_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/onion_payment.rs

   1 //! Utilities to decode payment onions and do contextless validation of incoming payments.
   2 //!
   3 //! Primarily features [`peel_payment_onion`], which allows the decoding of an onion statelessly
   4 //! and can be used to predict whether we'd accept a payment.
   5
   6 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
   7 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
   8 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{self, Secp256k1, PublicKey};
   9
  10 use crate::blinded_path;
  11 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, PaymentRelay};
  12 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
  13 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
  14 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BlindedForward, CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY, HTLCFailureMsg, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PendingHTLCInfo, PendingHTLCRouting};
  15 use crate::ln::features::BlindedHopFeatures;
  16 use crate::ln::msgs;
  17 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
  18 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
  19 use crate::sign::{NodeSigner, Recipient};
  20 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
  21
  22 use crate::prelude::*;
  23 use core::ops::Deref;
  24
  25 /// Invalid inbound onion payment.
  26 pub struct InboundOnionErr {
  27         /// BOLT 4 error code.
  28         pub err_code: u16,
  29         /// Data attached to this error.
  30         pub err_data: Vec<u8>,
  31         /// Error message text.
  32         pub msg: &'static str,
  33 }
  34
  35 fn check_blinded_forward(
  36         inbound_amt_msat: u64, inbound_cltv_expiry: u32, payment_relay: &PaymentRelay,
  37         payment_constraints: &PaymentConstraints, features: &BlindedHopFeatures
  38 ) -> Result<(u64, u32), ()> {
  39         let amt_to_forward = blinded_path::payment::amt_to_forward_msat(
  40                 inbound_amt_msat, payment_relay
  41         ).ok_or(())?;
  42         let outgoing_cltv_value = inbound_cltv_expiry.checked_sub(
  43                 payment_relay.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
  44         ).ok_or(())?;
  45         if inbound_amt_msat < payment_constraints.htlc_minimum_msat ||
  46                 outgoing_cltv_value > payment_constraints.max_cltv_expiry
  47                 { return Err(()) }
  48         if features.requires_unknown_bits_from(&BlindedHopFeatures::empty()) { return Err(()) }
  49         Ok((amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value))
  50 }
  51
  52 pub(super) fn create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
  53         msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
  54         new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
  55         next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
  56 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
  57         debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
  58         let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
  59                 version: 0,
  60                 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
  61                 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
  62                 hmac: hop_hmac,
  63         };
  64
  65         let (
  66                 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, inbound_blinding_point
  67         ) = match hop_data {
  68                 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
  69                         (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, None),
  70                 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
  71                         short_channel_id, payment_relay, payment_constraints, intro_node_blinding_point, features,
  72                 } => {
  73                         let (amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = check_blinded_forward(
  74                                 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, &payment_relay, &payment_constraints, &features
  75                         ).map_err(|()| {
  76                                 // We should be returning malformed here if `msg.blinding_point` is set, but this is
  77                                 // unreachable right now since we checked it in `decode_update_add_htlc_onion`.
  78                                 InboundOnionErr {
  79                                         msg: "Underflow calculating outbound amount or cltv value for blinded forward",
  80                                         err_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
  81                                         err_data: vec![0; 32],
  82                                 }
  83                         })?;
  84                         (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(intro_node_blinding_point))
  85                 },
  86                 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
  87                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
  88                                 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
  89                                 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
  90                                 err_data: Vec::new(),
  91                         }),
  92         };
  93
  94         Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
  95                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
  96                         onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
  97                         short_channel_id,
  98                         blinded: inbound_blinding_point.map(|bp| BlindedForward { inbound_blinding_point: bp }),
  99                 },
 100                 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
 101                 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
 102                 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
 103                 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
 104                 outgoing_cltv_value,
 105                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
 106         })
 107 }
 108
 109 pub(super) fn create_recv_pending_htlc_info(
 110         hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 111         amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
 112         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, current_height: u32, accept_mpp_keysend: bool,
 113 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
 114         let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
 115                 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
 116                         payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
 117                 } =>
 118                         (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
 119                 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
 120                         amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
 121                 } => {
 122                         let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
 123                         (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
 124                 }
 125                 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
 126                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
 127                                 err_code: 0x4000|22,
 128                                 err_data: Vec::new(),
 129                                 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
 130                         })
 131                 },
 132                 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward { .. } => {
 133                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
 134                                 err_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
 135                                 err_data: vec![0; 32],
 136                                 msg: "Got blinded non final data with an HMAC of 0",
 137                         })
 138                 }
 139         };
 140         // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
 141         if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
 142                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
 143                         msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
 144                         err_code: 18,
 145                         err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
 146                 })
 147         }
 148         // final_expiry_too_soon
 149         // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
 150         // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
 151         //
 152         // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
 153         // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
 154         // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
 155         if cltv_expiry <= current_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 {
 156                 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
 157                 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
 158                 err_data.extend_from_slice(&current_height.to_be_bytes());
 159                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
 160                         err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
 161                         msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
 162                 });
 163         }
 164         if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
 165                 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
 166                  amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
 167         {
 168                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
 169                         err_code: 19,
 170                         err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
 171                         msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
 172                 });
 173         }
 174
 175         let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
 176                 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
 177                 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
 178                 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
 179                 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
 180                 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
 181                 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
 182                 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
 183                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
 184                                 err_code: 0x4000|22,
 185                                 err_data: Vec::new(),
 186                                 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
 187                         });
 188                 }
 189                 if !accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
 190                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
 191                                 err_code: 0x4000|22,
 192                                 err_data: Vec::new(),
 193                                 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
 194                         });
 195                 }
 196                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
 197                         payment_data,
 198                         payment_preimage,
 199                         payment_metadata,
 200                         incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
 201                         custom_tlvs,
 202                 }
 203         } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
 204                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
 205                         payment_data: data,
 206                         payment_metadata,
 207                         incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
 208                         phantom_shared_secret,
 209                         custom_tlvs,
 210                 }
 211         } else {
 212                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
 213                         err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
 214                         err_data: Vec::new(),
 215                         msg: "We require payment_secrets",
 216                 });
 217         };
 218         Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
 219                 routing,
 220                 payment_hash,
 221                 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
 222                 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
 223                 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
 224                 outgoing_cltv_value,
 225                 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
 226         })
 227 }
 228
 229 /// Peel one layer off an incoming onion, returning a [`PendingHTLCInfo`] that contains information
 230 /// about the intended next-hop for the HTLC.
 231 ///
 232 /// This does all the relevant context-free checks that LDK requires for payment relay or
 233 /// acceptance. If the payment is to be received, and the amount matches the expected amount for
 234 /// a given invoice, this indicates the [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], once fully committed in the
 235 /// channel, will generate an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
 236 ///
 237 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
 238 pub fn peel_payment_onion<NS: Deref, L: Deref, T: secp256k1::Verification>(
 239         msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, node_signer: &NS, logger: &L, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
 240         cur_height: u32, accept_mpp_keysend: bool, allow_skimmed_fees: bool,
 241 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr>
 242 where
 243         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
 244         L::Target: Logger,
 245 {
 246         let (hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) =
 247                 decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, node_signer, logger, secp_ctx
 248         ).map_err(|e| {
 249                 let (err_code, err_data) = match e {
 250                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(m) => (m.failure_code, Vec::new()),
 251                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(r) => (0x4000 | 22, r.reason.data),
 252                 };
 253                 let msg = "Failed to decode update add htlc onion";
 254                 InboundOnionErr { msg, err_code, err_data }
 255         })?;
 256         Ok(match hop {
 257                 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
 258                         let NextPacketDetails {
 259                                 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat: _, outgoing_scid: _, outgoing_cltv_value
 260                         } = match next_packet_details_opt {
 261                                 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
 262                                 // Forward should always include the next hop details
 263                                 None => return Err(InboundOnionErr {
 264                                         msg: "Failed to decode update add htlc onion",
 265                                         err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
 266                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
 267                                 }),
 268                         };
 269
 270                         if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
 271                                 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
 272                         ) {
 273                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
 274                                         msg: err_msg,
 275                                         err_code: code,
 276                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
 277                                 });
 278                         }
 279
 280                         // TODO: If this is potentially a phantom payment we should decode the phantom payment
 281                         // onion here and check it.
 282
 283                         create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
 284                                 msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes, shared_secret,
 285                                 Some(next_packet_pubkey)
 286                         )?
 287                 },
 288                 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(received_data) => {
 289                         create_recv_pending_htlc_info(
 290                                 received_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry,
 291                                 None, allow_skimmed_fees, msg.skimmed_fee_msat, cur_height, accept_mpp_keysend,
 292                         )?
 293                 }
 294         })
 295 }
 296
 297 pub(super) struct NextPacketDetails {
 298         pub(super) next_packet_pubkey: Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>,
 299         pub(super) outgoing_scid: u64,
 300         pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
 301         pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
 302 }
 303
 304 pub(super) fn decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion<NS: Deref, L: Deref, T: secp256k1::Verification>(
 305         msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, node_signer: &NS, logger: &L, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
 306 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<NextPacketDetails>), HTLCFailureMsg>
 307 where
 308         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
 309         L::Target: Logger,
 310 {
 311         macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
 312                 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
 313                         {
 314                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
 315                                 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
 316                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
 317                                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
 318                                         sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array(),
 319                                         failure_code: $err_code,
 320                                 }));
 321                         }
 322                 }
 323         }
 324
 325         if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
 326                 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
 327         }
 328
 329         let shared_secret = node_signer.ecdh(
 330                 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
 331         ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
 332
 333         if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
 334                 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
 335                 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
 336                 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
 337                 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
 338                 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
 339                 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
 340                 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
 341         }
 342         macro_rules! return_err {
 343                 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
 344                         {
 345                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
 346                                 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
 347                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
 348                                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
 349                                         reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
 350                                                 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
 351                                 }));
 352                         }
 353                 }
 354         }
 355
 356         let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
 357                 shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
 358                 msg.payment_hash, node_signer
 359         ) {
 360                 Ok(res) => res,
 361                 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
 362                         return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
 363                 },
 364                 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
 365                         return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
 366                 },
 367         };
 368
 369         let next_packet_details = match next_hop {
 370                 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
 371                         next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
 372                                 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
 373                         }, ..
 374                 } => {
 375                         let next_packet_pubkey = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(secp_ctx,
 376                                 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
 377                         NextPacketDetails {
 378                                 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_scid: short_channel_id,
 379                                 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
 380                         }
 381                 },
 382                 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
 383                         next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
 384                                 short_channel_id, ref payment_relay, ref payment_constraints, ref features, ..
 385                         }, ..
 386                 } => {
 387                         let (amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match check_blinded_forward(
 388                                 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, &payment_relay, &payment_constraints, &features
 389                         ) {
 390                                 Ok((amt, cltv)) => (amt, cltv),
 391                                 Err(()) => {
 392                                         return_err!("Underflow calculating outbound amount or cltv value for blinded forward",
 393                                                 INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32]);
 394                                 }
 395                         };
 396                         let next_packet_pubkey = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&secp_ctx,
 397                                 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
 398                         NextPacketDetails {
 399                                 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_scid: short_channel_id, outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
 400                                 outgoing_cltv_value
 401                         }
 402                 },
 403                 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
 404                 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
 405                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
 406                 {
 407                         return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
 408                 }
 409         };
 410
 411         Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details)))
 412 }
 413
 414 pub(super) fn check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
 415         cur_height: u32, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, cltv_expiry: u32
 416 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
 417         if (cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
 418                 return Err((
 419                         "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
 420                         0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
 421                 ));
 422         }
 423         // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
 424         // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
 425         // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
 426         if cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
 427                 return Err(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14));
 428         }
 429         if cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
 430                 return Err(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21));
 431         }
 432         // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
 433         // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
 434         // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
 435         // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
 436         // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
 437         // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
 438         // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
 439         // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
 440         if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
 441                 return Err(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14));
 442         }
 443
 444         Ok(())
 445 }
 446
 447 #[cfg(test)]
 448 mod tests {
 449         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
 450         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
 451         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
 452         use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
 453         use crate::ln::ChannelId;
 454         use crate::ln::channelmanager::RecipientOnionFields;
 455         use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
 456         use crate::ln::msgs;
 457         use crate::ln::onion_utils::create_payment_onion;
 458         use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
 459         use crate::util::test_utils;
 460
 461         #[test]
 462         fn test_peel_payment_onion() {
 463                 use super::*;
 464                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 465
 466                 let bob = crate::sign::KeysManager::new(&[2; 32], 42, 42);
 467                 let bob_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bob.get_node_secret_key());
 468                 let charlie = crate::sign::KeysManager::new(&[3; 32], 42, 42);
 469                 let charlie_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &charlie.get_node_secret_key());
 470
 471                 let (session_priv, total_amt_msat, cur_height, recipient_onion, preimage, payment_hash,
 472                         prng_seed, hops, recipient_amount, pay_secret) = payment_onion_args(bob_pk, charlie_pk);
 473
 474                 let path = Path {
 475                         hops: hops,
 476                         blinded_tail: None,
 477                 };
 478
 479                 let (onion, amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = create_payment_onion(
 480                         &secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_amt_msat, recipient_onion, cur_height,
 481                         &payment_hash, &Some(preimage), prng_seed
 482                 ).unwrap();
 483
 484                 let msg = make_update_add_msg(amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, onion);
 485                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("bob".to_string());
 486
 487                 let peeled = peel_payment_onion(&msg, &&bob, &&logger, &secp_ctx, cur_height, true, false)
 488                         .map_err(|e| e.msg).unwrap();
 489
 490                 let next_onion = match peeled.routing {
 491                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
 492                                 onion_packet
 493                         },
 494                         _ => panic!("expected a forwarded onion"),
 495                 };
 496
 497                 let msg2 = make_update_add_msg(amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, next_onion);
 498                 let peeled2 = peel_payment_onion(&msg2, &&charlie, &&logger, &secp_ctx, cur_height, true, false)
 499                         .map_err(|e| e.msg).unwrap();
 500
 501                 match peeled2.routing {
 502                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, .. } => {
 503                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, preimage);
 504                                 assert_eq!(peeled2.outgoing_amt_msat, recipient_amount);
 505                                 assert_eq!(incoming_cltv_expiry, peeled2.outgoing_cltv_value);
 506                                 let msgs::FinalOnionHopData{total_msat, payment_secret} = payment_data.unwrap();
 507                                 assert_eq!(total_msat, total_amt_msat);
 508                                 assert_eq!(payment_secret, pay_secret);
 509                         },
 510                         _ => panic!("expected a received keysend"),
 511                 };
 512         }
 513
 514         fn make_update_add_msg(
 515                 amount_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 516                 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket
 517         ) -> msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
 518                 msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
 519                         channel_id: ChannelId::from_bytes([0; 32]),
 520                         htlc_id: 0,
 521                         amount_msat,
 522                         cltv_expiry,
 523                         payment_hash,
 524                         onion_routing_packet,
 525                         skimmed_fee_msat: None,
 526                         blinding_point: None,
 527                 }
 528         }
 529
 530         fn payment_onion_args(hop_pk: PublicKey, recipient_pk: PublicKey) -> (
 531                 SecretKey, u64, u32, RecipientOnionFields, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, [u8; 32],
 532                 Vec<RouteHop>, u64, PaymentSecret,
 533         ) {
 534                 let session_priv_bytes = [42; 32];
 535                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes).unwrap();
 536                 let total_amt_msat = 1000;
 537                 let cur_height = 1000;
 538                 let pay_secret = PaymentSecret([99; 32]);
 539                 let recipient_onion = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(pay_secret);
 540                 let preimage_bytes = [43; 32];
 541                 let preimage = PaymentPreimage(preimage_bytes);
 542                 let rhash_bytes = Sha256::hash(&preimage_bytes).to_byte_array();
 543                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(rhash_bytes);
 544                 let prng_seed = [44; 32];
 545
 546                 // make a route alice -> bob -> charlie
 547                 let hop_fee = 1;
 548                 let recipient_amount = total_amt_msat - hop_fee;
 549                 let hops = vec![
 550                         RouteHop {
 551                                 pubkey: hop_pk,
 552                                 fee_msat: hop_fee,
 553                                 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
 554                                 short_channel_id: 1,
 555                                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 556                                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 557                                 maybe_announced_channel: false,
 558                         },
 559                         RouteHop {
 560                                 pubkey: recipient_pk,
 561                                 fee_msat: recipient_amount,
 562                                 cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
 563                                 short_channel_id: 2,
 564                                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 565                                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 566                                 maybe_announced_channel: false,
 567                         }
 568                 ];
 569
 570                 (session_priv, total_amt_msat, cur_height, recipient_onion, preimage, payment_hash,
 571                         prng_seed, hops, recipient_amount, pay_secret)
 572         }
 573
 574 }