1 //! Utilities to decode payment onions and do contextless validation of incoming payments.
3 //! Primarily features [`peel_payment_onion`], which allows the decoding of an onion statelessly
4 //! and can be used to predict whether we'd accept a payment.
6 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
7 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
8 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{self, PublicKey, Scalar, Secp256k1};
11 use crate::blinded_path;
12 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, PaymentRelay};
13 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
14 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
15 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BlindedForward, CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY, HTLCFailureMsg, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PendingHTLCInfo, PendingHTLCRouting};
16 use crate::ln::features::BlindedHopFeatures;
18 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
19 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
20 use crate::sign::{NodeSigner, Recipient};
21 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
23 use crate::prelude::*;
26 /// Invalid inbound onion payment.
28 pub struct InboundHTLCErr {
29 /// BOLT 4 error code.
31 /// Data attached to this error.
32 pub err_data: Vec<u8>,
33 /// Error message text.
34 pub msg: &'static str,
37 fn check_blinded_payment_constraints(
38 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, constraints: &PaymentConstraints
40 if amt_msat < constraints.htlc_minimum_msat ||
41 cltv_expiry > constraints.max_cltv_expiry
46 fn check_blinded_forward(
47 inbound_amt_msat: u64, inbound_cltv_expiry: u32, payment_relay: &PaymentRelay,
48 payment_constraints: &PaymentConstraints, features: &BlindedHopFeatures
49 ) -> Result<(u64, u32), ()> {
50 let amt_to_forward = blinded_path::payment::amt_to_forward_msat(
51 inbound_amt_msat, payment_relay
53 let outgoing_cltv_value = inbound_cltv_expiry.checked_sub(
54 payment_relay.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
56 check_blinded_payment_constraints(inbound_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_constraints)?;
58 if features.requires_unknown_bits_from(&BlindedHopFeatures::empty()) { return Err(()) }
59 Ok((amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value))
62 pub(super) fn create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
63 msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
64 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
65 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
66 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundHTLCErr> {
67 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
68 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
70 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
71 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
76 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, inbound_blinding_point
78 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
79 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, None),
80 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
81 short_channel_id, payment_relay, payment_constraints, intro_node_blinding_point, features,
83 let (amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = check_blinded_forward(
84 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, &payment_relay, &payment_constraints, &features
86 // We should be returning malformed here if `msg.blinding_point` is set, but this is
87 // unreachable right now since we checked it in `decode_update_add_htlc_onion`.
89 msg: "Underflow calculating outbound amount or cltv value for blinded forward",
90 err_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
91 err_data: vec![0; 32],
94 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(intro_node_blinding_point))
96 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
97 return Err(InboundHTLCErr {
98 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
99 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
100 err_data: Vec::new(),
105 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
106 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
108 blinded: inbound_blinding_point.map(|bp| BlindedForward { inbound_blinding_point: bp }),
110 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
111 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
112 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
113 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
115 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
119 pub(super) fn create_recv_pending_htlc_info(
120 hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
121 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
122 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, current_height: u32, accept_mpp_keysend: bool,
123 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundHTLCErr> {
125 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
126 payment_metadata, requires_blinded_error
128 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
129 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
131 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata,
133 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
134 amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, intro_node_blinding_point,
135 payment_constraints, ..
137 check_blinded_payment_constraints(amt_msat, cltv_expiry, &payment_constraints)
140 err_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
141 err_data: vec![0; 32],
142 msg: "Amount or cltv_expiry violated blinded payment constraints",
145 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
146 (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None,
147 intro_node_blinding_point.is_none())
149 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
150 return Err(InboundHTLCErr {
152 err_data: Vec::new(),
153 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
156 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward { .. } => {
157 return Err(InboundHTLCErr {
158 err_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
159 err_data: vec![0; 32],
160 msg: "Got blinded non final data with an HMAC of 0",
164 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
165 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
166 return Err(InboundHTLCErr {
167 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
169 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
172 // final_expiry_too_soon
173 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
174 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
176 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
177 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
178 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
179 if cltv_expiry <= current_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 {
180 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
181 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
182 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
183 return Err(InboundHTLCErr {
184 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
185 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
188 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
189 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
190 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
192 return Err(InboundHTLCErr {
194 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
195 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
199 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
200 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
201 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
202 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
203 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
204 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
205 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
206 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
207 return Err(InboundHTLCErr {
209 err_data: Vec::new(),
210 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
213 if !accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
214 return Err(InboundHTLCErr {
216 err_data: Vec::new(),
217 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
220 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
224 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
227 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
228 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
231 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
232 phantom_shared_secret,
234 requires_blinded_error,
237 return Err(InboundHTLCErr {
238 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
239 err_data: Vec::new(),
240 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
246 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
247 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
248 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
250 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
254 /// Peel one layer off an incoming onion, returning a [`PendingHTLCInfo`] that contains information
255 /// about the intended next-hop for the HTLC.
257 /// This does all the relevant context-free checks that LDK requires for payment relay or
258 /// acceptance. If the payment is to be received, and the amount matches the expected amount for
259 /// a given invoice, this indicates the [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], once fully committed in the
260 /// channel, will generate an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
262 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
263 pub fn peel_payment_onion<NS: Deref, L: Deref, T: secp256k1::Verification>(
264 msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, node_signer: &NS, logger: &L, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
265 cur_height: u32, accept_mpp_keysend: bool, allow_skimmed_fees: bool,
266 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundHTLCErr>
268 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
271 let (hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) =
272 decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, node_signer, logger, secp_ctx
274 let (err_code, err_data) = match e {
275 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(m) => (m.failure_code, Vec::new()),
276 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(r) => (0x4000 | 22, r.reason.data),
278 let msg = "Failed to decode update add htlc onion";
279 InboundHTLCErr { msg, err_code, err_data }
282 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
283 let NextPacketDetails {
284 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat: _, outgoing_scid: _, outgoing_cltv_value
285 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
286 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
287 // Forward should always include the next hop details
288 None => return Err(InboundHTLCErr {
289 msg: "Failed to decode update add htlc onion",
290 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
291 err_data: Vec::new(),
295 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
296 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
298 return Err(InboundHTLCErr {
301 err_data: Vec::new(),
305 // TODO: If this is potentially a phantom payment we should decode the phantom payment
306 // onion here and check it.
308 create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
309 msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes, shared_secret,
310 Some(next_packet_pubkey)
313 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(received_data) => {
314 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(
315 received_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry,
316 None, allow_skimmed_fees, msg.skimmed_fee_msat, cur_height, accept_mpp_keysend,
322 pub(super) struct NextPacketDetails {
323 pub(super) next_packet_pubkey: Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>,
324 pub(super) outgoing_scid: u64,
325 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
326 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
329 pub(super) fn decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion<NS: Deref, L: Deref, T: secp256k1::Verification>(
330 msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, node_signer: &NS, logger: &L, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
331 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<NextPacketDetails>), HTLCFailureMsg>
333 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
336 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
337 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
339 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
340 let (sha256_of_onion, failure_code) = if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
341 ([0; 32], INVALID_ONION_BLINDING)
343 (Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array(), $err_code)
345 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
346 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
347 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
355 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
356 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
359 let blinded_node_id_tweak = msg.blinding_point.map(|bp| {
360 let blinded_tlvs_ss = node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::Node, &bp, None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
361 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(b"blinded_node_id");
362 hmac.input(blinded_tlvs_ss.as_ref());
363 Scalar::from_be_bytes(Hmac::from_engine(hmac).to_byte_array()).unwrap()
365 let shared_secret = node_signer.ecdh(
366 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), blinded_node_id_tweak.as_ref()
367 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
369 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
370 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
371 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
372 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
373 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
374 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
375 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
376 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
378 macro_rules! return_err {
379 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
381 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
382 return_malformed_err!($msg, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING)
385 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
386 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
387 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
388 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
389 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
390 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
396 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
397 shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
398 msg.payment_hash, msg.blinding_point, node_signer
401 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
402 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
404 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
405 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
409 let next_packet_details = match next_hop {
410 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
411 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
412 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
415 let next_packet_pubkey = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(secp_ctx,
416 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
418 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_scid: short_channel_id,
419 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
422 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
423 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
424 short_channel_id, ref payment_relay, ref payment_constraints, ref features, ..
427 let (amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match check_blinded_forward(
428 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, &payment_relay, &payment_constraints, &features
430 Ok((amt, cltv)) => (amt, cltv),
432 return_err!("Underflow calculating outbound amount or cltv value for blinded forward",
433 INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32]);
436 let next_packet_pubkey = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&secp_ctx,
437 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
439 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_scid: short_channel_id, outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
443 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
444 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
445 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
447 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
451 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details)))
454 pub(super) fn check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
455 cur_height: u32, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, cltv_expiry: u32
456 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
457 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
459 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
460 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
463 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
464 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
465 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
466 if cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
467 return Err(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14));
469 if cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
470 return Err(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21));
472 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
473 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
474 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
475 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
476 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
477 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
478 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
479 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
480 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
481 return Err(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14));
489 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
490 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
491 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
492 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
493 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
494 use crate::ln::channelmanager::RecipientOnionFields;
495 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
497 use crate::ln::onion_utils::create_payment_onion;
498 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
499 use crate::util::test_utils;
502 fn fail_construct_onion_on_too_big_payloads() {
503 // Ensure that if we call `construct_onion_packet` and friends where payloads are too large for
504 // the allotted packet length, we'll fail to construct. Previously, senders would happily
505 // construct invalid packets by array-shifting the final node's HMAC out of the packet when
506 // adding an intermediate onion layer, causing the receiver to error with "final payload
507 // provided for us as an intermediate node."
508 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
509 let bob = crate::sign::KeysManager::new(&[2; 32], 42, 42);
510 let bob_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bob.get_node_secret_key());
511 let charlie = crate::sign::KeysManager::new(&[3; 32], 42, 42);
512 let charlie_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &charlie.get_node_secret_key());
515 session_priv, total_amt_msat, cur_height, mut recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_hash,
517 ) = payment_onion_args(bob_pk, charlie_pk);
519 // Ensure the onion will not fit all the payloads by adding a large custom TLV.
520 recipient_onion.custom_tlvs.push((13377331, vec![0; 1156]));
522 let path = Path { hops, blinded_tail: None, };
523 let onion_keys = super::onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv).unwrap();
524 let (onion_payloads, ..) = super::onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
525 &path, total_amt_msat, recipient_onion, cur_height + 1, &Some(keysend_preimage)
528 assert!(super::onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(
529 onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash
534 fn test_peel_payment_onion() {
536 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
538 let bob = crate::sign::KeysManager::new(&[2; 32], 42, 42);
539 let bob_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bob.get_node_secret_key());
540 let charlie = crate::sign::KeysManager::new(&[3; 32], 42, 42);
541 let charlie_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &charlie.get_node_secret_key());
543 let (session_priv, total_amt_msat, cur_height, recipient_onion, preimage, payment_hash,
544 prng_seed, hops, recipient_amount, pay_secret) = payment_onion_args(bob_pk, charlie_pk);
551 let (onion, amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = create_payment_onion(
552 &secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_amt_msat, recipient_onion, cur_height,
553 &payment_hash, &Some(preimage), prng_seed
556 let msg = make_update_add_msg(amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, onion);
557 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("bob".to_string());
559 let peeled = peel_payment_onion(&msg, &&bob, &&logger, &secp_ctx, cur_height, true, false)
560 .map_err(|e| e.msg).unwrap();
562 let next_onion = match peeled.routing {
563 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
566 _ => panic!("expected a forwarded onion"),
569 let msg2 = make_update_add_msg(amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, next_onion);
570 let peeled2 = peel_payment_onion(&msg2, &&charlie, &&logger, &secp_ctx, cur_height, true, false)
571 .map_err(|e| e.msg).unwrap();
573 match peeled2.routing {
574 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, .. } => {
575 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, preimage);
576 assert_eq!(peeled2.outgoing_amt_msat, recipient_amount);
577 assert_eq!(incoming_cltv_expiry, peeled2.outgoing_cltv_value);
578 let msgs::FinalOnionHopData{total_msat, payment_secret} = payment_data.unwrap();
579 assert_eq!(total_msat, total_amt_msat);
580 assert_eq!(payment_secret, pay_secret);
582 _ => panic!("expected a received keysend"),
586 fn make_update_add_msg(
587 amount_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
588 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket
589 ) -> msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
590 msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
591 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([0; 32]),
596 onion_routing_packet,
597 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
598 blinding_point: None,
602 fn payment_onion_args(hop_pk: PublicKey, recipient_pk: PublicKey) -> (
603 SecretKey, u64, u32, RecipientOnionFields, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, [u8; 32],
604 Vec<RouteHop>, u64, PaymentSecret,
606 let session_priv_bytes = [42; 32];
607 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes).unwrap();
608 let total_amt_msat = 1000;
609 let cur_height = 1000;
610 let pay_secret = PaymentSecret([99; 32]);
611 let recipient_onion = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(pay_secret);
612 let preimage_bytes = [43; 32];
613 let preimage = PaymentPreimage(preimage_bytes);
614 let rhash_bytes = Sha256::hash(&preimage_bytes).to_byte_array();
615 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(rhash_bytes);
616 let prng_seed = [44; 32];
618 // make a route alice -> bob -> charlie
620 let recipient_amount = total_amt_msat - hop_fee;
625 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
627 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
628 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
629 maybe_announced_channel: false,
632 pubkey: recipient_pk,
633 fee_msat: recipient_amount,
634 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
636 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
637 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
638 maybe_announced_channel: false,
642 (session_priv, total_amt_msat, cur_height, recipient_onion, preimage, payment_hash,
643 prng_seed, hops, recipient_amount, pay_secret)