {
1212 fn eq(&self, other: &OnionPacket) -> bool {
1213 for (i, j) in self.hop_data.iter().zip(other.hop_data.iter()) {
1214 if i != j { return false; }
1216 self.version == other.version &&
1217 self.public_key == other.public_key &&
1218 self.hmac == other.hmac
1222 impl fmt::Debug for OnionPacket {
1223 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
1224 f.write_fmt(format_args!("OnionPacket version {} with hmac {:?}", self.version, &self.hmac[..]))
1228 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1229 pub(crate) struct OnionErrorPacket {
1230 // This really should be a constant size slice, but the spec lets these things be up to 128KB?
1231 // (TODO) We limit it in decode to much lower...
1232 pub(crate) data: Vec<u8>,
1235 impl fmt::Display for DecodeError {
1236 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
1238 DecodeError::UnknownVersion => f.write_str("Unknown realm byte in Onion packet"),
1239 DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature => f.write_str("Unknown required feature preventing decode"),
1240 DecodeError::InvalidValue => f.write_str("Nonsense bytes didn't map to the type they were interpreted as"),
1241 DecodeError::ShortRead => f.write_str("Packet extended beyond the provided bytes"),
1242 DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor => f.write_str("A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly"),
1243 DecodeError::Io(ref e) => fmt::Debug::fmt(e, f),
1244 DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression => f.write_str("We don't support receiving messages with zlib-compressed fields"),
1249 impl From<io::Error> for DecodeError {
1250 fn from(e: io::Error) -> Self {
1251 if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof {
1252 DecodeError::ShortRead
1254 DecodeError::Io(e.kind())
1259 impl Writeable for OptionalField<Script> {
1260 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1262 OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1263 // Note that Writeable for script includes the 16-bit length tag for us
1266 OptionalField::Absent => {}
1272 impl Readable for OptionalField<Script> {
1273 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1274 match <u16 as Readable>::read(r) {
1276 let mut buf = vec![0; len as usize];
1277 r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
1278 Ok(OptionalField::Present(Script::from(buf)))
1280 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(OptionalField::Absent),
1286 impl Writeable for OptionalField<u64> {
1287 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1289 OptionalField::Present(ref value) => {
1292 OptionalField::Absent => {}
1298 impl Readable for OptionalField<u64> {
1299 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1300 let value: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
1301 Ok(OptionalField::Present(value))
1305 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
1306 impl_writeable_msg!(AcceptChannel, {
1307 temporary_channel_id,
1308 dust_limit_satoshis,
1309 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1310 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1316 revocation_basepoint,
1318 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1320 first_per_commitment_point,
1321 shutdown_scriptpubkey
1323 (1, channel_type, option),
1327 impl_writeable_msg!(AcceptChannel, {
1328 temporary_channel_id,
1329 dust_limit_satoshis,
1330 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1331 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1337 revocation_basepoint,
1339 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1341 first_per_commitment_point,
1342 shutdown_scriptpubkey
1344 (1, channel_type, option),
1345 (4, next_local_nonce, option),
1348 impl_writeable_msg!(AnnouncementSignatures, {
1355 impl Writeable for ChannelReestablish {
1356 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1357 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
1358 self.next_local_commitment_number.write(w)?;
1359 self.next_remote_commitment_number.write(w)?;
1360 match self.data_loss_protect {
1361 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss_protect) => {
1362 (*data_loss_protect).your_last_per_commitment_secret.write(w)?;
1363 (*data_loss_protect).my_current_per_commitment_point.write(w)?;
1365 OptionalField::Absent => {}
1371 impl Readable for ChannelReestablish{
1372 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1374 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1375 next_local_commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
1376 next_remote_commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
1377 data_loss_protect: {
1378 match <[u8; 32] as Readable>::read(r) {
1379 Ok(your_last_per_commitment_secret) =>
1380 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
1381 your_last_per_commitment_secret,
1382 my_current_per_commitment_point: Readable::read(r)?,
1384 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => OptionalField::Absent,
1385 Err(e) => return Err(e)
1392 impl_writeable_msg!(ClosingSigned,
1393 { channel_id, fee_satoshis, signature },
1394 { (1, fee_range, option) }
1397 impl_writeable!(ClosingSignedFeeRange, {
1402 impl_writeable_msg!(CommitmentSigned, {
1408 impl_writeable!(DecodedOnionErrorPacket, {
1414 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
1415 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingCreated, {
1416 temporary_channel_id,
1418 funding_output_index,
1422 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingCreated, {
1423 temporary_channel_id,
1425 funding_output_index,
1428 (2, partial_signature_with_nonce, option),
1429 (4, next_local_nonce, option)
1432 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingSigned, {
1437 impl_writeable_msg!(ChannelReady, {
1439 next_per_commitment_point,
1441 (1, short_channel_id_alias, option),
1444 impl Writeable for Init {
1445 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1446 // global_features gets the bottom 13 bits of our features, and local_features gets all of
1447 // our relevant feature bits. This keeps us compatible with old nodes.
1448 self.features.write_up_to_13(w)?;
1449 self.features.write(w)?;
1450 encode_tlv_stream!(w, {
1451 (3, self.remote_network_address, option)
1457 impl Readable for Init {
1458 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1459 let global_features: InitFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
1460 let features: InitFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
1461 let mut remote_network_address: Option<NetAddress> = None;
1462 decode_tlv_stream!(r, {
1463 (3, remote_network_address, option)
1466 features: features.or(global_features),
1467 remote_network_address,
1472 impl_writeable_msg!(OpenChannel, {
1474 temporary_channel_id,
1477 dust_limit_satoshis,
1478 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1479 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1485 revocation_basepoint,
1487 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1489 first_per_commitment_point,
1491 shutdown_scriptpubkey
1493 (1, channel_type, option),
1496 impl_writeable_msg!(RevokeAndACK, {
1498 per_commitment_secret,
1499 next_per_commitment_point
1502 impl_writeable_msg!(Shutdown, {
1507 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFailHTLC, {
1513 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, {
1520 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFee, {
1525 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFulfillHTLC, {
1531 // Note that this is written as a part of ChannelManager objects, and thus cannot change its
1532 // serialization format in a way which assumes we know the total serialized length/message end
1534 impl_writeable!(OnionErrorPacket, {
1538 // Note that this is written as a part of ChannelManager objects, and thus cannot change its
1539 // serialization format in a way which assumes we know the total serialized length/message end
1541 impl Writeable for OnionPacket {
1542 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1543 self.version.write(w)?;
1544 match self.public_key {
1545 Ok(pubkey) => pubkey.write(w)?,
1546 Err(_) => [0u8;33].write(w)?,
1548 w.write_all(&self.hop_data)?;
1549 self.hmac.write(w)?;
1554 impl Readable for OnionPacket {
1555 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1557 version: Readable::read(r)?,
1559 let mut buf = [0u8;33];
1560 r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
1561 PublicKey::from_slice(&buf)
1563 hop_data: Readable::read(r)?,
1564 hmac: Readable::read(r)?,
1569 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateAddHTLC, {
1575 onion_routing_packet
1578 impl Readable for OnionMessage {
1579 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1580 let blinding_point: PublicKey = Readable::read(r)?;
1581 let len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1582 let mut packet_reader = FixedLengthReader::new(r, len as u64);
1583 let onion_routing_packet: onion_message::Packet = <onion_message::Packet as LengthReadable>::read(&mut packet_reader)?;
1586 onion_routing_packet,
1591 impl Writeable for OnionMessage {
1592 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1593 self.blinding_point.write(w)?;
1594 let onion_packet_len = self.onion_routing_packet.serialized_length();
1595 (onion_packet_len as u16).write(w)?;
1596 self.onion_routing_packet.write(w)?;
1601 impl Writeable for FinalOnionHopData {
1602 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1603 self.payment_secret.0.write(w)?;
1604 HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.total_msat).write(w)
1608 impl Readable for FinalOnionHopData {
1609 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1610 let secret: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
1611 let amt: HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize<u64> = Readable::read(r)?;
1612 Ok(Self { payment_secret: PaymentSecret(secret), total_msat: amt.0 })
1616 impl Writeable for OnionHopData {
1617 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1619 OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => {
1620 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
1621 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.amt_to_forward), required),
1622 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
1623 (6, short_channel_id, required)
1626 OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { ref payment_data, ref keysend_preimage } => {
1627 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
1628 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.amt_to_forward), required),
1629 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
1630 (8, payment_data, option),
1631 (5482373484, keysend_preimage, option)
1639 impl Readable for OnionHopData {
1640 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1641 let mut amt = HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(0u64);
1642 let mut cltv_value = HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(0u32);
1643 let mut short_id: Option<u64> = None;
1644 let mut payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData> = None;
1645 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
1646 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
1648 (4, cltv_value, required),
1649 (6, short_id, option),
1650 (8, payment_data, option),
1651 // See https://github.com/lightning/blips/blob/master/blip-0003.md
1652 (5482373484, keysend_preimage, option)
1655 let format = if let Some(short_channel_id) = short_id {
1656 if payment_data.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
1657 OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
1661 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1662 if data.total_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1663 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1666 OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
1672 if amt.0 > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1673 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1677 amt_to_forward: amt.0,
1678 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv_value.0,
1683 // ReadableArgs because we need onion_utils::decode_next_hop to accommodate payment packets and
1684 // onion message packets.
1685 impl ReadableArgs<()> for OnionHopData {
1686 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R, _arg: ()) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1687 <Self as Readable>::read(r)
1691 impl Writeable for Ping {
1692 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1693 self.ponglen.write(w)?;
1694 vec![0u8; self.byteslen as usize].write(w)?; // size-unchecked write
1699 impl Readable for Ping {
1700 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1702 ponglen: Readable::read(r)?,
1704 let byteslen = Readable::read(r)?;
1705 r.read_exact(&mut vec![0u8; byteslen as usize][..])?;
1712 impl Writeable for Pong {
1713 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1714 vec![0u8; self.byteslen as usize].write(w)?; // size-unchecked write
1719 impl Readable for Pong {
1720 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1723 let byteslen = Readable::read(r)?;
1724 r.read_exact(&mut vec![0u8; byteslen as usize][..])?;
1731 impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1732 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1733 self.features.write(w)?;
1734 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
1735 self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
1736 self.node_id_1.write(w)?;
1737 self.node_id_2.write(w)?;
1738 self.bitcoin_key_1.write(w)?;
1739 self.bitcoin_key_2.write(w)?;
1740 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
1745 impl Readable for UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1746 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1748 features: Readable::read(r)?,
1749 chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
1750 short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1751 node_id_1: Readable::read(r)?,
1752 node_id_2: Readable::read(r)?,
1753 bitcoin_key_1: Readable::read(r)?,
1754 bitcoin_key_2: Readable::read(r)?,
1755 excess_data: read_to_end(r)?,
1760 impl_writeable!(ChannelAnnouncement, {
1763 bitcoin_signature_1,
1764 bitcoin_signature_2,
1768 impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1769 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1770 // `message_flags` used to indicate presence of `htlc_maximum_msat`, but was deprecated in the spec.
1771 const MESSAGE_FLAGS: u8 = 1;
1772 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
1773 self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
1774 self.timestamp.write(w)?;
1775 let all_flags = self.flags as u16 | ((MESSAGE_FLAGS as u16) << 8);
1776 all_flags.write(w)?;
1777 self.cltv_expiry_delta.write(w)?;
1778 self.htlc_minimum_msat.write(w)?;
1779 self.fee_base_msat.write(w)?;
1780 self.fee_proportional_millionths.write(w)?;
1781 self.htlc_maximum_msat.write(w)?;
1782 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
1787 impl Readable for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1788 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1790 chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
1791 short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1792 timestamp: Readable::read(r)?,
1794 let flags: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1795 // Note: we ignore the `message_flags` for now, since it was deprecated by the spec.
1798 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(r)?,
1799 htlc_minimum_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
1800 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
1801 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(r)?,
1802 htlc_maximum_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
1803 excess_data: read_to_end(r)?,
1808 impl_writeable!(ChannelUpdate, {
1813 impl Writeable for ErrorMessage {
1814 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1815 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
1816 (self.data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
1817 w.write_all(self.data.as_bytes())?;
1822 impl Readable for ErrorMessage {
1823 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1825 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1827 let sz: usize = <u16 as Readable>::read(r)? as usize;
1828 let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(sz);
1830 r.read_exact(&mut data)?;
1831 match String::from_utf8(data) {
1833 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1840 impl Writeable for WarningMessage {
1841 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1842 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
1843 (self.data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
1844 w.write_all(self.data.as_bytes())?;
1849 impl Readable for WarningMessage {
1850 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1852 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1854 let sz: usize = <u16 as Readable>::read(r)? as usize;
1855 let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(sz);
1857 r.read_exact(&mut data)?;
1858 match String::from_utf8(data) {
1860 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1867 impl Writeable for UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1868 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1869 self.features.write(w)?;
1870 self.timestamp.write(w)?;
1871 self.node_id.write(w)?;
1872 w.write_all(&self.rgb)?;
1873 self.alias.write(w)?;
1875 let mut addr_len = 0;
1876 for addr in self.addresses.iter() {
1877 addr_len += 1 + addr.len();
1879 (addr_len + self.excess_address_data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
1880 for addr in self.addresses.iter() {
1883 w.write_all(&self.excess_address_data[..])?;
1884 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
1889 impl Readable for UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1890 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1891 let features: NodeFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
1892 let timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
1893 let node_id: NodeId = Readable::read(r)?;
1894 let mut rgb = [0; 3];
1895 r.read_exact(&mut rgb)?;
1896 let alias: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
1898 let addr_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1899 let mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress> = Vec::new();
1900 let mut addr_readpos = 0;
1901 let mut excess = false;
1902 let mut excess_byte = 0;
1904 if addr_len <= addr_readpos { break; }
1905 match Readable::read(r) {
1907 if addr_len < addr_readpos + 1 + addr.len() {
1908 return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor);
1910 addr_readpos += (1 + addr.len()) as u16;
1911 addresses.push(addr);
1913 Ok(Err(unknown_descriptor)) => {
1915 excess_byte = unknown_descriptor;
1918 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor),
1919 Err(e) => return Err(e),
1923 let mut excess_data = vec![];
1924 let excess_address_data = if addr_readpos < addr_len {
1925 let mut excess_address_data = vec![0; (addr_len - addr_readpos) as usize];
1926 r.read_exact(&mut excess_address_data[if excess { 1 } else { 0 }..])?;
1928 excess_address_data[0] = excess_byte;
1933 excess_data.push(excess_byte);
1937 excess_data.extend(read_to_end(r)?.iter());
1938 Ok(UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1945 excess_address_data,
1951 impl_writeable!(NodeAnnouncement, {
1956 impl Readable for QueryShortChannelIds {
1957 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1958 let chain_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(r)?;
1960 let encoding_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1961 let encoding_type: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
1963 // Must be encoding_type=0 uncompressed serialization. We do not
1964 // support encoding_type=1 zlib serialization.
1965 if encoding_type != EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8 {
1966 return Err(DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression);
1969 // We expect the encoding_len to always includes the 1-byte
1970 // encoding_type and that short_channel_ids are 8-bytes each
1971 if encoding_len == 0 || (encoding_len - 1) % 8 != 0 {
1972 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1975 // Read short_channel_ids (8-bytes each), for the u16 encoding_len
1976 // less the 1-byte encoding_type
1977 let short_channel_id_count: u16 = (encoding_len - 1)/8;
1978 let mut short_channel_ids = Vec::with_capacity(short_channel_id_count as usize);
1979 for _ in 0..short_channel_id_count {
1980 short_channel_ids.push(Readable::read(r)?);
1983 Ok(QueryShortChannelIds {
1990 impl Writeable for QueryShortChannelIds {
1991 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1992 // Calculated from 1-byte encoding_type plus 8-bytes per short_channel_id
1993 let encoding_len: u16 = 1 + self.short_channel_ids.len() as u16 * 8;
1995 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
1996 encoding_len.write(w)?;
1998 // We only support type=0 uncompressed serialization
1999 (EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8).write(w)?;
2001 for scid in self.short_channel_ids.iter() {
2009 impl_writeable_msg!(ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd, {
2014 impl QueryChannelRange {
2015 /// Calculates the overflow safe ending block height for the query.
2017 /// Overflow returns `0xffffffff`, otherwise returns `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`.
2018 pub fn end_blocknum(&self) -> u32 {
2019 match self.first_blocknum.checked_add(self.number_of_blocks) {
2020 Some(block) => block,
2021 None => u32::max_value(),
2026 impl_writeable_msg!(QueryChannelRange, {
2032 impl Readable for ReplyChannelRange {
2033 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2034 let chain_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(r)?;
2035 let first_blocknum: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
2036 let number_of_blocks: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
2037 let sync_complete: bool = Readable::read(r)?;
2039 let encoding_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
2040 let encoding_type: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
2042 // Must be encoding_type=0 uncompressed serialization. We do not
2043 // support encoding_type=1 zlib serialization.
2044 if encoding_type != EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8 {
2045 return Err(DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression);
2048 // We expect the encoding_len to always includes the 1-byte
2049 // encoding_type and that short_channel_ids are 8-bytes each
2050 if encoding_len == 0 || (encoding_len - 1) % 8 != 0 {
2051 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2054 // Read short_channel_ids (8-bytes each), for the u16 encoding_len
2055 // less the 1-byte encoding_type
2056 let short_channel_id_count: u16 = (encoding_len - 1)/8;
2057 let mut short_channel_ids = Vec::with_capacity(short_channel_id_count as usize);
2058 for _ in 0..short_channel_id_count {
2059 short_channel_ids.push(Readable::read(r)?);
2062 Ok(ReplyChannelRange {
2072 impl Writeable for ReplyChannelRange {
2073 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2074 let encoding_len: u16 = 1 + self.short_channel_ids.len() as u16 * 8;
2075 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
2076 self.first_blocknum.write(w)?;
2077 self.number_of_blocks.write(w)?;
2078 self.sync_complete.write(w)?;
2080 encoding_len.write(w)?;
2081 (EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8).write(w)?;
2082 for scid in self.short_channel_ids.iter() {
2090 impl_writeable_msg!(GossipTimestampFilter, {
2099 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
2100 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
2101 use crate::ln::msgs;
2102 use crate::ln::msgs::{FinalOnionHopData, OptionalField, OnionErrorPacket, OnionHopDataFormat};
2103 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
2104 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Hostname};
2106 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2107 use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
2108 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2109 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
2110 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2111 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
2113 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2114 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2116 use crate::io::{self, Cursor};
2117 use crate::prelude::*;
2118 use core::convert::TryFrom;
2121 fn encoding_channel_reestablish_no_secret() {
2122 let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
2123 channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
2124 next_local_commitment_number: 3,
2125 next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
2126 data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Absent,
2129 let encoded_value = cr.encode();
2132 vec![4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4]
2137 fn encoding_channel_reestablish_with_secret() {
2139 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2140 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
2143 let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
2144 channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
2145 next_local_commitment_number: 3,
2146 next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
2147 data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Present(msgs::DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret: [9;32], my_current_per_commitment_point: public_key}),
2150 let encoded_value = cr.encode();
2153 vec![4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 3, 27, 132, 197, 86, 123, 18, 100, 64, 153, 93, 62, 213, 170, 186, 5, 101, 215, 30, 24, 52, 96, 72, 25, 255, 156, 23, 245, 233, 213, 221, 7, 143]
2157 macro_rules! get_keys_from {
2158 ($slice: expr, $secp_ctx: expr) => {
2160 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode($slice).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2161 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &privkey);
2167 macro_rules! get_sig_on {
2168 ($privkey: expr, $ctx: expr, $string: expr) => {
2170 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&$string.into_bytes()[..]).unwrap();
2171 $ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &$privkey)
2177 fn encoding_announcement_signatures() {
2178 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2179 let (privkey, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2180 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2181 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("02020202020202020202020202020202"));
2182 let announcement_signatures = msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2183 channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
2184 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2185 node_signature: sig_1,
2186 bitcoin_signature: sig_2,
2189 let encoded_value = announcement_signatures.encode();
2190 assert_eq!(encoded_value, hex::decode("040000000000000005000000000000000600000000000000070000000000000000083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073acf9953cef4700860f5967838eba2bae89288ad188ebf8b20bf995c3ea53a26df1876d0a3a0e13172ba286a673140190c02ba9da60a2e43a745188c8a83c7f3ef").unwrap());
2193 fn do_encoding_channel_announcement(unknown_features_bits: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2194 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2195 let (privkey_1, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2196 let (privkey_2, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2197 let (privkey_3, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2198 let (privkey_4, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2199 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2200 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey_2, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2201 let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2202 let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2203 let mut features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
2204 if unknown_features_bits {
2205 features = ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF]);
2207 let unsigned_channel_announcement = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2209 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
2210 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2211 node_id_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_1),
2212 node_id_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_2),
2213 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_3),
2214 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_4),
2215 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![10, 0, 0, 20, 0, 0, 30, 0, 0, 40] } else { Vec::new() },
2217 let channel_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2218 node_signature_1: sig_1,
2219 node_signature_2: sig_2,
2220 bitcoin_signature_1: sig_3,
2221 bitcoin_signature_2: sig_4,
2222 contents: unsigned_channel_announcement,
2224 let encoded_value = channel_announcement.encode();
2225 let mut target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
2226 if unknown_features_bits {
2227 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0002ffff").unwrap());
2229 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000").unwrap());
2231 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
2232 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00083a840000034d031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f024d4b6cd1361032ca9bd2aeb9d900aa4d45d9ead80ac9423374c451a7254d076602531fe6068134503d2723133227c867ac8fa6c83c537e9a44c3c5bdbdcb1fe33703462779ad4aad39514614751a71085f2f10e1c7a593e4e030efb5b8721ce55b0b").unwrap());
2234 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0a00001400001e000028").unwrap());
2236 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2240 fn encoding_channel_announcement() {
2241 do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, false);
2242 do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, true);
2243 do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, false);
2244 do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, true);
2247 fn do_encoding_node_announcement(unknown_features_bits: bool, ipv4: bool, ipv6: bool, onionv2: bool, onionv3: bool, hostname: bool, excess_address_data: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2248 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2249 let (privkey_1, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2250 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2251 let features = if unknown_features_bits {
2252 NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF])
2254 // Set to some features we may support
2255 NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![2 | 1 << 5])
2257 let mut addresses = Vec::new();
2259 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::IPv4 {
2260 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252],
2265 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::IPv6 {
2266 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240],
2271 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::OnionV2(
2272 [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 38, 7]
2276 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::OnionV3 {
2277 ed25519_pubkey: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240, 239, 238, 237, 236, 235, 234, 233, 232, 231, 230, 229, 228, 227, 226, 225, 224],
2284 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::Hostname {
2285 hostname: Hostname::try_from(String::from("host")).unwrap(),
2289 let mut addr_len = 0;
2290 for addr in &addresses {
2291 addr_len += addr.len() + 1;
2293 let unsigned_node_announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2295 timestamp: 20190119,
2296 node_id: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_1),
2300 excess_address_data: if excess_address_data { vec![33, 108, 40, 11, 83, 149, 162, 84, 110, 126, 75, 38, 99, 224, 79, 129, 22, 34, 241, 90, 79, 146, 232, 58, 162, 233, 43, 162, 165, 115, 193, 57, 20, 44, 84, 174, 99, 7, 42, 30, 193, 238, 125, 192, 192, 75, 222, 92, 132, 120, 6, 23, 42, 160, 92, 146, 194, 42, 232, 227, 8, 209, 210, 105] } else { Vec::new() },
2301 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![59, 18, 204, 25, 92, 224, 162, 209, 189, 166, 168, 139, 239, 161, 159, 160, 127, 81, 202, 167, 92, 232, 56, 55, 242, 137, 101, 96, 11, 138, 172, 171, 8, 85, 255, 176, 231, 65, 236, 95, 124, 65, 66, 30, 152, 41, 169, 212, 134, 17, 200, 200, 49, 247, 27, 229, 234, 115, 230, 101, 148, 151, 127, 253] } else { Vec::new() },
2303 addr_len += unsigned_node_announcement.excess_address_data.len() as u16;
2304 let node_announcement = msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2306 contents: unsigned_node_announcement,
2308 let encoded_value = node_announcement.encode();
2309 let mut target_value = hex::decode("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2310 if unknown_features_bits {
2311 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0002ffff").unwrap());
2313 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000122").unwrap());
2315 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("013413a7031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f2020201010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010").unwrap());
2316 target_value.append(&mut vec![(addr_len >> 8) as u8, addr_len as u8]);
2318 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("01fffefdfc2607").unwrap());
2321 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("02fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f02607").unwrap());
2324 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("03fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f62607").unwrap());
2327 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("04fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0efeeedecebeae9e8e7e6e5e4e3e2e1e00020102607").unwrap());
2330 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0504686f73742607").unwrap());
2332 if excess_address_data {
2333 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f92e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d269").unwrap());
2336 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("3b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
2338 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2342 fn encoding_node_announcement() {
2343 do_encoding_node_announcement(true, true, true, true, true, true, true, true);
2344 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false);
2345 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, true, false, false, false, false, false, false);
2346 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, true, false, false, false, false, false);
2347 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, true, false, false, false, false);
2348 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, true, false, false, false);
2349 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, true, false, false);
2350 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, false, true, false);
2351 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, true, false, true, false, false, true, false);
2352 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, true, false, true, false, false, false);
2355 fn do_encoding_channel_update(direction: bool, disable: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2356 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2357 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2358 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2359 let unsigned_channel_update = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2360 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
2361 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2362 timestamp: 20190119,
2363 flags: if direction { 1 } else { 0 } | if disable { 1 << 1 } else { 0 },
2364 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2365 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
2366 htlc_maximum_msat: 131355275467161,
2367 fee_base_msat: 10000,
2368 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2369 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![0, 0, 0, 0, 59, 154, 202, 0] } else { Vec::new() }
2371 let channel_update = msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2373 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2375 let encoded_value = channel_update.encode();
2376 let mut target_value = hex::decode("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2377 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
2378 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00083a840000034d013413a7").unwrap());
2379 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("01").unwrap());
2380 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00").unwrap());
2382 let flag = target_value.last_mut().unwrap();
2386 let flag = target_value.last_mut().unwrap();
2387 *flag = *flag | 1 << 1;
2389 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap());
2390 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000777788889999").unwrap());
2392 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000003b9aca00").unwrap());
2394 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2398 fn encoding_channel_update() {
2399 do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, false);
2400 do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, true);
2401 do_encoding_channel_update(true, false, false);
2402 do_encoding_channel_update(true, false, true);
2403 do_encoding_channel_update(false, true, false);
2404 do_encoding_channel_update(false, true, true);
2405 do_encoding_channel_update(true, true, false);
2406 do_encoding_channel_update(true, true, true);
2409 fn do_encoding_open_channel(random_bit: bool, shutdown: bool, incl_chan_type: bool) {
2410 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2411 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2412 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2413 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2414 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2415 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
2416 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
2417 let open_channel = msgs::OpenChannel {
2418 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
2419 temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
2420 funding_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
2421 push_msat: 2536655962884945560,
2422 dust_limit_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
2423 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 8517154655701053848,
2424 channel_reserve_satoshis: 8665828695742877976,
2425 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
2426 feerate_per_kw: 821716,
2427 to_self_delay: 49340,
2428 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
2429 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
2430 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
2431 payment_point: pubkey_3,
2432 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
2433 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
2434 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
2435 channel_flags: if random_bit { 1 << 5 } else { 0 },
2436 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { OptionalField::Present(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { OptionalField::Absent },
2437 channel_type: if incl_chan_type { Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::empty()) } else { None },
2439 let encoded_value = open_channel.encode();
2440 let mut target_value = Vec::new();
2441 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
2442 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2444 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("20").unwrap());
2446 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00").unwrap());
2449 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
2452 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0100").unwrap());
2454 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2458 fn encoding_open_channel() {
2459 do_encoding_open_channel(false, false, false);
2460 do_encoding_open_channel(false, false, true);
2461 do_encoding_open_channel(false, true, false);
2462 do_encoding_open_channel(false, true, true);
2463 do_encoding_open_channel(true, false, false);
2464 do_encoding_open_channel(true, false, true);
2465 do_encoding_open_channel(true, true, false);
2466 do_encoding_open_channel(true, true, true);
2469 fn do_encoding_accept_channel(shutdown: bool) {
2470 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2471 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2472 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2473 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2474 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2475 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
2476 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
2477 let accept_channel = msgs::AcceptChannel {
2478 temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
2479 dust_limit_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
2480 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 2536655962884945560,
2481 channel_reserve_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
2482 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
2483 minimum_depth: 821716,
2484 to_self_delay: 49340,
2485 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
2486 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
2487 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
2488 payment_point: pubkey_3,
2489 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
2490 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
2491 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
2492 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { OptionalField::Present(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { OptionalField::Absent },
2495 next_local_nonce: None,
2497 let encoded_value = accept_channel.encode();
2498 let mut target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
2500 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
2502 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2506 fn encoding_accept_channel() {
2507 do_encoding_accept_channel(false);
2508 do_encoding_accept_channel(true);
2512 fn encoding_funding_created() {
2513 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2514 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2515 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2516 let funding_created = msgs::FundingCreated {
2517 temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
2518 funding_txid: Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap(),
2519 funding_output_index: 255,
2522 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2524 next_local_nonce: None,
2526 let encoded_value = funding_created.encode();
2527 let target_value = hex::decode("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202026e96fe9f8b0ddcd729ba03cfafa5a27b050b39d354dd980814268dfa9a44d4c200ffd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2528 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2532 fn encoding_funding_signed() {
2533 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2534 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2535 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2536 let funding_signed = msgs::FundingSigned {
2537 channel_id: [2; 32],
2540 let encoded_value = funding_signed.encode();
2541 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2542 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2546 fn encoding_channel_ready() {
2547 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2548 let (_, pubkey_1,) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2549 let channel_ready = msgs::ChannelReady {
2550 channel_id: [2; 32],
2551 next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
2552 short_channel_id_alias: None,
2554 let encoded_value = channel_ready.encode();
2555 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap();
2556 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2559 fn do_encoding_shutdown(script_type: u8) {
2560 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2561 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2562 let script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::OP_TRUE).into_script();
2563 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
2564 channel_id: [2; 32],
2566 if script_type == 1 { Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() }
2567 else if script_type == 2 { Address::p2sh(&script, Network::Testnet).unwrap().script_pubkey() }
2568 else if script_type == 3 { Address::p2wpkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).unwrap().script_pubkey() }
2569 else { Address::p2wsh(&script, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() },
2571 let encoded_value = shutdown.encode();
2572 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap();
2573 if script_type == 1 {
2574 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
2575 } else if script_type == 2 {
2576 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0017a914da1745e9b549bd0bfa1a569971c77eba30cd5a4b87").unwrap());
2577 } else if script_type == 3 {
2578 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0016001479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b235983").unwrap());
2579 } else if script_type == 4 {
2580 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("002200204ae81572f06e1b88fd5ced7a1a000945432e83e1551e6f721ee9c00b8cc33260").unwrap());
2582 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2586 fn encoding_shutdown() {
2587 do_encoding_shutdown(1);
2588 do_encoding_shutdown(2);
2589 do_encoding_shutdown(3);
2590 do_encoding_shutdown(4);
2594 fn encoding_closing_signed() {
2595 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2596 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2597 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2598 let closing_signed = msgs::ClosingSigned {
2599 channel_id: [2; 32],
2600 fee_satoshis: 2316138423780173,
2604 let encoded_value = closing_signed.encode();
2605 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2606 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2607 assert_eq!(msgs::ClosingSigned::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value)).unwrap(), closing_signed);
2609 let closing_signed_with_range = msgs::ClosingSigned {
2610 channel_id: [2; 32],
2611 fee_satoshis: 2316138423780173,
2613 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
2614 min_fee_satoshis: 0xdeadbeef,
2615 max_fee_satoshis: 0x1badcafe01234567,
2618 let encoded_value_with_range = closing_signed_with_range.encode();
2619 let target_value_with_range = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a011000000000deadbeef1badcafe01234567").unwrap();
2620 assert_eq!(encoded_value_with_range, target_value_with_range);
2621 assert_eq!(msgs::ClosingSigned::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value_with_range)).unwrap(),
2622 closing_signed_with_range);
2626 fn encoding_update_add_htlc() {
2627 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2628 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2629 let onion_routing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2631 public_key: Ok(pubkey_1),
2632 hop_data: [1; 20*65],
2635 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2636 channel_id: [2; 32],
2637 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2638 amount_msat: 3608586615801332854,
2639 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
2640 cltv_expiry: 821716,
2641 onion_routing_packet
2643 let encoded_value = update_add_htlc.encode();
2644 let target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
2645 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2649 fn encoding_update_fulfill_htlc() {
2650 let update_fulfill_htlc = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2651 channel_id: [2; 32],
2652 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2653 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([1; 32]),
2655 let encoded_value = update_fulfill_htlc.encode();
2656 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap();
2657 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2661 fn encoding_update_fail_htlc() {
2662 let reason = OnionErrorPacket {
2663 data: [1; 32].to_vec(),
2665 let update_fail_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2666 channel_id: [2; 32],
2667 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2670 let encoded_value = update_fail_htlc.encode();
2671 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d00200101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap();
2672 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2676 fn encoding_update_fail_malformed_htlc() {
2677 let update_fail_malformed_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2678 channel_id: [2; 32],
2679 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2680 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
2683 let encoded_value = update_fail_malformed_htlc.encode();
2684 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010100ff").unwrap();
2685 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2688 fn do_encoding_commitment_signed(htlcs: bool) {
2689 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2690 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2691 let (privkey_2, _) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2692 let (privkey_3, _) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2693 let (privkey_4, _) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2694 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2695 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey_2, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2696 let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2697 let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2698 let commitment_signed = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
2699 channel_id: [2; 32],
2701 htlc_signatures: if htlcs { vec![sig_2, sig_3, sig_4] } else { Vec::new() },
2703 let encoded_value = commitment_signed.encode();
2704 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2706 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00031735b6a427e80d5fe7cd90a2f4ee08dc9c27cda7c35a4172e5d85b12c49d4232537e98f9b1f3c5e6989a8b9644e90e8918127680dbd0d4043510840fc0f1e11a216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f91e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d2692b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
2708 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000").unwrap());
2710 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2714 fn encoding_commitment_signed() {
2715 do_encoding_commitment_signed(true);
2716 do_encoding_commitment_signed(false);
2720 fn encoding_revoke_and_ack() {
2721 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2722 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2723 let raa = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2724 channel_id: [2; 32],
2725 per_commitment_secret: [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1],
2726 next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
2728 let encoded_value = raa.encode();
2729 let target_value = hex::decode("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap();
2730 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2734 fn encoding_update_fee() {
2735 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
2736 channel_id: [2; 32],
2737 feerate_per_kw: 20190119,
2739 let encoded_value = update_fee.encode();
2740 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202013413a7").unwrap();
2741 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2745 fn encoding_init() {
2746 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
2747 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF]),
2748 remote_network_address: None,
2749 }.encode(), hex::decode("00023fff0003ffffff").unwrap());
2750 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
2751 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF]),
2752 remote_network_address: None,
2753 }.encode(), hex::decode("0001ff0001ff").unwrap());
2754 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
2755 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
2756 remote_network_address: None,
2757 }.encode(), hex::decode("00000000").unwrap());
2759 let init_msg = msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
2760 remote_network_address: Some(msgs::NetAddress::IPv4 {
2761 addr: [127, 0, 0, 1],
2765 let encoded_value = init_msg.encode();
2766 let target_value = hex::decode("000000000307017f00000103e8").unwrap();
2767 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2768 assert_eq!(msgs::Init::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value)).unwrap(), init_msg);
2772 fn encoding_error() {
2773 let error = msgs::ErrorMessage {
2774 channel_id: [2; 32],
2775 data: String::from("rust-lightning"),
2777 let encoded_value = error.encode();
2778 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000e727573742d6c696768746e696e67").unwrap();
2779 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2783 fn encoding_warning() {
2784 let error = msgs::WarningMessage {
2785 channel_id: [2; 32],
2786 data: String::from("rust-lightning"),
2788 let encoded_value = error.encode();
2789 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000e727573742d6c696768746e696e67").unwrap();
2790 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2794 fn encoding_ping() {
2795 let ping = msgs::Ping {
2799 let encoded_value = ping.encode();
2800 let target_value = hex::decode("0040004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap();
2801 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2805 fn encoding_pong() {
2806 let pong = msgs::Pong {
2809 let encoded_value = pong.encode();
2810 let target_value = hex::decode("004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap();
2811 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2815 fn encoding_nonfinal_onion_hop_data() {
2816 let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
2817 format: OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
2818 short_channel_id: 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea,
2820 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
2821 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2823 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
2824 let target_value = hex::decode("1a02080badf00d010203040404ffffffff0608deadbeef1bad1dea").unwrap();
2825 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2826 msg = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2827 if let OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } = msg.format {
2828 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea);
2829 } else { panic!(); }
2830 assert_eq!(msg.amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
2831 assert_eq!(msg.outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
2835 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data() {
2836 let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
2837 format: OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
2839 keysend_preimage: None,
2841 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
2842 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2844 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
2845 let target_value = hex::decode("1002080badf00d010203040404ffffffff").unwrap();
2846 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2847 msg = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2848 if let OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data: None, .. } = msg.format { } else { panic!(); }
2849 assert_eq!(msg.amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
2850 assert_eq!(msg.outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
2854 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data_with_secret() {
2855 let expected_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([0x42u8; 32]);
2856 let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
2857 format: OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
2858 payment_data: Some(FinalOnionHopData {
2859 payment_secret: expected_payment_secret,
2860 total_msat: 0x1badca1f
2862 keysend_preimage: None,
2864 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
2865 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2867 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
2868 let target_value = hex::decode("3602080badf00d010203040404ffffffff082442424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242421badca1f").unwrap();
2869 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2870 msg = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2871 if let OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
2872 payment_data: Some(FinalOnionHopData {
2874 total_msat: 0x1badca1f
2876 keysend_preimage: None,
2878 assert_eq!(payment_secret, expected_payment_secret);
2879 } else { panic!(); }
2880 assert_eq!(msg.amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
2881 assert_eq!(msg.outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
2885 fn query_channel_range_end_blocknum() {
2886 let tests: Vec<(u32, u32, u32)> = vec![
2887 (10000, 1500, 11500),
2888 (0, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
2889 (1, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
2892 for (first_blocknum, number_of_blocks, expected) in tests.into_iter() {
2893 let sut = msgs::QueryChannelRange {
2894 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap(),
2898 assert_eq!(sut.end_blocknum(), expected);
2903 fn encoding_query_channel_range() {
2904 let mut query_channel_range = msgs::QueryChannelRange {
2905 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap(),
2906 first_blocknum: 100000,
2907 number_of_blocks: 1500,
2909 let encoded_value = query_channel_range.encode();
2910 let target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206000186a0000005dc").unwrap();
2911 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2913 query_channel_range = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2914 assert_eq!(query_channel_range.first_blocknum, 100000);
2915 assert_eq!(query_channel_range.number_of_blocks, 1500);
2919 fn encoding_reply_channel_range() {
2920 do_encoding_reply_channel_range(0);
2921 do_encoding_reply_channel_range(1);
2924 fn do_encoding_reply_channel_range(encoding_type: u8) {
2925 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206000b8a06000005dc01").unwrap();
2926 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2927 let mut reply_channel_range = msgs::ReplyChannelRange {
2928 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2929 first_blocknum: 756230,
2930 number_of_blocks: 1500,
2931 sync_complete: true,
2932 short_channel_ids: vec![0x000000000000008e, 0x0000000000003c69, 0x000000000045a6c4],
2935 if encoding_type == 0 {
2936 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001900000000000000008e0000000000003c69000000000045a6c4").unwrap());
2937 let encoded_value = reply_channel_range.encode();
2938 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2940 reply_channel_range = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2941 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2942 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.first_blocknum, 756230);
2943 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.number_of_blocks, 1500);
2944 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.sync_complete, true);
2945 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[0], 0x000000000000008e);
2946 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[1], 0x0000000000003c69);
2947 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[2], 0x000000000045a6c4);
2949 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001601789c636000833e08659309a65878be010010a9023a").unwrap());
2950 let result: Result<msgs::ReplyChannelRange, msgs::DecodeError> = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]));
2951 assert!(result.is_err(), "Expected decode failure with unsupported zlib encoding");
2956 fn encoding_query_short_channel_ids() {
2957 do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(0);
2958 do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(1);
2961 fn do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(encoding_type: u8) {
2962 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206").unwrap();
2963 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2964 let mut query_short_channel_ids = msgs::QueryShortChannelIds {
2965 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2966 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0000000000008e, 0x0000000000003c69, 0x000000000045a6c4],
2969 if encoding_type == 0 {
2970 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001900000000000000008e0000000000003c69000000000045a6c4").unwrap());
2971 let encoded_value = query_short_channel_ids.encode();
2972 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2974 query_short_channel_ids = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2975 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2976 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[0], 0x000000000000008e);
2977 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[1], 0x0000000000003c69);
2978 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[2], 0x000000000045a6c4);
2980 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001601789c636000833e08659309a65878be010010a9023a").unwrap());
2981 let result: Result<msgs::QueryShortChannelIds, msgs::DecodeError> = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]));
2982 assert!(result.is_err(), "Expected decode failure with unsupported zlib encoding");
2987 fn encoding_reply_short_channel_ids_end() {
2988 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2989 let mut reply_short_channel_ids_end = msgs::ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
2990 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2991 full_information: true,
2993 let encoded_value = reply_short_channel_ids_end.encode();
2994 let target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e220601").unwrap();
2995 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2997 reply_short_channel_ids_end = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2998 assert_eq!(reply_short_channel_ids_end.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2999 assert_eq!(reply_short_channel_ids_end.full_information, true);
3003 fn encoding_gossip_timestamp_filter(){
3004 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
3005 let mut gossip_timestamp_filter = msgs::GossipTimestampFilter {
3006 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
3007 first_timestamp: 1590000000,
3008 timestamp_range: 0xffff_ffff,
3010 let encoded_value = gossip_timestamp_filter.encode();
3011 let target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e22065ec57980ffffffff").unwrap();
3012 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3014 gossip_timestamp_filter = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
3015 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
3016 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.first_timestamp, 1590000000);
3017 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.timestamp_range, 0xffff_ffff);
3021 fn decode_onion_hop_data_len_as_bigsize() {
3022 // Tests that we can decode an onion payload that is >253 bytes.
3023 // Previously, receiving a payload of this size could've caused us to fail to decode a valid
3024 // payload, because we were decoding the length (a BigSize, big-endian) as a VarInt
3027 // Encode a test onion payload with a big custom TLV such that it's >253 bytes, forcing the
3028 // payload length to be encoded over multiple bytes rather than a single u8.
3029 let big_payload = encode_big_payload().unwrap();
3030 let mut rd = Cursor::new(&big_payload[..]);
3031 <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut rd).unwrap();
3033 // see above test, needs to be a separate method for use of the serialization macros.
3034 fn encode_big_payload() -> Result<Vec<u8>, io::Error> {
3035 use crate::util::ser::HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize;
3036 let payload = msgs::OnionHopData {
3037 format: OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
3038 short_channel_id: 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea,
3040 amt_to_forward: 1000,
3041 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
3043 let mut encoded_payload = Vec::new();
3044 let test_bytes = vec![42u8; 1000];
3045 if let OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } = payload.format {
3046 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(&mut encoded_payload, {
3047 (1, test_bytes, vec_type),
3048 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(payload.amt_to_forward), required),
3049 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(payload.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
3050 (6, short_channel_id, required)