1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Wire messages, traits representing wire message handlers, and a few error types live here.
12 //! For a normal node you probably don't need to use anything here, however, if you wish to split a
13 //! node into an internet-facing route/message socket handling daemon and a separate daemon (or
14 //! server entirely) which handles only channel-related messages you may wish to implement
15 //! [`ChannelMessageHandler`] yourself and use it to re-serialize messages and pass them across
18 //! Note that if you go with such an architecture (instead of passing raw socket events to a
19 //! non-internet-facing system) you trust the frontend internet-facing system to not lie about the
20 //! source `node_id` of the message, however this does allow you to significantly reduce bandwidth
21 //! between the systems as routing messages can represent a significant chunk of bandwidth usage
22 //! (especially for non-channel-publicly-announcing nodes). As an alternate design which avoids
23 //! this issue, if you have sufficient bidirectional bandwidth between your systems, you may send
24 //! raw socket events into your non-internet-facing system and then send routing events back to
25 //! track the network on the less-secure system.
27 use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
28 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature;
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
30 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
33 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
34 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
35 use crate::onion_message;
37 use crate::prelude::*;
40 use crate::io::{self, Read};
41 use crate::io_extras::read_to_end;
43 use crate::events::{MessageSendEventsProvider, OnionMessageProvider};
44 use crate::util::logger;
45 use crate::util::ser::{LengthReadable, Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, FixedLengthReader, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize, Hostname};
47 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
49 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
51 /// 21 million * 10^8 * 1000
52 pub(crate) const MAX_VALUE_MSAT: u64 = 21_000_000_0000_0000_000;
55 /// A partial signature that also contains the Musig2 nonce its signer used
56 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
57 pub struct PartialSignatureWithNonce(pub musig2::types::PartialSignature, pub musig2::types::PublicNonce);
59 /// An error in decoding a message or struct.
60 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
61 pub enum DecodeError {
62 /// A version byte specified something we don't know how to handle.
64 /// Includes unknown realm byte in an onion hop data packet.
66 /// Unknown feature mandating we fail to parse message (e.g., TLV with an even, unknown type)
67 UnknownRequiredFeature,
68 /// Value was invalid.
70 /// For example, a byte which was supposed to be a bool was something other than a 0
71 /// or 1, a public key/private key/signature was invalid, text wasn't UTF-8, TLV was
72 /// syntactically incorrect, etc.
74 /// The buffer to be read was too short.
76 /// A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly.
78 /// Error from [`std::io`].
80 /// The message included zlib-compressed values, which we don't support.
81 UnsupportedCompression,
84 /// An [`init`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
86 /// [`init`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-init-message
87 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
89 /// The relevant features which the sender supports.
90 pub features: InitFeatures,
91 /// The receipient's network address.
93 /// This adds the option to report a remote IP address back to a connecting peer using the init
94 /// message. A node can decide to use that information to discover a potential update to its
95 /// public IPv4 address (NAT) and use that for a [`NodeAnnouncement`] update message containing
97 pub remote_network_address: Option<NetAddress>,
100 /// An [`error`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
102 /// [`error`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-error-and-warning-messages
103 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
104 pub struct ErrorMessage {
105 /// The channel ID involved in the error.
107 /// All-0s indicates a general error unrelated to a specific channel, after which all channels
108 /// with the sending peer should be closed.
109 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
110 /// A possibly human-readable error description.
112 /// The string should be sanitized before it is used (e.g., emitted to logs or printed to
113 /// `stdout`). Otherwise, a well crafted error message may trigger a security vulnerability in
114 /// the terminal emulator or the logging subsystem.
118 /// A [`warning`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
120 /// [`warning`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-error-and-warning-messages
121 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
122 pub struct WarningMessage {
123 /// The channel ID involved in the warning.
125 /// All-0s indicates a warning unrelated to a specific channel.
126 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
127 /// A possibly human-readable warning description.
129 /// The string should be sanitized before it is used (e.g. emitted to logs or printed to
130 /// stdout). Otherwise, a well crafted error message may trigger a security vulnerability in
131 /// the terminal emulator or the logging subsystem.
135 /// A [`ping`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
137 /// [`ping`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-ping-and-pong-messages
138 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
140 /// The desired response length.
142 /// The ping packet size.
144 /// This field is not sent on the wire. byteslen zeros are sent.
148 /// A [`pong`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
150 /// [`pong`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/01-messaging.md#the-ping-and-pong-messages
151 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
153 /// The pong packet size.
155 /// This field is not sent on the wire. byteslen zeros are sent.
159 /// An [`open_channel`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
161 /// [`open_channel`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-open_channel-message
162 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
163 pub struct OpenChannel {
164 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
165 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
166 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
167 pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
168 /// The channel value
169 pub funding_satoshis: u64,
170 /// The amount to push to the counterparty as part of the open, in milli-satoshi
172 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by sender will be omitted
173 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
174 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards sender, in milli-satoshi
175 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
176 /// The minimum value unencumbered by HTLCs for the counterparty to keep in the channel
177 pub channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
178 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
179 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
180 /// The feerate per 1000-weight of sender generated transactions, until updated by
182 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
183 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if
184 /// they broadcast a commitment transaction
185 pub to_self_delay: u16,
186 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards sender
187 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
188 /// The sender's key controlling the funding transaction
189 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
190 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
191 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
192 /// A payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
193 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
194 /// Used to derive a payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by sender
195 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
196 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to sender
197 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
198 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-sender transaction's per commitment point
199 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
200 /// The channel flags to be used
201 pub channel_flags: u8,
202 /// Optionally, a request to pre-set the to-sender output's `scriptPubkey` for when we collaboratively close
203 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField<Script>,
204 /// The channel type that this channel will represent
206 /// If this is `None`, we derive the channel type from the intersection of our
207 /// feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from the [`Init`] message.
208 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
211 /// An [`accept_channel`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
213 /// [`accept_channel`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-accept_channel-message
214 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
215 pub struct AcceptChannel {
216 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding outpoint is announced
217 pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
218 /// The threshold below which outputs on transactions broadcast by sender will be omitted
219 pub dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
220 /// The maximum inbound HTLC value in flight towards sender, in milli-satoshi
221 pub max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
222 /// The minimum value unencumbered by HTLCs for the counterparty to keep in the channel
223 pub channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
224 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
225 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
226 /// Minimum depth of the funding transaction before the channel is considered open
227 pub minimum_depth: u32,
228 /// The number of blocks which the counterparty will have to wait to claim on-chain funds if they broadcast a commitment transaction
229 pub to_self_delay: u16,
230 /// The maximum number of inbound HTLCs towards sender
231 pub max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
232 /// The sender's key controlling the funding transaction
233 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
234 /// Used to derive a revocation key for transactions broadcast by counterparty
235 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
236 /// A payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
237 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
238 /// Used to derive a payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by sender
239 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
240 /// Used to derive an HTLC payment key to sender for transactions broadcast by counterparty
241 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
242 /// The first to-be-broadcast-by-sender transaction's per commitment point
243 pub first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
244 /// Optionally, a request to pre-set the to-sender output's scriptPubkey for when we collaboratively close
245 pub shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField<Script>,
246 /// The channel type that this channel will represent.
248 /// If this is `None`, we derive the channel type from the intersection of
249 /// our feature bits with our counterparty's feature bits from the [`Init`] message.
250 /// This is required to match the equivalent field in [`OpenChannel::channel_type`].
251 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
253 /// Next nonce the channel initiator should use to create a funding output signature against
254 pub next_local_nonce: Option<musig2::types::PublicNonce>,
257 /// A [`funding_created`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
259 /// [`funding_created`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-funding_created-message
260 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
261 pub struct FundingCreated {
262 /// A temporary channel ID, until the funding is established
263 pub temporary_channel_id: [u8; 32],
264 /// The funding transaction ID
265 pub funding_txid: Txid,
266 /// The specific output index funding this channel
267 pub funding_output_index: u16,
268 /// The signature of the channel initiator (funder) on the initial commitment transaction
269 pub signature: Signature,
271 /// The partial signature of the channel initiator (funder)
272 pub partial_signature_with_nonce: Option<PartialSignatureWithNonce>,
274 /// Next nonce the channel acceptor should use to finalize the funding output signature
275 pub next_local_nonce: Option<musig2::types::PublicNonce>
278 /// A [`funding_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
280 /// [`funding_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-funding_signed-message
281 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
282 pub struct FundingSigned {
284 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
285 /// The signature of the channel acceptor (fundee) on the initial commitment transaction
286 pub signature: Signature,
288 /// The partial signature of the channel acceptor (fundee)
289 pub partial_signature_with_nonce: Option<PartialSignatureWithNonce>,
292 /// A [`channel_ready`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
294 /// [`channel_ready`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#the-channel_ready-message
295 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
296 pub struct ChannelReady {
298 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
299 /// The per-commitment point of the second commitment transaction
300 pub next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
301 /// If set, provides a `short_channel_id` alias for this channel.
303 /// The sender will accept payments to be forwarded over this SCID and forward them to this
304 /// messages' recipient.
305 pub short_channel_id_alias: Option<u64>,
308 /// A [`shutdown`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
310 /// [`shutdown`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#closing-initiation-shutdown
311 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
312 pub struct Shutdown {
314 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
315 /// The destination of this peer's funds on closing.
317 /// Must be in one of these forms: P2PKH, P2SH, P2WPKH, P2WSH, P2TR.
318 pub scriptpubkey: Script,
321 /// The minimum and maximum fees which the sender is willing to place on the closing transaction.
323 /// This is provided in [`ClosingSigned`] by both sides to indicate the fee range they are willing
325 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
326 pub struct ClosingSignedFeeRange {
327 /// The minimum absolute fee, in satoshis, which the sender is willing to place on the closing
329 pub min_fee_satoshis: u64,
330 /// The maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, which the sender is willing to place on the closing
332 pub max_fee_satoshis: u64,
335 /// A [`closing_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
337 /// [`closing_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#closing-negotiation-closing_signed
338 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
339 pub struct ClosingSigned {
341 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
342 /// The proposed total fee for the closing transaction
343 pub fee_satoshis: u64,
344 /// A signature on the closing transaction
345 pub signature: Signature,
346 /// The minimum and maximum fees which the sender is willing to accept, provided only by new
348 pub fee_range: Option<ClosingSignedFeeRange>,
351 /// An [`update_add_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
353 /// [`update_add_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#adding-an-htlc-update_add_htlc
354 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
355 pub struct UpdateAddHTLC {
357 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
360 /// The HTLC value in milli-satoshi
361 pub amount_msat: u64,
362 /// The payment hash, the pre-image of which controls HTLC redemption
363 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
364 /// The expiry height of the HTLC
365 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
366 pub(crate) onion_routing_packet: OnionPacket,
369 /// An onion message to be sent to or received from a peer.
371 // TODO: update with link to OM when they are merged into the BOLTs
372 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
373 pub struct OnionMessage {
374 /// Used in decrypting the onion packet's payload.
375 pub blinding_point: PublicKey,
376 pub(crate) onion_routing_packet: onion_message::Packet,
379 /// An [`update_fulfill_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
381 /// [`update_fulfill_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
382 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
383 pub struct UpdateFulfillHTLC {
385 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
388 /// The pre-image of the payment hash, allowing HTLC redemption
389 pub payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
392 /// An [`update_fail_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
394 /// [`update_fail_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
395 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
396 pub struct UpdateFailHTLC {
398 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
401 pub(crate) reason: OnionErrorPacket,
404 /// An [`update_fail_malformed_htlc`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
406 /// [`update_fail_malformed_htlc`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#removing-an-htlc-update_fulfill_htlc-update_fail_htlc-and-update_fail_malformed_htlc
407 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
408 pub struct UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
410 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
413 pub(crate) sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
415 pub failure_code: u16,
418 /// A [`commitment_signed`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
420 /// [`commitment_signed`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#committing-updates-so-far-commitment_signed
421 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
422 pub struct CommitmentSigned {
424 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
425 /// A signature on the commitment transaction
426 pub signature: Signature,
427 /// Signatures on the HTLC transactions
428 pub htlc_signatures: Vec<Signature>,
430 /// The partial Taproot signature on the commitment transaction
431 pub partial_signature_with_nonce: Option<PartialSignatureWithNonce>,
434 /// A [`revoke_and_ack`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
436 /// [`revoke_and_ack`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#completing-the-transition-to-the-updated-state-revoke_and_ack
437 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
438 pub struct RevokeAndACK {
440 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
441 /// The secret corresponding to the per-commitment point
442 pub per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
443 /// The next sender-broadcast commitment transaction's per-commitment point
444 pub next_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
447 /// An [`update_fee`] message to be sent to or received from a peer
449 /// [`update_fee`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#updating-fees-update_fee
450 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
451 pub struct UpdateFee {
453 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
454 /// Fee rate per 1000-weight of the transaction
455 pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
458 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
459 /// Proof that the sender knows the per-commitment secret of the previous commitment transaction.
461 /// This is used to convince the recipient that the channel is at a certain commitment
462 /// number even if they lost that data due to a local failure. Of course, the peer may lie
463 /// and even later commitments may have been revoked.
464 pub struct DataLossProtect {
465 /// Proof that the sender knows the per-commitment secret of a specific commitment transaction
466 /// belonging to the recipient
467 pub your_last_per_commitment_secret: [u8; 32],
468 /// The sender's per-commitment point for their current commitment transaction
469 pub my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
472 /// A [`channel_reestablish`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
474 /// [`channel_reestablish`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#message-retransmission
475 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
476 pub struct ChannelReestablish {
478 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
479 /// The next commitment number for the sender
480 pub next_local_commitment_number: u64,
481 /// The next commitment number for the recipient
482 pub next_remote_commitment_number: u64,
483 /// Optionally, a field proving that next_remote_commitment_number-1 has been revoked
484 pub data_loss_protect: OptionalField<DataLossProtect>,
487 /// An [`announcement_signatures`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
489 /// [`announcement_signatures`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-announcement_signatures-message
490 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
491 pub struct AnnouncementSignatures {
493 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
494 /// The short channel ID
495 pub short_channel_id: u64,
496 /// A signature by the node key
497 pub node_signature: Signature,
498 /// A signature by the funding key
499 pub bitcoin_signature: Signature,
502 /// An address which can be used to connect to a remote peer.
503 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
504 pub enum NetAddress {
505 /// An IPv4 address/port on which the peer is listening.
507 /// The 4-byte IPv4 address
509 /// The port on which the node is listening
512 /// An IPv6 address/port on which the peer is listening.
514 /// The 16-byte IPv6 address
516 /// The port on which the node is listening
519 /// An old-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening.
521 /// This field is deprecated and the Tor network generally no longer supports V2 Onion
522 /// addresses. Thus, the details are not parsed here.
524 /// A new-style Tor onion address/port on which the peer is listening.
526 /// To create the human-readable "hostname", concatenate the ED25519 pubkey, checksum, and version,
527 /// wrap as base32 and append ".onion".
529 /// The ed25519 long-term public key of the peer
530 ed25519_pubkey: [u8; 32],
531 /// The checksum of the pubkey and version, as included in the onion address
533 /// The version byte, as defined by the Tor Onion v3 spec.
535 /// The port on which the node is listening
538 /// A hostname/port on which the peer is listening.
540 /// The hostname on which the node is listening.
542 /// The port on which the node is listening.
547 /// Gets the ID of this address type. Addresses in [`NodeAnnouncement`] messages should be sorted
549 pub(crate) fn get_id(&self) -> u8 {
551 &NetAddress::IPv4 {..} => { 1 },
552 &NetAddress::IPv6 {..} => { 2 },
553 &NetAddress::OnionV2(_) => { 3 },
554 &NetAddress::OnionV3 {..} => { 4 },
555 &NetAddress::Hostname {..} => { 5 },
559 /// Strict byte-length of address descriptor, 1-byte type not recorded
560 fn len(&self) -> u16 {
562 &NetAddress::IPv4 { .. } => { 6 },
563 &NetAddress::IPv6 { .. } => { 18 },
564 &NetAddress::OnionV2(_) => { 12 },
565 &NetAddress::OnionV3 { .. } => { 37 },
566 // Consists of 1-byte hostname length, hostname bytes, and 2-byte port.
567 &NetAddress::Hostname { ref hostname, .. } => { u16::from(hostname.len()) + 3 },
571 /// The maximum length of any address descriptor, not including the 1-byte type.
572 /// This maximum length is reached by a hostname address descriptor:
573 /// a hostname with a maximum length of 255, its 1-byte length and a 2-byte port.
574 pub(crate) const MAX_LEN: u16 = 258;
577 impl Writeable for NetAddress {
578 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
580 &NetAddress::IPv4 { ref addr, ref port } => {
585 &NetAddress::IPv6 { ref addr, ref port } => {
590 &NetAddress::OnionV2(bytes) => {
592 bytes.write(writer)?;
594 &NetAddress::OnionV3 { ref ed25519_pubkey, ref checksum, ref version, ref port } => {
596 ed25519_pubkey.write(writer)?;
597 checksum.write(writer)?;
598 version.write(writer)?;
601 &NetAddress::Hostname { ref hostname, ref port } => {
603 hostname.write(writer)?;
611 impl Readable for Result<NetAddress, u8> {
612 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Result<NetAddress, u8>, DecodeError> {
613 let byte = <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
616 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::IPv4 {
617 addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
618 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
622 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::IPv6 {
623 addr: Readable::read(reader)?,
624 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
627 3 => Ok(Ok(NetAddress::OnionV2(Readable::read(reader)?))),
629 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::OnionV3 {
630 ed25519_pubkey: Readable::read(reader)?,
631 checksum: Readable::read(reader)?,
632 version: Readable::read(reader)?,
633 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
637 Ok(Ok(NetAddress::Hostname {
638 hostname: Readable::read(reader)?,
639 port: Readable::read(reader)?,
642 _ => return Ok(Err(byte)),
647 impl Readable for NetAddress {
648 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NetAddress, DecodeError> {
649 match Readable::read(reader) {
650 Ok(Ok(res)) => Ok(res),
651 Ok(Err(_)) => Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion),
657 /// Represents the set of gossip messages that require a signature from a node's identity key.
658 pub enum UnsignedGossipMessage<'a> {
659 /// An unsigned channel announcement.
660 ChannelAnnouncement(&'a UnsignedChannelAnnouncement),
661 /// An unsigned channel update.
662 ChannelUpdate(&'a UnsignedChannelUpdate),
663 /// An unsigned node announcement.
664 NodeAnnouncement(&'a UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)
667 impl<'a> Writeable for UnsignedGossipMessage<'a> {
668 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
670 UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
671 UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
672 UnsignedGossipMessage::NodeAnnouncement(ref msg) => msg.write(writer),
677 /// The unsigned part of a [`node_announcement`] message.
679 /// [`node_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-node_announcement-message
680 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
681 pub struct UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
682 /// The advertised features
683 pub features: NodeFeatures,
684 /// A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed
686 /// The `node_id` this announcement originated from (don't rebroadcast the `node_announcement` back
689 /// An RGB color for UI purposes
691 /// An alias, for UI purposes.
693 /// This should be sanitized before use. There is no guarantee of uniqueness.
695 /// List of addresses on which this node is reachable
696 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
697 pub(crate) excess_address_data: Vec<u8>,
698 pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
700 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
701 /// A [`node_announcement`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
703 /// [`node_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-node_announcement-message
704 pub struct NodeAnnouncement {
705 /// The signature by the node key
706 pub signature: Signature,
707 /// The actual content of the announcement
708 pub contents: UnsignedNodeAnnouncement,
711 /// The unsigned part of a [`channel_announcement`] message.
713 /// [`channel_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_announcement-message
714 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
715 pub struct UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
716 /// The advertised channel features
717 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
718 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
719 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
720 /// The short channel ID
721 pub short_channel_id: u64,
722 /// One of the two `node_id`s which are endpoints of this channel
723 pub node_id_1: NodeId,
724 /// The other of the two `node_id`s which are endpoints of this channel
725 pub node_id_2: NodeId,
726 /// The funding key for the first node
727 pub bitcoin_key_1: NodeId,
728 /// The funding key for the second node
729 pub bitcoin_key_2: NodeId,
730 pub(crate) excess_data: Vec<u8>,
732 /// A [`channel_announcement`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
734 /// [`channel_announcement`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_announcement-message
735 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
736 pub struct ChannelAnnouncement {
737 /// Authentication of the announcement by the first public node
738 pub node_signature_1: Signature,
739 /// Authentication of the announcement by the second public node
740 pub node_signature_2: Signature,
741 /// Proof of funding UTXO ownership by the first public node
742 pub bitcoin_signature_1: Signature,
743 /// Proof of funding UTXO ownership by the second public node
744 pub bitcoin_signature_2: Signature,
745 /// The actual announcement
746 pub contents: UnsignedChannelAnnouncement,
749 /// The unsigned part of a [`channel_update`] message.
751 /// [`channel_update`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_update-message
752 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
753 pub struct UnsignedChannelUpdate {
754 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain where the channel is to be opened
755 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
756 /// The short channel ID
757 pub short_channel_id: u64,
758 /// A strictly monotonic announcement counter, with gaps allowed, specific to this channel
762 /// The number of blocks such that if:
763 /// `incoming_htlc.cltv_expiry < outgoing_htlc.cltv_expiry + cltv_expiry_delta`
764 /// then we need to fail the HTLC backwards. When forwarding an HTLC, `cltv_expiry_delta` determines
765 /// the outgoing HTLC's minimum `cltv_expiry` value -- so, if an incoming HTLC comes in with a
766 /// `cltv_expiry` of 100000, and the node we're forwarding to has a `cltv_expiry_delta` value of 10,
767 /// then we'll check that the outgoing HTLC's `cltv_expiry` value is at least 100010 before
768 /// forwarding. Note that the HTLC sender is the one who originally sets this value when
769 /// constructing the route.
770 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
771 /// The minimum HTLC size incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi
772 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
773 /// The maximum HTLC value incoming to sender, in milli-satoshi.
775 /// This used to be optional.
776 pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
777 /// The base HTLC fee charged by sender, in milli-satoshi
778 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
779 /// The amount to fee multiplier, in micro-satoshi
780 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
781 /// Excess data which was signed as a part of the message which we do not (yet) understand how
784 /// This is stored to ensure forward-compatibility as new fields are added to the lightning gossip protocol.
785 pub excess_data: Vec<u8>,
787 /// A [`channel_update`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
789 /// [`channel_update`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-channel_update-message
790 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
791 pub struct ChannelUpdate {
792 /// A signature of the channel update
793 pub signature: Signature,
794 /// The actual channel update
795 pub contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate,
798 /// A [`query_channel_range`] message is used to query a peer for channel
799 /// UTXOs in a range of blocks. The recipient of a query makes a best
800 /// effort to reply to the query using one or more [`ReplyChannelRange`]
803 /// [`query_channel_range`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_channel_range-and-reply_channel_range-messages
804 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
805 pub struct QueryChannelRange {
806 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
807 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
808 /// The height of the first block for the channel UTXOs being queried
809 pub first_blocknum: u32,
810 /// The number of blocks to include in the query results
811 pub number_of_blocks: u32,
814 /// A [`reply_channel_range`] message is a reply to a [`QueryChannelRange`]
817 /// Multiple `reply_channel_range` messages can be sent in reply
818 /// to a single [`QueryChannelRange`] message. The query recipient makes a
819 /// best effort to respond based on their local network view which may
820 /// not be a perfect view of the network. The `short_channel_id`s in the
821 /// reply are encoded. We only support `encoding_type=0` uncompressed
822 /// serialization and do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization.
824 /// [`reply_channel_range`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_channel_range-and-reply_channel_range-messages
825 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
826 pub struct ReplyChannelRange {
827 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
828 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
829 /// The height of the first block in the range of the reply
830 pub first_blocknum: u32,
831 /// The number of blocks included in the range of the reply
832 pub number_of_blocks: u32,
833 /// True when this is the final reply for a query
834 pub sync_complete: bool,
835 /// The `short_channel_id`s in the channel range
836 pub short_channel_ids: Vec<u64>,
839 /// A [`query_short_channel_ids`] message is used to query a peer for
840 /// routing gossip messages related to one or more `short_channel_id`s.
842 /// The query recipient will reply with the latest, if available,
843 /// [`ChannelAnnouncement`], [`ChannelUpdate`] and [`NodeAnnouncement`] messages
844 /// it maintains for the requested `short_channel_id`s followed by a
845 /// [`ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd`] message. The `short_channel_id`s sent in
846 /// this query are encoded. We only support `encoding_type=0` uncompressed
847 /// serialization and do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization.
849 /// [`query_short_channel_ids`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_short_channel_idsreply_short_channel_ids_end-messages
850 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
851 pub struct QueryShortChannelIds {
852 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain being queried
853 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
854 /// The short_channel_ids that are being queried
855 pub short_channel_ids: Vec<u64>,
858 /// A [`reply_short_channel_ids_end`] message is sent as a reply to a
859 /// message. The query recipient makes a best
860 /// effort to respond based on their local network view which may not be
861 /// a perfect view of the network.
863 /// [`reply_short_channel_ids_end`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-query_short_channel_idsreply_short_channel_ids_end-messages
864 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
865 pub struct ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
866 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain that was queried
867 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
868 /// Indicates if the query recipient maintains up-to-date channel
869 /// information for the `chain_hash`
870 pub full_information: bool,
873 /// A [`gossip_timestamp_filter`] message is used by a node to request
874 /// gossip relay for messages in the requested time range when the
875 /// `gossip_queries` feature has been negotiated.
877 /// [`gossip_timestamp_filter`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#the-gossip_timestamp_filter-message
878 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
879 pub struct GossipTimestampFilter {
880 /// The genesis hash of the blockchain for channel and node information
881 pub chain_hash: BlockHash,
882 /// The starting unix timestamp
883 pub first_timestamp: u32,
884 /// The range of information in seconds
885 pub timestamp_range: u32,
888 /// Encoding type for data compression of collections in gossip queries.
890 /// We do not support `encoding_type=1` zlib serialization [defined in BOLT
891 /// #7](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#query-messages).
896 /// Used to put an error message in a [`LightningError`].
897 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
898 pub enum ErrorAction {
899 /// The peer took some action which made us think they were useless. Disconnect them.
901 /// An error message which we should make an effort to send before we disconnect.
902 msg: Option<ErrorMessage>
904 /// The peer did something harmless that we weren't able to process, just log and ignore
905 // New code should *not* use this. New code must use IgnoreAndLog, below!
907 /// The peer did something harmless that we weren't able to meaningfully process.
908 /// If the error is logged, log it at the given level.
909 IgnoreAndLog(logger::Level),
910 /// The peer provided us with a gossip message which we'd already seen. In most cases this
911 /// should be ignored, but it may result in the message being forwarded if it is a duplicate of
912 /// our own channel announcements.
913 IgnoreDuplicateGossip,
914 /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them.
916 /// The message to send.
919 /// The peer did something incorrect. Tell them without closing any channels.
921 /// The message to send.
923 /// The peer may have done something harmless that we weren't able to meaningfully process,
924 /// though we should still tell them about it.
925 /// If this event is logged, log it at the given level.
926 log_level: logger::Level,
930 /// An Err type for failure to process messages.
931 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
932 pub struct LightningError {
933 /// A human-readable message describing the error
935 /// The action which should be taken against the offending peer.
936 pub action: ErrorAction,
939 /// Struct used to return values from [`RevokeAndACK`] messages, containing a bunch of commitment
940 /// transaction updates if they were pending.
941 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
942 pub struct CommitmentUpdate {
943 /// `update_add_htlc` messages which should be sent
944 pub update_add_htlcs: Vec<UpdateAddHTLC>,
945 /// `update_fulfill_htlc` messages which should be sent
946 pub update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
947 /// `update_fail_htlc` messages which should be sent
948 pub update_fail_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFailHTLC>,
949 /// `update_fail_malformed_htlc` messages which should be sent
950 pub update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec<UpdateFailMalformedHTLC>,
951 /// An `update_fee` message which should be sent
952 pub update_fee: Option<UpdateFee>,
953 /// A `commitment_signed` message which should be sent
954 pub commitment_signed: CommitmentSigned,
957 /// Messages could have optional fields to use with extended features
958 /// As we wish to serialize these differently from `Option<T>`s (`Options` get a tag byte, but
959 /// [`OptionalField`] simply gets `Present` if there are enough bytes to read into it), we have a
960 /// separate enum type for them.
962 /// This is not exported to bindings users due to a free generic in `T`
963 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
964 pub enum OptionalField<T> {
965 /// Optional field is included in message
967 /// Optional field is absent in message
971 /// A trait to describe an object which can receive channel messages.
973 /// Messages MAY be called in parallel when they originate from different `their_node_ids`, however
974 /// they MUST NOT be called in parallel when the two calls have the same `their_node_id`.
975 pub trait ChannelMessageHandler : MessageSendEventsProvider {
977 /// Handle an incoming `open_channel` message from the given peer.
978 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OpenChannel);
979 /// Handle an incoming `accept_channel` message from the given peer.
980 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AcceptChannel);
981 /// Handle an incoming `funding_created` message from the given peer.
982 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingCreated);
983 /// Handle an incoming `funding_signed` message from the given peer.
984 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &FundingSigned);
985 /// Handle an incoming `channel_ready` message from the given peer.
986 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelReady);
989 /// Handle an incoming `shutdown` message from the given peer.
990 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Shutdown);
991 /// Handle an incoming `closing_signed` message from the given peer.
992 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ClosingSigned);
995 /// Handle an incoming `update_add_htlc` message from the given peer.
996 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateAddHTLC);
997 /// Handle an incoming `update_fulfill_htlc` message from the given peer.
998 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFulfillHTLC);
999 /// Handle an incoming `update_fail_htlc` message from the given peer.
1000 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFailHTLC);
1001 /// Handle an incoming `update_fail_malformed_htlc` message from the given peer.
1002 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFailMalformedHTLC);
1003 /// Handle an incoming `commitment_signed` message from the given peer.
1004 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &CommitmentSigned);
1005 /// Handle an incoming `revoke_and_ack` message from the given peer.
1006 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &RevokeAndACK);
1008 /// Handle an incoming `update_fee` message from the given peer.
1009 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &UpdateFee);
1011 // Channel-to-announce:
1012 /// Handle an incoming `announcement_signatures` message from the given peer.
1013 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &AnnouncementSignatures);
1015 // Connection loss/reestablish:
1016 /// Indicates a connection to the peer failed/an existing connection was lost.
1017 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey);
1019 /// Handle a peer reconnecting, possibly generating `channel_reestablish` message(s).
1021 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1022 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1023 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1024 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1025 /// Handle an incoming `channel_reestablish` message from the given peer.
1026 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelReestablish);
1028 /// Handle an incoming `channel_update` message from the given peer.
1029 fn handle_channel_update(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ChannelUpdate);
1032 /// Handle an incoming `error` message from the given peer.
1033 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &ErrorMessage);
1035 // Handler information:
1036 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1037 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1038 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1039 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1041 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1042 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1043 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1045 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1046 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1049 /// A trait to describe an object which can receive routing messages.
1051 /// # Implementor DoS Warnings
1053 /// For messages enabled with the `gossip_queries` feature there are potential DoS vectors when
1054 /// handling inbound queries. Implementors using an on-disk network graph should be aware of
1055 /// repeated disk I/O for queries accessing different parts of the network graph.
1056 pub trait RoutingMessageHandler : MessageSendEventsProvider {
1057 /// Handle an incoming `node_announcement` message, returning `true` if it should be forwarded on,
1058 /// `false` or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1059 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1060 /// Handle a `channel_announcement` message, returning `true` if it should be forwarded on, `false`
1061 /// or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1062 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1063 /// Handle an incoming `channel_update` message, returning true if it should be forwarded on,
1064 /// `false` or returning an `Err` otherwise.
1065 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError>;
1066 /// Gets channel announcements and updates required to dump our routing table to a remote node,
1067 /// starting at the `short_channel_id` indicated by `starting_point` and including announcements
1068 /// for a single channel.
1069 fn get_next_channel_announcement(&self, starting_point: u64) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)>;
1070 /// Gets a node announcement required to dump our routing table to a remote node, starting at
1071 /// the node *after* the provided pubkey and including up to one announcement immediately
1072 /// higher (as defined by `<PublicKey as Ord>::cmp`) than `starting_point`.
1073 /// If `None` is provided for `starting_point`, we start at the first node.
1074 fn get_next_node_announcement(&self, starting_point: Option<&NodeId>) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement>;
1075 /// Called when a connection is established with a peer. This can be used to
1076 /// perform routing table synchronization using a strategy defined by the
1079 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1080 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1081 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1082 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1083 /// Handles the reply of a query we initiated to learn about channels
1084 /// for a given range of blocks. We can expect to receive one or more
1085 /// replies to a single query.
1086 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1087 /// Handles the reply of a query we initiated asking for routing gossip
1088 /// messages for a list of channels. We should receive this message when
1089 /// a node has completed its best effort to send us the pertaining routing
1090 /// gossip messages.
1091 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1092 /// Handles when a peer asks us to send a list of `short_channel_id`s
1093 /// for the requested range of blocks.
1094 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1095 /// Handles when a peer asks us to send routing gossip messages for a
1096 /// list of `short_channel_id`s.
1097 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError>;
1099 // Handler queueing status:
1100 /// Indicates that there are a large number of [`ChannelAnnouncement`] (or other) messages
1101 /// pending some async action. While there is no guarantee of the rate of future messages, the
1102 /// caller should seek to reduce the rate of new gossip messages handled, especially
1103 /// [`ChannelAnnouncement`]s.
1104 fn processing_queue_high(&self) -> bool;
1106 // Handler information:
1107 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1108 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1109 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1110 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1111 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1112 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1113 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1115 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1116 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1119 /// A trait to describe an object that can receive onion messages.
1120 pub trait OnionMessageHandler : OnionMessageProvider {
1121 /// Handle an incoming `onion_message` message from the given peer.
1122 fn handle_onion_message(&self, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &OnionMessage);
1123 /// Called when a connection is established with a peer. Can be used to track which peers
1124 /// advertise onion message support and are online.
1126 /// May return an `Err(())` if the features the peer supports are not sufficient to communicate
1127 /// with us. Implementors should be somewhat conservative about doing so, however, as other
1128 /// message handlers may still wish to communicate with this peer.
1129 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init: &Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()>;
1130 /// Indicates a connection to the peer failed/an existing connection was lost. Allows handlers to
1131 /// drop and refuse to forward onion messages to this peer.
1132 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey);
1134 // Handler information:
1135 /// Gets the node feature flags which this handler itself supports. All available handlers are
1136 /// queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`NodeFeatures`]
1137 /// which are broadcasted in our [`NodeAnnouncement`] message.
1138 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures;
1140 /// Gets the init feature flags which should be sent to the given peer. All available handlers
1141 /// are queried similarly and their feature flags are OR'd together to form the [`InitFeatures`]
1142 /// which are sent in our [`Init`] message.
1144 /// Note that this method is called before [`Self::peer_connected`].
1145 fn provided_init_features(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures;
1148 mod fuzzy_internal_msgs {
1149 use crate::prelude::*;
1150 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
1152 // These types aren't intended to be pub, but are exposed for direct fuzzing (as we deserialize
1153 // them from untrusted input):
1155 pub(crate) struct FinalOnionHopData {
1156 pub(crate) payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
1157 /// The total value, in msat, of the payment as received by the ultimate recipient.
1158 /// Message serialization may panic if this value is more than 21 million Bitcoin.
1159 pub(crate) total_msat: u64,
1162 pub(crate) enum OnionHopDataFormat {
1164 short_channel_id: u64,
1167 payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData>,
1168 keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
1172 pub struct OnionHopData {
1173 pub(crate) format: OnionHopDataFormat,
1174 /// The value, in msat, of the payment after this hop's fee is deducted.
1175 /// Message serialization may panic if this value is more than 21 million Bitcoin.
1176 pub(crate) amt_to_forward: u64,
1177 pub(crate) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
1180 pub struct DecodedOnionErrorPacket {
1181 pub(crate) hmac: [u8; 32],
1182 pub(crate) failuremsg: Vec<u8>,
1183 pub(crate) pad: Vec<u8>,
1187 pub use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*;
1188 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
1189 pub(crate) use self::fuzzy_internal_msgs::*;
1192 pub(crate) struct OnionPacket {
1193 pub(crate) version: u8,
1194 /// In order to ensure we always return an error on onion decode in compliance with [BOLT
1195 /// #4](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md), we have to
1196 /// deserialize `OnionPacket`s contained in [`UpdateAddHTLC`] messages even if the ephemeral
1197 /// public key (here) is bogus, so we hold a [`Result`] instead of a [`PublicKey`] as we'd
1199 pub(crate) public_key: Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>,
1200 pub(crate) hop_data: [u8; 20*65],
1201 pub(crate) hmac: [u8; 32],
1204 impl onion_utils::Packet for OnionPacket {
1205 type Data = onion_utils::FixedSizeOnionPacket;
1206 fn new(pubkey: PublicKey, hop_data: onion_utils::FixedSizeOnionPacket, hmac: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
1209 public_key: Ok(pubkey),
1210 hop_data: hop_data.0,
1216 impl Eq for OnionPacket { }
1217 impl PartialEq for OnionPacket {
1218 fn eq(&self, other: &OnionPacket) -> bool {
1219 for (i, j) in self.hop_data.iter().zip(other.hop_data.iter()) {
1220 if i != j { return false; }
1222 self.version == other.version &&
1223 self.public_key == other.public_key &&
1224 self.hmac == other.hmac
1228 impl fmt::Debug for OnionPacket {
1229 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
1230 f.write_fmt(format_args!("OnionPacket version {} with hmac {:?}", self.version, &self.hmac[..]))
1234 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1235 pub(crate) struct OnionErrorPacket {
1236 // This really should be a constant size slice, but the spec lets these things be up to 128KB?
1237 // (TODO) We limit it in decode to much lower...
1238 pub(crate) data: Vec<u8>,
1241 impl fmt::Display for DecodeError {
1242 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
1244 DecodeError::UnknownVersion => f.write_str("Unknown realm byte in Onion packet"),
1245 DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature => f.write_str("Unknown required feature preventing decode"),
1246 DecodeError::InvalidValue => f.write_str("Nonsense bytes didn't map to the type they were interpreted as"),
1247 DecodeError::ShortRead => f.write_str("Packet extended beyond the provided bytes"),
1248 DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor => f.write_str("A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly"),
1249 DecodeError::Io(ref e) => fmt::Debug::fmt(e, f),
1250 DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression => f.write_str("We don't support receiving messages with zlib-compressed fields"),
1255 impl From<io::Error> for DecodeError {
1256 fn from(e: io::Error) -> Self {
1257 if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof {
1258 DecodeError::ShortRead
1260 DecodeError::Io(e.kind())
1265 impl Writeable for OptionalField<Script> {
1266 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1268 OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1269 // Note that Writeable for script includes the 16-bit length tag for us
1272 OptionalField::Absent => {}
1278 impl Readable for OptionalField<Script> {
1279 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1280 match <u16 as Readable>::read(r) {
1282 let mut buf = vec![0; len as usize];
1283 r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
1284 Ok(OptionalField::Present(Script::from(buf)))
1286 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(OptionalField::Absent),
1292 impl Writeable for OptionalField<u64> {
1293 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1295 OptionalField::Present(ref value) => {
1298 OptionalField::Absent => {}
1304 impl Readable for OptionalField<u64> {
1305 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1306 let value: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
1307 Ok(OptionalField::Present(value))
1311 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
1312 impl_writeable_msg!(AcceptChannel, {
1313 temporary_channel_id,
1314 dust_limit_satoshis,
1315 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1316 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1322 revocation_basepoint,
1324 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1326 first_per_commitment_point,
1327 shutdown_scriptpubkey
1329 (1, channel_type, option),
1333 impl_writeable_msg!(AcceptChannel, {
1334 temporary_channel_id,
1335 dust_limit_satoshis,
1336 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1337 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1343 revocation_basepoint,
1345 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1347 first_per_commitment_point,
1348 shutdown_scriptpubkey
1350 (1, channel_type, option),
1351 (4, next_local_nonce, option),
1354 impl_writeable_msg!(AnnouncementSignatures, {
1361 impl Writeable for ChannelReestablish {
1362 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1363 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
1364 self.next_local_commitment_number.write(w)?;
1365 self.next_remote_commitment_number.write(w)?;
1366 match self.data_loss_protect {
1367 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss_protect) => {
1368 (*data_loss_protect).your_last_per_commitment_secret.write(w)?;
1369 (*data_loss_protect).my_current_per_commitment_point.write(w)?;
1371 OptionalField::Absent => {}
1377 impl Readable for ChannelReestablish{
1378 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1380 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1381 next_local_commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
1382 next_remote_commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
1383 data_loss_protect: {
1384 match <[u8; 32] as Readable>::read(r) {
1385 Ok(your_last_per_commitment_secret) =>
1386 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
1387 your_last_per_commitment_secret,
1388 my_current_per_commitment_point: Readable::read(r)?,
1390 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => OptionalField::Absent,
1391 Err(e) => return Err(e)
1398 impl_writeable_msg!(ClosingSigned,
1399 { channel_id, fee_satoshis, signature },
1400 { (1, fee_range, option) }
1403 impl_writeable!(ClosingSignedFeeRange, {
1408 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
1409 impl_writeable_msg!(CommitmentSigned, {
1416 impl_writeable_msg!(CommitmentSigned, {
1421 (2, partial_signature_with_nonce, option)
1424 impl_writeable!(DecodedOnionErrorPacket, {
1430 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
1431 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingCreated, {
1432 temporary_channel_id,
1434 funding_output_index,
1438 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingCreated, {
1439 temporary_channel_id,
1441 funding_output_index,
1444 (2, partial_signature_with_nonce, option),
1445 (4, next_local_nonce, option)
1448 #[cfg(not(taproot))]
1449 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingSigned, {
1455 impl_writeable_msg!(FundingSigned, {
1459 (2, partial_signature_with_nonce, option)
1462 impl_writeable_msg!(ChannelReady, {
1464 next_per_commitment_point,
1466 (1, short_channel_id_alias, option),
1469 impl Writeable for Init {
1470 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1471 // global_features gets the bottom 13 bits of our features, and local_features gets all of
1472 // our relevant feature bits. This keeps us compatible with old nodes.
1473 self.features.write_up_to_13(w)?;
1474 self.features.write(w)?;
1475 encode_tlv_stream!(w, {
1476 (3, self.remote_network_address, option)
1482 impl Readable for Init {
1483 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1484 let global_features: InitFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
1485 let features: InitFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
1486 let mut remote_network_address: Option<NetAddress> = None;
1487 decode_tlv_stream!(r, {
1488 (3, remote_network_address, option)
1491 features: features.or(global_features),
1492 remote_network_address,
1497 impl_writeable_msg!(OpenChannel, {
1499 temporary_channel_id,
1502 dust_limit_satoshis,
1503 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
1504 channel_reserve_satoshis,
1510 revocation_basepoint,
1512 delayed_payment_basepoint,
1514 first_per_commitment_point,
1516 shutdown_scriptpubkey
1518 (1, channel_type, option),
1521 impl_writeable_msg!(RevokeAndACK, {
1523 per_commitment_secret,
1524 next_per_commitment_point
1527 impl_writeable_msg!(Shutdown, {
1532 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFailHTLC, {
1538 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, {
1545 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFee, {
1550 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateFulfillHTLC, {
1556 // Note that this is written as a part of ChannelManager objects, and thus cannot change its
1557 // serialization format in a way which assumes we know the total serialized length/message end
1559 impl_writeable!(OnionErrorPacket, {
1563 // Note that this is written as a part of ChannelManager objects, and thus cannot change its
1564 // serialization format in a way which assumes we know the total serialized length/message end
1566 impl Writeable for OnionPacket {
1567 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1568 self.version.write(w)?;
1569 match self.public_key {
1570 Ok(pubkey) => pubkey.write(w)?,
1571 Err(_) => [0u8;33].write(w)?,
1573 w.write_all(&self.hop_data)?;
1574 self.hmac.write(w)?;
1579 impl Readable for OnionPacket {
1580 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1582 version: Readable::read(r)?,
1584 let mut buf = [0u8;33];
1585 r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
1586 PublicKey::from_slice(&buf)
1588 hop_data: Readable::read(r)?,
1589 hmac: Readable::read(r)?,
1594 impl_writeable_msg!(UpdateAddHTLC, {
1600 onion_routing_packet
1603 impl Readable for OnionMessage {
1604 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1605 let blinding_point: PublicKey = Readable::read(r)?;
1606 let len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1607 let mut packet_reader = FixedLengthReader::new(r, len as u64);
1608 let onion_routing_packet: onion_message::Packet = <onion_message::Packet as LengthReadable>::read(&mut packet_reader)?;
1611 onion_routing_packet,
1616 impl Writeable for OnionMessage {
1617 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1618 self.blinding_point.write(w)?;
1619 let onion_packet_len = self.onion_routing_packet.serialized_length();
1620 (onion_packet_len as u16).write(w)?;
1621 self.onion_routing_packet.write(w)?;
1626 impl Writeable for FinalOnionHopData {
1627 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1628 self.payment_secret.0.write(w)?;
1629 HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.total_msat).write(w)
1633 impl Readable for FinalOnionHopData {
1634 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1635 let secret: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
1636 let amt: HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize<u64> = Readable::read(r)?;
1637 Ok(Self { payment_secret: PaymentSecret(secret), total_msat: amt.0 })
1641 impl Writeable for OnionHopData {
1642 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1644 OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => {
1645 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
1646 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.amt_to_forward), required),
1647 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
1648 (6, short_channel_id, required)
1651 OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { ref payment_data, ref keysend_preimage } => {
1652 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
1653 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.amt_to_forward), required),
1654 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(self.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
1655 (8, payment_data, option),
1656 (5482373484, keysend_preimage, option)
1664 impl Readable for OnionHopData {
1665 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1666 let mut amt = HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(0u64);
1667 let mut cltv_value = HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(0u32);
1668 let mut short_id: Option<u64> = None;
1669 let mut payment_data: Option<FinalOnionHopData> = None;
1670 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
1671 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
1673 (4, cltv_value, required),
1674 (6, short_id, option),
1675 (8, payment_data, option),
1676 // See https://github.com/lightning/blips/blob/master/blip-0003.md
1677 (5482373484, keysend_preimage, option)
1680 let format = if let Some(short_channel_id) = short_id {
1681 if payment_data.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
1682 OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
1686 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1687 if data.total_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1688 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1691 OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
1697 if amt.0 > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
1698 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1702 amt_to_forward: amt.0,
1703 outgoing_cltv_value: cltv_value.0,
1708 // ReadableArgs because we need onion_utils::decode_next_hop to accommodate payment packets and
1709 // onion message packets.
1710 impl ReadableArgs<()> for OnionHopData {
1711 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R, _arg: ()) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1712 <Self as Readable>::read(r)
1716 impl Writeable for Ping {
1717 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1718 self.ponglen.write(w)?;
1719 vec![0u8; self.byteslen as usize].write(w)?; // size-unchecked write
1724 impl Readable for Ping {
1725 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1727 ponglen: Readable::read(r)?,
1729 let byteslen = Readable::read(r)?;
1730 r.read_exact(&mut vec![0u8; byteslen as usize][..])?;
1737 impl Writeable for Pong {
1738 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1739 vec![0u8; self.byteslen as usize].write(w)?; // size-unchecked write
1744 impl Readable for Pong {
1745 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1748 let byteslen = Readable::read(r)?;
1749 r.read_exact(&mut vec![0u8; byteslen as usize][..])?;
1756 impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1757 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1758 self.features.write(w)?;
1759 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
1760 self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
1761 self.node_id_1.write(w)?;
1762 self.node_id_2.write(w)?;
1763 self.bitcoin_key_1.write(w)?;
1764 self.bitcoin_key_2.write(w)?;
1765 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
1770 impl Readable for UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1771 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1773 features: Readable::read(r)?,
1774 chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
1775 short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1776 node_id_1: Readable::read(r)?,
1777 node_id_2: Readable::read(r)?,
1778 bitcoin_key_1: Readable::read(r)?,
1779 bitcoin_key_2: Readable::read(r)?,
1780 excess_data: read_to_end(r)?,
1785 impl_writeable!(ChannelAnnouncement, {
1788 bitcoin_signature_1,
1789 bitcoin_signature_2,
1793 impl Writeable for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1794 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1795 // `message_flags` used to indicate presence of `htlc_maximum_msat`, but was deprecated in the spec.
1796 const MESSAGE_FLAGS: u8 = 1;
1797 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
1798 self.short_channel_id.write(w)?;
1799 self.timestamp.write(w)?;
1800 let all_flags = self.flags as u16 | ((MESSAGE_FLAGS as u16) << 8);
1801 all_flags.write(w)?;
1802 self.cltv_expiry_delta.write(w)?;
1803 self.htlc_minimum_msat.write(w)?;
1804 self.fee_base_msat.write(w)?;
1805 self.fee_proportional_millionths.write(w)?;
1806 self.htlc_maximum_msat.write(w)?;
1807 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
1812 impl Readable for UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1813 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1815 chain_hash: Readable::read(r)?,
1816 short_channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1817 timestamp: Readable::read(r)?,
1819 let flags: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1820 // Note: we ignore the `message_flags` for now, since it was deprecated by the spec.
1823 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(r)?,
1824 htlc_minimum_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
1825 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
1826 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(r)?,
1827 htlc_maximum_msat: Readable::read(r)?,
1828 excess_data: read_to_end(r)?,
1833 impl_writeable!(ChannelUpdate, {
1838 impl Writeable for ErrorMessage {
1839 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1840 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
1841 (self.data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
1842 w.write_all(self.data.as_bytes())?;
1847 impl Readable for ErrorMessage {
1848 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1850 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1852 let sz: usize = <u16 as Readable>::read(r)? as usize;
1853 let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(sz);
1855 r.read_exact(&mut data)?;
1856 match String::from_utf8(data) {
1858 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1865 impl Writeable for WarningMessage {
1866 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1867 self.channel_id.write(w)?;
1868 (self.data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
1869 w.write_all(self.data.as_bytes())?;
1874 impl Readable for WarningMessage {
1875 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1877 channel_id: Readable::read(r)?,
1879 let sz: usize = <u16 as Readable>::read(r)? as usize;
1880 let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(sz);
1882 r.read_exact(&mut data)?;
1883 match String::from_utf8(data) {
1885 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1892 impl Writeable for UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1893 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
1894 self.features.write(w)?;
1895 self.timestamp.write(w)?;
1896 self.node_id.write(w)?;
1897 w.write_all(&self.rgb)?;
1898 self.alias.write(w)?;
1900 let mut addr_len = 0;
1901 for addr in self.addresses.iter() {
1902 addr_len += 1 + addr.len();
1904 (addr_len + self.excess_address_data.len() as u16).write(w)?;
1905 for addr in self.addresses.iter() {
1908 w.write_all(&self.excess_address_data[..])?;
1909 w.write_all(&self.excess_data[..])?;
1914 impl Readable for UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1915 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1916 let features: NodeFeatures = Readable::read(r)?;
1917 let timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
1918 let node_id: NodeId = Readable::read(r)?;
1919 let mut rgb = [0; 3];
1920 r.read_exact(&mut rgb)?;
1921 let alias: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
1923 let addr_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1924 let mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress> = Vec::new();
1925 let mut addr_readpos = 0;
1926 let mut excess = false;
1927 let mut excess_byte = 0;
1929 if addr_len <= addr_readpos { break; }
1930 match Readable::read(r) {
1932 if addr_len < addr_readpos + 1 + addr.len() {
1933 return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor);
1935 addr_readpos += (1 + addr.len()) as u16;
1936 addresses.push(addr);
1938 Ok(Err(unknown_descriptor)) => {
1940 excess_byte = unknown_descriptor;
1943 Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor),
1944 Err(e) => return Err(e),
1948 let mut excess_data = vec![];
1949 let excess_address_data = if addr_readpos < addr_len {
1950 let mut excess_address_data = vec![0; (addr_len - addr_readpos) as usize];
1951 r.read_exact(&mut excess_address_data[if excess { 1 } else { 0 }..])?;
1953 excess_address_data[0] = excess_byte;
1958 excess_data.push(excess_byte);
1962 excess_data.extend(read_to_end(r)?.iter());
1963 Ok(UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1970 excess_address_data,
1976 impl_writeable!(NodeAnnouncement, {
1981 impl Readable for QueryShortChannelIds {
1982 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1983 let chain_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(r)?;
1985 let encoding_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
1986 let encoding_type: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
1988 // Must be encoding_type=0 uncompressed serialization. We do not
1989 // support encoding_type=1 zlib serialization.
1990 if encoding_type != EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8 {
1991 return Err(DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression);
1994 // We expect the encoding_len to always includes the 1-byte
1995 // encoding_type and that short_channel_ids are 8-bytes each
1996 if encoding_len == 0 || (encoding_len - 1) % 8 != 0 {
1997 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2000 // Read short_channel_ids (8-bytes each), for the u16 encoding_len
2001 // less the 1-byte encoding_type
2002 let short_channel_id_count: u16 = (encoding_len - 1)/8;
2003 let mut short_channel_ids = Vec::with_capacity(short_channel_id_count as usize);
2004 for _ in 0..short_channel_id_count {
2005 short_channel_ids.push(Readable::read(r)?);
2008 Ok(QueryShortChannelIds {
2015 impl Writeable for QueryShortChannelIds {
2016 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2017 // Calculated from 1-byte encoding_type plus 8-bytes per short_channel_id
2018 let encoding_len: u16 = 1 + self.short_channel_ids.len() as u16 * 8;
2020 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
2021 encoding_len.write(w)?;
2023 // We only support type=0 uncompressed serialization
2024 (EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8).write(w)?;
2026 for scid in self.short_channel_ids.iter() {
2034 impl_writeable_msg!(ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd, {
2039 impl QueryChannelRange {
2040 /// Calculates the overflow safe ending block height for the query.
2042 /// Overflow returns `0xffffffff`, otherwise returns `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`.
2043 pub fn end_blocknum(&self) -> u32 {
2044 match self.first_blocknum.checked_add(self.number_of_blocks) {
2045 Some(block) => block,
2046 None => u32::max_value(),
2051 impl_writeable_msg!(QueryChannelRange, {
2057 impl Readable for ReplyChannelRange {
2058 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2059 let chain_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(r)?;
2060 let first_blocknum: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
2061 let number_of_blocks: u32 = Readable::read(r)?;
2062 let sync_complete: bool = Readable::read(r)?;
2064 let encoding_len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
2065 let encoding_type: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
2067 // Must be encoding_type=0 uncompressed serialization. We do not
2068 // support encoding_type=1 zlib serialization.
2069 if encoding_type != EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8 {
2070 return Err(DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression);
2073 // We expect the encoding_len to always includes the 1-byte
2074 // encoding_type and that short_channel_ids are 8-bytes each
2075 if encoding_len == 0 || (encoding_len - 1) % 8 != 0 {
2076 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2079 // Read short_channel_ids (8-bytes each), for the u16 encoding_len
2080 // less the 1-byte encoding_type
2081 let short_channel_id_count: u16 = (encoding_len - 1)/8;
2082 let mut short_channel_ids = Vec::with_capacity(short_channel_id_count as usize);
2083 for _ in 0..short_channel_id_count {
2084 short_channel_ids.push(Readable::read(r)?);
2087 Ok(ReplyChannelRange {
2097 impl Writeable for ReplyChannelRange {
2098 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
2099 let encoding_len: u16 = 1 + self.short_channel_ids.len() as u16 * 8;
2100 self.chain_hash.write(w)?;
2101 self.first_blocknum.write(w)?;
2102 self.number_of_blocks.write(w)?;
2103 self.sync_complete.write(w)?;
2105 encoding_len.write(w)?;
2106 (EncodingType::Uncompressed as u8).write(w)?;
2107 for scid in self.short_channel_ids.iter() {
2115 impl_writeable_msg!(GossipTimestampFilter, {
2124 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
2125 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
2126 use crate::ln::msgs;
2127 use crate::ln::msgs::{FinalOnionHopData, OptionalField, OnionErrorPacket, OnionHopDataFormat};
2128 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
2129 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Hostname};
2131 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2132 use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
2133 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2134 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
2135 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2136 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
2138 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
2139 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message};
2141 use crate::io::{self, Cursor};
2142 use crate::prelude::*;
2143 use core::convert::TryFrom;
2146 fn encoding_channel_reestablish_no_secret() {
2147 let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
2148 channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
2149 next_local_commitment_number: 3,
2150 next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
2151 data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Absent,
2154 let encoded_value = cr.encode();
2157 vec![4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4]
2162 fn encoding_channel_reestablish_with_secret() {
2164 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2165 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
2168 let cr = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
2169 channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
2170 next_local_commitment_number: 3,
2171 next_remote_commitment_number: 4,
2172 data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Present(msgs::DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret: [9;32], my_current_per_commitment_point: public_key}),
2175 let encoded_value = cr.encode();
2178 vec![4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 3, 27, 132, 197, 86, 123, 18, 100, 64, 153, 93, 62, 213, 170, 186, 5, 101, 215, 30, 24, 52, 96, 72, 25, 255, 156, 23, 245, 233, 213, 221, 7, 143]
2182 macro_rules! get_keys_from {
2183 ($slice: expr, $secp_ctx: expr) => {
2185 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode($slice).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2186 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &privkey);
2192 macro_rules! get_sig_on {
2193 ($privkey: expr, $ctx: expr, $string: expr) => {
2195 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&$string.into_bytes()[..]).unwrap();
2196 $ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &$privkey)
2202 fn encoding_announcement_signatures() {
2203 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2204 let (privkey, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2205 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2206 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey, secp_ctx, String::from("02020202020202020202020202020202"));
2207 let announcement_signatures = msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2208 channel_id: [4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
2209 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2210 node_signature: sig_1,
2211 bitcoin_signature: sig_2,
2214 let encoded_value = announcement_signatures.encode();
2215 assert_eq!(encoded_value, hex::decode("040000000000000005000000000000000600000000000000070000000000000000083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073acf9953cef4700860f5967838eba2bae89288ad188ebf8b20bf995c3ea53a26df1876d0a3a0e13172ba286a673140190c02ba9da60a2e43a745188c8a83c7f3ef").unwrap());
2218 fn do_encoding_channel_announcement(unknown_features_bits: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2219 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2220 let (privkey_1, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2221 let (privkey_2, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2222 let (privkey_3, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2223 let (privkey_4, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2224 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2225 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey_2, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2226 let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2227 let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2228 let mut features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
2229 if unknown_features_bits {
2230 features = ChannelFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF]);
2232 let unsigned_channel_announcement = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2234 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
2235 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2236 node_id_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_1),
2237 node_id_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_2),
2238 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_3),
2239 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_4),
2240 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![10, 0, 0, 20, 0, 0, 30, 0, 0, 40] } else { Vec::new() },
2242 let channel_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2243 node_signature_1: sig_1,
2244 node_signature_2: sig_2,
2245 bitcoin_signature_1: sig_3,
2246 bitcoin_signature_2: sig_4,
2247 contents: unsigned_channel_announcement,
2249 let encoded_value = channel_announcement.encode();
2250 let mut target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
2251 if unknown_features_bits {
2252 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0002ffff").unwrap());
2254 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000").unwrap());
2256 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
2257 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00083a840000034d031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f024d4b6cd1361032ca9bd2aeb9d900aa4d45d9ead80ac9423374c451a7254d076602531fe6068134503d2723133227c867ac8fa6c83c537e9a44c3c5bdbdcb1fe33703462779ad4aad39514614751a71085f2f10e1c7a593e4e030efb5b8721ce55b0b").unwrap());
2259 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0a00001400001e000028").unwrap());
2261 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2265 fn encoding_channel_announcement() {
2266 do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, false);
2267 do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, true);
2268 do_encoding_channel_announcement(false, false);
2269 do_encoding_channel_announcement(true, true);
2272 fn do_encoding_node_announcement(unknown_features_bits: bool, ipv4: bool, ipv6: bool, onionv2: bool, onionv3: bool, hostname: bool, excess_address_data: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2273 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2274 let (privkey_1, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2275 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2276 let features = if unknown_features_bits {
2277 NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF])
2279 // Set to some features we may support
2280 NodeFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![2 | 1 << 5])
2282 let mut addresses = Vec::new();
2284 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::IPv4 {
2285 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252],
2290 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::IPv6 {
2291 addr: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240],
2296 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::OnionV2(
2297 [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 38, 7]
2301 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::OnionV3 {
2302 ed25519_pubkey: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240, 239, 238, 237, 236, 235, 234, 233, 232, 231, 230, 229, 228, 227, 226, 225, 224],
2309 addresses.push(msgs::NetAddress::Hostname {
2310 hostname: Hostname::try_from(String::from("host")).unwrap(),
2314 let mut addr_len = 0;
2315 for addr in &addresses {
2316 addr_len += addr.len() + 1;
2318 let unsigned_node_announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2320 timestamp: 20190119,
2321 node_id: NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey_1),
2325 excess_address_data: if excess_address_data { vec![33, 108, 40, 11, 83, 149, 162, 84, 110, 126, 75, 38, 99, 224, 79, 129, 22, 34, 241, 90, 79, 146, 232, 58, 162, 233, 43, 162, 165, 115, 193, 57, 20, 44, 84, 174, 99, 7, 42, 30, 193, 238, 125, 192, 192, 75, 222, 92, 132, 120, 6, 23, 42, 160, 92, 146, 194, 42, 232, 227, 8, 209, 210, 105] } else { Vec::new() },
2326 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![59, 18, 204, 25, 92, 224, 162, 209, 189, 166, 168, 139, 239, 161, 159, 160, 127, 81, 202, 167, 92, 232, 56, 55, 242, 137, 101, 96, 11, 138, 172, 171, 8, 85, 255, 176, 231, 65, 236, 95, 124, 65, 66, 30, 152, 41, 169, 212, 134, 17, 200, 200, 49, 247, 27, 229, 234, 115, 230, 101, 148, 151, 127, 253] } else { Vec::new() },
2328 addr_len += unsigned_node_announcement.excess_address_data.len() as u16;
2329 let node_announcement = msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2331 contents: unsigned_node_announcement,
2333 let encoded_value = node_announcement.encode();
2334 let mut target_value = hex::decode("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2335 if unknown_features_bits {
2336 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0002ffff").unwrap());
2338 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000122").unwrap());
2340 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("013413a7031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f2020201010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010").unwrap());
2341 target_value.append(&mut vec![(addr_len >> 8) as u8, addr_len as u8]);
2343 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("01fffefdfc2607").unwrap());
2346 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("02fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f02607").unwrap());
2349 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("03fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f62607").unwrap());
2352 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("04fffefdfcfbfaf9f8f7f6f5f4f3f2f1f0efeeedecebeae9e8e7e6e5e4e3e2e1e00020102607").unwrap());
2355 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0504686f73742607").unwrap());
2357 if excess_address_data {
2358 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f92e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d269").unwrap());
2361 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("3b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
2363 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2367 fn encoding_node_announcement() {
2368 do_encoding_node_announcement(true, true, true, true, true, true, true, true);
2369 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, false, false, false);
2370 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, true, false, false, false, false, false, false);
2371 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, true, false, false, false, false, false);
2372 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, true, false, false, false, false);
2373 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, true, false, false, false);
2374 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, true, false, false);
2375 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, false, false, false, false, true, false);
2376 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, true, false, true, false, false, true, false);
2377 do_encoding_node_announcement(false, false, true, false, true, false, false, false);
2380 fn do_encoding_channel_update(direction: bool, disable: bool, excess_data: bool) {
2381 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2382 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2383 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2384 let unsigned_channel_update = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2385 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
2386 short_channel_id: 2316138423780173,
2387 timestamp: 20190119,
2388 flags: if direction { 1 } else { 0 } | if disable { 1 << 1 } else { 0 },
2389 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
2390 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
2391 htlc_maximum_msat: 131355275467161,
2392 fee_base_msat: 10000,
2393 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
2394 excess_data: if excess_data { vec![0, 0, 0, 0, 59, 154, 202, 0] } else { Vec::new() }
2396 let channel_update = msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2398 contents: unsigned_channel_update
2400 let encoded_value = channel_update.encode();
2401 let mut target_value = hex::decode("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2402 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
2403 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00083a840000034d013413a7").unwrap());
2404 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("01").unwrap());
2405 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00").unwrap());
2407 let flag = target_value.last_mut().unwrap();
2411 let flag = target_value.last_mut().unwrap();
2412 *flag = *flag | 1 << 1;
2414 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap());
2415 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000777788889999").unwrap());
2417 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000003b9aca00").unwrap());
2419 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2423 fn encoding_channel_update() {
2424 do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, false);
2425 do_encoding_channel_update(false, false, true);
2426 do_encoding_channel_update(true, false, false);
2427 do_encoding_channel_update(true, false, true);
2428 do_encoding_channel_update(false, true, false);
2429 do_encoding_channel_update(false, true, true);
2430 do_encoding_channel_update(true, true, false);
2431 do_encoding_channel_update(true, true, true);
2434 fn do_encoding_open_channel(random_bit: bool, shutdown: bool, incl_chan_type: bool) {
2435 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2436 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2437 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2438 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2439 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2440 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
2441 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
2442 let open_channel = msgs::OpenChannel {
2443 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000").unwrap(),
2444 temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
2445 funding_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
2446 push_msat: 2536655962884945560,
2447 dust_limit_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
2448 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 8517154655701053848,
2449 channel_reserve_satoshis: 8665828695742877976,
2450 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
2451 feerate_per_kw: 821716,
2452 to_self_delay: 49340,
2453 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
2454 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
2455 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
2456 payment_point: pubkey_3,
2457 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
2458 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
2459 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
2460 channel_flags: if random_bit { 1 << 5 } else { 0 },
2461 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { OptionalField::Present(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { OptionalField::Absent },
2462 channel_type: if incl_chan_type { Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::empty()) } else { None },
2464 let encoded_value = open_channel.encode();
2465 let mut target_value = Vec::new();
2466 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f").unwrap());
2467 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("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").unwrap());
2469 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("20").unwrap());
2471 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00").unwrap());
2474 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
2477 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0100").unwrap());
2479 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2483 fn encoding_open_channel() {
2484 do_encoding_open_channel(false, false, false);
2485 do_encoding_open_channel(false, false, true);
2486 do_encoding_open_channel(false, true, false);
2487 do_encoding_open_channel(false, true, true);
2488 do_encoding_open_channel(true, false, false);
2489 do_encoding_open_channel(true, false, true);
2490 do_encoding_open_channel(true, true, false);
2491 do_encoding_open_channel(true, true, true);
2494 fn do_encoding_accept_channel(shutdown: bool) {
2495 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2496 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2497 let (_, pubkey_2) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2498 let (_, pubkey_3) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2499 let (_, pubkey_4) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2500 let (_, pubkey_5) = get_keys_from!("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505", secp_ctx);
2501 let (_, pubkey_6) = get_keys_from!("0606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606060606", secp_ctx);
2502 let accept_channel = msgs::AcceptChannel {
2503 temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
2504 dust_limit_satoshis: 1311768467284833366,
2505 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 2536655962884945560,
2506 channel_reserve_satoshis: 3608586615801332854,
2507 htlc_minimum_msat: 2316138423780173,
2508 minimum_depth: 821716,
2509 to_self_delay: 49340,
2510 max_accepted_htlcs: 49340,
2511 funding_pubkey: pubkey_1,
2512 revocation_basepoint: pubkey_2,
2513 payment_point: pubkey_3,
2514 delayed_payment_basepoint: pubkey_4,
2515 htlc_basepoint: pubkey_5,
2516 first_per_commitment_point: pubkey_6,
2517 shutdown_scriptpubkey: if shutdown { OptionalField::Present(Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey()) } else { OptionalField::Absent },
2520 next_local_nonce: None,
2522 let encoded_value = accept_channel.encode();
2523 let mut target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
2525 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
2527 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2531 fn encoding_accept_channel() {
2532 do_encoding_accept_channel(false);
2533 do_encoding_accept_channel(true);
2537 fn encoding_funding_created() {
2538 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2539 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2540 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2541 let funding_created = msgs::FundingCreated {
2542 temporary_channel_id: [2; 32],
2543 funding_txid: Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap(),
2544 funding_output_index: 255,
2547 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2549 next_local_nonce: None,
2551 let encoded_value = funding_created.encode();
2552 let target_value = hex::decode("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202026e96fe9f8b0ddcd729ba03cfafa5a27b050b39d354dd980814268dfa9a44d4c200ffd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2553 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2557 fn encoding_funding_signed() {
2558 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2559 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2560 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2561 let funding_signed = msgs::FundingSigned {
2562 channel_id: [2; 32],
2565 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2567 let encoded_value = funding_signed.encode();
2568 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2569 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2573 fn encoding_channel_ready() {
2574 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2575 let (_, pubkey_1,) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2576 let channel_ready = msgs::ChannelReady {
2577 channel_id: [2; 32],
2578 next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
2579 short_channel_id_alias: None,
2581 let encoded_value = channel_ready.encode();
2582 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap();
2583 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2586 fn do_encoding_shutdown(script_type: u8) {
2587 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2588 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2589 let script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::OP_TRUE).into_script();
2590 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
2591 channel_id: [2; 32],
2593 if script_type == 1 { Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() }
2594 else if script_type == 2 { Address::p2sh(&script, Network::Testnet).unwrap().script_pubkey() }
2595 else if script_type == 3 { Address::p2wpkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, inner: pubkey_1}, Network::Testnet).unwrap().script_pubkey() }
2596 else { Address::p2wsh(&script, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey() },
2598 let encoded_value = shutdown.encode();
2599 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap();
2600 if script_type == 1 {
2601 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001976a91479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b23598388ac").unwrap());
2602 } else if script_type == 2 {
2603 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0017a914da1745e9b549bd0bfa1a569971c77eba30cd5a4b87").unwrap());
2604 } else if script_type == 3 {
2605 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0016001479b000887626b294a914501a4cd226b58b235983").unwrap());
2606 } else if script_type == 4 {
2607 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("002200204ae81572f06e1b88fd5ced7a1a000945432e83e1551e6f721ee9c00b8cc33260").unwrap());
2609 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2613 fn encoding_shutdown() {
2614 do_encoding_shutdown(1);
2615 do_encoding_shutdown(2);
2616 do_encoding_shutdown(3);
2617 do_encoding_shutdown(4);
2621 fn encoding_closing_signed() {
2622 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2623 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2624 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2625 let closing_signed = msgs::ClosingSigned {
2626 channel_id: [2; 32],
2627 fee_satoshis: 2316138423780173,
2631 let encoded_value = closing_signed.encode();
2632 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2633 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2634 assert_eq!(msgs::ClosingSigned::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value)).unwrap(), closing_signed);
2636 let closing_signed_with_range = msgs::ClosingSigned {
2637 channel_id: [2; 32],
2638 fee_satoshis: 2316138423780173,
2640 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
2641 min_fee_satoshis: 0xdeadbeef,
2642 max_fee_satoshis: 0x1badcafe01234567,
2645 let encoded_value_with_range = closing_signed_with_range.encode();
2646 let target_value_with_range = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034dd977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a011000000000deadbeef1badcafe01234567").unwrap();
2647 assert_eq!(encoded_value_with_range, target_value_with_range);
2648 assert_eq!(msgs::ClosingSigned::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value_with_range)).unwrap(),
2649 closing_signed_with_range);
2653 fn encoding_update_add_htlc() {
2654 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2655 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2656 let onion_routing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2658 public_key: Ok(pubkey_1),
2659 hop_data: [1; 20*65],
2662 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2663 channel_id: [2; 32],
2664 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2665 amount_msat: 3608586615801332854,
2666 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
2667 cltv_expiry: 821716,
2668 onion_routing_packet
2670 let encoded_value = update_add_htlc.encode();
2671 let target_value = hex::decode("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").unwrap();
2672 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2676 fn encoding_update_fulfill_htlc() {
2677 let update_fulfill_htlc = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2678 channel_id: [2; 32],
2679 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2680 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([1; 32]),
2682 let encoded_value = update_fulfill_htlc.encode();
2683 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap();
2684 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2688 fn encoding_update_fail_htlc() {
2689 let reason = OnionErrorPacket {
2690 data: [1; 32].to_vec(),
2692 let update_fail_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2693 channel_id: [2; 32],
2694 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2697 let encoded_value = update_fail_htlc.encode();
2698 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d00200101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap();
2699 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2703 fn encoding_update_fail_malformed_htlc() {
2704 let update_fail_malformed_htlc = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2705 channel_id: [2; 32],
2706 htlc_id: 2316138423780173,
2707 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
2710 let encoded_value = update_fail_malformed_htlc.encode();
2711 let target_value = hex::decode("020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020200083a840000034d010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010100ff").unwrap();
2712 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2715 fn do_encoding_commitment_signed(htlcs: bool) {
2716 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2717 let (privkey_1, _) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2718 let (privkey_2, _) = get_keys_from!("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202", secp_ctx);
2719 let (privkey_3, _) = get_keys_from!("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303", secp_ctx);
2720 let (privkey_4, _) = get_keys_from!("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404", secp_ctx);
2721 let sig_1 = get_sig_on!(privkey_1, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2722 let sig_2 = get_sig_on!(privkey_2, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2723 let sig_3 = get_sig_on!(privkey_3, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2724 let sig_4 = get_sig_on!(privkey_4, secp_ctx, String::from("01010101010101010101010101010101"));
2725 let commitment_signed = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
2726 channel_id: [2; 32],
2728 htlc_signatures: if htlcs { vec![sig_2, sig_3, sig_4] } else { Vec::new() },
2730 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2732 let encoded_value = commitment_signed.encode();
2733 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a").unwrap();
2735 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("00031735b6a427e80d5fe7cd90a2f4ee08dc9c27cda7c35a4172e5d85b12c49d4232537e98f9b1f3c5e6989a8b9644e90e8918127680dbd0d4043510840fc0f1e11a216c280b5395a2546e7e4b2663e04f811622f15a4f91e83aa2e92ba2a573c139142c54ae63072a1ec1ee7dc0c04bde5c847806172aa05c92c22ae8e308d1d2692b12cc195ce0a2d1bda6a88befa19fa07f51caa75ce83837f28965600b8aacab0855ffb0e741ec5f7c41421e9829a9d48611c8c831f71be5ea73e66594977ffd").unwrap());
2737 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("0000").unwrap());
2739 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2743 fn encoding_commitment_signed() {
2744 do_encoding_commitment_signed(true);
2745 do_encoding_commitment_signed(false);
2749 fn encoding_revoke_and_ack() {
2750 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2751 let (_, pubkey_1) = get_keys_from!("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101", secp_ctx);
2752 let raa = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2753 channel_id: [2; 32],
2754 per_commitment_secret: [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1],
2755 next_per_commitment_point: pubkey_1,
2757 let encoded_value = raa.encode();
2758 let target_value = hex::decode("02020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f").unwrap();
2759 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2763 fn encoding_update_fee() {
2764 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
2765 channel_id: [2; 32],
2766 feerate_per_kw: 20190119,
2768 let encoded_value = update_fee.encode();
2769 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202013413a7").unwrap();
2770 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2774 fn encoding_init() {
2775 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
2776 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF]),
2777 remote_network_address: None,
2778 }.encode(), hex::decode("00023fff0003ffffff").unwrap());
2779 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
2780 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0xFF]),
2781 remote_network_address: None,
2782 }.encode(), hex::decode("0001ff0001ff").unwrap());
2783 assert_eq!(msgs::Init {
2784 features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
2785 remote_network_address: None,
2786 }.encode(), hex::decode("00000000").unwrap());
2788 let init_msg = msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![]),
2789 remote_network_address: Some(msgs::NetAddress::IPv4 {
2790 addr: [127, 0, 0, 1],
2794 let encoded_value = init_msg.encode();
2795 let target_value = hex::decode("000000000307017f00000103e8").unwrap();
2796 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2797 assert_eq!(msgs::Init::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value)).unwrap(), init_msg);
2801 fn encoding_error() {
2802 let error = msgs::ErrorMessage {
2803 channel_id: [2; 32],
2804 data: String::from("rust-lightning"),
2806 let encoded_value = error.encode();
2807 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000e727573742d6c696768746e696e67").unwrap();
2808 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2812 fn encoding_warning() {
2813 let error = msgs::WarningMessage {
2814 channel_id: [2; 32],
2815 data: String::from("rust-lightning"),
2817 let encoded_value = error.encode();
2818 let target_value = hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202000e727573742d6c696768746e696e67").unwrap();
2819 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2823 fn encoding_ping() {
2824 let ping = msgs::Ping {
2828 let encoded_value = ping.encode();
2829 let target_value = hex::decode("0040004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap();
2830 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2834 fn encoding_pong() {
2835 let pong = msgs::Pong {
2838 let encoded_value = pong.encode();
2839 let target_value = hex::decode("004000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap();
2840 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2844 fn encoding_nonfinal_onion_hop_data() {
2845 let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
2846 format: OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
2847 short_channel_id: 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea,
2849 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
2850 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2852 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
2853 let target_value = hex::decode("1a02080badf00d010203040404ffffffff0608deadbeef1bad1dea").unwrap();
2854 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2855 msg = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2856 if let OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } = msg.format {
2857 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea);
2858 } else { panic!(); }
2859 assert_eq!(msg.amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
2860 assert_eq!(msg.outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
2864 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data() {
2865 let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
2866 format: OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
2868 keysend_preimage: None,
2870 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
2871 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2873 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
2874 let target_value = hex::decode("1002080badf00d010203040404ffffffff").unwrap();
2875 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2876 msg = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2877 if let OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data: None, .. } = msg.format { } else { panic!(); }
2878 assert_eq!(msg.amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
2879 assert_eq!(msg.outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
2883 fn encoding_final_onion_hop_data_with_secret() {
2884 let expected_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([0x42u8; 32]);
2885 let mut msg = msgs::OnionHopData {
2886 format: OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
2887 payment_data: Some(FinalOnionHopData {
2888 payment_secret: expected_payment_secret,
2889 total_msat: 0x1badca1f
2891 keysend_preimage: None,
2893 amt_to_forward: 0x0badf00d01020304,
2894 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
2896 let encoded_value = msg.encode();
2897 let target_value = hex::decode("3602080badf00d010203040404ffffffff082442424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242421badca1f").unwrap();
2898 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2899 msg = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2900 if let OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
2901 payment_data: Some(FinalOnionHopData {
2903 total_msat: 0x1badca1f
2905 keysend_preimage: None,
2907 assert_eq!(payment_secret, expected_payment_secret);
2908 } else { panic!(); }
2909 assert_eq!(msg.amt_to_forward, 0x0badf00d01020304);
2910 assert_eq!(msg.outgoing_cltv_value, 0xffffffff);
2914 fn query_channel_range_end_blocknum() {
2915 let tests: Vec<(u32, u32, u32)> = vec![
2916 (10000, 1500, 11500),
2917 (0, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
2918 (1, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
2921 for (first_blocknum, number_of_blocks, expected) in tests.into_iter() {
2922 let sut = msgs::QueryChannelRange {
2923 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap(),
2927 assert_eq!(sut.end_blocknum(), expected);
2932 fn encoding_query_channel_range() {
2933 let mut query_channel_range = msgs::QueryChannelRange {
2934 chain_hash: BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap(),
2935 first_blocknum: 100000,
2936 number_of_blocks: 1500,
2938 let encoded_value = query_channel_range.encode();
2939 let target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206000186a0000005dc").unwrap();
2940 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2942 query_channel_range = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2943 assert_eq!(query_channel_range.first_blocknum, 100000);
2944 assert_eq!(query_channel_range.number_of_blocks, 1500);
2948 fn encoding_reply_channel_range() {
2949 do_encoding_reply_channel_range(0);
2950 do_encoding_reply_channel_range(1);
2953 fn do_encoding_reply_channel_range(encoding_type: u8) {
2954 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206000b8a06000005dc01").unwrap();
2955 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2956 let mut reply_channel_range = msgs::ReplyChannelRange {
2957 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2958 first_blocknum: 756230,
2959 number_of_blocks: 1500,
2960 sync_complete: true,
2961 short_channel_ids: vec![0x000000000000008e, 0x0000000000003c69, 0x000000000045a6c4],
2964 if encoding_type == 0 {
2965 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001900000000000000008e0000000000003c69000000000045a6c4").unwrap());
2966 let encoded_value = reply_channel_range.encode();
2967 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
2969 reply_channel_range = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
2970 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
2971 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.first_blocknum, 756230);
2972 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.number_of_blocks, 1500);
2973 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.sync_complete, true);
2974 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[0], 0x000000000000008e);
2975 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[1], 0x0000000000003c69);
2976 assert_eq!(reply_channel_range.short_channel_ids[2], 0x000000000045a6c4);
2978 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001601789c636000833e08659309a65878be010010a9023a").unwrap());
2979 let result: Result<msgs::ReplyChannelRange, msgs::DecodeError> = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]));
2980 assert!(result.is_err(), "Expected decode failure with unsupported zlib encoding");
2985 fn encoding_query_short_channel_ids() {
2986 do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(0);
2987 do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(1);
2990 fn do_encoding_query_short_channel_ids(encoding_type: u8) {
2991 let mut target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e2206").unwrap();
2992 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
2993 let mut query_short_channel_ids = msgs::QueryShortChannelIds {
2994 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
2995 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0000000000008e, 0x0000000000003c69, 0x000000000045a6c4],
2998 if encoding_type == 0 {
2999 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001900000000000000008e0000000000003c69000000000045a6c4").unwrap());
3000 let encoded_value = query_short_channel_ids.encode();
3001 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3003 query_short_channel_ids = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
3004 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
3005 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[0], 0x000000000000008e);
3006 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[1], 0x0000000000003c69);
3007 assert_eq!(query_short_channel_ids.short_channel_ids[2], 0x000000000045a6c4);
3009 target_value.append(&mut hex::decode("001601789c636000833e08659309a65878be010010a9023a").unwrap());
3010 let result: Result<msgs::QueryShortChannelIds, msgs::DecodeError> = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..]));
3011 assert!(result.is_err(), "Expected decode failure with unsupported zlib encoding");
3016 fn encoding_reply_short_channel_ids_end() {
3017 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
3018 let mut reply_short_channel_ids_end = msgs::ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
3019 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
3020 full_information: true,
3022 let encoded_value = reply_short_channel_ids_end.encode();
3023 let target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e220601").unwrap();
3024 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3026 reply_short_channel_ids_end = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
3027 assert_eq!(reply_short_channel_ids_end.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
3028 assert_eq!(reply_short_channel_ids_end.full_information, true);
3032 fn encoding_gossip_timestamp_filter(){
3033 let expected_chain_hash = BlockHash::from_hex("06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f").unwrap();
3034 let mut gossip_timestamp_filter = msgs::GossipTimestampFilter {
3035 chain_hash: expected_chain_hash,
3036 first_timestamp: 1590000000,
3037 timestamp_range: 0xffff_ffff,
3039 let encoded_value = gossip_timestamp_filter.encode();
3040 let target_value = hex::decode("0f9188f13cb7b2c71f2a335e3a4fc328bf5beb436012afca590b1a11466e22065ec57980ffffffff").unwrap();
3041 assert_eq!(encoded_value, target_value);
3043 gossip_timestamp_filter = Readable::read(&mut Cursor::new(&target_value[..])).unwrap();
3044 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.chain_hash, expected_chain_hash);
3045 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.first_timestamp, 1590000000);
3046 assert_eq!(gossip_timestamp_filter.timestamp_range, 0xffff_ffff);
3050 fn decode_onion_hop_data_len_as_bigsize() {
3051 // Tests that we can decode an onion payload that is >253 bytes.
3052 // Previously, receiving a payload of this size could've caused us to fail to decode a valid
3053 // payload, because we were decoding the length (a BigSize, big-endian) as a VarInt
3056 // Encode a test onion payload with a big custom TLV such that it's >253 bytes, forcing the
3057 // payload length to be encoded over multiple bytes rather than a single u8.
3058 let big_payload = encode_big_payload().unwrap();
3059 let mut rd = Cursor::new(&big_payload[..]);
3060 <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut rd).unwrap();
3062 // see above test, needs to be a separate method for use of the serialization macros.
3063 fn encode_big_payload() -> Result<Vec<u8>, io::Error> {
3064 use crate::util::ser::HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize;
3065 let payload = msgs::OnionHopData {
3066 format: OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode {
3067 short_channel_id: 0xdeadbeef1bad1dea,
3069 amt_to_forward: 1000,
3070 outgoing_cltv_value: 0xffffffff,
3072 let mut encoded_payload = Vec::new();
3073 let test_bytes = vec![42u8; 1000];
3074 if let OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } = payload.format {
3075 _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(&mut encoded_payload, {
3076 (1, test_bytes, vec_type),
3077 (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(payload.amt_to_forward), required),
3078 (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(payload.outgoing_cltv_value), required),
3079 (6, short_channel_id, required)