1 //! Utilities to decode payment onions and do contextless validation of incoming payments.
3 //! Primarily features [`peel_payment_onion`], which allows the decoding of an onion statelessly
4 //! and can be used to predict whether we'd accept a payment.
6 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
7 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
8 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{self, PublicKey, Scalar, Secp256k1};
11 use crate::blinded_path;
12 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, PaymentRelay};
13 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
14 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
15 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BlindedFailure, BlindedForward, CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY, HTLCFailureMsg, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PendingHTLCInfo, PendingHTLCRouting};
16 use crate::ln::features::BlindedHopFeatures;
18 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
19 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
20 use crate::sign::{NodeSigner, Recipient};
21 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
23 #[allow(unused_imports)]
24 use crate::prelude::*;
28 /// Invalid inbound onion payment.
30 pub struct InboundHTLCErr {
31 /// BOLT 4 error code.
33 /// Data attached to this error.
34 pub err_data: Vec<u8>,
35 /// Error message text.
36 pub msg: &'static str,
39 fn check_blinded_payment_constraints(
40 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, constraints: &PaymentConstraints
42 if amt_msat < constraints.htlc_minimum_msat ||
43 cltv_expiry > constraints.max_cltv_expiry
48 fn check_blinded_forward(
49 inbound_amt_msat: u64, inbound_cltv_expiry: u32, payment_relay: &PaymentRelay,
50 payment_constraints: &PaymentConstraints, features: &BlindedHopFeatures
51 ) -> Result<(u64, u32), ()> {
52 let amt_to_forward = blinded_path::payment::amt_to_forward_msat(
53 inbound_amt_msat, payment_relay
55 let outgoing_cltv_value = inbound_cltv_expiry.checked_sub(
56 payment_relay.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
58 check_blinded_payment_constraints(inbound_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_constraints)?;
60 if features.requires_unknown_bits_from(&BlindedHopFeatures::empty()) { return Err(()) }
61 Ok((amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value))
64 pub(super) fn create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
65 msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
66 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
67 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
68 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundHTLCErr> {
69 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
70 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
72 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
73 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
78 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, intro_node_blinding_point
80 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
81 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, None),
82 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
83 short_channel_id, payment_relay, payment_constraints, intro_node_blinding_point, features,
85 let (amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = check_blinded_forward(
86 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, &payment_relay, &payment_constraints, &features
88 // We should be returning malformed here if `msg.blinding_point` is set, but this is
89 // unreachable right now since we checked it in `decode_update_add_htlc_onion`.
91 msg: "Underflow calculating outbound amount or cltv value for blinded forward",
92 err_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
93 err_data: vec![0; 32],
96 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, intro_node_blinding_point)
98 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
99 return Err(InboundHTLCErr {
100 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
101 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
102 err_data: Vec::new(),
107 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
108 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
110 blinded: intro_node_blinding_point.or(msg.blinding_point)
111 .map(|bp| BlindedForward {
112 inbound_blinding_point: bp,
113 failure: intro_node_blinding_point
114 .map(|_| BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)
115 .unwrap_or(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
118 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
119 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
120 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
121 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
123 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
127 pub(super) fn create_recv_pending_htlc_info(
128 hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
129 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
130 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, current_height: u32, accept_mpp_keysend: bool,
131 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundHTLCErr> {
133 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, onion_cltv_expiry,
134 payment_metadata, requires_blinded_error
136 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
137 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat,
138 cltv_expiry_height, payment_metadata, ..
140 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat,
141 cltv_expiry_height, payment_metadata, false),
142 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
143 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat, total_msat, cltv_expiry_height, payment_secret,
144 intro_node_blinding_point, payment_constraints, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs
146 check_blinded_payment_constraints(
147 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat, cltv_expiry, &payment_constraints
151 err_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
152 err_data: vec![0; 32],
153 msg: "Amount or cltv_expiry violated blinded payment constraints",
156 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
157 (Some(payment_data), keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs,
158 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat, cltv_expiry_height, None,
159 intro_node_blinding_point.is_none())
161 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
162 return Err(InboundHTLCErr {
164 err_data: Vec::new(),
165 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
168 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward { .. } => {
169 return Err(InboundHTLCErr {
170 err_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
171 err_data: vec![0; 32],
172 msg: "Got blinded non final data with an HMAC of 0",
176 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
177 if onion_cltv_expiry > cltv_expiry {
178 return Err(InboundHTLCErr {
179 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
181 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
184 // final_expiry_too_soon
185 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
186 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
188 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
189 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
190 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
191 if cltv_expiry <= current_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 {
192 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
193 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
194 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
195 return Err(InboundHTLCErr {
196 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
197 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
200 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
201 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
202 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
204 return Err(InboundHTLCErr {
206 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
207 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
211 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
212 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
213 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
214 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
215 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
216 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
217 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
218 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
219 return Err(InboundHTLCErr {
221 err_data: Vec::new(),
222 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
225 if !accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
226 return Err(InboundHTLCErr {
228 err_data: Vec::new(),
229 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
232 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
236 incoming_cltv_expiry: onion_cltv_expiry,
238 requires_blinded_error,
240 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
241 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
244 incoming_cltv_expiry: onion_cltv_expiry,
245 phantom_shared_secret,
247 requires_blinded_error,
250 return Err(InboundHTLCErr {
251 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
252 err_data: Vec::new(),
253 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
259 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
260 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
261 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
262 outgoing_cltv_value: onion_cltv_expiry,
263 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
267 /// Peel one layer off an incoming onion, returning a [`PendingHTLCInfo`] that contains information
268 /// about the intended next-hop for the HTLC.
270 /// This does all the relevant context-free checks that LDK requires for payment relay or
271 /// acceptance. If the payment is to be received, and the amount matches the expected amount for
272 /// a given invoice, this indicates the [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], once fully committed in the
273 /// channel, will generate an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
275 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
276 pub fn peel_payment_onion<NS: Deref, L: Deref, T: secp256k1::Verification>(
277 msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, node_signer: &NS, logger: &L, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
278 cur_height: u32, accept_mpp_keysend: bool, allow_skimmed_fees: bool,
279 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundHTLCErr>
281 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
284 let (hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) =
285 decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, node_signer, logger, secp_ctx
287 let (err_code, err_data) = match e {
288 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(m) => (m.failure_code, Vec::new()),
289 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(r) => (0x4000 | 22, r.reason.data),
291 let msg = "Failed to decode update add htlc onion";
292 InboundHTLCErr { msg, err_code, err_data }
295 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
296 let NextPacketDetails {
297 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat: _, outgoing_scid: _, outgoing_cltv_value
298 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
299 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
300 // Forward should always include the next hop details
301 None => return Err(InboundHTLCErr {
302 msg: "Failed to decode update add htlc onion",
303 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
304 err_data: Vec::new(),
308 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
309 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
311 return Err(InboundHTLCErr {
314 err_data: Vec::new(),
318 // TODO: If this is potentially a phantom payment we should decode the phantom payment
319 // onion here and check it.
321 create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
322 msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes, shared_secret,
323 Some(next_packet_pubkey)
326 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(received_data) => {
327 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(
328 received_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry,
329 None, allow_skimmed_fees, msg.skimmed_fee_msat, cur_height, accept_mpp_keysend,
335 pub(super) struct NextPacketDetails {
336 pub(super) next_packet_pubkey: Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>,
337 pub(super) outgoing_scid: u64,
338 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
339 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
342 pub(super) fn decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion<NS: Deref, L: Deref, T: secp256k1::Verification>(
343 msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, node_signer: &NS, logger: &L, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
344 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<NextPacketDetails>), HTLCFailureMsg>
346 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
349 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
350 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
352 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
353 let (sha256_of_onion, failure_code) = if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
354 ([0; 32], INVALID_ONION_BLINDING)
356 (Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array(), $err_code)
358 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
359 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
360 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
368 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
369 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
372 let blinded_node_id_tweak = msg.blinding_point.map(|bp| {
373 let blinded_tlvs_ss = node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::Node, &bp, None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
374 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(b"blinded_node_id");
375 hmac.input(blinded_tlvs_ss.as_ref());
376 Scalar::from_be_bytes(Hmac::from_engine(hmac).to_byte_array()).unwrap()
378 let shared_secret = node_signer.ecdh(
379 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), blinded_node_id_tweak.as_ref()
380 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
382 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
383 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
384 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
385 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
386 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
387 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
388 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
389 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
391 macro_rules! return_err {
392 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
394 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
395 return_malformed_err!($msg, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING)
398 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
399 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
400 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
401 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
402 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
403 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
409 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
410 shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
411 msg.payment_hash, msg.blinding_point, node_signer
414 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
415 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
417 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
418 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
422 let next_packet_details = match next_hop {
423 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
424 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
425 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
428 let next_packet_pubkey = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(secp_ctx,
429 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
431 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_scid: short_channel_id,
432 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
435 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
436 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
437 short_channel_id, ref payment_relay, ref payment_constraints, ref features, ..
440 let (amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match check_blinded_forward(
441 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, &payment_relay, &payment_constraints, &features
443 Ok((amt, cltv)) => (amt, cltv),
445 return_err!("Underflow calculating outbound amount or cltv value for blinded forward",
446 INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32]);
449 let next_packet_pubkey = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&secp_ctx,
450 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
452 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_scid: short_channel_id, outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
456 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
457 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
458 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
460 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
464 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details)))
467 pub(super) fn check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
468 cur_height: u32, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, cltv_expiry: u32
469 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
470 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
472 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
473 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
476 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
477 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
478 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
479 if cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
480 return Err(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14));
482 if cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
483 return Err(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21));
485 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
486 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
487 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
488 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
489 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
490 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
491 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
492 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
493 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
494 return Err(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14));
502 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
503 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
504 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
505 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
506 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
507 use crate::ln::channelmanager::RecipientOnionFields;
508 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
510 use crate::ln::onion_utils::create_payment_onion;
511 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
512 use crate::util::test_utils;
515 fn fail_construct_onion_on_too_big_payloads() {
516 // Ensure that if we call `construct_onion_packet` and friends where payloads are too large for
517 // the allotted packet length, we'll fail to construct. Previously, senders would happily
518 // construct invalid packets by array-shifting the final node's HMAC out of the packet when
519 // adding an intermediate onion layer, causing the receiver to error with "final payload
520 // provided for us as an intermediate node."
521 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
522 let bob = crate::sign::KeysManager::new(&[2; 32], 42, 42);
523 let bob_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bob.get_node_secret_key());
524 let charlie = crate::sign::KeysManager::new(&[3; 32], 42, 42);
525 let charlie_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &charlie.get_node_secret_key());
528 session_priv, total_amt_msat, cur_height, mut recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_hash,
530 ) = payment_onion_args(bob_pk, charlie_pk);
532 // Ensure the onion will not fit all the payloads by adding a large custom TLV.
533 recipient_onion.custom_tlvs.push((13377331, vec![0; 1156]));
535 let path = Path { hops, blinded_tail: None, };
536 let onion_keys = super::onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv).unwrap();
537 let (onion_payloads, ..) = super::onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
538 &path, total_amt_msat, recipient_onion, cur_height + 1, &Some(keysend_preimage)
541 assert!(super::onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(
542 onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash
547 fn test_peel_payment_onion() {
549 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
551 let bob = crate::sign::KeysManager::new(&[2; 32], 42, 42);
552 let bob_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bob.get_node_secret_key());
553 let charlie = crate::sign::KeysManager::new(&[3; 32], 42, 42);
554 let charlie_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &charlie.get_node_secret_key());
556 let (session_priv, total_amt_msat, cur_height, recipient_onion, preimage, payment_hash,
557 prng_seed, hops, recipient_amount, pay_secret) = payment_onion_args(bob_pk, charlie_pk);
564 let (onion, amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = create_payment_onion(
565 &secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_amt_msat, recipient_onion, cur_height,
566 &payment_hash, &Some(preimage), prng_seed
569 let msg = make_update_add_msg(amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, onion);
570 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("bob".to_string());
572 let peeled = peel_payment_onion(&msg, &&bob, &&logger, &secp_ctx, cur_height, true, false)
573 .map_err(|e| e.msg).unwrap();
575 let next_onion = match peeled.routing {
576 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
579 _ => panic!("expected a forwarded onion"),
582 let msg2 = make_update_add_msg(amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, next_onion);
583 let peeled2 = peel_payment_onion(&msg2, &&charlie, &&logger, &secp_ctx, cur_height, true, false)
584 .map_err(|e| e.msg).unwrap();
586 match peeled2.routing {
587 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, .. } => {
588 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, preimage);
589 assert_eq!(peeled2.outgoing_amt_msat, recipient_amount);
590 assert_eq!(incoming_cltv_expiry, peeled2.outgoing_cltv_value);
591 let msgs::FinalOnionHopData{total_msat, payment_secret} = payment_data.unwrap();
592 assert_eq!(total_msat, total_amt_msat);
593 assert_eq!(payment_secret, pay_secret);
595 _ => panic!("expected a received keysend"),
599 fn make_update_add_msg(
600 amount_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
601 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket
602 ) -> msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
603 msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
604 channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([0; 32]),
609 onion_routing_packet,
610 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
611 blinding_point: None,
615 fn payment_onion_args(hop_pk: PublicKey, recipient_pk: PublicKey) -> (
616 SecretKey, u64, u32, RecipientOnionFields, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, [u8; 32],
617 Vec<RouteHop>, u64, PaymentSecret,
619 let session_priv_bytes = [42; 32];
620 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes).unwrap();
621 let total_amt_msat = 1000;
622 let cur_height = 1000;
623 let pay_secret = PaymentSecret([99; 32]);
624 let recipient_onion = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(pay_secret);
625 let preimage_bytes = [43; 32];
626 let preimage = PaymentPreimage(preimage_bytes);
627 let rhash_bytes = Sha256::hash(&preimage_bytes).to_byte_array();
628 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(rhash_bytes);
629 let prng_seed = [44; 32];
631 // make a route alice -> bob -> charlie
633 let recipient_amount = total_amt_msat - hop_fee;
638 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
640 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
641 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
642 maybe_announced_channel: false,
645 pubkey: recipient_pk,
646 fee_msat: recipient_amount,
647 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
649 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
650 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
651 maybe_announced_channel: false,
655 (session_priv, total_amt_msat, cur_height, recipient_onion, preimage, payment_hash,
656 prng_seed, hops, recipient_amount, pay_secret)